IV.
Amendment and Alteration the court authority to reopen the
Section 108. Amendment and alteration
of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or
amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a
certificate of title or of a memorandum
thereon and the attestation of the same
in the Register of Deeds, except by
order of the proper Court of First
Instance. A registered owner of other
person having an interest in registered
property, or, in proper cases, the
Register of Deeds with the approval of
the Commissioner of Land Registration,
may apply by petition to the court upon
the ground that the registered interests
of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant or inchoate
appearing on the certificate, have
terminated and ceased; or that new
interest not appearing upon the
certificate have arisen or been created;
or that an omission or error was made
in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon, or, on any
duplicate certificate; or that the same or
any person on the certificate has been
changed; or that the registered owner
has married, or, if registered as married,
that the marriage has been terminated
and no right or interests of heirs or
creditors will thereby be affected; or
that a corporation which owned
registered land and has been dissolved
has not convened the same within three
years after its dissolution; or upon any
other reasonable ground; and the court
may hear and determine the petition
after notice to all parties in interest, and
may order the entry or cancellation of a
new certificate, the entry or cancellation
of a memorandum upon a certificate, or
grant any other relief upon such terms
and conditions, requiring security or
bond if necessary, as it may consider
proper; Provided, however, That this
section shall not be construed to give
judgment or decree of registration, and
that nothing shall be done or ordered by
the court which shall impair the title or
other interest of a purchaser holding a
certificate for value and in good faith, or
his heirs and assigns, without his or
their written consent. Where the
owner's duplicate certificate is not
presented, a similar petition may be filed
as provided in the preceding section.
All petitions or motions filed under this
Section as well as under any other
provision of this Decree after original
registration shall be filed and entitled in
the original case in which the decree or
registration was entered.
Cases:
Averia v. Caguioa
146 SCRA 459
Same; Same; Same; Same; Regional trial
court, now authorized
to hear and decide not only non-
controversial cases but also contentious
and substantial issues.—Consequently,
and specifically with reference to
Section 112 of the Land Registration
Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529),
the court is no longer fettered by its
former limited jurisdiction which
enabled it to grant relief only in cases
where there was "unanimity among the
parties" or none of them raised any
"adverse claim or serious objection."
Under the amended law, the court is
now authorized to hear and decide not
only such non-controversial cases but
even the contentious and substantial
issues, such as the question at bar,
which were beyond its competence
before.
Facts:

The oppositor, petitioner herein, refused
to participate in the hearing of the
registration proceedings below,
claiming the respondent court, acting as
a cadastral court, had no competence to
act upon the said case under Section 112
of Act 496, otherwise known as the
"Land Registration Act."
The respondent court then held the
hearing ex parte and later rendered a
decision ordering the registration
prayed for on the basis of the evidence
presented by the private respondent
herein.
…It is argued that the lower court had
no competence to act on the registration
sought because of the absence of
unanimity among the parties as required
under Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act.
The petitioner cites Fojas v. Grey
…In a long line of decisions dealing
with proceedings under Section 112 of
the Land Registration Act, it has been
held that summary relief under Section
112 of Land Registration Act can only
be granted if there is unanimity among
the parties, or there is no adverse claim
or serious objection on the part of any
party in interest; otherwise, the case
becomes contentious and controversial
which should be threshed out in an
ordinary action or in any case where the
incident properly belongs.
While this was a correct interpretation
of the said provision, the same is,
however, not applicable to the instant
case. The reason is that this case arose
in 1982, after the Land Registration Act
had been superseded by the Property
Registration Decree, which became
effective on June 11,1979.
Issue:
Whether or not the court has
jurisdiction to order the registration of a
deed of sale, opposed on the ground of
an antecedent contract to sell?
Held:
The above provision has eliminated the
distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial
court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law
when acting merely as a cadastral court.
Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits,
the change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the
regional trial courts the authority to act
not only on applications for "original
registration" but also "over all petitions
filed after
original registration of title, with power
to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or
petitions."
It appears that the respondent court
proceeded to hear the case below
notwithstanding the manifestation by
the petitioner of his intention to elevate
to this Court the question of jurisdiction
he had raised. The trial court should
have given him the opportunity to do so
in the interest of due process, pending a
categorical ruling on the issue. As it
happened, it arrived at its decision after
considering only the evidence of the
private respondent and without regard
to the evidence of the petitioner.
