Ho 4 Forecast Civil Law PDF

2019 BAR REVIEW
CIVIL LAW
Handout No. 4
PRELIMINARY TITLE
The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who
has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent,
or deceitful. Beumer vs. Amores, 686 SCRA 770, G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
Principle of Unjust Enrichment; No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust
enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary
reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit: Futile, too, is
petitioner’s reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art. 22. Every person who
through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: “MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST”
(No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of
what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This
provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine.
It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject
properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield
stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: “The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal
as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in
general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real
justice, as between him and the plaintiff.” Beumer vs. Amores, 686 SCRA 770, G.R. No. 195670
December 3, 2012
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Unfair Competition; The instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on human relations,
and not unfair competition under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, as the present suit is a damage
suit and the products are not covered by patent registration.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on
human relations, and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293, as the present suit is
a damage suit and the products are not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence
of patent registration is immaterial in the present case. The concept of “unfair competition”
under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the
present article, which follows the extended concept of “unfair competition” in American
jurisdictions, the term covers even cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of
his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s
contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s business.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that “unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or
any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the
person who thereby suffers damage.” From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to
be prevented is not competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high-handed methods
which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly, what
the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means used are fair and
legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as “unfair,” it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve
an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must in volve acts which are characterized as
“contrary to good conscience,” or “shocking to judicial sensibilities,” or otherwise unlawful; in
the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the
essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means. It is
evident that petitioner is engaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting
his business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the
employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets
of the respondent. Willaware Products Corporation vs. Jesichris Manufacturing Corporation,
734 SCRA 238, G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage.

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A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural

safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution
of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry
is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient
of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered
into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate
was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been
given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed,
and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed
sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction
of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated,
in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage
to speak of. Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No, 189538, February 10, 2014
Correction of Entry; In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which
an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein
may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a
harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of
the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly

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observed. Braza vs. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 607 SCRA 638,
G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
Doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack; An action
seeking the declaration of marriage as void for being bigamous and one impugning a child’s
legitimacy are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Art. 171 of the Family
Code, respectively, and the petition should be filed in a Family Court.
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to
nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn
Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to
a DNA test. Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of
Patrick’s birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto. Petitioners’
position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are
governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and
Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as
expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as
well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Braza vs. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 607 SCRA 638, G.R. No.
181174 December 4, 2009
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

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4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April
24, 2018
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a

foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage.
It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it
is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes
a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code can now be applied even if it is the Filipino spouse
who initiated the foreign divorce decree against his/her alien spouse. Accordingly, a Filipino
citizen has [now] the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can [We] put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent
by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean
that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not
follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature
or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have

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ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective
in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in “like circumstance as a Filipino
who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.” Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operation of the latter's national law. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April
24, 2018
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
The foregoing notwithstanding, [We] the Court cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese
court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of divorce must still first be proven.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Also, Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. The burden of proof lies with the "party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."

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It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Hence, since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese
laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April
24, 2018
Foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen
may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated
the divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign
divorce decree - presumably the Filipino citizen - must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to
have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground
that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not
allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC
had been rendered nugatory.
However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda.'s petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her "Divorce by Agreement"
obtained in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce.
Luzviminda Morisono v. Ryoji Morisono, et al., G.R. No. 226013, July 2, 2018
The Supreme Court holds that paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of

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his second marriage. x x x We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter
of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. Republic vs. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114,
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
The Supreme Court is unanimous in holding that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,
who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also
to remarry.
We are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209,
as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
Republic vs. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114, G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
We state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry. Republic vs. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114, G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

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Declaration of Presumptive Death; The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of
a spouse for four(4) consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse
that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years,
coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead,
that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the
presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Santos vs. Santos, 737 SCRA 637, G.R.
No. 187061 October 8, 2014
Affidavit of Reappearance; The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the

part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he
or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
The Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the
subsequent marriage by mere reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an
admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was
terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead. Moreover, a close
reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by
reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the nonexistence of a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence
of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined. Santos vs. Santos, 737 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death,
a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal.
This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first
spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to
show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity
of the second marriage. Santos vs. Santos, 737 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014

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Mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the
subsequent marriage were notified if there was “no step taken to terminate the subsequent
marriage, either by filing an affidavit of reappearance or by court action.”
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the
subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon, 485 SCRA 376 (2006). This court
noted that mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties to
the subsequent marriage were notified if there was “no step . . . taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]” “Since
the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is
dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction
of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law.” Santos vs. Santos, 737 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 187061 October 8,
2014
Conditions for a Bigamous Subsequent Marriage to be Considered Valid.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent
marriage may be considered valid when the following are present: 1) The prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years; 2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead; 3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse; and 4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death
of the absent spouse. Santos vs. Santos, 737 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally
considered bigamous and void.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration
of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already
dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior
to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void.
Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law. Santos vs. Santos, 737
SCRA 637, G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014

