Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes

Author(s): Sarah Broadie

Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 101 (2001), pp. 295-308
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
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 XIV*-SOUL AND BODY IN PLATO
AND DESCARTES'

bySarahBroadie

ABSTRACT Althoughtheyare oftengroupedtogetherin comparison withnon-

dualisttheories,Plato'ssoul-bodydualism,and Descartes'mind-body dualism,
are fundamentally different.
The doctrines
examinedare thoseof the Phaedo
and theMeditations. fromwhichothersflow,liesin Plato's
The maindifference,
acceptanceand Descartes'rejectionoftheassumption thatthesoul (= intellect)
is identicalwithwhatanimatesthebody.

W henphilosophy
teachers the'-ism's'pertinent
present to
mind-body relations,and arestillat thebroad-brush stage,
quite oftenone findsthempairingPlato and Descartesas the
twomosteminent dualistsof ourWesterntradition. As Plato to
thethrough-and-through materialistDemocritus, so Descartesto
Gassendi,it is oftensuggested-reasonably, perhaps.As the
modernnon-reductive materialistto his Cartesianbetenoir,so
Aristotleto Plato on soul-bodyrelations,we are sometimes
told-a misleading analogy,somethink.For thepurposeofcon-
trastwithvariousnon-dualist viewsitmayseemusefulto group
Plato'sdualismand thatofDescartestogether, and inmanycon-
textstheirdifferences may not matter.But if one simplycom-
paresthetheorieswitheach other,notwithanythirdsystem, the
differences
are fascinating and seemimportant.
Of coursethereare similarities to sustainthe initialpairing.
Bothphilosophers arguethatwe consistof something incorpor-
eal,whether one callsit 'mind'or 'soul',whichforthetimebeing
is somehowunitedwitha bodythatis partofthephysicalworld.
Both identifythe self,the 'I', withthe incorporealmemberof
thisalliance.Both hold thatmy mindor soul will survivethe
demiseofthebodybywhichI am nowpresentto thisaudience-
whichin turnis presentto methrough itsmembers'bodies.Both

1. A versionof thispaper was deliveredas the2000 FoersterLectureon theImmor-

talityof the Soul, at the University
of Californiaat Berkeley.
*Meetingof the AristotelianSociety,held in Senate House, Universityof London,
on Monday,4thJune,2001, at 4.15 p.m.

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296 SARAH BROADIE

may be understoodas holdingthatthemindor soul can exist

altogetherindependently of body, though Plato may have
changedpositionon thispoint.2Both are concernedwiththe
immortality of thesoul.
Here I shallfocuson separability of mindor soul frombody
in Plato's Phaedo and Descartes'Meditations. But firsta word
about terms.SeveraltimesalreadyI have said 'mindor soul' as
ifthewordsmeantthesame,whichof coursetheydo not.Plato
consistentlyspeaksofthesoul (psuche?), butnotso Descartes.In
his prefaceaddressed to the theologiansat the Sorbonne
Descartesclaimsthathe willprovetheimmortality of thesoul.
He is usingthechurch'slabel forthedoctrine, butit is doubtful
thatwhathe thoughthe could proveis whatthechurchmeans
by thephrase.Roughly,I suppose,thechurch'smeaningspot-
lightsthe humanindividualminusa biologicalbody. It is this
thatcan sin and be forgiven, is summonedto the Last Judge-
ment,has prayerssaid for its salvation.But what Descartes
believedhecouldshowis theimmortality ofthemindor intellect,
and althoughthemind,as he was foreverstressing, is proneto
errorand shouldbe expectedto conductitselfaccordingto an
intellectualcode of conduct,its errorsare not sins or offences
against morality.In more philosophicalcontextsDescartes
explicitly mindfromsoul,reserving
distinguishes 'soul' forthat
whichanimatesthebody.In thissenseof 'soul' he eitherdenies
thatany such principleexistsor reducesit to a physicalcon-
figuration.The biologicaldifference betweena livingbodyand a
corpseis the purelyphysicaldifference betweena machinein
workingorderand one thatis brokenor wornout.
So what Descartesis leftwith,in additionto his machine-
body-if his or any otherbodyevenexists,whichat thebegin-
ningof the Meditationshe calls into doubt-is a mindwhose
businessis to thinkand imagine,but not to animateany cor-
porealsystem. And sinceit is himself thathe findsthinking, and
sincehe is unable,no matterhowhardhe tries,to doubthisown
existenceas this currently thinkingthing,Descartesidentifies
himselfwiththismind.Butat first he is notin a positionto assert
that he, or the mindthat is he, can existwithoutthe body,