Cuyugan vs Sy Quia
24 Phil 567
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION
; OPENING OF FINAL
DECREES TO ADMIT NEW
EVIDENCE. —A decree entered by the
Court of Land Registration cannot be
considered as permanent if the limits of
the land therein registered may be
changed or the area of the land so
registered can be altered by a
subsequent adjudication by the court,
based upon new evidence tending to
show that the evidence introduced at
the former hearing was incorrect.
ID; CORRECT AND ERRONEOUS
DECREES. —A decree by the Court of
Land Registration, entered upon the
facts as they appeared, but which were
not true, is not an erroneous decree; it is
a decree which is correct according to
the evidence. A decree at variance with
the evidence presented at the hearing is
an erroneous decree and, within certain
limitations, may be corrected to
conform to the evidence.
ID; CONTESTS OVER
BOUNDARIES AFTER DECREE
BECOMES FINAL —Contests arising
over the location of boundary lines are
actions in personam and must be tried
in the ordinary courts of law. After land
has been finally registered, the Court of
Land Registration ceases to have
jurisdiction. The only authority
remaining in the Court of
Land Registration, after its decree
becomes final, is that conferred by
section 112 of Act No. 496.
Facts:
The original application which resulted
in the decree aforesaid was made in the
name of Manuel E. Cuyugan y Vergara.
Pedro Sy Quia, who owned the land
bounding upon
the north side the lands sought to be
registered, opposed the registration.
After a trial in the Court of Land
Registration the opposition of Sy Quia
was overruled and the property
was registered in the name of Manuel E.
Cuyugan y Vergara aforesaid.
After the registration of the land
Manuel E. Cuyugan y Vergara sold the
same to Lim Tuico in the
manner prescribed in Act No. 496
Until the 19th of December, 1911, no
controversy had arisen between Pedro
Sy Quia and Manuel E. Cuyugan y
Vergara or his grantee, Lim Tuico, in
regard to the actual location of the line
between their lands as described and
defined in the decree of registration
entered on the 11th day of July, 1907.
On said December 19, 1911, the city of
Manila presented to the Court of Land
Registration the following writing:
"[Expediente No. 3325. Mariano
Cuyugan, applicant.]
"The city of Manila by its attorney
appears and respectfully sets forth to
the court:
That the plan of the land to which the
above proceedings refer contains an
error of closure greater than 1/1500;
That the city of Manila is interested in
the correction of said error for the
reason that it must condemn a part of
said land for a public street.
"Therefore, said city prays the court to
order a new measurement of said land
described in the plan filed in this
proceeding."
Upon the hearing thus set there
appeared the city of Manila, Lim Tuico,
and Pedro Sy Quia. Without any of the
parties objecting to or in any way
questioning the power or authority of
the city of Manila to begin such a
proceeding, trial was had, evidence was
introduced by the city, by Lim Tuico,
and by Sy Quia relative to the location
of the line between the lands registered
and the lands of Sy Quia.
Upon the evidence thus adduced the
Court of Land Registration entered a
decree.
(a) That said new plan, being folio No.
68 of expediente
No. 3325, be approved;
(b) That the certificate of title and
duplicate thereof, entered and issued as
aforesaid in the name of the
said Lim Tuico, be canceled by the
registrar of deeds of the city of Manila
and that a new certificate of
title be entered and a new duplicate
issued to said Lim Tuico, including
therein the technical description
contained in said new plan, as follows:
(New description.)
(c) That, for the purpose indicated, the
duplicate certificate of title issued to the
said Lim Tuico be delivered up to the
said registrar of deeds without
delay."
This appeal is from that decree.
A comparison of the plan which was the
basis of the original registration with
the plan made under the proceedings
initiated by the city of Manila discloses
a difference in the size of the parcel of
land which the two plans are supposed
to describe. There also appears from
such comparison a difference in the
direction of one or more of the lines
which mark the limits of said land. It
appears from the record, indeed it is the
cause of the controversy now before us,
that the new plan takes from Sy Quia a
small piece of land which pertained to
him under the original plan and decree
of the Court of Land Registration. In
other words, the result of the
proceedings instituted nearly four years
after the final decree of the Court of
Land Registration, which final decree
definitely and finally registered the land
therein described, extends the limits of
the land thus registered toward and
upon the lands of Sy Quia, thereby
depriving him of land which was found
to belong to him in the proceedings
resulting in said decree and which lands,
by virtue of such finding, were excluded
from registration in the name of Manuel
E. Cuyugan y Vergara. It is thus seen
that, under and as a result of
proceedings begun by the city of
Manila, the Court of Land Registration
has opened a final decree of that court
and changed not only the description
but the area of the land registered by
that decree.
