(Thijl Sunier, Nico Landman (Auth.) ) Transnational PDF

Transnational Turkish Islam
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0001
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DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0001
Transnational Turkish
Islam: Shifting
Geographies of
Religious Activism and
Community Building
in Turkey and Europe
Thijl Sunier
Professor of Anthropology, VU University Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
and
Nico Landman
Associate Professor of Islamic Studies, Utrecht University,
The Netherlands
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0001
© Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman 2015
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this

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Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
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in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
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DOI 10.1007/978-1-137-39422-4
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Contents
Acknowledgements vii
Introduction 1
1 Islam and Politics in Turkey 9
Introduction 10
Stage 1 (1923–1945) 12
Stage 2 (1946–1979) 15
Stage 3 (1980–2002) 22
Stage 4 (2003–present) 25
2 Turkish Organized Islam in Europe 29
Introduction 30
Turkish migration to Europe 31
Political culture, legal arrangements, and the
Islamization of migrants 33
Organizational development: Turkish Islam 37
3 Diyanet 46
Introduction 47
Origins 48
To Europe 49
Organizational dimensions 51
Worldviews, goals, and agendas 54
4 Süleymanlıs 57
Introduction 58
Origins 58
To Europe 60
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0001 v
vi Contents
5 Milli Görüş 68
Introduction 69
Origins 69
To Europe 73
6 Gülen-movement (Hizmet) 81
Introduction 82
Origins 83
To Europe 87
7 Alevis 95
Introduction 96
Origins 97
To Europe 101
8 Other Movements and Organizations 107
Nationalism and Islam 108
Islamic radicalism: the Kaplan movement 112
Conclusions, Dynamics, and Tendencies 114
Bibliography 121
Index 134
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0001
Acknowledgements
This book is the result of an analysis of primary and
secondary sources on Islam in Turkey and in several
countries in Europe and beyond. In addition to these
sources we have collected first-hand information about
the current situation in a number of selected countries in
Europe that are discussed in the book. In such a situation
and with limited time at our disposal, it was absolutely
vital, but first and foremost a great privilege, to have an
extended network of colleagues and friends across Europe
who were willing to provide us with the data we were after.
Especially the network around the Journal of Muslims in
Europe (JOME) and the rich source of data provided by
the ongoing Yearbook of Muslims in Europe project were
essential for our search.
Special thanks are due to Dr. Kerstin Rosenow-Williams
of the Ruhr University in Bochum, Germany; to Prof. Dr.
Brigitte Marechal of the University of Louvain-la-Neuve; to
Prof. Dr. Samim Akgönül of the University of Strasbourg;
to Dr. Nadia Fadil of the University of Leuven; to Dr.
Egdunas Racius of the University of Vilnius; to Prof. Dr.
Göran Larsson of the University of Gothenburg; and last
but not least to Prof. Dr. Jörgen Nielsen of the University
of Copenhagen, the grand old man of studies on Islam in
Europe and initiator of numerous joint scholarly projects,
plans, and networks on this fascinating research field. They
were all willing to help us out despite their busy schedule.
It goes without saying that the final text of this book is
completely our responsibility.
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0002 vii

Introduction
Abstract: The aim of the book is to give a state-of-the-art
portrait of the Turkish Islamic infrastructure in Europe and
to analyse how the organizational landscape has developed
and changed in the course of the last three decades. There
are three main causes for change: the transformation of
Turkish Muslims from migrants to permanent residents in
European societies, the rooting of Islam in Europe, and the
societal and political changes in Turkey in the past decades.
By presenting an up-to-date portrait and discussing future
trends, the authors critically take issue with the dominant
integration paradigm in Europe that states that Islam
should be ‘domesticated’, cut off from its roots, and adopt
a ‘European’ format. They argue that organized Islam is
embedded in a transnational social, cultural, and religious
field and must be studied as such.
Sunier, Thijl, and Nico Landman. Transnational Turkish

Islam: Shifting Geographies of Religious Activism and
Community Building in Turkey and Europe. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. doi: 10.1057/9781137394224.0003.
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0003 
 Transnational Turkish Islam
From the time of the first waves of labour migration from Turkey to
Europe in the early 1960s there have been initiatives to enable Muslims
to fulfil their religious duties. However, the institutionalization of
Turkish Islam in Europe really took off in the second half of the 1970s
when Turkish Islamic movements became active in Europe. Although
the start of organizational activities and the pace of institutionaliza-
tion differed from country to country, most Islamic movements were
firmly settled in countries with a sizable Turkish Muslim population by
the early 1980s. Today the Turkish Islamic landscape is almost entirely
covered by the major Islamic movements with roots in Turkey. Of all the
Muslim communities the Turks have the most tightly knit organizational
networks and structures, and in many countries in Europe they are in
the forefront of advisory boards, of Muslim networks, and of political
action.
The aim of this book is twofold. We present a state-of-the-art portrait
of the Turkish Islamic infrastructure in Europe and analyse how the
organizational landscape has developed in the course of the last three
decades. There are good and thorough monographs on specific Turkish
Islamic movements, and we in no way pretend to redo the work of the
authors and to reach their depth and completeness. We bring together the
prominent players in the Turkish Islamic field and present a comparative
picture. By doing so we set out some relevant lines and discuss some
future trends with respect to Turkish organized Islam. Currently Turkish
organized Islam is a topic of heated debates in all countries in Europe.
Opinion leaders, politicians, and journalists seem to be rather puzzled
about how Turkish organized Islam will develop, what its influence will
be on the integration of people with a Turkish background into the host
countries, and how the principal actors position themselves now and will
do so in the future. In all European countries policy reports have been
published in order to map out the organizational landscape and to get a
grip on the field and to get answers to pressing policy questions.1
There are plenty of indications to reconsider and explore the current
Turkish Islamic organizational landscape to see where it stands and in
what possible directions the principal actors move. There are three main
reasons to do so: (1) the fundamental transformation of Turkish Muslims
from migrants to permanent residents in European societies, (2) the
rooting of Islam in Europe, and (3) the societal and political changes in
Turkey in the past decades. These changes impact on the ways Turkish
Muslims organize and how they relate to Turkey on the one hand and
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0003
Introduction 
to their European environment on the other. This does not mean that
the Turkish Islamic landscape has already been changed fundamentally
in the past years. It is a sociological truism that established and embed-
ded organizational structures develop only very slowly. Vested positions
and interests, long-term settlements, elaborate agendas, and, last but
not least, sheer numbers make change slow and complex. And it makes
change more difficult to trace.
Yet, the changing circumstances have to be addressed and taken into
consideration when analysing the current Turkish Islamic landscape.
However, with a few exceptions Turkish Islamic organizations have
hardly been assessed in scholarly work on Turkish Islam in Europe. There
is an impressive body of literature that addresses the developments with
respect to Islam in Turkey in recent decades,2 but this has hardly led to
an exploration of Turkish organized Islam in Europe. In comparison to
the early 1990s, there is even a decrease in scholarly attention for Turkish
organized Islam. There are a number of good studies on particular cases
of Turkish organized Islam in particular countries, but the vast major-
ity of publications on Muslims in Europe do not address organizational
aspects.3 Most studies focus on issues of piety, everyday practices and
convictions, or issues related to the legal position of Islam.
This is remarkable since religious life of Muslims in Europe takes place
in institutional and organizational settings. In political negotiations
about the development of religious accommodation, organizations play
a crucial role. In all countries in Europe with a sizable Turkish Muslim
community there are debates and controversies that concern activities
of organized Islam. Especially the cross-border activities of Turkish
organized Islam worries policymakers because they run counter to
what is envisioned for the place of Islam in society. A key feature of the
dominant integration paradigm is the assumption that Islam should be
‘domesticated’, cut off from its roots, and adopt a ‘European’ format. In
the course of the 1980s ‘Islam’ became the principal denominator with
which the background of migrants could be understood and explained
at the cost of other factors such as economic structure and social context
in the host countries. ‘Muslim culture’ rendered an almost timeless
character.
In the early 1990s most governments in Western Europe were increas-
ingly concerned about how to ‘integrate’ Muslims into their societies,
each according to their own political frameworks (Bader, 2007, p. 879).
It was already clear that most migrants would stay permanently and
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0003
 Transnational Turkish Islam
that Islam would be a lasting element in the political and social fabric of
society. An element that became more prominent in the 1990s was the
strong emphasis on the juxtaposition of the perceived liberal and secular
foundations of West-European nation-states and the religious tradi-
tionalism that Muslim immigrants were said to carry with them. The
public debates and policy measures that emerged in the 1990s included
state neutrality, the governance of alterity, but also the perceived roots
of European civilization. They all revolved around the same question:
how to deal with a new Muslim presence and how to defend ‘liberal’
accomplishments against Muslim traditionalism. The terrorist attacks
in the past decade and the ‘war on terror’ have strengthened anxieties
about global events and have led to a further inward turn of European
nation-states, a process of ‘social closure’ (Geschiere and Meyer, 1998).
The worries about young Muslims who joined radical Islamic organiza-
tions in Syria and Iraq have made monitoring and security of Islamic
activity top priority of European governments. The governance of Islam
has become the fastest growing focus of research on Islam in Europe.
The strong emphasis on the nation-state as the prime analytical format
reinforced methodological nationalism and the equation of ‘society’ with
the nation-state but narrowed down the analytical scope and rigour.4
The exclusive focus on the nation-state over the past two centuries has
defined the very concept of migration. Studies on migration processes
have been narrowed down to the question of how nation-states integrate
migrants. Consequently transnational flow as an inherent aspect of
migratory cycles is also caught in a national paradigm (Wimmer and
Glick Schiller, 2002, p. 324). Similarly, the study of Islam in Europe has
implicitly become synonymous with studying how individual states,
with their respective modes of incorporation and integration, national-
ize Islam and integrate Muslims.
Transnational networks of Muslims are considered temporal, at least
undesirable characteristics of religious life in Europe. Muslims must
eventually develop an individualized, ‘private’ Islam that is cut loose
from its former roots. Private transnational networks and contacts
abroad continue to pose a challenge for integration, but they are manage-
able. The transnational activities of foreign states and organizations are,
however, considered to be of a different nature and are generally met
with suspicion and even outrage. The involvement of foreign states in
the lives of their European subjects is a source of contention. This lays
bare the inherent tensions that exist in all migratory cycles across the
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0003
Introduction 
globe between sending states and migrants that seek to sustain transna-
tional linkages as long as possible and receiving states that embark on
a domestication and integration program to turn migrants into citizens
(see Sunier, 2014a).
In this book we critically take issue with this paradigm. There is a
growing tension between ‘Muslim’ as a policy category, as it is applied
in integration programs in different countries of Europe, and the experi-
ences, contacts, and practices of Muslims. Migrants and their offspring
can participate fully in the host society while being oriented towards
the country of origin. We cannot fully understand what goes on in the
lives of individuals when we take national boundaries as the only point
of reference. ‘Migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-
sited transnational social fields’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002,
p. 326). There is an extensive body of literature addressing the dialectical
relationship between the fixing and flow inherent in migration cycles.5
This literature convincingly demonstrates that there is no contradic-
tion between transnational activities and practices on the one hand
and processes of local rooting on the other. Contemporary transnational
networks are not the undesirable remnants of an era of migration that will
disappear eventually. They have rather become more important due to
increased communication means (Bowen, 2004; Grillo, 2004; Grillo and
Soares, 2005). The transnational Islamic organizational landscape must be
approached as an inherent part of religious life of Muslims in Europe.
We consider Islam as a dynamic field, a multi-dimensional and multi-
perspective binding mechanism. Religion is a broad register that links
emotion, affect, and ever-changing senses of belonging and binding of
individuals to political and cultural projects of collective actors and
states (Levitt, 1998; Vasquez and Marquardt, 2003; Werbner, 2002). As
a consequence of processes of globalization and international migra-
tion, nation-states have redressed their role as active cultural and social
agents in continuously evolving discursive fields (see also Ferguson and
Gupta, 2002). As Rose and Miller (1992, p. 177) have argued, ‘It is in this
discursive field that “the state” itself emerges as a historically variable
linguistic device for conceptualizing and articulating ways of ruling’. In
that regard, a sharp distinction between the state as the domain of laws,
rules, and institutionalized power and private initiatives as the domain
of contingent, volatile, and personal exchange overlooks the entangle-
ment and the societal embeddedness of both state and private transna-
tional activity. The increasingly diversified transnational field includes
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0003
 Transnational Turkish Islam
a wide variety of forms, practices, goals, strategies, and motivations

(Vertovec, 2009).
This book deals with Turkish transnational (organized) Islam as a
crucial component of religious life of Muslims of Turkish background
in Europe. We focus on one particular ethnically specific section of the
general Islamic landscapes in Europe. This is not a self-evident choice
and should be underpinned. An obvious reason to do so is of course that
the Islamic landscape in Europe is still ethnically fragmented. Turkish
Islamic movements mainly focus on a constituency with a Turkish back-
ground and Turkish identity and loyalty is an important source of organ-
izational strength. But in addition to that we contend that the complex
dynamics at work among Muslims in Europe require an analytical frame
beyond national perspective. As we argued earlier, a proper analysis takes
on board the changing, but not disappearing, relations with countries
of origin (including the active involvement of states) and the shifting
characteristics of the transnational networks among Muslims. This book
is divided in three parts; one on the changing relation between Islam and
the Turkish state, one on the settlement of Turkish Muslims in European
countries, and one on the main players in the Turkish Islamic field.
The main players in the Turkish Islamic field in Europe are first the
organizational network of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs
(Diyanet), a governmental body that is in charge of official Islamic
activities in Turkey. It controls roughly two-third of the Islamic asso-
ciations in Europe. Diyanet is not an Islamic movement in the strict
sense of the word. In the early 1980s the Directorate decided to extend
its activities beyond Turkish borders. It was the time when there was a
growing need for religious services and accommodation. They were able
to establish regular contacts with European governments. Today they
send out paid imams to Europe, publish religious material, and organize
all kinds of services for Turkish Muslims in Europe. But the extension
of their services to Europe was also motivated by the concerns of the
Turkish government about the growing influence of several Turkish
Islamic movements that were already active for some years, notably the
Süleymanlı movement. The other major player in the field was Milli
Görüş, an Islamic movement founded by supporters of an Islamic party
that has been present in Turkish politics since the late 1960s.
The current Turkish Islamic landscape is also shaped by a relatively
new player, the Gülen-movement. Their history in Europe is somewhat
different from that of the other organizational networks, and their
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0003
Introduction 
activities also differ markedly from the regular religious services that
the others offer. Their focus on relatively young, well-educated Muslims
makes them an essential factor in today’s Turkish Islam.
Most studies on Turkish organized Islam tend to focus exclusively on
Sunni Muslims because they constitute the vast majority of Muslims in
Europe. In the case of Turkish Islam the heterodox Alevi community
should be included in any overview. Their numbers are estimated at
15–20 per cent of the Turks in Turkey and Europe, so a proper assessment
of the Turkish Islamic landscape should pay attention to this important
community.
Apart from the major players in the field there are a number of smaller
associations. These include two ultranationalist political parties that
extended their network to Turkish migrants in Europe, communities of
Turkish Shia Muslims, and a number of Sufi orders active among Turkish
Muslims. We will briefly refer to them in Chapter 8.
In Chapter 1 we present a historical account of the developments in
Turkey with special focus on recent changes in the state-religion rela-
tions and the position of Islam in Turkey. In Chapter 2 we address the
establishment and institutionalization of Turkish Islam in Europe and
the changes in the socio-economic make-up of the Muslim popula-
tion in Western Europe in recent years. These two chapters constitute
the backdrop of the second part of the book that deals with organized
Turkish Islam in more detail (Chapters 3–8). It provides an analysis of
transnational Turkish Islam along organizational lines in a number of
European countries with a sizable Turkish Muslim population. Each of
the relevant Islamic movements will be treated separately in order to
understand their (changing) position in Turkey and in Europe. We have
very deliberately chosen an account of each of the main collective actors,
rather than an account of Turkish Islamic presence in various European
countries. We see the advantages of an analysis of specific national
contexts, but as we have argued we consider a focus on specific Turkish
Islamic movements across national borders, a format that does justice to
their dynamics.
Notes
1 In Germany authorities regularly publish on certain Turkish organizations,
especially Milli Görüş. Throughout Europe the Gülen-movement is subject
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0003
 Transnational Turkish Islam
of public debates, and in the Netherlands already several reports have been
published, commissioned by the government about Turkish organized Islam.
2 See, for example, Azak (2010); Çağlar (2013b); Gözaydın (2009); Turam
(2007); White (2013).
3 Studies on the organizational dimensions include Akgönül (2005); Jonker
(2002); Rosenow-Williams (2012); Schiffauer (2010); Seufert (2014); Yükleyen
(2012).
4 Methodological nationalism ‘is the all-pervasive assumption that the nation-
state is the natural and necessary form of society in modernity; the nation-
state is taken as the organizing principle of modernity’ (Chernillo, 2006, p. 6;
see also Beck, 2000, 2002).
5 See Basch, Glick Schiller, and Blanc (1994); Vertovec (2009).
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0003
1
Islam and Politics in Turkey
Abstract: This chapter addresses the changing relation
between Islam and the Turkish state since the foundation
of the republic in 1923. This is necessary information to
understand the origins of Turkish Islamic organizations in
Europe and the way they have developed since. Rather than
reproducing the simplistic secular-religious dichotomies
that characterize many historical accounts on Turkey, the
authors approach the complex relation between state and
Islam as a political struggle around the question, ‘What
place Islam has and should have in society?’. It shows that
the relationship among religion, politics, and economy
changed fundamentally in each of the four historical
stages to be distinguished. It reveals what issues were at
stake; who the principal actors were; and how Islam was
organized politically and socially.

DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0004 
 Transnational Turkish Islam
Introduction
Although the Turkish Islamic landscape in Europe increasingly develops

according to its own dynamics, the significance of the Turkish context
in co-shaping this landscape has not diminished; it has changed. The
developments in Turkey in the past three decades, particularly those
in the past years with the coming to power of the Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi (AKP; Justice and Progress Party), have prompted existing Islamic
organizations in Europe to reconsider their position vis-à-vis Turkey. But
also the relative success of the Gülen-movement in recent years cannot
be understood without a thorough assessment of the position of Islam in
Turkish society, particularly the changing relation between Islam and the
state. The Turkish context has become part of a larger transnational field
that has transformed from a typical hierarchical migrant-configuration
into a more horizontal network of exchange and interaction. In this
chapter we will address the Turkish context and explore the relevant
traits for the current situation.
In much of the early literature on the foundation of the Turkish
re-public in 1923 and the subsequent societal, cultural, and political
reforms, the transformation has been depicted as a historically necessary
and inevitable process of modernization in which the role of Islam has
been relegated to the private sphere. The founder of the Turkish repub-
lic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, would build a modern, western nation-state
on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.1 Turkey was often depicted as the
phoenix rising from the ashes of more than 600 years of Ottoman rule.
In the rather simplistic image of the Turkish republic that has been
developed since then, the Kemalist revolution was depicted as a ‘total
social and cultural revolution’. The Kemalist takeover had rendered an
almost mythical status, a complete breach with the past. The Ottoman
Empire was an Islamic empire; the Turkish republic was founded on
secular principles. In this way the two societal models were juxtaposed
as each other’s mirror image and found their way into political, educa-
tional, and cultural programs. Islam with all its institutions, principles,
and practices represented obscurantism, while the Kemalist state model
represented progress and modernization. The emerging resistance against
the rigorous and highly symbolic reforms initiated by the Kemalist
government was explained as a struggle between traditional backward-
ness and modernization, old and new, progress, and reactionary forces.
As a political statement the image served the goals of the Kemalists, but
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0004
Islam and Politics in Turkey 
analytically it is an obvious simplification, not least because it reduces

the Kemalist reforms to anti-religious measures whereas the new govern-
ment had a much more extended, predominantly economic agenda. It
also implicitly assumes that the foundation of the Turkish republic in
1923 was the initial and decisive moment of societal reform and thus
ignores the fundamental societal changes that took place in the mid-19-
th-century Ottoman Empire.
The foundation of the Turkish republic is a crucial, symbolically laden
event in the development of the relation between the state and Islam of
over 150 years. However, in terms of societal impact it is not more impor-
tant than subsequent transformations of Turkish society and not least
than those that took place before 1923. The political liberalization that
took place after the Second World War, the economic transformations
in the 1950s and those in the 1980s had in many respects a more trans-
formative effect than the Kemalist revolution. As Turam (2007) argues,
the growth of a civil society in the 1980s has been a crucial condition for
the modernization of the political system in Turkey. Along with Turam
and other scholars we contend that Islamic political actors, rather than
resisting modernization, were decisive forces in that process. The victory
of the AKP in the 2002 elections did not herald the end of the secular
state model of the republic as some critics argue, but the integration of
Islamic societal political and social actors in the secular state (Turam,
2007, p. 8). As Çinar (2006, p. 471) argues, the success of the AKP with
its Islamic program has laid bare the democratic deficit of the Kemalist
model.2 The successive stages in the relation between state and religion in
Turkey clearly show the dynamics of secularism as a political project and
a social imaginary and demonstrate that it is far more complex than the
‘separation of religion and state’. To understand this we need to analyse
the specific traits of Turkish secularism and trace its historical trajectory
and its manifold manifestations.
Four stages can be distinguished in this trajectory. The first stage
(1923–1945) covers the heydays of Kemalist reform. In those years the
state occupied a central role in the reconstruction of society. Many
reforms were implemented top-down. The second stage (1946–1979) is
characterized by political liberalization, the introduction of the multi-
party system, and the emergence of Islam as a political pivot. In the last
part of this stage, migration to Europe reached its peak. Most of the
present-day Turkish Islamic movements and organizations in Europe
arrived towards the end of the 1970s. They were a product of the fierce
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0004
 Transnational Turkish Islam
struggle between ‘official’ state secularism and the oppositional religious

field. From then on events took a different route in Turkey and in
Europe. The third stage (1980–2002) started with the military coup d’état
and is characterized by the emergence and extension of civil society.
An important development in those years was the growth of a relatively
wealthy middle class with an Islamic outlook. In this stage Muslims
entered all segments of society and all spheres of public life. The fourth
stage (2003–present) is marked by the coming to power of the AKP and
its continuous political dominance.
The political struggle in each of these four periods revolves around the
question of the place Islam has and should have in society. It is a strug-
gle about the very foundations of the Turkish state. An analysis of these
four periods reveals what issues were at stake, who the principal actors
were, and how Islam was organized politically and socially. We will show
that each of these stages, rather than delineating sharp ruptures with
the period before, provided the necessary conditions for each following
stage.
Stage 1 (1923–1945)
Although the Kemalist state was modelled after the Western concept
of people’s sovereignty, it was forced upon the population (Kieser,
2013; Lewis, 1968, p. 352). A national ideology was meant to provide
the regime with political legitimacy to rule the entire population,
irrespective of race or ethnic or religious background. Populism, one of
the central creeds of the Kemalist doctrine, not only implied a certain
equality of all people, it was also understood as ‘the people ruling the
people’ (Shaw and Shaw, 1977, p. 378). Consequently, only one party
was allowed according to the Kemalist regime: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
(CHP; Republican People’s Party). This party would promote the new
Turkish national identity. Organization on the basis of class, ethnic-
ity, or religion was forbidden (Toprak, 1981, pp. 38–39). From then on
state sovereignty was no longer based on divine legitimacy, but on the
Kemalist conception of people’s power. There is a considerable similarity
between the position of the Communist Party in the early Soviet Union
and the CHP in that the party, rather than being the organization of
a certain political loyalty, constituted the political vanguard that was
supposed to lead the people.
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Islam and Politics in Turkey 
Reforms with respect to religion had a highly symbolic significance,

but they were certainly not unique. The first series of reform measures
concerned secularisation of state, education, and legal institutions. Many
of these reforms were already initiated almost 75 years earlier during
the so-called Tanzimat reforms and concluded during the rule of the
Young Turks (1908–1918) (Zürcher, 2006, pp. 227–235). Mustafa Kemal
belonged to the radical wing of the Young Turks who were in favour of
a forced process of societal renewal. He considered Islam as a ‘natural’
aspect of the Turkish people, but it could never play any significant role
in the building of the Turkish nation-state (WRR, 2004, p. 98).
Religion, according to the Kemalists, not only had a dominant position in
Ottoman state institutions, it was also thoroughly intertwined with Turkish
society. Consequently it was the task of the state and party to ‘domesticate’
Islam according to Kemalist principles and to build a new secular state.
The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı), founded in
1924, was entrusted with the task of organizing religious services and of
coordinating religious accommodation and religious instruction. Diyanet
was reminiscent of the French Bureau Central des Cultes (Gözaydın, 2008,
p. 218) and served as a format for similar institutions in the Soviet Union.
One of the main goals was the total centralization and reorganization of
religious life in Turkish society. In that respect the Diyanet model had
more far-reaching consequences than the French institute.
In 1931 all mosques were brought under the direct control of a separate
institute, the Directorate for Religious Institutions. All mosques that
were not part of this foundation were de facto illegal. Imams became
employees of the Turkish state, and they were obliged to work according
to strict regulations. The reforms explained here were a reorganization of
Islam, rather than a separation of state and religion. The Turkish concept
laiklik, generally translated as secularism, thus had a different meaning
than the way it is applied in the West (Kinzer, 2001).
The second series of reforms were aimed at secularizing culture, eradi-
cating religious symbols from the public sphere, and transforming the
dominant symbols in society. In 1928 the Arabic script was replaced by
Latin alphabet, and the Turkish language was gradually purified from
Arabic idiom. It was forbidden to do the call to prayer (ezan) in Arabic. A
proposal to even turn Quran recitation into Turkish was not effectuated.
The motivation behind the ‘turkification’ of religious rituals and practices
was the idea that it would cut off the Turkish population from the Arab
world. Many of these early reforms have been turned back in the course
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
of years. A more important aspect of symbolic secularization was the

reconceptualization of history from a Turkish nationalist perspective.
According to the Kemalists the strong link between Islam and the Arab
world had caused a neglect of the historical links between the Turks of
Anatolia and the Turkic people in central Asia. By emphasizing these
ethnic roots they intended to provide their nationalist ideology with a
firm historical basis. The abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the introduc-
tion of the Gregorian calendar and Sunday as the weekly holiday, the
introduction of family names, and the prohibition of certain clothing
were all intended to turn the Turkish people away from the Islamic world
(Toprak, 1981, pp. 40–46; Kinzer, 2001).
The main goal of the secular reforms, however, was the complete
control by the state over the religious field. Not only were the institutions
and symbols of the republic being secularized, the Kemalists intended to
develop a dominant religious domain that was completely subordinate
to the state and subject to strict state control. In the large mosques only
imams who were recognized by the state and trained by the Diyanet
could be appointed. Imams who were not educated in the official institu-
tions could only work in the smaller, more remote mosques. Later on all
religious activity came under state control. Especially in rural areas the
number of religious employees with sufficient knowledge of orthodox
Islamic sources decreased. Religious education in schools was gradually
abolished. An important consequence of this development was that for
a large section of the urban population the role of Islam, even in private
life, became less significant, while the lack of religious leaders in rural
areas with a formal education resulted in the growth rather than the
diminution of Islamic practices and convictions that were fully entangled
with everyday life (Bruinessen, 1982, p. 177). While the role of orthodox
Islam in politics and its influence on the state weakened, the influence
of local ulama and şeyhs among the rural population further increased
(Sunar and Toprak, 1983, p. 426; Sunier, 1996).
This increased influence also had a socio-economic cause. In rural areas,
the existing social, economic, and administrative structures which were
closely intertwined with local religious leadership were largely left intact.
Administrative and economic reforms hardly reached the societal periph-
ery, but the countryside was indirectly affected by the economic reforms.
The economic policies of the government were directed towards develop-
ing a state-owned heavy industry, with the aim of becoming independent
from the West. Industrial development focussed primarily on the already
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Islam and Politics in Turkey 
developed areas in the Western regions of the country. The industrializa-

tion program was funded with revenues from the countryside and thus at
the expense of agriculture (Smit and Velzen, 1982, p. 54). By neglecting the
periphery, traditional power structures remained relatively unaffected.
The side effect of these policies was a certain level of political stability
in the periphery. Although the economic policies led to a widening of the
gap between urban and rural areas, the political neglect functioned as a
valve against protest and resistance. Apart from some incidents no major
rebellions inspired by Islam have taken place. A major reason was the
lack of organizational strength among Muslims in the peripheral areas.
Most groups and brotherhoods (tarikat) had a local base and any mutual
communication, necessary for massive protests, was hardly present.
That does not mean that there was no opposition or protest. However,
this resistance had a strong local character and was based on existing
traditional organizational networks. It was primarily directed against
specific measures of the regime. Most protests also had a messianic
character. The arrival of Atatürk was taken as a sign that the end times
had come (Bruinessen, 1982, p. 175). Yet also new organizational struc-
tures emerged that sought to protect Islam against the regime. In many
places they organized demonstrations. Many of these organizations
were founded by leaders of the influential Nakşibendi-order. The most
important major uprising in 1925 in south-east Turkey was led by the
influential Nakşibendi şeyh Said. However, some observers argue that
nationalist rather than Islamic motives were behind this relatively size-
able rebellion. The insurgents were Kurds (Olson, 1989). The regime
suppressed the uprising with a bloody attack. Subsequently a decree was
issued that outlawed all the tarikats in the course of 1925. In this way
a so-called parallel Islam emerged next to the official Islam monitored
by the state (Dumont, 1984, pp. 364–375; Çakır, 1990). Within these
parallel Islamic networks a wide range of religious services came into
being to replace the atrophied official orthodox Islam in the cities. These
networks constituted the organizational basis for the new organizations
that developed in the period after the Second World War.
Stage 2 (1946–1979)
In 1946 Turkey, forced by the Allies, introduced a multi-party system. This

had profound effects on the place of Islam in society and politics. Islam
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
became a crucial factor in political struggle not only to build up rank-and-

file, but also to establish a new political agenda. In the 1940s 75 per cent
of the population still lived in rural areas. They constituted an important
electoral potential, not just because of their religious affiliation, but also in
relation to the socio-economic situation. The rural areas hardly benefited
from the economic fruits of Kemalist development. The parties that
appeared in the political arena in 1946 not only challenged the monopoly
position of the Republican Party (CHP), but also put the emphasis on
economic development in rural areas (Öktem, 2011, p. 40; Szyliowicz, 1966;
Mardin, 1989).
Due to the poor infrastructural facilities, election campaigns hardly
reached the rural population. Most opposition parties had no organizational
base in the countryside. For that reason, by way of some sort of goodwill
campaign, all parties, including the CHP, proposed to soften the legal and
institutional restrictions on Islam. The CHP still won the first elections in
1946 with a majority in parliament, but in subsequent years and with the
gradual opening up of the countryside their support diminished. In April
1950 the CHP-government decided to grant Diyanet a more autonomous
status and transferred the management of religious accommodation
back to the board of the directorate. A favourable side effect was that
the growing dissatisfaction in the ranks of Diyanet about the control of the
state waned and the prestige of the organization increased again (Gözaydın,
2008, p. 220).
In May 1950 the CHP was defeated in the general elections by the
Demokrat Parti (DP; Democratic Party). In the preceding years the
party had worked hard to build up an electorate by acquiring support
among local Islamic leaders and networks, particularly among support-
ers of the Kurdish Islamic scholar and preacher Said Nursi (1876–1960).
Nursi initially supported the Kemalist revolution, but became an import
opponent in the 1930s. Unlike others parties which focussed almost
exclusively on the urban population, the DP effectively made use of the
electoral potential of the rural population.
One of the first measures of the new DP prime minister Adnan
Menderes was to allow the ezan, the call to prayer, to be done in Arabic
again. Furthermore, religious education and the training of imams were
expanded. In 1951 Imam-Hatip schools were established with a large
religious curriculum designed for pupils who wanted to plan a religious
career (Shaw and Shaw, 1977, p. 409). The sale of religious literature was
liberalized (Zürcher, 1993, p. 274). A more significant development was
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Islam and Politics in Turkey 
the gradual marginalization and eventual closing down of the so-called