2. In theTimaeusitis takenforgrantedthattheworld-soul musthavea body;and

purifiedhumanintellectsreturn
to spatiallocations
instars.

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 SOUL AND BODY IN PLATO AND DESCARTES 297

becauseprimafacie it is possiblethatthemind'sexistenceor its

essentialactivity of thinking dependson bodyin someway.For
eventhoughtheminddoes notrequirebodyin thewayin which
an animating principlepresumably requiresa bodyifit is to do
its thingof animatingsomething, themindmaydependon the
bodyin some otherway,a way in which,so to speak,it is the
body thatgiveslifeto the mind,muchas an arrangement of
particlesgives rise to a magneticfield.Later on, however,
Descartesmaintains thataccordingto hisclearand distinct ideas
of mindand body,neitherof thesenaturescontainsor refers to
the other.And meanwhilehe takeshimselfto have established
thateverything he clearlyand distinctly perceivesis true.Hence
he can concludethatmind,and perhapssoul in thetheological
sense,is separablefrombody,whichis thebasis forprovingthe
mindor soul immortal.
Or, more precisely,Descartescan concludethatmind and
bodyare separablefromeach otheronce he is freeof his initial
wholesaledoubtconcerning therealexistence ofbody.For obvi-
ouslyifthephysicalworldis onlyhisfinite mind'sdreamobject,
neitherit nor any of its partscan existindependently of that
dreaming. And in that case it may not be easyto showthatthe
finitemindthatdreamssuch a dream-a dreamin whichit is
embodiedand itsbodyis partofa physicalworld-can be freeof
dreaming thisor otherdreamslikeit.Butifwe taketheopposite
hypothesis, thatthephysicalworldexistsindependently, thenthis
world,especiallythe part of it that is Descartes'body, can
reasonablybe heldresponsible fortheappearancesof thephysi-
cal thatare presentto Descartes'mind.In thatcase it is reason-
able to assumetheseappearanceswillceasewhenbodyand mind
actuallyseparate.The mindwill thenbe phenomenally unem-
bodiedas wellas reallyso. But as longas it is uncertain whether
thephysicalis realindependently ofthefinitemind,one can sup-
pose thateitherthismindgenerates theappearancesfromitself,
or theyare causedin it byGod. But sincethefinite mindcannot
be separatedfromGod anymorethanit can be separatedfrom
itself,on eitherofthesehypotheses thecause of theappearances
is necessarilyalwayswiththatfinite mind-so whyshoulditever
be withouttheappearances? It is truethatin thesixthMeditation
Descartessays he can clearlyand distinctly understand himself
to be a completebeingevenwithouthis facultyof sensoryand