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A subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing “an action in court to prove the
reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage.”
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the
subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from
availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent
marriage may also be terminated by filing “an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.”
Santos vs. Santos, 737 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014
Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until
terminated, the “children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property
relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages.”
If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived

before the termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring
presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. It is true that in most cases, an
action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent
marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a
respondent for bigamy. Santos vs. Santos, 737 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for
nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the
ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the
exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
“The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in
the following manner, viz.:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages
and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

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Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.”
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
“aggrieved or injured spouse.” If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is
unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous
marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void
and thus, in such circumstance, the “injured spouse” who should be given a legal remedy is the
one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior
marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution. Juliano-Llave vs. Republic, 646 SCRA
637, G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
A reading of Article 41 of the Family Code shows that the presumption of death established
therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the
said law.
It can be recalled that the RTC, in the fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the
petitioner’s petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead “under Article 41 of the FC.” By
doing so, the RTC gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of presumptive death
filed by petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the FC. This is wrong. The petition
for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would have
warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC because petitioner was not seeking to remarry.
Tadeo-Matias vs. Republic , 862 SCRA 788, G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018

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Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose
of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article
390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code express the general rule regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose.
Petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death of
Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive
death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed “not for any other purpose but
solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.” Given that her petition for the
declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was
clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil
Code as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule
regarding presumptions of death for any civil purpose, to wit: Art. 390. After an absence of seven
years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the
age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession
may be opened. Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage,
or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the
vessel or aeroplane; (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances
and his existence has not been known for four years. Tadeo-Matias vs. Republic , 862 SCRA 788,
G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018
Conjugal Properties; Any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the
Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title
IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the Family Code. Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr.
and Marta Barola vs. Servacio, 657 SCRA 10, G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011
Article 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the

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case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.
Palpably, the wisdom behind the provision is to maintain sacred the ties among members of the
same family. "As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more
tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every
effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and
passion in the family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than between strangers." Thus, a party's failure to comply with this provision before
filing a complaint against a family member would render such complaint premature; hence,
dismissible.
This notwithstanding, the Court held in Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales3that non-compliance with
the earnest effort requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is not a jurisdictional defect
which would authorize the courts to dismiss suits filed before them motu proprio. Rather, it
merely partakes of a condition precedent such that the non-compliance therewith constitutes a
ground for dismissal of a suit should the same be invoked by the opposing party at the earliest
opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. Otherwise, such ground is deemed
waived. Moreno v. Kahn, G.R. No. 217744, July 30, 2018
In this relation, Article 150 of the Family Code reads: Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants
and descendants: and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
In this light, case law states that Article 151 of the Family Code must be construed strictly, it being
an exception to the general rule. Hence, any person having a collateral familial relation with the
plaintiff other than what is enumerated in Article 150 of the Family Code is considered a stranger
who, if included in a suit between and among family members, would render unnecessary the
earnest efforts requirement under Article 151. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.38
In this instance, it is undisputed that: (a) Jose and Consuelo are full-blooded siblings; and (b)
Consuelo is the mother of Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine, which make them nephews and
niece of their uncle, Jose. It then follows that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine are considered
"strangers'' to Jose insofar as Article 151 of the Family Code is concerned. In this relation, it is apt
to clarify that while it was the disagreement between Jose and Consuelo that directly resulted in
the filing of the suit, the fact remains that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine were rightfully
impleaded as co-defendants Jose’s complaint as they are co-owners of the subject lands in
dispute. In view of the inclusion “strangers" to the suit between Jose and Consuelo who are full-

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blooded siblings, the Court concludes that the suit is beyond the ambit of Article 151 of the Family
Code. Perforce, the courts a quo gravely erred in dismissing Jose's complaint due to non-
compliance with the earnest effort requirement therein. Moreno v. Kahn, G.R. No. 217744, July
30, 2018
The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the
preservation of the homestead — the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population is a
burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater
calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under
which it has been gathered and sheltered. The family home cannot be seized by creditors except
in special cases. Eulogio vs. Bell, Sr., 762 SCRA 103, G.R. No. 186322 July 8, 2015
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt are determined
by the exemption statute.
The exemption is limited to the particular kind of property or the specific articles prescribed by
the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit. Articles 155 and 160 of the Family
Code specify the exceptions mentioned in Article 153, to wit: ARTICLE 155. The family home shall
be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2)
For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers,
mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building. Eulogio vs. Bell, Sr., 762 SCRA 103, G.R. No. 186322
July 8, 2015
Execution of Judgments; The exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or
attachment is limited to P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those
maximum values are adjusted by law.
If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the peso because
of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most
favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be

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applied to the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160. Eulogio vs.
Bell, Sr., 762 SCRA 103, G.R. No. 186322 July 8, 2015
The family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit
is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it,
its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the
time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the
improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory
limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the
statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160. Certainly, the humane
considerations for which the law surrounds the family home with immunities from levy do not
include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their creditors. Eulogio vs. Bell,
Sr., 762 SCRA 103, G.R. No. 186322 July 8, 2015
To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Article 160, petitioners
needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase
resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting
the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value
exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged — much less proven — by
petitioners. The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already
determined with finality that the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was an
equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in
1990, the price stated therein was not the actual value of the property in dispute. Eulogio vs.
Bell, Sr., 762 SCRA 103, G.R. No. 186322 July 8, 2015
Upon the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No. 9255, the provision that illegitimate children shall
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother was retained, with
an added provision that they may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by their father.

