Criminal Law Jurisprudence 2019 by Prof. Modesto Ticman, Jr.

JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™
CRIMINAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE

Prepared by: Atty. Modesto A. Ticman, Jr.
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
BOOK ONE
1. Construction of Penal Laws. Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be
preferred.1
2. Prospective application. Penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they
acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused.2
3. Motive, not essential; exceptions. Motive pertains to the reason which prompts the
accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. It is not an essential element of a crime and need
not be proven by the State in criminal prosecutions. Hence, proof of motive alone will not establish guilt
in the same way that the absence thereof cannot establish innocence.3
3.1 Although the general rule is that motive is not essential to a conviction especially where
the identity of the assailant is duly established by other competent evidence or is not disputed, the
absence of such motive is important in ascertaining the truth as between two antagonistic theories or
versions of the killing. Proof as to motive is essential when the evidence on the commission of the
crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive.4
4. Alibi as a defense. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the witnesses. To be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense
of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the person charged with the
crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be
in two places at the same time.5
5. Classification of felonies according to their means of execution. These two types

of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the
offender –
―In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the
language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender,
in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to
another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The
injury caused by the offender to another person is ―unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.‖6
1
People vs. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, 12 March 2018.
2
Valeroso vs. People, 546 SCRA 450 (2008).
3
People vs. Pentecostes, G.R. No. 226158, 08 November 2017.
4
Ubales vs. People, 520 SCRA 251 (2008).
5
see People vs. Ambatang, G.R. No. 205855, 29 March 2017.
6
Calimutan vs. People, 482 SCRA 47 (2006).
Criminal Law Jurisprudence by Prof. Modesto A.Ticman, Jr. for Jurists Bar Review Center™. © 2019 by Jurists Review Center Inc.
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6. Mala in se and mala prohibita, distinguished. The rule is that in acts mala in se, the
intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is
illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is
considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself.
6.1 A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however,
there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended. Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical
malversation.7
6.2 When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even
if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the
other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.8
6.3 The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The act of hazing itself is
not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited.
Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of
good faith cannot be raised in its prosecution.9
7. Mistake of fact. A "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would

have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. A proper invocation of this
defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c)
that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the
statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.10
8. How criminal liability may be incurred. A person committing a felony is criminally

liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. ―Natural‖ refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human
life or events, while ―logical‖ means that there is a rational connection between the act of the accused
and the resulting injury or damage.11
8.1 When death results, even if there was no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not just physical
injuries, since with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results
following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. Accordingly,
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
―Art. 4. Criminal liability – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
―1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.‖12
9. Proximate cause; Efficient intervening cause. Proximate cause is defined as that

cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.13
9.1 The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when: (a) there
is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active
7
Dungo vs. People, 761 SCRA 375 (2015)
8
Mabunot vs. People, G.R. No. 204659, 19 September 2016.
9
Dungo vs. People, supra note 7.
10
Yapyuco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, 674 SCRA 420 (2012).
11
Quinto vs. Andres, 453 SCRA 511 (2005).
12
Ng vs. People, 619 SCRA 219 (2010).
13
Dumayag vs. People, 686 SCRA 347 (2012).
force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or (b) the resulting
injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.
9.2 The ―cause and effect‖ relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing
conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim; the predisposition of the offended party; the
physical condition of the offended party; or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the
negligence or fault of the doctors; or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus,
pulmonary infection or gangrene.14
10. Impossible crimes. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act
performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent;
[and] (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual15, and (4) that the act performed should not constitute a violation of another
provision of the Revised Penal Code.16
11. Stages of Execution; Attempted, Frustrated and Consummated. In homicide cases,

the rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is
only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have
brought about death.17 Conversely, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if
the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical
intervention or attendance.18
11.1 Whether attempted/frustrated homicide or Physical Injuries. In order to determine

whether the crime committed is attempted or frustrated parricide, murder or homicide, or only physical
injuries, the crucial points to consider are: a) whether the injury sustained by the victim was fatal, and
b) whether there was intent to kill on the part of the accused. If there was no intent to kill on the part of
the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be
serious, less serious or slight physical injury.19
11.2 In Rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for
there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual
organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.20
11.3 No frustrated stage in Rape. From the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of
his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential.
Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Necessarily, rape is attempted if
there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were performed.21
11.4 No frustrated stage in Theft. Theft is either attempted or consummated. Theft is

already ―produced‖ upon the ―taking of personal property of another without the latter‘s consent.‖ There
was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the
offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already constituted apoderamiento.22
12. Conspiracy. Conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a
penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
14
Quinto vs. Andres, supra note 11.
15
Jacinto vs. People, 592 SCRA 426 (2009).
16
p. 84, L.B. Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book 1, 18 th ed., (2012)
17
Olalia vs. People, 562 SCRA 723 (2008).
18
People vs. Caballero, 400 SCRA 424 (2003)
19
Etino vs. People, G.R. No. 206632, 14 February 2018
20
Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 382 SCRA 182 (2002).
21
People vs. Aca-ac, 357 SCRA 373 (2001).
22
Valenzuela vs. People, 525 SCRA 306 (2007).
12.1 How proved. A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It
must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself.23 Mere
suspicion, speculation, relationship, association, and companionship do not prove conspiracy.24 Mere
knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime, with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy transcends companionship.25 Mere
presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish
conspiracy.26
12.2 Implied conspiracy. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be
established by acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from
which it may be logically inferred the existence of a common purpose to commit the same.27
12.3 Conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability. Once conspiracy is

established, all the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of
their participation. The guilt of one is the guilt of all.28
12.4 Conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the information. Absence of a
particular statement in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any definitive act
constituting conspiracy renders the indictment insufficient to hold one accused liable for the individual
acts of his co-accused. Thus, each of them would be held accountable only for their respective
participation in the commission of the offense.29
12.5 Confederation, Not an Aggravating Circumstance. Confederation is not enumerated

as an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like conspiracy which
must be alleged in and not merely inferred from the information, confederation is but a mode of
incurring criminal liability and may not be considered criminal in itself unless specifically provided by
law.30
13. Justifying Circumstances; Self-defense. The elements of self-defense are: (1) that the
victim has committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of
the person claiming self-defense; (2) that there be reasonable necessity in the means employed to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming
self-defense be not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim‘s aggression.31
13.1 Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict
physical injury upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful
aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to
cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which
puts the defendant‘s life in real peril.32
13.2 Unlawful aggression, an indispensable requisite. There can be no self-defense,

complete or incomplete unless there is clear and convincing proof of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim.33
23
People vs. Mapalo, 514 SCRA 689 (2007).
24
People vs. Manijas, 391 SCRA 731 (2002).
25
People vs. Compo, 358 SCRA 266 (2001).
26
People vs. Gonzales, 357 SCRA 460 (2001).
27
People vs. Bulan, 459 SCRA 550 (2005)
28
People vs. Yongco, 731 SCRA 544 (2014)
29
People vs. Galvez, 519 SCRA 529 (2007).
30
People vs. Baroy, 382 SCRA 56 (2002)
31
People vs. Enfectana, 381 SCRA 359 (2002).
32
Manaban vs. CA, 494 SCRA 503 (2006).
33
Quintos vs. People, 735 SCRA 16 (2014).
13.3 When an unlawful aggression has ceased to exist, the one making a defense has no
right to kill or injure the former aggressor.34 An act of aggression, when its author does not persist in his
purpose, or when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of his attack is no longer in
peril, is not unlawful aggression warranting self-defense.35 Aggression, if not continuous, does not
constitute aggression warranting self-defense.36
13.4 Self-defense and retaliation, distinguished. In retaliation, the inceptual unlawful

aggression had already ceased when the accused attacked him. In self-defense, the unlawful
aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the person making the
defense.37 In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the
accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured
by the accused.38
13.5 Reasonable necessity of the means employed. The second element of self-defense
demands that the means employed to neutralize the unlawful aggression are reasonable and
necessary. It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense.39 What the law requires is a rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct more than reason, that moves or
impels the defense; and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but upon
the imminent danger of such injury.40
13.6 Lack of Sufficient Provocation. The provocation must be sufficient to excite one to
commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede the act. This third requisite of self-defense is
present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was
given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the
person defending himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself,
it was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.41
13.7 Defense of Relatives. In order that this defense is to be appreciated, the following
requisites must concur, namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the
person attacked, that the person making the defense took no part in the provocation.42
13.8 Defense of Strangers. In order to successfully put up this defense an accused must
show (1) the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) that the accused has not been induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.43
13.9 Avoidance of Greater Evil. To successfully invoke avoidance of greater evil as a

justifying circumstance, the infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may
not befall one‘s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible
prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to
another or, if there is no such other way but the damage to another may be minimized while avoiding
an evil or injury to one‘s self, then such course should be taken.44
34
People vs. San Juan, 386 SCRA 400 (2002).
35
People vs. Geneblazo, 361 SCRA 572 (2001).
36
Sanchez vs. People, 510 SCRA 365 (2006).
37
People vs. Gallego, 406 SCRA 6 (2003).
38
People vs. Advincula, G.R. No. 218108, 11April 2018.
39
People vs. Dagani, 499 SCRA 64 (2006).
40
Velasquez vs. People, G.R. No. 195021, 15 March 2017
41
Urbano vs. People, 576 SCRA 826 (2009).
42
Medina vs. People, 713 SCRA 311 (2014).
43
People vs. Dijan, 383 SCRA 15 (2002).
44
People vs. Punzalan, 687 SCRA 687 (2012).
13.10 The evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be
avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have
been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. 45
13.11 Fulfillment of a Lawful Duty; Requisites. (a) the accused acted in the performance of
his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed
is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right
or office.46
13.12 Obedience to an Order. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following
requisites must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for
some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.47
14. Exempting Circumstances. For one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting
circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which
constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. Therefore, while there is a
crime committed, no criminal liability attaches.48
14.1 Insanity. An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a
lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he
shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he
may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but
rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution.49
14.2 Minority. Under the ―Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006‖ (R.A. No. 9344), a child
in conflict with the law fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted with discernment. Persons below
eighteen years of age shall be exempt from criminal prosecution for the crime of prostitution under
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy under PD No. 1563, and sniffing rugby under PD
No. 1619.
14.3 Accident. For this to be properly appreciated, the following requisites must concur: (1)
that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is caused by mere
accident; and (3) that there was no fault or intent on his part to cause the injury.
14.4 Uncontrollable Fear. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must
establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and
(3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to
prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough.50 The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity
for the accused to escape.51
14.5 Irresistible Force. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the
actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is
not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for
45
Ty vs. People, 439 SCRA 220 (2004).
46
Yapyuco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, 674 SCRA 420 (2012).
47
Ambil vs. Sandiganbayan, 653 SCRA 576 (2011)
48
Ortega vs. People, 562 SCRA 450 (2008).
49
People vs. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, 04 September 2017.
50
People vs. Anticamara, 651 SCRA 489 (2011).
51
People vs. Baron, 621 SCRA 646 (2010).
escape or self-defense in equal combat.52 A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future
injury, is insufficient.53
15. Entrapment vs. Instigation. There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and
schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There
is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two
lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the
criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer
conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it
into execution.54 The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation
does.55
16. Mitigating Circumstances; Incomplete Self-defense. In order that it may be

