MAY 13, 2013 – Erap won as mayor, although
STATCON NOTES – BATCH 5 (ATTY.
JUANICO).
TOPIC: VERBA LEGIS
RISOS VIDAL v. COMELEC
FACTS: September 12, 2007 - Sandiganbayan
convicted former President Estrada for plunder.
- ERAP - guilty beyond
reasonable doubt (GBRD).
- Jinggoy and Atty. Edward
Serapio – acquitted.
- Penalty for plunder (R.A
7080) – Reclusion perpetua to
death.
- Jinggoy – detention, for as
long as he agrees in writing to
abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners.
OCTOBER 25, 2007 - GMA extended
clemency by way of pardon to Estrada.
- The pardon was set to take
effect upon the acceptance of
Estrada.
OCTOBER 26, 2007 (3:35 P.M). - Estrada
received and accepted the pardon.
NOVEMBER 30, 2009 – Erap filed a Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of President.
MAY 10, 2010 – when results came out, Erap
only placed second. On October 2, 2012, Erap
filed another COC for local elective post: Mayor
of the City of Manila.
JANUARY 24, 2013- RISOS- VIDAL, filed a
petition for disqualification against ERAP before
the COMELEC, on the ground that because of
Erap’s former conviction. She also relied on Sec.
40 of the LGC in relation to Sec. 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (discussion later on).
the case against him was still pending.
JUNE 7. 2013- Lim, one of Erap’s opponents for
the position moved for leave to intervene in this
case. He subscribed to Risos-Vidal’s theory that
Erap is disqualified to run for and hold public
office since the pardon granted to the latter failed
to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification.
STATCON ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT
THE LACK OF AN EXPRESS STATEMENT
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF ARTICLES 36
AND 41 OF THE RPC IN GMA’S PARDON
TO ERAP ALLOWING THE LATTER’S
RELEASE AND REDEMPTION OF HIS
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS MAY
DISQUALIFY THE SAME FROM
CANDIDACY THEREOF.
HELD: (see discussion below).
FORFEITURES PRESENTED IN THE
CASE (in accordance with Sec. 2, R.A. 7080).
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty[-
]Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety[-]One
Thousand Pesos (₱545,291,000.00), with interest
and income earned, inclusive of the amount of
Two Hundred Million Pesos (₱200,000,000.00),
deposited in the name and account of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty[-]Nine
Million Pesos (₱189,000,000.00), inclusive of
interests and income earned, deposited in the Jose
Velarde account.
(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot
dubbed as "Boracay Mansion" located at #100
11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
The cash bonds of Jinggoy and Serapio were
cancelled and released upon presentation of the
original receipt evidencing payment thereof.
Thus, the departure order held against them were
declared function oficio.
OCTOBER 25, 2007 - GMA extended
clemency by way of pardon to Estrada.
 WHEREAS CLAUSES IN THE
PARDON ( RELATED TO VERBA LEGIS).
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of
releasing inmates who have reached the age of
seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been
under detention for six and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective
position or office.
When Estrada filed for his candidacy, there were
three objections:
1. "Petition to Deny Due Course and
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy" filed by
Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong
2. a petition "Disqualification as
Presidential Candidate" filed by Evilio C.
Pormento (Pormento); and
3. "Petition to Disqualify Estrada
Ejercito, Joseph M.from Running as
President due to Constitutional
Disqualification and Creating Confusion
to the Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B"
filed by Mary Lou Estrada.
The three objections were dismissed since:
The Constitutional proscription on reelection
applies to a sitting president; and the pardon
granted to former President Estrada by former
President Arroyo restored the former’s right to
vote and be voted for a public office.
Section 40 – LGC
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following
persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for
violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or
nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or
those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right
after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded.
Sec. 12 – OEC
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who
has been declared by competent authority insane
or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any public office, unless
he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS IN THE CASE
(against ERAP):
1. The pardon of Erap was conditional
(refer to the third whereas clause).
2. Any breach of the pardon would
“recommit him to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence and
disqualifies him as a candidate for the
mayoralty position of manila.”
3. As per the petitioner, plunder is
punishable by imprisonment of one year
or more and involving moral turpitude.
4. Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the
ostensible requirements provided under
 Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not
work the restoration of the right to hold
publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from
the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence.
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The
penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the
sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual
absolute disqualification which the offender shall
suffer even though pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
5. Risos-Vidal cites the concurring
opinions of Associate Justices Teodoro
R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. to endorse her
position that "[t]he restoration of the
right to hold public office to one who has
lost such right by reason of conviction in
a criminal case, but subsequently
pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no
matter how intensely arguable, but must
be statedin express, explicit, positive and
specific language."
Applying Monsantoto former President
Estrada’s case, Risos-Vidal reckons that
"such express restoration is further demanded
by the existence of the condition in the [third]
Whereas Clause of the pardon indubitably
indicating that the privilege to hold public
office was not restored to him."
IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS IN THE
CASE ( IN FAVOR OF ERAP)
1. OSG contends that there is no need
to reverse the decision since COMELEC
has already settled this issue before (Sec.
2, Rule 129).
2. The restoration of his right to run for
any office, through the subsequent grant
of pardon to him, is an exception to
Section 40 and Section 12.
3. The express requirement in Art. 36
and 41 would constitute stretching the
plain and clear meaning of the
aforementioned provisions.”
4. The whereas clauses are not an
integral part of the decree and cannot
restrict the pardon’s effectivity.
5. A pardon is an act of grace, there fore
it must favor the grantee.
RULING OF THE COURT:
Former President Estrada was granted an
absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes
the right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy. The wording
of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language
of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. Recall that the petition for
disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against
former President Estrada, docketed as SPA
No. 13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section
40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the
OEC, that is, having been convicted of a
crime punishable by imprisonment of one
year or more, and involving moral turpitude,
former President Estrada must be disqualified
to run for and hold public elective office
notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee
of a pardon that includes a statement
expressing "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights.
 It is insisted that, since a textual examination
of the pardon given to and accepted by former
President Estrada does not actually specify
which political right is restored, it could be
inferred that former President Arroyo did not
deliberately intend to restore former
President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to
hold public office, orto otherwise remit the
penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on
the pardon’s text.
Proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis
that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code
cannot, in any way, serve to abridge or diminish
the exclusive power and prerogative of the
President to pardon persons convicted of
violating penal statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s
interpretation that the said Articles contain
specific textual commands which must be strictly
followed in order to free the beneficiary of
presidential grace from the disqualifications
specifically prescribed by them.
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above
provisions of law, as proposed by Risos-Vidal, is
unwarranted, especially so if it will defeat or
unduly restrict the power of the President to grant
executive clemency.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that
where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum.
From the words of a statute there should be no
departure. It is this Court’s firm view that the
phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which
declares that former President Estrada "is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights"
substantially complies with the requirement of
express restoration.
ADDITIONAL:
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (ART 25).
Every citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
(b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors.
If former President Arroyo intended for the
pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s
promise never to seek a public office again, the
former ought to have explicitly stated the same
in the text of the pardon itself. Since former
President Arroyo did not make this an integral
part of the decree of pardon, the Commission
is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular
clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to
the pardon extended to former President
Estrada.
The statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights," to the mind of the
Court, is crystal clear – the pardon granted to
former President Estrada was absolute, meaning,
it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted
in scope, complete and plenary in character, as
the term "political rights"adverted to has a settled
meaning in law and jurisprudence.
With due respect, I disagree too with Justice
Leonen that the omission of the qualifying
word "full" can be construed as excluding the
restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold
public office. There appears to be no
distinction as to the coverage of the term "full
political rights" and the term "political
rights" used alone without any qualification.
How to ascribe to the latter term the meaning
that it is "partial" and not "full" defies one’s
understanding. More so, it will be extremely
difficult to identify which of the political rights
are restored by the pardon, when the text of
the latter is silent on this matter. Exceptions to
the grant of pardon cannot be presumed from
the absence of the qualifying word "full" when
the pardon restored the "political rights" of
former President Estrada without any
exclusion or reservation (Leonen had a
dissenting opinion).
the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position
or office," neither makes the pardon conditional,
nor militate against the conclusion that former
President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek
public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does
not explicitly impose a condition or limitation,
considering the unqualified use of the term "civil
and political rights "as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an
essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for
the enactment, usually introduced by the word
"whereas.”
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to
say that the pardon granted to former President
Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear,
unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon
which to anchor or support the Presidential intent
to grant a limited pardon.
NOTE: Whereas clauses do not form part of the
statute, they are not part of its operative language.
It does not make the pardon conditional nor
effective.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
TOPIC: VERBA LEGIS
FACTS: AUGUST 30, 2001 - De Guzman was
appointed as a Financial Management Specialist
IV of TIDCORP (GOCC – WAS CREATED
PURSUANT TO P.D 1080). His appointment
was included in TIDCORP’s report on personnel
actions and this was submitted to the CSC—
Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
field office
SEPTEMBER 28, 2001 – Leticia Bugtong
disallowed De Guzman’s appointment because
his position was not included in DBM’s index of
occupational service. TIDCORP’s VP appealed.