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298 SARAH BROADIE

imaginational appearances.Fromthishe concludesthathe or his

mindcan existwithoutthatfacultyand its objects.It follows
fromthis that those objects,the empiricalappearances,arise
neitherfromhis own intellectual naturenor directly fromGod
whois alwayspresentto,or evenin,hismind.ThusDescartesis
onlyone stepaway fromconcludingthattheimmediatesource
oftheseappearancesmustbe something altogetherdifferent
from
mind,bothfromthefinitemindthatis Descarteshimself, and
fromthe infinite mindthatis God. In sum,the sourceof the
appearancesmustbe a corporealsubstance, a realphysicalthing
thatexistsindependently of Descartes'mind.
But letus stopour thinker beforehe takesthatlast step,and
questionhim about his premiss.If he or his mindreallyis or
would be a completebeingminusthe facultyof sensoryand
imaginational appearances,why,byhis ownadmission, do these
appearancesbesethim so? No doubt theyfade away whenhe
completely absorbshimselfin puremathematics or in thoughts
aboutGod and aboutpurefinite mind,ifthereis sucha thingas
purefinite mind.But in Descartes'ownexperience theempirical
appearancesalwaysreturn.So perhapsit is the natureof his
mindto conjurethemup foritselfagainand again,or to become
receptive againand againto theseeffects causedin himbyGod.
If,on carefulreflection,
one can considerthispossible,Descartes
is mistakenin claimingthatthehumanmindcan attaina clear,
distinctand completeidea of itselfas existingfreeof empirical
appearancesto itself.
Thatthesesometimes recedewhenthemind
is abstractlyengageddoes notprove that theyare notamongthe
objectsnaturalto it or naturallyservedup to it immediately by
God. For whereis it written thatall themind'snaturalobjects
are presentto it at once? Certainly, Cartesiandoubtcan save
Descartesfromregardingtheseappearancesas anything more
thanphenomenal, buthe knowsfromexperience thatdoubtcan-
not put an end to the phenomenaas such. He may alwaysbe
saddledwiththem,then,evenifonlyas appearancesrecognised
as such.In thissense,a sortof phenomenalist sense,the self's
body and physicalenvironment may be as immortalas the
humanmind.
Thus Descartes'ideas of himselfor hismindare not,I think,
able to show thatthe humanmindis in everysenseseparable

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 SOUL AND BODY IN PLATO AND DESCARTES 299

frombody.To showthis,he mustfallback on theindependent

attractiveness of the thoughtthat'real' or 'externally' existing
bodyis whatcausestheempiricalappearances.Thisis ofcourse
an independently attractivethoughtto theextentthatit is unat-
tractive to supposethatGod (whomDescarteshas by now pro-
ved to existand to be hiscreator)deceivesor meanlyfrustrates
a finitemindlike that of Descartes.For insofaras Descartes
cannothelptakingtheempiricalappearancesto be of indepen-
dentlyexisting bodies,ifDescarteswerealwaysmistakenin this
thenGod wouldbe a deceiver;and evenif Descartescan break
out of thedeceptionby meansof systematic doubt,God would
be cruelin makingtheescape dependon a methodso hardfor
thehumanmind.
So if one is a Cartesian,thepositionthatmindis separable
frombody,not only ontologically but also phenomenally, is
securedby meansof twoconclusions:if thereis any suchthing
as a reallyexistingbody,mindis not existentially dependent on
it; and: body reallyexistsand is the separablecause of mind's
corporealexperiences.
I wantnow to say something about the universality of Car-
tesianseparability, and something about whatunitesthesepar-
ables while they are together.These are points on which
Descartesand Plato differ fundamentally. First,universality:in
claimingthat mind and body are ontologicallyseparable,
Descartes,of course,claimsmuchmorethanthata givenmind
can existapartfroma givennaturalbody.Separability is guaran-
teedforhimby theessenceof mindin generaland theessence
of bodyin general.Fromhis ideas of theseessenceshe believes
he can see thatmind-any mind-can existapartfrombody-
anybody,and viceversa(Meditation6). This is in linewiththe
Church'steaching,accordingto whicheveryhumansoul comes
to theLast Judgement eitherstrippedofbodyaltogether, or with
a sortof supernatural bodythroughwhichit can communicate
and suffer, butwhichis notsetin a naturalphysicalenvironment
and is notsubjectto thelaws of physicalnature.
Phenomenalseparability, as I am callingit,is likewiseuniver-
sal fortheCartesianinsofaras theCartesianholdsthatmindas
such is subject to corporealappearancesbecause and only
becausean associatedrealbodycausesthem.It followsfromthis