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Thus, Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides: Illegitimate children shall
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of
their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Barcelote vs.
Republic, 834 SCRA 564, G.R. No. 222095 August 7, 2017
The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother.
The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. The use of the word “shall” underscores its mandatory character. The
discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional
upon proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR. Since the undisputed facts show that the
children were born outside a valid marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and
August 2011, respectively, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The
children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth
certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname should have
been “Barcelote” and not “Tinitigan.” Barcelote vs. Republic, 834 SCRA 564, G.R. No. 222095
August 7, 2017
It is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in
all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes the child as his or not.
The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of
the child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that
individuals are not falsely named as parents. The mother must sign and agree to the information
entered in the birth certificate because she has the parental authority and custody of the
illegitimate child. In Briones v. Miguel, 440 SCRA 455 (2004), we held that an illegitimate child is
under the sole parental authority of the mother, and the mother is entitled to have custody of
the child. The right of custody springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority
is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and

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the education of their heart and senses. Barcelote vs. Republic, 834 SCRA 564, G.R. No. 222095
August 7, 2017
Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did not sign the
documents, the local civil registrar had no authority to register the subject birth certificates.
Under the IRR of Act No. 3753, the civil registrar shall see to it that the Certificate of Live Birth
presented for registration is properly and completely filled up, and the entries are correct. In case
the entries are found incomplete or incorrect, the civil registrar shall require the person
concerned to fill up the document completely or to correct the entries, as the case may be.
Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of the law
respecting the registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the fact that the entry in
the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is incorrect since it should have
been that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are also incomplete as they lacked the
signature of the mother. Barcelote vs. Republic, 834 SCRA 564, G.R. No. 222095 August 7, 2017
The Supreme Court (SC) declares the subject birth certificates void and order their cancellation
for being registered against the mandatory provisions of the Family Code requiring the use of
the mother’s surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of
the mother in her children’s birth certificates.
Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void. In Babiera v.
Catotal, 333 SCRA 487 (2000), we declared as void and cancelled a birth certificate, which showed
that the mother was already 54 years old at the time of the child’s birth and which was not signed
either by the civil registrar or by the supposed mother. Accordingly, we declare the subject birth
certificates void and order their cancellation for being registered against the mandatory
provisions of the Family Code requiring the use of the mother’s surname for her illegitimate
children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature of the mother in her children’s birth
certificates. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be the primary consideration. Barcelote vs. Republic, 834 SCRA 564,
G.R. No. 222095 August 7, 2017
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The
exception provided by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly

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recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother. Since parental
authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother,
unless she is shown to be unfit. An acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to
use the surname of his illegitimate father.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis
for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent? Clearly, there is
none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision of Art.
176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to
decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein
respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children. Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear
and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal
meaning free from any interpretation. Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors
to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from
ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word
“may” in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word “may” is permissive and
operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children. Grande vs. Antonio, 716 SCRA 698,
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
On the matter of children’s surnames, the Supreme Court has, time and again, rebuffed the
idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be
measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames, this Court has, time and
again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor
child. In Alfon v. Republic, 97 SCRA 858 (1980), for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate
child to continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it
serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of
her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic, 19 SCRA 721 (1967), this
Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname
different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use
of a child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best
possible situation considering his circumstances. Grande vs. Antonio, 716 SCRA 698, G.R. No.
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An illegitimate child is permitted to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly
recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register,
or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or
private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for
judicial approval is necessary. Dela Cruz vs. Gracia, 594 SCRA 649, G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private
handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative
father.
This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code
which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature. Dela Cruz vs. Gracia, 594
SCRA 649, G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009
A father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his
signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the “paramount consideration” in resolving
questions affecting him. x x x It is thus “(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on
the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x
x.” Too, “(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.” Dela Cruz vs. Gracia, 594
SCRA 649, G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009
Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that “legitimate parents” pertain to those who
exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the Employees’ Compensation
Program (ECP).
It was only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming
arguendo that the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code

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provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated
legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary. True,
when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed,
aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years
after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age. John’s minority
at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological
parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal
relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to
care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away? Bartolome vs. Social Security
System, 740 SCRA 78, G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
It is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their
child who was the subject of adoption.
While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the
estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least
reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right
to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of
the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of
parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive
parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance at a better
life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp.
Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at all
if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the
time of John’s minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the
adopted child. Bartolome vs. Social Security System, 740 SCRA 78, G.R. No. 192531 November
12, 2014
PROPERTY
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of

private ownership.
Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)

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belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth. Land belonging to the State that is not of such character,
or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms
part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial
property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to
a private individual. Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 561,
G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the
country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State.
This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands not appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable
land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to
private persons. Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 561, G.R.
No. 179987 September 3, 2013
The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural,
forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks; Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, lands of
the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. Section
10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven,
specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications.
Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands
of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,

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without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands
of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,
without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. If, however, public
land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when
public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or
the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or
for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and
disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify
lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order
for the provision to apply. xxx However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification
of a public land as agricultural. Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 704
SCRA 561, G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.