village institutes, a heritage of the Kemalists. The educational institutes
were primarily intended to teach the rural population the principles of
the Kemalist secularism. Although these institutes played an impor-
tant role in the literacy campaign in the countryside, in the course of
the 1940s it was already clear that they did not have the desired result
(Arayıcı, 1999, p. 277; Karaömerlioğlu, 1998, p. 72).
Menderes remained in office for ten years. After the military coup
of 1960, he was executed. He became known as the prime minister who
had thrown Kemalist ideals for grabs, but although he had reversed some
of the most radical measures of the Kemalists, he never questioned the
secular foundations of the Turkish republic. In that respect, there is an
intriguing parallel between the image that exists about Menderes and that
of the current president and former prime minister Erdoğan. Both went
against the grain of Kemalist secularism, took a series of measures in favour
of Islam, and developed an authoritarian style of governing in the course
of their reign. However, they left the secular order intact (Çarkoğlu and
Rubin, 2006; Turam, 2007; Öktem, 2011; White, 2013). The DP wanted to
reduce state interference in Islam. State intervention should be limited to
constitutional matters (Zürcher, 1993, pp. 285–287; Yavuz, 2003, pp. 61–62;
WRR, 2004, pp. 105–106).
In addition to these measures with respect to religion, the DP initi-
ated a series of economic changes that were downright radical and
would fundamentally impact on the political landscape. The DP was
founded by the new mercantile elite who opposed the centrally planned
economic model of the Kemalists. The electorate of the DP was to be
found predominantly among the farmers who felt themselves victims
of this economic model. The DP had promised to bring about rural
development. The economic policy of the DP aimed at increasing
export-oriented agricultural production. Especially cereal produc-
ers saw this as an opportunity to increase their production. Post-war
Europe had a large deficit of food. It was also in line with the policy
of the United States after the war. Through the ‘Marshall aid’ Turkey
was granted loans to mechanize its agricultural production (Smit and
Velzen, 1982, p. 68). An extensive road network was constructed to
unlock the remote regions of the country. Furthermore, with US help,
agricultural machines were imported and were deployed in a number of
strategic regions, especially in central Anatolia. It soon turned out that
the richer farmers benefited most from these measures. They were able
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
to receive the necessary loans for investments. The poorer farmers were
driven out.
Part of the landless peasants could get work as an agricultural labourer,
but for a large part of the peasantry there was no source of income anymore.
In the first half of the 1950s nearly one million people migrated to the cities
in the hope of finding work there, but the developing industry could absorb
only a small proportion of these migrants. Many ended up in the rapidly
expanding informal sector and earned their living in retail or unskilled serv-
ices. Mass unemployment would also give rise to the migration of workers
to Europe at the beginning of the 1960s (Abadan-Unat, 1976; Paine, 1974).
The massive migration to the cities had an impact on the place of Islam
in society. At the outskirts of the big cities whole new neighbourhoods with
migrants from the countryside emerged. The urban population, which
until then formed only a small part of the total population, for the first
time encountered those parts of the population for which Islam had always
played a central and self-evident role in their life. In this context some have
referred to this development as the ‘traditionalization’ of the cities. The
rural population on the other hand was for the first time confronted with
the major changes that had taken place since 1923. The massive urbanization
changed both the self-image of the original and that of the new urbanites
dramatically. Everyday routines and self-evident situations came under
pressure and were problematized.
The DP era, between 1950 and 1960, is one of the most dramatic
periods in the social history of the Turkish republic. The changes that
were initially socio-economic in nature led to a total transformation of
the make-up of society. In the ten years that the DP was in power, the
political, economic, and social landscape of Turkey was radically and
permanently changed. The sharp dividing line between town and coun-
try was blurred. Old differences between urban and rural areas in Turkey
before the Second World War were characterized by socio-economic
centre-periphery relations and not by ethnic, religious, and cultural
differences. The new situation, however, rendered Islam a new meaning.
The image of Islam had hitherto been associated with rural backward-
ness and underdevelopment. The massive urbanization in the 1950s and
1960s generated new dividing lines but it also marked the beginning of
the political and social emancipation of Islam in Turkey (Sunier, 1996).
The changing nature of the socio-economic relations affected the nature
of the political struggle and the modes of organization and participation.
While before the war resistance against the regime was mainly initiated
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Islam and Politics in Turkey 
by local şeyhs who could deploy their personal networks and loyalties
to provide grassroots for action, towards the end of the 1950s there was a
shift towards more instrumental political motives (Yücekök, 1971, p. 222).
The importance of the patron-client system typical of many rural politics
diminished and new forms of political loyalty took shape. Hence new types
of Islamic organizations emerged. These organizations, rather than being
local, focussed on society as a whole and drafted political programs inspired
by Islam that were oriented towards the country as a whole (Sunar and
Toprak, 1983, p. 432).
From 1965 onwards the conservative-liberal policies of the DP were
continued by the Adalet Partisi (AP; Justice Party), led by Süleyman
Demirel. He too applied a form of liberalization with respect to Islam
without questioning the secular foundations of the republic. In the heydays
of the Cold War the liberal conservatism of the AP together with Kemalist
nationalism was regarded by the Western powers as a moral counterweight
to communism and socialism. This contributed to the further integration of
parties with an Islamist agenda into mainstream politics (Yavuz, 2003, p. 62;
WRR, 2004, pp. 106–107). The liberal Constitution of 1961 made it possible
to explicitly refer to Islamic principles as the basis of party politics as long
as the secular foundations were not questioned. It goes without saying that
this formulation left significant room for interpretation.
In the course of the 1960s the use of Islamic rhetoric as a political tool
became increasingly common and widespread. This made it increas-
ingly difficult to distinguish between Islamic and non-Islamic parties
or between secular and Islamic politics. The specific meaning of laiklik,
the Turkish version of secularism, became a major political controversy.
Parties would challenge each other’s take on the issue and the very
principle of laiklik that the Kemalists always presented as an apolitical
and neutral principle of statecraft, became a political pivot. The idea that
Turkish politics evolved against the background of a neutral secular state
has been increasingly questioned (Yavuz, 2006, p. 8; see also Mardin,
1989; Çakır, 1990; Turam, 2007).
Between 1945 and 1980, a gradual change in the meaning of the Turkish
version of secularism occurred. This shift is due to the changing role of Islam
in society. While the Kemalists always regarded themselves as the bearers of
modern civilization, towards the end of the 1970s, an increasing number
of political parties considered Islam as a major social force for renewal that
cannot be ignored. The Kemalists were accused of having brought Turkey
into a state of moral void and ethical disarray.
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
A movement that thrived under these circumstances was Milli Görüş, a

political-religious movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan, a professor
of economy and president of the Association of Chambers of Commerce
and Industry. Under his leadership a series of political parties had been
established that have marked the political landscape since the early 1970s.
Followers of this political movement in Europe became active in the begin-
ning of the 1980s.
The movement had an Islamist agenda no doubt, but the main focus
was the struggle against the liberal economic policies that would harm
peasants and small manufacturers. The Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP;
National Order Party), the short-lived precursor to the Milli Selamet
Partisi (MSP; National Salvation Party), was founded in 1970 by Erbakan.
The MNP was a fierce opponent of the further internationalization of the
economy and the growing dependence of Turkey on the West (Toprak,
1981, p. 98). Although the party thus clearly defended the economic
interests of a particular sector, it also had strong and explicit views on
the moral basis of society. From the beginning it was clear that the party
had an Islamic moral agenda (Schiffauer, 2010).
There has always been a discussion about the intentions of the move-
ment and whether or not Erbakan was in favour of a state based on Islamic
principles, but it is clear that adversaries of Milli Görüş considered them
political Islamists with an anti-secular program. After the military coup
of 1971, the MNP was banned for criticizing the secular foundations of the
republic, but already in 1972, its successor, the MSP, appeared on the politi-
cal stage. The MSP operated more cautiously than the MNP in order to
prevent another ban. Too overt Islamist rhetoric was avoided as much as
possible. At the party congress of 1973, the party unfolded the basic idea that
would become the ideological foundation of the party. In Turkey, according
to Erbakan, there are three major visions of society: a liberal vision that was
represented by the AP, a leftist vision was represented by the CHP, and a
national vision (Milli Görüş) propagated by the MSP (Sarıbay, 1985, p. 262;
Kuru, 2005).
Later on Erbakan would further elaborate his doctrine. He wondered
how it was possible that the once great Ottoman Empire had totally
collapsed. This, according to Erbakan, was primarily due to the fact
that Turkey had not only adopted Western technology, but also copied
the moral foundations of the West. This resulted in an alienation of the
Turkish people from their indigenous cultural and religious roots. Turkey
should not only work on industrial development and a fairer distribution
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Islam and Politics in Turkey 
of wealth, but also enhance spiritual development. Only in this way

Turkey would be able to become materially and spiritually independent.
Yeniden Büyük Türkiye (a mighty Turkey again) was the main slogan of
the party. Historically the West owed much of its achievements to the
Islamic world according to Erbakan. The MSP was a fierce opponent
of Turkey’s membership of the European Union. This political position
resulted in a very intriguing coalition government with the CHP in 1974.
Both parties had adopted a very strong anti-European policy for differ-
ent reasons. The MSP for motives mentioned earlier, the CHP because of
the strong emphasis on economic independence of Turkey.
In the private sphere, the MSP sought to strengthen the sense of
community and a rethinking of the moral standards of families and indi-
viduals. Economic progress in combination with a sound moral basis
was more important than a legal restructuring of the state. Rather than
theocracy the movement strived for a moral revival (Sarıbay, 1985, p. 289).
The concept of ‘milli’ has two meanings. In modern Turkish it means
‘national’. It refers to the nationalist, nationwide party program that
focuses on the entire society. The other, the religious meaning of ‘milli’
is derived from the Arabic ‘milla’ meaning ‘religious community’. By this
the party emphasized that it focussed on all Muslims. The party is often
wrongly portrayed as a traditional movement. The rhetoric of MSP was
in a sense traditionalist; with their language and symbols they appealed
to local Islamic and social traditions, but their anti-capitalist rhetoric and
ideas about social justice were programmatic rather than reactionary.
The party was critical both towards the excesses of traditional Islam in
the countryside, and towards the excesses caused by Western economic
and cultural domination. The success of the MSP can be regarded as a
‘revolt of the petit-bourgeoisie’. The movement combines specific moral
characteristics of Islam with characteristics of the modernization process
of the republic (Sunier, 1996, p. 50). With respect to explicitly religious
matters the party advocated the improvement of religious facilities and
the increase of budgets for Islamic institutions.
The MSP and its successors are the products of the profound economic
and social changes since 1950. The movement has been a crucial factor in
the shift of Islam from something that is ‘lived’ and is associated with tradi-
tions and local communities, to something that is about belief, conviction,
and political program (Sunar and Toprak, 1983, p. 435). The MSP has played
an important role in making politically legitimate religious claims (Toprak,
1981, p. 96). Schiffauer (1993) summarizes the Milli Görüş ideology as a
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
scriptural version of Islam, unlike Süleymanlıs and the Nurcu-movement,

which, as we shall demonstrate, incline towards a more mystical version of
Islam. As a movement Milli Görüş has sought to Islamize society through
a purposeful political strategy and participation in the political arena
(Schiffauer, 1993, pp. 468–485; see also Schiffauer, 2010; Azak, 2010).
The strong focus on political empowerment and the sometimes prag-
matic, even opportunist, choices that Erbakan made to gain political
influence have also met with criticism and a loss of votes. The party was
accused of opportunism when it formed a coalition government with
the Kemalist CHP in 1974. The MSP occupied a key position between the
two large political blocks in the 1970s and was able to acquire significant
influence on economic and educational policies. This strategic position
is an important reason why an Islamization of state policies in the 1970s
and 1980s took place (Bruinessen, 1982, p. 183; Sunar and Toprak, 1983,
p. 441). In electoral terms, the MSP was able to acquire 12 per cent of the
votes in the elections of 1973. Although this percentage dropped in 1977
to 8.6 per cent, Milli Görüş continued to be a political factor well into
the 1990s. The background of its constituency was quite heterogeneous
and Islamic motives were not always the decisive factor (Çakır, 1990,
p. 215; Sarıbay, 1985, pp. 270–287).
Stage 3 (1980–2002)
The third stage began with the military coup of 12 September 1980. Under
the leadership of junta general Kenan Evren the entire political landscape
was radically reformed. In addition a moral campaign was launched in
which ‘Islamic values’ were given a central place. Turkish society was to
sail on a moral compass in which Islam and Turkish nationalism were
interrelated, the so-called Turkish-Islam synthesis (Yavuz, 2013, p. 38;
WRR, 2004, p. 109). Islam was presented as an ‘enlightened’ religion
open to science and technology (Evren, 1986, p. 221; WRR, 2004, p. 109).
An important motive behind this moral rearmament was to occupy an
ideological position to counterbalance ‘socialist propaganda’ on the one
hand and ‘Islamic propaganda’ on the other. The central role of the state
that decreased considerably in the 1970s had to be repaired and redressed
according to the junta leaders (Yavuz, 2003, pp. 70–71). This new ideol-
ogy should determine the new political landscape that the generals had
in mind.
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Islam and Politics in Turkey 
This new ideology was to be propagated mainly through education. Ethics

and Islam became compulsory subjects (WRR, 2004, p. 109). Diyanet, the
Directorate of Religious Affairs, had the task of introducing the Turkish-
Islam synthesis ideology in their material and to teach it both in Turkish
mosques as well as among Turkish migrants in Europe. In 1982 the budget
of Diyanet increased sharply. The personnel were expanded, and in several
European countries with large Turkish migrant populations community
branches of Diyanet were established. They had the task to ‘protect Turkish
national identity’ (Sunier et al., 2011, p. 17).
The MSP led by Erbakan, together with all other political parties, was
banned after the coup. In 1983 a new party was founded, the Refah Partisi
(RP; Welfare Party). Current president Erdoğan was a prominent member
of the party in those years. He belonged to the so-called new generation.
This generation wanted to push the party politics into another direction,
especially in the field of economic policy. Erbakan had in the eyes of
these innovators focussed too long on the lower middle class and artisans
who had been victims of the economic policy of the 1960s and 1970s.
The emerging middle class, to whom also Erdoğan belonged, could not
in any way identify with Erbakan’s viewpoints. In that same year also
a new centre-right party was founded, the Anavatan Partisis (ANAP;
Motherland Party) led by Turgut Özal. Özal had an ambitious economic
agenda. He wanted to make a radical end to the protectionist economic
policies of the Kemalists that had shaped political decision-making for
decades. According to Özal protectionism had brought Turkey into an
almost continuous state of economic crisis. ANAP won the general elec-
tions in 1983 and Özal became the next prime minister of Turkey.
The significance of these developments can hardly be overestimated. Not
only did it result in a radical break with the centrality of the Turkish state
in economic policies, it also resulted in the emergence of the so-called
Anatolian tigers, the nickname for a new generation of entrepreneurs
who combined neo-liberal economic activity with a conservative Islamic
worldview (Sunier et al. 2011, p. 20). It also resulted in the growth of a new
middle class that no longer identified with Kemalism. In the 1980s and 1990s
a young generation of Muslim consumers became the focus of economic
activity (Çağlar, 2013a). Their societal success made Muslims visible at all
levels of society. As a consequence the old image that equates Islam with
underdevelopment and deprivation was broken.
In the 1990s the RP occupied a key position in Turkish politics. In
1995 they won the general elections and Erbakan became prime minister.
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
In 1996 the party formed a coalition with the Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP;
Party of the Right Path), a neo-liberal centre party. Especially Erbakan’s
decision to replace strong ties with the West with a diplomatic focus on
the Arab world was seen by many as an attempt to turn Turkey into a
‘second Iran’. In February 1997 the army committed a ‘silent coup’ in the
form of an ultimatum to Erbakan. Eventually he had to resign (Çağlar,
2013b). Shortly after the military intervention the RP was banned by the
Constitutional Court. The successor of the RP, the Fazilet Partisi (FP;
Virtue Party), was also banned in 2001. In the same year, the Saadet
Partisi (SP; Felicity Party) was founded. This party was led by Erbakan
until his death in 2011.
The controversies within the Milli Görüş movement between the old
guard around Erbakan and the new generation, led by Erdoğan, rose to a
climax after the ban of the FP in 2001. Milli Görüş split into two groups,
the ‘traditionalists’ around Erbakan and the reformists led by Erdoğan
who founded the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP; Justice and Progress
Party) in the same year. Tayyip Erdoğan who had built up his reputa-
tion as a political leader when he was mayor of Istanbul became the new
party leader. The AKP sharply criticized the Islamist and anti-Western
policies of Erbakan, which according to the AKP had not only caused a
lot of damage to the image of Turkey, but also put Islam in a bad light.
It had strongly contributed to the image that Islam, modernization, and
democracy do not match. In the general elections of 2002, the AKP had
a landslide victory and won the absolute majority in parliament. In 2003,
the party presented the new government.
The AKP presented a program which emphasized that Islam and the
secular order were not opposing principles, but rather mutually rein-
forced each other. The party in fact introduced a new meaning of laiklik
(secularism) by stressing that the secular state implies freedom of reli-
gion. In a speech in 2006, Erdoğan used the term ‘negotiated democratic
secularism’, thereby reintroducing secularism into the political arena.
In response to the allegations of the Constitutional Court in 2008 that
the party undermined secular foundations of the Turkish republic, the
party reiterated that full democracy is not guaranteed by a strong state
and a strong army, but by a well-developed civil society (Yavuz, 2009,
p. 159). Civil democracy according to the party is a better guarantee for
the continuation of the modernization project of Atatürk than continu-
ous state control over religion. The party intended to transform the
Turkish political system after the model of Western democracies. Recent
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Islam and Politics in Turkey 
developments, however, point in a different direction. In the last years

Erdoğan has turned Turkey increasingly into an authoritarian political
power in which democratic freedoms are in jeopardy (see Görener and
Ucal, 2011; Adams, 2013).
Stage 4 (2003–present)
In the first period of the AKP rule from 2003 to 2007 a general euphoria
prevailed in Turkey about the new political wind that was blowing. The
government concentrated on urgent economic problems. In addition,
the new leaders were trying to reconcile with the opposition to advert
the huge political polarization that had developed towards the end of
the 1990s. That was partly the reason why Erdoğan even enjoyed support
in secular circles. Furthermore, the government embarked on renewed
negotiations with the EU in 2005, but the broad support for the AKP
was mainly due to the economic growth that the country went through
in those years. The elections of 2007 brought another huge victory for
the AKP. Now the party felt secure enough to pursue their other main
goal: to reduce the power of the army and to put an end to the measures
against Islam that were effectuated after 1997.
The victory gave a huge boost to the confidence of the party, but it
also meant that the political polarization between the CHP and the AKP
increased, especially after the announcement by the government to lift the
ban on headscarves in public buildings. In 2008 a majority in Parliament
voted in favour of the lifting of this ban, but the Constitutional Court
decided to turn this back. Only in October 2013, after the 2011 elections in
which the AKP had a massive victory for the third time, could the ban be
lifted. In the same month, the first female MP with a headscarf appeared in
Parliament.
According to some observers, the era of the AKP should be divided
in the period before and after August 2007 when AKP’s former foreign
minister Abdullah Gül became president of the republic. His predeces-
sor Ahmet Sezer, a lawyer and former president of the Constitutional
Court, was a very dedicated defender of the Kemalist secular model and
a strong opponent of the government of Erdoğan. With his thorough
knowledge of the Turkish political system, he managed to block various
proposals of the AKP. With the presidency of Gül the AKP was released
from its toughest adversary. In the years after 2007 the government
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
would gradually remove legal restrictions on the public confession

of Islam, but it would also introduce restrictions on alcohol in public
places, stricter rules of engagement between men and women, and other
measures that have an impact on public life. Opponents of the current
government regarded these measures as clear indications that the secular
foundations of the Turkish republic gradually demolished.
During local elections in March 2014 the AKP again had a major
victory. Many observers expected a decline of the support because of the
clash with Fethullah Gülen whose followers tended to vote for AKP. In
August 2014 Erdoğan became the first president to be elected directly.
Davutoğlu, a close associate of Erdoğan, became prime minister. Erdoğan
intends to give the presidency a stronger and more powerful position in
the Turkish political system.
The electoral success of the AKP is based on three important constitu-
encies: the rapidly growing conservative population in the poorer neigh-
bourhoods in the big cities, the also rapidly growing new conservative
middle class, and a part of the Kurdish population who see Erdoğan
as the first politician to change the position of the Kurdish population.
They all consider the AKP as the only viable alternative to the Kemalist
CHP. Among these three sections of the population Erdoğan continues
to be immensely popular.
Although there is an unmistakable evidence of social change and
measures to be taken in favour of the place of Islam in society, and
although it is clear that the current government is increasingly operating
in a very authoritarian way, it is important to access the changes prop-
erly. The history of the relationship between state, society, and religion
in Turkey always revolved around two issues: the interpretation and
application of secularism and the role of the state (and army) in it. From
the establishment of the republic in 1923 onwards, the state has always
played a central role in the organization of society. One of the pillars of
Kemalism was ‘etatism’ (devletçilik), which meant a central role to the
state and the army. In the first three decades of the republic the state
deeply intervened into the lives of Turkish citizens. After the Second
World War, the relation between the state and the population continued
to be a central theme in Turkish politics, but the relation shifted and
changed its characteristics.
Especially the state control on the institutional dimensions of religious
life and the far-reaching state interference with the private lives of its citi-
zens have encountered increasing opposition. This was the stake in the
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Islam and Politics in Turkey 
political struggle as it evolved from the early 1980s onwards. The AKP
made the elimination of the state control over Islam and the establishment
of a genuine separation of state and religion into their prime political
goals. The abolition of the separation of church and state as the basis of
the polity has never been questioned, but it is precisely the specific meaning
attached to this separation that is at stake. The AKP argues that separation
was never put into practice by Kemalists. On the contrary, the state strongly
controlled religious life. Separation according to the AKP should imply
non-interference just as in Europe. This principle should be further applied
according to the AKP (Çarkoğlu, 2010, p. 209). One of the intriguing
recent developments is the debate about the status of Diyanet. There is
a growing support for a much more autonomous status for the institute
that organizes religious life in Turkey and among a proportion of Turkish
Muslims in Europe (Seufert, 2014, p. 139).
After 1980 the societal basis was established for the gradual reduction
of the dominant role of the state and the army and the emergence of what
Hendrick (2013) has coined ‘post-political market Islam’ (p. 236). Civil
society grew and diversified and acquired more influence over the political
process. A conservative worldview and an Islamic lifestyle were publicly
disseminated as a feature of the emergent affluent, self-conscious middle
class. Many Muslims in the cities exchanged the poor neighbourhoods
for the new suburban residential areas that fully meet the consumption
needs of the new affluent conservative middle class (see also Saktanber and
Kandiyoti, 2002, p. 257; Fischer, 2011). This is an irreversible development
that goes far beyond current political controversies.
Two recent developments should be discussed here briefly because
they bear relevance to the place of Islam in Turkish society. One is the
clash between the AKP and the Gülen movement (see Chapter 6), the
other is the war with IS at the southern border of Turkey.
The followers of Gülen have largely contributed to the resounding
victories of the AKP in the past decade. Recently, however, they have
increasingly become highly critical of the policies of Erdoğan. The bomb
exploded in December 2013 after police raids among close associates
and political friends of Erdoğan who were suspected of corruption. The
prime minister responded by accusations of the Gülen supporters. They
were accused of infiltrating in government’s institutions and developing
a ‘parallel state’ backed by foreign intelligence. The Gülen movement
was also accused of instigating the so-called Ergenekon-affair in which
senior military leaders were suspected of planning a coup against the
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
Erdoğan government (about that affair, see Cizre and Walker, 2010). In
April 2014 Erdoğan asked the American government to arrest Fethullah
Gülen, who resides in the United States, and to hand him over to Turkey.
Gülen and his followers in turn argue that Erdoğan deploys all possible
means to increase his political and legal power.
When finalizing the manuscript for this book Turkey had decided to
fight IS, partly under pressure of international public opinion. In the
weeks before the Turkish government was accused of supporting the
Sunni jihadist forces at the expense of the Kurdish population in the
south-eastern part of the country. Turkey finds itself in a very complex
position. On the one hand there is no reason whatsoever to assume that
the AKP would support IS for ideological or even religious reasons.
On the other hand there is the protracting Kurdish issue. The Turkish
government started to negotiate with Kurdish movements, even with the
incarcerated leader of the Kurdish PKK Abdullah Öcalan. This resulted
in some sort of peace treaty in 2013. Under the present circumstances
this fragile treaty is certainly in jeopardy.
Notes
1 In his biography of Atatürk, Kinross (1964, p. 503) pathetically exclaimed that
Atatürk ‘had transported his country from the Middle Ages to the threshold of
the modern era and a stage beyond’.
2 The current political unrest in the country and the growing critique on the
autocratic measures of Erdoğan have to be taken seriously, but they do not
refute the argument presented here.
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0004
2
Turkish Organized
Islam in Europe
Abstract: This chapter provides a picture of the historical,
social, and political circumstances under which Turkish
Muslims arrived in Europe and how Islamic organizations
came into being. This description builds on two
characteristics. The first concerns the fundamental breach
in organizational development before and after migration.
Turkish Islamic movements are rooted in the political
struggle in Turkey, but they have diverse origins ranging
from state bureaucracy to mystical Islam. In Europe these
organizations converged into typical migrant associations
offering basic religious services. The second characteristic
concerns the major demographic and socio-economic shifts
that took place among the Turkish population in Europe.
This shift also changed the orientation towards Turkey.
In the course of time Turkish Islamic movements have
developed their own niche in the Islamic landscape.

DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0005 
 Transnational Turkish Islam
Introduction
In this study we explore trends in Turkish organized Islam by giving an

account of a number of Islamic movements as they settled in several
countries in Europe. The present chapter consists of two parts. First we
will address the political, cultural, and social context in which organi-
zational developments took place in Europe. In the second part we will
present a general picture of the trajectories of Islamic collective actors
within, but also beyond, these social and political contexts.
In most statistical surveys, demographic developments and distribu-
tions are presented along national lines, relative to the total number of
Muslims and to the total population. Most studies on migrant commu-
nities and religious minorities also tend to follow a national logic in their
analyses. There are a number of obvious arguments to do so. First of
course is the fact that national states are still the prime political contexts
in which migrants arrive. Organizational structures are embedded in
national legislation. Specific state-church relations do not only impact
on the formal position of Islamic organizations, but they also shape
debates and stakes about Islam in particular countries.1 Nation-states
are political entities that have the power to arrange things in a way that
fits national projects. The idea of a neutral state where religion and state
are completely separated and that only grants religious freedom without
interference in religious affairs is a myth (Bowen, 2004; Bowen 2014;
Lemke, 2007; Sunier, 2014a). The very principle of neutrality requires a
continuous monitoring, intervention, and regulating of religious activity
by the state.
Although an analysis at the national level in various countries is, there-
fore, justified, we point to the relevance of local dynamics in regions,
cities, towns, and even neighbourhoods. The way in which local Islamic
organizations position themselves and become rooted in the local
society is the outcome of a very complex and diverse multi-level process
that is largely shaped by the political climate and social circumstances.
There are important regional and local differences in the way arrange-
ments are accomplished, even in highly centralized countries such as
France. Constitutional principles and legislation are always binding,
but the actual arrangements are much more than a blueprint of these
legal principles.2 In other words general legal frameworks tell us very
little about the actual negotiations and position of individual organiza-
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe 
tions. The only way to understand these processes is through thorough

ethnographic research that is beyond the scope of this book.
We will present a general account of the organizational activities of
Turkish Muslims in Europe, by drawing on data from a limited number
of countries with a relatively large Turkish population, notably Austria,
Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, and Belgium. These
countries had bilateral agreements with Turkey to receive contingents of
Turkish workers from the early 1960s onwards.
Turkish migration to Europe
Turkish migration to Europe started relatively late. In the 1950s, 1960s,

and 1970s migrants from southern Europe moved to the north to work
in mining and heavy industry. Turkish migration took off in the 1960s
when several European countries signed an agreement with Turkey to
send batches of temporal labourers. Germany reached an agreement
as early as 1961, whereas most other countries in Europe did so in the
mid-1960s (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 11). Currently the number of citizens
in the EU with a Turkish passport is almost 2.5 million. In addition,
there are an estimated 1.6 million national citizens born in Europe of
Turkish origin. When we speak of ‘Turks’ in this study, we refer to the
broad category of people of Turkish descent regardless of their current
nationality. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the countries with the larg-
est number of Turkish citizens absolutely as well as relatively to the total
population.3
table 2.1 Countries with the largest number of Turkish citizens
Est. Turkish
population 2010 Population 2010 Est. Turkish
Country (x1000) (x1000) population (%)
Germany , , .
France  , .
Netherlands  , .
Belgium  , .
Austria  , .
Sweden  , .
Denmark  , .
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
table 2.2 Muslims in European countries
Est. Muslim Est. Muslim Turks as % of Muslim

Country
population (1000) population (%) population
Germany , . 
France , . 
Netherlands  . 
Belgium  . 
Austria  . 
Sweden  . 
Denmark  . 
Note: These figures are based on the 2012 statistical survey of Pew Research Centre in Washington,
DC. They use demographic data and not religious affiliation. It provides us at least with some
consistency, but the figures are certainly too high. In addition we made use of the recent version
of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe published by Brill (Nielsen et al., 2013). The Yearbook gives
a much more accurate picture as far as religious affiliation and practice are concerned.
Source: Pew Research Centre (http://www.pewresearch.org/); Nielsen et al., 2013.
It is even more difficult to determine the relative size of the Turkish

Muslim population as a percentage of the total Muslim population in
the respective European countries. The figures presented in Table 2.2
are approximations based on a combination of data from immigration
statistics, assumed percentage of Muslims in the countries of origin,
censuses, and demographic surveys.4
With all precautions to be taken into consideration, the table allow for
some interesting observations. The number of Muslims as a percentage of
the total population is similar in the countries included. The number of
Turkish Muslims as a percentage of the Muslim population varies greatly,
which gives them quite different roles in shaping the Islamic landscape
locally. In Germany almost 75 per cent of all Muslims have a Turkish
background. Not only do they occupy prominent roles in advisory boards
and networks, the image of Islam in the country is predicated predomi-
nantly on Turkish Muslims (see Rosenow-Williams, 2012). Although in
Denmark and Austria the percentage of Turks is smaller, they consti-
tute the largest ethnic group among Muslims (Jacobsen, 2012; Nielsen,
2013). In Belgium the Turkish Muslim community is smaller than the
Moroccan community, and in the Netherlands Turkish and Moroccan
Muslims are almost equal in size. In France the general image of Islam
is first and foremost predicated on that of North African Muslims, and
the number of Turks is relatively small (Akgönül, 2005; Kanmaz, 2003).
In Sweden Turkish Muslims, together with those of Arabic backgrounds
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe 
constitute the majority. Turkish Muslims do not have a very prominent

position in advisory boards in the country.
Political culture, legal arrangements, and the

Islamization of migrants
Although processes of settlement took a similar course in most European
countries, there were also differences related to different political cultures
and legal conditions.5 In Belgium there is a constitutional system of
official recognition of religious denominations. Islam has been formally
recognized already back in 1974. Until the late 1980s the representation of
Muslims was considered a diplomatic (foreign) affair. In the 1990s there
were several attempts to elect a representative body, the Executive of
Muslims of Belgium, and to let Muslims benefit from the constitutional
provisions attached to recognition, such as the appointment of Islamic
teachers in public schools, and Islamic chaplains. Although some teach-
ers and chaplains have been appointed, the work of the Executive has
been hampered by interventions of the security service, boycotts of its
election, and accusations of fraud. The future of the Executive is unsure
(Loobuyck et al., 2013, p. 70). In Germany there is a somewhat similar
situation. Religious denominations can be recognized as corporation of
public law, which goes with privileges such as the right to levy taxes from
their adherents through the instruments of the state. Until today there are
no Muslim organizations that have this status. A lower legal status is that
of Religious Community, which is needed to obtain funding for religious
education in state schools. Several Muslim organizations have obtained
that status. Germany also has a federal advisory body, the Deutsche Islam
Konferenz. However, since this board does not consist of representatives
of Muslim communities, but of appointed members, it is hardly recog-
nized by Muslim communities. In Austria Islam has been recognized
already more than hundred years ago in 1912. In 1979 the Islamische
Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ) was recognized by the govern-
ment as the official representative body of Muslims. In Denmark Muslims
can benefit from tax exemptions since 2012 when 23 different Muslim
communities were officially recognized as religious communities. In
Sweden a number of Muslim communities were granted recognition in
2012 which implied that they would get financial support by the Swedish
Commission for Government Support to Religious Communities.
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
In France and the Netherlands formal legal recognition of any religion

does not exist. In some regions of France there are legal arrangements
for Jews and Christians on historical grounds. In both countries there
are representative bodies for Muslims. In the Netherlands the remnants
of pillarization grant Muslims the right to set up private schools with
state subsidies. Turkish Islamic organizations have been active in the
establishment of schools under these legal provisions. In France the
Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman (CFCM) consists of individual
representatives of local Muslim associations. In the Netherlands the
Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (CMO) consists of representatives of
Islamic organizations. In both countries these advisory boards have no
formal legal status. Their influence fully depends on the extent to which
governments are willing to take their advice.
In all these countries the efforts to incorporate the Muslim organiza-
tions into the national legal framework for religious institutions has
inspired public debates about the existing systems. Comparison between
the EU countries had become an important aspect in this debate, as both
advocates of state recognition of religions and the protagonists of stricter
separation between church and states point to neighbouring states in the
EU-union to advance their own claims. The growing influence of the
European Union has not, however, diminished the existing diversity in
the institutional position of religions in general, and of Islam in particu-
lar. Although certain religious rights are increasingly settled on EU level
in EU treaties and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,
individual states have defended their own system of managing religious
diversity as part of their sovereignty, and even turn it into symbols of
their own national heritage to be defended against European harmoni-
zation tendencies (Koenig, 2005, 2007).
The position of Turkish Islamic organizations within these formally or
informally recognized bodies varies, depending on their relative number
and size, but also on negotiations. Thus, in France, Turks have negotiated
a strong position within the CFCM even though they constitute only 8
per cent of the French Muslims. In Austria, by contrast, the IGGiÖ was
set up regardless of ethnic background of the Muslim population, and
the largest Turkish association challenged its monopoly, claiming that
Turks were underrepresented in its organs.
Government policies and legal regulations concerning Islam are not
just shaped by the religion-state relation, but also by migration and inte-
gration policies. Since the vast majority of Muslims in these countries
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe 
have a migrant background, issues of integration, minoritization, and

not least political and cultural controversies largely determine how
political decision-making evolves and how religious freedom and reli-
gious equality take shape. In that respect there are striking similarities
in the way cultural and religious background were perceived and acted
upon by all host societies. Until the end of the 1970s, the cultural and
religious background of migrants did not play any significant role in
debates about their position in society. Migrants were defined in terms of
ethnic origin, but this had no political consequences. They were prima-
rily seen as members of a temporary labour force who would return to
their countries of origin. Policies across Europe were based on this idea
of temporariness. The creation of religious facilities was therefore seen
to be something that should be left solely to private initiative. No special
policies were needed; it was believed to be a self-regulating process
(Nielsen, 2004; Sunier, 1996; Rath et al., 2001). In situations where the
majority of Muslims migrated from former colonies such as in the case
of France and the United Kingdom, the situation is somewhat different.
However, Turkish migrants across Europe have an intriguing feature in
common: they have never been colonial subjects.6
Towards the end of the 1970s important developments took place.
The number of immigrants increased considerably, mainly due to
family reunions. These families settled in the old quarters of the main
town centres. Although for the vast majority of Muslims returning to
their country of origin was still their intention, the actual return was
postponed. Many migrants could not afford to return home. As a conse-
quence, the need for religious facilities increased, especially the need
for qualified religious personnel (Abadan-Unat, 2011; Landman, 1992).
Towards the beginning of the 1980s governments acknowledged that the
majority of the migrants would stay permanently (Castles et al., 1984). In
some countries this resulted in elaborate programs to integrate migrants
in the host countries; in other countries it was basically through general
legislation that integration would take place. The gradual transformation
from migrants to settlers also resulted in a stronger emphasis on the
cultural backgrounds of these new settlers. Governments realized that
migrants brought with them their cultural and religious background.
Across Europe emerging Islamic organizations were increasingly
perceived as organizations of migrants with traditional backgrounds.
This was certainly not unfavourable for Islamic organizations. It provided
them with the political leverage to accomplish an Islamic infrastructure.
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
At the same time, however, there was also a concern about the attitude
of Muslims and their organizations towards the host countries. Dramatic
events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of the
Egyptian president Sadat had their backlash in Europe as well. In 1986
Muslims in several European cities protested against the American raid
against Libya following the attack on a discotheque in Berlin in that year.
For many people in Europe it was the first time that they experienced
Muslims in a way different from the general image of a conservative
backward community, isolated from mainstream society.
A new cultural category emerged in public discourse: ‘Muslim
migrants’. For convenience’s sake, people with completely different back-
grounds were lumped together under the heading of ‘Muslim culture’. The
origin of this image can be related to the rural background of migrants.
The image of Islam that made its way into public discourse was based on
the idea that Muslims are the least integrated migrants. Muslims were
perceived as passive, fatalist people who are turned inwardly and face
difficulties catching up with the pace of modern society, and easily fall
back on their faith (Rath and Sunier, 1994).
Towards the end of the 1980s, mainly as a result of the developments
in the Middle East and the Rushdie Affair in 1989, the image of Muslims
as a powerless, conservative community started to shift and a new type
of image emerged. This image links Muslims in Europe to the violence
in the Middle East. Muslims are conceived as a fifth column that may be
a threat to society. This has resulted in an ongoing debate about growing
radicalization among migrants. Already in the 1980s there were worries
about connections between Muslims in Europe and Islamist groups in
the Middle East. In the beginning of the 1990s European nation-states
were increasingly concerned with the question how to integrate Islam
into their national projects (Fadil, 2011).
It will come as no surprise, then, that the events of 11 September 2001
reinforced this image and made it a dominant one in almost all countries
in Western Europe. These events caused not only a relative strengthening
of this image, but also a shift in argumentation against Islamic institu-
tions such as schools and mosques. Even parties who initially supported
Muslims in attempts to build up a religious infrastructure now expressed
deep worries about the presence of Islam (Fekete, 2004).7
The position of Muslims in European societies and the place of Islam
depend on a complex of factors, notably legal recognition of religion
in the various countries, immigration policies, and the increasingly
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe 
negative public image of Islam. However, in this field, Muslims are not
just the passive objects of these conditions and developments, but are
actively involved in the political process. Negotiations about rights and
provisions require organizational and political skills. Turkish Islamic
organizations have been actively engaged in these negotiations. We
suggest that this is because they have a long experience in dealing with
the legal complexities of secular societies.
Organizational development: Turkish Islam

The developments sketched in the previous section constitute the back-
ground against which Turkish (and other) Muslims have tried to gain
foothold in European countries. In the first half of the 1970s, organi-
zational development among Muslim migrants in Europe had a fairly
straightforward character. The first forms of cooperation were local initi-
atives and were mainly focussed on the establishment of temporal places
of worship. This cooperation occurred across ethnic dividing lines. The
arrival of Turkish religious-ideological movements in the second half of
the 1970s implied a new turn in organizational developments. Ideological
contradictions were transplanted from Turkey. Turkish Islamic organi-
zations were engaged in an ideological struggle and looked for ways
to increase their rank-and-file to reach potential adherents of their
movement among the Turkish migrants in Europe. The establishment of
mosques and the provision of Islamic accommodation for the migrants
were obvious means. These provisions became an essential feature of
the mutual competition between the different movements. It added an
important dimension to organizational development and accelerated the
process. Relatively spontaneous and minimally structured processes of
organizational development of the first stage of migration were deployed
and transformed into focussed and planned build-up of organizational
networks. In short, organizational developments, methods, and strate-
gies were motivated by political controversies imported from Turkey
(Sunier, 1996).
As we have indicated in the previous chapter, it was the time when
Turkey was caught up in a fierce political struggle. The reasons for
Turkish organizations to transfer activities to Europe were manifold and
differed from organization to organization. Oppositional groups tried
to escape state repression and the ever stricter measures on dissident
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
religious activity. The state controlled Islam responded by also invest-

ing in European activities. Others simply saw in the growing number of
Turkish migrants in Europe a field to increase influence. The largest actors
were the Süleymanlıs, the Milli Görüş, and the Directorate of Religious
Affairs (Diyanet), but Turkish nationalist parties also became active in
the European scene. These actors struggled for control over the existing
mosque associations and invited them to join umbrella organizations
established by them. This often led to fusion and fission adding to the
dynamics of organizational development (Akgönül, 2005; Canatan, 2001;
Kühle, 2012; Landman, 1992; Maréchal and Asri, 2012; Yükleyen, 2012).
The Nurcu-movement, and one of its offshoots, the Gülen-movement,
also extended its network to Europe, but rather than competing with the
others over mosques, they focussed on creating informal study groups.
Although this process took place in many countries in Europe,
Germany, not very surprisingly, became the organizational hub from
early on due to its relatively large numbers of Turkish migrants. The
initial organizational landscape that emerged among Turkish Muslims in
Europe constituted a crucial impetus to the organizational development
in subsequent years. We must realize that movements in Europe could
ensure moral and material support and know-how from their Turkish
counterparts.
In the 1980s local mosques were increasingly incorporated in this
organizational landscape. The number of new places of worship
increased at a very high pace. Current Turkish mosques in Europe are
almost all part of one of the Turkish movements that are represented
at national level by so-called umbrella organizations (Nielsen, 2004;
2012; Rath et al., 2001; Yükleyen, 2012). The strength of these national
umbrella organizations vis-à-vis other Muslim organizations, and their
relation with the authorities, differs from country to country. The rapid
institutionalization in the 1980s along religious and ideological dividing
lines caused a considerable organizational fragmentation. The structure of
religious institutions was not only a reflection of the religious needs and
desires among the Muslim population in Europe, it was instrumental in
the competitive struggle between movements. However, the new social and
political context within which these movements in Europe were operating
constituted a major change. The beginning of the 1980s was the advent of
a new phase in the place of Islam in Turkish society. This set in motion
a process of gradual divergence of the organizational developments in
Turkey and those in Europe.
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe 
Although the logistical support from Turkish sister organizations

was crucial for the dynamics of organizational development in Europe,
the circumstances in which religious and ideological movements must
operate in Europe differed substantially from those in Turkey. As we
have indicated, the Turkish authorities suppressed Islamic movements
that were considered a threat to the secular principles of the republic.
Legal opportunities for Islamic organizations were limited because many
activities such as the administration of mosques, the appointment of
imams, and the running of Quran courses were either the monopoly of
state institutions, or under their control. In Europe Islamic movements
such as the Süleymanlıs and Milli Görüş not only benefitted from the
greater religious freedom guaranteed by European constitutions, it also
enabled them to open mosques and appoint their own imams. Diyanet,
which had a monopoly position in Turkey, became an equal partner to
the other movements in many respects. Other movements also empha-
sized their independence from Turkish state control, which later on
would give them a relatively beneficial image in Europe when the role
of the Turkish state in religious affairs in Europe became a point for
concern of governments.
The opportunities in the European context led to an intriguing
shift in the activities and the institutional settings of the movements. The
Süleymanlıs in Turkey are actually a network of religious schools set up by
the founder of the movement Tunahan (see Chapter 4). Only in Europe
they started to open mosques as a base for their activities. Milli Görüş in
Turkey is primarily a political movement, but in Europe they also built
up their organization around mosques and Islamic centres. When the
Directorate of Religious Affairs established European branches they basi-
cally provided the same services as in Turkey. Diyanet required a favourable
position only because they had agreements with national governments to
provide imams from Turkey (Sunier et al., 2011). Only in the case of the
Gülen-movement is there organizational continuity in that they extended
their educational networks to Europe.
There was also an important difference with regard to the potential
rank-and-file among Muslims in Europe. A significant part of Turkish
migrants in Europe came from rural areas, where they were only very
indirectly confronted with the political struggle in the cities. Socially
and economically Turkish migrants in Europe constituted a very
specific segment of Turkish society. With some exaggeration it could be
argued that the various movements had to build up their rank-and-file
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
virtually from scratch. In Europe Turkish Islamic movements actually

went through a process of ‘ruralization’. It is obvious that the means and
strategies applied reflected this shift.
This transformation has often been ignored in studies dealing with
Turkish Islamic movements, thereby assuming organizational continuity.
It was obvious that the creation of new places of worship was the most
appropriate means to start with. It was one of the most pressing needs
among Muslims in Europe. They neither had the necessary means nor
the know-how to accomplish this. The shortage of accommodation and
trained religious personnel gave the Süleymanlıs, who were the first to
become active in Europe, a powerful position as early as the late 1960s.
In Europe a concentration and a fragmentation of religious activity
took place. Religious activities and services that took place in various
settings in Turkey now were concentrated and controlled by various
organizations. While it was quite common in Turkey that an individual
Muslim visits an official Diyanet mosque, sends his children to a Quran
course of the Süleymanlıs, and votes for a party related to Milli Görüş,
these options rendered an ideological charge in Europe as the Islamic
movements were in fierce competition over the same potential clientele.
As a result, gradually all practicing Muslims were incorporated in these
organizations. The often fierce competition between the movements had
less to do with doctrinal differences than with a battle for the grassroots.
In this process, organizations profiled themselves more rigorously along
ideological lines. To the daily users of their services, however, they all
looked the same. It is thus incorrect to assert that organizational devel-
opment in Europe was simply a matter of accommodating ‘sympathiz-
ers’. Only a small portion of the visitors to local mosques did so out of
deliberate ideological motives. The majority visited the ‘mosque around
the corner’ for practical reasons (Sunier, 1996).
All in all the local Turkish Islamic associations developed into typical
organizations for the large group of first-generation migrants who had
left their home country to earn money to be able to return home and to
build a better life. The need for religious accommodation was inextrica-
bly linked up with a strong orientation towards the country or region of
origin. Most workers lived in boarding houses. Their lives were organ-
ized around a future in Turkey. Permanent stay in Europe did not occur
to most of them; they felt in no way part of the host society. Mosques
and other Islamic institutions were considered ‘pieces of homeland’
in a society that was not theirs. Going to the mosque implied meeting
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe 
compatriots. The extension of non-religious services was meant to cater

to these needs. There were shops and other facilities and places where
visitors could meet each other and chat. In short Islamic organizations
jumped at the right time in this ‘gap in the market’.8
Within these organizations a type of leadership emerged that was able
to assist migrants during their stay in Europe. They primarily acted as
intermediaries between migrants and society (Rath et al., 2001; Sunier,
1996). Most of them belonged to the early migrants who lived in the host
country for a relatively long time; they knew the host society quite well
and had acted as an intermediary between Muslim migrants and soci-
ety. They were entrepreneurs rather than ‘ideologists’, and they aimed
at mobilizing as many resources as possible. They successfully made
use of their contact with policymakers and institutions, and they were
able to fine-tune negotiations according to the local political dynamics
(Rath et al., 2001). They emphasized that Islamic organizations must
be considered as the main forms of ‘self-organization’ among migrants.
These leaders increasingly took part in discussions about the position of
migrants. As opinion leaders, they gained influence and they represented
the Muslim populations and articulated what needs existed among
Muslims. They also articulated what it means to be a Muslim in a non-
Islamic society. By stressing the ‘foreign’ character of Islam as something
that is part of the cultural heritage of a specific group of migrants, they
were able to convince policymakers that certain facilities were required
(Sunier, 1996).
The strong focus on Muslims as migrants resulted in an increase of
non-religious activities that could justify their status. It also contributed
to the image that they were dedicated to the integration of Muslims into
the host society. Over the years, these activities became an inherent part of
the local organizational structure which constituted the basis for the specific
characteristics of the Turkish Islamic organizational landscape across
Europe.
In the 1990s new developments took place. There was an increas-
ing concern about the place of Islam in European nation-states and
about the orientation and involvement of Muslims in Europe with the
developments in the Islamic world. This required a new strategy. Until
then the ‘foreignness’ of Muslims constituted an important political
asset of Islamic organizations, but this turned out to be increasingly
counterproductive. Muslim organizations were faced with the essential
choice of whether or not they should orientate on their place in the host
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
society. This choice was partly invigorated by the increasing numbers of

young Muslims in organizations. Within most organizations of Turkish
Muslims heated debates broke loose about the priorities and agendas for
the near future. At a local level the debate revolved around the question
of whether strong ties with the Turkish counterparts would be gradually
replaced by a strategy that focussed on the building of stronger ties with
the local community at the neighbourhood level, expanding local part-
nerships, and greater attention to social issues from an Islamic perspec-
tive and a stronger focus on the position of Muslims in the host society.
Those in favour of change were convinced that their organizations were
too much perceived in society as the representatives of a marginal and
economically weak segment of the population in society. They argued
that organizations of Muslims should primarily be concerned with the
place of Islam in the host society and that they should contest the image
of being marginalized and alienated. Keywords were increased ‘profes-
sionalism’, ‘interaction’, and ‘integration’.
While in the 1980s Muslims ‘as migrants’, as ‘outsiders’, constituted a
crucial feature of organizational strategies, the emerging new leadership
in the 1990s was looking for a new legitimation basis for their existence.
As long as organizational development was seen as a sign of failing inte-
gration by the wider society, it would lead to a dead end. Now emphasis
was put on Muslims as full members of the host society. The aim was the
recognition of Islam as a full-fledged religion in society. Also after 2001
when the general climate towards Islam deteriorated seriously, recogni-
tion continued to be the basic strategy in all Turkish Islamic movements.
However, the way in which this goal should be accomplished, with what
means, and how the relation with Turkey should develop, increasingly
diversified. In the 1980s Muslim organizations were basically converg-
ing towards the mosque-based model; in recent years Turkish Islamic
organizations are each developing their own niche within the organiza-
tional landscape.
Two seemingly opposing crucial trends can be observed. The first
is the basic demographic, economic, and social transformation that is
currently taking place among Muslims in Europe. The proportion of
Muslims who were born and raised in Europe is growing very fast (SCP,
2012). The social and socio-economic diversification among Muslims
has increased tremendously. The proportion of Muslims with higher
education has also increased. This has not led to a decline in religiosity,
but to a diversification in the ways in which Muslims experience their
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe 
life in European societies. Old family networks of the early stages of the
migration have lost their naturalness and emotional underpinnings.
Economically and socially the majority of inhabitants of Europe with
a Turkish background see their future in Europe rather than in Turkey
(Abadan-Unat, 2011). Rooting in the local community has become a rule
rather than an exception.
The other trend is a seemingly opposing development. As a result of
globalization, the rise of modern media and socio-economic upward
mobility of the former migrants and their descendants and the relations
between Turkey and Turks in Europe have not diminished but have
rendered a more egalitarian form. Turkey is no longer the pivot point in
the organizational development, but part of a multipolar transnational
field. For the first generation of migrants religious orientations were
inextricably linked up with family ties, regional affiliations, and dreams
of return. This naturalness has increasingly come under pressure.
Orientation on Turkey now has a different content and significance.
Religiosity and migratory affiliations with the country or region of
origin cannot be conflated anymore. The religious movements that will
be addressed in the following chapters are a part of this increasingly
complex landscape.
Because of these socio-economic and social developments the Turkish
Muslim communities in Europe can no longer be seen as simply an
extension of those in Turkey. Over the years, the Islamic landscape in
Europe has developed its own dynamics that has increasingly been
disentangled from the traditional migration patterns. Not only the
Turkish Islamic movements, but also the Turkish state face this new
reality and act upon it. Attempts to maintain redefine and revive these
ties, both by Turkish Islamic movements and by the Turkish state, must
be understood against the background of this new reality. Thus of the
approximately four million citizens in Europe with a Turkish background
a large part has a Turkish passport. For a long time it was not possible for
Turkish political parties to operate outside the country. Moreover, it was
not possible to vote outside Turkish territory. Those restrictions have
recently been lifted. As a result, the political struggle in Turkey clearly
resonates among Turks in Europe, not just among Muslims, but across
the whole political spectrum.
In recent years the Turkish state has developed an active policy to
bind and sometimes control Turks in the ‘diaspora’ and to give the ties
with Turkey a new meaning. In 2010 the ‘Ministry of the Turks living
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
abroad and related communities’ (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları

Başkanlığı, YTB) has been established. The Ministry states that the
purpose is to assist Turks living abroad in many areas with advice and
assistance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diyanet have their own
agenda when it comes to their involvement with Turkish nationals
abroad. The YTB ministry is involved in organizing meetings in various
countries in Europe and elsewhere about issues that affect the Turkish
communities directly.9
As we will describe in the following chapters, each of the Turkish
Islamic movements develop their own policy and agenda towards Turkey.
Although they are the product of the Turkish history of secularism, the
arrival in Europe marked a break with the past in several respects. The
trajectories they follow, goals they pursue, and the networks they build
are predicated on this essential shift. In some cases a fundamental change
has taken place in the way they locate themselves within the Turkish
Islamic landscape.
Notes
1 Brill publishers in Leiden started a project, called Annotated Legal Documents
on Islam in Europe, with the aim to collect primary legal sources for the
respective countries, in their original language, with English summaries. The
project will cover the 28 member states of the European Union (including
Croatia), Norway and Switzerland plus the European Union and the European
Court of Justice.
2 Rath et al. (2001) have provided an analysis of the complexities of this process
in a number of countries in Europe.
3 The figures we present here are collected from several sources and should
be observed with maximum precaution. The total number of citizens with
a Turkish background, the potential rank-and-file for Turkish Islamic
movements, is hard to grasp. Statistics in different countries apply different
criteria. The figures we presented in Table 2.1 concern citizens with a Turkish
background, including those with a Turkish passport and those with a
national passport, or both.
4 In a recent Dutch survey on religiosity it turned out that 4 per cent of
the Turks in the Netherlands do not identify as Muslim. A much higher
percentage of them, 25 per cent, did not follow any religious prescription.
Almost half of the population frequents a mosque ranging from occasionally
to daily (SCP, 2012). We have no reason to assume that figures elsewhere in
Europe are considerably different.
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Turkish Organized Islam in Europe 
5 Much of the information in this chapter is based on the Yearbook of Muslims in

Europe (Nielsen et al., 2013).
6 The Turkish Cypriots in the United Kingdom are an exception to this rule, but
they are not included in this study.
7 See, for example, Kepel (2006); Marchand (2003).
8 The mosque as part of the local societal texture was also a break with the
past. Under Kemalist rule mosques in Turkey developed into formal places
of worship with a sharp dividing line between strict religious functions
attributed to the mosque and the society outside. In 2009 Diyanet in Turkey
designated 200 so-called pilot mosques that would develop into community
centres, much in the same way as the mosque in Europe (Sunier et al., 2011,
67).
9 http://www.ytb.gov.tr/.
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3
Diyanet
Abstract: This chapter deals with Turkish official Islam.
In most European countries the Turkish Directorate of
Religious Affairs (Diyanet) runs the majority of local
Turkish mosques. Diyanet has long been the instrument
of the Turkish secular state to control Islam at home and
abroad. Most national umbrella organizations of Diyanet
in Europe were founded in the early 1980s partly as a
reaction to the growing influence of rival movements
among Muslims in Europe. Even though Diyanet in
Turkey is still a state organization with a broad network of
organizations in Europe, its position has been affected by
developments in both Turkey and Europe. Today Diyanet
branches in Europe present themselves as service centres of
all Turkish Muslims rather than as representatives of the
Turkish secular state.

 DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0006
Diyanet 
Introduction
The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı; abbreviated:

Diyanet) is the department of the Turkish state that regulates the prac-
tical aspects of religious life in Turkey. Diyanet is oriented exclusively
on Islam on the grounds that the Turkish population is predominantly
Islamic. The small Christian and Jewish communities in the country
have their own institutions. In addition to practical issues, Diyanet is
also directly involved in the interpretation and the teaching of religious
doctrines and practices.
The existence of an Islamic institution in a state that considers secular-
ism as one of its founding principles is remarkable and has often puzzled
observers. As Rumpf (1987, p. 10) has put it, the presence of Diyanet
in the Turkish republic shows that secularism was not understood as
a rigorous separation of religion and state, but as an attempt to bring
Islam under state control. Whereas Rumpf interprets this in terms of
tolerance of Atatürk towards religion and in terms of continuity with the
Ottoman past, others have suggested a more antireligious motive behind
the Kemalist brand of secularism and compared it to the Bolshevik
Revolution and its attempt to bring the Orthodox Church under its
control (Toprak, 1981, p. 36).
As an institution of the secular state, however, Diyanet has always
had a complex relation with the other actors in the Turkish Islamic field
with whom it had to compete over the hearts and minds of the Turkish
Muslims. With the changing role of Islam in Turkish public life in the
post WW-II period, the relations between Diyanet and other Muslim
organizations have also altered.
Also in Europe, where Diyanet has become an active player, its close
attachment to the Turkish state puzzles observers and policymakers.
Since the late 1970s, Diyanet has sent imams to Turkish mosques in
Europe. Sometimes, this involvement of the Turkish authorities in the
life of the European Turkish Muslim community has been welcomed as
a contribution to stability and to the promotion of a moderate form of
Islam. Others have expressed concerns about the influence of a foreign
state on the life of European immigrants (Binswanger and Sipahıoğlu,
1988, p. 75).
In this chapter, we will address the emergence of Diyanet as a major
player in the Turkish Islamic field, its changing interaction with various
Muslim groups in Turkey, and the way its role in Europe has developed.
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
Origins
The foundation of the Turkish republic in 1923 led to a program of secu-
larization, but the founders of the republic also intended to monitor and
control religious life. For this purpose, they established the Directorate
of Religious Affairs as a successor of the Ottoman Ministry for Religious
Affairs and Pious Foundations (Şeriye ve Evkâf Vekâleti). But unlike its
predecessor Diyanet was merely a bureaucratic institution designed to
carry out a limited number of tasks.
The official task given to Diyanet when it was established in 1924
was threefold: (1) to administer the affairs of the Islamic faith and the
principles of its worship and morality; (2) to illuminate the public about
religion; and (3) to administer places of worship. This last task was
transferred to another institution, the Directorate General for Religious
Foundations, in 1931, but it was restored to Diyanet in 1950. Diyanet is
mentioned briefly in the constitutions of 1924, 1961, and 1982. The 1982
Constitution states that Diyanet is part of the General Administration,
the Ministry led by the prime minister. It should function in accordance
with the principle of secularism, staying out of all political ideas and
opinions and identifying national solidarity and unity as its primary aim
(Sunier et al., 2011, p. 32). Diyanet can be considered the office of ‘official
Turkish Islam’ (Dumont, 1984, pp. 364–375) and has been used by the
state to prevent Islam from becoming an oppositional force in Turkish
society. As such, it is an important component of the secular system in
Turkey (Gözaydın, 2009, p. 286). In its role as employer of all the imams
and Friday preachers in the mosques of Turkey, Diyanet is entitled even
to prescribe what is to be preached. For a long time, Diyanet has issued
centrally drafted Friday sermons and only recently started to decentral-
ize the responsibility for the content of sermons to regional offices and to
local imams (Sunier et al., 2011, p. 52).
The task to illuminate the public about Islam and simultaneously
advocate the secular and national principles of the Turkish republic
led to a sometimes curious mix of religious and nationalist practices
and formal policy measures. It also shaped the relations with various
non-official Muslim institutions and organizations in Turkey which are
sometimes lumped together as ‘parallel Islam’ (Dumont, 1984). Islamic
scholars have sometimes challenged the legitimacy of Diyanet because of
its strong alliance with the secular regime (Dilipak, 1990, p. 183). Diyanet
officials have justified its position by claiming that leaving religious life
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Diyanet 
to society would inevitably lead to sectarian struggle and to attempts to

create a theocratic state (Sunier et al., 2011, p. 37). Notwithstanding this
opposition between Diyanet and the representatives of ‘parallel Islam’,
there are many ties as well. Adherents of Islamic movements such as
the Süleymanlıs have been appointed as imams. The writings of Said
Nursi, founder of the Nurcu-movement, have found their way to Diyanet
magazines and are sold in Diyanet bookshops.
As we explained in Chapter 1, the role of Islam in the Turkish social
and political life has changed considerably in the recent decades.
The coming to power of the AKP, whose leaders originate in the Milli
Görüş movement, is the major result of this change. Consequently, the
opposition between Diyanet’s official Islam and the parallel Islam of the
various religious movements has softened considerably. Senior officials
of Diyanet speak far more positively about these movements than they
did 20 years ago (Sunier et al., 2011, p. 113). Especially the controversy
between Diyanet and Milli Görüş has lost its fervour (Akgönül, 2005).
With regard to the relation between Diyanet and the Alevi community
the situation is different. Representatives of the Alevis argue that Diyanet
propagates the Sunni branch of Islam and marginalizes the Alevis by
refusing to recognize them as a religious minority.
The importance of Diyanet for the Turkish state can also be illustrated
by its sheer size. Apart from its headquarters in Ankara, Diyanet has
offices in all Turkish provinces and towns to supervise the mosques
and their imams. In 2008, Diyanet had 83,033 employees, most of them
imams. Its budget surpassed that of the Turkish Ministry of Education
(Çitak, 2010, p. 262).
In some fields, the activities of Diyanet are supplemented by the Türkiye
Diyanet Vakfı (TDV; Turkish Foundation for Religious Affairs), established
in 1975 by senior Diyanet officials. Because the TDV is not a part of the
Turkish state, it has greater flexibility in the acquisition and spending of
resources than Diyanet itself. The TDV has sponsored the construction
of mosques both in Turkey and abroad, published many books, including
the prestigious Turkish Islam Encyclopaedia, and runs book shops.
To Europe
The Turkish authorities started to engage with the religious life of
Turkish migrants in Europe, in the late 1970s by sending some imams
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
during Ramadan (Landman, 1992, p. 102). However, a more systematic

