TEAM LEADER

G. Priyanka 2017030 State of Punjab and Ors. 2

Vs.
Jalour Singh and Ors
AIR (2008) 2 SCC 660

TEAM MEMBERS

NAME OF THE ROLL CASE NAME PAGE

STUDENT NUMBER NUMBER
Adarsh Kumar 2017004 Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna 5
Mukherjee & ors.
AIR1953SC65

Ajay 2017005 Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others v. 9

BanamaliSen & ors BholanathSen and
others
1953 AIR 33

Balabhadra Usha 2017020 M/s. Makhija Construction and 13

Chandrakala Engineering Private v. Indore
Development Authority & ors
AIR 2005 SC 2499

Bandhili Yogitha Sri 2017021 Ramji Gupta v. Gopi Krishna Agrawal 16

(AIR 2013SC 3099)

Gauri Chauhan 2017027 Rajasthan High Court Advocates 19

Association v. The State of Rajasthan
and Ors.
MANU/RH/0647/2001

1
 CASE TITLE

State of Punjab and Ors. v. Jalour Singh and Ors

AIR (2008)2SCC660

OBJECTIVE OF THE CASE:

The main objective of the case is to determine of the role of the Lok Adalat as it should not in the
manner of judicial determination but in the manner as to compromise and settle things between
two parties which was challenges by the parties.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The facts of the case are respondents 1 and 2 herein, the husband and son of one Amarjit Kaur
who died in a motor accident involving a Punjab Roadways bus, filed a claim petition before the
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Faridkot. As against the compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs claimed,
the Tribunal, on 1-12-1998 awarded a compensation of Rs. 1,44,000. Not being satisfied with the
quantum of compensation, Respondents 1 and 2 filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
The said appeal was referred to the Lok Adalat organised by the High Court, for settlement. The
case was taken on 3-8-2001 where only the counsel for the parties were only present. After
hearings to the counsel, they proposed to increase the amount of compensation, which is
considered just and reasonable in this case.

The accident took place on March 4, 1997. Amarjit Kaur, aged about 32 years, died in the
accident. Her husband and minor son claimed compensation. The Tribunal granted Rs. 1,44,000
along with 12 percent per annum interest. Feeling dissatisfied, they are in appeal. The deceased
was doing household work and also looking after some cattle and selling milk. The Tribunal after
all the calculations , the compensation worked out at Rs. 1,63,200 (Rs. 800 x 12 x 17). To this a
sum of Rs. 7000 is added i.e. Rs. 2000 towards funeral expenses and Rs. 5000 towards loss of
consortium, payable to the husband, making total compensation payable at Rs. 1,70,200.

The Tribunal under this head allowed compensation of Rs. 1,08,000 i.e. under this head the
claimants would get Rs. 62,200 over and above that amount. The compensation granted under
other heads is considered just and reasonable. Thus, while allowing the appeal, we grant
compensation of Rs. 62,200 over and above the amount awarded by the Tribunal to the

2
Appellants, who would share it equally. On this amount they will get interest at the rate of 12 per
cent her annum from the date of filing of the claim petition i.e. July 28, 1997, till payment. Two
months' time is allowed to the Respondents to make the payment. If the parties object to the
proposed order as above, they may move the High Court within two months for disposal of the
appeal on merits according to law.

Punjab Roadways (the second Appellant herein) filed an application to set aside order dated 3-8-
2001 passed by the Lok Adalat, as it was passed without their consent. The said application was
rejected by a learned Single Judge by a short order dated 11-9-2002 on the ground that such
objections were not maintainable or entertainable, having regard to its decision in Charanjit
Kaur v. Balwant Singh1 decided on 30-7-2002 and other cases. In Charanjit Kaur the learned
Single Judge had held that an order passed by the Lok Adalat can be challenged only by a
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, as all proceedings before the Lok Adalat are
deemed to be judicial proceedings and the Lok Adalat is deemed to be a civil court under Section
22(3) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.

Now the instant petition has been filed against challenging the order of the Lok Adalat dated 3-8-
2001. Nothing has been pointed out showing that such a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution is maintainable. Apart from the fact that the Lok Adalat has granted time for filing
the objections and the objections have been dismissed, the meagre increase in the amount of
compensation does not warrant any interference. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed
being not maintainable.

The said order is under challenge in this appeal by special leave.