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300 SARAH BROADIE

premissthatforanymindM, once thecausal nexusbetweenM

and realbodyis broken,M is automatically separatednot only
fromrealbodybutalso fromall corporealappearances.3
In sum:bothontologically and phenomenally, thepossibility
thata humanmindis linkedto corporealthings, and thepossibil-
ityofitsnotbeingthuslinked,flowfromthenaturecommonto
all humanminds;and a mind'sactuallinkageor non-linkage is
or is based on itsstandingor not standingin causal nexuswith
something metaphysically externalto itself.Its linkageor notto
corporealthingsis therefore notdetermined byanyinternal men-
tal dispositionof its own, stillless by any internalrespectin
whichone particular humanmindmaydiffer fromanother,for
examplein respectof stronginvolvement in a certaintypeof
pursuit.ConsiderDescarteshimself in his unusualifnotunique
enterpriseofseekingcertainty through doubt.Thisextraordinary
practicecan surelybe describedas a lettinggo of thecorporeal
perspective, and it leads him,or so he thinks,to theproofthat
mindand bodyareontologically separable.Butthisproofapplies
even to mindssunkin ordinaryhabitsof thinking, mindsfor
whichCartesiandoubtis meaningless and impossible.And this
proofis not performatively givenin thepractice,but is derived
fromindependent truthswhichthepracticeuncoversas suitable
startingpoints.ThuswhatDescartesproveswhenhe provessep-
arationpossibleis a truththatwouldhold evenifno mindever
engagedin Cartesianor similardetachment. It surelysuitsthe
doctorsof orthodoxtheologythatDescartespresents themwith
thediscovery of a truththatis likethetruthsoflogicand math-
ematicsand Cartesianphysicsin thatit holds no matterwhat
any of us maythinkor feelabout anything. This is by contrast
with any factsor possibilitieshe himselfmightbringabout
througha mentalactivity willedby him.
Now forthequestionof whatunitestheCartesianseparables
whentheyare together. It is not the finitemind'sown agency
thatconnectsit witha body whichit thenfeelsto be its own.
Thiscouldonlybe donebyan act ofwillon thepartofthefinite
mind.But althoughDescartesregardshis willas 'not restricted
in anyway' (Meditation 4), itsunrestricted domainturnsout to

3. For Descartes these include memoriesso far as the latterdepend on images

groundedin the body.

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 SOUL AND BODY IN PLATO AND DESCARTES 301

consistentirelyof propositions to whichhe maychoose not to

assentwhentheyfailto be clearand distinct.This unrestricted
willis nota willto bringanything aboutexceptitsownassertion
and denialofalreadyconstituted truthsand falsehoods.For this
unrestrictedwillbelongsto Descartesinsofaras he is pureintel-
lect.On its own,therefore, it cannottake as its objectsthings
that are sensedor imagined,for accordingto Descartessuch
thingscan be presentto themindonlywhenit is alreadyunited
withthebody.Consequently, theexplanation forthisunioncan-
notbe thatthefinite mindwantsor willsto be connectedwitha
particularbody,or withsomeparticular bodyor other.For with-
out senseexperience we couldnothavean idea,eitherdefinite or
ofa particular
indefinite, body.And presumably anyexplanation
in termsofthemind'swantingto be connectedwithbodywould
attendto whatit feelsliketo have a body-the mindwouldbe
assumedto havea senseofwhatthatfeelslike,and to be drawn
towardsa corresponding existence as ifitwouldbe at homein a
body. But for Descartes such feelingsand the imaginationof
themcan onlyarisewhenthemindis alreadyembodied,so they
cannotexplainembodiment.
Nor can we explainit byturning to bodybyitself.Obviously,
body by itselfis powerlessto connectitselfwitha mind.Only
God, a thirdbeingofinfinitepower,can causebyhiswilla union
betweensubstancesof suchmutuallyaliennaturesas mindand
body.Of courseeveryarrangement of finitethingsdependson
thewillof God, butotherarrangements, sayofbodywithbody,
fall withina naturalsystemand can be explainedby familiar
secondary causesaccordingto thesystem's laws.Mindand body,
however,fall withinno such single system,accordingto
Descartes;theiruniontherefore speaksdirectly ofa supernatural
cause. On presentshowing,thiscause is as different fromfinite
mindas it is fromfinitebody,sincethelatterare bothdevoidof
thethirdthing'spowerto unitethem.In thisrespect,thefinite
mindis as passiveand inertas matteris traditionally supposed
to be.
Let me now turnto Plato.
Readersof thePhaedosometimes takePlato to taskforcon-
fusingsoul as mindor thatwhichthinks, withsoul as thatwhich
animatesthe body.Perhapsthisis a terrible mistake.But it is
not a confusionin the senseof a blundercommitted en route