successfully appreciated (as a privileged mitigating circumstance), it is necessary that a majority of the
requirements of self-defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other two requisite suffices
to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense,
complete or incomplete, because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of
defense will have no basis.56
16.1 Minority as a Mitigating Circumstance. A child, above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen years of age, who, at the time of the commission of the crime has acted with discernment shall
be entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. A minor is fifteen (15) years of age on
the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birth date. In A.M. No. 02-l-18-SC dated November 24,
2009, the Supreme Court likewise defined the age of criminal responsibility as the age when a child,
fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old or above but below eighteen (18) years of age, commits an
offense with discernment.57
16.2 Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong. The lack of ―intent‖ to commit a wrong
so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the
injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted.58
16.3 Sufficient Provocation/Threats. For this to be appreciated, the following elements

must concur: (1) That the provocation or threat must be sufficient or proportionate to the crime
committed and adequate to arouse one to its commission; (2) That the provocation or threat must
originate from the offended party; and (3) That the provocation must be immediate to the commission of
the crime by the person provoked.59
16.4 Vindication of Grave Offense. For such to be credited, the following requisites must
be satisfied: (1) that there be a grave offense done to the one committing the felony, his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity
within the same degrees; and (2) that the felony is committed in vindication of such grave offense.60
16.5 Passion or Obfuscation. To be entitled to this mitigating circumstance, the following

elements must be present: (1) There should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind; (2) the act that produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission
of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal
52
People vs. Dequina, 640 SCRA 111 (2011)
53
People vs. Licayan, G.R. No. 203961, 29 July 2015
54
Chang vs. People, 496 SCRA 321 (2006)
55
People vs. Sta. Maria, 519 SCRA 621 (2007)
56
People vs. Court of Appeals and Tangan, 352 SCRA 599 (2001).
57
People vs. Deliola, G.R. No. 200157, 31 August 2016.
58
People vs. Callet, 382 SCRA 43 (2002).
59
People vs. Beltran, 503 SCRA 715 (2006)
60
Napone vs. People, G.R. No. 193085, 29 November 2017.
equanimity61; and that (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a
spirit of lawlessness or revenge.62
16.6 Provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances. It
is settled that if these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together
as one mitigating circumstance.63
16.7 Voluntary Surrender. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following
elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders
himself to a person in authority or to the latter‘s agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary.
16.8 Filing of Information/issuance of Arrest Warrant. The mere filing of an information

and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender involuntary.
Notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the
mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act
of giving himself up.64
16.9 Confession of guilt. To be entitled to such mitigating circumstance, the following

requirements must concur: (1) the accused spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the confession of
guilt was made in open court, that is, before a competent court trying the case; [and] (3) the confession
of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution[.]65 and that the accused
must have pleaded guilty to the offense charged.66
16.10 Restitution, a mitigating circumstance analogous to Voluntary surrender and

Confession of guilt. Although restitution is akin to voluntary surrender, restitution should be treated
as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused when the two circumstances are present
in a case, which is similar to instances where voluntary surrender and plea of guilty are both present
even though the two mitigating circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code. Considering that restitution is also tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part
of the accused, it is proper to consider it as a separate mitigating circumstance in favor of the
accused.‖67
17. Aggravating Circumstances; Advantage taken of public position. To appreciate this

aggravating circumstance, the public officer must use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which his
office gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented
in the inquiry ―Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime?‖68
17.1 In Contempt of or With Insult to Public Authorities. The requisites of this

circumstance are: (1) the public authority is engaged in the discharge of his duties and (2) he is not
the person against whom the crime is committed. None of these circumstances are present in this
case.69
17.2 Disregard of Age or Sex. There must be a showing that the malefactor deliberately
intended to offend or insult the age, rank or sex of the victim.
17.3 Dwelling. This is aggravating if the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended
party and the latter has not given provocation. Dwelling may mean temporary dwelling and that it may
be aggravating even though the victim was not the owner of the house where the crime was
61
People vs. Cuasay, 569 SCRA 870 (2008).
62
People vs. Gonzalez, 359 SCRA 220 (2001).
63
Romera vs. People, 434 SCRA 467 (2004).
64
De Vera vs. De Vera, 584 SCRA 506 (2009).
65
People vs. Montinola, 360 SCRA 631 (2001).
66
People vs. Dawaton, 389 SCRA 277 (2002).
67
Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, 672 SCRA 270 (2012).
68
People vs. Villamor, 373 SCRA 254 (2002).
69
People vs. De Mesa, 354 SCRA 397 (2001
committed[.]70 [B]e he a lessee, a boarder, or a bedspacer, the place is his home, the sanctity of which
the law seeks to protect.71
17.4 When a crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not
given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. Provocation in the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c)
immediate to the commission of the crime.72
17.5 Dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the abode
of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery with
homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the sanctity of the
victim's domicile.73
17.6 Abuse of confidence. It is essential to show that the confidence between the parties
must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for
him to commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the
crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party‘s belief that the former would not abuse said
confidence.74
17.7 Nighttime, band or uninhabited place. By and of itself, it is not an aggravating

circumstance. It becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the offender; or (2) it is
taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender‘s
immunity from capture.75
17.8 Aid of armed men. In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices only. They must
not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused,
otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators.76
17.9 Recidivism. A recidivist as "one who, at the time of his trial for one crime shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code."
To prove recidivism, it is necessary to allege the same in the information and to attach thereto certified
copies of the sentences rendered against the accused.77
17.10 Reiteracion. Reiteracion or habituality is present when the accused has been
previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that
attached by law to the second offense or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter
penalty.78
17.11 Evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following

requisites must be shown: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between such a determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act79 and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of the will if he
desired to hearken to its warning.80
70
People vs. Melendres, 402 SCRA 279 (2003).
71
People vs. Dela Torre, 373 SCRA 104 (2002).
72
People vs. Rios, 333 SCRA 823 (2000).
73
People vs. Arizobal, 348 SCRA 143 (2000).
74
People vs. Arrojado, 350 SCRA 679 (2001).
75
People vs. Silva, 387 SCRA 77 (2002).
76
People vs. Enojas, 718 SCRA 313 (2014).
77
People vs. Dacillo, 427 SCRA 528 (2004)
78
People vs. Cajara, 341 SCRA 192 (2000).
79
People vs. Dimacuha, G.R. No. 191060, 02 February 2015.
80
People vs. Cirbeto, G.R. No. 231359, 08 February 2018
17.12 The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. There is no evident premeditation when the attack;
was the result of rising tempers or made in the heat of anger.81
17.13 Craft, Fraud or Disguise. Craft involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of
the offender. When there is a direct inducement by insidious words or machinations, fraud is present. 82
In disguise, what is important is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused.83
17.14 Abuse of Superior Strength. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously
advantageous to the aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force
excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The
appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties.84
17.15 Mere superiority in number would not necessarily indicate the attendance of abuse of
superior strength. The prosecution should still prove that the assailants purposely used excessive force
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the persons attacked.85
17.16 Treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.86 For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the employment of means
of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.87
17.17 The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the
person of the victim, without the slightest provocation on the part of the latter.88
17.18 In treachery, the mode of attack must be consciously adopted. This means that the
accused must make some preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the execution
of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. The
mode of attack, therefore, must be planned by the offender, and must not spring from the unexpected
turn of events. The meeting between appellant‘s group and the victim was merely by chance and it
could not be said that the mode of attack could have been planned. A killing done at the spur of the
moment is not treacherous.89
17.19 Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or
acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim were held to
be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal.90
17.20 Chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment, or
those that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery, for lack of
opportunity of the accused deliberately to employ a treacherous mode of attack.91
81
People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 224498, 11 January 2018.
82
People vs. Labuguen, 337 SCRA 488 (2000).
83
People vs. Feliciano, 724 SCRA 148 (2014).
84
People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 226475, 13 March 2017.
85
People vs. Amodia, 571 SCRA 444 (2008).
86
Par. 16, Art. 14, RPC.
87
People vs. Aviles, 541 SCRA 265 (2007).
88
People vs. Hormina, 420 SCRA 102 (2004).
89
People vs. Calago, 381 SCRA 448 (2002).
90
People vs. Gonzalez, 359 SCRA 220 (2001).
91
People vs. Caratao, 403 SCRA 482 (2003).
17.21 Ignominy. The aggravating circumstance of ignominy shall be taken into account if
means are employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the
offense; or if the crime was committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the
victim, that is, add to her moral suffering.92 Where the accused in committing the rape used not only
the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e.
entry from behind, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the commission thereof.93
17.22 Use of motor vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the
same was perpetrated by means thereof.94
17.23 Cruelty. For cruelty to exist, there must be proof showing that the accused delighted in
making their victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and moral pain in the
consummation of the criminal act.95 The crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply because the victim
sustained ten stab wounds, three of which were fatal. For cruelty to be considered as an aggravating
circumstance, there must be proof that, in inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the perpetrator
intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of the victim. The number of wounds inflicted on the
victim is not proof of cruelty.96
18. Alternative Circumstances; Intoxication. The general rule is that intoxication may be
considered either as aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the
commission of the crime.97 The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a
mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same
is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or
intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.98
18.1 Relationship. In order that the alternative circumstance of relationship may be taken
into consideration in the imposition of the proper penalty, the offended party must either be the (a)
spouse, (b) ascendant, (c) descendant, (d) legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or (e) relative
by affinity in the same degree, of the offender. The rule is that relationship is aggravating in crimes
against persons as when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the same level such as
killing a brother.99
19. Persons criminally liable; Principals. The principals in the commission of a crime are
(1) those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; (2) those who directly force or induce others
to commit it; and (3) those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it could not have been accomplished.100
19.1 Principal by Direct Participation. Two or more persons taking part in the commission
of a crime are considered principals by direct participation if the following requisites are present: (a)
they participated in the criminal resolution, and (2) they carried out their plan and personally took part
in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. Two or more persons are said to have
participated in the criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the time of the commission of the
crime.101
19.2 Criminal liability as a principal even if there is no conspiracy among the offenders.
Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held
criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or
92
People vs. Bumidang, 346 SCRA 807 (2000).
93
People vs. Siao, 327 SCRA 269 (2000).
94
People vs. Enguito, 326 SCRA 508 (2000).
95
People vs. Catian, 374 SCRA 514 (2002).
96
Simangan vs. People, 434 SCRA 38 (2004).
97
Art. 15. RPC; People vs. Bernal, 388 SCRA 211 (2002)
98
People vs. Rebucan, 654 SCRA 726 (2011)
99
People vs. Marcos, 349 SCRA 537 (2001).
100
People vs. Ragundiaz, 334 SCRA 193 (2001).
101
People vs. Dacillo, 427 SCRA 528 (2004).
immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim. It is sufficient if the injuries cooperated in
bringing about the victim‘s death. The offenders are criminally liable for the same crime by reason of
their individual and separate overt criminal acts. Absent conspiracy between two or more offenders,
they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the death of the victim as principals by direct
participation.102
19.3 Principal by inducement. The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement

requires (1) that the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime;
and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor.103
19.4 Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or agreement for
consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the
principal by direct participation.
19.5 Accomplices. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following
requisites must concur: (1) that there be community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in
the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done
by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.104
19.6 Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct
participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the
accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should
be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its
accomplishment. However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt
acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely
an accomplice.105
19.7 Conspirators distinguished from Accomplices. Conspirators and accomplices have

one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the
criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices
come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to
cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely
concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to
the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are
merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.106
19.8 Accessories. An accessory is one who had knowledge of the commission of the crime
and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took part subsequent to its
commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting oneself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects
of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof,
in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the
offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory, the
following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the crime and (2) subsequent
participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes.107
20. Corpus Delicti. Corpus delicti is defined as the body, foundation or substance upon
which a crime has been committed, e.g. the corpse of a murdered man. It refers to the fact that a
102
People vs. Cabareño, 349 SCRA 297 (2001).
103
Ambagan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, 14 October 2015.
104
Napone vs. People, G.R. No. 193085, 29 November 2017.
105
People vs. Pilola, 405 SCRA 134 (2003).
106
People vs. Salvador, 695 SCRA 660 (2013).
107
People vs. Tolentino, 380 SCRA 171 (2002)
crime has been actually committed. Corpus delicti does not refer to the autopsy report evidencing the
nature of the wounds sustained by the victim nor the testimony of the physician who conducted the
autopsy or medical examination. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been
proved, for example, a man has died and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act.
21. Pardon by the offended party; Recantation/Affidavit of Desistance, not a ground to

dismiss criminal action. A criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State
belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes. By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right
or absolute privilege to decide whether the criminal charge should proceed, because the case was
already filed and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.108
21.1 A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. The
Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an
affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves
only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be secured
from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration.109
21.2 Exception. It is only where there exist special circumstances which, when coupled with
the desistance or retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can a
retraction be considered and upheld. An affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to
buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal.110
22. Life imprisonment vs. Reclusion perpetua. The penalty of life imprisonment is not the
same as reclusion perpetua. They are distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties. First,
―life imprisonment‖ is imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua
is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, ―life imprisonment‖ does not carry with it any
accessory penalty. Reclusion perpetua has accessory penalties. Third, ―life imprisonment‖ does not
appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at
least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period
thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.111
22.1 Reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty. Reclusion perpetua remains to be an

indivisible penalty and, when it is the prescribed penalty, should be imposed in its entirety, i.e.,
reclusion perpetua sans a fixed period for its duration, regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime. In prescribing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, its duration in years, in fine, need not be specified.112 Since reclusion perpetua is
an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or maximum periods. It is imposed in its entirety
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of
the crime.113
23. Fine as a penalty. Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
10951, now reads as follows:
―ART. 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty.— A fine, whether imposed
as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it
exceeds One million two hundred thousand (₱1,200,000); a correctional penalty, if it
does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but is not less
than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000); and a light penalty, if it be less than Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000).‖
108
People vs. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647 (2005).
109
People vs. Lamsen, 709 SCRA 522 (2013).
110
Adlawan vs. People, G.R. No. 197645, 04 April 2018.
111
People vs. Latupan, 360 SCRA 60 (2001).
112
People vs. Zacarias, 375 SCRA 278 (2002).
113
People vs. Ramirez, 356 SCRA 595 (2001).
24. Subsidiary Imprisonment. Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 10159, reads in part:
―Art. 39. Subsidiary Penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to meet
the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a
subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the
highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of
judgment of conviction by the trial court, subject to the following rules: xxx‖
25. Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly stated in the

Judgment. The accused cannot be legally compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency if it is not stated in the judgment. It is imposed upon the accused and served by him in lieu of
the fine which he fails to pay on account of insolvency. There is not a single provision in the Code from
which it may be logically inferred that an accused may automatically be made to serve subsidiary
imprisonment in a case where he has been sentenced merely to pay a fine and has been found to be
insolvent.114
26. Complex crimes. A complex crime is only one crime. Although two or more crimes are
actually committed, there is only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the
offender when it comes to complex crimes. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the
commission of a complex crime.115
26.1 Complex crime has two (2) kinds. The first is known as compound crime, or when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is known as complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.116 The phrase "necessary
means" does not mean indispensable; otherwise, the offense as a "necessary means" to commit
another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.117
26.2 Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts
done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a
single complex offense.118
26.3 In Quasi-delicts, light felonies are not treated and punished as offenses separate
from grave and less grave felonies. Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single
charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. There shall be no splitting of charges
under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same court. (Ivler vs. San Pedro, 635
SCRA 191 [2010]).
26.4 Forcible Abduction with Rape. There can only be one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the
subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction
with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the forcible abduction.119
26.5 No complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of private document. As there is

no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is important to ascertain whether
the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of
a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is
falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper
crime to be charged is estafa.120
114
People vs. Alapan, G.R. No. 199527, 10 January 2018
115
People vs. Bernardo, 697 SCRA 121 (2013).
116
People vs. Elarcosa, 622 SCRA 417 (2010).
117
David vs. People, G.R. No. 208320, 19 August 2015.
118
People vs. Sanidad, 402 SCRA 381 (2003).
119
People vs. Garcia, 378 SCRA 266 (2002).
120
Batulanon vs. People, 502 SCRA 35 (2006).
26.6 Special Complex Crimes; as distinguished from complex crimes. A special complex
crime is composed of two or more crimes but is treated by law as a single indivisible and unique
offense for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty
provided by law, and is to be distinguished from a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code.121 The composite crime and the complex or compound crime are really distinct
and different. The composition of the offenses in the composite crime is fixed by law, but the
combination of the offenses in a complex or compound crime is not specified but generalized, that is,
grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other. In the
composite crime, the penalty for the combination of crimes is specific, but the penalty in the complex or
compound crime is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum
period. A light felony that accompanies the commission of the complex or compound crime may be
subject to a separate information, but the light felony that accompanies the composite crime is
absorbed.122
27. Total extinction of criminal liability; Death of convict; Its Implications with Regard
to his Criminal and Civil Liabilities. In People v. Bayotas, the Supreme Court made the following
pronouncements:
―1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, ‗the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.‘‖
―2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
(the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx xxx xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
―3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
―4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on a possible privation of right by prescription.‖123
27.1 Prescription of offenses punishable under the RPC. Under Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, the period of prescription shall ―commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. In People v. Reyes, it was held that
registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its
121
People vs. Esugon, G.R. No. 185244, 22 June 2015.
122
People vs. Salga, G.R. No. 233334, 23 July 2018.
123
People vs. Toukyo, G.R. No. 225593, 20 March 2017.
contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with
knowledge of what it contains.124
27.2. The filing of complaint with prosecutor‘s office interrupts the running of period of
prescription of offense charged.125
27.3 Prescription of offenses punishable under Special Laws. Under Section 2 (of Act
No. 3326, as amended), there are two modes of determining the reckoning point when prescription of
an offense runs. The first, to the effect that prescription shall "run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law," is the general rule. The fact that any aggrieved person entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises does not prevent the running of
the prescriptive period. The second mode is an exception to the first, and is otherwise known as the
discovery rule. The discovery rule, which is also known as the blameless ignorance doctrine, stipulates
that the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will
support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations
where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of
action.126
27.4 Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22
merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a
fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the
commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof.127
27.5 Prescription of offenses punishable by ordinances or covered by the Rules of