PLEA OF THE DEFENDANT:

The instant petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution seeking necessary
directions quashing the order dated 3-8-2001 passed by the Lok Adalat enhancing the
compensation in favour of the Respondent claimants to the tune of Rs. 62,200. The order of the
Lok Adalat specifically indicated that if the parties were not satisfied, they could file objections
within a period of two months for the disposal of the appeal on merits in accordance with law.

1 S.L.P.(Crl.)No.3695 of 2013

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The Petitioner State had filed objections which were dismissed on 11-9-2002 and the order of the
Lok Adalat dated 3-8-2001 had attained finality.

A reference to relevant provisions will be of some assistance, before examination of the issues
involved. Section 19 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 ("the LSA Act"provides for
organisation of the Lok Adalats. Section 19(5)(i) of the LSA Act provides that a Lok Adalat shall
have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to
a dispute in respect of any case pending before any court for which the Lok Adalat is organised.
Section 20 relates to cognizance of cases by the Lok Adalats. Sub-section (1) refers to the Lok
Adalats taking cognizance of cases referred to by courts and Sub-section (2) refers to the Lok
Adalats taking cognizance of matters at pre-litigation stage.

ISSUES INVOLVED:

 Whether the High Court and the Lok Adalat acted in a manner contrary to law?
 Whether the raise in compensation is fair and just by the Lok Adalat?

INTERPRETATION OF COURT:

The court has interpreted that it is evident from the said provisions that the Lok Adalats have no
adjudicatory or judicial function. Their functions relate purely to conciliation. When the Lok
Adalat is not able to arrive at a settlement or compromise, no award is made and the case record
is returned to the court from which the reference was received, for disposal in accordance with
law. No Lok Adalat has the power to "hear" parties to adjudicate cases as a court does. It
discusses the subject-matter with the parties and persuades them to arrive at a just settlement. In
their conciliatory role, the Lok Adalats are guided by the principles of justice, equity and fair
play. When the LSA Adalat, the said Act does not contemplate nor require an adjudicatory
judicial determination, but a non-adjudicatory determination based on a compromise or
settlement, arrived at by the parties, with guidance and assistance from the Lok Adalat. The
"award' of the Lok Adalat does not mean any independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any
decision making process. The making of the award is merely an administrative act of
incorporating the terms of settlement or compromise agreed by parties in the presence of the Lok
Adalat, in the form of an executable order under the signature and seal of the Lok Adalat.

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The order of the Lok Adalat in this case (extracted above), shows that it assumed a judicial role,
heard parties, ignored the absence of consensus, and increased the compensation to an extent it
considered just and reasonable, by a reasoned order which is adjudicatory in nature. It arrogated
to itself the appellate powers of the High Court and "allowed" the appeal and "directed" the
Respondents in the appeal to pay the enhanced compensation of Rs. 62,200/- within two months.
The order of the Lok Adalat was not passed by consent of parties or in pursuance of any
compromise or settlement between the parties, is evident from its observation that "if the parties
object to the proposed order they may move the High Court within two months for disposal of
the appeal on merits according to law".

FINAL JUDGEMENT:

Thus it was said find that the Lok Adalat exercised a power/jurisdiction not vested in it. On the
other hand, the High Court twice refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, thereby denying
justice and driving the Appellants to this Court. In this process, a simple appeal by the legal heirs
of the deceased for enhancement of compensation, has been tossed around and is pending for
more than eight years, putting them to avoidable expense and harassment. We therefore allow
this appeal and quash the order dated 3-8-2001 of the Lok Adalat as also set aside the orders
dated 11-9-2002 and 26-2-2003 of the High Court. As a consequence, the High Court shall hear
and dispose of FAO No. 1549 of 1999 which continues to be pending on its record, on merits in
accordance with law. The High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal expeditiously. Parties
to bear their respective costs.

CASE TITLE

Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee & ors.