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An examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no
requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived
only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over
it. xxx In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain
for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a
result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for
this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the
requisite period of possession. Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 704
SCRA 561, G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013
Rules Relative to the Disposition of Public Land or Lands of the Public Domain.
We now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public
domain, namely: (1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or
disposed; (2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit: (a) Agricultural lands of
the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the
application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June
12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of the
land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to
be part of the public domain and has become private property. (b) Lands of the public domain
subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the development
of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed
through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition
is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition
sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

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Buyer in Good Faith
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to, or an interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same
at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of some other person’s claim or interest in
the property. Corollary thereto, when a piece of land is in the actual possession of persons other
than the seller, the buyer must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession.
Without making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer in good faith. When a man
proposes to buy or deal with realty, his duty is to read the public manuscript, that is, to look and
see who is there upon it and what his rights are. A want of caution and diligence, which an honest
man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases, is in contemplation of
law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him
is in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. Go vs. Estate of the Late Felisa Tamio
de Buenaventura, 763 SCRA 632, G.R. No. 211972 July 22, 2015
Legal Easement Pertaining to the Natural Drainage of Lands
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform
for his own protection. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in
elevation than the Vergara property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the waters that flow
from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code. This provision refers to the legal
easement pertaining to the natural drainage of lands, which obliges lower estates to receive from
the higher estates water which naturally and without the intervention of man descends from the
latter, i.e., not those collected artificially in reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth carried by
the waters, viz.:
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they
carry with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this
easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this light, Sps. Sonkin should have been aware of such circumstance and, accordingly, made
the necessary adjustments to their property so as to minimize the burden created by such legal
easement. Instead of doing so, they disregarded the easement and constructed their house
directly against the perimeter wall which adjoins the Vergara property, thereby violating the
National Building Code in the process, specifically Section 708(a) thereof which reads:

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Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Dwellings.—(a) Dwelling Location and Lot
Occupancy. The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety percent of a corner lot and eighty
percent of an inside lot, and subject to the provisions on Easement on Light and View of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2 meters from the property line. Vergara vs. Sonkin, 757
SCRA 442, G.R. No. 193659 June 15, 2015
Classifications of Nuisance
Article 695 of the Civil Code classifies nuisances with respect to the object or objects that they
affect. In this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance (or one which “affects a
community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal”); or (b) a private nuisance (or
one “that is not included in the foregoing definition” [or, as case law puts it, one which “violates
only private rights and produces damages to but one or a few persons”]). Jurisprudence further
classifies nuisances in relation to their legal susceptibility to summary abatement (that is,
corrective action without prior judicial permission).
In this regard, a nuisance may either be: (a) a nuisance per se (or one which “affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined
law of necessity”); or (b) a nuisance per accidens (or that which “depends upon certain conditions
and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due
hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a
nuisance.”) Rana vs. Wong, 727 SCRA 539, G.R. No. 192862 June 30, 2014
Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should be taken under the parameters
stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances) and 706 (for private nuisances) of the Civil Code, a
private person whose property right was invaded or unreasonably interfered with by the act,
omission, establishment, business or condition of the property of another may file a civil action
to recover personal damages.
Abatement may be judicially sought through a civil action therefor if the pertinent requirements
under the Civil Code for summary abatement, or the requisite that the nuisance is
a nuisance per se, do not concur. To note, the remedies of abatement and damages are
cumulative; hence, both may be demanded. Rana vs. Wong, 727 SCRA 539, G.R. No. 192862
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SUCCESSION
Attestation Clause; The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in
the pages.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the
subject last will and testament that it “consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The
will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde. Lopez vs. Lopez, 685 SCRA 209, G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
In order that there may be substantial performance of an obligation, there must have been an
attempt in good faith to perform, without any willful or intentional departure therefrom. The
deviation from the obligation must be slight, and the omission or defect must be technical and
unimportant, and must not pervade the whole or be so material that the object which the
parties intended to accomplish in a particular manner is not attained.
The non-performance of a material part of a contract will prevent the performance from
amounting to a substantial compliance.The party claiming substantial performance must show
that he has attempted in good faith to perform his contract, but has through oversight,
misunderstanding or any excusable neglect failed to completely perform in certain negligible
respects, for which the other party may be adequately indemnified by an allowance and
deduction from the contract price or by an award of damages. But a party who knowingly and
wilfully fails to perform his contract in any respect, or omits to perform a material part of it,
cannot be permitted, under the protection of this rule, to compel the other party, and the trend
of the more recent decisions is to hold that the percentage of omitted or irregular performance
may in and of itself be sufficient to show that there had not been a substantial performance.
International Hotel Corp v. Joaquin Jr., G.R. No. 158361, April 10, 2013
Conversely, the principle of substantial performance is inappropriate when the incomplete

performance constitutes a material breach of the contract.