This proceeding seems to have been
conducted by the city of Manila, by Lim
Tuico, and by the court upon the theory
that its object was and the result would
be the correction of a decree of the
Court of Land Registration.
Issue:
Whether or not the result of the
proceeding in manila would corret the
decree of the Court of Land
Registration?
Held:
Whatever the intention of the parties
and of the court may have been the
result was not the correction of a decree
but the making of a new decree upon
new evidence. It was not the changing
of a decree but the changing of the
evidence upon which the decree was
based. It is not questioned by any of the
parties or contradicted by any portion of
the record that the original decree,
entered on the 11th day of July, 1907,
was in its provisions in strict accord
with the evidence in the case. The same
description appears in the decree that
appears in the plan submitted describing
the lands registered. That a plan was
made by an expert surveyor who
testified upon that proceeding to its
correctness and to the location of the
lines marking the boundaries of the
lands registered. If there was a mistake
in that description as given by the plan
and the testimony given by the surveyor
who made it to prove its correctness, it
was a mistake of evidence, an error of
fact. A decree entered upon facts which
are not true is not itself erroneous. It is
a perfectly correct decree according to
the evidence in the case. No other
decree could have been entered. A
decree which is at variance with the
evidence presented to support that
decree is an erroneous decree and,
within certain limitations, may be
corrected to conform to the evidence.
From this it is clear that what the Land
Court attempted and accomplished was
not the correction of a decree but the
retrial of the case with the production of
new and conflicting evidence and the
entering of a new decree thereupon.
That the proceeding was a new trial
essentially is demonstrated by the fact
that Lim Tuico claimed that the
northern line was located at one place
and introduced evidence to support that
contention, while Sy Quia claimed that
said line was located at another place
and introduced evidence to support his
contention. Different surveyors were
presented as witnesses and gave
conflicting testimony as to where the
line between Lim Tuico and Sy Quia
was really located.
Upon this conflicting evidence the court
found that the line was located
differently from what its location was
found to be on the trial of case No. 3325
which resulted in the decree of
July 11, 1907. It found that, according
to the preponderance
of the evidence, the line was located as
described in the new plan made by the
surveyor favorable to Lim Tuico and
adjudged that the land registered in
1907 was not correct in amount or
description. It, therefore, decreed the
registration of the newly described
parcel of land. It is our opinion that the
Court of Land Registration exceeded its
authority. The original and fundamental
purpose of Act No. 496 was to settle
finally and for all time the title to land
registered. A decree of registration
cannot be permanent if the limits of the
land therein registered may be changed
or the amount of land so registered
altered by a subsequent adjudication of
said court based upon new evidence
tending to show that the evidence
introduced on the former hearing was
incorrect. Moreover, contests arising
over the location of division lines are
actions in personam and must be tried
in the ordinary courts of law and not in
the Court of Land Registration. They
are actions involving the title to real
estate, damages for illegal detention, for
the cutting of timber, or the taking of
crops. Sometimes they are for ejectment
and sometimes for trespass. After the
land has been registered the Court of
Land Registration ceases to have
jurisdiction over it for any purpose and
it returns to the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts of law of the Islands for
all subsequent purposes. The only
authority remaining in the Court of
Land Registration after its decree
becomes final is that given to it by
section 112 of Act No. 496. That section
does not convey authority to conduct a
proceeding like the present or to take
cognizance in any way of disputes
subsequently arising between adjoining
owners and owners of the land
registered.
Del Prado v. Caballero
G.R. No. 148225
Same; Same; Same; What really defines a
piece of ground is not the area calculated
with more or less certainty mentioned in its
description but the boundaries therein laid
down as enclosing the land and indicating
its limits. —Where both the area and the
boundaries of the immovable are declared,
the area covered within the boundaries of
the immovable prevails over the stated area.