STATCON ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT
SECTION 7 of R.A. 8494 EXEMPTS
TIDCORP FROM THE RULES OF CSC
REGARDING POSITION
CLASSIFICATION
HELD: (see discussion below).
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8494, WHICH
AMENDED TIDCORP’S CHARTER,
PROVIDES THAT:
SECTION 7. The Board of Directors shall
provide for an organizational structure and
staffing pattern for officers and employees of the
Trade and Investment Development Corporation
of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and upon
recommendation of its President, appoint and fix
their remuneration, emoluments and fringe
benefits: Provided, That the Board shall have
exclusive and final authority to appoint, promote,
transfer, assign and re-assign personnel of the
TIDCORP, any provision of existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding.
All positions in TIDCORP shall be governed by a
compensation and position classification system
and qualification standards approved by
TIDCORP's Board of Directors based on a
comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual
duties and responsibilities. The compensation
plan shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensation plans in the private sector and
shall be subject to periodic review by the Board
no more than once every four (4) years without
prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases
based on productivity and profitability.
TIDCORP shall be exempt from existing laws,
rules and regulations on compensation, position
classification and qualification standards. It
shall, however, endeavor to make the system to
conform as closely as possible to the principles
and modes provided in Republic Act No. 6758.
Thus, with this provision, TIDCORP is
deemed exempted from DBM’s index.
TIDCORP’s Board of Directors issued
Resolution No. 1185, s. 1998 approving the
corporation’s re-organizational plan, under which
De Guzman was appointed Financial
Management Specialist IV. De Guzman’s
appointment was valid because the plan
providing for his position followed the letter of
the law.
Tambanillo also noted that prior to De Guzman’s
appointment as Financial Management Specialist
IV, the position had earlier been occupied by Ma.
Loreto H. Mayor whose appointment was duly
approved by Director Bugtong. Thus, Director
Bugtong’s invalidation of De Guzman’s
appointment is inconsistent with her earlier
approval of Mayor’s appointment to the same
position.
IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS IN THE CASE
(PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS).
1. CSC’s interpretation of the last
sentence of Section 7 is misplaced. The
provision does not bar TIDCORP from
adopting a position classification system
and qualification standards different
from those prescribed by the CSC. It is
also not duty bound to comply with civil
service rules on compensation and
position classification since it is exempt.
ONLY REQUIREMENT - furnish the
CSC with its compensation and position
classification system and qualification
standards so that CSC may be properly
guided in processing TIDCORP’S
appointments, promotion, and personnel
action.
2. RA 6758, which the CSC applied to
TIDCORP, is a general law, while
TIDCORP’s charter, RA 8494, is a
special law. In interpreting conflicting
provisions of a general law and a special
law, the provisions of the two laws
should be harmonized to give effect to
both. But if these provisions cannot be
reconciled, then the special law should
prevail because it is a qualification to the
general rule.
3. Further, RA 8494 is a later
expression of Congress’ intent as it was
enacted nine years after RA 6758 was
approved, and should therefore be
construed in this light in its relation with
the latter. A new statute should be
interpreted in connection with those
already existing in relation to the same
subject matter and all should be made to
harmonize and stand together –
interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretandi.
Under these principles, TIDCORP argued
that Section 7 of RA 8494, the provision of a
special law, should be interpreted as an
exemption to RA 6758. Thus, CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998,
which was issued pursuant to RA 6758,
should not have been applied to limit
TIDCORP’s staffing prerogatives.
IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS OF
RESPONDENT:
1. The CSC noted that CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of
1998, as amended by CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 15, s. 1999, was issued in
accordance with its authority to prescribe
rules and regulations to carry out the
provisions of civil service laws and other
pertinent laws (Administrative Code),
and not pursuant to RA 6758
2. The CSC maintained that Section
2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution
includes government and controlled
corporations as part of the civil service.
TIDCORP, a GOCC, is therefore
covered by the civil service rules and by
the CSC. It should submit its Position
Allocation List to the DBM, regardless of
its exemption under RA 6758.
3. The CSC argued that RA 8494 should
not prevail over RA 6758 because the
latter also applies to GOCCs like
 TIDCORP; RA 8494 even makes a
reference to RA 6758.
RULING:
TIDCORP IS EXEMPTED DUE TO
SECTION 7. However, this only means that
TIDCORP cannot disregard R.A 6758 but
must take their own principles into account
with regard to position classifications. This
does not run counter to the constitutional
provisions invoked by CC. THE CSC shall
enforce position classifications at
TIDCORP, but must do this under the
terms that TIDCORP HAS
ESTABLISHED.
Does the wording of Section 7 of RA 8494
command TIDCORP to follow issued
requirements pursuant to RA 6758 despite its
exemption from laws involving position
classification? No.
COURT’S EXPLANATION: "Under the
principles of statutory construction, if a statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule
or verba legis is derived from the maxim index
animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) and rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the legislature in
a statute correctly express its intent and
preclude the court from construing it
differently. The legislature is presumed to know
the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the
use of such words as are found in the statute.
Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure."
The phrase "to endeavor" means to "to devote
serious and sustained effort" and "to make an
effort to do." It is synonymous with the words
to strive, to struggle and to seek. The use of "to
endeavor" in the context of Section 7 of RA
8494 means that despite TIDCORP’s
exemption from laws involving compensation,
position classification and qualification
standards, it should still strive to conform as
closely as possible with the principles and
modes provided in RA 6758. The phrase "as
closely as possible," which qualifies
TIDCORP’s duty "to endeavor to conform,"
recognizes that the law allows TIDCORP to
deviate from RA 6758, but it should still try to
hew closely with its principles and modes.
Had the intent of Congress been to require
TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply
with RA 6758, it would have so stated in
unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate it gave
TIDCORP was to endeavor to conform to the
principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to the
entirety of this law
TOPIC: DURA LEX SED LEX
REVALDO v. PEOPLE
FACTS: The petioner was charged with the
offense of illegal possession of premium
hardwood lumber (violation of Section 68 of
the Forestry Code).
June 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Maasin,
Province of Southern Leyte, the accused, with
intent of gain, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously possessed 96.14 board ft. of flat
lumber with a total value of P1,730.52 in
Philippine Currency. There was no legal
document as required under existing forest laws
and regulations from proper government
authorities.
Maceda, the person in charge of the operations
section of the PNP in Maasin, Southern Leyte,
testified that on 18 June 1992, at around 11:00 in
the morning, he went with Chief Alejandro Rojas,
SPO3 Melquiades Talisic and SPO3 Nicasio
Sunit to the house of petitioner to verify the report
of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession
lumber without the necessary documents. They
were not armed with a search warrant on that day
.They confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of different
varieties lying around the vicinity of the house of
petitioner.
- In petitioner’s defense, he told
them that he was a carpenter
specializing in furniture making.
- On 18 June 1992 when
policemen arrived and inspected his
 lumber. Maceda, Sunit and Rojas
entered his house while Talisic
stayed outside. Petitioner admitted to
the policemen that he had no permit
to possess the lumber because those
were only given to him by his uncle
Felixberto Bug-os (Bug-os), his aunt
Gliceria Bolo (Bolo), his mother-in-
law Cecilia Tenio (Tenio). The seven
pieces of "magkalipay" lumber were
left over from a divider he made for
his cousin Jose Epiz. He explained
further that the lumber were intended
for the repair of his dilapidated
house. The defense presented Caalim
to corroborate the testimony of
petitioner.
- Defense witness Candole
testified that it was Bug-os who hired
him to cut a "tugas" tree on his land,
sawed it into lumber and delivered
the same to petitioner who paid for
the labor transporting the sawn
lumber. Candole further testified that
while they were on their way to
Barangay Combado, Sunit stopped
them but allowed the lumber to be
brought to the house of petitioner
September 5, 1997, the RTC-Branch 25
rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the
offense charged and sentencing him.
August 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals ruled that motive or intention is
immaterial for the reason that mere possession
of the lumber without the legal documents gives
rise to criminal liability.
STATCON ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AS DONE IN THE PRESENT
CASE IS INVALID
IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS OF
PETITIONER:
1. There was no search warrant.
2. The police officers only acted upon a verbal
order.
3. Because the search was illegal, the things
seized from him, may not be used as evidence
against him.
4. The day before the search and seizure, Sunit
had given the team the information they needed
(name and location of petitioner). This gave
them a leeway as they could have easily
convinced a judge that there is probable cause.
IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS OF
RESPONDENT
1. The search and seizure was valid (Section
80 of the forestry code).
2. The plain view doctrine was invoked
- Under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in "plain view" of an
officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. This Court had the
opportunity to summarize the rules
governing plain view searches in the
case of People v. Doria, to wit:
The "plain view" doctrine applies when
the following requisites concur: (a) the
law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he
can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object
must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent.
3. The petitioner had no permit to possess the
lumber.
