The 1987 Constitution, in Article III, Section 17, provides that “no person shall be compelled to be a witness

against himself.” The phrase “self-incrimination” does not appear. Nor does it appear in Section 12 of the
same Article III on the rights of a person in custodial investigation which provides, among others, for the
“right to remain silent.”

Also, under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, particularly Rule 115, Section 1(e), an accused at trial is exempt
from being compelled to be a witness against himself. The phrase self-incrimination does not appear.
Likewise, self-incrimination is not used in Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution in reference to inquiries
in aid of Legislation. Section 21 provides that, “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedures. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”

Why is this “right against self-incrimination” invoked everytime a witness refuses to answer a difficult
question in Senate or House investigative hearings? Is this right without any limitations?

The landmark case of People v. Ayson (175 SCRA 1989, 225-230 [1989]) distinguishes between “the right
against self-incrimination” and “the rights in custodial investigation.” The first right, against self-
incrimination [Article III, Section 17], is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or
under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or administrative proceedings. The right is not to “be
compelled to be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an “option of refusal to answer incriminating
questions” and not a prohibition of inquiry. It simply secures to a witness, whether he or she be a party, the
right to refuse to answer any particular incriminating question, i.e., one to which has a tendency to
incriminate him or her for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not
give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed or to refuse to testify altogether. The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or
automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed, by or in behalf of the witness, the protection
does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly or impliedly, as by a failure to
claim it at the appropriate time” (People v. Ayson, at pp. 27-28).

Understandably, People v. Ayson, decided by the SC in 1989 before Senate/House inquiries became a fad,
does not expound on the right against self-incrimination in investigative inquiries in Congress. However,
the Senate has provided in its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, in Section 19
thereof, that “the right against self-incrimination shall be allowed only when a question, which tends to
elicit an answer that will incriminate, is propounded.” The senators can determine whether the right was
properly invoked, by a majority vote of the committee members if there is a quorum present. The right
against self-incrimination covers testimonial compulsion only and the compulsion to produce real or
physical evidence using the body of the witness or accused. It applies to commutative testimony and not
mechanical testimony. Commutative testimony involves the use of intelligence on the part of the accused
or witness. Thus, handwriting, signatures and similar incidents, which involve the use of intelligence, are not
permissible. Corollary, mechanical testimony, such as substance from the body, morphine from mouth, put
on pants, physical exam, wallet, picture taking, etc. (not involving use of intelligence) is permissible

The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate
officers perform their duties." 48 If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. 49 The President's
power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed,
or that subordinate officers act within the law. 50 Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. 51 And
the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the
President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of
the public service so requires.

The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the
President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local
government officials. A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special
Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation,
contrary to petitioner Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is
the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. 54

Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego
principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.