effort to extend Diyanet’s activities to Europe was made after the military
coup of 1980. The repression of religious movements, in particular Milli
Görüş, by the military regime induced some of their leading figures to
escape to Europe where they helped to organize European branches
of their movements. Tayyer Altıkulaç, the Diyanet president at that
time, visited the Turkish immigrants in Europe, and upon his return to
Turkey he recommended to President Kenan Evren to launch a counter-
offensive to Turkish Islamic movements that according to him ‘exploited
the religious needs of the Turkish migrants and mobilized them against
the interests of the Turkish republic’ (Landman, 1997, p. 220; Yükleyen,
2012, p. 51). This counter-offensive consisted of sending paid imams to
the European mosques and encouraging local mosque associations to
become part of a hierarchical organization under the supervision of
Diyanet. If these local associations owned the buildings that they used as
mosques, these properties were to be transferred to the central organiza-
tion. Many of the local associations that were targeted by Diyanet were
under the influence of the rival organizations; others were independent.
The intervention of Diyanet, therefore, led to a fierce competition over
the control of these mosques. The offer of a full-time salaried imam was
a trump card that made Diyanet a strong player in the field.
In Germany, the Diyanet İşleri Türk-İslam Birliği (DITIB; Turkish
Islamic Union of the Directorate for Religious Affairs) became the
largest umbrella organization for mosques in the country, with 896
member organizations, which is more than the other movements
together.1 The situation in Austria is somewhat different. The Islamische
Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ) had been recognized by the
state in 1979 as the official representative of the Muslim community. By
virtue of this recognition, IGGiÖ has special corporate rights, such as
the control over Islamic religious education in Austrian public schools
and the appointment of religious teachers. The IGGiÖ is oriented
towards all Muslims in Austria regardless of their origin, and most local
and national Muslim organizations cooperate with it. When Diyanet
extended its network to Europe, however, it refused to recognize the
monopoly of the IGGiÖ, claiming that Turks were underrepresented in
the IGGiÖ bodies. The Austrian branch of Diyanet, Avusturya Türk İslam
Birliği (ATİB; Turkish Islamic Union in Austria), controls about 58 of the
250 mosques in the country (Sezgin and Rosenow-Williams, 2013). ATİB
is the largest Muslim organization outside the IGGiÖ.2
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Diyanet 
In France, Diyanet operates under the name DITIB and controls a

considerable part of the local Turkish Islamic associations. In 2005,
this network included 50 per cent of the Turkish mosques (Akgönül,
2005). By 2010, the number had risen to 210, whereas its closest rival
Milli Görüş has 70 mosques. Although the Turks in France are by far
outnumbered by the Muslims of North-African descent, DITIB France
became a major interlocutor of the French state, in the framework of the
French Council for the Muslim Religion, in which Milli Görüş also is
represented (Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman, CFCM) (Çitak, 2010).
In the Netherlands, Hollanda Diyanet Vakfı (Diyanet Foundation
Netherlands, Islamitische Stichting Nederland, ISN) succeeded in becom-
ing the largest mosque-organization in the country, controlling 143 of
the 220 Turkish mosques (Sunier et al., 2011, p. 54f). In Belgium, Diyanet
(Belçika Türk Islam Diyanet Vakfı) controls 65 mosques.3 In Denmark, the
Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation runs 27 mosques and is the largest
Turkish Muslim organization.4 Half of the Turkish population in this
country are members of the funeral trust founded by Diyanet (Jacobsen,
2013). In Sweden, the Diyanet network seems to be more modest in size
and less uniform than in most other countries. This may be due to the
more limited number of Turkish Muslims and the ethnically very diverse
composition of the Muslim population. In recent surveys about Islam
in Sweden, Diyanet is not even mentioned. Diyanet does, however, send
imams to 9 Swedish mosques and has funded a mosque.5
Organizational dimensions
More than any other Turkish Islamic organization, the Diyanet network
is structured hierarchically. The Diyanet centre in Ankara has a depart-
ment that is responsible for the activities outside Turkey, which covers
not just Western Europe, but also the post-Soviet Central Asian republics,
Australia, and the United States. This ‘Directorate for External Relations’
selects, trains, and sends imams to Western European countries. This
office is also involved in international inter-religious dialogue activities
(Sunier et al., 2011, p. 40). According to the Diyanet website, its offices
abroad are either associated with embassies, in which case the highest
local Diyanet official has the status of a counsellor of the embassy, or with
consulates, where the Diyanet official is an attaché. However, to operate
effectively in foreign countries, associations and foundations have been
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
created according to the legal requirements and opportunities of the

respective nations (p. 42). In most cases, this has led to the establishment
of a foundation at the national level with local departments running the
mosques. The official tie between these national foundations and Diyanet
depends on the circumstances and legal conditions in the respective
countries. It is common practice, however, that these foundations are
chaired by Diyanet officials at the embassies. The president of DITIB in
Germany is the councillor for religious affairs in the embassy in Berlin,
the president of the ISN in the Netherlands holds a similar position in
the embassy in The Hague, and their confrère in the embassy in Paris
presides over the French DITIB (Çitak, 2010, p. 262; Sunier et al., 2011, p.
58; Yükleyen, 2012, p. 52). For this office, Diyanet selects highly educated
theologians.
This obvious institutional link to a Turkish state institution is not
appreciated and accepted everywhere. The DITIB France joined the
efforts to establish a representative body for French Muslims, the French
Council for Muslim Religion, that was set up in 2003. This council was
designed as an intermediary institution between Muslims and the state.
However, because the diplomatic status of DITIB was seen as an obstacle
to reach Muslims, a separate organization, the Coordination Committee
of Muslim Turks in France (CCMTF), was created. In practice, the names
DITIB and CCMTF are used simultaneously.
Also in the Netherlands, the Diyanet network has two organizations
on the national level, one of which is firmly under the control of Turkish
state officials. When Diyanet started to reach out to Turkish migrants
in Europe in the early 1980s, there was already a Federation of Turkish
Islamic Cultural Organizations (TICF) that wished to cooperate with
Diyanet and to apply for imams. According to statutory regulations,
TICF is an independent organization. When Diyanet set up its own, more
centralized organization in the Netherlands, TICF could not be ignored.
The two organizations clearly delineated their responsibilities: the TICF
focussed on social, cultural, and socio-economic interests of Turkish
Muslims in Dutch society, whereas the ISN was to supervise religious
activities. However, this division of labour has become blurred. The ISN
is increasingly engaged with the lives of Turkish Muslims and positions
itself as the representative of all Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands and
has successfully marginalized the TICF (Sunier et al., 2011, p. 58).
However, this horizontal engagement does not imply a fundamental
change in the hierarchical structure of the organization. In all countries,
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Diyanet 
the Diyanet institutions have strengthened their relation with local

mosque associations (Rosenow-Williams, 2012). Also on websites of
local associations the link with Diyanet is apparent because they carry
the logo of Diyanet. In organizational regulations, the formal responsi-
bilities are meticulously stipulated.6
Sending imams has been one of the major instruments for Diyanet to
extend its influence in all European countries. The imams are selected by
the Diyanet Directorate for External Relations in Ankara, and their work
is supervised by the Diyanet officials in the European embassies and
consulates. They are usually deployed for four or five years in a European
mosque, after which they return to Turkey. In individual cases, Diyanet
imams stay on in Europe, but to do so they must resign. It is not uncom-
mon that they are hired by rival organizations. This system of circulation
of imams prevents them from becoming locally rooted. It is often argued
that the short term of their assignment also hinders them from getting
acquainted with the local language and culture or from building long-
lasting relations with their environment. The same can be said about
the officials who were sent out to coordinate and supervise their work.
These officials are highly educated, they are familiar with local customs
and manners, but they too tend to be replaced after some time. Yükleyen
(2012) considers this as a major weakness in the Diyanet network.
Especially in Germany and in the Netherlands, but also in other
European countries, Diyanet has made a considerable contribution
to the construction of new mosques. Constructing mosques is not a
formal task of Diyanet itself. In Turkey, local Muslim organizations
collect money to build mosques, after which Diyanet takes over the
management and appoints imams. The Diyanet Foundation, however, is
involved in mosque construction. Turkish mosques in Europe also need
funding by local communities, but since Diyanet has sufficient means,
they often provide loans for building initiatives. As a result, the Diyanet
organizations have become the largest mosque builders in Europe. Of
the 162 newly constructed mosques in Germany, 130 belong to DITIB.
The architecture of these mosques expresses the wish to create large and
representative buildings in a somewhat traditional Turkish style (Roose,
2009, p. 131f).
The attitude and strategies of Diyanet organizations towards the other
Turkish Islamic organizations in Europe is very different from that in
Turkey. They have no monopoly position, but because of their sheer
size they actually dominate the Turkish Islamic landscape to a large
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
extent. After the AKP came to power in Turkey, relations with the other
Islamic movements have improved. The causes for this development are
manifold, but a possible one might be the desire to transform Diyanet
into a representative body of Sunni Muslims. An indication for this is
the creation in 2012 of the Coordination Committee of Franco-Turkish
Associations, in which DITIB joined forces with Milli Görüş and the
nationalist Turkish Federation of France.7 Moreover, in countries where
Turks constitute the largest Muslim population, they have claimed a
leading position in representative bodies.
Worldviews, goals, and agendas
The strong institutional ties of European member associations with

Diyanet in Ankara enable the organization to exert their influence in a
number of issues. Apart from formal and material regulations described
earlier, Diyanet conveys guidelines for life in accordance with Islamic
principles. This is a sensitive issue because Diyanet is bound to the secu-
lar principles of the Turkish republic. The religious guidance provided
by Diyanet is a balancing act between religious traditions on the one
hand and the limitations imposed by the Turkish state on the other. In
their instructions concerning contemporary moral issues such as birth
control, in vitro fertilization, organ transplantation, teaching sexuality
in schools, and monogamy, Diyanet theologians tend to hold moderate
views, commonly accepted by the majority of the Turkish population
(Sunier et al., 2011).
According to Diyanet, religious life is inextricably linked with Turkish
national identity and history. This connection is part and parcel of its
constitutional task to contribute to national harmony and solidarity. It
is reflected in sermons and written texts that purport the love for the
fatherland as an Islamic virtue. The celebration of Turkish historical
victories and national holidays belongs to the standard activities of
Diyanet associations, even in Europe. Thus, on the website of the Belgium
Diyanet branch it is stated that ‘teaching our children the Muslim Turkish
culture and national and spiritual values [constitute one of the essential
activities]’.8 The language of the Friday sermon continues to be Turkish
(Sunier et al., 2011, p. 83).
Diyanet considers this combination of religious and national values
not in contradiction with the integration of the Turkish Muslims in the
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Diyanet 
European societies. With their emphasis on the spiritual dimensions of

Islam and on the mosque as a place of peace and contemplation, Diyanet
wants to convey a message of peaceful coexistence between Turkish
Muslims and their European environment.
Training imams in Europe and recruiting candidates from among the
Muslims living in Europe has not been a priority of the Diyanet. Instead,
they use the vast pool of imams trained at Turkish high schools for imams
and preachers (imam hatip lisesi) and at theological faculties. The argu-
ment often put forward is that the long educational trajectory in Turkey
guarantees a qualitative degree that European training institutions cannot
provide. However, the increasing criticism to be heard among European
Muslims and European politicians prompts Diyanet to take issue and
engage with the negotiations about the setup of imam training facilities
in Europe. Thus, the German DITIB was one of the four participants in
the Coordination Council of the Muslims in Germany (Koordinationsrat
der Muslime in Deutschland, KRM) for the chair of Islamic theology in
Münster. The current president of Diyanet, Mehmet Görmez, stated in
2012 that he had no principle objections to imams trained in Europe but
that he doubted about the quality of European imam training programs.9
Rather than creating programs in Europe, Diyanet has invested in
programs that prepare the Turkish imams for their assignment in
European countries by providing language courses and courses on the
history and culture of the host countries. For Germany and Austria,
these courses are provided by the Goethe Institute in Istanbul. During
their stay in Germany, the Diyanet imams are encouraged to participate
in a program developed by DITIB and the Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung (Federal Centre for Political Education) to improve their capaci-
ties to communicate with their German environment (Sunier et al., 2011,
p. 86; Bundesregierung, 2006, p. 12). In recent years, the Dutch Diyanet
branch ISN recruited 23 candidates from among the Dutch Turkish
youth to go to Turkey for a theological study. Three of them now work as
assistant-imams in Dutch mosques.
Another field in which European Diyanet organizations have invested
is the funeral trusts, which cover the costs of transferring the mortal
remains of its members to Turkey to be buried there, including travel
costs of one or more family members. This also is an indication that
Diyanet invests in relations with Turkey.
The transnational networks that Diyanet maintains differ in several
respects from those of other organizations in that they predominantly
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
concern activities in which the Turkish state plays a central role. The
interference of Turkey with Turkish people abroad is certainly not
unique. All national states have transnational agendas (Lafleur, 2011).
Brand (2008) shows how Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon
try to maintain links with their subjects abroad and thus extend their
sovereignty across national borders. The current extent of the Diyanet
network makes it unlikely that the role of Ankara will dwindle in the
near future.
Notes
1 Rohe (2013) and Yükleyen (2012, p. 50) estimate the number of DITIB
mosques in Germany at 740 against 323 for Milli Görüş and 274 for the
Süleymanlı-movement.
2 See http://www.atib.at/. The site mentions 63 member organizations.
3 http://www.diyanet.be/Kurumsal/CamilerveDernekler.aspx. Manço and
Kanmaz (2009, p. 39) and Fadil (2013, pp. 105, 109) state that the Diyanet
network includes two-thirds of the 140 Turkish mosques in the country. This
is substantially more than those listed on the Diyanet website.
4 http://www.danimarkatdv.org.
5 Email communication with Göran Larsson, author of the chapter on Sweden
in Yearbook Muslims in Europe (2013). The website of the Scandinavian Diyanet
organization, http://www.isvecdiyanetvakfi.org, mentions 10 associated
organizations in Sweden.
6 See, for example, http://diyanet.nl/wp-content/uploads/standart/pdf/2013/
HDV_SUBELER_YONETMELIGI_2012.pdf.
7 http://www.zamanfrance.fr/article/le-rC3A9veil-citoyen-de-tous-les-turcs-
de-france.
8 http://www.diyanet.be/Kurumsal/CamilerveDernekler.aspx.
9 http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/906590-gormez-avrupaya-imam-
destegi-verebiliriz.
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4
Süleymanlıs
Abstract: Süleymanlıs belonged to the first Turk migrants
in Western Europe who established religious organizations,
provided Islamic education for children, and created
facilities for ritual prayer. They paved the way for other
movements to follow. As followers of the Turkish teacher
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, they understood the importance
of providing religious service to migrants, even if they
would be in Europe temporarily. In the first decades of
migration the movement was rather closed to the outside
world. Today they have successfully created their own
spiritual, quietist niche in the Turkish Islamic landscape.
They continue to focus primarily on educational activities.
The younger generation who is now in charge in most of
the local organizations is generally well-educated and more
ready to engage with the surrounding society.

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 Transnational Turkish Islam
Introduction
Followers of the Turkish Nakşibendi Sufi şeyh Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan

(1888–1959) were among the first Turks in Europe to organize religious
life of Turkish migrants in the 1970s. They were active in local mosque
initiatives and created their own infrastructure at national and European
levels. In Turkey the movement is primarily organized around educa-
tional institutions, in particular dormitories for students of high school
and university. External observers and critics of the movement in Turkey
would call them Süleymancı (‘supporters of Süleyman’), a name the
movement rejects as derogatory. They refer to themselves as ‘the pupils
of Süleyman Efendi’, or simply as students.1 The name ‘Süleymanlı’
(belonging to Süleyman’s community) is often used in academic stud-
ies. It was accepted by Kemal Kaçar, the former leader of the movement
(Landman, 1992, p. 85).
In Turkey the movement has hardly been the object of study. Turkish
authorities would use the words tarikat (religious sects) or gericilik (reaction-
ary forces) to denote Süleymanlıs.2 One of the few descriptions of the life of
the founder and the origin of his movement is a chapter entitled ‘Those
Who Recently Have Suffered Persecution for Their Religion’ in a book
(Kısakürek, 1988). It was first published in 1969 by the editor of an Islamic
magazine who had known Tunahan personally. More recently a small
monograph was published in Turkish, titled ‘Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan
from Silistre in the Light of Archival Documents’ (Akgündüz, 1997).
Also in Europe attention for the Süleymanlı-movement has been
minimal compared to other movements. This lack of interest may be
explained by their focus on spirituality and their closed sectarian image.
The tone in European academic literature and in the media was predom-
inantly negative (see, e.g., Binswanger and Sipahıoğlu, 1988; Lemmen,
2000). One of the reasons may be because they were the first to set up
religious infrastructure among Turkish Muslims in Europe. Today the
movement is an important player in the Islamic landscape in Europe and
has a relatively small but stable rank-and-file.
Origins
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, the founder of the movement, was a master
in the Nakşibendi Sufi Order, an order that emerged in the 12th century
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Süleymanlıs 
and spread over a large part of the Muslim world, in particular India and
the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Tunahan followed the doctrines of
the Indian şeyh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564–1624), whom the Turks call Imam
Rabbani and who is considered by his followers to be the ‘Reformer of
the 11th Islamic century’.
In the Turkish republic, the order was abolished in 1925 together with
all Sufi orders, but it survived underground and its leaders continued to
play a significant role in Turkey, sometimes as imams hired by the Turkish
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and sometimes through their
own informal networks. One of them was Tunahan. As an imam and
preacher in Istanbul, Tunahan was arrested several times by the secular
authorities. In 1943, he was deprived of his permission to preach and his
activities were curbed (Akgündüz, 1997, p. 56f; Kısakürek, 1988, p. 135).
Later he was able to travel through the country and to build a network
of informal and private Quran schools led by his pupils. About 1,000 of
such institutions existed when he died.3
Tunahan did not publish books or articles. He was a teacher in the
literal sense of the word, who functioned best teaching situations. The
only documents he left were a seven-page instruction for teaching the
Quran and a number of letters, some of which were later collected in
a booklet in Ottoman characters called Letters and Some Important
Questions, discussing some matters of law and mysticism (Akgündüz,
1997, p. 97). As a result, the only information available about his life and
ideas is produced by his followers. After his death in 1959 his son-in-law
Kemal Kaçar became the leader and organizer of the movement. In 2002
he was succeeded by Tunahan’s grandson Ahmet Arif Denizolgun, the
current leader.
As the Süleymanlı network was mainly organized around Quran
courses, a new law in 1971 that brought all informal Quran schools in
Turkey under the authority of Diyanet was a major blow to the auton-
omy of the movement. In reaction to this law, the movement created
alternative legal forms to conduct their activities. They provide courses
and educational support and, first and foremost, organize student
dormitories. At the national level the movement had operated under
several names such as Federation of Quran Course Associations. Since
1980 they call themselves Kurs ve Okul Talebelerine Yardım Dernekleri
Federasyonu (Federation of Student Support Associations) (Landman
1992, p. 90). The dormitories house high-school and university students
and offered religious lessons in the evenings and weekends. Later on,
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
homework support and preparation for university entrance exams were

added to the service. Reliable numbers of the size of this network are
not available. Based on a journalistic source it has been claimed that the
movement ran 450 dormitories in 1986, with a total of 100,000 students.
This implies a rather high average of 222 students per dorm (Gökalp,
1990, p. 430; Jonker, 2002, p. 90).
Although the movement has always been labelled as a Sufi Order, there
are important differences with traditional orders. Most importantly, Sufi
orders have a living spiritual leader, the şeyh, who is connected to and
can communicate with his deceased predecessors. Tunahan has always
refuted this status. He did not appoint a successor, which is an indication
of his stature and the uniqueness of his religious authority. He himself
was considered part of the doctrine and the devotional practices of the
movement (Jonker, 2002, p. 75f).
Adherents, though, do observe religious practices and beliefs pertain-
ing to Sufi traditions, such as contemplative remembrance of God (zikr),
either individual or in prayer groups (halqas). They hold the conviction
that specific spiritual knowledge was transmitted from the prophet
Muhammad to the founder of the movement through a chain of trans-
mitters (silsila) whose names are part of the doctrine. The Nakşibendi
order recognizes a ‘chain of gold’ (silsilat al-dhahab) connecting a line of
exceptional spiritual leaders (Trimingham, 1971, p. 150). In the writings
of Süleymanlı preachers, Tunahan is called the 33rd and the last of this
chain of gold (Landman, 1992, p. 92).4 In addition, the movement applies
an initiation rite and a clear distinction between initiated members who
have access to esoteric knowledge of the doctrine and the uninitiated
ones (Yükleyen, 2012, p. 97f).
The idea that the chain of gold ends with Tunahan is associated with
the eschatological expectations of an approaching end of the world. He is
considered to be spiritually in charge of his community (Yükleyen, 2012,
p. 100). His grave in Istanbul is an informal place of pilgrimage (visitors
come in small groups in order not to attract too much attention), and his
image is used in meditation (Jonker, 2002, p. 207f).
To Europe
Followers of Tunahan belonged to the first Turk migrants in Western
Europe who established religious organizations, provided Islamic
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Süleymanlıs 
education for children, and created facilities for the ritual prayer.
From the early 1970s onwards Islamic centres were opened in various
European countries. The Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V.
(VIKZ; Federation of Islamic Cultural Centres) in Cologne became the
European centre. By 1980 the VIKZ coordinated 210 Islamic centres
in Germany. A VIKZ list of associated organizations outside Germany
that circulated in the early 1980s contains the addresses of 16 centres in
the Netherlands, 1 each in Belgium, France, Switzerland, and Sweden,
9 in Austria, and 2 in Denmark (Landman, 1992, p. 95). In the 1970s
the gradual extension of this network did not attract much attention,
but when the centre in Cologne applied for the status of corporation
of public law secular Turkish opponents accused the VIKZ publicly of
being extreme right and hostile towards Europe. The official status was
refused, and from then on the movement tended to avoid public atten-
tion. The emergence of rival Turkish Islamic organizations in the 1980s
made it more difficult to extend the network. Nevertheless, the VIKZ
grew out to currently about 300 congregations in Germany, with about
20,000 registered members (Sezgin and Rosenow-Williams, 2013).5 The
Swedish branch, the Islamiska Kulturcentreunionen i Sverige (IKUS; Union
of Islamic Cultural Centres), became the largest Muslim organization in
the country in the 1980s. Until today it remains one of the larger federa-
tions, with 14 congregations and more than 10,000 members. Especially
in Stockholm, the IKUS is well represented.6 The Austrian branch of
the movement has 23 mosques and organizations that are coordinated
from Vienna (Sezgin and Rosenow-Williams, 2013). In the Netherlands,
the Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland (SICN; Islamic Centre in the
Netherlands) is based in the city of Utrecht and coordinates 48 local
organizations. The Belgium Union of Islamic Cultural Centres (Belçika
İslam Kültür Merkezleri Birliği) represents 13 local centres (Kanmaz, 2003).
In France 12–14 mosques are associated with the Süleymanlı-movement
(Akgönül, 2005), and there are also branches of the movement in other
European countries and across the Atlantic (Jonker, 2002, p. 127).7
After the death of the founder in 1959, his son-in-law Kemal Kaçar led the
movement for four decades. Kaçar was not a theologian, but a business-
man, whose leadership was based on his organizational capacities rather
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
than on charisma. He became gradually accepted in the movement as

both the worldly and the spiritual leader, even though the mystical chain
that had connected the şeyh (Tunahan) with his predecessors (silsile) had
ended when he died in 1959 (Jonker, 2002, p. 114f). Kaçar organized the
movement through the Federation of Quran Course Associations, later
the Federation of Student Support Associations, based in Istanbul. To
guide his community morally and spiritually, he could neither draw on
his own charisma, nor on a written legacy of Tunahan. Therefore, he had
the Maktubat (letters) of Ahmad Sirhindi (Imam Rabbani) translated into
Turkish and distributed among Tunahan’s followers. When Kaçar died in
2000, he was succeeded by Ahmed Arif Denizolgun, an economist and
architect, whose legitimacy derived from his family ties with the founder
(Jonker, 2002, p. 118).
In the European branch of the movement, the chief imam in Cologne
counts as the highest authority. The European branch developed rela-
tively autonomously from the federation in Istanbul. Kemal Kaçar
accepted the situation that the European members faced quite different
circumstances and challenges than those in Turkey, and therefore had to
find their own solutions. The leadership of Kaçar became manifest to the
outside world every now and then, for example, when he apologized to
the German bishops for some controversial statements of the chief imam
in Cologne (Karakaşoğlu-Aydın, 1999, p. 336). However, his successor
Denizolgun embarked on a new policy by intervening directly in the
European branch. He replaced many of the chief imams and banned
some of the practices that had emerged in European associations such as
running groceries in the Islamic centres (Jonker, 2002, p. 118).
This control is based on a combination of authoritative influence and
a hierarchical structure of the religious teachers. Initiated members are
expected to obey a local hoca or teacher, who is bound to regional hocas
in various European countries or districts, who in their turn report to
Cologne. The hoca in Cologne works under the spiritual authority of
the leader in Istanbul who is believed to be connected with Tunahan
at a higher spiritual level (Yükleyen, 2012, p. 103). The chief imam of
Berlin compared the hierarchy within the movement with the papacy
in the Catholic Church: ‘[O]ur leader Kemal Kaçar is the pope, and our
regional leaders are his bishops’ (Jonker, 2002, p. 138). It is not uncom-
mon that chief imams serve terms in different locations successively.8
The hierarchy is also manifest in the training program of theologians.
Elementary theological training is available for both young men and
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Süleymanlıs 
women in the larger mosques of the movement in Europe, but teachers of

the Cologne centre take the annual examinations. For the more advanced
levels the candidates have to go to Cologne, although the Dutch branch
has developed their own theological training at advanced level (Jonker,
2002, p. 127). The highest level of theological training, called tekamül
(completion), can only be obtained in Istanbul in a full-time course of at
least eight months (Yükleyen, 2012, p. 67).
Legally, the VIKZ in Cologne is an association according to German
law with only German member organizations. The departments in
other countries have their own legal format and have an autonomous
status vis-à-vis Cologne. In the statutory regulations of the Dutch SICN,
for example, neither the centre in Cologne nor the European mother
organization is mentioned.9
The hierarchical structure of the movement is grounded in religious
authority and spiritual charisma rather than in formal positions. This
partly explains why the strong hierarchy goes hand in hand with a rela-
tive autonomous position of local branches in accordance with local
conditions and requirements. To put it differently, the strong normative
and spiritual convergence is primarily of a religious nature. The promi-
nence of the leader of the movement is to a certain extent reminiscent
of the position of Fethullah Gülen in the Hizmet (see Chapter 6) and
rather dissimilar with the organizational characteristics of Diyanet and
Milli Görüş (Chapters 3 and 5). In the latter two cases there is a much
more formal organizational structure. Milli Görüş branches are formally
connected to the headquarters in Germany, but in practice operate
autonomously, whereas local branches of the Süleymanlıs are formally
autonomous, but are connected to one another by authority and charis-
matic influence.
The Süleymanlıs have often been described as closed strongholds and
symbols of self-isolation (Doomernik, 1991). Jonker (2002) character-
izes Süleymanlıs as a religious movement that has roots in an age-old
spiritual tradition. She criticizes the dominant approach in Turkish and
German literature that portrays the movement primarily as a reaction-
ary, anti-Semitic sect. Jonker indicated new developments in the late
1990s, in which the movement gradually and cautiously opens up to the
outside world, with open days in the Islamic centres, and invitations for
iftar-meals during Ramadan (p. 126). An Islamic Academy was opened
in 1999 near Cologne to become a centre for dialogue with non-Muslims
(Karakaşoğlu-Aydın, 1999). Similar developments took place in the
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
Dutch branch of the movement (Sunier, 1996). Moreover, the movement

was involved in joint ventures with other Muslim organizations.
In 2000 the new Turkish leader of the movement Denizolgun, wanted
to strengthen his leadership and reorganized some of the religious
core activities. However, recent developments seem to indicate that a
centralization of the movement did not occur; at least it did not last very
long. The mere existence of websites of the movement in the various
European countries points at an awareness of the need to communicate
with society. The movement has started to train their young members in
organizational skills and communication techniques.