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302 SARAH BROADIE

to something else. For the identification of thinking soul with

animating soul is Plato's theoryin thePhaedo.
In trying to understand this,one mightseemto discerna close
analogybetweenthinking and animating if one identifiesthink-
ingwiththeexerciseofintelligence and assumes,as is naturalfor
manypeople,thatthepracticalsphereis thearenaforexercising
intelligence. For thepersonof practicalintelligence is switched
on to thepracticaldemandsof his situationin a waynotunlike
the way in whicha perceptually sensitiveorganismis switched
on to signalsin theenvironment and its own body,4and again
notunlikethewayin whichtheelementsof a physiological sys-
temare switchedon and offby chemicalsignalsin theinterest
ofpurelybiologicalanimation.Again,someonewhois irrespon-
sive to thingsthatinterest mostpeople may be said not to be
properly alive,and evennotto be properly animating his body.
In sayingthiswe need not mean thathe functions below par
physiologically; we mayinsteadbe regarding hisbodyas a social
presence,an instrument foractionand communication, which
comesto lifewhenactivated.Beingalive on thislevelpresup-
poses being biologicallyalive, and for most normal human
beings,beingbiologically aliveautomatically resultsinlifeon the
levelof practice,exceptforwhentheyare sleeping.These two
modesof beingaliveare linkedin sucha waythat,ratherthan
deemingthemanalogous,one might,moreprimitively perhaps,
failto distinguish them,and thusconflatewhatthinkswithwhat
animatesthebody.
Plato's view,however,is quitedifferent, becauseforhimthe
paradigmexerciseof intelligence is theoreticalor at anyratenot
immediately practical:it deals in universalsand abstractions, it
is conductedat leisurefrompracticallife,and it has no palpable
effectsexcepton thethoughts ofoneselfand a fewinterlocutors.
Platobelievesthatthesoulthinksbestwhendissociatedfromthe
body.He has tworeasons:one is theobservation thatwe cannot
engagein thekindofthinking thatforhimis thinking par excel-
lencewhenwe are physically activeand attending to goingson
in our bodiesand in our physicalenvironment; and theotheris
histheorythatthesoul has latentwithinita supremely pureand
beautifulkindof knowledgewhichit could onlyhave come by

4. Thus phronein(= 'to have one's witsabout one') rangesin meaningfrom'to be

sane' to 'to be conscious'.

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 SOUL AND BODY IN PLATO AND DESCARTES 303

beforebirthinto a body. Since the thinking soul is at its best

whenin fullcontactwiththe objectsof thisknowledge, Plato
concludesthatthebestthingthatcan happento thissoul is to
be separatedfrombodyupon death.
So farone mightthinkthatPlato'sthinking soul cannotposs-
iblybe whatanimatesthebody;forit seemsabsurdto suggest
thatsomething bothanimatesa bodyand is a pureintellect that
functions bestaway fromthebody.But in fact,thebeliefthat
the soul is an intellectthatfunctions best away frombody is
precisely one of two assumptions thatlie at thebase of Plato's
equationof intellectwithanimator.The secondassumptionis
thatthisself-same intellect is also intimately connectedwiththe
body.The argument forthisis mediatedby theconceptof the
self.On the one hand it is naturalforSocratesand his inter-
locutorsin thePhaedoto identify themselves withtheirintellects.
Afterall, if you are Socratesand I am Simmiasin thePhaedo,
thenwhatare you and I engagedin ifnotparadigmatic intellec-
tion,whileminimally usingourbodiesto exchangeourthoughts?
If we could thinkat our bestwithouteverexchanging thoughts,
or could exchangethoughtsby somenon-physical means,then
we as intellects
wouldnotneedbodiesat all. On theotherhand,
though,each one ofus knowshimself to be in or intimately con-
nectedwitha body.And Socrates'friends knowthisof Socrates,
or whywouldtheydreadlosingSocratesoncehisphysicaldeath
has beendecreed?So theselfthatis Socrates'intellect is theself
boundup withhis body.And thefactthatin thislifethesoul
functions bestas intellect whenleastinvolvedin bodilyactivity
and sensation, together withthedoctrinethatthesoul'sintellec-
tualactivity was at itsabsolutebestwhenthesoul was attached
to no body,now strongly pointsto theconclusionthatintellec-
tual activitywaxesas bodilyinvolvement wanesand viceversa.
And sinceit is naturalto thinkof bare biologicalanimationas
thelimiting case ofa soul'sbodilyinvolvement, and as thebasic
formwhichmore complicatedforms-the ones expressedin
actionsand emotions-dependon and presuppose, it is notdif-
ficultto drawthefurther conclusionthatthesoul thatcan func-
tionas pureintellect is thesameas thesoul thatkeepsthebody
alive.5
5. If bare biologicalanimationis thoughtof as continuousin kind withintelligent
physicalactivitysuchas playingtennisor cooking,itwillseemplausiblethattheoreti-
cal contemplation at itsfullestdependson suspensionof animation,sinceit seemsto
be a fact,and not a merelycontingent one, thatattentionused in theoretical
contem-