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A contractual breach is material if it will adversely affect the nature of the obligation that the
obligor promised to deliver, the benefits that the obligee expects to receive after full compliance,
and the extent that the non-performance defeated the purposes of the contract. Accordingly, for
the principle embodied in Article 1234 to apply, the failure of Joaquin and Suarez to comply with
their commitment should not defeat the ultimate purpose of the contract. International Hotel
Corp v. Joaquin Jr., G.R. No. 158361, April 10, 2013
The real nature of a contract may be determined from the express terms of the written
agreement and from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the contracting parties.
A contract is what the law defines it to be, taking into consideration its essential elements, and
not what the contracting parties call it. The real nature of a contract may be determined from
the express terms of the written agreement and from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts
of the contracting parties. However, in the construction or interpretation of an instrument, the
intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued. The denomination or title given by the
parties in their contract is not conclusive of the nature of its contents. Ace Foods, Inc. vs. Micro
Pacific Technologies Co., Ltd., 712 SCRA 679, G.R. No. 200602 December 11, 2013
For a stipulation pour autrui to be appreciated, it is indispensable that there be a stipulation

deliberately conferring a benefit or favor to a third person.
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature,
or by stipulation, or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
he received from the decedent. If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third
person, he may demand its fulfilment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor
before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The
contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person.
Republic vs. Legal Heirs of Jose L. Africa, 767 SCRA 640, G.R. No. 205722 August 19, 2015
Requisites of a Stipulation Pour Autrui
The Court laid down the requisites of a stipulation pour autrui, namely: (1) there is a stipulation
in favor of a third person; (2) the stipulation is a part, not the whole, of the contract; (3) the
contracting parties clearly and deliberately conferred a favor to the third person — the favor is

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not an incidental benefit; (4) the favor is unconditional and uncompensated; (5) the third person
communicated his or her acceptance of the favor before its revocation; and (6) the contracting
parties do not represent, or are not authorized by, the third party. Republic vs. Legal Heirs of
Jose L. Africa, 767 SCRA 640, G.R. No. 205722 August 19, 2015; see also Mamaril vs. The Boy
Scout of the Philippines, 688 SCRA 437, G.R. No. 179382 January 14, 2013
Simulation takes place when the parties do not really want the contract they have executed to
produce the legal effects expressed by its wordings. Simulation or vices of declaration may be
either absolute or relative.
Article 1345 of the Civil Code distinguishes an absolute simulation from a relative one; while
Article 1346 discusses their effects, as follows: Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be
absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all;
the latter when the parties conceal their true agreement. Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or
fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is
not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
binds the parties to their agreement. Tanchuling vs. Cantela, 774 SCRA 406, G.R. No. 209284
November 10, 2015
A contract of adhesion is one wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the
other.
A contract of adhesion is one wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the
other. It is a contract whereby almost all of its provisions are drafted by one party, with the
participation of the other party being limited to affixing his or her signature or “adhesion” to the
contract. However, contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se as they are binding as ordinary
contracts.
While the Court has occasionally struck down contracts of adhesion as void, it did so when the
weaker party has been imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and reduced
to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on
equal footing.
Thus, the validity or enforceability of the impugned contracts will have to be determined by the
peculiar circumstances obtained in each case and the situation of the parties concerned.