In cases of conflict between areas and
boundaries, it is the latter which should
prevail. What really defines a piece of
ground is not the area, calculated with more
or less certainty, mentioned in its
description, but the boundaries therein laid
down, as enclosing the land and indicating
its limits. In a contract of sale of land in a
mass, it is well-established that the specific
boundaries stated in the contract must
control over any statement with respect to
the area contained within its boundaries. It
is not of vital consequence that a deed or
contract of sale of land should disclose the
area with mathematical accuracy. It is
sufficient if its extent is objectively
indicated with sufficient precision to enable
one to identify it. An error as to the
superficial area is immaterial. Thus, the
obligation of the vendor is to deliver
everything within the boundaries, inasmuch
as it is the entirety thereof that
distinguishes the determinate object.
Land Titles; Indefeasibility of Titles;
Prescription; It is a fundamental principle in
land registration that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears
therein; Such indefeasibility commences
after one year from the date of entry of the
degree of registration. —We find no
reversible error in the decision of the CA.
Petitioner’s recourse, by filing the petition
for registration in the same cadastral case,
was improper. It is a fundamental principle
in land registration that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears
therein. Such indefeasibility commences
after one year from the date of entry of the
decree of registration. Inasmuch as the
petition for registration of document did
not interrupt the running of the period to
file the appropriate petition for review and
considering that the prescribed one-year
period had long since expired, the decree of
registration, as well as the certificate of title
issued in favor of respondents, had become
incontrovertible.
Judge Juan Y. Reyes of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch
14, adjudicated in favor of Spouses
Antonio L. Caballero and Leonarda B.
Caballero several parcels of land
situated in Guba, Cebu City, one of
which was Cadastral Lot
No. 11909, the subject of this
controversy.2 On May 21, 1987,
Antonio Caballero moved for the
issuance of the final decree of
registration for their lots. Consequently,
on May 25, 1987, the same court,
through then Presiding Judge Renato C.
Dacudao, ordered the National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration to issue the decree of
registration and the
corresponding titles of the lots in favor
of the Caballeros. On June 11, 1990,
respondents sold to petitioner, Carmen
del Prado, Lot No. 11909 on the basis of
the tax declaration covering the
property. On March 20, 1991, petitioner
filed in the same cadastral proceedings a
“Petition for Registration of Document
Under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1529”7 in
order that a certificate of title be issued
in her name, covering the whole Lot No.
11909. In the petition, petitioner alleged
that the tenor of
the instrument of sale indicated that the
sale was for a lump sum or cuerpo
cierto, in which case, the vendor was
bound to deliver all that was included
within said boundaries even when it
exceeded the area specified in the
contract. Respondents opposed, on the
main ground that only 4,000
sq m of Lot No. 11909 was sold to
petitioner. They claimed that the sale
was not for a cuerpo cierto. They moved
for the outright dismissal of the petition
on grounds of prescription
and lack of jurisdiction.After trial on the
merits, the court found that petitioner
had established a clear and positive
right to Lot No. 11909. The intended
sale between the parties was for a lump
sum, since there was no evidence
presented that the property was sold for
a price per unit. It was apparent that the
subject matter of the sale was the parcel
of land, known as Cadastral Lot No.
11909, and not only a portion thereof.
An appeal was duly filed. On September
26, 2000, the CA promulgated the
assailed decision, reversing and setting
aside the decision of the RTC.
The CA no longer touched on the
character of the sale, because it found
that petitioner availed herself of an
improper remedy. The “petition for
registration of document” is not one of
the remedies provided under P.D.
No. 1529, after the original registration
has been effected. Thus, the CA ruled
that the lower court committed an error
when it assumed jurisdiction over the
petition, which prayed for a remedy not
sanctioned under the Property
Registration
Decree.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the land was
for a lump sum or not?
Held:
We do not agree
The deed of sale is not one of a unit
price contract. The parties agreed on
the purchase price of P40,000.00 for a
predetermined area of 4,000 sq m, more
or less, bounded on the North by Lot
No. 11903, on the East by
Lot No. 11908, on the South by Lot
Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West
by Lot No. 11910. In a contract of sale
of land in a mass, the specific boundaries
stated in the contract must control over
any other statement, with respect to the
area contained within its boundaries.
We find no reversible error in the
decision of the CA. Petitioner’s
recourse, by filing the petition for
registration in the same cadastral case,
was improper. It is a fundamental
principle in land registration that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of
an indefeasible and incontrovertible title
to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. Such
indefeasibility commences after one year
from the date of entry of the decree of
registration.20 Inasmuch as the petition
for registration of document did not
interrupt the running of the period to
file the appropriate petition for review
and
considering that the prescribed one-year
period had long since expired, the
decree of registration, as well as the
certificate of title issued in favor of
respondents, had become
incontrovertible.