The punishment is found under Section 68
of the Forestry Code:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting
Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. - Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the
case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the
cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall
be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they
shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in
favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or
forest products are found.
There are two distinct and separate offenses
punished under Section 68 of the Forestry Code,
to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing
timber or other forest products from any forest
land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any
authority;
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products
without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations
PEOPLE V. QUE - The forestry code is a
special law which considers mere possession of
timber or other forest products without the proper
documentation as malum prohibitum.
SECTION 80 - A forest officer or employee of
the Bureau or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall
arrest even without warrant any person who
has committed or is committing in his presence
any of the offenses defined in this chapter. He
shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense, and the forest products
cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the
process of committing the offense.
Mere possession of forest products without the
proper documentation consummates the
crime. DURA LEX SED LEX.
PUNISHMENT IMPOSED UPON
PETITIONER: INDETERMINATE
PENALTY OF FOUR MONTHS AND ONE
DAY OF ARRESTO MAYOR, AS
MINIMMUM TO TWO YEARS, FOUR
MONTHS, AND ONE DAY OF PRISION
CORRECIONAL AS MAXIMUM.
SAGANA v. FRANCISCO
TOPIC: DURA LEX SED LEX
FACTS: December 13, 1994, petitioner Arnel
Sagana filed a Complaint for Damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and raffled
to Branch 99. Petitioner alleged that on 20
November 1992, respondent Richard A.
Francisco, with intent to kill and without
justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting him
on the right thigh. As a result, petitioner incurred
medical expenses and suffered wounded feelings,
and was compelled to engage the services of a
lawyer, due to respondent’s refusal to pay said
expenses. Petitioner thus demanded payment of
P300,000.00 as actual damages, P150,000.00 as
moral damages,P50,000.00, exemplary damages,
and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
January 31, 1995, process server Manuel S.
Panlasigui attempted to serve summons at
respondent’s address at No. 36 Sampaguita St.,
Baesa, Quezon City but was unsuccessful. In his
Server’s Return, Panlasigui stated that he tried to
personally serve the summons to respondent at
his given address. However, the occupant of that
house told him that respondent is unknown at said
address. Panlasigui also declared that diligent
efforts were exerted to serve the summons but
these proved to be futile. Subsequently, the trial
court attempted to serve summons to
respondent’s office through registered mail.
However, despite three notices, respondent failed
to pick up the summons.
August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar
again tried to serve the summons at the address of
the respondent but no avail. According to
Iconar’s handwritten notation on the summons,
he was informed by Michael Francisco,
respondent’s brother, that respondent no longer
lived at said address. However, he left a copy of
the summons to Michael Francisco.
November 10, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to
Declare Defendant in Default, alleging that
despite service of summons, respondent still
failed to file an Answer.
February 16, 1996, the trial court issued an Order
finding that the summons was validly served to
respondent through his brother, Michael. It thus
declared respondent in default and allowed
petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.
Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court
documents were furnished to respondent.
March 1, 1996, Michael Francisco, through his
counsel, Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, filed a
Manifestation and Motion denying that he
received the summons or that he was authorized
to receive summons on behalf of his brother. He
alleged that the substituted service did not
comply with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.
October 4, 1996, the trial court issued an Order
denying Michael Francisco’s Manifestation and
Motion for lack of merit. Judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff and hereby orders
defendant to pay plaintiff.
November 23, 1999, respondent Richard A.
Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that
he received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on
9 November 1999; that the same was contrary to
the law, facts, and evidence, and praying that his
appeal be given due course.
August 13, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered
the herein assailed Decision granting the appeal
and setting aside the Decision of the trial court.
The appellate court held that the service of
summons was irregular and such irregularity
nullified the proceedings before the trial court.
Since it did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent, the trial court’s decision
was void.
STATCON ISSUE:
ATONG PAG LAUM INC. V. COMELEC
TOPIC: STATUTES MUST BE CAPABLE
OF INTERPRETATION
This case overturned the ruling in Bayani v.
COMELEC which excluded political parties
from the party-list system.
FACTS: 280 organizations wanted to
participate in the May 13, 2013 elections for
the party-list systems; however, some were
rejected by COMELEC.
STATCON ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT
POLITICAL PARTIES ARE DEEMED
EXCLUDED FROM THE PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the
party-list system of representation. Simply put,
the party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that
cannot win in legislative district elections a
chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives:
one for his or her legislative district, and another
for his or her party-list group or organization of
choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
 (1) The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including
those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except
for those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.
Intent of the framers: Party-list is not a
sectoral representation.
The members who form the part-list should
come from different , marginalized sectors of
society.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three
different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or
organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties
or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any
particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is
not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives would naturally be open
to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly
negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second,
the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats
to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any
class or type of party that qualifies under the three
groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and
party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not
for sectoral parties only, but also for non-
sectoral parties.
Definition of terms:
a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives
from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition
may participate independently provided the
coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political
party or a sectoral party or a coalition
of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an
organized group of citizens advocating
an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public
office.
It is a national party when its
constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional
party when its constituency is spread
over the geographical territory of at least
a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an
organized group of citizens belonging
to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a
group of citizens or a coalition of groups
of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment,
interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of
duly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes.
IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS IN THE
CASE:
The COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming elections.
However, since the Court adopts new
parameters in the qualification of the party-
list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in
the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the
COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to
register under the party-list system, and to
participate in the coming elections, under the
new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution mandates that, during the
first three consecutive terms of Congress
after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the
religious sector." This provision clearly
shows again that the party-list system is not
exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives
would naturally be open to non-sectoral
party-list representatives, clearly negating
the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties
representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the
party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only
for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly
making the party-list system fully open after
the end of the first three congressional terms.
This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of
party that qualifies under the three groups
constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and
party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be disputed: the party-list system is
not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-
sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and
regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to
represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude,
by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system.
How will these ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the
electoral process if they are excluded from
the party-list system? To exclude them from
the party-list system is to prevent them from
joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as
their only option the armed struggle. To
exclude them from the party-list system is,
apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and
express wording of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941.
Thus, the ruling in Bayani v. COMELEC
was overturned and the 13 organizations
who were denied were allowed to have
their names placed in the ballots and all
the consolidated petitions in the case were
approved.
SANTIAGO V. COMELEC
TOPIC: STATUTES SHOULD BE
SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION
FACTS: REFER TO GAB DIGEST
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE
POWER OF INITIATIVE INCLUDES
TO POWER DIRECTLY PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION
HELD: SAME RULING IN CONSTI,
THE WORD “CONSTITUTION” WAS
JUST A MERE AFTERTHOUGHT.
NOTES:
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE
SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE
TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.
IS R.A 6735 SUFFICIENT?
NO.
Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The
power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with
the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution"
therein was a delayed afterthought. That word
is neither germane nor relevant to said section,
which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is
silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the
power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only
do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further
buttressed by the fact that this section
was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill
No. 17, which solely referred to a
statement of policy on local initiative and
referendum and appropriately used the
phrases "propose and enact," "approve or
reject" and "in whole or in part."
It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of
the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three
systems of initiative, and that Section 5
(Requirements) restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the
registered voters who must submit the proposal.
But unlike in the case of the other systems of
initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires,
among other things, statement of the proposed
law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does
not include, as among the contents of the petition,
the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as
follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided
therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered
voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not
more than one hundred (100) words which shall
be legibly written or printed at the top of every
page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that
Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for
National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II)
and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the
latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act
is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative
on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that
in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution
is far more important than the initiative on
national and local laws.
THREE TYPES OF INITIATIVE
1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
2. Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation; and
3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance.
REPUBLIC V. YAHON
TOPIC: WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT
DISTINGUISH
FACTS: Sgt Yahon was married to respondent.
A TPO has been issued against Sgt Yahon to
protect the respondent from further abuses. In the
TPO, Sgt Yahon was ordered to provide
reasonable financial spousal support to the
respondent. In his failure to appear before the
court with a counsel and with an answer to the
charges against him, the court has granted PPO
for the respondent against Sgt Yahon. It was also
reiterated that Sgt Yahon should provide for the
financial spousal support to his wife from his
retirement benefits. However, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Finance Center contended that
half of the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon
cannot be given to the respondent as it is from a
military institution. The petitioner contended that
money due to government employees is not liable
to the creditors of the said employees in the
process of garnishment.
Issue:
Whether or not the retirement benefits of Sgt
Yahon be subject to the ruling of the court to
provide for the financial spousal support of
respondent.
Held:
Retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon are subject to
the financial spousal support of respondent. As a
rule in statutory construction, when the law does
not distinguish, the court should not distinguish.
As section 8 (g) of RA No. 9262 used the general
term 'employer', it includes in its coverage the
military institution, which is the employer of Sgt
Yahon.
A protection order is an order issued by the court
to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household
members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from
further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability
to regain control of their life. The protection
orders issued by the court may be a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order
that may be issued by the barangay shall be
known as a Barangay Protection Order (BPO).