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Encarnacion Construction & Industrial Corporation vs. Phoenix Ready Mix Concrete
Development & Construction, Inc., 838 SCRA 500, G.R. No. 225402 September 4, 2017
Contracts of adhesion are not void per se. It is binding as any other ordinary contract and a
party who enters into it is free to reject the stipulations in its entirety. If the terms thereof are
accepted without objection, then the contract serves as the law between them.
Anent Sps. Mamaril’s claim that the exculpatory clause: “Management shall not be responsible
for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein” contained in the BSP issued
parking ticket was void for being a contract of adhesion and against public policy, suffice it to
state that contracts of adhesion are not void per se. It is binding as any other ordinary contract
and a party who enters into it is free to reject the stipulations in its entirety.
If the terms thereof are accepted without objection, as in this case, where plaintiffs-appellants
have been leasing BSP’s parking space for more or less 20 years, then the contract serves as the
law between them. Besides, the parking fee of P300.00 per month or P10.00 a day for each unit
is too minimal an amount to even create an inference that BSP undertook to be an insurer of the
safety of plaintiffs-appellants’ vehicles. Mamaril vs. The Boy Scout of the Philippines, 688 SCRA
437, G.R. No. 179382 January 14, 2013
The principle of in pari delicto provides that when two parties are equally at fault, the law
leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. However, this principle does
not apply with respect to inexistent and void contracts
Assessing the respective infractions of the parties herein, the Court finds it prudent to sustain the
CA’s verdict offsetting the damage caused by said parties against each other. The Court can,
however, only concur with the CA in result since the latter inaccurately applied, as basis for its
ruling, the in pari delicto principle enunciated in the case of Yu Bun Guan v. Ong (Yu Guan), 367
SCRA 559 (2001). In said case, the Court discussed the in pari delicto principle with respect to the
subject matter of inexistent and void contracts, viz.: Inapplicability of the in Pari Delicto Principle.
Xxx Said this Court in Modina v. Court of Appeals: “The principle of in pari delicto non oritur actio
denies all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. It applies to cases where the nullity arises from
the illegality of the consideration or the purpose of the contract. When two persons are equally
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The exception to this general rule is when the principle is invoked with respect to inexistent
contracts.” (emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Clearly, no void or inexistent contract is herein
at issue, hence, the Court’s disagreement with the CA’s invocation of Yu Guan in this respect.
Rana vs. Wong, 727 SCRA 539, G.R. No. 192862 June 30, 2014; see also Banco Filipino Savings
and Mortgage Bank vs. Tala Realty Services Corporation, 705 SCRA 208, G.R. No. 158866
September 9, 2013
SALES AND LEASE
A contract of sale is classified as a consensual contract, which means that the sale is perfected
by mere consent.
No particular form is required for its validity. Upon perfection of the contract, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance, i.e., the vendee may compel transfer of ownership of the
object of the sale, and the vendor may require the vendee to pay the thing sold.
In contrast, a contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller,
while expressly reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery thereof to the
prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon
fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, i.e., the full payment of the purchase price.
A contract to sell may not even be considered as a conditional contract of sale where the seller
may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive
condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is present,
although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur.
Ace Foods, Inc. vs. Micro Pacific Technologies Co., Ltd., 712 SCRA 679, G.R. No. 200602
December 11, 2013
A contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while
expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the
prospective buyer, binds itself to sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon
fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
It is basic that a contract is what the law defines it to be, and not what it is called by the
contracting parties. Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the Philippines PTGWO-
ITF vs. Decena, 682 SCRA 308, G.R. No. 178584 October 8, 2012

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R.A. No. 6552, otherwise known as the Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act, recognizes in
conditional sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial, commercial, residential) the right of the
seller to cancel the contract upon non-payment of an installment by the buyer, which is simply
an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
While we agreed that the cancellation of a contract to sell may be done outside of court,
however, “the cancellation by the seller must be in accordance with Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 6552,
which requires a notarial act of rescission and the refund to the buyer of the full payment of the
cash surrender value of the payments on the property.” Associated Marine Officers and
Seamen's Union of the Philippines PTGWO-ITF vs. Decena, 682 SCRA 308, G.R. No. 178584
October 8, 2012
Settled is the rule that a forged deed of sale is null and void and conveys no title.
In the present case, the complaint was filed assailing the validity of the 1979 deed of sale, the
execution of which was denied by both parties. However, while the CA found that petitioners’
signatures on the said deed were manifestly different from their signatures on other pertinent
documents before it, and thus, declared the said deed as spurious and did not validly transfer
title to the subject properties, it failed to nullify the subject certificates of title issued pursuant
to the said deed.
Settled is the rule that a forged deed of sale is null and void and conveys no title. Notably, the
complaint prayed for the nullification of the said certificates of title based on the spurious 1979
deed of sale. Hence, finding the foregoing in order, the CA’s ruling must be modified accordingly.
Aguinaldo vs. Torres, Jr., 839 SCRA 354, G.R. No. 225808 September 11, 2017
PARTNERSHIP
Articles 1822 and 1824 of the Civil Code pertain to the obligations of a co-partner in the event
that the partnership to which he belongs is held liable.
There is no perceptible legal basis to hold them solidarily liable under Articles 1822 and 1824 of
the Civil Code. These provisions, which are found under Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IX, Book IV of
the Civil Code on Partnership, respectively state:
Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course
of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his copartners, loss or injury is caused

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to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership
is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the partnership for everything chargeable to
the partnership under Articles 1822 and 1823. Evidently, the foregoing legal provisions pertain
to the obligations of a copartner in the event that the partnership to which he belongs is held
liable.
In this case, Buenviaje never dealt with any partnership constituted by and between Jebson and
Sps. Salonga. As previously mentioned, the subject CTS, which was the source of the obligations
relative to the completion and delivery of Unit 5, solely devolved upon the person of Jebson. As
there was no partnership privy to any obligation to which Buenviaje is a creditor, Articles 1822
and 1824 of the Civil Code do not apply. Buenviaje vs. Salonga, 805 SCRA 369, G.R. No. 216023
October 5, 2016
AGENCY
An agent is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he expressly binds
himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice of his
powers.
Article 1868 of the Civil Code states: “ART. 1868. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself
to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter.” Ace Navigation Co., Inc. vs. FGU Insurance Corporation, 674
SCRA 348, G.R. No. 171591 June 25, 2012
Article 1868 of the Civil Code states that “[b]y the contract of agency, a person binds himself to
render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter.”
Nor can it be said that a principal-agent relationship existed between BSP and the security guards
Peña and Gaddi as to make the former liable for the latter’s complained act. Article 1868 of the
Civil Code states that “[b]y the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service
or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of
the latter.” The basis for agency therefore is representation, which element is absent in the
instant case. Records show that BSP merely hired the services of AIB, which, in turn, assigned