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304 SARAH BROADIE

But now if one and the same entity,the soul, can function
bothas unembodiedintellect and as animatorof a body,what
determines it to one of thesefunctions ratherthan the other?
And sincetheyare alternatives, and thesoul is capableof both,
is neitherfunction essentialto it,anymorethana pieceof wax
is essentiallytheshapeofa ball oressentially theshapeofa cube?
Butifneither functionis essentialto thesoul,we havebeentold
nothingof the soul's nature.If, on the otherhand, both are
essential,whatunitesthem?
Accordingto the theoryof the Phaedo, the soul becomes
involvedwitha bodybecauseit desiresto livein a wayin which
it onlycan ifit has a bodyof suitablekind.To beginwith,per-
haps,thesoul is notorientedto anyveryspecificsetof physical
activitiesor pleasures,sinceit has no experienceof any. So to
beginwithperhapsall thatit takesto involvea soul withbody
is thesoul'sfailureto understand or fullybelievethatitsexistence
can be completeas a pure intellect. Not realizingthis,it feels
incomplete, and thisbreedsthedesireforsomenon-intellectual
activity;and lo and beholdthesoul findsitselfwitha body,and
presumably a physicalenvironment, of a sortthatwouldenable
it to livein thewayit thoughtwouldbringit completeness, but
whichin fact,of course,does nothingof thekind.Now it is in
thebodyof a humanbeing,or perhapsa humanmale,and ifit
continuesto misunderstand its own originalnature-whichis
easiernow forit to do, sinceit has cometo feelat homein an
actual physicalexistence, and to becomehabituatedto various
kindsofembodiedpleasures-thenit seeksto be in a body,and
alwaysa bodythatwouldbestexpresstheway it wantsto live.
So on physicaldeath,a soul in thisstateis reincarnated, perhaps
as anotherhumanbeing,but also perhaps(so Plato held,to the
greatembarrassment ofsomeofhisadmirers) as a loweranimal,
say a pig or wolfwhosewallowingor raveninglife-style fleshes
out thesoul's mostpreciouspreviousdesires.6 Alternatively,
the
plationis attentiontakenaway fromintelligent
physicalactivity, and viceversa.Plato
modelsintellection on dreaming,whichthesoul is freeto do onlywhennotgoverning
thelimbsand perceivingthroughthesenseorgansin wakinglife(cf.theHippocratic
treatiseOn Dreams [RegimenIV], 86). However,Plato thenturnsthingsroundwith
hisfamiliardictumthatthewakingworldis thatoftheeternalintelligibles, thedream
worldthatof everydaylife.
6. Aristotlewas unfairif he meantto includePlato in his criticismof thePythagor-
eans forassigning'any chancesoul to anychancebody' (De AnimaI 3, 407b 20-24).