AIR 1953 SC 65

OBECTIVE OF THE CASE

The main objective of the case is primarily concerned with Order 21, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 as the same provides for sending a copy of the decree, a certificate setting forth
that setting forth that satisfaction of the decree has not been obtained by execution within the

5
jurisdiction of the court and a copy of the order for execution of the decree but there is authority
to that effect that an omission to send a copy of the decree doesn’t prevent the decree holder to
apply for execution to the court to which the decree has been transmitted. Such omission doesn’t
amount to material irregularity within the meaning of Order 21, Rule 90 and same cannot be
made a ground for setting the execution aside

FACTS OF THE CASE

A decree passed by the Calcutta High Court on its Original Side in 1923, was transferred by that
Court for execution to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Asansol in 1931 with a certified of
the decree, copy of, the order of transmission and certificate of partial satisfaction. The decree-
holder applied for execution to the Asansol Court but the application was dismissed for default in
February 1932, and the Asansol Court sent to the Calcutta High Court what purported to be a
certificate under s. 41, Civil Procedure Code, stating that the execution case was dismissed for
default, but neither the copy of the decree nor a covering letter was sent to the High Court. The
decree-holder again applied for execution in November, 1932, and a certain colliery was
proclaimed for sale on April 3, 1933. Meanwhile, other application of the decree-holder, the
High Court passed an order on March 27, 1933, discharging a Receiver who had been appointed
in 1926 and granting liberty to the Court-of Asansol to sell the colliery in execution by public
auction. After this order was communicated to the Asansol Court, it sold the colliery in auction.
The sale was set aside and the colliery was resold. Again the sale was set aside and after the
property was sold for the third time the judgment debtor applied under s. 47 and 0. XXI, r. 90,
Civil Procedure Code, for setting aside the sale on the ground that after the dismissal of the
execution case in February, 1932, and the transmission of a certificate under s. 41 to the High
Court, the Asansol Court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree

PLEA OF THE DEFENDANT

The defendant raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court. It appears that , subsequently
the defendant joined the plaintiff in petitioning the District Judge to transfer the case to his own
Court. This was done. The suit was transferred under section 25 of the Civil Procedure Code. It
was admitted that the -suit could not be transferred unless the Court from which the transfer was
sought to be made had jurisdiction to try it. The defendant adhered to the plea of jurisdiction

6
throughout the proceedings but it was urged that by his subsequent conduct he had waived the
objection to the irregularity in the institution of the suit

ISSUES INVOLVED

1) Whether the case is maintainable u/s 151 of CPC?

2) Whether the court acted as per section 41 of CPC?

3) Whether the miscellaneous suit barred by Res judicata ?

INTERPRETATION OF THE COURT

Their Lordships held that although a defendant may be barred by his own conduct from’
objecting to the irregularity in the institution of the suit, yet where the Judge had no inherent
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit, the parties cannot by their mutual consent convert
it into a proper judicial process. The first was a case of the grant of assignment of the, land
revenue of a village in favour of the grantee. He mortgaged it and a suit brought on foot of the
mortgage was decreed. In a subsequent suit for a declaration that the previous decree of the
Court was null and void by reason of the fact that the suit was not cognisable in the absence of a
certificate from the Collector as required by the Pensions’ Act authorizing the trial of such a suit,
it was held that the decree was one without jurisdiction and that it did not operate as res judicata
in the subsequent suit for which the certificate was obtained. It was obvious that the statutory
provisions of the Act forbade the trial of any suit without the certificate of the Collector. There
was, therefore, an initial lack of jurisdiction to try the case and the case is inapplicable to the
facts of the present case. The second case which involved the question of territorial jurisdiction
was in our view not correctly decided. There a suit against a minor for enforcement of the
mortgage was decreed in respect of property which was beyond-the territorial jurisdiction of the
Court passing the decree. When the decree was transferred for execution to the Court within
whose jurisdiction the property was situate, it was objected that the decree was a nullity. The
objection was overruled and the objector was referred to file a regular suit. In the regular suit
filed by him it was decided that an independent suit was maintainable for avoiding the decree
although no objection was raised to jurisdiction in the Court passing the decree

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FINAL JUDGMENT

In this case the decree-holder in t e earlier execution proceedings could have raised a plea that
the judgment debtor had an interest in certain property which could be attached under his decree
but the plea was not raised through his own default and the execution was dismissed. It was held
under such circumstances that the dismissal operates as res judicata in the subsequent execution
proceedings and even apart from the provisions of section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is
contrary to principle to allow the decree-bolder in fresh proceedings to renew the same claim
merely because he neglected at a proper stage in previous proceedings to support his claim by the
argument of which he subsequently wishes to avail himself. There is ample authority for the
proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as Res judicata
between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon
the question whether or not it operates as res judicata. A decision in the previous execution.