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security guards, solely for the protection of its properties and premises. Nowhere can it be
inferred in the Guard Service Contract that AIB was appointed as an agent of BSP.
Instead, what the parties intended was a pure principal-client relationship whereby for a
consideration, AIB rendered its security services to BSP. Mamaril vs. The Boy Scout of the
Philippines, 688 SCRA 437, G.R. No. 179382 January 14, 2013
TRUST
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in
another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the
benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied.
An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust
comes into being by operation of law. Go vs. Estate of the Late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura,
763 SCRA 632, G.R. No. 211972 July 22, 2015
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or
will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust.
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or
will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust.
Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, “[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an
express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.” It is possible to create a trust
without using the word “trust” or “trustee.” Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used
does not necessarily indicate an intention to create a trust.
The question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of
relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the
relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise
characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust. Go vs. Estate of the Late Felisa Tamio
de Buenaventura, 763 SCRA 632, G.R. No. 211972 July 22, 2015

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Express trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is repudiated.
Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action for reconveyance instituted by
respondents has not yet prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule that express trusts
prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is repudiated. In this case, there was a
repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as the remaining trustee, sold the subject property
to Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997. As the complaint for reconveyance and damages was
filed by respondents on October 17, 1997, or only a few months after the sale of the subject
property to Wilson and Peter, it cannot be said that the same has prescribed. Go vs. Estate of the
Late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, 763 SCRA 632, G.R. No. 211972 July 22, 2015
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
For the contract of antichresis to be valid, Article 2134 of the Civil Code requires that the amount
of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise the contract of
antichresis shall be void.
In this case, the Heirs of Adolfo were indisputably unable to produce any document in support of
their claim that the contract between Adolfo and Bangis was an antichresis, hence, the CA
properly held that no such relationship existed between the parties. Bangis vs. Heirs of Serafin
and Salud Adolfo, 672 SCRA 468, G.R. No. 190875 June 13, 2012
Although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation,
his liability to the creditor is direct, primary and absolute; he becomes liable for the debt and
duty of another although he possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor
does he receive any benefit therefrom. The fundamental reason therefor is that a contract of
suretyship effectively binds the surety as a solidary debtor
A surety is considered in law as being the same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is
adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their liabilities are interwoven as to be
inseparable. Xxx This is provided under Article 2047 of the Civil Code which states: Article 2047.
By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation
of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so. If a person binds himself solidarily
with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of this Book shall be
observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship. Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (Formerly Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation) vs. Asia Paces Corporation, 716 SCRA 67, G.R. No. 187403 February 12, 2014; see

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also Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 760 SCRA 486, G.R. No.
187487 June 29, 2015
Article 2079 of the Civil Code, which pertinently provides that “[a]n extension granted to the
debtor by the creditor without the consent of the guarantor extinguishes the guaranty,” equally
applies to both contracts of guaranty and suretyship.
The rationale therefor was explained by the Court as follows: The theory behind Article 2079 is
that an extension of time given to the principal debtor by the creditor without the surety’s
consent would deprive the surety of his right to pay the creditor and to be immediately
subrogated to the creditor’s remedies against the principal debtor upon the maturity date. The
surety is said to be entitled to protect himself against the contingency of the principal debtor or
the indemnitors becoming insolvent during the extended period. Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the Philippines (Formerly Philippine Export and Foreign Loan
Guarantee Corporation) vs. Asia Paces Corporation, 716 SCRA 67, G.R. No. 187403 February 12,
2014
In a contract of suretyship, one lends his credit by joining in the principal debtor’s obligation so
as to render himself directly and primarily responsible with him, and without reference to the
solvency of the principal.
That CGAC’s financial standing differs from that of NSSC does not negate the order of execution
pending appeal. As the latter’s surety, CGAC is considered by law as being the same party as the
debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and their
liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. xxx Thus, execution pending appeal against NSSC
means that the same course of action is warranted against its surety, CGAC. The same reason
stands for CGAC’s other principal, Orimaco, who was determined to have permanently left the
country with his family to evade execution of any judgment against him. Centennial Guarantee
Assurance Corporation vs. Universal Motors Corporation, 737 SCRA 654, G.R. No. 189358
October 8, 2014
QUASI-CONTRACTS
Solutio Indebiti; Bank of the Philippine Islands’ (BPI’s) payment of the proceeds of the subject
check was due to a mistaken notion that such check was cleared, when in fact, it was