SECTION 8, R.A 9262
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening
to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of
this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or
indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent
from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for
the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or
permanently where no property rights are
violated, and if respondent must remove personal
effects from the residence, the court shall direct a
law enforcement agent to accompany the
respondent to the residence, remain there until
respondent has gathered his things and escort
respondent from the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from
petitioner and any designated family or
household member at a distance specified by the
court, and to stay away from the residence,
school, place of employment, or any specified
place frequented by the petitioner and any
designated family or household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by
petitioner of an automobile and other essential
personal effects, regardless of ownership, and
directing the appropriate law enforcement officer
to accompany the petitioner to the residence of
the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely
restored to the possession of the automobile and
other essential personal effects, or to supervise
the petitioner’s or respondent’s removal of
personal belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of
a child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to
the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal
support. Notwithstanding other laws to the
contrary, the court shall order an appropriate
percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent to be withheld regularly by the
respondent's employer for the same to be
automatically remitted directly to the woman.
Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in
the remittance of support to the woman and/or her
child without justifiable cause shall render the
respondent or his employer liable for indirect
contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or
possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and
order him to surrender the same to the court for
appropriate disposition by the court, including
revocation of license and disqualification to apply
for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the
offender is a law enforcement agent, the court
shall order the offender to surrender his firearm
and shall direct the appropriate authority to
investigate on the offender and take appropriate
action on matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the
violence inflicted, including, but not limited to,
property damage, medical expenses, child care
expenses and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate
agency to provide petitioner temporary shelter
and other social services that the petitioner may
need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the
court deems necessary to protect and provide for
the safety of the petitioner and any designated
family or household member, provided petitioner
and any designated family or household member
consents to such relief. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the
RTC’s directive for the automatic deduction of
50% from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits and
pension to be given directly to respondent, as it
contravenes an explicit mandate under the law
governing the retirement and separation of
military personnel.
NOTES:
under Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act
of 2004, even retirement benefits of military
personnel are not exempt from execution.
According to the Supreme Court:
“We hold that Section 8(g) of RA 9262, being a
later enactment, should be construed as laying
down an exception to the general rule above-
stated that retirement benefits are exempt from
execution. The law itself declares that the court
shall order the withholding of a percentage of the
income or salary of the respondent by the
employer, which shall be automatically remitted
directly to the woman ‘[n]otwithstanding other
laws to the contrary.’
“Section 8(g) of RA 9262 used the general term
‘employer,’ which includes in its coverage the
military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer.
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all
employers, whether private or government.
“It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for
spousal and child support, is a support
enforcement legislation. In the United States,
provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act
allow garnishment of certain federal funds where
the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal
obligation of child support. As these provisions
were designed “to avoid sovereign immunity
problems” and provide that “moneys payable by
the government to any individual are subject to
child support enforcement proceedings,” the law
is clearly intended to “create a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity so that state courts could
issue valid orders directed against government
agencies attaching funds in their possession.”
CONFLICTING PROVISIONS
IN FAVOR OF Sgt. Yahon.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638, which
states: Section 31. The benefits authorized under
this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not
be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy,
execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall
they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third
person: Provided, That if a retired or separated
officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any
benefit under this Decree has unsettled money
and/or property accountabilities incurred while in
the active service, not more than fifty per centum
of the pension gratuity or other payment due such
officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this
Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle
such accountabilities.
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291,
otherwise known as the "Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and
Lien -- x x x
The funds and/or the properties referred to
herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act
shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, execution, levy or other
processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial
agencies or administrative bodies including
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances
and from all financial obligations of the
members, including his pecuniary
accountability arising from or caused or
occasioned by his exercise or performance of
his official functions or duties, or incurred
relative to or in connection with his position or
work except when his monetary liability,
contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the
GSIS.
Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court - a
court order directing the Philippine National
Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his
retirement benefits and to deliver one-half of such
monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latter’s
conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it
violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law)
which exempts retirement benefits from
execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been
incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, which governs execution
of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule
39 enumerates those properties which are exempt
from execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution.–
Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the following property, and no other, shall
be exempt from execution:
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money
or property obtained as such support, or any
pension or gratuity from the Government.
These provisions were invoked as to contest
the giving of benefits to Daisy Yahon.
However, it is basic in statutory construction that
in case of irreconcilable conflict between two
laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the
more recent expression of legislative will.
Statutes must be so construed and harmonized
with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. However, if several laws cannot
be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to
the later enactment. The later law is the latest
expression of the legislative will.
IN FAVOR OF DAISY YAHON
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general
term "employer," which includes in its coverage
the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer.
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all
employers, whether private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for
spousal and child support, is a support
enforcement legislation. In the United States,
provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act
allow garnishment of certain federal funds where
the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal
obligation of child support. As these provisions
were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity
problems" and provide that "moneys payable by
the Government to any individual are subject to
child support enforcement proceedings," the law
is clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity so that state courts could
issue valid orders directed against Government
agencies attaching funds in their possession."
R.A 9262 FOCUSES ON ONE TYPE OF
ABUSE ONLY WHEN IT COMES TO
SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT
ECONOMIC ABUSE:
Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or
attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to
the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or
preventing the victim from engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and
moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of
financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or
property owned in common;
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims' own money or
properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
VISAYAS COMMUNITY MEDICAL
CENTER v. YBALLE
TOPIC: WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT
DISTINGUISH
FACTS: The union organization of the
employees of the Visayas Community Medical
Center continued to strike despite the fact that it
is not a legitimate labor organization. The
respondents in this case were said to have
committed illegal acts during the strike; thus, by
virtue of Paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the
Labor Code which provides that ". . .any union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status, the employees
were dismissed.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE
DISMISSAL WAS VALID:
HELD: Since there was no showing that the
complainants committed any illegal act during
the strike, they may not be deemed to have lost
their employment status by their mere
participation in the illegal strike. On the other
hand, the union leaders (Nava group) who
conducted the illegal strike despite knowledge
that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not a duly registered
labor union were declared to have been validly
terminated by petitioner.
STATCON DOCTRINE AS APPLIED IN
THE CASE: Illegal strike and illegal acts during
the strike; distinction between union members
and union officers in determining when they lose
their employment status. The Supreme Court
stressed that the law makes a distinction between
union members and union officers. A union
member who merely participates in an illegal
strike may not be terminated from employment. It
is only when he commits illegal acts during a
strike that he may be declared to have lost
employment status. In contrast, a union officer
may be terminated from employment for
knowingly participating in an illegal strike or
participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike. The law grants the employer the
option of declaring a union officer who
participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
employment. It possesses the right and
prerogative to terminate the union officers from
service.
DAYAO V. COMELEC
TOPIC: DISJUNCTIVE AND CONJUCTIVE
WORDS
FACTS: The individual petitioners are dealers of
different brands of liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG)while petitioner FPII is an association
comprised of entities engaged in various
industries in the country.
On May 21, 2009, LPGMA sought to advance its
cause by seeking party-list accreditation with the
COMELEC, through a petition for registration as
a sectoral organization for the purpose of
participating in the May 10, 2010 elections under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 or the Party-List
System Act. LPGMA claimed that it has special
interest in the LPG industry and other allied
concerns.
After the requisite publication, verification and
hearing, and without any apparent opposition,
LPGMA's petition was approved by the
COMELEC in its Resolution dated January 5,
2010.
Four (4) months thereafter, individual petitioners
lodged before the COMELEC a complaint for the
cancellation of LPGMA's registration as a party-
list organization. They were later on joined by
FPII as a complainant-in-intervention.
The complaint proffered in essence that LPGMA
does not represent a marginalized sector of the
society because its incorporators, officers and
members are not marginalized or
underrepresented citizens since they are actually
marketers and... independent re-fillers of LPG
that control 45% of the national LPG retail
market and have significant ownership interests
in various LPG refilling plants.
LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution does not require that
party-list representatives must be members of the
marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of
the society.
In its first assailed Resolution dated August 5,
2010, the COMELEC dismissed the complaint
for two reasons. First, the ground for cancellation
cited by the petitioners is not among the exclusive
enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.
Second, the complaint is actually a belated
opposition to LPGMA's petition for registration
which has long been approved with finality on
January 5, 2010. The ruling was reiterated in the
COMELEC Resolution dated September 6, 2010
denying the petitioners' motions for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE
CANCELLATION IS VALID
APPLICATION OF STATCON DOCTRINE
IN CASE: There was no valid justification for
the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation.
However, in light of COMELEC Resolution
dated December 13, 2012, the present petitions
ought to be dismissed.
An opposition to a petition for registration is
not a condition precedent to the filing of a
complaint for cancellation.
Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds
and procedure for the cancellation of party-list
accreditation, viz:
Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of
Registration.
The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on
any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association, organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to
seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules
or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its
petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1)
year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
For the COMELEC to validly exercise its
statutory power to cancel the registration of a
party-list group, the law imposes only two (2)
conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is
afforded to the party-list group concerned;
and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for
disqualification in Section 6 exists.