The learned Chief Justice concedes that the principle of res judicata applies to the execution
proceedings but he refused to apply it to the present case on the ground that there was lack of
inherent jurisdiction in the execution Court to proceed with the execution. He relied upon
Ledgard and Another v. Bull. This case is distinguishable upon the facts. This was a suit
instituted before the Subordinate -Judge for infringement of certain exclusive rights secured to
the plaintiff by three Indian patents. Under the Patents Act the suit could be brought only before
the District Judge. The defendant raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court.

It appears that , subsequently the defendant joined the plaintiff in petitioning the District Judge to
transfer the case to his own Court. This was done. The suit was transferred under section 25 of
the Civil Procedure Code. It was admitted that the -suit could not be transferred unless the Court
from which the transfer was sought to be made had jurisdiction to try it. The defendant adhered
to the plea of jurisdiction throughout the proceedings but it was urged that by his subsequent
conduct he had waived the objection to the irregularity in the institution of the suit.

Their Lordships held that although a defendant may be barred by his own conduct from’
objecting to the irregularity in the institution of the suit, yet where the Judge had no inherent
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit, the parties cannot by their mutual consent convert
it into a proper judicial process. This decision has no bearing upon the present case as no

8
question of constructive res judicata arose in that case. It was obvious that the statutory
provisions of the Act forbade the trial of any suit without the certificate of the Collector. There
was, therefore, an initial lack of jurisdiction to try the case and the case is inapplicable to the
facts of the present case. The second case which involved the question of territorial jurisdiction
was in our view not correctly decided.

CASE TITLE
Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others v. BanamaliSen and others BholanathSen and others
1953 AIR 33

OBJECTIVE OF THE CASE

The honourable Apex Court in the aforementioned case discussed in detail the concept of Res
Judicata as given under Section 11 of the CPC. Through the detailed study of thus case, one can
get acquainted with the concept of Res Judicata and Mesne Profit.

FACTS OF THE CASE

These two connected appeals from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at
Calcutta in appeal from Original Decree dated the 6th May, 1946, arise out of Title Suit,
instituted the 21st September, 1938, in the Court of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge of
Alipore, by Rajlakshmi against the Sens and the Dasses for possession of the properties which
represent a four anna share of the estate once held by one Raj Ballav Seal.

The 8th June, 1870, two days before his death, Raj Ballav Seal, a Hindu inhabitant of the town
ofCalcutta governed by the Bengal School of Hindu law, executed a will giving authority to his
widow MatiDassi to adopt a son and appointed her and three other persons as executors and
trustees of the estate and gave them elaborate directions for the administration and distribution of
his extensive properties. Raj Ballav was one of those persons who believe 0in leaving detailed
instructions about their property and the manner in which it is to be managed and taken after
their death and expect their wishes to be dutifully carried out by those who survive them. How
his wishes have been respected by his descendants is now a matter of history. Since the year
1890 this is the eighth or ninth litigation concerning the construction of the testament he made
that fateful &ay, and if by any means Raj Ballav could be informed of the result of these

9
litigations and was told that it had been held that he had died intestate, he would surely rise out
of the ashes and lodge an emphatic protest against what has happened.

By a judgment dated 5th January, 1903, the trial court dismissed the suit the view that under the
will the first adopted son had acquired an absolute right, Patel and interest in the share -of the
estate left by the will of his adoptive father and he having left a widow and a daughter,
MatiDassi had no authority to make a second adoption. This decision was affirmed in the case of
AmitlyaCharan Seal v. Kalidas Sen.2

Rajlakshmi appealed to the High Court against the decision of the special judge but without any
success.Her appeal was dismissed 8th March, 1935. She preferred an appeal to the Privy
Council. This was allowed and Rajlakshmi was declared entitled to the entire compensation
money in the case of Rajlakshmi v. Bholanath Sen.3

ISSUES RAISED

The learned Judges posed certain questions and then attempted to answer them in view of the
limited provisions of section 11, Civil Procedure Code. The questions were:

(1) Did the judgment of the Privy Council in the 1928 land acquisition proceedings decide any
question as to the right of the mortgagees to hold from the Sens a mortgage of the four anna
share, or their right to prove the title of their mortgagors in a question between themselves and
the reversions to Jogendra'sestate?

(2) Could the mortgagees have raised these questions in the land acquisition proceedings and
even if they could have, are the questions such that they ought to have been raised?

