Garcia vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 [Initiative and Referendum; Recall proceeding]

FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-
mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the
province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall
election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall
proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction
to annul the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the
"substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local
Government Code 1991). They pointed out the most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by
the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to 65
members of the assembly.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials
belonging to the political minority to equal protection of the law.

RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the
"sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution
did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to
choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many,
to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion,
Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to
supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative records
reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall
process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru
the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.

2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the
municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at
the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is
given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at
the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their
number, the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly,
sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss
of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of
their political parties but as representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of
confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our
Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition parties is
indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted
cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a
preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice
to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its
proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly
members to convene in session and in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with these
requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be
given due course by the COMELEC

Claudio vs COMELEC

FACTS:
LGU concerned: Pasay City
Position of person/s involved: Mayor of Pasay City
Contested Law/Ordinance:
Jovito O. Claudio (Claudio) was duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Sometime in May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered for the purpose
of convening the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) and to file a petition for recall against
Mayor claudio for loss of confidence. On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed
of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted
Resolution No. 01, S-1999 recalling Claudio as mayor for loss of confidence. The petition for
recall was filed on July 2, 1999 and copies of the petition were in public areas throughout the
City. Claudio filed an opposition against the petition alleging, among others, that the petition
for recall was filed within one year from his assumption into office and therefore prohibited. He
argued that the PRA was convened within the 1 year prohibited period as provided by Section
74 of the Local Government Code. The COMELEC, however, granted the petition for recall ruling
that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall and since the
petition was filed exactly one year and a day after Claudio's assumption of office, the petition
was filed on time. Thereafter, COMELEC set the date of the recall elections on April 15, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WoN the petition for recall was filed within the proper period provided for by Section 74
of the Local Government Code

HELD: Yes. SC Affirmed COMELEC

The limitations in Section 74 apply to the exercise of the power of recall (i.e. the recall election
itself) which is vested with the registered voters of the LGU. It does not apply to the
preparatory processes to such exercise of recall such as the proceedings of the PRA

We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall
assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local
government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the
COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall
election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph
(b) of § 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether
they should retain their local official or elect his replacement.
Section 69 of the Local Government Code provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised
by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs."
Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the
power to elect an official into office, the limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to the
entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the
recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the
COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for
recall. Anything steps prior to recall election itself are merely preliminary steps for the purpose
of initiating a recall. The limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall
which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps
required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of §74 seeks to limit by providing
that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an
elective local official.

The proceedings of the PRA do not constitute the exercise of recall

It is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the
people. A recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal
of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the
people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office. Thus, the
preliminary proceedings of the PRA do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether the
local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition
in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one year after the official's assumption
of office, cannot apply to such proceedings. Purpose of the one year prohibitory period against
the exercise of recall The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for
judging the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election
is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held
even before the end of the first year in office of a local official. Including the convening of the
PRA as part of recall restricts right of speech and assembly Third, to construe the term "recall"
in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the
performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional
right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day
of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and
formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation
in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions
among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it
is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the
contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent

Failiure of elections