Summary Procedure. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.128
27.6 Prescription of penalties. It shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the
service of his sentence. Evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have
been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence. ―Escape‖ in legal
parlance means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. One who has not been
committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.129 The prescription of penalties found
in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and
are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of penalties
begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000
and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his service, the period
for prescription never began.130
27.7 Pardon vs. Amnesty. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no
notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of
Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political
offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of
which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it
does ‗not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,‘ and it ‗in no case exempts the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence‘ (Article 36, Revised Penal Code).
124
Recebido vs. People, 346 SCRA 881 (2000).
125
Brillante vs. Court of Appeals, 440 SCRA 541 (2004).
126
Del Rosario vs. People, G.R. No. 199930, 27 June 2018.
127
Panaguiton, Jr. vs. Department of Justice, 571 SCRA 549 (2008)
128
Jadewell Parking Systems vs. Lidua, 706 SCRA 724 (2013)
129
Del Castillo vs. Torrecampo and People, 394 SCRA 221 (2002).
130
Pangan vs. Gatbalite, 449 SCRA 144 (2005).
While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.131
28. Civil liability arising from crimes; Subsidiary civil liability of employers. This
liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. However, before
execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose
of 1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind
of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the
offense in the discharge of his duties not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of
such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent.132
28.1 Employer, not a party to criminal case filed against its employee. With regard to the
subsidiary liability of employers, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be
viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latter‘s lawyers, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only
defend the accused.133
28.2 Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense on the part
of the employer and may not free the latter from subsidiary liability for the employee‘s civil liability in a
criminal action. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability – Articles 102 and 103
– are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer.134
BOOK TWO
29. Arbitrary Detention. It is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal
grounds, detains a person. The elements of the crime are: [1] That the offender is a public officer or
employee; [2] That he detains a person; and [3] That the detention is without legal grounds.
29.1 It is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict his
freedom of locomotion. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of
the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own
actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents
and purposes, detained against his will.135
29.2 The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical
restraint, is fear.136
30. Rebellion. The political motivation for the crime must be shown in order to justify finding
the crime committed to be rebellion.137
30.1 One can be convicted only of rebellion where the murders, robberies and kidnapping
were committed as a means to or furtherance of rebellion. Corollarily, offenses which were not
131
People vs. Patriarca, 341 SCRA 464 (2000).
132
Basilio vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 341 (2000).
133
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. People, 427 SCRA 526 (2004).
134
Pangonorom and MMTC vs. People, 455 SCRA 211 (2005).
135
Astorga vs. People, 412 SCRA 512 (2003).
136
Astorga vs. People, 437 SCRA 152 (2004).
137
People vs. Silongan, 401 SCRA 459 (2003).
committed in furtherance of the rebellion, but for personal reasons or other motives, are to be punished
separately even if committed simultaneously with the rebellious acts.138
31. Direct Assault. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two
ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation
for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;
and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.139
31.1 When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in authority for that
matter, there arises the complex crime of Direct Assault with murder or homicide.140
32. Illegal possession and use of bank notes. The elements of the said crime are: (1)
that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any
instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by
another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and
(3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.141
32.1 Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a
criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be
with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes.142
33. Usurpation of authority and Offical functions. There are two ways of committing this
crime: first, by knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of
any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or second,
under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public
officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being
lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter act
constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.143
34. Falsification of Documents. What is punished in falsification of a public document is

the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it. Generally,
the elements of Article 171 are: 1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he
takes advantage of his official position; and 3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of the
ways it is done. On the other hand, the elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1,
Article 172 are: 1) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position; 2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated
in Article 171; and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.144
35.1 The offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he
has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he
has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.145
35.2 Any person in possession of the forged document is presumed to be the author thereof,
despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery. More especially, if he is the
only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is
presumed that he is the material author of the falsification.146
138
People vs. Oliva, 341 SCRA 78 (2001).
139
People vs. Vidal, G.R. No. 229678, 20 June 2018.
140
People vs. Vidal, ibid.
141
Rimando vs. People, G.R. No. 229701, 29 November 2017.
142
Clemente vs. People, 652 SCRA 382 (2011).
143
Ruzol vs. Sandiganbayan, 696 SCRA742 (2013).
144
Guillergan vs. People, 641 SCRA 511 (2011).
145
People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 197953, 05 August 2015.
146
Recebido vs. People, 346 SCRA 881 (2000).
35.3 Falsification committed by public officers by causing it to appear that persons
have participated in an act or a proceeding. Its elements are: (1) that the offender is a public officer,
employee or notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; (3) that he falsifies a
document by causing it to appear that a person or persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate.147
35.4 Falsification by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. This kind of

falsification requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false. 148 "Legal
obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.149
35.5 Falsification by making alteration. It elements are: (1) that there be an alteration
(change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document; (2) that it was made on a genuine document; (3)
that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and (4) that the changes
made the document speak something false. When these are committed by a private individual on a
private document the violation would fall under paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there
must be, in addition to the aforesaid elements, independent evidence of damage or intention to cause
the same to a third person.150
35.6 Falsification by private individuals. This refers to falsification by a private individual or

a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private or
commercial documents. Its elements are: [1] that the offender is a private individual or a public officer
or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; [2] that he committed any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171; and [3] that the falsification was committed in a public, official or
commercial document.151
35.7 Falsification of public or official document or commercial document vs.

Falsification of a private document. Falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 172 goes beyond the
elements of falsification enumerated under Article 171. The former requires additional independent
evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third person. In Article 171, damage is not an
element of the crime; but in paragraph 2 of Article 172, or falsification of a private document, damage is
an element necessary for conviction.152
35.8 The elements of "Use of Falsified Documents," are: (a) That the offender knew that a
document was falsified by another person; (b) That the false document is embraced in Art. 171 or in
any of subdivisions 1 or 2 of Art. 172; (c) That he used such document (not in judicial proceedings);
and, (d) That the use of the false document caused damage to another or at least it was used with
intent to cause such damage.153
36. Perjury. Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or
affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. The elements of the felony are: (a)
That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter;
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath; (c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood, and (d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is
required by law or made for a legal purpose.154
147
Bernardino vs. People, 506 SCRA 237 (2006).
148
Santos vs. Sandiganbayan, 347 SCRA 386 (2000).
149
Galeos vs. People, 642 SCRA 485 (2011).
150
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 477 SCRA 427 (2005).
151
Santos vs. People, 564 SCRA 60 (2008).
152
Malabanan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 186329, 02 August 2017.
153
Lumancas vs. Intas, 347 SCRA 22 (2000).
154
Union Bank vs. People, 667 SCRA 113 (2012).
36.1 Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its
truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an
adequate defense. A false statement which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is not
perjury.155
36.2 On the element of materiality, a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of the inquiry
or any fact or circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to
corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of
any witness who testifies.156
36.3 A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn
statements of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and must
show the statement to be false by other evidence than the contradicting statement.157
37. Obscene Publications. Mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to

sell, exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the law
is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of the forms
under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity. The law does not require that a person be
caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for as long as the
said materials are offered for sale, displayed or exhibited to the public.158
38. Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that
the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously,
intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held
liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is
contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment remains the law.159
39. Direct Bribery. The crime of direct bribery consists of the following elements: (1) that
the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present,
offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his
commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something
which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as
a public officer.160 The acts constituting direct bribery are: (1) by agreeing to perform, or by performing,
in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present an act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties; (2) by accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duty; or (3) by
agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which is his official duty to do, in
consideration of any gift or promise.161
40. Indirect Bribery. Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer who shall accept gifts
offered to him by reason of his office. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article
211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or
material consideration.162
41. Corruption of Public Officials. Its elements are: [1] That the offender makes offers or
promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer; and [2] That the offers or promises are made or
155
Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice, 475 SCRA 495 (2005).
156
Masangkay vs. People, 621 SCRA 231 (2010)
157
Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice, supra, note 155.
158
Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 351 (2006)
159
Diego vs. Castillo, 436 SCRA 67 (2004).
160
Balderama vs. People, 542 SCRA 423 (2008).
161
Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, 507 SCRA 258 (2006).
162
Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, ibid.
the gifts or presents are given to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer
liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.163
42. Malversation of Public Funds or Property. Malversation may be committed by