Section 6 clearly does not require that an
opposition to the petition for registration be
previously interposed so that a complaint for
cancellation can be entertained. Since the law
does not impose such a condition, the
COMELEC, notwithstanding its delegated
administrative authority to promulgate rules
for the implementation of election laws, cannot
read into the law that which it does not
provide. The poll body is mandated to enforce
and administer election-related laws. It has no
power to contravene or amend them.
Moreover, an opposition can be reasonably
expected only during the petition for registration
proceedings which involve the COMELEC’s
power to register a party-list group, as
distinguished from the entirely separate power
invoked by the complaint, which is the power to
cancel.
The distinctiveness of the two powers is
immediately apparent from their basic
definitions. To refuse is to decline or to turn
down, while to cancel is to annul or remove.
Adopting such meanings within the context of
Section 6, refusal of registration happens during
the inceptive stage when an organization seeks
admission into the roster of COMELEC-
registered party-list organizations through a
petition for registration. Cancellation on the other
hand, takes place after the fact of registration
when an inquiry is done by the COMELEC, motu
propio or upon a verified complaint, on whether
a registered party-list organization still holds the
qualifications imposed by law. Refusal is handed
down to a petition for registration while
cancellation is decreed on the registration itself
after the petition has been approved.
A resort to the rules of statutory construction
yields a similar conclusion.
The legal meaning of the term "and/or" between
"refusal" and "cancellation" should be taken in its
ordinary significance "refusal and/or
cancellation" means "refusal and cancellation" or
"refusal or cancellation". It has been held that the
intention of the legislature in using the term
"and/or" is that the word "and" and the word "or"
are to be used interchangeably. The term "and/or"
means that effect shall be given to both the
conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or" or that
one word or the other may be taken accordingly
as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose
intended by the legislature as gathered from the
whole statute. The term is used to avoid a
construction which by the use of the disjunctive
"or" alone will exclude the combination of
several of the alternatives or by the use of the
conjunctive "and" will exclude the efficacy of any
one of the alternatives standing alone.
Hence, effect shall be given to both "refusal and
cancellation" and "refusal or cancellation"
according to how Section 6 intended them to be
employed. The word "and" is a conjunction used
to denote a joinder or union; it is pertinently
defined as meaning "together with", "joined
with", "along or together with." The use of "and"
in Section 6 was necessitated by the fact that
refusal and cancellation of party-list registration
share similar grounds, manner of initiation and
procedural due process requirements of notice
and hearing. With respect to the said matters,
"refusal" and "cancellation" must be taken
together. The word "or", on the other hand, is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a
disjunctive word. As such, "refusal or
cancellation", consistent with their disjunctive
meanings, must be taken individually to mean
that they are separate instances when the
COMELEC can exercise its power to screen the
qualifications of party-list organizations for
purposes of participation in the party-list system
of representation.
That this is the clear intent of the law is
bolstered by the use simply of the word "or"
in the first sentence of Section 6 that "the
COMELEC may, motu propio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition."
Consequently, the COMELEC’s conclusion
that the complaint for cancellation, filed four
(4) months after the petition was approved, is
actually a belated opposition, obliterates the
distinction between the power to
register/refuse and the power to cancel. Since
an opposition may only be sensibly interposed
against a petition for registration, the
proceedings for which involve the
COMELEC’s power to register, it is wrong to
impose it as a condition for the exercise of the
COMELEC’s entirely separate power to
cancel. As such, the absence of an opposition
to a petition for registration cannot serve to
bar any interested party from questioning,
through a complaint for cancellation, the
qualifications of a party-list group.
PEOPLE v. COMADRE
TOPIC: DISJUNCTIVE WORDS
Facts: Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry
Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio
(drinking grioup) were having a drinking
spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s
father (Jaime). As the drinking session went
on, Robert and the others noticed appellants
Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano (appellants) walking. The three
stopped in front of the house. While
his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly
throw a hand grenade, ripping a hole in the
roof of the house. Drinking group were hit by
shrapnel (fragments of the grenade) and
slumped unconscious on the floor. They were
all rushed to the Hospital. However, Robert
died before reaching the hospital.
Trial Court: appellants guilty of complex
crime of murder with multiple attempted
murder.
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in convicting
the appellants?
Held: Only Antonio is liable for the crime.
RULING:
It was established that prior to the
grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog,
Jimmy Wabe and Gerry Bullanday were able to
identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio
Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano because there was a lamppost in front of
the house and the moon was bright. No
conspiracy. Only Antonio is liable for the crime.
When Antonio Comadre was in the act of
throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering
a single word of encouragement or performed any
act to assist him
APPLICATION OF STATCON DOCTRINE IN
THE CASE: The evidence shows that George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any
participation in the commission of the crime and
must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at
the scene of the crime as well as their close
relationship with Antonio are insufficient to
establish conspiracy considering that they
performed no positive act in furtherance of the
crime.
Neither was it proven that their act of running
away with Antonio was an act of giving moral
assistance to his criminal act. The ratiocination of
the trial court that "their presence provided
encouragement and sense of security to Antonio,"
is devoid of any factual basis. Such finding is not
supported by the evidence on record and cannot
therefore be a valid basis of a finding of
conspiracy.
Time and again we have been guided by the
principle that it would be better to set free ten men
who might be probably guilty of the crime
charged than to convict one innocent man for a
crime he did not commit. There being no
conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer
for the crime.
Coming now to Antonio’s liability, we find that
the trial court correctly ruled that treachery
attended the commission of the crime. For
treachery to be appreciated two conditions must
concur: (1) the means, method and form of
execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2)
such means, methods and form of execution was
deliberately and consciously adopted by the
accused. Its essence lies in the adoption of ways
to minimize or neutralize any resistance, which
may be put up by the offended party.
Appellant lobbed a grenade which fell on the roof
of the terrace where the unsuspecting victims
were having a drinking spree. The suddenness of
the attack coupled with the instantaneous
combustion and the tremendous impact of the
explosion did not afford the victims sufficient
time to scamper for safety, much less defend
themselves; thus insuring the execution of the
crime without risk of reprisal or resistance on
their part. Treachery therefore attended the
commission of the crime.
It is significant to note that aside from treachery,
the information also alleges the "use of an
explosive" as an aggravating circumstance. Since
both attendant circumstances can qualify the
killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code,we should determine which of the
two circumstances will qualify the killing in this
case.
When the killing is perpetrated with treachery
and by means of explosives, the latter shall be
considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not
only does jurisprudence support this view but
also, since the use of explosives is the principal
mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant
circumstance should qualify the offense instead
of treachery which will then be relegated merely
as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997
of Republic Act No. 8294which also considers
the use of explosives as an aggravating
circumstance, there is a need to make the
necessary clarification insofar as the legal
implications of the said amendatory law vis-à-vis
the qualifying circumstance of "by means of
explosion" under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code are concerned. Corollary thereto is
the issue of which law should be applied in the
instant case. R.A. No. 8294 was a reaction to the
onerous and anachronistic penalties imposed
under the old illegal possession of firearms law,
P.D. 1866, which prevailed during the
tumultuous years of the Marcos dictatorship. The
amendatory law was enacted, not to
decriminalize illegal possession of firearms and
explosives, but to lower their penalties in order to
rationalize them into more acceptable and
realistic levels.
This legislative intent is conspicuously reflected
in the reduction of the corresponding penalties for
illegal possession of firearms, or ammunitions
and other related crimes under the amendatory
law. Under Section 2 of the said law, the penalties
for unlawful possession of explosives are also
lowered. Specifically, when the illegally
possessed explosives are used to commit any of
the crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which
result in the death of a person, the penalty is no
longer death, unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but it shall
be considered only as an aggravating
circumstance. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. 8294 now reads:
Section 2. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Explosives. The penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal and a fine
of not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble,
deal in, acquire, dispose or possess hand
grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives,
including but not limited to "pillbox," "molotov
cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other
incendiary devices capable of producing
destructive effect on contiguous objects or
causing injury or death to any person.
When a person commits any of the crimes defined
in the Revised Penal Code or special law with the
use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation
agents or incendiary devises, which results in the
death of any person or persons, the use of such
explosives, detonation agents or incendiary
devices shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. (shall be punished with the penalty
of death is DELETED.)
With the removal of death as a penalty and the
insertion of the term "xxx as an aggravating
circumstance," the unmistakable import is to
downgrade the penalty for illegal possession of
explosives and consider its use merely as an
aggravating circumstance.
Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to
reduce the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Also, Congress clearly
intended RA No. 8294 to consider as aggravating
circumstance, instead of a separate offense,
illegal possession of firearms and explosives
when such possession is used to commit other
crimes under the Revised Penal Code.
It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294
did not amend the definition of murder under
Article 248, but merely made the use of
explosives an aggravating circumstance when
resorted to in committing "any of the crimes
defined in the Revised Penal Code." The
legislative purpose is to do away with the use of
explosives as a separate crime and to make such
use merely an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of any crime already defined in the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely
added the use of unlicensed explosives as one of
the aggravating circumstances specified in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like the
aggravating circumstance of "explosion" in
paragraph 12, "evident premeditation" in
paragraph 13, or "treachery" in paragraph 16 of
Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance
added by RA No. 8294 does not change the
definition of murder in Article 248.