The fact that Tunahan did not appoint a successor could be interpreted
as a transformation of his movement from a mystical order to a ‘lay
community’. The charismatic leadership of the mystical master was
replaced by managers with organizational skills, and the focus of the
community was developing teaching skills rather than acquiring mysti-
cal experience (Jonker, 2002, p. 76; 2006). Yavuz (2003, p. 147) calls this
training ‘traditional’ because of the emphasis on memorizing rather than
on discussing and commenting texts, and because they reject religious
innovations (bid’a).
The focus on conveying, teaching, and producing Islamic knowledge
locates the organization firmly in mainstream Sunni Islam, often referring
to the Hanafi School of law and the Maturidi School of Islamic theology.
The institutionalization of educational activities is the main goal of the
movement throughout Europe. This training starts in the local mosques
with a preparatory stage in which the Arabic alphabet is learned. This
is followed by basic instructions in the Islamic obligations and believes,
supported by a catechism (İlmihal) that is available in Turkish but also
translated into several European languages. This first stage, designed for
the age group 10–13, also includes memorizing parts of the Quran. A
ceremony marks the end of this stage. This elementary religious educa-
tion is one of the strong assets of the movement, as it is highly valued
among Turkish Muslims in Europe, also outside Sülemanlı circles. The
second stage, for pupils of 13–16 years, still takes place in local mosques
and focuses on the study of Arabic grammar and the tajwīd (rules for
the recitation of the Quran). This forms the basis for the more advanced
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Süleymanlıs 
level where Islamic law and theology is studied on the basis of Arabic
sources (Jonker, 2002, p. 273).
In Germany this advanced theological training is offered in the Islamic
Centre of Cologne. The Dutch branch SICN developed its own theologi-
cal seminar called Euro Ilim Instituut. Between 2010 and 2014 the insti-
tute cooperated with one of the Dutch universities of applied sciences
in a program for Islamic theology. For the more confessional parts of
the training, SICN relies on their own hocas, but their students also take
general courses about the role of religion in Western societies. The high-
est level of theological training within the movement continues to be
organized in Istanbul only. Within the Turkish Islamic field in Europe,
the Süleymanlı-movement is by far the most advanced in organizing the
training of religious personnel locally.
The educational program is partly organized in dormitories for chil-
dren in the secondary school age, a model that was developed in Turkey.
In Germany, there are 18 dormitories; in other countries numbers are
subject to speculation. Dormitories provide not only religious training,
but also a more comprehensive educational program that is designed
to support the children in off-school hours, helping them with their
homework and giving them a structured life. The European Süleymanlı
dormitories were confronted with strong opposition. Boarding houses
continues to be an issue of great controversy. In the early 2000s several
German states suspended their permission for new dormitories. More
recently, the dormitories in the Netherlands also came under pressure
when similar objections were raised in the Parliament in 2012.
The links with the Nakşibendi Sufi Order is becoming increasingly
manifest in the public profile of the movement in Europe. The ‘About
Us’ page on the website of VIKZ Germany has a rather elaborate section
on the mystical orientation of the organization. Here, the importance of
some Nakşibendi traditions are explained, such as the zikr hafi (silent
meditation), the hatim ihlas (recitation of Sura 112 in groups), and the
sohbet (explaining the mystical dimensions of Islam to the community).
After having presented these mystical orientations, the website states that
the VIKZ is not organized as a Sufi order, but as a religious community,
stating that the mürşit or mystical master is Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan
who died in 1959.10 On the website of the Dutch branch this reference to
the mystical dimensions of the movement are presented only in Turkish.
In 2004 a report commissioned by the German state of Hessen was
published by Spuler-Stegemann (2004), a German turcologist about the
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
VIKZ and its dormitories. The report was not published but summaries
circulate on the Internet.11 The report contains heavy accusations about
the ideology and goals of the VIKZ in general, and the educational facili-
ties in particular. The VIKZ was portrayed as an elitist sect with an anti-
Western, anti-democratic, anti-Christian, anti-Judaist, and anti-secular
ideology based on a strict sharia-interpretation that rejects human rights,
gender equality, and tolerance towards other faiths. According to Spuler,
the public statements of the VIKZ should be distrusted and are meant
to deceive the outside world. She particularly refers to the alleged bad
conditions and poor pedagogical climate in the educational institutions
and dorms. Homework support, German language training, and compu-
ter lessons are marginal and function as a façade for the outside world.
According to Spuler the main activity is Arabic and Islamic teaching.
The accuracy of the report by Spuler was, however, questioned by a
counter research, commissioned by the VIKZ. An empirical research
among students and teachers of 18 educational institutions about the
pedagogical climate was conducted in which most of the allegations by
Spuler were refuted. According to researcher Boos-Nünning, there are no
indications that ordinary school work is hampered by religious instruc-
tion. Most of the dormitories hire non-Muslim German personal and
pupils are not deliberately isolated from non-Muslims. Boos-Nünning
argues that the dormitories structure the daily life of the pupils in a way
that is beneficial for the school success; in fact, this structure is a major
motive for the students to come and live there. Also in other European
countries the pedagogical climate of religious institutions continues to
be a source of controversies and debates.
The Süleymanlıs are first and foremost an association of Muslims
who are primarily focussed on ethical self-improvement and spiritual
immersion. As such they have carved out their own religious niche in
the course of years.
Notes
1 See the website of the German branch of the movement, http://www.vikz.de/
index.php/unsere-gemeinden.html.
2 Tarikat is Turkish for the Arabic tariqa, meaning mystical order. However, in
contemporary Kemalist literature it acquired a negative connotation close to
the derogatory term ‘sect’.
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Süleymanlıs 
3 Yükleyen (2012, p. 64) who quotes Aydın (2004) as his source.

4 The complete list of 33 spiritual leaders according to the Süleymanlıs can be
found at http://www.tunahan.org/silsile-i-saadat-i10.html (consulted 8 June
2014).
5 http://www.vikz.de/index.php/unsere-gemeinden.html.
6 Email communication of Göran Larsson, author of the chapter on ‘Sweden’
in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe (Larsson, 2013).
7 The website of the United American Muslim Association provides the
addresses of 21 centres in the United States and 6 in Canada. The Turkish
page contains information about Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan. http://
unitedamericanmuslim.org/suleyman_hilmi_tunahan.php.
8 http://www.vikz.de/index.php/pressemitteilungen/items/vikz-waehlt-neuen-
bundesvorstand-neuer-praesident-ist-der-theologe-mehmet-duran.html.
9 Statutes of SICN of 14 May 2004.
10 http://vikz.de/index.php/mystische-ausrichtung.html.
11 http://wirinherten.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/gutachten-
zusammenfassung-spuler-stegemann-vikz.pdf.
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0007
5
Milli Görüş
Abstract: Milli Görüş is the general denominator of an
Islamic political movement founded in the 1970s. Political
leader Erbakan was critical about the strict control
of the Turkish state on religious issues, but first and
foremost he opted for a strong Turkish economy and an
acknowledgement of the deeply religious attitude of the
Turkish people. Erbakan founded several political parties
since 1970 and was successful until the early 2000s. The
ruling AK party originates in the MG movement, but
diverted considerably from the Erbakan political agenda
under the leadership of the current president Erdoğan. In
the late 1970s members of the MG founded organizations
in many countries in Europe. They have always been
successful among young Muslims and counted as the most
important competitors of Diyanet.

 DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0008
Milli Görüş 
Introduction
Milli Görüş, the political movement founded by Necmettin Erbakan

(see Chapter 1), is probably the most discussed topic in studies on Islam
and politics in Turkey. The political agenda of the movement and its
possible intentions have been subjects of heated debates. The arrival of
Milli Görüş in Europe, especially in Germany, has attracted the atten-
tion in many ways, not least because the movement was positioned
almost antagonistically to the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs
(Diyanet). In Germany the security agencies still consider Milli Görüş
a threat to the societal order despite ample evidence that Milli Görüş in
Europe had transformed considerably in the past decades.1 In this study
we will address these changes. In Chapter 1, we have analysed Turkish
politics with respect to Islam and the prominent role the movement has
played in the political arena for a number of decades. In this chapter we
will come back to the origins of the movement because it bears relevance
to the transformations in Europe at its uneasy relation with security
authorities in many countries.
Origins
Milli Görüş (national vision) is inextricably linked to the person of

Necmettin Erbakan, who was the face of political Islam in Turkey for
nearly 30 years (1968–1997). He founded and directed a number of parties
(MNP, MSP, RP, FP and SP) with which he tried to re-Islamize Turkey
with parliamentary means. Not very surprisingly it brought him in
direct confrontation with the military and judiciary authorities because
he would threaten the secular principles of the Turkish Republic. All the
parties were eventually banned and closed down by the state, except the
last one, which is no more than a shadow of what it once was. During the
last election the SP did not even reach the parliamentary threshold.
In the mid-1970s Erbakan presented his religious-political vision in a
book titled Milli Görüş (1975). From then on his movement adopted this
name. The book was an elaboration of his speech at the opening cere-
mony of the newly founded Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP; National Salvation
Party) in 1973 (see Chapter 1). With regard to the content of the book, it
has been argued that Milli Görüş was a foundational text for a doctrine
that linked Islam to Turkish nationalism. In that respect it fits within a
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
long tradition of works that have addressed the historical interrelation of

Turkish identity and Islam, to which the Turkish-Islamic synthesis ideol-
ogy of the junta of the 1980s also belonged. It dates back to 19th- and
early 20th-century thinkers, notably Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura who
were the most well-known in this regard. The book therefore stands in
a much more mainstream Turkish tradition than political adversaries of
Milli Görüş would claim. The book was, however, not an Islamic political
treatise. If we look at the text in hindsight it is a foundational text for a
political movement and addresses much more than Islamic ethics alone.
Many ideas and principles that later on appeared in party programs are
already present in the text. In that respect there is a remarkable stability
and continuity in the ideas that have been propagated by the Milli Görüş
parties over the years.
But it should also be clear that the vision Erbakan put forward in the
book and the actual political strategies of the successive political parties
only partly overlap, even though Erbakan was the central figure in all of
these parties. Most parties led by Erbakan were coalitions of several reli-
gious and political constituencies and often rival fractions. Within the
ranks of the Milli Görüş there have always been deep-seated differences
in outlook. In the successive political parties there was no central guid-
ing agenda other than Erbakan’s charisma. In other words, we cannot
understand the dynamics of the Milli Görüş movement if we ignore the
often stunning political capacities of Erbakan. Consequently, we should
not underestimate the changes that occurred after his death in 2011.
The emergence of Milli Görüş as a political movement in the early
1970s marked a shift in the Islamic opposition against Kemalist rule.
Until the 1950s arguments against the secular measures of the Kemalists
were predominantly theological, and the resistance against Kemalism by
Islamic actors was aimed at restoring the central legal and institutional
pillars of Islam: a return to the Ottoman times. After 1950, and partly
as a consequence of the changing political and economic situation, the
modes of activism that challenged the Kemalist principles diversified.
Intellectuals with an Islamic outlook but without theological training
now took part in debates. The agenda shifted from restoration of the
Ottoman institutional setting to political empowerment.
Erbakan was one of the new political actors of the 1960s. Whatever
we make of his ideas, it is clear that his political activism and the issues
he addressed brought Islam to the heart of the political arena. Erbakan
himself had an ordinary upbringing in which Islam was a self-evident
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Milli Görüş 
but not very central part. His parents were not very religious. Erbakan
himself spent much of his professional life in mechanics and industry
and lived a couple of years in Germany. He was a follower of the influen-
tial Nakşibendi teacher Mehmed Zahid Kotku. The Nakşibendi order also
stood at the cradle of some other Turkish-Islamic movements, such as the
Süleymanlıs and Nurcu’s. But where these two chose to build an educational
network, Kotku encouraged his disciples to reform society with political
means. Although there are differences of opinion about whether Erbakan
has been initiated into the ‘mystical way’, he himself belonged to Kotku’s
pupils, and he was encouraged to go into politics by the şeyh (Schiffauer,
2010, p. 67). Erbakan actually took the initiative to found a political
party.
It has been claimed that the Nakşibendi background of the founders
of Milli Görüş constitute a key factor in understanding the implications
of Erbakan’s ideas. However, due to the strict secular legislation his real
intentions were hidden behind seemingly neutral key concepts such
as adil düzen (just order), ahlak ve maneviyat (morals and spirituality),
and fikir ve inanç hürriyeti (freedom of speech and belief). The most
well-known example is the apparent double meaning of Milli (national)
denoting the Turkish people and Muslims in general. Hence according
to his adversaries, Milli Görüş actually denotes ‘Islamic vision’, and all
his talk about nationalism, modernization, and economic development
is secondary, even a cover-up.
This is, however, a serious misinterpretation of Erbakan’s political
ideas. In fact it reduces Islamic inspiration in political matters to the
reconstruction of the state foundations, and it ignores the intercon-
nectedness of the different spheres and the role of morality. In the book
Erbakan presented his views about the economic, societal, and spiritual
condition of Turkey and what should be changed. He elaborated what
he considered the core values of Turkish identity. Basically the book
must be understood as a timely document that deals with the roots of
Turkish identity, written by an important political actor, published in
an extremely turbulent period in Turkish history in which Islam had
become a highly sensitive issue. It should be seen as a declaration about
the poor moral condition of the Turkish people and a proposal for the
way back to spiritual prosperity and material welfare. In the preface of
the book Erbakan (1975, p. 10) summarized this moral appeal with the
catchphrase Yeniden Büyük Türkiye (Towards a grand Turkey again).
Although it was not stated explicitly, it was obvious that he referred to
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
the heydays of the Ottoman Empire, but it was certainly not a call for
simple restoration.
In order to reach this goal a national vision is needed, a total economic,
political, and moral program that gives back to the Turkish people
what they deserve: independence, not just materially, but also morally
and spiritually. This should be accomplished through a program that
combines a moral uplift with a thorough industrial development and an
overall societal modernization. ‘Giving back’ referred to the Kemalists
who imposed an ‘empty ideology’ on the Turkish people. Erbakan then
explains what went wrong. Already in the 1930s and 1940s but especially
after the Second World War, when Turkey became an ally of the West, a
part of the Turkish people took over a Western mentality (batı zihniyeti),
in other words a liberal vision (liberal görüş) took root. Others were
inclined to follow a socialist or leftist vision (solcu görüş). But, according
to Erbakan, both visions are false, fake, and empty. They do not fit with
the Turkish soul. They have no substance. They are foreign to the Turkish
nation and people. They are a misfit and therefore not useful and in many
cases even harmful. Be it international capital, laiklik (secularism), the
Western ideas introduced in Turkish public education, or the European
common market, all these phenomena are bad for the Turkish nation
and largely account for its woeful condition. Turkey has allied with the
West not out of strength but out of weakness and dependence (Erbakan
(1975, p. 24).
In the book Erbakan does not call for a struggle to fight those practices
itself; he simply wants to keep them out of Turkey. The Turkish people
have been lazy and forgot their national strength and the roots of their
identity, but now there is an old and proven and trusty alternative ahead
of us: the national vision (Milli Görüş). ‘Most of what these foreign
ideas pretend we do better. We do not need them’. This was a phrase that
Erbakan would articulate on many occasions.
A crucial issue that still haunts Milli Görüş today is whether or not
Erbakan intended to overthrow the secular state. Although we should not
overestimate the influence of the book, there are intriguing clauses that
give a hint to what Erbakan had in mind. Throughout the book he refers
to human dispositions as the key conditions for a sound society. These
key conditions must be fulfilled otherwise legal and state structures are
empty boxes. The most important human quality is iman (belief). It is the
source of strength, not just for Turks, but for humankind. It provides the
indispensable resources for knowing ourselves, taking the morally right
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Milli Görüş 
decisions, and adopting the proper attitude towards others. It feeds our
soul and makes us spiritually independent. It also comes as an indispen-
sable prerequisite for material progress and welfare (refah). The obvious
basis for iman in the case of Turks is Islam. Once this is accomplished
a combination of technological development throughout the country
(especially in the more backward regions in Anatolia) within a spiritual
framework and a democratic political structure will bring prosperity in
the Turkish people.
The general message of the book revolves around three basic issues:
the recognition of what we today would call identity, the political
arrangements that grants the space and freedom to live according to this
identity, and the development of the proper conditions to accomplish
a glorious and prosperous future. Identity refers to the centrality of the
Turkish consciousness and the Turkish soul. Not surprisingly Erbakan
adopts a rather essentialist notion of Turkish identity with a core that
consists of an intricate relation between Turkishness and Islam. Turks,
according to Erbakan, have a natural inclination towards the dignity and
morality that is to be found in Islamic sources. Erbakan then proposes a
political and legal framework that secures the opportunity to live accord-
ing to this identity of which freedom of opinion and freedom of belief
are the core conditions. Then Erbakan states that the present political
situation in Turkey does not fulfil these requirements, and therefore the
country is in a bad situation. Turkey has been dominated by principles
that are alien to the Turkish soul.
His appeal which he restated again and again in public speeches reso-
nated well among all those who felt victim of the economic policies of the
big parties. The MSP became the voice of the traditional and underde-
veloped regions in central Anatolia where the people blamed the secular
authorities in the urban centres for their misery (Seufert, 1997, p. 271).
To Europe
Among the Turkish workers in Europe, who were predominantly from the
Turkish countryside, were also supporters of Erbakan’s political movement.
In 1976 they founded the Türkische Union in Europa, later to be renamed as
Islamic Union and from 1985 Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatları (Milli Görüş
organizations Europe) (Binswanger and Sipahioğlu, 1988, p. 91). Since 1994
it is called Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş (IGMG), with the European
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
headquarters in Kerpen near the city of Cologne (Rosenow-Williams, 2012,

p. 249). Towards the end of the 1970s the movement opened branches in
several other European countries.
Initially the movement presented itself very explicitly as an anti-
imperialist and anti-secularist alternative to both leftist Turkish asso-
ciations who were very active in those years and to the state-controlled
Islam, represented by Diyanet. The German and the Dutch branches
have constituted the organizational axis from early onwards. Publicly the
movement denied any relationship with the political parties of Erbakan. This
was understandable since Turkish law forbade political parties to establish
branches outside Turkey (Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009). This law was abolished
in 1995. Despite this public denial, the link between the movement in
Europe and Turkey was clear from the outset. One of the first activities
was the printing in Frankfurt of a European edition of Milli Gazete, the
newspaper of the movement (Binswanger and Sipahioğlu, 1988, p. 91). The
founders and the leadership of the AMGT were well-known MSP members
(Seufert, 1999, p. 296). The initial stage of organizational developments of
Milli Görüş in Europe cannot be understood properly without taking into
account the developments in Turkey.
The military coup of 1980 led to a strengthening of the European
branch of the movement. A large part of the well-organized cadre of
the party escaped from Turkey to avoid prosecution and joined the
movement in Europe. They improved and extended the network of
local organizations first in Germany and then also in neighbouring
countries. This network was managed from the headquarters in Cologne
(Landman, 1992, p. 120). When Erbakan founded a new political party
three years after the coup, the RP, the European branch of the movement
re-established the link with the Turkish counterpart. But the movement
also had to deal with the first serious internal conflict. The AMGT board
decided to support the RP in 1983, but a radical-Islamist faction rejected
the political system altogether and left the AMGT to set up its own
organization: the caliphate state in exile led by Cemalettin Kaplan. We
will address Kaplan’s organization in Chapter 7.
The period between 1988 and 1997 were the years of unprecedented
achievements and success for the RP in Turkey and Milli Görüş in Europe.
There were frequent visits of celebrities from Turkey to MG mosques which
created enthusiasm among many Muslims in Europe. The RP was able to
extend its support among them and raise funds for the political struggle
in Turkey (Schiffauer, 2010, p. 102).
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Milli Görüş 
The years between 1997 and 2002 were marked by the dissolution of
the RP in Turkey and fierce debates about the future prospects of Milli
Görüş. Within the RP a younger generation advocated a reconsidera-
tion of the strong anti-European stance of the party. This resulted in a
split between the old supporters of Erbakan who later founded the SP
and a new generation led by Tayyip Erdoǧan which founded the AKP.
Although it would be too simple to argue that the schism in Turkey
would neatly cut across the Milli Görüş echelons in Europe, a similar
debate took place there. In Milli Görüş in Europe it was not primarily a
matter of Turkish foreign policy, but a matter of how to position oneself
vis-à-vis the non-Muslim environment. In Germany the new leader of
IGMG Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, a nephew of Necmettin Erbakan, who
was appointed in 1995, stated that the West should not be demonized
without solid argumentation. Europe also offered opportunities for
Muslims to live according to their convictions.
The victory of the AKP in Turkey in 2002 heralded a new political era,
with a party that has roots in Milli Görüş but embarked on a different route
away from Erbakan. The party of the old leader Erbakan gradually margin-
alized, but his person was still immensely popular among many Muslims in
Europe and Turkey. This popularity, however, did not turn the tide within
the European ranks of the movement to adopt a more autonomous policy
independent from the Turkish origin. Erbakan himself made an attempt in
the early 2000s to strengthen the links between the IGMG and his party, but
he too failed despite his personal popularity. The attempt only widened the
gap between the SP and Milli Görüş (Schiffauer, 2010, pp. 127–131). After
Erbakan passed away, the anniversary of his death has become a contro-
versial issue, as both the SP leadership and part of the IGMG rank-and-file
have tried to turn it into an important event, whereas the IGMG leadership
has discouraged this. In 2013, IGMG, accepted the celebration to take place,
but turned it into a broader event to commemorate ‘those who preceded us’
(Bundesministerium des Innern, 2014).
The European network of Milli Görüş organizations is formally linked

by statutory regulations in which the IGMG in Cologne is entitled to
appoint chairpersons of national umbrella organizations. In Austria the
Avusturya Islam Federasyonu (AIF) in Vienna is the umbrella organization
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
of the movement with 60 local associations throughout Austria which is

only 5 associations less than the ATIB. The AIF has a strong position in
the IGGiÖ and is the most active organization of Turkish Muslims in the
country (Schmidinger, 2013). In Belgium the Belçika Islam Federasyonu
(BIF) is only half as big as the BTIDV of Diyanet (Fadil, 2013). According
to a survey carried out in the late 1990s, among about 1,000 respondents
of Turkish background over 65 per cent identified with Diyanet, whereas
only 5 per cent sympathized with Milli Görüş. In recent years the BIF has
been very active in extending its network among non-Turkish Muslims
and building up relations with public authorities.
In Denmark Milli Görüş founded the Danimarka Müslüman Göçmenler
Teşkilatı (DMGT) in 1986. Currently there are six mosques run by the
movement and another 35 local associations. An important difference in
status with the Diyanet-backed DITIB is that the latter has an official
status as a religious community since 2006, which implies that they get
state support (Jacobsen, 2012, 2013). In France, Turkish-Islamic organi-
zations are minor players in the field. The Confederation Islamique Milli
Görüş France (CIMG) is the umbrella organization of Milli Görüş.2 In the
Netherlands there are two branches of Milli Görüş since 1998, one for the
northern part of the country (Milli Görüş Noord Nederland, MGNN) and
one for the southern part (Milli Görüş Zuid Nederland, MGZN). The last
one is still known with its former name NIF (Dutch Islamic Federation).
Together they run 36 local mosque associations. There is some debate
whether or not the split has to do with the split in Milli Görüş in Turkey
that took place around the same time (Sunier et al., 2011). In Sweden the
Isveç Milli Görüş Teşkilatları (IMGT; Swedish Milli Görüş Organizations)
have their headquarters in the southern city of Malmö where most
of the estimated 100,000 Turks live (Larsson, 2013). Germany not
only has the largest Milli Görüş branch of Europe, also the European
headquarters IGMG is situated in Germany. Of the officially registered
514 local associations in Europe (with an estimated number of 87,000
members), 323 are to be found in Germany.3 A separate organization
was set up for the management and the building of mosques. In Germany
this is the Europäische Gemeinschaft e.V. Moscheebau und Unterstützungs
(EMUG, founded in 1994). In all European countries there are similar
organizations.
According to the statutory regulations IGMG in Kerpen is at the top of
an organizational hierarchy. Local branches officially have no say in the
European federation. They can only comment on certain policies of the
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Milli Görüş 
federation indirectly through the Council of Associated Organizations.

However, in practice local associations can act relatively autonomously.
They are able to develop their own policies in accordance with local
circumstances (Lindo, 2008; Schiffauer, 2010). Activities and organi-
zational build-up are similar in all European branches with separate
associations for youth and women.
According to a survey that has been conducted by the German
Zentrum für Türkeistudien Milli Görüş has a relatively juvenile rank-
and-file with an average age of 35.5. This is much younger than that of
Diyanet and Süleymanlıs (Yükleyen, 2012, p. 61). Milli Görüş and the
Gülen-movement are indeed predominantly oriented towards young
people. Within the ranks of Milli Görüş a growing number of adherents
in Europe is in favour of an organizational structure that provides local
associations more independence vis-à-vis Turkey. They consider the
self-evident hierarchical structure based on migratory networks that
existed in the early years as not in line with the developments taking
place among Muslims in Europe. In recent years there is a more relaxed
understanding between Milli Görüş and Diyanet, and occasionally they
jointly organize events. This might be related to the coming to power of
the AKP in Turkey in 2003. However, since the Turkish government lifted
the ban on political activities of Turkish parties outside Turkey, there is a
growing concern about this among Milli Görüş leaders in Europe. Some
are very critical about Turkish politicians of whatever background to use
European Muslim networks to attract votes.

Between 1997 and 2002 an ideological reorientation took place within the
movement in Europe which led to a greater distance from the ideas of
Erbakan and a stronger focus on living in a non-Islamic environment. Before
that, the ideology and activities of Milli Görüş were oriented towards the
Islamization of the Turkish state. The main goal of the branches in Europe
was in fact to support the political movement in Turkey and to propagate
the program that Erbakan had developed since the early 1970s. It was
emphasized that the West was a hostile power (Binswanger and Sipahioğlu,
1988). Activities and propaganda were almost exclusively oriented
towards Turkey and the rest of the Muslim world from the perspective of a
legitimate liberation struggle of oppressed peoples (Seufert, 1999). Members
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
were invited to donate for fellow Muslims in countries where the situation
was difficult such as Bosnia, Chechnya, China, Kashmir, Palestine, Pakistan,
and Algeria. This was articulated in a discourse of struggle against oppressive
regimes and Muslim-hostile environments. Turkish Muslims were regarded
as a community in diaspora physically as well as ideologically.
From the late 1990s onwards the IGMG and Milli Görüş organizations
elsewhere in Europe embarked on a much more pragmatic route and
focussed on the interests of Turkish Muslims in European societies whose
open, pluralistic, and democratic character was recognized and accepted.
Schiffauer (2010) has referred to the new young generation that grew up in
Europe as Change into: post-Islamist to emphasize their dissociation from
the old ideas of Erbakan. This new course became visible in all countries in
Europe and manifested itself in the aims and activities presented on websites
and annual reports of the national umbrella organizations and affiliated local
organizations.
Milli Görüş increasingly presented itself as an organization that
works in the interests of Muslims, solving their problems, and encour-
aging them to participate in society. This is done by embracing the
multi-religious and multicultural character of European societies and
emphasizing the constitutional freedom of religion. Rather than focuss-
ing on the interests of an ethnically specific Muslim population with a
migratory background, they stressed that Muslims constitute an integral
part and an enriching element of society. Whereas the discourse in the
initial years was anti-European, it became increasingly inclusive by argu-
ing that Muslim presence is a European societal reality. Although the
Turkish language and culture continue to be important for many of the
adherents, the leadership tries to focus on the religious rather than the
ethnic and cultural identity.
In all countries where Milli Görüş has an active branch a wide
variety of activities is organized partly to cater religious needs of their
constituency such as the yearly hajj to Mecca, funeral services, religious
instruction, religious accommodation, but also activities with the aim to
strengthen the position of Muslims in the local community. The central
aim of Milli Görüş to be found in IGMG documents but also in the local
statutory principles is the improvement of the position of Muslims as
citizens of the country of residence. In the Netherlands and Belgium
Milli Görüş has been very active early onwards in the foundation of
schools with an Islamic identity according to legal provisions in each of
the countries (Landman, 1992).
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Milli Görüş 
Despite the transformations within Milli Görüş in Europe the movement

continues to be depicted by the German authorities and elsewhere in Europe
as an Islamist movement that aims to establish an Islamic state in Turkey
(Rosenow-Williams, 2012, p. 250). The security authorities of Niedersachsen
refute that IGMG would support integration: ‘Actually by a comprehensive
range of Quran courses, homework groups, holiday camps and sports
activities IGMG is trying [ ... ] to bind young people to the movement and to
indoctrinate Muslims with the political ideology of the “Righteous Order” ’.4
‘Righteous Order’ is a reference to Erbakan’s program. Interestingly, the
various security services disagree in their assessment of the movement. The
German security service has for many years reported on the IGMG and its
alleged continuous propagation of Erbakan’s radical anti-European ideol-
ogy. Only in its latest annual report the service refers to a change in attitude
among the IGMG leadership (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2013). The
Dutch security service (AIVD), however, has called Milli Görüş a moderate
organisation and factor of resistance against the threat of Islamic radicalism
in its annual report of 2008 (AIVD, 2009, p. 30).
The central position of the European headquarters in Germany
continues to be perceived as an indication that the ‘conservative’ board
in Cologne rules the movement top-down, even though it had been
demonstrated that it was the German headquarters that initiated the
changes described earlier (see Schiffauer, 2010). A protracting conflict
in the city of Amsterdam around the building of a new mosque is a clear
example of how these images work out in negotiations. The changes
with respect to the movement’s strategies towards the end of the 1990s
became particularly visible in the Netherlands through the work of
a local leader of Milli Görüş, Haci Karacaer. He became a prominent
figure with a reputation far beyond the boundaries of the country and
was very successful in putting Milli Görüş on the agenda and making
it an acceptable partner in negotiations (Lindo, 2008, p. 35; Schiffauer,
2010, p. 117). Karacaer was the chairman of MGNN, the northern branch
of Milli Görüş. The way in which he operated, his active involvement
in the local community, his inclusive appeal, and his cooperation with
local authorities rendered him the image of a ‘liberal Muslim leader’
(Lindo, 2008, p. 34). Even though there were many indications that the
situation was not at all that simple, he was soon depicted by the media
as the first leader to resist the pressure from Cologne when a conflict
broke out about the financial sources of the mosque project and IGMG
in Germany intervened and replaced the chairman.5
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
The development of the Milli Görüş in Europe shows the complex

dynamics that are at work in transnational Turkish-Islamic movements.
In Turkey itself the movement is in flux. In the various European coun-
tries, a younger generation has started to engage with the local context
and to distance itself from the influence of Turkish politicians. This takes
place while simultaneously public opinion and some security services
continue to distrust their intentions.
Notes
1 In his study on Milli Görüş in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, Schiffauer
(2010) argues that the movement embarked on a different trajectory and
should therefore be viewed from a different perspective. Research carried
out in other European countries point in the same direction (Akgönül, 2005;
Canatan, 2001; Lindo, 2008). For the perspective of the security service, see:
Bundesministerium des Innern, 2013, pp.296–307.
2 http://www.cimgfrance.fr/.
3 http://www.igmg.org/gemeinschaft/islamic-community-milli-goerues/
organisational-structure.html.
4 http://www.verfassungsschutz.niedersachsen.de/portal/live.
php?navigation_id=12327&article_id=54208&_psmand=30.
5 For an elaborate analysis of the conflict, see Lindo (2008) and Sunier (2006).
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6
Gülen-movement (Hizmet)
Abstract: The Gülen-movement was founded in Turkey in
the 1960s. It is one of the fastest growing Islamic movements
in the world. They have established schools, institutions, and
business companies in more than one hundred countries.
The movement was founded by its present spiritual leader
Fethullah Gülen and emerged in the early 1980s in the
changing political and economic environment of Turkey. In
the 1990s the movement expanded internationally. Today they
count as the most influential Islamic movement in the Turkish
political landscape and beyond. The modus operandi of the
Gülen-movement as well as its internal structure is markedly
different from the established organizations. It has made the
organization effective on the one hand, but also suspicious in
the eyes of many policy makers on the other.