V. Adverse Claim
Section 70. Adverse claim. Whoever
claims any part or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner,
arising subsequent to the date of the
original registration, may, if no other
provision is made in this Decree for
registering the same, make a statement
in writing setting forth fully his alleged
right or interest, and how or under
whom acquired, a reference to the
number of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, the name of the
registered owner, and a description of
the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
The statement shall be signed and
sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimant's residence, and a place at
which all notices may be served upon
him. This statement shall be entitled to
registration as an adverse claim on the
certificate of title. The adverse claim
shall be effective for a period of thirty
days from the date of registration. After
the lapse of said period, the annotation
of adverse claim may be canceled upon
filing of a verified petition therefor by
the party in interest: Provided, however,
that after cancellation, no second
adverse claim based on the same ground
shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid,
any party in interest may file a petition
in the Court of First Instance where the
land is situated for the cancellation of
the adverse claim, and the court shall
grant a speedy hearing upon the
question of the validity of such adverse
claim, and shall render judgment as may
be just and equitable. If the adverse
claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration thereof shall be ordered
canceled. If, in any case, the court, after
notice and hearing, shall find that the
adverse claim thus registered was
frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an
amount not less than one thousand
pesos nor more than five thousand
pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse
of thirty days, the claimant may
withdraw his adverse claim by filing
with the Register of Deeds a sworn
petition to that effect.
Cases:
Concepcion v. Concepcion
Actions; Land Registration; Jurisdictions;
Regional Trial Courts, as a Land
Registration Court, can hear cases
otherwise litigable only in ordinary civil
actions since RTCs are at the same time
courts of general jurisdiction.
Same; Judgments; A judgment that has
become final and executory can no longer
be amended or corrected except for clerical
errors and mistakes, and this rule holds true
regardless of whether the modification is to
be made by the magistrate who rendered
the judgment or by an appellate tribunal
which reviewed the same.
All the parties in this case are
descendants of the late spouses Regino
Concepcion, Sr. and Concepcion
Famador. Petitioner Emmanuel is a son
of the late spouses while the other
petitioners Betty, Jimmy, Rosario and
Jernie (all surnamed Concepcion) and
the respondents Antonio Concepcion,
Lourdes C. Watts and Ida C. Horvat are
grandchildren of the spouses.
The deceased spouses Regino
Concepcion, Sr. and Concepcion
Famador had seven children namely:
Jose (father of respondents Antonio
Concepcion, Lourdes Watts
and Ida Horvat), Jesus (father of
petitioners Betty Concepcion and Jimmy
Concepcion), Maria, Vicente,
Regino, Jr. (father of petitioners Rosario
Vda. de Concepcion
and Jernie Concepcion), Elena and
Emmanuel. During their marriage, the
couple acquired real properties Regino,
Sr. died in 1944. Ten (10) years later or
in 1954, his wife, Concepcion Famador,
also passed away. Upon the latter’s
death, she left a will disposing of all her
paraphernal properties as well as her
share in the conjugal partnership of
gains.
The will was subjected to probate in
Special Proceedings No. 1257-R of the
then Court of First Instance of Cebu
City. Jose, one of the sons of the late
spouses and father of the
herein respondents, contested the
probate on the ground that the
disposition made therein impaired his
legitime.
Eventually, the will was allowed
probate. However, on July 6, 1960, the
probate court motu proprio dismissed
the probate proceedings because Jesus,
as the estate’s executor, neglected to
perform his duties after the will was
probated.
Consequently, the probate court was not
able to adjudicate to the heirs their
respective shares in the estate.
On account thereof, Jose filed a
complaint for partition with damages
against his six (6) brothers and sisters
before the then Court of First Instance
of Cebu which rendered a decision:
Ordering defendants Regino, Jesus and
Emmanuel Concepcion to contribute
proportionately to the completion of
plaintiff’s legitime.
The decision became final and executory
as no appeal was taken therefrom by the
herein petitioners.
Inasmuch as the herein respondents
have not yet complied with the
aforementioned August 10, 1978
decision of CFI-Cebu, Branch XIII, the
same court issued an Order dated 27
May 1987, directing its branch sheriff
Candido A. Gadrinab to execute a deed
of conveyance covering the Zulueta
property in favor of Jose. Complying
with the above, Sheriff Gadrinab
executed a
Deed of Conveyance over the Zulueta
property in favor of Jose.