Nonetheless, even if favorable to the appellant,
R.A. No. 8294 still cannot be made applicable in
this case. Before the use of unlawfully possessed
explosives can be properly appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately
established that the possession was illegal or
unlawful, i.e., the accused is without the
corresponding authority or permit to possess.
This follows the same requisites in the
prosecution of crimes involving illegal
possession of firearm which is a kindred or
related offense under P.D. 1866, as amended.
This proof does not obtain in the present case. Not
only was it not alleged in the information, but no
evidence was adduced by the prosecution to show
that the possession by appellant of the explosive
was unlawful.
It is worthy to note that the above requirement of
illegality is borne out by the provisions of the law
itself, in conjunction with the pertinent tenets of
legal hermeneutics.
A reading of the title of R.A. No. 8294 will show
that the qualifier "illegal/unlawful ...possession"
is followed by "of firearms, ammunition, or
explosives or instruments..." Although the term
ammunition is separated from "explosives" by the
disjunctive word "or", it does not mean that
"explosives" are no longer included in the items
which can be illegally/unlawfully possessed. In
this context, the disjunctive word "or" is not used
to separate but to signify a succession or to
conjoin the enumerated items together Moreover,
Section 2 of R.A. 8294, subtitled: "Section 3.
Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,
Disposition or Possession of Explosives", clearly
refers to the unlawful manufacture, sale, or
possession of explosives.
What the law emphasizes is the act’s lack of
authority. Thus, when the second paragraph of
Section 3, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by RA No.
8294 speaks of "the use of the aforementioned
explosives, etc." as an aggravating circumstance
in the commission of crimes, it refers to those
explosives, etc. "unlawfully" manufactured,
assembled, dealt in, acquired, disposed or
possessed mentioned in the first paragraph of the
same section. What is per se aggravating is the
use of unlawfully "manufactured or possessed"
explosives. The mere use of explosives is not.
GONZALES v. COMELEC
- Same with consti ruling. May be held in
special election OR general election.
- Or sometimes means “and”
PEOPLE v. FLORES
TOPIC: DISJUNCTIVE WORDS
Word being debated upon: guardian
Facts: Flores was charged with 181 counts of
rape for raping his daughter when she was still a
minor. The Court applied Article 266- B
imposing death penalty since the crime of rape
was qualified by the circumstances of minority
and relationship. The crime of rape may be
qualified when the victim is a minor and the
acused is a guardian.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of rape may
be qualified in the case.
Held: No. The qualifying circumstance of
minority and relationship was not proven in
the case; hence, Flores was only held liable for
2 counts of simple rape and the cost of
damages was also reduced. His penalty was
reculusion perpetua.
APPLICATION OF STATCON DOCTRINE
IN CASE
Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial
conference that appellant is the guardian of AAA.
However, we cannot simply invoke this
admission to consider guardianship as a
qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape.
"Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase
its penalty to death cannot be subject of
stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to
suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of
stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is
warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of
capital punishment. To justify the death penalty,
the prosecution must specifically allege in the
information and prove during the trial the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the
victim and her relationship to the offender."
Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be
a person who has legal relationship with his ward.
The theory that a guardian must be legally
appointed was first enunciated in the early case of
People v. De la Cruz.40 The issue in said case was
whether the aunt of a rape victim could file a
criminal complaint on behalf of her niece, when
the victim’s father was still living and residing in
the Philippines. The Solicitor-General contended
that the aunt was the legal guardian of the victim,
thus, was competent to sign the information. The
Court rejected this contention and ruled as
follow:
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph
3, is as follows:
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de
estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos deshonestos,
sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada,
o de sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de
haberse otorgado al ofensor, perdon expreso por
dichas partes, segun los casos." Without passing
at this time on the question whether the tutor
(legal guardian) may file a complaint in the
temporary absence of the parents or grandparents
of the offended party, it suffices to say that we
cannot accept the view of the Government that an
aunt who has the temporary custody of a minor in
the absence of her father occupies the position of
a tutor (legal guardian). The word "tutor"
(guardian) appearing in article 344, supra, must
be given the same meaning as in section 551 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, a
guardian legally appointed in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Garcia was more direct in addressing the issue of
when the accused will be considered a "guardian"
as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape.
In said case, appellant therein raped a 12-year-old
girl. The victim was left to the care of appellant,
who is the live-in partner of the victim’s aunt. The
issue of whether appellant is considered a
guardian in the contemplation of the amendment
to the law on rape such that, the victim being a
minor, he should be punished with the higher
penalty of death for the nine (9) crimes of rape
was answered in the negative by the Court. The
underlying reason behind its ruling was explained
in this discourse:
In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is
provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code, specifically as one who, aside from the
offended party, her parents or grandparents, is
authorized to file the sworn written complaint to
commence the prosecution for that crime. In
People vs. De la Cruz, it was held that the
guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or
judicial guardian as understood in the rules on
civil procedure.
It would not be logical to say that the word
"guardian" in the third paragraph of Article 344
which is mentioned together with parents and
grandparents of the offended party would have a
concept different from the "guardian" in the
recent amendments of Article 335 where he is
also mentioned in the company of parents and
ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the
inclusion of the guardian is only to invest him
with the power to sign a sworn written complaint
to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against
chastity, while his inclusion in the enumeration of
the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the
imposition of the death penalty on him. With
much more reason, therefore, should the
restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that
is, that he be a legal or judicial guardian, be
required in the latter article.
The Court notes from the transcripts of the
proceedings in Congress on this particular point
that the formulators were not definitive on the
concept of "guardian" as it now appears in the
attendant circumstances added to the original
provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took
note of the status of a guardian as contemplated
in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic
considerations to be determined by the courts on
an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state
"guardian" without the qualification that he
should be a legal or judicial guardian.1âwphi1 It
was assumed, however, that he should at the very
least be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must
have been aware of jurisprudence that the
guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code,
even after its amendment by Republic Act No.
4111, would either be a natural guardian,
sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory
guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the
court over the person of the ward.
They did agree, however, that the additional
attendant circumstances introduced by Republic
Act No. 7659 should be considered as special
qualifying circumstances specifically applicable
to the crime of rape and, accordingly, cannot be
offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious
ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the
attendant circumstances therefore added by
Republic Act No. 4111, although the crime is still
denominated as rape such circumstances have
changed the nature of simple rape by producing a
qualified form thereof punishable by the higher
penalty of death.
The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since
it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity
of judicial appointment which impresses upon the
guardian the lofty purpose of his office and
normally deters him from violating its objectives.
Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's
case or, for that matter, any person similarly
circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or
another's property. The fiduciary powers granted
to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions
should he betray the trust.
In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be
considered as the guardian falling within the
ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by
Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either
in the category of the "common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim" in the same enumeration,
since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of
[AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly
demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian,
that is, a mere caretaker of the children over
whom he exercises a limited degree of authority
for a temporary period, we cannot impose the
death penalty contemplated for a real guardian
under the amendments introduced by Republic
Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that
category.
People v. De la Cuesta adhered to Garcia when it
ruled that the mere fact that the mother asked the
accused to look after her child while she was
away did not constitute the relationship of
guardian-ward as contemplated by law.
Garcia was further applied by analogy in People
v. Delantar where it was held that the "guardian"
envisioned in Section 31(c) of Republic Act No.
7610 is a person who has a legal relationship with
a ward. In said case, accused was charged for
violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act
No. 7610 when he pimped an 11 year old child to
at least two clients. The Court held that the
prosecution failed to establish filiation albeit it
considered accused as a de facto guardian.
However, this was not sufficient to justify the
imposition of the higher penalty pursuant to the
ruling in Garcia. In addition, the Court construed
the term "guardian" in this manner:
Further, according to the maxim noscitur a
sociis, the correct construction of a word or
phrase susceptible of various meanings may be
made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is found or with
which it is associated. Section 31(c) of R.A. No.
7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of
relationship between the perpetrator and the
victim which will justify the imposition of the
maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator
is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or
collateral relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that
the words with which "guardian" is associated in
the provision all denote a legal relationship. From
this description we may safely deduce that the
guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a
legal relationship with a ward. This relationship
may be established either by being the ward’s
biological parent (natural guardian) or by
adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither
AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s
adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the
"guardian" contemplated by law.
Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of
being a guardian was not even mentioned in the
Informations. What was clearly stated was that
appellant was the "adopting father" of AAA,
which the prosecution nonetheless failed to
establish.
CARANDANG v. SANTIAGO
Word being debated upon: physical injuries
FACTS: The petitioner seeks the help of the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to annul the
order of Judge Vicente Santiago suspending the
civil case filed by the petitioner against Tomas
Valenton, Sr. and Tomas Valenton, Jr. to await
the result of a criminal case filed by said
petitioner against the defendants.
