831440

research-article2019
LAPXXX10.1177/0094582X19831440Latin American PerspectivesAdrover / Uruguay And The Palestinian Problem

Uruguay’s Stance on the Palestinian Problem at the

United Nations and the Creation of the State of Israel
by
Fernando Adrover Orellano
Translated by
Victoria J. Furio

Examination of documents on the decision-making process that accounts for the pro-
Zionist stance of the Uruguayan delegation at the United Nations during the debate on
Palestine reveals that the position coincides with the pro-Zionist consensus among local
political groups and was influenced by the local Jewish community lobby and its contacts
with government representatives.

Un examen de los documentos sobre el proceso de toma de decisiones que explica la

postura pro-sionista de la delegación uruguaya en las Naciones Unidas durante el debate
sobre Palestina revela que la posición coincide con el consenso pro-sionista entre los gru-
pos políticos locales y fue influenciada por el lobby de la comunidad judía local y sus
contactos con representantes del gobierno.

Keywords: Palestine, Israel, Uruguay, Foreign policy, United Nations

This article analyzes the decision-making process that led the Uruguayan
representatives to the United Nations to defend the creation of the State of
Israel in the context of advancing a broader foreign policy. This task involves
study of the Uruguayan government’s internal processes, the organization of
its diplomacy, the debate in the press, and action by pressure groups that sought
to affect the government’s stance. Although it falls within a very well-devel-
oped field of study internationally (the analysis of the Palestinian problem and
its diplomatic dimension), this work is related to another topic much less
explored by local historiography, that of Uruguay’s late-twentieth-century for-
eign relations,1 and to that of the establishment and organization of the Jewish
community and its relationship to the society of which it is a part (Aldrighi
et al., 2000; Bouret, Martínez, and Telias, 1997; Feldman, 2001; Porzecanski,
2003). The period examined falls between the decision by the British, having
failed to provide a political solution in the dispute between the Arab and Jewish
communities at the heart of the Mandate conferred on it in 1922 (Beckerman-
Boys, 2013), to refer the problem of Palestine to the UN and the beginning of
the final phase of the Arab-Israeli War in October 1948 following the break-
down of a truce brokered by the UN.

Fernando Adrover Orellano is a professor of history and researcher at the Instituto de Ciencias
Históricas, Universidad de la República, Uruguay. Victoria J. Furio is a translator living in New
York City.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 226, Vol. 46 No. 3, May 2019, 26–41
DOI: 10.1177/0094582X19831440
https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X19831440
© 2019 Latin American Perspectives

26
 Adrover / URUGUAY AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM   27

This article has certain limitations, especially with respect to access to

sources. Since official Uruguayan records do not provide sufficient informa-
tion, in the future it will be necessry to access documents from the British
Foreign Office to learn more about possible British pressure on the Uruguayan
government regarding the problem of Palestine. Dealing with the pro-Arab
sectors and the Zionist groups entails similar difficulties that I am attempting
to correct by seeking access to private archives. Despite its preliminary nature,
this essay explores a little-studied field focusing on unexplored records on this
issue.

The Uruguayan Stance and the Platforms of The Parties

in Conflict

In order to analyze the Uruguayan stance and its motivations within the
international context of which it was a part, it is necessary to summarize both
the Arab and Jewish positions and the British, U.S., and Soviet stances.