appropriating public funds or property; by taking or misappropriating the same; by consenting, or
through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to take such public funds or
property; or by being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property.164
42.1 Requisites of Malversation: [1] That the offender is a public officer; [2] That he has the
custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; [3] That the funds or
property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and, [4] That he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
them.165
42.2 In the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for conviction is proof
that the accountable officer had received the public funds and that he failed to account for the said
funds upon demand without offering a justifiable explanation for the shortage.166
42.3 Malversation through Negligence. The felony consists not only in misappropriation or
converting public funds or property to one‘s personal use but also by knowingly allowing others to make
use of or misappropriate the same. The felony may thus be committed by dolo or by culpa. The crime
is consummated and the appropriate penalty is imposed regardless of whether the mode of commission
is with intent or due to negligence.167
42.4 Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is still committed; hence, a conviction is proper. All that is necessary for a conviction is
sufficient proof that the accused accountable officer had received public funds or property, and did not
have them in his possession when demand therefor was made without any satisfactory explanation of
his failure to have them upon demand. For this purpose, direct evidence of the personal
misappropriation by the accused is unnecessary as long as he cannot satisfactorily explain the inability
to produce or any shortage in his accounts.168 A possible exception would be when the mode of
commission alleged in the particulars of the indictment is so far removed from the ultimate
categorization of the crime that it may be said due process was denied by deluding the accused into an
erroneous comprehension of the charge against him.169
42.5 An accountable public officer is one who has custody or control of public funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office.170 The name or relative importance of the office or
employment is not the controlling factor. The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the
fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to account and failed to
account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused
public officer or employee. Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or municipal government may be held
guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.171
42.6 Private individuals may be liable for malversation. A public officer who is not in
charge of public funds or property by virtue of her official position, or even a private individual, may be
liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such public officer or private individual
163
Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, 705 SCRA 459 (2013).
164
Pondevida vs. Sandiganbayan, 467 SCRA 219 (2005).
165
Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, 672 SCRA 270 (2012).
166
Venezuela vs. People, G.R. No. 205693, 14 February 2018.
167
Sarigumba vs. Sandiganbayan, 451 SCRA 533 (2005).
168
Mesina vs. People, G.R. No. 162489, 17 June 2015.
169
Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, 29 July 2015.
170
Quiñon vs. People, 389 SCRA 412 (2002).
171
Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan, 457 SCRA 301 (2005).
conspires with an accountable public officer to commit malversation or illegal use of public funds or
property.172
42.7 Presumption of misappropriation. The failure of the public officer to have duly
forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.173 An accountable officer
may thus be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the
only evidence is that there is a shortage in the officer‘s account which he has not been able to explain
satisfactorily. All that is essential is proof that the accountable officer has received public funds but that
when demand therefor is made, he is unable to satisfactorily account for the same.174
42.8 Demand is not necessary in malversation. Demand merely raises a prima facie
presumption that the missing funds have been put to personal use. The demand itself, however, is not
an element of, and is not indispensable to constitute malversation. Malversation is committed from the
very moment the accountable officer misappropriates public funds and fails to satisfactorily explain his
inability to produce the public finds he received.175
42.9 The presumption of conversion is — by its very nature — rebuttable. It is not conclusive
but disputable by satisfactory evidence to the effect that the accused did not utilize the public funds or
property for his personal use, gain or benefit.176 Because of the prima facie presumption, the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or property under his
custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for
himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the accused may be convicted therefor.177
43. Technical Malversation. The essential elements of the crime of technical malversation
are: [1] That the offender is a public officer; [2] That there is public fund or property under his
administration; [3] That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance; [4]
That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has been
appropriated by law or ordinance.178 For technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public
funds or properties had been diverted to any public use other than that provided for by law or
ordinance. To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which
they had been originally appropriated by law or ordinance.179
43.1 Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of
diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public
purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but
becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of
public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence,
malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.180
44. Parricide. It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused. 181 The key
element here is the relationship of the offender with the victim.182
172
Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan, ibid.
173
Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, 05 December 2018
174
Sarigumba vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, note 167.
175
Venezuela vs. People, supra, note 166.
176
Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan, 361 SCRA 556 (2001).
177
Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532 (2008).
178
Abdulla vs. People, 455 SCRA 78 (2005).
179
Tetangco vs. Ombudsman, 479 SCRA 249 (2006).
180
Ysidoro vs. People, 685 SCRA 637 (2012).
181
People vs. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, 09 September 2015
182
People vs. Calonge, 623 SCRA 445 (2010).
45. Death inflicted under exceptional circumstances; As an absolutory cause. By
invoking this defense, the accused waives his right to the constitutional presumption of innocence and
bears the burden of proving the following: [1] That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his
spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; [2] That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both
of them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter; and [3] That he has not
promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to
the infidelity of the other spouse.183
46. Murder. The elements of murder are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by
accused; (3) the killing is attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide.184
46.1 When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter
shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Since the use of explosives is the principal mode of
attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery
which will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.185
46.2 Outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim. The mere decapitation of the
victim‘s head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to
murder.186
47. Homicide. The crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill,
which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.187
48. Death caused/physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray; tumultuous affray,

defined. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage
in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wounded and the
author thereof cannot be ascertained. It may be a melee or free-for-all, where several persons not
comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner,
resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them.188
49. Discharge of firearm. The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a
firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person.
Though the information charged the petitioner with murder, he could be validly convicted of illegal
discharge of firearm, an offense which is necessarily included in the crime of unlawful killing of a
person.189
50. Unintentional abortion, as distinguished from Infanticide. As distinguished from

infanticide, the elements of unintentional abortion are as follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2)
that violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is
intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after
having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is necessary that the child be born alive
and be viable, that is, capable of independent existence.190
51. Intentional Mutilation. The elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262
of the Revised Penal Code are the following: 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs
183
People vs. Puedan, 388 SCRA 266 (2002).
184
People vs. Brgy. Capt. Tony Tomas, Sr., et al., 643 SCRA 530 (2011)
185
People vs. Comadre, 431 SCRA 366 (2004)
186
People vs. Whisenhunt, 386 SCRA 586 (2001).
187
Guevarra vs. People, 715 SCRA 384 (2014).
188
People vs. Unlagada, 389 SCRA 224 (2002)
189
Dado vs. People, 392 SCRA 46 (2002).
190
People vs. Paycana, 551 SCRA 657 (2008).
necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to
deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction.191
52. Slight Physical Injuries. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the
offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries.192
53. Rape. The crime of rape is committed either by sexual intercourse or by sexual assault.
Rape by sexual intercourse is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman,193
under any of the following circumstances: (a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) When the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) By means of fraudulent machination
or grave abuse of authority; and (d) When the offended party is under twelve [12] years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. Rape by sexual
assault is committed by any person who, under any of the aforestated circumstances, inserts his penis
into another person‘s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.194
53.1 Consummated rape. Rape is consummated ―by the slightest penetration of the female
organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis.‖ There need not be full and complete
penetration of the victim‘s vagina for rape to be consummated.195 Penile invasion necessarily entails
contact with the labia. Even the briefest of contacts, without laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be
rape.196
53.2 Statutory rape. Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is statutory rape. The
two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that
the woman was below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is always
rape.197 In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age
consummates the crime of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. The law
presumes that a woman of tender age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving
intelligent consent to the sexual act.198
53.3 Liability of several accused in multiple rape. In cases of multiple rape, each of the
defendants is responsible not only for the rape committed by him but also for those committed by the
others. An accused therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but also
for the other counts of rape committed by his co-accused.199
53.4 Rape through sexual assault. It is committed by inserting his penis into another
person‘s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person. It is also called "instrument or object rape", also "gender-free rape", or the narrower
"homosexual rape,"200 and that the act of sexual assault is accomplished by using force or intimidation,
among others.201
53.5 Rape by Sexual Assault is not subsumed in Rape through Sexual Intercourse. An
accused charged in the Information with rape by sexual intercourse cannot be found guilty of rape by
sexual assault, even though the latter crime was proven during trial. This is due to the substantial
191
Aguirre vs. Secretary of Justice, 547 SCRA 431 (2008).
192
Li vs. People, 427 SCRA 217 (2004)
193
People vs. Buban, 512 SCRA 500 (2007).
194
People vs. Olaybar, 412 SCRA 490 (2003).
195
People vs. Jalosjos, 369 SCRA 179 (2001).
196
People vs. Teodoro, 691 SCRA 324 (2013).
197
People vs. Perez, 575 SCRA 653 (2008).
198
People vs. Jalosjos, supra, note 195.
199
People vs. Plurad, 393 SCRA 306 (2002).
200
People vs. Gaduyon, 709 SCRA 129 (2013).
201
People vs. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, 08 August 2017.
distinctions between these two modes of rape. In view of the material differences between the two
modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa.202
53.6 Inserting a finger inside the genital of a woman is rape through sexual assault.203 The
insertion of one‘s finger into the genital or anal orifice of another person constitutes rape by sexual
assault and not merely an act of lasciviousness.204
53.7 Marital Rape. Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual
intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.205
53.8 Affidavit of Desistance in Rape Cases. The submission of an affidavit of desistance