In his contention, Judge Santiago stated that trial
of the civil action must await the result of the
criminal case on appeal. The court anchored its
decision on the contention of the defendants that
the plaintiff cannot invoke article 33 since the
defendants were charged with frustrated
homicide and not for physical injuries.
Article 33: In cases of defamation, fraudm and
physical injuries a civil action for damages
entirely separate and distinct from the criinal
action may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall only require a
preponderance of evidence. “
Issue: whether the term "physical injuries"
used in Article 33 means physical injuries in
the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical
injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted with
intent to kill or not.
The Article in question uses the words
"defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries."
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary
sense because there are no specific provisions in
the Revised Penal Code using these terms as
means of offenses defined therein, so that these
two terms defamation and fraud must have been
used not to impart to them any technical meaning
in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic
sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind,
it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could
not have been used in its specific sense as a crime
defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is
difficult to believe that the Code Commission
would have used terms in the same article —
some in their general and another in its technical
sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries"
should be understood to mean bodily injury, not
the crime of physical injuries, because the terms
used with the latter are general terms. In any case
the Code Commission recommended that the
civil for assault and battery in American Law, and
this recommendation must have been accepted by
the Legislature when it approved the article intact
as recommended. If the intent has been to
establish a civil action for the bodily harm
received by the complainant similar to the civil
action for assault and battery, as the Code
Commission states, the civil action should lie
whether the offense committed is that of physical
injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted
homicide, or even death.
A parallel case arose in that of Bixby vs Sioux
City, 164 N. W. 641, 643. In that case, the
appellant sought to take his case from the scope
of the statute by pointing out that inasmuch as
notice is required where the cause of action is
founded on injury to the person, it has no
application when the damages sought are for the
death of the person. The court ruled that a claim
to recover for death resulting from personal
injury is as certainly "founded on injury to the
person" as would be a claim to recover damages
for a non-fatal injury resulting in a crippled body.
LIWAG V. HAPPY GLEN LOOP
HOMEOWNERS, INC.
TOPIC: Ejusdem Generi
In 1978, F.G.R. Sales, the original developer of
Happy Glen Loop, a subdivision in Deparo,
Caloocan, obtained a loan from Ernesto Marcelo
(Marcelo), the owner of T.P. Marcelo Realty
Corporation. To settle its debt after failing to pay
its obligation, F.G.R. Sales assigned to Marcelo
all its rights over several parcels of land in the
Subdivision. Marcelo represented to subdivision
lot buyers, NHA and HSRC that a water facility
was available in the Subdivision.
For almost 30 years, the residents of the
Subdivision relied on this facility as their only
source of water. This fact was acknowledged by
Marcelo and Hermogenes, petitioners late
husband who was then the president of
respondent Happy Glen Loop Homeowners
Association (Association).
Sometime in September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot
11, Block No. 5 to Hermogenes. As a result,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-350099 was
issued to him. When Hermogenes died in 2003,
petitioner Emeteria P. Liwag subsequently wrote
a letter to respondent Association, demanding the
removal of the overhead water tank from the
subject parcel of land.
Refusing to comply with petitioners’ demand,
respondent Association filed before the HLURB
an action for specific performance; confirmation,
maintenance and donation of water facilities;
annulment of sale; and cancellation of TCT No.
350099 against T.P. Marcelo Realty Corporation
(the owner and developer of the Subdivision),
petitioner Emeteria, and the other surviving heirs
of Hermogenes.
After the parties submitted their respective
position papers, Housing and Land Use Arbiter
Melchor ruled in favor of the Association. He
invalidated the transfer of the parcel of land in
favor of Hermogenes in a Decision dated 5
October 2004.
On appeal before the HLURB Board of
Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11,
Block 5 was not an open space. Moreover, it ruled
that Marcelo had complied with the requirements
of PD 1216 with the donation of 9,047 square
meters of open space and road lots. It further
stated that there was no proof that Marcelo or the
original subdivision owner or developer had at
any time represented that Lot 11, Block 5 was an
open space. It therefore concluded that the use of
the lot as site of the water tank was merely
tolerated.
Respondent Association interposed an appeal to
the OP, which set aside the Decision of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners and affirmed
that of the Housing and Land Use Arbitration
Board.
STATCON ISSUE: Whether or not Lot 11,
Block 5 of Happy Glen Loop Subdivision
forms part of its open space
The term open space is defined in P.D. 1216 as an
area reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds,
recreational uses, schools, roads, places of
worship, hospitals, health centers, barangay
centers and other similar facilities and amenities.
The decree makes no specific mention of areas
reserved for water facilities. Therefore, we resort
to statutory construction to determine whether
these areas fall under other similar facilities and
amenities.
The basic statutory construction principle of
ejusdem generis states that where a general
word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class,
the general word or phrase is to be construed
to include or to be restricted to things akin to
or resembling, or of the same kind or class as,
those specifically mentioned.
Applying this principle to the afore-quoted
Section 1 of P.D. 1216, we find that the
enumeration refers to areas reserved for the
common welfare of the community. Thus, the
phrase other similar facilities and amenities
should be interpreted in like manner.
Here, the water facility was undoubtedly
established for the benefit of the community.
Water is a basic need in human settlements,
without which the community would not survive.
We therefore rule that, based on the principle of
ejusdem generis and taking into consideration the
intention of the law to create and maintain a
healthy environment in human settlements, the
location of the water facility in the Subdivision
must form part of the area reserved for open
space.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOM v. COURT
OF TAX APPEALS
-mehn di na kaya ng utak ko to.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE V. AMERICAN EXPRESS
TOPIC: EJUSDEM GENERIS
The said doctrine is inapplicable in the said case.
As the law put into question (Section 4.102-2 (b)
(92) of RR 7-95 as amended by RR 5-96). IS
VERY CLEAR.
FACTS: Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the
Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked
with servicing a unit of AMEX-Hongkong Branch
and facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK
receivables from card members situated in the
Philippines and payment to service establishments
in the Philippines.
It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its
1997 excess input taxes, citing as basis Section
110B of the 1997 Tax Code, which held that “xxx
Any input tax attributable to the purchase of capital
goods or to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered
person may at his option be refunded or credited
against other internal revenue taxes, subject to the
provisions of Section 112.”
In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No.
080-89, which read, “In Reply, please be informed
that, as a VAT registered entity whose service is
paid for in acceptable foreign currency which is
remitted inwardly to the Philippine and accounted
for in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the Central Bank of the Philippines, your service
income is automatically zero rated xxx”
Petitioner claimed, among others, that the claim for
refund should be construed strictly against the
claimant as they partake of the nature of tax
exemption.
CTA rendered a decision in favor of respondent,
holding that its services are subject to zero-rate. CA
affirmed this decision and further held that
respondent’s services were “services other than the
processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods
for persons doing business outside the Philippines”
and paid for in acceptable foreign currency and
accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of BSP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the AMEX is entitled to
tax refund (ONLY ISSUE IN CASE).
HELD: Yes.
NOTES:
The phrase “sale or exchange of services” means
the performance of all kinds of services in the
Philippines for other for a fee, remuneration, or
consideration, including those performed or
rendered by persons engaged in milling,
processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for
others, services of banksnon-bank financial
intermediaries, etc.
Gross receipts means the total amount of money
or its equivalent representing the contract price,
compensation, service, rental or royalty,
including the amount charged for materials
supplied and services rendered.
TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO ZERO
PERCENT RATE
Transactions subject to zero percent (0%) rate. -
- The following services performed in the
Philippines by VAT-registered persons shall be
subject to zero percent (0%) rate
'(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking
goods for other persons doing business outside
the Philippines which goods are subsequently
exported, where the services are paid for in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in
(2) Services other than those mentioned in the
preceding subparagraph, the consideration
for which is paid for in acceptable foreign
currency and accounted for in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the BSP.
AMEX is a VAT- registered person which
facilitates the collection and payment of
receivables belonging to its non-resident foreign
client, for which it gets paid in acceptable foreign
currency inwardly remitted and accounted for in
conformity with BSP rules.
RR 7-95 Broad Enough
RR 7-95, otherwise known as the "Consolidated
VAT Regulations,"reiterates the above-quoted
provision and further presents as examples only
the services performed in the Philippines by
VAT-registered hotels and other service
establishments. Again, the condition remains that
these services must be paid in acceptable foreign
currency inwardly remitted and accounted for in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the
BSP. The term "other service establishments" is
obviously broad enough to cover respondent's
facilitation service. Section 4.102-2 of RR 7-95
provides thus:
"SECTION 4.102-2. Zero-Rating. - - (a) In
general. - - A zero-rated sale by a VAT registered
person, which is a taxable transaction for VAT
purposes, shall not result in any output tax.
However, the input tax on his purchases of goods,
properties or services related to such zero-rated
sale shall be available as tax credit or refund in
accordance with these regulations.