2
(1905) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 361
3
(1938) 65 I.A. 365 1938 Indlaw PC 30

10
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

In, the plaint as originally filed, Katyayani admitted the title of the Sens to a one-fourth share of
the estate and claimed only a three-fourth share for herself as the widow of Jogendra. The Sens
claimed the whole estate for themselves as the heirs of Raj Ballav. They pleaded that the will
was not genuine and that even if it was genuine, the bequests in favour of the adopted son and for
the worship of the deity were invalid and that even if they were valid, Jogendra having died
before attaining the age of 20 years had taken nothing under the will.

The first contention raised by him was that the judgment of the Privy Council could not operate
as res judicata against the present contention of the Sens and the mortgagees,about the title to the
four anna share of Raj Ballav's estate, because the subject matter of those proceedings was the
compensation money, a sum of Rs. 900, and not the property that is the subject-matter of the
present suit. He argued that when the plea of res judicata is founded general principles of law,
that plea can only prevail provided the subject-matter in the two cases is identical.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS

It was then argued by Mr.Ghose that the judge who decided the apportionment issue in the land
acquisition proceedings of 1928 was a special judge appointed under the Land Acquisition Act
and not being a District Judge, the two decisions of the Privy Council., i.e., Bamachandra Bao v.
Bamachandra Rao4and Bhagwati v. Bam Kali5, had no application, as the special judge had no
jurisdiction to hear the present suit, while the District Judge in those cases would have
jurisdiction to hear the regular suits. It was urged that to substantiate the plea of resjudicata even
general principles of law it was necessary that the court that heard and decided the former case
should be a court competent to hear the subsequent case. This contention was based the language
of section 11.

Mr.Ghose raised a question of limitation and urged that Rajlakshmi's suit was barred by time
inasmuch as the cause of action to sue for possession of the four anna share accrued to Jogendra

4
[1922] 49 I.A. 129 1922 Indlaw PC 23
5
[1939] 66 I. A. 145 1939 Indlaw PC 50

11
and he having failed to file a suit, both Katyayani and Rajlakshmi must be taken to have lost the
title to the part of the property in the possession of the Sens.

INTREPRETATION BY THE COURT

The Apex Court Observed that,

In order successfully to establish a plea of res judicata or estoppel by record it is necessary to

show that in a previous case a court, having jurisdiction to try the question, came to a decision
necessarily and substantially involving the determination of the matter in issue in the latter case.
It was at one time a matter of doubt whether the determination of a court to which a matter had
been referred by the collector was such a decision and that doubt was resolved by the judgment
of the Privy Council in BamachandraBao v. RamachandraRao6, which decided that where a
dispute as to the title to receive the compensation had been referred to the court, a decree thereon
not Appealed from renders the question of title resjudicata in a suit between the parties to the
dispute.

These two decisions were found to be conclusive to clear the point of res judicata raised in the
present case and in these circumstances it has to be hold that the question of title to the four anna
share was necessarily and substantially involved in the land acquisition proceedings and was
finally decided by a court having jurisdiction to try it and that decision (thus operates as res
judicata and estops the Sensand the mortgagees from re-agitating that matter in this suit. The
honourable bench was no more concerned with the question whether the Privy Council was right
or wrong.

JUDGEMENT

For the reasons given above the honourable bench held that the appeal preferred behalf of the
Sens has no merits and must fail. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. The appeal preferred by
Rajlakshmi against the mortgagees was allowed with costs in all the courts and her title to the
property in suit and for possession of the same is decreed and it is directed that the defendants do
deliver Possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff. It is further declared that the plaintiff is
entitled to mesne profits from the defendants. An enquiry will be made as to the amount of

(1922) 49 I.A. 129

6

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mesne profits due prior and-subsequent to the institution of the suit and there will be a decree for
the amount so determined.

The honourable bench further expressed the hope that this judgment will finally conclude the
ruinous litigations which have-been going in courts since the last 62 years in respect of Raj
Ballav's estate and ingenuity of counsel will no longer-be pressed into service to again reopen
questions which must now be taken as finally settled.