by the victim is not a ground for the dismissal of rape case. Rape is no longer considered a private
crime as R.A. No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 has reclassified rape as a crime against persons.
Rape may now be prosecuted de officio; a complaint for rape commenced by the offended party is no
longer necessary for its prosecution. Hence, an affidavit of desistance, which may be considered as
pardon by the complaining witness, is not by itself a ground for the dismissal of a rape action over
which the court has already assumed jurisdiction.206
53.9 Forcible abduction may be absorbed in Rape. The crime of forcible abduction with
rape is a complex crime that occurs when the abductor has carnal knowledge of the abducted woman
under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Where the main objective of the culprit for the abduction of the victim of rape was to have carnal
knowledge of her, he could be convicted only of rape.207
53.10 Rape with Homicide. In a special complex crime of rape with homicide, the following
elements must concur: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman
was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the accused killed a woman. Both rape and homicide must
be established beyond reasonable doubt.208
53.11 In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason
or on occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by the accused is
still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only.209
54. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. The essence of the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the
actual deprivation of the victim‘s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.210 It includes
not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for
whatever length of time.211
54.1 The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping
202
People vs. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, 08 August 2017.
203
People vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 207815, 22 June 2015.
204
People vs. Fetalino, 525 SCRA 170 (2007).
205
People vs. Jumawan, 722 SCRA 108 (2014).
206
People vs. Bagsic, G.R. No. 218404, 13 December 2017.
207
People vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 225743, 07 June 2017.
208
People vs. Narzabal, 632 SCRA 772 (2010).
209
People vs. Laog, 658 SCRA 654 (2011).
210
People vs. Muit, 568 SCRA 251 (2008).
211
People vs. Mamantak, 560 SCRA 298 (2008).
must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three [3] days; or (b) it is committed by simulating
public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer.212
54.2 Public officer as an offender. A public officer can commit kidnapping within the
context of the Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if the detention is neither in furtherance of official
functions nor in the pursuit of authority vested in him or is not in relation to his office, but in purely
private capacity.213
54.3 In cases of kidnapping, if the person detained is a child, the question is whether there
was actual deprivation of the child's liberty, and whether it was the intention of the accused to deprive
the parents of the custody of the child.214 What is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the
victim against his or her will after the offender is able to take the victim in his custody. In short, the
carrying away of the victim in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention can either be made
forcibly or fraudulently.215
54.4 If the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element is no
longer necessary.216
54.5 Ransom. The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an
individual has been in any manner deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person. Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the
perpetrators is of no moment.217 Ransom may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may
accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victim‘s release.218 The amount of and purpose for the
ransom is immaterial.219
54.6 Kidnapping with Homicide. Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267,
as amended by RA No. 7659.‘‖220
54.7 Kidnapping with Rape. When the victim is raped, this gives rise to a special complex
crime wherein the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses.
54.8 No matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these
composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these
acts with only one single penalty.221
55. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. Its essential elements are: that - (1) the
offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to
restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is not the
kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the
latter to his parents or guardians. The word ―deliberate‖ must imply something more than mere
212
People vs. Chan, G.R. No. 226836, 05 December 2018.
213
People vs. Trestiza, 660 SCRA 407 (2011)
214
People vs. Suriaga, 381 SCRA 159 (2002).
215
People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 214502, 25 November 2015.
216
People vs. Silongan, 401 SCRA 459 (2003)
217
People vs. Bautista, 622 SCRA 524 (2010)
218
People vs. Ejandra, 429 SCRA 364 (2004).
219
People vs. Parba-Rural, G.R. No. 231884, 27 June 2018.
220
People vs. Dionaldo, 731 SCRA 68 (2014)
221
People vs. Mirandilla, 654 SCRA 761 (2011).
negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously
wrong.222
56. Grave Coercion. First, that the offender has prevented another from doing something
not prohibited by law, or that he has compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
second, that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such
display of force as would produce intimidation and control over the will of the offended party; and, third,
that the offender who has restrained the will and liberty of another did so without any right or authority
of law.223
57. Unjust vexation. It is defined as any human conduct which, although not productive of
some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. It may exist
without compulsion or restraint. However, it being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the
crime. Good faith is a good defense to a charge for unjust vexation because good faith negates malice.
The paramount question to be considered is whether the offender‘s act caused annoyance, irritation,
torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. The main purpose of
the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no person may
take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is unlawful for any
person to take into his own hands the administration of justice.224
58. Robbery. Intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt
acts of the offender. Although proof as to motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the
theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain or animus lucrandi is the usual motive to be presumed from all
furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different
intent on the part of the perpetrator. Intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.225
58.1 The term ―gain‖ is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit
which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere
use of the thing which was taken without the owner‘s consent constitutes gain.226
58.2 In robbery through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary that the person unlawfully
divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. It merely require that the property taken does
not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed thereof
suffices227
59. Robbery with Homicide. The accused must be shown to have the principal purpose of
committing robbery, the homicide being committed either by reason of or on occasion of the robbery.
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. So long as the intention of the felons was to
rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. The original design must have been
robbery, and the homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct
relation to, or must be perpetrated with a view to consummate the robbery. The taking of the property
should not be merely an afterthought which arose subsequently to the killing.228
59.1 It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple
negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be
consummated.229
222
People vs. Marquez, 648 SCRA 694 (2011).
223
Barbasa vs. Tuquero, 575 SCRA 102 (2008).
224
Maderazo vs. People, 503 SCRA 234 (2006).
225
People vs. Del Rosario, 359 SCRA 166 (2001).
226
De Guzman vs. People, 569 SCRA 452 (2008).
227
People vs. Reyes, 399 SCRA 528 (2003).
228
People vs. Lara, 505 SCRA 137 (2006).
229
People vs. Hernandez, 432 SCRA 104 (2004).
59.2 If the original design does not comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the homicide
either as an afterthought or merely as an incident of the homicide, then the malefactor is guilty of two
separate crimes, that of homicide or murder and robbery, and not of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, a single and indivisible offense.
59.3 The law does not require that the sole motive of the malefactor is robbery and commits
homicide by reason or on the occasion thereof. Even if the malefactor intends to kill and rob another, it
does not preclude his conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.230
59.4 A homicide is considered as having been committed on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery when the motive of the offender in killing the victim is to deprive the latter of his property, to
eliminate an obstacle to the crime, to protect his possession of the loot, to eliminate witnesses, to
prevent his being apprehended or to insure his escape from the scene of the crime,231 or to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery.232 Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof
of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be
prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes are committed at the same time. 233
59.5 It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from
the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers;
the felony would still be robbery with homicide.234
59.6 The word ―homicide‖ (in robbery with homicide) is used in its generic sense. Homicide,
thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.235 Also, it embraces not only the act which results in
death but also all other acts producing anything short of death. Neither is the nature of the offense
altered by the number of killings in connection with the robbery.236 Stated differently, the homicides or
murders and physical injuries, irrespective of their numbers, committed on the occasion or by reason of
the robbery are merged in the composite crime of robbery with homicide.237
59.7 Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim of the robbery is different from the
victim of homicide, as long as the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. It
is not even necessary that the victim of the robbery is the very person the malefactor intended to rob.238
59.8 There is no crime of robbery with homicide committed by a band. If robbery with
homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be denominated as robbery with
homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The element of band would be appreciated
as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.239
59.9 Whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery,

all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it is
clearly shown that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.240
59.10 If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the
robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit
230
People vs. Milliam, 324 SCRA 155 (2000).
231
People vs. Cachuela, 698 SCRA 161 (2013).
232
People vs. Cariňo, G.R. No. 232624, 09 July 2018.
233
People vs. Ebet, 634 SCRA 689 (2010).
234
People vs. Laog, 658 SCRA 654 (2011).
235
People vs. Ebet, 634 SCRA 689 (2010).
236
People vs. Zuela, 323 SCRA 589 (2000).
237
People vs. Dinamling, 379 SCRA 107 (2002).
238
People vs. Daniela, 401 SCRA 519 (2003).
239
People vs. Sugan, 646 SCRA 406 (2011).
240
People vs. FO1 Dela Cruz, 575 SCRA 412 (2008)
robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from
the robbery.241
59.11 When the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is accompanied by another
offense like rape or intentional mutilation, such additional offense is treated as an aggravating
circumstance which would result in the imposition of the maximum penalty of death.242
59.12 In People vs. De Jesus243 and People vs. De Leon244 however, it was held that: ―It is
immaterial that, xxx, aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide.‖
59.13 When the killing is committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the qualifying
circumstances attendant to the killing would be considered as generic aggravating circumstances.245
60. Robbery with Rape. For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must
be shown that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way
around. This special complex crime under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a
situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property
belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.246
In other words, the offenders had an intent to rob personal property belonging to another, and such
intent preceded the rape. If the original plan was to rape but the accused after committing the rape also
committed the robbery when the opportunity presented itself, the offense should be viewed as separate
and distinct; if the intention of the accused was to rob, but rape was committed even before the
asportation, the crime is robbery with rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of
the robbery. Article 294 of the RPC does not distinguish whether the rape was committed before, during
or after the robbery; it suffices that the robbery was accompanied by rape.247
60.1 Whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all

those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of
them took part in the rape.248 Once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission
of the crime of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them on
the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from
committing the rape. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a
consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of
the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape.249
60.2 The special complex crime of robbery with rape covers cases of multiple rapes. This is
primarily due to the fact that the juridical concept of this crime does not limit the consummation of rape
against one single victim or to one single act, making other rapes in excess of that number as separate,
independent offense or offenses. All the rapes are merged in the composite, integrated whole that is
robbery with rape, so long as the rapes accompanied the robbery. It does not matter too whether the
rape occurred before, during, or after the robbery.250
60.3 There is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered
as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the
241
People vs. Labagala, G.R. No. 221427, 30 July 2018
242
People vs. Fabon, 328 SCRA 302 (2000).
243
429 SCRA 384 (2004).
244
591 SCRA 178 (2009).
245
People vs. Montinola, 360 SCRA 631 (2001).
246
People vs. Bongos, G.R. No. 227698, 31 January 2018.
247
People vs. Romobio, G.R. No. 227705, 11 October 2017.
248
People vs. Bongos, supra, note 246.
249
People vs. Verceles, 388 SCRA 515 (2002).
250
People vs. Seguis, 349 SCRA 547 (2001).
Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same Code
regarding mitigating circumstances where there is specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for
analogous circumstances.‖251
61. Theft. The fact that the stolen property was found in the possession of the accused
created the disputable presumption that he stole the same. If a person is found in possession of stolen
goods after the commission of the crime, that person is called upon to give an explanation for his
possession.252
61.1 Property subject of theft; Unlawful taking. Any property which is not included in the
enumeration of real properties under the Civil Code and capable of appropriation can be the subject of
theft under the Revised Penal Code. xxx. The business of providing telecommunication or telephone
service is likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code.253 Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one‘s personal property, is the element
which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an
act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.254
61.2 Where one, in good faith, takes another's property under claim of title in himself, he is
exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the same
is true where the taking is on behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. The gist of the offense is
the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel, either for gain or out of wantonness or malice
to deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This cannot be where the taker honestly believes the
property is his own or that of another, and that he has a right to take possession of it for himself or for
another.255
62. Qualified Theft; Qualifying Circumstances. Theft is qualified when any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed
with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large
cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the
property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion
of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.256
62.1 “With Grave Abuse of Confidence.” The grave abuse of confidence must be the result
of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the
offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant
abused.257
62.2 Taking money in his possession by receiving teller of bank is Qualified Theft. The
possession of money received by a teller in behalf of a bank is considered only as material possession
of the teller. Juridical possession remains with the bank. If the teller appropriates the money for
personal gain then the felony committed is theft and not estafa. Since the teller occupies a position of
confidence, and the bank places money in the teller‘s possession due to the confidence reposed on the
teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.258
63. Occupation of real property or Usurpation of real rights in property. The requisites
of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another‘s real property or usurped real rights in
another‘s property; that the possession or usurpation was committed with violence or intimidation and
that the accused had intent to gain. In order to sustain a conviction therefor, the proof must show that
the real property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third
251
People vs. Gano, 353 SCRA 126 (2001).
252
People vs. dela Cruz, 326 SCRA 324 (2000).
253
Laurel vs. Abrogar, 576 SCRA 41 (2009).
254
People vs. Canceran, G.R. No. 206442, 01 July 2015.
255
People vs. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 220685, 29 November 2017.
256
Miranda vs. People, 664 SCRA 124 (2012)
257
People vs. Sabado, G.R. No. 218910, 05 July 2017.
258
Roque vs. People, 444 SCRA 98 (2004).
person, and that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done
to the person ousted of possession of the property.259
63.1 Article 312 may be considered as defining and penalizing the single, special and
indivisible crime of occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons. It is not a complex crime as defined under Article 48. Article
312 provides a single, albeit two-tiered, penalty consisting of a principal penalty, which is that incurred
for the acts of violence, and an additional penalty of fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the
accused. This is clear from the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence
executed by him." For want of a better term, the additional penalty may be designated as
an incremental penalty. What Article 312 means then is that when the occupation of real property is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, the accused may be prosecuted
under an information for the violation thereof, and not for a separate crime involving violence or
intimidation. But, whenever, appropriate, he may be sentenced to suffer the penalty for the acts of
violence and to pay a fine based on the value of the gain obtained. Thus, if by reason or on the
occasion of such occupation or usurpation, the crime of homicide, or any physical injuries is committed;
or when the same shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation; xxx; the accused may
be convicted for the violation of Article 312. However, he shall be sentenced: (a) to suffer the penalty
for homicide, rape, intentional mutilation and/or physical injuries, or for the intimidation, which may fall
under Article 282 (Grave Threats) or Article 286 (Grave Coercion) of the Revised Penal Code, as the
case may be, and (b) to pay a fine based on the value of the gain obtained by him260
64. Estafa in general. For charges of estafa to prosper, the following elements must be
present: (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (2)
that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.261
64.1 Estafa through conversion or misappropriation. The elements of estafa with abuse
of confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation
or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is demand by the offended party
to the offender.262
64.2 In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of

misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items
to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.263
64.3 The words ―convert‖ and ―misappropriate‖ as used in the aforequoted law connote an act
of using or disposing of another‘s property as if it were one‘s own or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. To ―misappropriate‖ a thing of value for one‘s own use or benefit, not
only the conversion to one‘s personal advantage but also every attempt to dispose of the property of
another without a right.264
64.4 Damage as an element of Estafa. It may consist in: (1) the offended party being
deprived of his money or property as a result of the defraudation; (2) disturbance in property right; or (3)
temporary prejudice.265
259
Quinao vs. People, 335 SCRA 741 (2000).
260
Alfeche vs. People, 211 SCRA 770.
261
People vs. Gallo, 622 SCRA 439 (2010).
262
Gamaro vs. People, G.R. No. 211917, 27 February 2017.
263
Pamintuan vs. People, 621 SCRA 538 (2010).
264
Lee vs. People, 455 SCRA 256 (2005).
265
Khitri vs. People, G.R. No. 210192, 04 July 2016.
64.5 A fiduciary relationship between the complainant and the accused is an essential
element of estafa by misappropriation or conversion, without which the accused could not have
committed estafa.266
64.6 When the thing is received by the offender from the offended party in trust or in
commission or for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and
juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the
transferee a right over the thing transferred and this he may set up even against the owner. 267 So long
as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the perpetrator, the offense
committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence, conversion of personal property in the
case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in
the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred,
misappropriation of the same property constitutes Estafa.268
64.7 Deceit, not an element estafa by abuse of confidence. Deceit is not an essential
requisite of estafa by abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or deceit,
which is a usual element in the other estafas.269
65. Estafa by means of false pretenses. Its elements are the following: [1] That there
must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; [2] That such false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud; [3] That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; [4] That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.270
65.1 Under this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. xxx. It is essential that
the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which
induces the complainant to part with the thing of value.271
65.2 Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive,
including all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or
confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious
advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human
ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another
by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling
and any unfair way by which another is cheated.272
65.3 Deceit is defined as any act or devise intended to deceive; a specie of concealment or
distortion of the truth for the purpose of misleading.273 False pretense is any deceitful practice or device
by which another is led to part with the property in the thing taken.274
65.4 A person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted
separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code (now under the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 [R.A. No. 8042])and estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code.275 The reason for the rule is that the crime of illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while the crime of
266
Murao vs. People, 462 SCRA 366 (2005).
267
San Diego vs. Court of Appeals, 755 SCRA 260 (2015).
268
Benabaye vs. People, G.R. No. 203466, 25 February 2015.
269
Brokmann vs. People, 665 SCRA 83 (2012).
270
Franco vs. People, 643 SCRA 474 (2011).
271
People vs. Calimon, 577 SCRA 116 (2009).
272
People vs. Mateo, G.R. No. 210612, 09 October 2017.
273
People vs. Pascual, G.R. No. 204873, 27 July 2016.
274
Pablo vs. People, 442 SCRA 146 (2004).
275
People vs. Temporada, 574 SCRA 258 (2008).
estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction.276 Unlike in
illegal recruitment where profit is immaterial, a conviction for estafa requires a clear showing that the
offended party parted with his money or property upon the offender‘s false pretenses, and suffered
damage thereby.277
65.5 In estafa by means of false pretenses, Lastly, unlike estafa under paragraph 1 (b) of
Article 315 of the Code, proof that the accused misappropriated or converted the swindled money or
property as an element is not required. All that is required is proof of pecuniary damage sustained by
the complainant arising from his reliance on the fraudulent representation.278
65.6 Estafa by postdating or issuing a check. Its elements are the following: (1) postdating
or issuing checks in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the checks were issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover said checks; (3) knowledge on the part of the drawer of checks of such
lack or insufficiency of funds; and (4) damage capable of pecuniary estimation to the payee thereof.
Underlying all these must be the presence of fraud or deceit.279
65.7 The first element of the offense requires that the dishonored check must have been
postdated or issued at the time the obligation was contracted. In other words, the date the obligation
was entered into, being the very date the check was issued or postdated, is a material ingredient of the
offense.280
65.8 The act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient
cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from
the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words,
the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it
not for the issuance of the check by the offender. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon
proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within
three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.281
65.9 It is the fraud or deceit employed by the accused in issuing a worthless check that is
penalized. Deceit, to constitute estafa, should be the efficient cause of defraudation. It must have been
committed either prior or simultaneous with the defraudation complained of. There must be
concomitance: the issuance of a check should be the means to obtain money or property from the
payee. Hence, a check issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation does not constitute estafa even if
there is no fund in the bank to cover the amount of the check.282
65.10 If the transaction was one for a loan of money and for which the accused issued checks
to guarantee the payment of the loan, he has the obligation to make good the payment of the money
borrowed by him. But such obligation is civil in character and in the absence of fraud, no criminal
liability under the Revised Penal Code arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a
guarantee of repayment.283 In the same vein, if the accused issued the checks as evidence of
indebtedness to cover the value of the jewelry, a drawer who issues a check as security or evidence of
investment is not liable for Estafa.284
65.11 There is no estafa through bouncing checks when it is shown that private complainant
knew that the drawer did not have sufficient funds in the bank at the time the check was issued to him.
Such knowledge negates the element of deceit and constitutes a defense in estafa through bouncing
checks.285
276
People vs. Comila, 517 SCRA 153 (2007).
277
People vs. Chua, 680 SCRA 575 (2012).
278
Lopez vs. People, 703 SCRA 118 (2013)
279
Flores vs. People, 375 SCRA 491 (2002).
280
People vs. Dinglasan, 389 SCRA 71 (2002).
281
People vs. Wagas, 705 SCRA 17 (2013).
282
People vs. Reyes, 454 SCRA 635 (2005).
283
People vs. Cuyugan, 392 SCRA 140 (2002).
284
People vs. Dimalanta, 440 SCRA 55 (2004).
285
People vs. Reyes, 454 SCRA 635(2005).
65.12 Uncollected deposits are not the same as insufficient funds. The prima facie presumption
of deceit arises only when a check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. Notably, the
law speaks of insufficiency of funds but not of uncollected deposits.286
65.13 If there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be

presumed, and unless there is a priori intent, which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from
mere failure to comply with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist. Notice of dishonor is required
under both par. 2(d) Art. 315 of the RPC and of BP 22. Under both laws, notice of dishonor is
necessary for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP 22). Without proof of notice of dishonor,
knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no crime (whether estafa or violation of
BP 22) can be deemed to exist.287
65.14 There can be no estafa if the accused acted in good faith because good faith negates
malice and deceit.288
65.15 Novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
extinguishment of criminal liability for Estafa.289 It may prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it
occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court. In other words, novation does not
extinguish criminal liability but may only prevent its rise.‖290 The role of novation may only be either to
prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction,
whether or not it was such that the breach of the obligation would not give rise to penal responsibility,
as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to.291
65.16 The reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the sums swindled by the
accused does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto the civil
liability. Moreover, estafa is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State on its
own motion even though complete reparation had been made for the loss or damage suffered by the
offended party. The consent of the private complainant to petitioner‘s payment of her civil liability
pendente lite does not entitle the latter to an acquittal. Subsequent payments does not obliterate the
criminal liability already incurred. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise between
accused and the private complainant on the former‘s civil liability.292
65.17 Estafa through issuance of bouncing checks vs. Violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The
issuance of a check subsequently dishonored, estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are separate and
distinct from each other because they pertain to different causes of action. xxx, among other
differences, damage and deceit are essential elements for estafa under Article 315 2(d) of the RPC, but
are not so for violation under B.P. Blg. 22, which punishes the mere issuance of a bouncing check,
xxx. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of
knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence
punishable which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the
following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even
if he had issued the same for a preexisting obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised
Penal Code, such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are
imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire
banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Reyised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.293
286
Dy vs. People, 571 SCRA 59 (2008).
287
People vs. Ojeda, 430 SCRA 436 (2004).
288
Recuerdo vs. People, 493 SCRA 517 (2006).
289
Ocampo-Paule vs. Court of Appeals, 376 SCRA 83 (2002).
290
Diongzon vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 477 (1999).
291
Degaños vs. People, 707 SCRA 438 (2013).
292
Firaza vs. People, 518 SCRA 681 (2007).
293
Batac vs. People, G.R. No. 191622, 06 June 2018.
66. Other Forms of Swindling. The elements of other forms of swindling under Article 316,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) that the thing disposed of be real property;
(2) that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the encumbrance is
recorded or not; (3) that there must be express representation by the offender that the real property is
free from encumbrance; and (4) that the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of
another.294
67. “Other Deceits.” For one to be liable for ―other deceits‖ under the law, it is required that
the prosecution must prove the following essential elements: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or
pretense other than those in the preceding articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense
must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a
result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. It is essential that such false statement or
fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to
part with her property. Thhis includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in
Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as the catchall provision for that purpose
with its broad scope and intendment.295
68. Destructive Arson. In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated – whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is
de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of
the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply
arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to
accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a
particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to
cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed – homicide/murder and
arson.296
69. Malicious Mischief. Its elements are: (1) That the offender deliberately caused damage
to the property of another; (2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving
destruction; (3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of
damaging it.297
70. Concubinage. Even a subsequent pronouncement that the marriage is void from
beginning, the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage.298
71. Acts of Lasciviousness. There must be a confluence of the following elements before
conviction can be had for such crime: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness; (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat, or
intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means
of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) when the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. 299 In acts of lasciviousness, the acts
complained of are prompted by lust or lewd design where the victim has not encouraged such acts. In
cases of acts of lasciviousness, the offender is deemed to have accomplished all the elements
294
Estrellado-Mainar vs. People, G.R. No. 184320, 29 July 2015.
295
Guinhawa vs. People, 468 SCRA 278 (2005).
296
People vs. Malngan, 503 SCRA 294 (2006).
297
Taguinod vs. People, 659 SCRA 23 (2011).
298
Beltran vs. People, 334 SCRA 106 (2000)
299
Orsos vs. People, G.R. No. 214673, 20 November 2017.
necessary for the existence of the felony once he has been able, by his overt acts, to actually achieve
or attain his purpose.300
72. Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, distinguished. While rape and acts of
lasciviousness have the same nature, they are fundamentally different. For in rape, there is the intent
to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness, this element is absent.301
73. Simple Seduction. To constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some deceitful
promise or inducement. The woman should have yielded because of this promise or inducement.302
74. Forcible Abduction. The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, are: (1) that the
person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken
against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.303
74.1 If the main objective of the accused when the victim was taken by him was to rape her,
then forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape.304 Although forcible abduction was seemingly
committed, the accused is not guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape when the
objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the
forcible abduction.
75. Bigamy. Its elements are, that: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2)
the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been preemptively declared dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and,
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.305
75.1 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all
the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. It does
not matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects
until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.306
75.2 The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Thus, a marriage,
even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. Even if theaccused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.307
75.3 What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.308
75.4 In one case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. The accused and the complaining witness merely signed a marriage contract on
their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
300
People vs. Perez, 378 SCRA 476 (2002)
301
Tibong vs. People, 630 SCRA 639 (2010).
302
People vs. Pascua, 406 SCRA 103 (2003).
303
People vs. Ablaneda, 357 SCRA 479 (2001).
304
People vs. Lining, 384 SCRA 427 (2002).
305
Morigo vs. People, 422 SCRA 376 (2004).
306
Manuel vs. People, 476 SCRA 461 (2005).
307
People vs. Abunado, 426 SCRA 562 (2004).
308
People vs. Odtuhan, 701 SCRA 506 (2013).
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which accused might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.309
75.5 The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who
marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. In the crime of
bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous
marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the
accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused. The second spouse, if indicted in
the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice.310
76. Article 351, Repealed. The felony of Premature Marriages defined and punished under
311
Article 351 of the Revised Penal Code has already been decriminalized with the passage of Republic
Act No. 10655 in March 2015.
77. Libel. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be present: (a) it
must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be
identifiable.312
77.1 Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed
phrase must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the words imputed
not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is necessarily rendered
immaterial.313
77.2 An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes

to the latter the commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or imaginary; or
any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.314 In determining whether a
statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in
their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. Moreover, a charge is
sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person
or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach
the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.315
77.3 Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written,
known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. A communication of the
defamatory matter to the person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his
self-esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in
which other hold him. In the same vein, a defamatory letter contained in a closed envelope addressed
to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted with its possession in such a way that
it can be read by person other than the offended party. If a sender of a libelous communication knows
or has good reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before reaching the person defamed, there is
sufficient publication. The publication of a libel, however, should not be presumed from the fact that the
309
Morigo vs. People, 422 SCRA 376 (2004).
310
Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, 15 July 2015.
311
“Article 351. Premature marriages. - Any widow who shall marry within three hundred and one day from the
date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if she shall have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be
punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.
“The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman whose marriage shall have been annulled or dissolved, if she
shall marry before her delivery or before the expiration of the period of three hundred and one day after the legal separation.”
312
Soriano vs. People, G.R. No. 225015, 21 November 2018.
313
Lopez vs. People, 642 SCRA 668 (2011).
314
Brillante vs. Court of Appeals, 440 SCRA 541 (2004).
315
Soriano vs. People, G.R. No. 225015, 21 November 2018.
immediate control thereof is parted with unless it appears that there is reasonable probability that it is
hereby exposed to be read or seen by third persons.316
77.4 To satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third person or a
stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement. It is enough if by intrinsic
reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to
facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to; or if the
latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did
understand that he was the person referred to.317
77.5 Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will
or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed;
it implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author
of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
as to the truth or falsity thereof.318
77.6 The presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies
as privileged communication.319 Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not
prove malice on the part of the accused (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that accused‘s
imputation is malicious (malice in law).
77.7 A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if the author has
acted in bad faith. This class includes allegations or statements made by parties or their counsel in
pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as
answers given by the witness in reply to questions propounded to them in the course of said
proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers
are responsive to the questions propounded to said witnesses.320
77.8 In libel cases against public officials, for liability to arise, the alleged defamatory
statement must relate to official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false, unless the public
official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it
was false or not.321
77.9 Liability of editor of the publication. Criminal liability for libel equally applies to an
editor of a publication in which a libelous article was published and states that the editor of the same
shall be responsible for the defamation in writing as if he were the author thereof. Indeed, when an
alleged libelous article is published in a newspaper, such fact alone sufficient evidence to charge the
editor or business manager with the guilt of its publication. This sharing of liability with the author of
said article is based on the principle that editors and associate editors, by the nature of their positions,
edit, control and approve the materials which are to be published in a newspaper. This means that,
without their nod of approbation, any article alleged to be libelous would not be published.322
78. Oral Defamation. Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken)
means, instead of in writing. It is defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to
prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood." The elements of oral
defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5)
directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonour,
discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It
becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature.323
316
Belen vs. People, G.R. No. 211120, 13 February 2017.
317
MBPC and Batuigas vs. Domingo and People, G.R. No. 170341, 05 July 2017.
318
MBPC and Batuigas, ibid.
319
MBPC and Batuigas, ibid.
320
Belen vs. People, G.R. No. 211120, 13 February 2017.
321
Jalandoni vs. Hon. Secretary of Justice, 327 SCRA 107 (2000).
322
Bautista vs. Cuneta-Pangilinan, 684 SCRA 521 (2012).
323
De Leon vs. People, G.R. No. 212623, 11 January 2016.
79. Slander by Deed. Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by
performing any act, which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. The elements
are (1) that the offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor, (2) that such
act is performed in the presence of other person or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon the offended party. Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by
deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended party, the
circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion, etc. It is libel committed by actions
rather than words. The most common examples are slapping someone or spitting on his/her face in
front of the public market, in full view of a crowd, thus casting dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon
the person of another.324
79.1 Pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase ―Fuck You,‖ which is similar to the
expression ―Puta‖ or ―Putang Ina mo,‖ in local parlance. Such expression was not held to be libelous in
Reyes v. People, xxx. In Villanueva though, the Supreme Court held that ―in light of the fact that there
was a perceived provocation coming from complainant, petitioner‘s act of pointing a dirty finger at
complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the case that
the act complained of was employed by petitioner ‗to express anger or displeasure‘ at complainant for
procrastinating the approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus, the penalty shall be arresto menor
meaning, xxx‖325
#updated/ 071619
324
Villanueva vs. People, 487 SCRA 42 (2006).
325
Villanueva, ibid.

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JURISTS BAR REVIEW CENTER™

CRIMINAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE

THE REVISED PENAL CODE

5. Classification of felonies according to their means of execution. These two types

7. Mistake of fact. A "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would

8. How criminal liability may be incurred. A person committing a felony is criminally

―Art. 4. Criminal liability – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

9. Proximate cause; Efficient intervening cause. Proximate cause is defined as that

11. Stages of Execution; Attempted, Frustrated and Consummated. In homicide cases,

11.1 Whether attempted/frustrated homicide or Physical Injuries. In order to determine

11.4 No frustrated stage in Theft. Theft is either attempted or consummated. Theft is

12.3 Conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability. Once conspiracy is

12.5 Confederation, Not an Aggravating Circumstance. Confederation is not enumerated

13.2 Unlawful aggression, an indispensable requisite. There can be no self-defense,

13.4 Self-defense and retaliation, distinguished. In retaliation, the inceptual unlawful

13.9 Avoidance of Greater Evil. To successfully invoke avoidance of greater evil as a

16. Mitigating Circumstances; Incomplete Self-defense. In order that it may be

16.3 Sufficient Provocation/Threats. For this to be appreciated, the following elements

16.5 Passion or Obfuscation. To be entitled to this mitigating circumstance, the following

16.8 Filing of Information/issuance of Arrest Warrant. The mere filing of an information

16.9 Confession of guilt. To be entitled to such mitigating circumstance, the following

16.10 Restitution, a mitigating circumstance analogous to Voluntary surrender and

17. Aggravating Circumstances; Advantage taken of public position. To appreciate this

17.1 In Contempt of or With Insult to Public Authorities. The requisites of this

17.7 Nighttime, band or uninhabited place. By and of itself, it is not an aggravating

17.11 Evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following

19.3 Principal by inducement. The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement

19.7 Conspirators distinguished from Accomplices. Conspirators and accomplices have

21. Pardon by the offended party; Recantation/Affidavit of Desistance, not a ground to

22.1 Reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty. Reclusion perpetua remains to be an

25. Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly stated in the

26.5 No complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of private document. As there is

―3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

27.5 Prescription of offenses punishable by ordinances or covered by the Rules of

34. Falsification of Documents. What is punished in falsification of a public document is

35.4 Falsification by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. This kind of

35.6 Falsification by private individuals. This refers to falsification by a private individual or

35.7 Falsification of public or official document or commercial document vs.

37. Obscene Publications. Mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to

42. Malversation of Public Funds or Property. Malversation may be committed by

48. Death caused/physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray; tumultuous affray,

50. Unintentional abortion, as distinguished from Infanticide. As distinguished from

53.8 Affidavit of Desistance in Rape Cases. The submission of an affidavit of desistance

59.9 Whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery,

60.1 Whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all

64.2 In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of

65.13 If there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be

77.2 An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes

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