Unfortunately, when Jose presented the
same deed for registration, the Register
of Deeds required him to surrender the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-
52227 covering the Zulueta property,
which title was then in the possession of
the petitioners. Despite demands,
petitioners
refused delivery of the title.
Hence, Jose filed with the Regional
Trial Court at Cebu
City, Branch V, then sitting as a land
registration court, a Petition for the
Cancellation of TCT No. T-52227. In
an Order dated January 22, 1988, said
court granted Jose’s petition.
It is petitioners’ thesis that the cadastral
court (RTC,
Cebu City, Branch V), had no authority
to order the surrender and/or delivery
to the respondents of the owner’s copy
of TCT No. T-52227 covering the
Zulueta property, because the parcel of
land subject thereof had been devised to
them by their common ascendant, the
late Concepcion Famador, as
indicated in her will.
Issue:
whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners’
appeal in CA-G.R.
CV 28665, thereby effectively sustaining
the cadastral
court’s order dated January 22, 1988?
Held:
We resolve the issue in the affirmative.
By issuing its order of May 27, 1987,
RTC-Cebu, Branch
XIII, sought to amend its August 10,
1978 decision. We must emphasize,
however, that there is nothing in the
August 10, 1978 decision of said court
which authorizes the surrender and/or
delivery of the title covering the Zulueta
property. It merely required the
defendants therein to “contribute
proportionately to the completion of the
plaintiff ’s legitime.”
The subsequent issuance of the order
dated May 27, 1987
which amends the final and executory
decision dated August 10, 1978 cannot
be allowed. We have repeatedly held
that a judgment that has become final
and executory
can no longer be amended or corrected
except for clerical
errors and mistakes. This rule holds
true regardless of
whether the modification is to be made
by the magistrate
who rendered the judgment or by an
appellate tribunal
which reviewed the same.11 Doubtless,
then, the order dated
May 27, 1987 of RTC-Cebu, Branch
XIII, in Civil Case No.
R-13850 is a nullity.
And because a spring cannot rise higher
than its source,
it follows that the cadastral court’s
order of January 22,
1988 which merely seeks to implement
the earlier void order
dated May 27, 1987 in Civil Case No. R-
13850 is infected
with the same nullity
VI. Lis Pendens
Section 76. Notice of lis pendens. No
action to recover possession of real
estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to
remove clouds upon the title thereof, or
for partition, or other proceedings of
any kind in court directly affecting the
title to land or the use or occupation
thereof or the buildings thereon, and no
judgment, and no proceeding to vacate
or reverse any judgment, shall have any
effect upon registered land as against
persons other than the parties thereto,
unless a memorandum or notice stating
the institution of such action or
proceeding and the court wherein the
same is pending, as well as the date of
the institution thereof, together with a
reference to the number of the
certificate of title, and an adequate
description of the land affected and the
registered owner thereof, shall have
been filed and registered.
Section 77. Cancellation of lis
pendens. Before final judgment, a notice
of lis pendens may be canceled upon
order of the court, after proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of
the party who caused it to be registered.
It may also be canceled by the Register
of Deeds upon verified petition of the
party who caused the registration
thereof.
At any time after final judgment in
favor of the defendant, or other
disposition of the action such as to
terminate finally all rights of the
plaintiff in and to the land and/or
buildings involved, in any case in which
a memorandum or notice of lis pendens
has been registered as provided in the
preceding section, the notice of lis
pendens shall be deemed canceled upon
the registration of a certificate of the
clerk of court in which the action or
proceeding was pending stating the
manner of disposal thereof.
Section 14. Notice of lis pendens. — In an
action affecting the title or the right of
possession of real property, the plaintiff
and the defendant, when affirmative
relief is claimed in his answer, may
record in the office of the registry of
deeds of the province in which the
property is situated notice of the
pendency of the action. Said notice shall
contain the names of the parties and the
object of the action or defense, and a
description of the property in that
province affected thereby. Only from the
time of filing such notice for record shall
a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the
property affected thereby, be deemed to
have constructive notice of the
pendency of the action, and only of its
pendency against the parties designated
by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove

mentioned may be cancelled only upon
order of the court, after proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is
not necessary to protect the rights of
the rights of the party who caused it to
be recorded. (24a, R-14)