CASE TITLE
M/s. Makhija Construction and Engineering Private v. Indore Development Authority and
others
AIR 2005 SC 2499

OBJECTIVE OF THE CASE

Tender Res judicata Appellant's tender for allotment of land reserved for educational use was not
accepted by respondent-authority .There was a conflict of interest between two co-respondents in
Crescent's appeal.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant and Jagriti filed writ petitions in the Gujarat High Court. The appellant's grievance
was that he was the highest tenderer having quoted for the land at Rs.261 per sq. mtr. And that
his tender was rejected unreasonably. Jagriti's grievance was that it had bid for the land at Rs.201
per sq. mtr. Which was higher than the bid of Crescent which had offered only Rs.177.60 per sq.
mtr? Jagriti, therefore, claimed that the whole of the land should have been made available to it.
Both the writ petitions were disposed of by an order dated 4th March 1998 by which the Court
directed the respondent authority to consider the representations of the appellant and Jagriti. The
matter was re-considered by respondent No. 1 and again by resolution dated 7th December 1998,
the decision taken earlier was re-affirmed. Pursuant to the decision, a letter of allotment was
issued to Jagriti and Crescent. This led to a second round of litigation by the appellant and Jagriti
reiterating their earlier stand. Both the writ petitions were allowed by a common order on 29th
February 2000. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the requirement in the tender that

13
the tender would be accepted only from registered institutions which are engaged in educational
activities had an alternative which was ignored by the respondent No.1, namely, that the
institutions constituted for that purpose could also participate. Since the appellant's memorandum
showed that the appellant was constituted, inter- alia, for setting up schools, it could not be
disqualified on this ground. The respondent No. 1 was accordingly required to decide the
representations of the appellant and Jagriti afresh with a speaking order without being influenced
by the earlier recommendations or earlier resolutions.

Three appeals were preferred from this order before the Division Bench. One appeal was by
Jagriti and two by Crescent. Jagriti's appeal was dismissed for default. One of Crescent's appeal
was dismissed on the ground that the Single Judge had done substantial justice. The respondent
No. 1 authority then reconsidered the matter again and by a resolution dated 18th September
2000, in keeping with the observations of the High Court, held that the appellant was competent
to tender and accept the tender. Its tender was accepted and allotment of the entire plot of 10,340
sq. Mtrs was made to the appellant.

PLEA OF DEFENDANT

On the question of the eligibility of the appellant to apply, it was contended that irrespective of
the construction of the advertisement since Jagriti had established experience in the field of
education it was better qualified than the appellant. It is submitted that the appellant could not be
said to have been constituted for the purpose of education. The objects of Memorandum of
Association merely list possible fields of diversification.

ISSUES INVOLVED

 Whether it was necessary for the Appellate Court to decide the appellant was entitled to
participate in the tender?
 If the decision of the Appellate Court is cryptic, nevertheless to tell appellate not to
participate?

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INTERPRETATION OF COURT

 The objects incidental or ancillary to the attainment of the main objects are specified in
Clauses 3 to 28. Other objects are mentioned in Clauses 30 to 67. These include a wide
variety of possible diversification of the appellants businesses.
 The last Clause reads:" 67. To establish and construct shopping markets, show rooms
Nursing homes, schools, clubs houses, cinemas, office premises and other buildings for
commercial purposes on lands seized and licence basis".
 To be 'constituted for' means the primary objective of the constitution. The primary
objective of the appellant was certainly not to carry on educational activities. Besides the
language of Clause 67 does not indicate that even this object is to carry on the running of
the management of the school, but rather pertains to the construction of school buildings.
Where the object was to carry on the business, this has been specifically so stated in the
remaining objects clauses, for example in Clauses 30-31, 34-37, 40-42, 44-64 and 66 of
the Memorandum.
 The importance of the requirement for being involved with educational activities will also
appear from the Regulations for Transfer of Property and Other Ancillary Matters, 1987
framed under the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam 1973, where
Regulation 33.

FINAL JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court Held that in the present case the facts show that all the three conditions were
fulfilled. There was a conflict of interest between the two co-respondents in Crescent's appeal,
namely between Jagriti and the appellants. For the purposes of deciding the relief, if any, to be
granted to Crescent it was necessary for the Appellate Court to decide whether the appellant was
entitled to participate. Although, the decision of the Appellate Court is cryptic, nevertheless, it
cannot be said that the Court had not applied its judicial mind to the merits of the case. The exact
language of the order disposing of the Crescent's appeal reads as follows:

"Heard. Dismissed as the order of the Hon'ble Single Judge has done substantial justice, it also
says that I.D.A. would decide the matter by all considerations. This order is passed after hearing
the L/C for the parties for about an hour."