"(b) Transaction subject to zero-rate. - - The
following services performed in the Philippines
by VAT-registered persons shall be subject to
0%:
'(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking
goods for other persons doing business outside
the Philippines which goods are subsequently
exported, where the services are paid for in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the
BSP;
'(2) Services other than those mentioned in the
preceding subparagraph, e.g. those rendered by
hotels and other service establishments, the
consideration for which is paid for in acceptable
foreign currency and accounted for in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the BSP;' "
Meaning of "as well as" in RR 5-96
Section 4.102-2(b)(2) of RR 7-95 was
subsequently amended by RR 5-96 to read as
follows:
"Section 4.102-2(b)(2) - - 'Services other than
processing, manufacturing or repacking for other
persons doing business outside the Philippines for
goods which are subsequently exported, as well
as services by a resident to a non-resident foreign
client such as project studies, information
services, engineering and architectural designs
and other similar services, the consideration for
which is paid for in acceptable foreign currency
and accounted for in accordance with the rules
and regulations of the BSP. '"
Aside from the already scopious coverage of
services in Section 4.102-2(b)(2) of RR 7-95, the
amendment introduced by RR 5-96 further
enumerates specific services entitled to zero
rating. Although superfluous, these sample
services are meant to be merely illustrative. In
this provision, the use of the term "as well as" is
not restrictive. As a prepositional phrase with an
adverbial relation to some other word, it simply
means "in addition to, besides, also or too."
Neither the law nor any of the implementing
revenue regulations aforequoted categorically
defines or limits the services that may be sold or
exchanged for a fee, remuneration or
consideration. Rather, both merely enumerate the
items of service that fall under the term "sale or
exchange of services."
Ejusdem Generis Inapplicable
The canon of statutory construction known as
ejusdem generis or "of the same kind or specie"
does not apply to Section 4.102-2(b)(2) of RR 7-
95 as amended by RR 5-96.
First, although the regulatory provision contains
an enumeration of particular or specific words,
followed by the general phrase "and other similar
services," such words do not constitute a readily
discernible class and are patently not of the same
kind.Project studies involve investments or
marketing; information services focus on data
technology; engineering and architectural designs
require creativity. Aside from calling for the
exercise or use of mental faculties or perhaps
producing written technical outputs, no common
denominator to the exclusion of all others
characterizes these three services. Nothing sets
them apart from other and similar general
services that may involve advertising, computers,
consultancy, health care, management,
messengerial work - - to name only a few.
Second, there is the regulatory intent to give the
general phrase "and other similar services" a
broader meaning. Clearly, the preceding phrase
"as well as" is not meant to limit the effect of "and
other similar services."
Third, and most important, the statutory provision
upon which this regulation is based is by itself not
restrictive. The scope of the word "services" in
Section 102(b)(2) of the Tax Code is broad; it is
not susceptible of narrow interpretation.
ROMUALDEZ V. MARCELO
FACTS: DI SIYA NAG DECLARE NG
SALAN NIYA TAPOS NA CHRGE NIYA FOR
THE VIOLATION OF THE LAW PUNISHING
IT TAPOS SABI NIYA DAPAT MA DISMISS
YUNG CASE DUE TO PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD.
ISSUE:
PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN
FROM THE DAY OF THE COMMISSION OF
THE VIOLATION OF THE LAW AND IF THE
SAME BE KNOWN AT THE TIME, FROM
THE DISCOVERY THEREOF.
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto, this Court was
categorical in ruling that –
The law on prescription of offenses is found in
Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for
offenses punishable thereunder. For those
penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326
applies.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the
prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The running of the prescriptive period shall be
interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of
the accused from the Philippines prevents the
running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only
inference that can be gathered from the foregoing
is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326,
did not consider the absence of the accused from
the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of
the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. To elaborate, -
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory
construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others. This rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited
to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature
would not have made specified enumerations in a
statute had the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.41
Had the legislature intended to include the
accused’s absence from the Philippines as a
ground for the interruption of the prescriptive
period in special laws, the same could have been
expressly provided in Act No. 3326. A case in
point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of
1997 where the legislature made its intention
clear and was thus categorical that –
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any
Provision of this Code – All violations of any
provision of this Code shall prescribe after five
(5) years.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty
persons and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
The term of prescription shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippines.
According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code fills the so-called "gap" in
Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs
the operation of the prescriptive period for
violations of R.A. No. 3019, Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied
in cases where the accused is absent from the
Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would
supplement Act No. 3326.
This could not have been the intention of the
framers of the law.
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised
Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to special
laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within
the ambit of "special law" as contemplated and
used in Article 10 of the RPC.
In the case of United States v. Serapio,42 the
Court had the occasion to interpret the term
"special laws" mentioned in Article 7 of then
Penal Code of the Philippines, which is now
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as referring
to penal laws that punish acts not defined and
penalized by the Penal Code of the Philippines.
Thus –
This contention makes it necessary to define
"special laws," as that phrase is used in article 7
of the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes
especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7)
have the meaning applied to the phrase "special
laws," as the same is generally used? x x x It is
confidently contended that the phrase "leyes
especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7)
is not used with this general signification: In fact,
said phrase may refer not to a special law as
above defined, but to a general law. A careful
reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that the
phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to signify
"special laws" in the general signification of that
phrase. The article, it will be noted, simply says,
in effect, that when a crime is made punishable
under some other law than the Penal Code, it (the
crime) is not subject to the provisions of said
code.43
Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and
Article 91 as supplements to RA No. 3019, the
same result would obtain. A conflict will arise
from the contemporaneous application of the two
laws. The Revised Penal Code explicitly states
that the absence of the accused from the
Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the
prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does not.
In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail
over Article 91 because it specifically and
directly applies to special laws while the Revised
Penal Code shall apply to special laws only
suppletorily and only when the latter do not
provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of
statutory construction dictate that special legal
provisions must prevail over general ones.
The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpio’s
reservations about the effects of ruling that the
absence of the accused from the Philippines shall
not suspend the running of the prescriptive
period. Our duty, however, is only to interpret the
law. To go beyond that and to question the
wisdom or effects of the law is certainly beyond
our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have
already explained –
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a
legislative gap caused by such an omission,
neither could the Court presume otherwise and
supply the details thereof, because a legislative
lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed,
courts may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of the
enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot
be judicially supplied however after later wisdom
may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not
authorized to insert into the law what they think
should be in it or to supply what they think the
legislature would have supplied if its attention
has been called to the omission. Mr. Justice
Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation
of the statute of limitations in favor of the accused
only relates to the following issues: (1)
retroactive or prospective application of laws
providing or extending the prescriptive period;
(2) the determination of the nature of the felony
committed vis-à-vis the applicable prescriptive
period; and (3) the reckoning of when the
prescriptive period runs. Therefore, the
aforementioned principle cannot be utilized to
support the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that
the prescriptive period in a special law continues
to run while the accused is abroad.
We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law
on prescription in criminal cases equally provides
the authority for the rule that the prescriptive
period runs while the accused is outside of
Philippine jurisdiction. The nature of the law on
prescription of penal statutes supports this
conclusion. In the old but still relevant case of
People v. Moran, this Court extensively discussed
the rationale behind and the nature of prescription
of penal offenses –
"We should at first observe that a mistake is
sometimes made in applying to statutes of
limitation in criminal suits the construction that
has been given to statutes of limitation in civil
suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are
essentially different. In civil suits the statute is
interposed by the legislature as an impartial
arbiter between two contending parties. In the
construction of the statute, therefore, there is no
intendment to be made in favor of either party.
Neither grants the right to the other; there is
therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary
presumptions, of construction are to be made. But
it is, otherwise when a statute of limitation is
granted by the State. Here the State is the grantor,
surrendering by act of grace its rights to
prosecute, and declaring the offense to be no
longer the subject of prosecution.' The statute is
not a statute of process, to be scantily and
grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring
that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over
the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to
return to his country, and resume his immunities
as a citizen and that from henceforth he may cease
to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the
proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that
statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed
in favor of the defendant, not only because such
liberality of construction belongs to all acts of
amnesty and grace, but because the very
existence of the statute, is a recognition and
notification by the legislature of the fact that time,
while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence,
has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in
which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently
of these views, it must be remembered that delay
in instituting prosecutions is not only productive
of expense to the State, but of peril to public
justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by
mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is
the policy of the law that prosecutions should be
prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such
promptitude should be vigorously maintained.
They are not merely acts of grace, but checks
imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant
activity from its subalterns, and to secure for
criminal trials the best evidence that can be
obtained." (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny
petitioner the benefits accruing from the liberal
construction of prescriptive laws on criminal
statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality
of the State. Any bar to or cause of interruption in
the operation of prescriptive periods cannot
simply be implied nor derived by mere
implication. Any diminution of this endowment
must be directly and expressly sanctioned by the
source itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter
must be resolved in favor of the grantee thereof,
the accused.

The foregoing conclusion is logical considering

the nature of the laws on prescription. The
exceptions to the running of or the causes for
the interruption of the prescriptive periods
may and should not be easily implied. The
prescriptive period may only be prevented
from operating or may only be tolled for
reasons explicitly provided by the law.