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dishonored due to an alteration in the amount indicated therein. Such payment on the part of
BPI to respondents was clearly made by mistake, giving rise to the quasi-contractual obligation
of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 in relation to Article 2163 of the Civil Code.
Records reveal that BPI’s payment of the proceeds of the subject check was due to a mistaken
notion that such check was cleared, when in fact, it was dishonored due to an alteration in the
amount indicated therein. Such payment on the part of BPI to respondents was clearly made by
mistake, giving rise to the quasi-contractual obligation of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 in
relation to Article 2163 of the Civil Code. Not being a loan or forbearance of money, an interest
of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the amount to be refunded and on the
damages and attorney’s fees awarded, if any, computed from the time of demand until its
satisfaction. Consequently, respondents must return to BPI the aforesaid amount, with legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of extrajudicial demand — or on
June 27, 1997, the date when BPI informed respondents of the dishonor of the subject check and
demanded the return of its proceeds — until fully paid. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs.
Mendoza, 821 SCRA 41, G.R. No. 198799 March 20, 2017
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
If two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the better
approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of titles were derived.
As held in the case of Top Management Programs Corporation v. Luis Fajardo and the Register of
Deeds of Las Piñas City, 652 SCRA 18 (2011): “if two certificates of title purport to include the
same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from
which the certificates of titles were derived.”
Having, thus, traced the roots of the parties’ respective titles supported by the records of the
Register of Deeds of Malaybalay City, the courts a quo were correct in upholding the title of the
Heirs of Adolfo as against TCT No. T-10567 of Bangis, notwithstanding its earlier issuance on
August 18, 1976 or long before the Heirs of Adolfo secured their own titles on May 26, 1998.
To paraphrase the Court’s ruling in Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 556 (1998): where two
(2) transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates, the one who holds the earlier
title may prevail only in the absence of any anomaly or irregularity in the process of its
registration, which circumstance does not obtain in this case. Bangis vs. Heirs of Serafin and
Salud Adolfo, 672 SCRA 468, G.R. No. 190875 June 13, 2012

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CIVIL LAW
Handout No. 4
No title in derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
Settled is the rule that no title in derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, even if acquisitive prescription can be appreciated
in this case, the Heirs of Bangis’ possession being in bad faith is two years shy of the requisite 30-
year uninterrupted adverse possession required under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. Bangis vs.
Heirs of Serafin and Salud Adolfo, 672 SCRA 468, G.R. No. 190875 June 13, 2012
The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not
to the improvements built thereon.
Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in
owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to
ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2)
houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties
subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national
patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect. Beumer vs. Amores, 686
SCRA 770, G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
A reconstitution of title proceeding involves only the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost
or destroyed in its original form and condition.
Notably, these findings should not be taken as an adjudication on the ownership of the subject
lands. As priorly intimated, they are but determinations of whether or not the certificate of title
sought to be reconstituted is authentic, genuine, and in force and effect at the time it was lost or
destroyed, which, based on case law, are central to resolving petitions for reconstitution of title.
Clearly, a reconstitution of title proceeding involves only the re-issuance of a new certificate of
title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. In this light, the court does not pass upon
the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed certificate, as the said matter should
be threshed out in a separate proceeding for the purpose. Luriz vs. Republic, 785 SCRA 142, G.R.
No. 208948 February 24, 2016

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CIVIL LAW
Handout No. 4
Time and again, it has been held that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral
attack and that the issue of the validity of title can only be assailed in an action expressly
instituted for such purpose.
It should be pointed out that petitioners’ attack on the validity of respondent’s Torrens title in
Civil Case No. S-606 by claiming that their father Victor became the owner of the subject property
by virtue of the CLT issued to him in 1978 constitutes a collateral attack on said title. It is an attack
incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the property in an accion publiciana, not
in a direct action aimed at impugning the validity of the judgment granting the title.
Hence, any declaration the CA may have made in its October 17, 2003 Decision stemming from
Civil Case No. S-606 cannot affect respondent’s ownership over the property nor nullify his
Torrens title, as the adjudication was only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession.
Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Vallecer, 848 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 227124 December 6, 2017
TORTS AND DAMAGES
Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting
damage; Joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
Both Transworld and Ruks were fully aware that the foundation for the former’s billboard was
weak; yet, neither of them took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely relied on
each other’s word that repairs would be done to such foundation, but none was done at all.
Clearly, the foregoing circumstances show that both Transworld and Ruks are guilty of negligence
in the construction of the former’s billboard, and perforce, should be held liable for its collapse
and the resulting damage to Adworld’s billboard structure. As joint tortfeasors, therefore, they
are solidarily liable to Adworld. Verily, “[j]oint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or
approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are also referred to as those who act
together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a
single injury. Ruks Konsult and Construction vs. Adworld Sign and Advertising Corporation, 746
SCRA 622, G.R. No. 204866 January 21, 2015

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2019 BAR REVIEW

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

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A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

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Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a

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Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Affidavit of Reappearance; The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the

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Conditions for a Bigamous Subsequent Marriage to be Considered Valid.

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If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived

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Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

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The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.

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Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of

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Buyer in Good Faith

Legal Easement Pertaining to the Natural Drainage of Lands

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Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

Conversely, the principle of substantial performance is inappropriate when the incomplete

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For a stipulation pour autrui to be appreciated, it is indispensable that there be a stipulation

Requisites of a Stipulation Pour Autrui

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SALES AND LEASE

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Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

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