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 SOUL AND BODY IN PLATO AND DESCARTES 305

embodiedsoul mayinclinetowardsdisembodiment, and achieve

it or come closerto achievingit by practising its intellectuality
and rejecting physicaland worldlyenthusiasms. This is why,in
thePhaedo,about-to-die Socratestriesto comfort hisfriendsby
tellingthemthatifdeathis theseparationofsoul frombody,the
philosopher shouldbe gladto die,sincethephilosopher has lived
his presentlifegladlypractising fordeathby losinghimselfto
intellectualactivity.
In Plato,then,thequestionof separability of soul frombody
is not a simpleone. In the firstplace, everyembodiedsoul is
separablefromits currentbody, since the soul is immortal,
whereasanygivenbodywillwearout. Secondly,everysoul is in
principleseparablefrombodyaltogether, sinceeveryembodied
soul is in principle,
or at least by virtueof its originalnature,
able to refineitselfto the pointwhereit wantsnothingthata
body can provide.However,sayingthis is a bit like saying:
humanbeingsby naturecan live withoutheroinor cocaine;
heroinand cocaineaddictsarehumanbeingsbynature;therefore
theycan livewithoutheroinor cocaine.Grantedtheyhave the
capacity,theylack the powerto exerciseit as of now,just as
humanbeingsby contrastwithbull-frogs have thecapacityto
speak severaldifferent languages,but someonewho has never
learnta foreign languagelackstheabilityto exercisethishuman
capacity.In thissense,someembodiedsoulscannotliveseparate
froma body suitedto theirdesires,whileothers,a minority
perhaps,can.
Accordingto thispicture, thebodyis simplytheinstrument of
thesoul,a viewthatAristotle too wouldendorseat one stageof
hiscareer.Thatis, thesoul does notdependon thebodyexcept
to do throughit something thatit wantsto do. Thusit fashions
and animatesitsbodyforthesake of physicalaction,sensation
and experience. Thatthesoulcan do thisifitchoosesgoesalong
withthethought, whichwe findagain and again in Plato,that
the soul is divineor godlike.This meansthatin itselfit has a
sortof limitedomnipotence. If it willsor reallydesiresa certain
kindoflifeforitself,its'willis done' evenifit willswhatis bad
forit: automaticallyit comesto be equippedwithwhatis neces-
sary.But onceit is in a body,ofcourse,whatit can bringabout
is limitedbythenatureof itsbodyand theenvironment.
So to answerour earlierquestionsabout the essence of
soul-the soul forPlato is essentially a valuingpower:a power

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306 SARAH BROADIE

to createand maintainforitselfthelifeittrulydesiresand thinks

good, alongwiththatlifestyle's accoutrements or freedomfrom
accoutrements. Its purelyintellectualfunctionand itsbody-ani-
matingfunctionrepresent different bentsor inclinations.If we
considersoulin generaland in theabstract, itis presumably con-
tingent whether soulis embodied,and embodiedthiswayor that,
or whether it is pureintellect.Whatis essentialand fundamental
is soul's determinability, in contrary
in factself-determinability,
ways.If,however, we consideran individual soul,itsdeterminate
condition-its beingembodiedor not, and if embodiedthen
how-is all butfundamental forthisindividual.For on theone
hand this conditionreflectsthe individual'scurrently dearest
values,and on the otherhand it affectsalmosteverything the
individualdoes and experiences in itscurrentlife.
We maywonderhow thesoul is supposedto takeon a body.
Plato sayslittleaboutthis.At one pointhe seemsto suggestthat
thesoul 'weaves'a bodyforitself.7 Certainlyhe does not want
to implythatthesoul has handsand movesa shuttleto and fro.
The idea presumably is thatthe soul informs certainmaterials
whichin its presencegrow and organisethemselves into the
requisitebody.A previously embodiedsoul maystartwithsome
matterfromitspreviousbody.8Plato showsno signof holding
thatthesoul createsitsbodyex nihilo.
Some philosophers mightbalk at the idea thatthe soul has
powerto re-arrange matter.They might,if theyacceptedthe
existenceof the soul at all, feel more comfortable with the
thoughtthat the soul actuallydreamsits body and physical
environment. Someworkwouldthenhaveto be doneto explain
whether, and ifso, how,soulsdreaming differentphysicaldreams
nonetheless in somesensesharea worldwitheach other.Butthis
is not Plato's problem,forhe does not strikeout in theidealist
direction.
It is sometimes suggestedthatone needsto have been bitten
by thebug ofexternal-world scepticism beforeone can seriously
consideridealism.Certainly thebugofexternal-world scepticism
did notgetto Plato. Butthereis something elseone shouldbear
7. Phaedo 87b-e. The weavingidea occursas partof a viewthatis rejected,butwhat
is rejectedis not the weaving,but the thoughtthat,as withan actual weaver,the
soul mightcease to existbeforewearingout its finalcoat.
8. Cf. Phaedo 80c-81c.