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Jagriti's counsel was recorded as being present. The fact that the Appellate Court was wrong in
affirming the decision of the learned Single Judge would not make the decision less binding.
none of the decisions are apposite. They refer to the principle of precedent which is distinct from
the principle of res judicata. A precedent operates to bind in similar situations in a distinct case.
Res judicata operates to bind parties to proceedings for no other reason, but that there should be
an end to litigation.In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed without any order as to costs.
Appeal allowed

CASE TITLE
RAMJI GUPTA v. GOPI KRISHNA AGRAWAL
(AIR 2013 SC 3099)

OBJECTIVE OF THE CASE

Small Causes Court cannot adjudicate upon the issue of title. When a finding as regards
title to immovable property is rendered by a Small Causes Court, res judicata cannot be pleaded
as a bar in the subsequent regular suit, for the determination or enforcement of any right or
interest in the immovable property. A matter collaterally in issue for deciding a matter directly in
issue in the case, cannot be made the basis for a plea of resjudicata – A question regarding title in
a small cause suit, may be regarded as incidental only.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The dispute pertains to the ownership of shop no.53/11 (old number) corresponding to its new
number, i.e. 53/8, Nayayaganj, Kanpur Nagar. Janki Bibi (Ist) daughter of Har Dayal, was
married to one Durga Prasad, son of Dina Nath. Radhey Shyam was the adopted son of Durga
Prasad, whose son Shyam Sunder was married to Janki Bibi (2nd). Shyam Sunder died in the
year 1914. Thus, Radhey Shyam created a life interest in the property in favour of Janki Bibi
(2nd), by way of an oral Will, which further provided that she would have the right to adopt a
son only with the consent of Mohan Lal, the grand son of Har Dayal. Gopi Krishan, the great

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grand son of Mohan Lal, claims to have been adopted by Janki Bibi (2nd), with the consent of
Mohan Lal, and as regards the same, a registered document was also prepared.
Gopi Krishan filed a Regular Suit against Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd) in the Court of the Civil Judge,
Mohanlal Ganj in Lucknow, seeking the relief of declaration, stating that Janki Bibi was only a
life estate holder in respect of the properties shown in Schedule 'A', and that further, she was not
entitled to receive any compensation or rehabilitation grant bonds with respect to the village
Nawai Perg, Jhalotar Ajgain, Tehsil Hasangunj, District Unnao. He stated all this, while claiming
himself to be her adopted son. Janki Bibi (2nd) contested the suit, denying the aforesaid
adoption. However, the suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 23.4.1958, holding that
while Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd) was in fact the life estate holder of Radhey Shyam's property, she
was also entitled to receive the said compensation, in respect of the property in question herein.
The suit shop was under the tenancy of one Shri Badri Vishal. However, Janki Bibi (2nd)
transferred the same in favour of the appellant's mother Smt. Ram Kumari, wife of Shri Badri
Vishal, vide registered sale deed dated 7.5.1974. The said tenant, Shri Badri Vishal died on
23.1.1986, and the tenancy was hence inherited by the appellants. They thus, continued to pay
rent to the vendee Smt. Ram Kumari. Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd) died on 27.2.1996.

PLEA OF THE DEFENDANT

Respondent Gopi Krishan, filed suit stating that the appellants had defaulted in making the
payment of rent, and that a sum of Rs.2,768.62 was outstanding against them, as rent payable
between the time period 17.2.1986 to 13.8.1988, and also damages for the period 14.8.1988 to
21.2.1989, amongst other amounts due. During the pendency of the suit, Shri Gopi Krishan
respondent no.1, sold the said suit property to Smt. Vidyawati Rathaur respondent no.2, vide
registered sale deed dated 3.8.1989. In view thereof, respondent no.2 got herself impleaded as
plaintiff no.2 in Suit in 1989.

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ISSUES RAISED

(i) Whether petitioners have paid rent or not ?

(ii) Whether notice is valid or not ?
(iii) Whether suit barred by time under the provisions of section 23 (2) of the provincial
small cause court Act , 1887, hereafter called the “ACT ” and ?
(iv) Question of title if so , its effect

INTREPRETATION OF THE COURT

According to the Civil Procedure Code , 1908 sections 11, 7 and 8 explains about Res judicata
when operates to finding in respect of an issue must be be regarded as incidental to main issue
when court concerned does not have jurisdiction to decide an issue. Hence held finding on such
issue which must be deemed to be incidental cannot be made basis for bar of res judicata in
subsequent suit directly raising that issue before a competent court, finding rendered by small
cause court as regards title to immovable property would only be incidental to substantial issue
involved in small cause suit concerned. hence held ,such finding of small cause court would not
operate as res judicata in subsequent civil suit for determination of any right or interest in
property in this case .