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 Transnational Turkish Islam
Introduction
The Hizmet (service), better known as the Gülen-movement, was founded

in Turkey in the 1960s by its present spiritual leader Fethullah Gülen. It
is one of the fastest growing Islamic movements in the world. They have
established schools, educational institutions, and business companies in
more than one hundred countries. In the changing political and economic
environment of Turkey in the early 1980s Hizmet became an important
religious and social innovative force.1 In the 1990s the movement expanded
internationally. In the course of the 1990s Hizmet grew considerably among
Turkish Muslims in Europe and became an important player in the Turkish-
Islamic landscape in Europe. The modus operandi of Hizmet as well as
its internal structure is markedly different from that of the established
Turkish-Islamic organizations we discussed in the previous chapters. But
most importantly, the movement has a particular attraction among young,
relatively highly educated Muslims. As the proportion of this category of
Muslims is growing in all countries in Europe, it is to be expected that the
Hizmet will develop a more prominent position in the Turkish-Islamic
landscape in the near future. Some authors argue that Hizmet has the most
beneficial position of being the vanguard in the development of a ‘European
Islam’ (see, e.g., Carroll, 2007; Yükleyen, 2012).
However, the movement also has an image of not being transparent.
More serious accusations concern a hidden political agenda to infiltrate
state and societal institutions with the aim to gain power. The loose
organizational structure of the movement causes different reactions in
different political contexts. Since the 2013 crisis in Turkey about alleged
corruption by the government and the role of Hizmet (see Chapter 1),
media attention almost exploded. In Turkey the accusations against
Hizmet about infiltrating state institutions constitute the very essence of
the conflict between the AK party and Hizmet. In Europe the image of
Hizmet is rather mixed. In the Netherlands and Belgium Hizmet is regu-
larly portrayed in the media as an organization with a double agenda
and a strong aura of secrecy. In Germany by contrast Hizmet is seen as
a much more preferable, open, and accessible partner for governmental
institutions than, for example, Milli Görüş, and its loose structure seems
to work in its favour (see Andrews, 2011, p. 520). In that country Milli
Görüş continues to be the main object of distrust. Seufert (2014) argues
that Hizmet is currently developing rather quickly and that it is hard to
predict how the movement will establish.
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet) 
Origins
Hizmet is a branch of the Nurcu-movement, founded by the charismatic
Islamic theologian Said Nursi (1873–1960). Nursi was of Kurdish origin
and born in the eastern Turkish city of Bitlis. After being trained in a
local medrese for a number of years, Nursi moved to the city of Mardin in
southern Turkey. He soon became well known for his profound knowl-
edge of Islamic sources. He gathered a group of followers who would call
him Bediüzzaman (glory of his time) (Dumont, 1986; Yavuz, 2009). Nursi
produced a series of comments on Islamic sources and a collection of
tractates in which he put special emphasis on the mystical dimensions of
the sources. Nursi contended that these divine sources contained ‘hidden
layers’ of knowledge, only to be accessed after long and disciplined study.
Nursi’s main and most well-known work was the Risale-i-Nur (message
of Light). Light refers to one of the Quranic verses in which God is
depicted as light. Nursi’s disciples therefore referred to themselves as
‘followers of the Light’ (Nurcu) (Bruinessen, 2010, p. 9; Mardin, 1989).
Nursi’s students have sometimes referred to him as the ‘Spinoza of the
Islamic world’ because there are some striking parallels in the theologies
of both thinkers (Çelik, 2010, pp. 125–133). Just as Spinoza, Nursi encour-
aged his followers to understand God’s creation by studying it. ‘The
Machinery of Nature’, according to Nursi, is one of the great mysteries
of God’s creation (Mardin, 1989, p. 214). Only through continuous study
human beings are able to remain connected with God’s creation (Turner
and Horkuç, 2009, p. 60).
Although Nursi considered himself an ordinary Islamic scholar, the
roots of the Nurcu-movement are to be found in the mystical traditions
of Islam, notably the Nakşibendi-order, founded in central Asia. One
of the relevant features of the order is the central role of religious text,
but Nursi also distanced himself from those scholars who only focussed
on legal issues and fiqh, Islamic law. Nursi proposed a proper balance
between textual and rational dimensions of religious reasoning and
knowledge production on the one hand and the emotional relation with
God on the other (Turner and Horkuç, 2009, p. 90).
Gülen was born in 1941 in a village in the eastern province of Erzurum.
He received training as a local priest in the Sufi environment so typical
for this part of the country. Here he became acquainted with Nursi’s
work. Fethullah Gülen had mastered Nursi’s work thoroughly, but he
did not belong to Nursi’s intimate community. He developed Nursi’s
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
balance between mystics and ratio into a specific pedagogical trajectory.

Divine knowledge, according to Gülen, was only to be accessed through
disciplined training and learning (Bruinessen, 2010). The first 25 years of
his career as an Islamic scholar he fully immersed in the mystical tradi-
tions of Islam. This turned out to be decisive for his religious approach,
especially the intimate relation between piety and everyday life (Yavuz,
2013, p. 28). Living in a region where Turks and Kurds lived close to
each other, Gülen also became a proponent of Turkish nationalism
(Bruinessen, 2010).
In 1962 he was appointed as imam in the western city of Edirne close to
the Greek border, and four years later he became the director of a school
for religious education and a preacher in the city of Izmir. It was during
those years that Gülen developed his own version of Nursi’s ideas. He
organized summer camps, lecture series, and courses for all age groups
and backgrounds. One of his prime targets was to raise a generation of
Muslims that was able to cope with the inevitable deconfessionalization
of society. Gülen considered this a worrisome development, but he was
vehemently against any political solution such as promoted by Erbakan.
It was not a matter of law, but a matter of attitude according to Gülen.
This attitude would thrive upon a spiritual bond with God combined
with intellectual growth. The new generation should adopt this attitude
not just by studying Islamic sources, but by becoming active members of
society and building careers. In the course of the 1970s Gülen founded
educational institutions called dersane (study house) where he taught his
students (Yavuz, 2013).
The 1970s were the years of increasing political polarization and
violence. Although Gülen was politically right-wing, he tried to keep his
students out of the political turmoil. In 1971 he was accused of organ-
izing clandestine religious meetings. Therefore Gülen wanted to avoid
any situation which could be explained as religious political activity in
the heightened political controversies in the course of the 1970s. His
main objective was to prevent his students from being influenced by the
political activism of MSP leader Erbakan. His writings suggest that these
attempts were not just out of opportunistic motives to stay away from
the police. Gülen was convinced that Islam was first and foremost about
spirituality and acquiring profound religious knowledge and insight.
Political power could never be a goal in itself and is counterproductive
for spiritual self-improvement. Erbakan’s activism had little to do with
spirituality (Yavuz, 2013, p. 39). According to Gülen, the 1970s serious
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet) 
political clashes had to do with a lack of communal sense and a lack of

knowledge. In 1979 Gülen was involved in the foundation of the journal
Sızıntı and hoped to be able to spread his ideas more extensively by
publishing them (ibid.).
Gülen had mixed feelings about the 1980s general’s coup d’état. He
welcomed the junta’s attempt to bring an end to the street fighting and
he was also positive about the introduction of the new Turkish-Islamic
nationalist ideology ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’, propagated by the junta
to counter both left-wing and Islamist reaction. His moderate support
for the junta was heavily criticized by Nurcu’s, but despite that, his
relation with the junta remained tense. In the first years after 1980 Gülen
focussed on the distribution of his sermons on video and cassette. Many of
the famous weeping sermons in which Gülen developed his own form of
preaching were recorded in those years (Yavuz, 2013, p. 40).
During the 1980s the position of the Gülen-movement in Turkey improved
significantly after he developed strong ties with Prime Minister Özal. Özal
himself came from a Milli Görüş milieu, but was sympathetic to the ideas
of Gülen. Özal was the first prime minister to whom Gülen gave advice, and
as a result the star of Gülen in those years rose quickly. The radically new
economic policy introduced by the ANAP resulted in the emergence of a
new conservative educated middle class who wanted to change the in their
eyes inward looking economic policies of the Kemalists (Yavuz, 2009, p.
77). The rapid economic development, the opening of Turkey to the outside
world, and the emergence of a new generation of educated Muslims laid
the foundation for the gradual changes that Hizmet would undergo from
the late 1980s onwards. These changes became particularly evident in the
1990s.
One of the main issues was the growing difference of opinion between
him and the RP, the party of Erbakan about the relation between state
and religion. Erbakan pursued the transformation of the secular state
through democratic political empowerment. Gülen argued that a strong
civil society and an open public sphere were much more important. A
sound and stable political culture could only be realized when citizens
were able to talk and participate fully in political debates and decision-
making. He criticized not only the central regulatory role of the state
that was characteristic of Turkish political culture, but also all those
political actors who were heading towards a confrontation with the state.
It was in those years that the foundation was laid for what Turam (2007,
p. 10) has described as the ‘politics of engagement’; the secular system
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
should not be removed, but liberalized and opened up. This transition
has also been described as the ‘conservative democratic turn’ (Hendrick,
2013, p. 52). The term ‘dialogue’ that appears in many of Gülen’s writings
occupies a central place in his doctrine. It is based on the idea that Muslims
must accept that society is composed of a multitude of beliefs, religions, and
worldviews. Instead of fighting diversity people should encounter each
other in a continuous dialogue.
The 1990s were very crucial for the movement in many respects. Gülen
emerged as a prominent preacher who was addressed with the title
hocaefendi, a title that denotes religious authority. It gave him a prominent
public role (Yavuz, 2013, p. 40). Hizmet opened an increasing number of
educational institutions in Turkey in those years. Sympathizers of Gülen
also set up a network of schools in the new independent states in central
Asia. Because education at these institutions was of good quality, many
parents, including those who were not followers of Gülen, brought their
children to those schools. Economic development and the emergence
of a prosperous middle class made it possible to build up a commercial
imperium with banks and media, including the newspaper Zaman, and
the TV station Samanyolu. The movement was funded by fellow entre-
preneurs who were willing to invest in projects of Hizmet. Eventually
the movement was able to become independent from gifts and charity
(Bruinessen, 2010, p. 13; Ebaugh, 2010, p. 83).
A major factor that has contributed to the success of the movement in
the 1990s was its attention for to the emerging middle class in the urban
regions. Erbakan continued to focus on the traditional, relatively poor
Muslim population in the countryside, in the provincial towns, and in
the poor areas of the big cities. His popularity among these segments
of society remained very strong. Gülen started to build a generation of
young followers who were employed in key sectors of society and industry
(Bruinessen, 2010).
Although Gülen was not involved in any way in the political activities of
Erbakan, he also got in trouble in 1997 when Erbakan was forced by the mili-
tary to resign as prime minister (see Chapter 1). The new government that
took office after the 1997 coup took a series of measures in which the rela-
tively liberal policy towards Islamic private activities was reversed. Gülen’s
departure to the United States (officially for medical reasons) in 1999 and
the opening of his headquarters in Pennsylvania was a major turning point
for the movement. The nationalism that was part and parcel of Gülen’s ideas
well into the 1990s, receded further and further into the background, not
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet) 
least because the number of non-Turkish followers increased and because

Gülen, while being in the United States, became increasingly convinced that
the American political ‘model’ of managing religious diversity would fit
much better with his ideas and with a movement that intends to operate
on the world stage (Yavuz, 2013, p. 45). Hizmet transformed into a typical
NGO.
From an originally Turkish nationalist Islamic actor, Fethullah Gülen
developed into a genuinely global phenomenon (Agai, 2007). Followers
often refer to his Islamic doctrine as ‘civil Islam’, denoting an ethical
code for conduct that goes beyond the strictly theological understanding
of Islamic ethics. The aim of the educational centres that the movement
founded all over the world is to breed a new generation of young Muslims
that is capable of acting in today’s complex world in a responsible and
reflexive way (Yilmaz, 2005, p. 394), which trainees are helped to achieve
through a series of introspective exercises. Hizmet and the teachings of
its founder Fethullah Gülen focus on the contemporary global condi-
tions under which Muslims live (see, e.g., Carroll, 2007; Yilmaz, 2007;
Çelik, 2010; Esposito and Yılmaz, 2010).
To Europe
Although Hizmet propagates a global Islamic doctrine with explicitly
cosmopolitan underpinnings, it goes without saying that the activities
that Hizmet developed outside Turkey were largely related to local
conditions and circumstances. In the United States they received sympa-
thetic responses for the NGO-like activities (Yavuz, 2013, p. 24; see also
Vasquez and Marquardt, 2003). In Central Asia and the Balkans the
Turkish origin was emphasized in a stronger manner than elsewhere. The
establishments of Hizmet in Western Europe, especially their activities
from the late 1990s onwards, differ from those developed by the other
Turkish organizations in several respects.
In most countries in Europe organizations such as Süleymanlıs, Milli
Görüş, and Diyanet were already active in the 1970s, even in the late
1960s in some countries. Followers of Gülen started much later in the
1980s, but especially in the 1990s (Seufert, 2014). Due to their relative
late start they arrived in an organizational environment that was already
well-established. The other movements concentrated on religious accom-
modation and focussed on the first generation migrant population, the
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
so-called mosque model. In Germany with its relatively large Turkish

minority, Hizmet did not take part in national advisory boards, such
as the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD), the German
Islamic Council (IRD), the Coordinating Council of Muslims (KRM),
or the German Islam Conference (DIK) (p. 26). Also in other countries
Hizmet operates low profile in this respect.
The reason for this self-chosen side-line position is no doubt related to
the specific goals of the movement. As Seufert (2014, p. 24) argues, they
aimed at ‘creating a Muslim-elite via a self-organised system of secular
education’. Therefore ‘a class of Turkish entrepreneurs and free-lancers
able to finance the necessary institutions was required on the one hand
and a critical mass of young people with a command of the respective
local languages on the other’ (ibid.). From the beginning Gülen activists
focussed primarily on educational activities. In the 1970s and 1980s follow-
ers of different branches of the Nurcu-movement were already active among
Turkish Muslims in Europe. In 1981 in the Dutch city of Rotterdam the
Akyazılı Foundation was established, named after the institute that Gülen
founded in 1972 in Izmir. The youth centre with a mosque soon became
a European hub of educational activities. Members of Akyazılı were also
active in local politics concerning religious accommodation (Landman,
1992, p. 139). The founder of the organization Necdet Başaran was an
itinerant preacher in Europe who encouraged local volunteers to become
active and to set up educational institutes. Hizmet was particularly
interested in volunteers with a successful educational career (Bruinessen,
2010, p. 33).
Already in the 1980s various branches of the Nurcu-movement attracted
a relatively large number of young highly educated people with their
activities. Because they constituted a very small proportion of Muslims
in those years, they did not attract much public attention. These early
forms of activity, however, such as inviting prominent people of the move-
ment from Turkey, organizing educational activities and discussions, have
laid the foundation for the developments in the second half of the 1990s
(Bruinessen, 2010).
Although all Turkish religious movements discussed in the previous
chapters have built up transnational networks in Europe and beyond,
Hizmet is probably most successful in establishing a genuine network
of activities across borders. There are two reasons for that. One is the
large proportion of highly educated people in the movement. Turkish,
which still is the main language in many of the activities organized by
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet) 
Hizmet, is becoming less and less important in many of the public meet-
ings organized by organizations related to Hizmet. Most international
conferences are in English and national activities are predominantly in
the local language. In that respect Hizmet has a big advantage over other
organizations. The other reason for their success is their loose organi-
zational structure. As we saw, the other Turkish-Islamic movements
developed into migrant organizations providing religious services which
typically imply a local structure and rooting. Hizmet is almost by defini-
tion ‘uprooted’.
Diyanet, Milli Görüş, and the Süleymanlıs in Europe have a relatively

clear organizational structure consisting of associations and foundations
that are connected through national and international umbrella organiza-
tions. These organizational characteristics reflect the existing national
legal and political context in which they operate, but the basic format
is on the whole very similar. At the local level, the mosque is the focus
of the organization from which activities are undertaken for members and
visitors. Hizmet, by contrast, is described by followers as a network of
Muslims who are inspired by the ideas of Gülen and who develop activi-
ties in many areas. It is a loose network of volunteers without a formal
organization with members, boards, and umbrella organizations. The
core of the movement consists of relatively autonomous educational
institutions and student houses of different types. Within these institu-
tions so-called abis (elderly brother) and ablas (elderly sister) constitute
the core of insiders. They have a certain authority and play an important
role as a guide and mentor to new participants of the movement. In
every country where Hizmet is active, an abi acts as representative of the
movement. His authority is based on his position in the movement, his
network, his knowledge of the important writings, and his position as a
mentor. Also at the local level there are abis. This active group of local
leaders is not connected to each other through a formal organization,
but there is regular interaction as a network of friends who help each
other and develop initiatives and consult regularly. Abis consult each
other regularly in national as well as international meetings (Bruinessen,
2010, p. 31). The hierarchical authoritative configuration based on knowl-
edge, authority, and influence is one of the reasons why so many people
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
critical of Hizmet are suspicious about the actual power relations within
the movement (Sunier and Landman, 2014).
The prominent role of individual actors and the lack of a formal
organizational cadre resemble the structure of Sufi movements, but
otherwise Hizmet differs significantly from traditional Sufi networks.
Some observers see a resemblance with the Jesuit order especially its
emphasis on an ascetic way of life and the absence of a formal organi-
zation (see, e.g., Bruinessen, 2010). It should be emphasized that even
Fethullah Gülen himself has no formal statutory power of decision in
matters concerning the movement at the local level. Gülen’s influence
manifests itself mainly through his charisma and stature as an important
Islamic scholar. Ebaugh (2010, p. 48) refers to local networks with their
own agenda. In a certain sense these local networks consist of concentric
circles in which those members belonging to the inner circle dispose
of the most authority and informal status. This status has to do with
knowledge about important Islamic sources including of course the
Risale-i-Nur and the works of Fethullah Gülen. In addition to knowledge,
it is also crucial to what extent individual members have acquired a habit
of self-discipline and austerity. This is another parallel with the way
access to esoteric knowledge; dedication and discipline are intertwined
in many Sufi orders. Gülen (2007, p. 50) himself refers to the earliest
Muslim community where an ascetic attitude was central. Next to the
abis, who are mainly responsible for theological and spiritual activities,
there is a larger group of sympathizers (mütevelli) essential for building
up the institutional landscape of the movement, both organizationally
and financially. The dersanes (educational institutions) are the focal heart
of the activities of the movement, but they too are not part of a formal
structure.
There is little information about the size of the movement in Europe.
This is partly because of the personal network structure, but equally
important is the need for secrecy that developed at the time the Nurcu-
movement and Hizmet were heavily attacked in Turkey (Bruinessen,
2010, p. 24). Due to the recent developments and the accusations
towards Fethullah Gülen by current president and former prime minis-
ter Erdoğan, members prefer to keep silence about size, support, and
activities. The inner core of active members, supporters, and volunteers
is relatively small, but the number of people involved in activities is much
bigger. The vast majority of the followers is relatively young and well
educated (Yükleyen, 2012, p. 72). Contrary to what is often assumed, the
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet) 
movement is not at all directed to rapid growth and expansion per se. It
is a very long and difficult road to arrive at the inner circle of the move-
ment. The movement focusses on young people who have already shown
that they are successful and dedicated and who have demonstrated that
they have career ambitions. In addition there are activities designed for
under-educated youth, but these activities are less designed to raise a
new generation of activists.
In each European country the basic organizational format with educa-
tional centres is similar, but in addition to that there are organizations
that are associated with Hizmet through personal networks and contacts.
In each of the European countries there is a local branch of the move-
ment’s newspaper Zaman with the headquarters in the city of Frankfurt.
In Germany with an estimated 2.9 million inhabitants of Turkish back-
ground, Hizmet has founded a number of educational institutes.2 The
Munich-based International Dialogue Centre, established in 2001, is the
biggest of its sort in Europe. It organizes all kinds of seminars, public
debates, and study activities about a wide variety of topics. In Belgium
the Intercultural Dialogue Platform, the Dialogue Forum in Denmark,
and the Platform INS in the Netherlands have a similar function.3 There
are also networks of businessmen that sympathize with the movement
and which provide material support. In a number of countries the move-
ment runs public schools (Bruinessen, 2010; Seufert, 2014).4

Gülen’s message is primarily spiritual. It is not a political-ideological
program, nor a philosophy that deals with Islamic law. The central creeds
in Fethullah Gülen’s teachings are ‘peaceful coexistence’ (of people with
different convictions and backgrounds), ‘dialogue’, and Hizmet. These
themes appear in many of the written material produced by the move-
ment, denoting ‘activist pietism’ (as opposed to escapist mysticism). It
refers to social service grounded in a religiously inspired ideology and
the need to serve and be responsible to God by making the world better
through active engagement not withdrawal (Özdalga, 2000; Esposito
and Yılmaz, 2010). This attitude requires, according to Gülen, a notion of
global connectedness and moral responsibility towards an increasingly
diverse world and its inhabitants (Kurtz, 2005; Carroll, 2007). Hizmet
is this worldly activity to create a more rational and ethically better
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
society and requires a particular consciousness, civic responsibility, and

concomitant competences.
There are basically three clusters of concepts to be found in the writ-
ings of Gülen and his followers that constitute the core creed of human
interdependence: (1) tolerance, love, and compassion; (2) dialogue,
peace-building, and coexistence; and (3) responsibility, civility, and citi-
zenship (Sunier, 2014b). Although these concepts belong to the standard
discourse of many global organizations such as Amnesty International,
the United Nations, or the World Peace Forum, Gülen integrates them in
his theological worldview and explains them as Islamic principles. There
is also logic in the sequence of these clusters when translating them into
Islamic reasoning. In Gülen’s (1994) philosophy the first cluster consti-
tutes the essence of Islam, but under modern global conditions the call
to love and tolerance becomes a difficult task to accomplish because we
live in such a complex world inhabited by strangers. So it is the duty
of every Muslim to train himself to develop an attitude of responsibility
and to apply it towards non-Muslims. Gülen (2010, p. 198) emphasizes
the crucial role of education in this process: ‘As ignorance is the most
serious problem, it must be opposed with education, [ ... ] Now that we
live in a global village, education is the best way to serve humanity and
to establish a dialogue with other civilizations’. The clusters of concepts
are connected to one another through Hizmet which not only denotes
service to God, but also implies civility and dedication in one’s work
and in society. Gülen expects Muslims to submit to God, to pray, and
to perform daily Islamic duties, but if one sticks to these normative and
ritual obligations without understanding their implications, it will not
lead to a growing awareness and sensitivity to the world around us. It
will certainly not be enough to act in a responsible way towards others
and to recognize the diversity in the world.
To accomplish these goals, a program is needed that focusses on
personality development and mental conditioning (Turam, 2007). The
dersanes and students’ boarding houses are places where new members
are recruited and trained. The most successful of these students will
eventually belong to the so-called golden generation. Recently a slight
shift in focus can be observed from internal training to an expansion of
the social activities, although training, discipline, and personality forma-
tion of young members continue to be important activities. Reaching
deeper, esoteric layers of divine knowledge is only possible through
intensive mental and physical training. An important concept in this
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Gülen-movement (Hizmet) 
respect is zuhd, the Arabic word for asceticism (Gülay, 2007, p. 51). At
the same time adopting an austere and moderate lifestyle is considered
essential for a life of service in this world. Here the Weberian concept of
Innerweltliche Askese to denote the Protestant attitude is applicable (see
Weber, 1930).
Several studies about Hizmet point at the strict discipline in the dersanes,
boarding houses and institutes. The potential group of active members is
enrolled in regular education, but also receives instructions about important
works of the movement. They are expected to develop an ascetic and disci-
plined attitude. In the boarding houses strict rules and a tight schedule is
applied. Students who have actually chosen a life as a disciple of Gülen must
submit to this regime voluntarily (Bruinessen, 2010). In recent years the
disciplinary regime has been loosened because the current generation
of students, born and raised in Europe, are not accustomed to an overly
strict and disciplined educational regime.
Often the charge has been made that there is a strong discrepancy
between the internal religious disciplining activities on the one hand,
and public embrace of the secular foundations of society and the open-
ness on the other. Some critics even argue that the outward activities only
serve to cover up the internal activities. However, both types of activities
are more in line with each other than they are opposite (Sunier, 2014b).
The transformation of Hizmet from an esoteric mystic community into
a global religious movement with a strong outwardly oriented message
brings to light an intriguing development about the way the movement
is perceived. Gülen’s ever widening and inclusive message to the world
stands in stark contrast to its esoteric and secretive ways of knowledge
production and the sectarian and closed character of its inner circles.
This contradiction has often been depicted as Gülens’s double face and
the esoteric practices he espouses as some sort of ‘cover up’. The younger
members of Hizmet have become visible in society and the more they
are actively engaged in it, the more this double image is depicted as a
way to detract attention from Gülen’s ‘Islamist agenda’ to turn Turkey
into an Islamic state (see, e.g., Koç, 2008; Sharon-Krespin, 2009).
However, to depict these two aspects of Hizmet as contradictory or
as the outer and inner face of the movement misses the point. First,
it assumes that the transformation of the movement from the 1980s
onwards was a strategy of deception that did not reflect Gülen’s inten-
tions. Rather, this transformation took place in response to the move-
ment’s changing position within the Turkish political landscape and the
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
changing demography of the rank and file of Hizmet which also trans-
formed Gülen’s vision of Islam in the contemporary globalized world.
Notes
1 Recent studies include Agai (2003, 2005, 2007); Çarkoğlu and Rubin (2006);
Ebaugh (2010); Esposito and Yılmaz (2010); Hendrick (2013); Özdalga (2003);
Turam (2007); White (2013); Yavuz (2009, 2013). In a number of studies the
position of Hizmet in Turkey is explicitly addressed.
2 Yükleyen (2012) estimates a total number of 200 educational institutes and
dorms in Germany, but this number is probably not very accurate. Others
mention at least 100 educational centres in Bavaria alone.
3 For a more extended overview, see Bektovic (2012).
4 See http://cosmicus.nl/; http://www.lucernacollege.be/.
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7
Alevis
Abstract: The Alevis is a heterodox religious minority in
Turkey whose identity is shaped by Shia Islam, elements of
popular religious culture. From a traditional, village-based
cultural and religious community the Alevis developed in
the 1980s and 1990s into a predominantly urban-based
movement. In the past decades there was a revival of the
Alevi identity. New Alevi associations emerged among
urban groups of Alevi background, both in Turkey and in
Western Europe. Today the Alevi community in Turkey
and in Europe consists of a wide variety of associations.
Among them there is some rivalry and debate about
what Alevi identity implies and how one should position
themselves vis-à-vis the state and the Sunni majority both
in Europe and in Turkey.

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 Transnational Turkish Islam
Introduction
The Alevis constitute a community in Turkey that asserted its own

separate identity in the late 1980s, first through the publication of an
extensive series of books by young intellectuals of the community
who tried to assert this separate identity (Vorhoff, 1995), and later by
the foundation of hundreds of Alevi associations. In 1993, right-wing
extremists launched an arson attack on a cultural festival in the town of
Sivas in which 37 prominent Alevi singers and poets were killed. Anger
about this massacre of Sivas greatly enhanced the self-consciousness of
the Turkish Alevis and gave impetus to organize and to make their voice
heard. Their revival in the 1980s and 1990s made the Alevi community
in Turkey much more visible than before. Although reliable statistics
are not available, their numbers are estimated at 10–15 per cent of the
Turkish population.1
The inclusion of Alevis in a book about Turkish Islam in Europe
seems to be odd. In many publications of both Alevis themselves and
external observers, Alevism has been portrayed as a syncretic religion in
which various religious traditions come together, including Shamanism,
Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. Thus the Alevi Cultural Association
of Bochum, Germany, explains on its website:
The Alevi understanding of belief is based on values like love, respect and
tolerance towards the neighbour. It emerged from a symbiosis of old-Islamic
mysticism, early Anatolian culture, old Asian traditions, and therefore consti-
tutes a mosaic of different influences that in the course of the centuries were
merged into an independent belief.2
Others have called Alevism a humanistic philosophy, downplaying its

religious nature altogether.
Many contemporary observers – both inside and outside the move-
ment – consider Alevism as part of the Islamic tradition on the margins
of Shia Islam (Dressler, 2013, p. xii). The Turkish administration does not
recognize Alevism as a separate entity and Alevis is by default registered
as Muslims. Diyanet explains their specific rituals and practices as
cultural expressions that do not concern their Islamic identity (Sunier
and Landman, 2011, p. 116f). The confusion about how to categorize the
Alevi community is partly the result of persecution, but it has certainly
also to do with the political and academic obsession with clear-cut
boundaries and categories.
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Alevis 
Dressler (2013) historicizes the label ‘Alevi’ and the meanings it has
today. He argues that the word ‘Alevi’ has been framed by secular Turkish
nationalists in the first half of the 20th century, attributing a prominent
role to the historian Mehmet Fuad Köprülü (1890–1966). Turkish
nationalists tried to include Alevis in the conception of a unified Turkish
nation. They emphasized the Turkish origins and Islamic orientations
of Alevis, and refuted two alternative views: (1) the Ottoman rhetoric
that had excluded them from mainstream Islam, and (2) the Western
discourse that suggested strong Christian influences on Alevism (Lee,
1994, p. 22f). This nationalist project has been quite successful. Attempts
to link Alevism to Iranian and Kurdish culture, and to Zoroastrianism,
have been marginalized in much of the public imaginary on Alevis
(Dressler, 2013, pp. xvii and 273).
In contemporary Turkey the ‘Alevi issue’ is inextricably linked up with
the general discussion on Turkish Islamic and national identity. The
position of Alevis vis-à-vis the Muslim population of Turkey is subject
of fierce debates, both within the Alevi community and among Sunni
Muslims. We include Alevis in our analysis of the Turkish Islamic land-
scape because we contend that they constitute an important factor that
influences European policies towards the Turkish communities and their
religious affiliations.
Origins
Current studies on Alevism trace the origins of the community alter-

natively to pre-Islamic Central Asian Shamanism, to early Islamic
controversies about the succession of the prophet, to the 13th-century
Anatolian Sufi master Haci Bektaş Veli, and to Shah Ismail (1487–1524),
the founder of the Safawid empire in Persia. To understand current devel-
opments, however, it is essential to briefly discuss two related groups
in the Ottoman Empire: the Kızılbaş and the Bektaşi Order. They can be
considered as the direct predecessors of the contemporary Alevis.
Kızılbaş (‘red-heads’) was a pejorative name given in the Ottoman period
to followers of Shah Ismail, with whom the Ottoman Empire was at war in
the early 16th century. Shah Ismail had taken the leadership of the Safawi
Sufi order based in Ardabil, Azerbaijan, in 1499, and made the order into
a political and religious movement that sought to impose a form of Shia
Islam in Azerbaijan, Eastern Anatolia, and Persia. He had followers among
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
Turkish tribes in Eastern Anatolia. They regarded him as a messianic

figure that could help them in their struggle against Ottoman rule. In 1514,
however, he was defeated by the Ottoman sultan Selim I in the battle of
Chalderan and forced to retreat. Whereas the new Safawid empire in Iran
cultivated Shia Islam, the Ottomans made Sunni Islam the state religion
and suppressed the ‘Kızılbaş’, followers of Shah Ismail. Several Kızılbaş
revolts were crushed by the Ottomans, killing tens of thousands of people.
These killings were legitimized by fatwas of Sunni religious scholars who
declared the Kızılbaş apostates. In the more remote regions of Anatolia,
they survived as relatively isolated communities with their own religious
traditions, which merged Shia Islam and popular culture. Kızılbaş poems
continued a culture of resistance against the Ottomans. Others lived in the
towns, surrounded by Sunnis, and practiced takiya, dissimulation of one’s
identity (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1988, pp. 8–47; Sökefeld, 2008, p. 42).
The Bektaşi order is named after the 13th-century mystic Haci Bektaş
Veli. After his death the order dispersed over Anatolia and set up a
network of dervish lodges. The theological orientation of these sects was
close to a form of Shi’a Islam, even though the writings attributed to Haci
Bektaş nowhere suggest Shi’a teachings (Jong, 1989, p. 7). In the 16th
century some Kızılbaş group associated themselves with the order which
afterwards was distrusted by Sunni orthodoxy for holding heterodox Shi’a
beliefs. The order was sponsored by the Ottomans which, according to
some observers, was a strategy to subdue the Kızılbaş opposition to their
rule. The Ottoman military corps of the Janissaries was closely associated
with the order. The relation between the Kızılbaş communities and the
Bektaşi order is, therefore, complex. There is some overlap in religious
beliefs, practices, and leadership. The Bektaşi order was organized in
dervish lodges in or close to cities, but they also exerted some influence
on the villages of the Kızılbaş. This created its own spiritual hierarchy,
located in the town of Hacibektaş in central Anatolia. Bektaşism thus
had two hierarchies that competed with each other: one line of dedes
claiming to descend from Haci Bektaş, called Çelebis; and a spiritual
genealogy of celibatarian dervishes (babas) chosen by their fellows. The
Çelebis gained recognition mainly among the Kızılbaş (Dressler, 2013, p.
7; Massicard, 2013, p. 15).
In the Ottoman period both the Kızılbaş village communities and
the Bektaşis tended to hide their religious beliefs and practices from the
outside world. However, their traditions were transferred and reproduced
in the form of oral conveyance through songs, poems, and stories and
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Alevis 
some written documents.3 A central Alevi practice is the cem, a commu-