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 SOUL AND BODY IN PLATO AND DESCARTES 307

inmindwhenconsidering Plato'ssilenceon thesegreatquestions

ofmodernphilosophy. The factis thatfromthepointofviewof
Platonicethicalconcern,whichis a pointof viewthatpervades
mostof the dialogues,it makesno difference whetherthe soul
choosesto dream,and thenbecomesaddictedto dreaming, its
embodiment, or whetherit choosesand thenbecomesaddicted
to lifemediatedby a real,independently existing,bodyin a real
physicalenvironment.9 WhereasforDescartesthismakesall the
difference-onewayGod is a deceiver,theotherwaynot-for
Plato eitherway the soul in questiongetswhat it wants,and
is just as misguidedin wantingit if the body turnsout to be
independently realas it wouldbe ifthebodywereitsfantasy.
I have been comparingPlato's argument in the Phaedowith
Descartes'in theMeditations thatsoul is separablefrombody.
Let me end by comparingsomeof thewiderpurposesof those
arguments. Plato offers theargument ofthePhaedoas, interalia,
an instanceand exampleof thekindof intellectual exercisethat
loosens the human soul's attachmentto its body. Since the
attachment reflectsthesoul'smisunderstanding ofthetruenature
of happiness,thePhaedoargument, forthosewho enterintoit,
is an exercisein soul-saving.By contrast,what Descartesdis-
coverswhen he discovershis reasonsfor declaringthe mind
separablefromthe body is entirely differentfromthe intellec-
tualization he himself undergoes in orderto reachtheproof.And
he cannotovertly, evenifhe is inclinedso inwardly, claimthis
refinement as a sortof soul-saving withoutrunningfoulof the
religionof his time.For althoughthisreligiondiffered within
itselfon how muchfaithcountsforsalvation,and how much
works,thesewerethe onlyoptionsconsidered,and Descartes'
activity does notcomeundereither.Instead,hisavowedpurpose
in following thepathof theMeditations fromdoubtto himself,
and fromhimself to theGod whois nota deceiver, is to establish
'something firmand lastingin the sciences',10 i.e. mathematics
and mathematical physics.
This is an extremely puzzlingremarkif it meansthatthese
sciencesfailas sciencesiftheycannotbe rendered indubitable by
9. Plato can of coursemake thisdistinctionevenif,as I am arguing,itdoes notcarry
forhima burningquestion;but theword'real' used as above would presumablynot
be his tool formakingit,sincehis realia are immutableForms.
10. MeditationI, firstparagraph.

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308 SARAH BROADIE

an argument thatfirstdoubtsand thenreinstates theclearand

distinctideas on whichsuchinquiriesdepend.For themathema-
tician'sperformance as suchis not less clearor less accurateif
he lacks a proofto the effectthatalthoughthe mostrigorous
mathematics conceivableto man can be doubted,nonetheless in
the end we are theologically justifiedin acceptingthem.But
surelyDescartes'hopeis notto makethemathematician a more
successful mathematician, butratherto showtherestof us that
mathematical scienceinitsownspherecarriesthesameauthority
as divinerevelation in its,sincebothcomefromthesamesource.
Rightly understood, thepracticeofsuchabstractstudies,though
nota religiousexercise, is notseculareither,foritexpresses God
as reasonor the naturallight.Plato would surelyhave agreed
thatit is notsecular,buthe couldnothaveimaginedthehistori-
cal contextthatmadeit so important forsomeonein Descartes'
positionto distinguish priestand mathematical scientist,
in effect
postulating at leasttwokindsof 'highercalling',one devotedto
faith,theotherto reason.

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