Based on the Court , Tribunal And Special Courts sections 23 and 16 explains about the
jurisdiction of small cause courts , nature and scope depends on the bar to adjudicate upon issue
of titles in the present case.

The issuing of title to tenanted property and the tenant’s right to seek adjudication upon the
admission as to title of lessors by tenant cannot be resiled.

The sections 14 (1) and 2 Hindu law provides right as to absolute ownership to property of a
female Hindu terms of section 14 (1) has applicable as life interest in property created in instant
case by oral will in favour of daughter –in – law who was widow and impliedly held that the
same remained a life interest.

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According to Specific Relief ACT sec 34 provides the remedy of declaration and explains about
that whether the exhaustive question will be considered or not.
The sections 7 ,8 and 54 of the transfer of property Act , 1882 transfer by holder of life estate
held do not bind remainder men after death of life estate holder. Hence sale of lessor’s reversion
by life estate holder Janakibibi to predecessor of appellant tenants did not bind Gopi Krishna ,
the remainder man and upon death of Janakibibi , Gopi Krishna became the lessor of appellant
tenants.
FINAL JUDGEMENT
The trial court held as under this court cannot determine the question relating to proprietary
right/ownership of the parties. On this point, this court has limited jurisdiction to decide as to
whether there exists the relationship of house-owner and tenants in between the parties or not. As
per the judgment passed by the competent court, Smt. Janakibibi had the right in the disputed
property during her life time only. She had no right or authority to sale or transfer the disputed
property. This court is bound to accept the aforesaid conclusion. Therefore, if Smt. Janakibibi
has transferred the disputed property, contrary to her rights, to the defendant no. 4 - Smt.
Ramkumari on 7th of May, 1974, then because of that, no rights are established to Smt.
Ramkumari. Such document is a nullity and no legal cognizance can be taken in account. The
appeal was dismissed.

CASE TITLE
Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors.
MANU/RH/0647/2001

OBJECTIVE OF THE CASE

There must be balanced development of the State, particularly Western Rajasthan which had
been the subject-matter of neglect by all the Governments of the State. The petitioner has averred
that at the time of formation of the State of Rajasthan and reorganisation of the State, it was
principally agreed that the Jaipur shall be the political capital and Jodhpur shall bethe judicial
capital. The claim of Jodhpur is stated on the basis that this is the second largest city of the State.

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And this continued neglect of the executive and in political circles there has virtually been no
development in the city of Jodhpur and its adjoining areas lead to this case.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association, an Association of the Advocates
Practicing at Jodhpur, has moved certain writ petitions. In these writ petitions, the petitioner
Association has prayed that the Principal Seat/Bench/ circuit Benches of the various Tribunals be
established at Jodhpur.

PLEA OF THE DEFENDANT

The State of Rajasthan has submitted in its written reply that the case of the petitioner is based on
wild allegations. The State has contended that the petitioner Associations being of the Advocates
have made allegations of vested and political reasons. Such allegations are not supported by
facts. Making of such allegations of imbalance development, according to the respondent, appear
to be motivated politically. No discrimination has been made by the State as far as Western
Rajasthan is concerned.

ISSUES INVOLVED

 Whether the state has discriminated in the development of Rajasthan as a state in total?

INTERPRETATION OF THE COURT

The Supreme Court think that there cannot be a dispute about the proposition of law that the
High Courts have a greater scope of passing orders required in a particular contingency but then
there has to be a right which requires its enforcement in the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court. The establishment of Court is a question of public policy.

FINAL JUDGEMENT

Thus, The Supreme Court has firmly of the opinion that the present petitioners have no right in
asking for establishment of a bench at Jodhpur. Since the Supreme Court have held that the
petitioners have no locus standi in maintaining the writ petition, it is not necessary to go into the
other questions raised by the petitioners. In this view of the matter, the writ petitions are not

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liable to succeed on the ground of right of the petitioners to maintain the present writ petitions.
That being the position the writ petitions are dismissed as not maintainable.

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