nity gathering with religious teaching, singing hymns (nefes), a liturgical
dance (sema), and a meal, all under the guidance of a dede. The cem
takes place several times a year and is a re-enactment of the so-called
meeting of the 40 saints. This is a mythical narrative starting with the
ascension of the prophet Muhammad to heaven. Here he discovers that
God, with whom he is allowed to speak, is none other than his nephew
Ali. Back on earth he is admitted to a company of 40 saints, with Ali
being one of them (Bozkurt, 1988, pp. 17–22). The narrative is reminis-
cent of the Christian Eucharist, which made Western missionaries in the
19th century to conclude that the religious culture of the Kızılbaş and
Bektasis had Christian origins (Lee, 1994).
An important religious practice of the Kızılbaş was the fast during
the first ten days of the month Muharram to commemorate the martyr-
dom of Hussain, the son of Ali in 680. The veneration of Ali, his son
Hussain, and ‘the twelve imams’ are elements shared with Shia Islam.
Other elements of the tradition are close to Islamic mysticism, such as
the idea of a mystical path, travelled by the novice under the guidance
of a spiritual master (Bozkurt, 1998, p. 29f). The distinction between
esoteric and exoteric meanings of Islam, common in Sufism, was used
by Kızılbaş/Alevis to legitimize their flexibility or noncompliance with
Islamic rituals and prescriptions (Massicard, 2013, p. 15).
The Turkish republic changed the conditions for the Kızılbaş and
Bektaşis considerably. The Bektaşi order was shut down together with
all other Sufi orders by a decree of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1925. The
Kemalists tried to integrate the Kızılbaş into the Turkish nation by
encompassing their culture within a larger Turkish Islamic tradition.
Part of this project was the replacement of the name ‘Kızılbaş’, with its
negative connotations, by the more respectable term Alevilik (Alevism).
However, most Kızılbaş-Alevis continued to hide their identity for fear of
prejudice, persecution, and discrimination, not least when it turned out
that even under the new republican leadership Sunni Islam continued to
be a dominant social force in Turkey.
In the massive post–World War II urbanization, many Alevis moved
from rural areas to the provincial towns and later on to the urban centres.
Even though they tended to be concentrated in specific residential areas,
the urbanization undermined the social structure of Alevi communities.
Moreover, the influence of modern education also led to an erosion of
religious authority of the Alevi dedes. In the 1960s and 1970s, many
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
Alevi youngsters in the cities joined left-wing political movements. As a

consequence they were perceived as communists by right-wing opposi-
tion, a depiction with strong negative underpinnings. The abolishment
of the Bektaşi order and other measures against religious communities
caused a gradual process of alienation of the younger generation from
the Alevi religious culture. Around the beginning of the 1980s Alevi
culture was on the verge of becoming derelict (Bruinessen et al., 1982,
p. 190; Şener, 1989, pp. 143–159).
In the 1980s there was a revival of Alevi culture. Movements that
sought to gain recognition of the Alevis as a separate community came
into being. This revival can be explained by a combination of factors:
violence against Alevis by right-wing extremists in the 1970s was certainly
an important one. The imposition by the military regime in the early
1980s of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis ideology as a basis for national
unity was another factor, but the emergence of a young, well-educated
generation of activists who gave Alevi a new impetus was probably most
crucial for the Alevi revival of the 1980s and 1990s (Landman, 1992, p.
143; Massicard, 2013, pp. 35–44). The sense of being different was more
acutely felt in urban social conditions then was the case in the ethnically
and religiously homogeneous rural communities where they originated
(Schüler, 2000, p. 203; Shankland, 2003, p. 147f).
They did, however, not succeed in creating a unified movement.
Although Alevis shared some grievances they were much divided with
regard to their demands and identity claims. A variety of Alevi organiza-
tions emerged, representing the three directions within the movement.
The first, represented by the Haci Bektaş Veli Kültür ve Turizm Derneği
(HBVKTD) and the Haci Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı (HBVAKV),
focusses on maintaining and reviving traditional culture and maintaining
the former Bektaşi lodges. The second stresses political and social issues
and demands a total separation of religion and state. This direction is
propagated by the Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği (PSAKD), which is
also the strongest organization within the Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu
(ABF). Finally, there are attempts to revive Alevism as a religion. The
CEM-Foundation is the main representative of this branch. They advo-
cate cooperation with the state and seek state funding for cem houses as
places of worship. They want dedes to be recognized as religious digni-
taries on a similar basis as their Sunni counterparts. The less influential
Ehli Beyt Foundation also defines Alevism in religious terms, but is
much closer to the Shia orthodoxy of Iran.
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Alevis 
The different Alevi organizations strongly disagree on the future posi-

tion of Diyanet. The CEM-Foundation is the only organization that wants
to be recognized by Diyanet. The other Alevi organizations demand the
complete abolishment of this institution because they consider Diyanet
a violation of the separation of religion and state (Schüler, 2000, p. 206f;
Massicard, 2013, pp. 47–55).
To Europe
Alevis were among the migrants from Turkey to Western European
countries in the 1960s and 1970s, but there are no data available about
their numbers. Whereas their Sunni compatriots soon started to organ-
ize themselves around mosques and Islamic centres, the Alevis remained
by and large invisible to the outside world, largely on similar grounds as
in Turkey (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 45f).
Alevis tended to become involved in social and political organizations
such as trade unions, committees of Turkish workers, and left-wing
political parties. The first Alevi organization in the south of Germany
was called Türkiye Amele Birliği (Union of Workers of Turkey). Some
Kurdish cultural and political organizations also had large constituen-
cies of Alevis from the Kurdish regions of Turkey. Only a small minority
among the Alevis held informal cem gatherings organized by travelling
dedes (Landman, 1992, p. 142; Massicard, 2013, p. 186).
In the late 1980s there was an Alevi revival in Europe as well, but it
took different trajectories due to different conditions. The European
context allowed for a greater freedom and Europe became the centre of
Turkish and Kurdish political activism. Alevis in Europe resented the
increasing influence of Sunni Islam in Turkey since the 1980 military
coup. The introduction of the compulsory subject Knowledge of Religion
and Morality in state schools in Turkey was seen by Alevis as an instru-
ment of assimilation and exclusion. Also initiatives of the Turkish state
to found mosques in Alevi villages and not least the attempts to organize
religious life in Europe were seen as an indication to prioritize Sunni
Islam. In Hamburg discontent about this Islamization and ‘Sunnification’
motivated Alevis to form an Alevi Culture group. Similar initiatives were
taken elsewhere. The German government facilitated these initiatives by
offering funding for Alevi cultural manifestations. Thus, in Hamburg,
an ‘Alevi Cultural Week’ was organized in 1989, with lectures about the
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
history of Anatolian Alevism, a festival with Alevi poets and singers, and
a cem-ceremony. For the Alevis of Hamburg, this was a decisive moment
to become more assertive and articulate (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 55f).
From the mid-1980s, associations were founded in various European
cities carrying names that contained the words ‘Alevi’, ‘Bektaşi’ or ‘Haci
Bektaş’. This was not just a move to make public what existed informally;
in fact it implied the revival of a culture that was considered to be lost.
Alevi associations had to apply strategies to involve the younger genera-
tion into Alevi culture and belief. An important tool in this respect
was the music of the saz (lute). Ozans (folk singers) playing the saz are
prominent figures in Alevi culture. The songs are the medium through
which religious ideas of Alevism have been transmitted from generation
to generation. For European Alevi associations, offering saz courses
constituted a major tool to attract young people (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 78).
In addition, they offered courses to explain the young generation about
Alevi history, culture, and religious traditions. The Dutch Alevi federa-
tion organized such a course in 1995 in cooperation with the University
of Utrecht, with more than one hundred young Alevis attending. After
a series of 12 lectures, the young men and women were invited to a cem
ceremony in Rotterdam where the local Alevi association had its own
centre. During the course it had become clear that most of the partici-
pants knew hardly anything about Alevi history and culture. For many
the cem ceremony was the first encounter with Alevi culture (Landman,
1995, p. 7).
Alevi organization on a national level started in the late 1980s. Nine
German Alevi organizations established Federation of Alevi Associations
in Germany (Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu, AABF) in 1989, which
from then on played a major role in the struggle for recognition in
Turkey. Anger about the massacre of Sivas in 1993, followed in 1995 by
violence against Alevis in the Gazi quarter in Istanbul fuelled the emerg-
ing Alevi movement demanding punishment for the perpetrators. Those
who were killed in these attacks became the martyrs of the Alevis. By
2014, the number of local member organizations of the AABF had risen
to 130.4 Alevis in the Netherlands founded the Haci Bektaş Foundation
in The Hague in 1987. The celebration of the Kurdish New Year (nevruz)
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Alevis 
by the Haci Bektaş Association of Deventer in 1990 and the foundation

of the Hollanda Alevi Bektaşi Kültür Dernekleri Federasyonu (HAK-DER;
Federation of Social and Cultural Alevi and Bektaşi Associations in the
Netherlands) in 1991 were also important landmarks (Landman, 1992,
p. 136). Today HAK-DER has 24 member organizations (21 associations
and 3 foundations).5
Later on Alevi federations were founded in various European coun-
tries. The Austrian Alevi federation was established in 1998 and has 9
local associations.6 The French association in Strasbourg was founded
in 1999 and has currently 45 member associations, most of them in the
eastern and southern provinces of France.7 In Belgium, the Belçika Alevi
Birlikleri Federasyonu (BABF) was founded in 2003 by a number of local
and regional organizations.8 The Alevi Federation in Denmark coordi-
nates 6 local associations.9 Six Alevi associations in Sweden founded the
Swedish Alevi Federation in 2008.10 Since 2002, the Alevi federations in
the various European countries cooperate in the Avrupa Alevi Birliklere
Konfederasyonu (AABK; Confederation of Alevi Associations in Europe),
and organization with a federative structure, but with a general board
that has considerable power over member organizations. The federation
appoints delegations in the various federal states, which operate under
the supervision of the centre in Cologne. Member organizations have to
use the logo of the AABK.
In all countries, Alevi organizations attempted to gain some form of
support or recognition from the local authorities. The most successful
attempt in this respect was in Germany where they were recognized as
a religious community (Religionsgemeinschaft), enabling them to teach
their religion in state schools. After the Berlin senate had granted this
recognition to the Islamische Federation Berlin (IFB), a Milli Görüş
branch, the Alevi federation of Berlin successfully applied for a similar
status. Several other German states followed suit granting German
Alevis an official status (Massicard, 2013, p. 192f).11 This recognition as
a religious community required Alevi organizations, including the AABF,
to reformulate their goals and identities in more explicitly religious
terms. This was done in 2002 (Pries and Tuncer-Zengingül, 2013, p. 159).
The opening of Alevi places of worship (cem houses) became a prior-
ity, and a council of religious dignitaries gained a prominent place in
the organization. According to the 2002 statutory rules, the council of
religious dignitaries, consisting of dedes (or anas for women), decides
about issues of faith.
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
Although the AABF is legally the sole representative of the Alevis in

Germany, other Alevi federations continue to exist independently. The
Turkish CEM-Foundation and the Ehli Beyt-Foundation each set up a
department in Germany (in 1997 and 2001, respectively). Moreover, the
Kurdish issue intersected in several ways with the attempts to organ-
ize Alevis. A considerable part of the Alevis belongs to the Kurdish or
Zaza-speaking population of Turkey. Some of them participate in AABF
member organizations. The Kurdish movement PKK tried to mobilize
Kurdish Alevis for its cause and to dissociate them from non-Kurdish
Alevis. The Federation of Kurdistan Alevis (Federasyon Elewiyen Kurdistani,
FEK) has organized Kurdish Alevis independent from the AABF.
After the recognition of the AABF by German authorities as the inter-
locutor on behalf of the Alevis, and the permission to teach Alevism in
schools, the AABF has been involved in the development of a German
program for Alevi religious education (Massicard, 2013, p. 197). This
program is now taught in 60 schools in Germany by 40 teachers.12
The official recognition of the German AABF encouraged the Alevis
in Austria to follow their example. Austria has a system of recognition
of religious communities and religious education slightly similar to the
German one. The Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ)
is the official representative of the Muslim community since 1979.
Alevis refused to cooperate with the IGGiÖ and instead made their own
application for recognition. However, rival applications have brought
cleavages within the Alevi population to the fore. On 23 March 2009, the
Cultural Association of Alevis in Vienna applied for recognition of the
Islamic Alevi religious community. Initially, the application was turned
down for being too similar to the already existing IGGiÖ. They success-
fully appealed against this decision and were recognized in 2013.13 The
AABF also applied for recognition, but this attempt was turned down.
The AABF has since then tried to undo this situation, by mobilizing
support among sister associations in Europe and Turkey, and went to the
European Court of Human Rights, so far to no avail.14
As the Austrian controversy about recognition makes clear that the Alevi
movement in Europe is far from united. The German recognition of
the AABF as the one and only representative of the Alevi helps them to
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Alevis 
maintain some cohesion. Nevertheless, Alevis, also those in Europe, are

more easily united in protests against anti-Alevi violence or discrimination
in Turkey, or against the growing influence of Sunni Islam. The articula-
tion of a common identity is much more difficult to accomplish. There are
recognizable Alevi cultural practices, specific symbols and markers, and
a canonized religious historiography with reference to the 12 imams and
the suffering of Imam Husain in the battle of Kerbala. There are poets and
singers who resisted Ottoman persecution, but the question whether reli-
gious beliefs and practices are the core of Alevism, or merely its outward
form, is a matter of continuous dispute (Sökefeld, 2008, p. 101).
Among the Alevi religious authorities, the dedes, there is a minority
claiming that Alevism is the true form of Islam, taught by the prophet
Mohammed and laid down in the Quran. The position that Alevism
combines elements from various religious and cultural traditions is more
widespread. In general there is much debate and controversy among
Alevis about the characteristics and essential features of their religion
and culture. In 2004 the Dutch Council of Alevi Dedes was founded.
Together with dedes from Germany, Austria, France, and Bulgaria they
issued a statement that unambiguously defined Alevism as an Islamic
tradition. This statement renders the dedes the status of guardians of the
Alevi tradition (Furat, 2007, p. 60).
Both with respect to their internal controversies and their responses
to the social and political environment in which they operate, Alevis
associations are definitively part of a transnational movement covering
Turkey and Europe. National branches attend each other’s manifesta-
tions, exchange information, follow each other’s examples, and support
recognition claims of sister organizations elsewhere. Responses to devel-
opments in Turkey are high on the agendas of European Alevi federa-
tions. Recent studies on European Alevis show that European networks
increasingly influence the position of Alevis in Turkey. Not only do
European Alevis provide financial support to establish cem houses in
Turkey, they also succeed in lobbying with the EU to put pressure on
Turkey (Pries and Tuncer-Zengingül, 2013, p. 161). In EU documents
about the Turkish EU membership Alevi claims for recognition have
become a recurring point of attention.
In reaction to internal and external pressure, the AKP government has
launched a program in 2007, commonly referred to as ‘the Alevi opening’.
It is a dialogue with Alevi representatives about their cultural and social
demands (Köse, 2010). The most tangible outcome of this dialogue is a
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
modification of the curriculum for the mandatory religious education

since 2011, which includes some information about Alevism. However,
recognition of the Alevis as a religious minority, or a modification of
the position of Diyanet is not likely to be granted in the near future.
However, the position of Alevis has implications for the relations within
the Turkish Islamic field both in Turkey and in Europe. It brings to bear
discussions about the relation between state and religion, but also about
the increasing diversity within Islam in Europe.
Notes
1 The claim in some Alevi publications that they constitute 30 per cent of the
Turkish population is challenged by analysts of election results who combine
an assumed leftist preference of the Alevis with low score of left-wing
political parties. On the other hand, an estimation of only 6.1 per cent Alevis
may have been influenced by the reluctance of Alevi respondents to identify
themselves as such (see Schüler, 2000).
2 http://www.alevi-bochum.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=48&Itemid=82.
3 Several editions were published in Turkey between 1958 and 1982. A German
edition was prepared by Bozkurt (1988).
4 http://alevi.com/de/mitgliederaktivitaten/ortsgemeinden/. According to
Massicard (2013, p.189) all 40 existing Alevi associations were included in
1993. Pries and Tuncer-Zengingül (2013, p.153) claim that the AABF was
founded in 1989.
5 http://www.hakder.nl/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=132:lid-
organisaties&catid=44&Itemid=202.
6 http://www.aleviten.or.at/menuleft/aabf/geschichte.html.
7 http://www.alevi-fuaf.com/index.php?p=downloads&area=1.
8 http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/tsv_pdf/2008/02/28/08033120.pdf.
9 http://alevi.dk/.
10 http://www.trf.nu/isvec-alevi-birlikleri-federasyonu-kuruldu.html.
11 Massicard (2013) mentions four German states that introduced Alevi
religious education. Today, there are eight German states that have done so.
http://alevi.com/de/religionsunterricht/allgemeines/.
12 http://alevi.com/de/religionsunterricht/allgemeines/.
13 http://www.aleviten.at/de/?page_id=136, and http://www.bka.gv.at/site/4735/
default.aspx#a18.
14 http://www.aleviten.or.at/de-detail/article/sachverhaltsdarstellung.html.
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0010
8
Other Movements and
Organizations
Abstract: This chapter deals with two smaller but
nevertheless relevant ideological currents among Turkish
Muslims in Europe: Turkish ultra-nationalism and radical
Islam. Originally Turkish ultra-nationalists were anti-
Islamic because Islam was considered alien to the Turkish
identity. For strategic reasons they changed their position.
Turkish nationalists in Europe today are predominantly
organized in religious organizations, but the core of their
activities is strictly nationalist in character.
For many years a small movement with a radical Islamist
agenda was active among Turkish Muslims in Europe. The
movement was founded by a charismatic preacher Cemalettin
Kaplan who wanted to overthrow the Turkish political system
and set up a Caliphate. His radical political program never
gained much foothold among Turkish Muslims. Only a tiny
minority sympathizes with the ideas, and the movement
hardly exists today.

DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0011 

 Transnational Turkish Islam
Diyanet, Süleymanlıs, Mili Görüş, and Hizmet are currently the major
actors in the Turkish-Islamic landscape in Europe. Alevis also became
an important Turkish community in Europe. In addition, there are a
number of religious-ideological currents that co-shape the Turkish-
Islamic landscape. We will briefly discuss them in this final chapter.
Nationalism and Islam

As we have indicated, several movements include to a smaller or larger
extent Turkish ethnic or nationalist rhetoric. There are also a number of
organizations that very explicitly embark on a Turkish nationalist agenda.
Turkish nationalism was one of the pillars of the Kemalist ideology. The
nationalism of the Kemalists was first and foremost about nation-building
and creating a sense of national unity and pride among the population of
Turkey. The Kurds were regarded as ‘mountain-Turks’, and children were
brought up with the famous words of Atatürk, ‘How happy is the one
who can say “I am a Turk” ’ (Ne mutlu Türküm diyene). Atatürk and his
companions applied a moderate, pragmatic mode of nationalism. They
were not interested in uniting Turkic people in Central Asia, Turkey, and
the Balkans (Landau, 1995, p. 74). In the 1960s, however, Pan-Turkism,
the ideal of uniting all Turkic people, often casted in a language of racial
superiority and exclusivity, became a political and social force of consid-
erable strength in Turkey. The leader of this movement was Alparslan
Türkeş, a commander in the Turkish army, who founded the Milliyetçi
Haraket Partisi (MHP; Nationalist Movement Party) in 1969 and the
Ülkücü Hareketi (Movement of Idealists) in 1969. In the streets of Turkey
the battle was fought by the militant combatants of the movement, the
Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar), who defended the Turkish people against all
those who wanted to harm the unity of the Turks: communists, Alevis,
and Kurdish separatists. This struggle reached its apogee in the 1970s
resulting in hundreds of deaths.
The movement adopted the ideology of the ‘nine lights’ developed by
Türkeş. It refers to a glorious Turkish past but hardly mentions Islam. The
original movement in fact considered Islam to be alien to the Turkish
soul. For strategic reasons the movement later on made attempts to
reconcile Turkishness and Islam (Poulton, 1997, pp. 145–155). In doing so,
the MHP accepted ideas propagated by a group that called itself ‘Hearth
of Intellectuals’ and coined the idea of the Türk-Islam Sentezi (Turkish-
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0011
Other Movements and Organizations 
Islamic Synthesis). In the 1980s the idea entered mainstream politics

when the ideology was adopted by the junta as an instrument to impose
unity on society (see Chapter 1). The curriculum for the mandatory reli-
gious education at Turkish schools reflects this harmonization of Islamic
identity and Turkish nationalism. In the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the
Turkish people are presented as a warrior nation. Pre-Islamic Turkish
warriors in Central Asia, the ghazi fighters of the Ottomans, and the war
of independence led by Atatürk are fused into images of a proud, resist-
ant nation (White, 2013, p. 71).
Both militant ultra-nationalism and Turkish-Islamic synthesis have
become manifest in Europe as well. As we have explained in Chapter 3,
a combination of Islamic virtues, love for the fatherland, and national
solidarity is part of the vision propagated by Diyanet. But before Diyanet
became active in Europe, ultra-nationalists had already gained foothold
among Turkish migrants in several countries. In the 1970s adherents of
the MHP established Turkish associations and some mosques. These
efforts were countered by anti-fascist collective actors (Turkish and non-
Turkish) who tried to prevent their meetings (Tanja, 2008). Nevertheless,
in 1978, the Avrupa Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu
(ADÜTDF; Federation of Democratic Idealist Turkish Associations) was
founded in Frankfurt. Since then it has functioned as an umbrella organi-
zation for the Turkish ‘idealist’ movement. Until his death in 1997, party
leader Türkeş was a regular guest at meetings in Europe (Binswanger and
Sipahıoğlu, 1988, p. 61f; Landman, 1992, p. 115; Spuler-Stegemann, 1998,
p. 124). Devlet Bahçeli, the current party leader, lacks the charisma of
Türkeş, but regularly visits Turkish communities in Europe to sustain
ties and to generate loyalty. The homepage of the ADÜTDF opens with a
picture displaying Atatürk, Türkeş, and Bahçeli together.1
Some of the activities of the ADÜTDF are religious in character, and
a limited number of member associations run mosques. But central to
their activities are Turkish cultural events and educational activities to
strengthen the ties of the European-born Turkish youth with the Turkish
homeland. In addition the federation defends the social interests of
the Turkish citizens through political action. The focus on Turkishness
rather than on Islam is evident in their public expressions.
The ADÜTDF has 150 associated organizations in Germany, most of
them in the federal states of Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Nordrhein-
Westfalen, and Hessen.2 Its headquarters in Frankfurt is the German
and the European centre of the movement. In 1996 it was renamed
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
Avrupa Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Konfederasyonu (AÜTDK; Confederation

of Idealist Turkish Associations), in short the European Turkish
Confederation (Verfassungsschutz des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen,
2004).
There are six national federations: the Federation of Democratic
Idealistic Turkish Associations in the Netherlands, the Federation of
Turkish Associations in Belgium, the Federation of Turkish-Islamic
Cultural Associations in Switzerland, the Federation of Democratic
Idealistic Turkish Associations in France, the Turkish Federation in
Denmark, and the Federation of Idealistic Turkish Associations in
Austria. Later on Norwegian, Swedish, and British branches were added.
The Dutch Turkish Federation, with a centre in Amsterdam, coor-
dinates 21 organizations, 16 of which are mosque associations. The
federation participates, together with several left-wing and religious
Turkish organizations, in the Inspraak Orgaan Turken, an interlocutor of
the Dutch government on behalf of the Turkish citizens. This indicates
that the sometimes violent polarization that characterized their relations
in the 1970s and 1980s has diminished (Tanja, 2008). They also joined
the Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (CMO), the representative body
of Muslim associations in the Netherlands.3 The French federation has
been working together with DITIB and Milli Görüş since 2012 in the
Coordination Committee of Franco-Turkish Associations.4
Under the leadership of Bahçeli, the MHP has moved from the
extreme right to the centre right of the Turkish political spectrum.
Bahçeli has tried to shake off the image of violence and racism that had
characterized the party in the 1970s. He also severed ties with some
militant organization associated with the movement (Çınar and Arıkan,
2002). The emphasis on unity and solidarity of the Turkish people and on
the struggle against its enemies continues to be a central creed. A topic
that has been high on the agenda of both the MHP and the movement
in Europe is the Armenian genocide, systematically referred to as the
‘so-called genocide’. They organize protest against the yearly commemo-
ration by ‘the Armenian lobby’. When Bahçeli visited the Dutch, Belgian,
and French federations during the annual meetings in 2012, he made this
into one of the key issues in his address.5
In the 1980s there were voices both in Turkey and in Germany within
ultra-nationalist circles that opted for a more prominent place of Islam in
the movement’s ideology. They advocated an Islamization of the move-
ment and a rapprochement to the Islamist political forces in Turkey.
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0011
Other Movements and Organizations 
Seyid Ahmet Arvasi, the most well-known and most vocal representa-
tive of this idea, published a four-volume book titled Türk-İslam Ülküsü
(the Turkish-Islamic Ideal), claiming that Turkishness and Islam need
no ‘synthesis’ because they always constituted an organic whole (Bora
and Can, 1991, pp. 243–282). The political leader of this movement was
Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, who founded the Büyük Birlik Partisi (BBP; Great
Unity Party) in 1993, but never rose to prominence. Yazıcıoğlu also
founded the Alperen Ocakları, a foundation that promoted the Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis ideology. The Avrupa Türk Birliği (Turkish Union in
Europe), founded in 1994, was closely associated with this movement. It
has about ten centres, most of them in Germany, but also in Amsterdam
and Mulhouse.6
Prior to the foundation of the BBP in Turkey, the new Islamic direction
resulted in a cleavage in the ADÜTDF in 1987 and the creation of a new
federation, the Avrupa Türk-İslam Birliği (ATİB; Turkish-Islamic Union
in Europe), based in Cologne. Under the leadership of Musa Serdar
Çelebi, who had been a former president of the ADÜTDF, the ATIB
developed a more explicitly Islamic profile than the Turkish Federation
had done so far. Çelebi is said to have been sympathizing with the ideas
of the BBP but also emphasized his independence from Turkish political
parties (Landman, 1992, p. 117). Currently the ATIB claims to have 122
member associations.7 Although its name suggests that they operate on
a European level, not much is known about activities outside Germany.
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Union of Turkish-Islamic Associations
(NUTIO) split off from the Turkish Federation in the year of ATIB’s
foundation and is a federation with 7 member organizations. It is not
very active, though, and its current website refers to activities in 2008
and 2009.8 The German ATİB, however, is a more visible actor in the
Turkish-Islamic field. It is the largest of 19 member organizations of
the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD) and one of the four
participants in the Coordination Council of the Muslims in Germany
(Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland, KRM).
In comparison to the big Islamic organizations nationalist movements
have always been of minor importance. This has several reasons. One is
of course the (moderate) Turkish nationalist rhetoric that can be found
in all organizations, but equally important is the fact that explicit Turkish
nationalism as a political project has increasingly become a marginalized
alternative for a population for which strong ties with Turkey are not
self-evident anymore.
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0011
 Transnational Turkish Islam
Islamic radicalism: the Kaplan movement

The Kaplan-movement is a radical splinter branched off from Milli Görüş
in Germany in 1983. The radical imam Cemalettin Kaplan had been
MSP candidate for the Turkish parliament but fled to Germany in 1981,
where he became actively involved in building the Milli Görüş network.
Within that network, he belonged to a branch that was inspired by the
Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Kaplan was convinced that an Islamic
state could not be achieved through participation in the current politi-
cal system, but only by overthrowing the entire political order (Atacan,
1999). In 1983, three years after the military coup and the ban on the
MSP, Erbakan founded a new political party, the RP, and the European
branch of the movement started to revive the link with the party. Kaplan
published a manifest in Turkish entitled ‘What is the way to an Islamic
state: a party, or preaching?’ in which he expressed his discontent with
the way in which Erbakan co-opted with the Turkish political system.
In 1984 Kaplan pulled out and founded a new organization, İslâmî
Cemiyet ve Cemaatlar Birliği (ICCB; Union of Islamic Associations and
Communities), to which a minority of the Milli-Görüş associations in
Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands joined. In his magazines, he now
openly attacked the Turkish republic, its founder Atatürk, the current
political leaders, and also Diyanet, changing its name into Hıyanet (trea-
son) (Landman, 1992, pp. 130–134).
On 18 April 1992 Kaplan proclaimed the Islamic state of Anatolia,
of which he himself was the leader, bearing the title of ‘deputy of the
Caliph’. This was presented as a first step towards a reintroduction of the
Caliphate that had been abolished by Atatürk in 1924. The proclamation
of the Caliphate, with Kaplan as the Caliph, followed two years later. This
move cost him many followers and his organization gradually turned
into an inwardly oriented sect with declining support (Schiffauer, 2000).
Today the remaining followers of Kaplan, who died in 1995, are hardly
organized. His son Metin Kaplan became his successor, but he has been
accused of complicity to murder an internal rival in 1997. In 2001 the
German constitutional court outlawed the organization in Cologne and 19
of its local member organizations. Metin Kaplan was extradited to Turkey
in 2004, convicted for high treason, and sentenced to life imprisonment
(Bundesministerium des Innern, 2005, p. 210f). Today there is a small
minority of Muslims of Turkish background who sympathize with radical
ideologies such as those propagated by Kaplan. In the wake of the quickly
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0011
Other Movements and Organizations 
evolving developments in northern Iraq and Syria there are also activists of
Turkish background who seek connection. However the strong Arab influ-
ence in radical networks along with the strong organizational structures
that characterize the Turkish-Islamic landscape make a growing support for
radical alternatives less likely.
Notes
1 http://www.turkfederasyon.com.
2 Security Service of Baden-Württemberg, http://www.verfassungsschutz-bw.de.
3 The federation was strongly criticized of being extremist, racist, and criminal by
two journalists in 1997 (Braam et al., 2004; Tanja, 2008), but an anthropological
study in 1998 presented a more moderate portrait of the movement (Geerse, 1998).
4 http://www.zamanfrance.fr/article/le-rC3A9veil-citoyen-de-tous-les-turcs-de-
france.
5 http://88.255.31.62/htmldocs/genel_baskan/1545/konusmalari/Devlet_
Bahceli_2012_yili_konusmalari.html.
6 http://www.atb-europa.com/node/119.
7 http://islam.de/1630.php, and http://www.atib.org/.
8 Landman (1992, p. 117).
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0011
Conclusions, Dynamics,
and Tendencies
Abstract: Two seemingly opposing trends can be observed
in the development of Turkish Islam in Europe. On the
one hand the transnational field has been intensified
and transformed, partly as the result of modern means
of communication and the explosive growth of social
media. On the other hand an increasing number of young
Turkish Muslims are rooted in local society of residence,
and organized Islam in Europe increasingly evolves
according to its own dynamics, independent from Turkey.
This is not a contradiction, but part of the contemporary
global conditions. The Turkish-Islamic landscape should
be approached as a transnational field that is structured
not anymore by unequal migrant family networks
stretching between two nation-states, but by multi-polar
transnational networks and new senses of belonging
sustained by modern media.

 DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0012

Conclusions, Dynamics, and Tendencies 
The aim of this study is twofold. By providing an updated account of the

important players in the Turkish-Islamic landscape in Europe we also
analysed the dynamics of organizational development among Turkish
Muslims. By putting these dynamics in a historical perspective we have
demonstrated which mechanisms are at work and what trends can be
discerned.
With regard to the Turkish-Islamic movements there are a number of
important developments that can be observed across Europe over the
past two decades. All movements with the exception of Hizmet started
in the late 1970s and early 1980s as typical migrant organizations, firmly
embedded in the Turkish migrant communities. Although they had very
different origins, they converged with regard to the organizational struc-
ture and the nature of their activities (the mosque organization model).
The affiliations and power relations were based on a combination of
ethnic loyalty and traditional authoritative structures. The ‘Turkish
environment’ and the use of Turkish within these organizations were
self-evidently connected to the nature of the rank-and-file and to the
strong ties with family and community in Turkey. The use of Turkish
remains a habitual practice even today, even though a majority of the
current members is integrated into the societies of residence. This
Turkish habitus should not be confused with a deliberate ‘identity poli-
tics’, propagated by Diyanet and some nationalist movements.
Turkish migrants and their descendants are by far the best organized
of all Muslim communities in Europe. In Germany, Austria, Denmark,
and the Netherlands they have a strong position in advisory boards and
negotiation processes. But even in countries where Turkish Muslims
constitute a minority, their position is relatively strong. This creates a
paradoxical situation. Organizational strength, especially the transna-
tional networks and activities is an asset, but it renders Turkish organiza-
tions an image of inwardly orientation and parallel organization, despite
the multiplicity of connections they have with the surrounding society.
Furthermore we can observe two seemingly opposing trends. On the
one hand a transformation of the transnational field takes place. Due to
modern means of communication and the explosive growth of social
media, relations across boarders extend, intensify, and diversify. It is
very likely that European networks of Turkish-Islamic organizations are
currently stronger than they were 20 years ago. Changing modes and
means of transnational exchange have caused a diversification and in
many cases intensification of contacts and links with Turkey. On the
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0012
 Transnational Turkish Islam
other hand, and precisely because an increasing number of Turkish

young Muslims is being rooted in local society of residence, the devel-
opment of organized Islam in Europe increasingly evolves according to
its own dynamics. This is not a contradiction, but part of the contem-
porary global conditions. The Turkish-Islamic landscape should be
approached as a transnational field that is structured not anymore by
unequal migrant family networks stretching between two nation-states,
but by multi-polar transnational networks and new senses of belonging
sustained by modern media. Identification with Turkey today is becom-
ing increasingly a matter of choice and lifestyle, rather than of unequal
power relations. The changing circumstances have rendered established
agendas and strategies of Islamic organizations based on migration rela-
tions obsolete. New organizations emerge (such as the very successful
Gülen-movement), and changing characteristics of Turkish Muslim
population prompt organizations to adapt their activities and outlooks
to seek a religious niche in the market and to address shifting audiences.
The changing political climate in Europe towards Islam also prompts
Turkish-Islamic movements to make choices and to explore new routes.
We have indicated that national states increasingly consider transna-
tional networks undesirable because it would run counter to local
rooting, and even more importantly it limits state control on activities
of Muslim organizations. The present concerns about radicalization of
young Muslims in Europe turn control of activities of Muslim organiza-
tions into a top priority.
How does a transnational field actually operate? The term ‘transna-
tional’ may suggest only links between national branches of movements.
We have shown that each of the Turkish-Islamic organizations indeed
has a more or less developed structure of formal links with headquarters
somewhere in Europe or in Turkey. But next to these statutory ties, there
are networks of people across borders that form the basis of activities
and that are not formally structured. They do not necessarily run parallel
to formal links and they are sustained by a multiplicity of motives and
intentions. These networks and activities occur spontaneously and are
actually particular organizational hubs in specific cities and the connec-
tions across borders between them. These processes occur simultane-
ously and influence each other mutually. Cross-borders activities and
networks are self-evidently limited by national legal conditions, but to
analyse them only from a national perspective as part of an imagined
‘national Muslim community’, or otherwise exclusively as puppets of
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0012
Conclusions, Dynamics, and Tendencies 
powerful foreign institutions (states or headquarters) misses the complex

mechanisms at work. Turkish-Islamic organizations are at once reflect-
ing local, national, and transnational conditions.
In addition to these common features of the organizations, there are
undeniable differences between them. There are differences that have
to do with their religious, ideological, and organizational origins: an
institution connected to the Turkish state (Diyanet), a political activ-
ist movement (Milli Görüş), a movement rooted in the mystical Islam
(Süleymanlı), a movement of supporters of an Islamic preacher (Hizmet),
and the revival of religiousness among a minority demanding recogni-
tion (Alevis). Many of the differences between them are not religious
but social and political. They are rooted in the typically Turkish history
secularism and the struggles about this. The mutual relations between
Turkish-Islamic movements in Europe have long been determined by
these controversies and contradictions, but not only have these bounda-
ries been blurred, the present developments also show that the often
invoked distinction between ‘official’ and ‘parallel’ Islam as a format for
describing the Turkish-Islamic landscape is not very adequate anymore.
Today Turkish-Islamic movements tend to have developed their
own niche and address their own audience. The traditional activities
such as the provision of religious services are still there, but religious
accommodation is stable in almost all countries in Europe. Most activity
is oriented towards consolidating networks and institutions. Diyanet,
the largest among the Turkish-Islamic organization in all countries in
Europe, continues to facilitate and cultivate the cultural and emotional
link with Turkey with a combination of religious duty and love for
the motherland. The financial and logistical support from the Turkish
government and the relatively large number of affiliated local associa-
tions make them an important player in the European Islamic landscape.
They continue to profile themselves as the moderate face of Islam. At
the central level the strong alliance with Turkey through its connection
with the national embassies of Turkey constitutes a strategic asset of the
organization. They want to develop good contacts with national authori-
ties. On a local level Diyanet aims at strengthening the relations with
the local Turkish community. As we have indicated for a long time this
relation was formal and detached, but that is currently changing.
Diyanet is not the only actor that tries to link Islamic identity with
loyalty to the Turkish nation. Several Turkish nationalist political parties
have extended their activities to Europe as well and continue to organize
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0012
 Transnational Turkish Islam
the Turkish community around loyalty to the flag and the nation. Turkish
federations cultivate Turkish solidarity worldwide and maintain ties with
the National Action Party. Other nationalists have severed ties with the
party but see a synthesis of Turkishness and Islam as the core of their
identity.
The Süleymanlıs concentrate on deepening religious spirituality and
educating their followers. More than the other Turkish-Islamic move-
ments they are a community of Muslims that share specific meditational
practices. Rooted as they are in the Nakşibendi Sufi order, they empha-
size their connection with the Muslim community as a whole, but at the
same time they have a very distinct religious identity. This concentration
on a shared religious life has generated an inward-looking attitude.
However, they also actively engage with their environment.
Milli Görüş is the organization that has actually diverted most from
its initial goal. Since 1997 a reorientation has taken place. Before that the
ideology was oriented towards the pursuit of an Islamic state in Turkey. The
European branch was an extension of the Turkish political movement.
Activities and goals were fully subordinate to the Turkish movement.
The new course from 1997 onwards that was adopted throughout Europe
was much more pragmatic and focussed on the interests of Turkish Muslims
in European societies whose open, pluralistic, and democratic character was
recognized and accepted. From an Islamist they transformed into a post-
Islamist movement that is focussed on the improvement of the position
of Islam in European societies. They have maintained their activist atti-
tude but revised their goals and ambitions.
Hizmet, or the Gülen-movement, only relatively recently developed
into an important force in the Turkish-Islamic landscape and beyond.
Their growth has impacted considerably on the parameters that shape
this landscape. One important reason for that is they have never
competed with the other movements by refraining from the ‘mosque
organization model’. In addition to that nowhere in Europe they take
part in consultation boards and negotiation processes. Their activities cut
across the initial dividing lines between the other movements. Although
they have their own niche and have developed their own specific activi-
ties, their active involvement in public debates, their engagement with
academic topics, and the way in which they take up important and often
sensitive and controversial issues have made them into a kind of model
for a European Islam. The average profile of their constituency enhances
this image. But the combination of disciplined internal training and
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Conclusions, Dynamics, and Tendencies 
outreach to the surrounding society has also given the movement an

aura of secrecy and suspicion. Whereas the other bigger movements
have entered into a more stabilized, even balanced stage, Hizmet is still
developing and finding its niche.
The Alevi movement, finally, operates in a niche from the outset. They
have their own community, their specific audience, and not least their
own allies in the wider society. Their internal debates about origins,
characteristics, and relevant sources render the movement a constant
dynamic. Transnational relations also create an intriguing dynamic,
since recognition of Alevism as a religion is almost unconceivable in
contemporary Turkey, but actually takes place in Europe. The most
important developments for the Turkish Alevi movement took place in
Europe and not in Turkey.
One thing is certain—the parameters that shape the Turkish-Islamic
landscape in Europe have changed thoroughly. Until the mid-1990s
organized Turkish Islam in Europe was determined by migratory
patterns. Religious organizational activity was shaped by the unequal
centre-periphery relations between Turkey and Turkish Muslim migrants
abroad. The vast majority of Turkish Muslims had a rural background.
They were poorly educated and occupied the lowest level of the labour-
market in Europe. For many of them the idea of returning home was
probably not very realistic, but it continued to determine future aspira-
tions and current loyalties. Religious accommodation was related to the
strong ties of many of the Turkish migrants with the country or region of
origin. The development of the infrastructure was engrafted upon migra-
tory networks and strong personal links with the countries of origin.
Individual Muslims practiced religious life in familial and communal
networks based on ethnic and regional ties. Religious orientations and
authoritative frames were transplanted from the countries of origin and
reproduced in the countries of residence. Economic and personal ties
were inextricably linked to one another. Religious authority was closely
connected to migratory patterns of ethnic, regional, and political author-
ity. Participating in religious services was as much a communal affair as
it was a religious act. Turkey was the spiritual and ideological centre of
religious activity.
In the course of the 1990s it became increasingly manifest that these
characteristics were changing fundamentally. When we take a closer
look at the changes we can observe two (seemingly contradictory) devel-
opments: on the one hand the Islamic landscape in Europe increasingly
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 Transnational Turkish Islam
operates according to local dynamics and becomes less dependent on

agents in the countries of origin to determine their agendas. On the
other hand a relatively wealthy, well-educated, and mobile middle
class has emerged among Turkish Muslims, both in Turkey as well as
in Europe. Due to the rapid spread of modern mass media, transna-
tional networks have increased producing a multiplicity of forms and
modes with which Turkish Muslims sustain relations across borders.
Consequently the Turkish state has stepped up its attempt to regulate
and dominate the Turkish organizational scene in Europe, but they have
to resort to other means than the ‘old’ emotional, familial, and financial
bonds that linked migrant communities with the country and region
of origin. Other Islamic movements are also changing their strategies,
and new players have emerged. Today we find a wide array of different
organizational patterns and networks operating at the same time among
Turkish Muslims.
Where Turkey used to be the dominant guiding factor in determining
the development of organized Islam among Turkish migrants in Europe,
the changes explained before have seriously undermined this domi-
nance. Contemporary Turkish organized Islam must be approached as a
complex multi-polar and multi-directional field in which modern mass
media and socio-economic developments are crucial co-shaping factors.
Hence the assumption that Turkey is the only spiritual and political
centre of Turkish transnational Islam must be addressed critically.
This is not to suggest that the Turkish-Islamic landscape in Europe has
been transformed completely or that personal migratory networks and
dependencies do not play a significant role anymore. However, both the
recent developments in Turkey and the changing characteristics of the
Muslim population in Europe prompt us to explore this transnational
field anew and to indicate the parameters of change and potential trans-
formation and the mechanism at work.
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0012
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DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0013
Index
AABF (Federation of Alevi AP (Justice Party), 19–20
Associations in Germany), Arayıcı, Ali, 17
102–4, 106n4 Atacan, Fulya, 112
AABK (Confederation of Alevi Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 10, 15,
Associations in Europe), 24, 28n1, 47, 99, 108–9, 112
103 ATB (Turkish Union in
Abadan-Unat, Nermin, 18, 31, Europe), 111
35, 43 ATİB (Turkish Islamic Union
ABF (Alevi Bektaşi in Austria), 50, 76
Federasyonu), 100 ATİB (Turkish-Islamic Union
Adalet Partisi, see AP in Europe), 111
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, see Austria, 31–4, 50, 55, 61, 75–6,
AKP 104–5, 110, 112, 115
Adams, Patrick, 25 AÜTDK (Confederation
ADÜTDF (Federation of of Idealist Turkish
Democratic Idealist Associations), 110
Turkish Associations), Azak, Umut, 22
109–11
Agai, Begim, 87, 94n1 Bader, Veit, 3
AİF (Avusturya İslam Basch, Linda, 8n5
Federasyonu or Islamic BBP (Great Unity Party), 111
Federation Austria), Beck, Ulrich, 8n4
75–6 Bektaşi Order, 97–100
Akgönül, Samim, 8n3, 32, 38, Bektovic, 94n3
49, 51, 61, 80n1 Belgium, 31–3, 51, 54, 61, 76, 78,
Akgündüz, Ahmet, 58, 59 82, 91, 103, 110
AKP (Justice and Progress Belgium Union of Islamic
Party), 10–12, 24–8, 49, 54, Cultural Centres, 61
75, 77, 105 BİF (Belçika İslam Federasyonu
Alevi, 7, 49, 96–7, 99–106, or Islamic Federation
106n1, 106n4, 106n11, 119 Belgium), 76
Alperen Ocakları, 111 Binswanger, Karl, 47, 58, 73, 74,
AMGT (Milli Görüş 77, 109
organizations Europe), 74 Boos-Nünning, Ursula, 66
Andrews, Mathew, 82 Bowen, John, 5, 30
 DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0014

Index 
Bozkurt, Fuat, 99, 106n3 DİTİB (Turkish Islamic Union of the

Bozkurtlar (Grey Wolves), 108 Directorate for Religious Affairs,
Braam, Stella, 113n3 Germany and France)
Brand, Laurie, 56 Diyanet, 6, 13–14, 16, 23, 27, 38–40, 44,
Bruinessen, Martin van, 14, 15, 22, 83, 45n8, 47–56, 59, 63, 69, 74, 76–7,
84, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 100 87, 89, 96, 101, 106, 108–9, 112, 115,
BTİDV (Turkish-Islamic Religious 117
Foundation Belgium), 76 DMGT (Organisation of Muslim
Migrants in Denmark), 76
Çağlar, İsmail, 8n2, 23, 24 domestication of Islam, 3–5, 13
Çakır, Ruşen, 15, 19, 22 Doomernik, Jeroen, 63
Canatan, Kadir, 38, 80n1 DP (Democratic Party), 16–19
Çarkoğlu, Ali, 17, 27, 94n1 Dressler, Markus, 96–8
Carroll, Jill, 82, 87, 91 Dumont, Paul, 15, 48, 83
Castles, Stephen, 35
Çelik, Gürkan, 83, 87 Ebaugh, Helen, 86, 90, 94n1
cem (ceremony), 99–102 economic reforms in Turkey, 14–15, 17
CEM Foundation, 100–1, 104 Ehli Beyt Foundation, 100, 104
CFCM (Conseil Francais du Culte Erbakan, Mehmet Sabri, 75, 77–9, 85–6
Musulman), 34, 51 Erbakan, Necmettin, 20–4, 69–75, 84,
Chernillo, Daniel, 8n4 112
CHP (Republican People’s Party), 12, Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 17, 23–8, 28n2,
16, 20–1, 25 75, 90
CIMG (Confederation Islamique Milli Esposito, John, 87, 91, 94n1
Görüş France), 76 European Islam, 82, 117, 118
Çınar, Alev, 110 Evren, Kenan, 22, 50
Çınar, Menderes, 11 Executive of Muslims in Belgium, 33
Çitak, Zana, 49, 51, 52
civil society, 11–12, 24, 27, 85 Fadil, Nadia, 36, 56n3, 76
CMO (Contactorgaan Moslims en Fazilet Partisi, see FP
Overheid), 34, 110 FEK (Federation of Kurdistan Alevis),
coup-d’état 1980, 12, 22–5, 50, 74, 85, 101 104
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, see CHP Fekete, Liz, 36
Felicity Party, see SP
debate on Islam, 2–4, 30, 34–6, 42, Fischer, Johan, 27
69–70, 75–6 FP (Virtue Party), 24, 69
dedes, 98–101, 103, 105 France, 30–2, 34–5, 51–2, 54, 61, 76, 103,
Democratic Party, see DP 105, 110
Denizolgun, Ahmed Arif, 59, 62, 64 Furat, Kenan, 105
Denmark, 31–3, 51, 61, 76, 91, 103, 110,
115 Geerse, Miriam, 113n3
Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK), 33, Germany, 7n1, 31–3, 38, 50, 52–3, 55,
88 56n1, 61, 63, 65, 69, 71, 74–6, 79,
Dialogue Forum (Denmark), 91 80n1, 82, 88, 91, 94n2, 96, 101–5,
Directorate of Religious Affairs, see 109–12, 115
Diyanet Geschiere, Peter, 4
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0014
 Index
globalization, 5, 43 Islamitische Glaubensgemeinschaft in

Gökalp, Altan, 60 Österreich (IGGiÖ), 33, 34, 50,
Görener, Aylın, 25 76, 104
governance of Islam, 3–5 islamization of migrants, 33–7
Gözaydın, Iştar, 8n2, 13, ISN (Islamitische Stichting Nederland),
16, 48 51–2, 55
Grey Wolves, 108
Grillo, Ralph, 5 Jacobsen, Brian, 32, 51, 76
Gülay, Erol, 93 Jong, Fred de, 98
Gülen movement, 6–7, 7n1, 10, 27, Jonker, Gerdien, 8n3, 60–5
38–9, 77, 82–94, 116, 118 Justice and Progress Party, see AKP
Gülen, Fethullah, 26, 28, 63, 82–3, 87, Justice Party, see AP
90–1
Kaçar, Kemal, 58, 59, 61–2
Haci Bektaş Foundation, 102–3 Kanmaz, Meryem, 32, 56n3, 61
Haci Bektaş Veli, 97–8 Kaplan movement, 112–13
HAK-DER (Federation of Social Kaplan, Cemalettin, 74, 112
and Cultural Alevi and Bektaşi Kaplan, Metin, 112
Associations in the Nederlands), 103 Karakaşoğlu-Aydin, Yasemin, 62, 63
HBVAKV (Haci Bektaş Veli Anadolu Karaömerlioğlu, Asim, 17
Kültür Vakfı), 100 Kehl-Bodrogi, Krisztina, 98
HBVKTD (Haci Bektaş Veli Kültür ve Kemalism, 23, 26, 70
Turizm Derneği), 100 Kepel, Gilles, 45n7
Hearth of Intellectuals, 108 Kieser, Hans-Lukas, 12
Hendrick, Joshua, 27, 86, 94n1 Kinross, Lord, 28n1
Hizmet, see Gülen movement Kinzer, Stephen, 13, 14
Kısakürek, Necip Fazil, 58, 59
IGMG (Islamische Gemeinde Milli Kızılbaş, 97–9
Görüş), 73–6, 78–9 Koç, Handan, 93
IKUS (Union of Islamic Cultural Koenig, Mathias, 34
Centres. Sweden), 61 Köse, Talha, 105
images of Islam, 10, 18, 23–4, 32, 36–7, Kühle, Lena, 38
41–2, 118 Kurtz, Lester, 91
imam, 6, 13–14, 16, 39, 47–53, 55, 59, 62, Kuru, Ahmet, 20
84, 99, 105, 112
Imam Hatip schools, see religious Lafleur, Jean-Michel, 56
education laiklik, 11–14, 17, 19, 24–6, 47–8, 72–3,
immigration, see migration 117
integration, 2–5, 11, 19, 34–5, 41–2, 54, Landau, Jacob, 108
79 Landman, Nico, 35, 38, 50, 58–61, 74,
Intercultureel Dialoog Platform 78, 88, 90, 96, 100–3, 109, 111–12,
(Intercultural Dialogue Platform, 113n8
Belgium), 91 Larsson, Göran, 56n5, 67n6, 76
International Dialogue Centre Lee, Jonathan L., 97, 99
(Munich), 91 Lemke, Thomas, 30
islamic mysticisms, see Sufi order Lemmen, Thomas, 58
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0014
Index 
Levitt, Peggy, 5 Nurcu movement, 22, 38, 49, 83, 88

Lewis, Bernard, 12 Nurculuk, see Nurcu movement
Lindo, Flip, 77, 79, 80n1, 80n5 Nursi, see Said Nursi
local Islamic centres, see mosques
Loobuyck, Patrick, 33 official Islam in Turkey, 6, 15, 47–56
Öktem, Kerem, 16, 17
Manço, Ural, 56n3 Özdalga, Elisabeth, 91, 94n1
Marchand, René, 45n7
Mardin, Şerif, 16, 19, 83 Paine, Suzanne, 18
Maréchal, Brigitte, 38 parallel Islam, 15, 48–9, 117
Massicard, Elise, 98–101, 103–4, 106n4, places of worship, see mosques
106n11 Platform INS (Netherlands), 91
Menderes, Adnan, 16–17 Poulton, Hugh, 108
MGNN (Milli Görüş Noord Nederland), Pries, Luger, 103, 105, 106n4
76, 79 PSAKD (Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür
MGZN (Milli Görüş Zuid Nederland), 76 Derneği), 100
MHP (Nationalist Movement Party),
108–10 Quran courses, see religious education
migration, 2, 4–5, 11, 18, 31–7, 43, 116
Milli Görüş movement, 6, 7n1, 20–2, Rath, Jan
24, 38–40, 49–51, 54, 56n1, 63, Refah Partisi (see RP)
69–80, 82, 85, 87, 89, 103, 110, 112, religious education, 16, 39–40, 55, 59,
117–18 62, 64, 79
Milli Selamet Partisi, see MSP Republican People’s Party, see CHP
mosques, 13–14, 23, 36–40, 45n8, 47–53, Rohe, Mathias, 56n1
55, 61, 63–4, 76, 89, 101, 109 Roose, Eric, 53
MSP (National Salvation Party), 20–3, Rose, Nikolas, 5
69, 73–4, 84, 112 Rosenow-Williams, Kerstin, 8n3, 32,
multi-party system in Turkey, 15–22 50, 53, 61, 74, 79
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, see Atatürk RP (Welfare Party), 23–4, 69, 74–5, 85,
mystical brotherhoods, see tarikat 112
mysticism, see tarikat Rumpf, Christian, 47
Nakşibendi order, 15, 60, 71, 83 Saadet Partisi, see SP

nation-state, 4–5, 10, 13, 30, 36, 41, 116 Said Nursi, 16, 49, 83
National Salvation Party, see MSP Saktanber, Ayşe, 27
nationalism, 4, 8n4, 19, 22, 69, 71, 84, Sarıbay, Ali Yaşar 20–2
86, 108–111 Schiffauer, Werner, 8n3, 20–2, 71, 74–5,
Nationalist Movement Party, see MHP 77–9, 80n1, 112
Netherlands, 8n1, 31–2, 34, 44n4, 51–3, Schmidinger, Thomas, 76
61, 65, 76, 78–9, 82, 91, 102–3, Schüler, Harald, 100–1, 106n1
110–12, 115 secular reforms in Turkey, see laiklik
neutrality of the state, 4, 30 secularism, see laiklik
Nielsen, Jörgen, 32, 35, 38, 45n5 Şener, Cemal, 100
NIF (Dutch Islamic Federation), 76 Seufert, Günter, 8n3, 27, 73–4, 77, 82,
number of Muslims in Europe, 30–3 87–8, 91
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0014
 Index
Sezgin, Zeynep, 50, 61 Turam, Berna, 8n2, 11, 17, 19, 85, 92,
Shankland, David, 100 94n1
Sharon-Krespin, Rachel, 93 Turkey, 2–3, 6–7, 10–28, 31, 37–40,
Shaw, Stanford, 12, 16 42–44, 45n8, 47–51, 53–6, 58–9, 62,
Shia, 7, 96–100 65, 69, 71–7, 79–80, 82–3, 85–8, 90,
SICN (Islamic Centre in the 93, 94n1, 96–7, 99, 101–2, 104–6,
Netherlands), 61, 63, 65, 67n9 106n3, 108, 110–12, 115–20
Smit, Wicher, 15, 17 Turkish Foundation for Religious
Sökefeld, Martin, 98, 101–2, 105 Affairs, see TDV
SP (Felicity Party), 24, 69, 75 Turkish Islamic Foundation
Spuler-Stegemann, Ursula, 65–6, 109 (Denmark), 51
Sufi order, 7, 58–60, 65, 90, 96–7, 99, Turkish Islamic Synthesis, 70, 85, 100,
118 109, 111
see also tarikat Turkish nationalism, see nationalism
Sufism, see tarikat Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, see TDV
Süleymancis, see Süleymanlı movement Turner, Colin, 83
Süleymanlı movement, 6, 22, 38–40,
49, 56n1, 58–67, 71, 77, 87, 89, 108, Ülkücü, 108–10
117–18 umbrella organizations, 38, 50, 75–6,
Sunar, Ilkay, 14, 19, 21–2 78, 89, 109
Sunier, Thijl, 5, 14, 18, 21, 23, 30, 35–7,
39–41, 45n8, 48–9, 51–2, 54–5, 64, Vasquez, Manuel, 5, 87
76, 80n5, 90, 92–3, 96 Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren
Sweden, 31–3, 51, 56n5, 61, 67n6, 76, 103 e.V., see VIKZ
Swedish Alevi Federation, 103 Vertovec, Steve, 6, 8n5
Szyliowicz, Joseph, 16 VIKZ (Federation of Islamic
Cultural Centres, Germany), 61,
Tanja, Jaap, 109, 110, 113n3 63, 65–6
Tanzimat (reforms), 13 Virtue Party, see FP
tarikat, 15, 58–60, 62, 64–6, 66n2, 71, Vorhoff, Karin, 96
83–4, 90–1, 93, 96, 99, 117
TDV (Turkish Foundation for Weber, Max, 93
Religious Affairs), 49 Welfare Party, see RP
TICF (Federation of Turkish Islamic Werbner, Pnina, 5
Cultural Organizations, White, Jenny, 8n2, 17, 94n1, 109
Netherlands), 52 Wimmer, 4, 5
Toprak, Binnaz, 12, 14, 19–22, 47
transnational field, 5–6, 10, 43, 115–16, Yavuz, Hakan, 17, 19, 22, 24, 64, 83–7,
120 94n1
transnational Islam, 5, 120 Yilmaz, Ihsan, 87, 91, 94n1
transnational networks, 4–6, 55–6, Yücekök, Ahmet, 19
88–9, 115–16, 120 Yükleyen, Ahmet, 8n3, 38, 50, 52, 53,
transnationalism, 5–8 56n1, 60, 62, 63, 67n3, 77, 82, 90,
Trimingham, John Spencer, 60 94n2
Tunahan, Süleyman Hilmi, 39, 58–60,
62, 64–5, 67n7 Zürcher, Erik Jan, 13, 16, 17
DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0014

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Transnational Turkish Islam

Daria J. Kuss and Mark D. Griffiths: Internet Addiction in Psychotherapy

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this

ISBN: 978–1–137–39423–1 EPUB

DOI: 10.1057/9781137394224.0002 vii

Sunier, Thijl, and Nico Landman. Transnational Turkish

a wide variety of forms, practices, goals, strategies, and motivations

Sunier, Thijl, and Nico Landman. Transnational Turkish

Although the Turkish Islamic landscape in Europe increasingly develops

analytically it is an obvious simplification, not least because it reduces

struggle between ‘official’ state secularism and the oppositional religious

Reforms with respect to religion had a highly symbolic significance,

of years. A more important aspect of symbolic secularization was the

developed areas in the Western regions of the country. The industrializa-

In 1946 Turkey, forced by the Allies, introduced a multi-party system. This

became a crucial factor in political struggle not only to build up rank-and-

the gradual marginalization and eventual closing down of the so-called

A movement that thrived under these circumstances was Milli Görüş, a

of wealth, but also enhance spiritual development. Only in this way

scriptural version of Islam, unlike Süleymanlıs and the Nurcu-movement,

This new ideology was to be propagated mainly through education. Ethics

developments, however, point in a different direction. In the last years

would gradually remove legal restrictions on the public confession

Sunier, Thijl, and Nico Landman. Transnational Turkish

In this study we explore trends in Turkish organized Islam by giving an

tions. The only way to understand these processes is through thorough

Turkish migration to Europe

Turkish migration to Europe started relatively late. In the 1950s, 1960s,

table 2.1 Countries with the largest number of Turkish citizens

table 2.2 Muslims in European countries

Est. Muslim Est. Muslim Turks as % of Muslim

It is even more difficult to determine the relative size of the Turkish

constitute the majority. Turkish Muslims do not have a very prominent

Political culture, legal arrangements, and the

In France and the Netherlands formal legal recognition of any religion

have a migrant background, issues of integration, minoritization, and

Organizational development: Turkish Islam

religious activity. The state controlled Islam responded by also invest-

Although the logistical support from Turkish sister organizations

virtually from scratch. In Europe Turkish Islamic movements actually

compatriots. The extension of non-religious services was meant to cater

society. This choice was partly invigorated by the increasing numbers of

abroad and related communities’ (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları

5 Much of the information in this chapter is based on the Yearbook of Muslims in

Sunier, Thijl, and Nico Landman. Transnational Turkish

The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı; abbreviated:

to society would inevitably lead to sectarian struggle and to attempts to

during Ramadan (Landman, 1992, p. 102). However, a more systematic

In France, Diyanet operates under the name DITIB and controls a

created according to the legal requirements and opportunities of the

the Diyanet institutions have strengthened their relation with local

Worldviews, goals, and agendas

The strong institutional ties of European member associations with

European societies. With their emphasis on the spiritual dimensions of

Sunier, Thijl, and Nico Landman. Transnational Turkish

Followers of the Turkish Nakşibendi Sufi şeyh Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan

homework support and preparation for university entrance exams were

than on charisma. He became gradually accepted in the movement as

women in the larger mosques of the movement in Europe, but teachers of

Dutch branch of the movement (Sunier, 1996). Moreover, the movement

Worldviews, goals, and agendas

3 Yükleyen (2012, p. 64) who quotes Aydın (2004) as his source.

Sunier, Thijl, and Nico Landman. Transnational Turkish