The British Stance

From early 1947 on, Britain was opposed to the partition of the Palestinian
territory into two states. The Foreign Office and Colonial Office ministers
(Ernest Bevin and Arthur Creech-Jones, respectively) sought alternatives,
attempting to have Arabs and Zionists negotiate on their own terms. According
various researchers (Beckerman-Boys, 2013; Cohen, 1982; Lepkin, 1986), pos-
sible alternatives at the time included (1) partition (generally rejected by Britain
but defended by Creech-Jones), (2) a binational state and British trusteeship, (3)
a federal state with provincial autonomy, (4) a single Arab state, and (5) main-
tenance of the status quo (implementing the 1939 White Paper). Fearing that
Arab rejection would weaken its position in the Near East, the British consid-
ered the first of these of little benefit to their interests. The next two were
rejected by the Jewish Agency, the Arab states, and the United States. The
British desire to separate the issue of displaced persons from the Palestinian
problem was thwarted by pressure from the United States, which was promot-
ing the immigration of 100,000 displaced persons. The Arabs were in favor of
the last two possibilities —they preferred an Arab state, but maintaining the
status quo was considered acceptable if it retained the restrictions on migration
imposed in 1939. For Britain this would allow time to mitigate the displaced-
persons problem (Beckerman-Boys, 2013: 128–136, 259–262). Britain was torn
between the need to maintain cordial relations with the United States (hoping
to gain its support for its negotiating points) and not endangering its relations
with Arab nations for strategic reasons (Cohen, 1982: 108).
The options for the mandatory power were reduced to imposing a solution
without consensus (negative from a strategic point of view and burdensome
resourcewise) and withdrawing from Palestine. The idea of delegating the
problem to the UN prevailed between February and April 1947, but Britain was
unwilling to become involved in enforcing the stipulations of the majority plan
of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), going so far as to boycott
28   LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

the activities of this committee and the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) (Cohen,
1982: 265–268).

The United States’ Position

Until October 11, 1947, when the U.S. government gave explicit official sup-
port to partition, its stance was hesitant and widely debated internally. Truman
struggled between the State Department (headed by Edward Stettinius until
1945, later by James Byrnes, and from 1947 on by George Marshall) and the
Jewish lobby, which used its community’s votes in key states as an instrument
of pressure (Cohen, 1990: 165). Moderate Zionism had the support of the influ-
ential pro-Zionist advisers in the White House David Niles and Max Lowenthal.
Since 1945 the U.S. State Department had been insisting on the importance of
oil interests in the Near East and their strategic postwar value, recommending
not altering relations with the Arab states (Stettinius to Truman, 4/18/1945;
Grew to Truman, 6/6/1945, Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org).
Nevertheless, Truman’s public declarations (especially his 1946 Yom Kippur
speech), often interpreted as support for Zionism, contravened these recom-
mendations and the British efforts to bring the parties closer to its terms. The
United States did not work for the victory of the partition proposal in the
November 25 General Assembly vote, but afterward Truman shifted to a more
active stance, pressuring some countries to thwart the decisive November 29
vote (Cohen, 1982: 292–300). The Soviet pronouncement possibly conditioned
this decision.

The Soviet Position

The Soviet stance changed as it strengthened its diplomatic ties with Zionist
organizations during the war and in its later negotiation of its spheres of influ-
ence2 with a Britain in decline (Ro’i, 1980: 15–25). During the 1946 Anglo-U.S.
negotiations, the Soviets pressured for the problem to be delegated to the UN
(Gorodetsky, 2003: 13–14), since a bilateral agreement would exclude them.
Aware of this fact, the Jewish Agency stepped up its conversations with its
diplomats (N. Goldman Memorandum, cited in Bentsur and Kolokolov, 2000:
128–130). In early 1947 the Soviet position was still separating the Palestinian
conflict from the situation of displaced Europeans and recommending an inter-
national trusteeship (Maksimov to Nemchinov, 3/5/1947, cited in Bentsur and
Kolokolov, 2000: 166–168). But on May 14, the General Assembly delegate
Andrei Gromyko defended a binational state or, if this were not viable, parti-
tion (UN, General Assembly, A/PV.77).3 Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov,
in secret correspondence, would later acknowledge that the reference to a bina-
tional state was merely tactical (Bentsur and Kolokolov, 2000: 227).

The Zionist Position

Political Zionism proclaimed itself the legitimate voice of a people vaguely

defined in terms of cultural, religious, and ethnic criteria. Although various
tendencies often in conflict existed within their cores, its UNSCOP and AHC
 Adrover / URUGUAY AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM   29

representatives were in agreement on certain basic points justifying the crea-

tion of a Jewish state. The principal argument was the ancestral right of the
Jewish people to Palestinian territory, based on historical-ethnic and religious
references and expressed in an enduring desire for return. Palestine was neces-
sary to redeem the Jewish people and to normalize its situation in the world as
much as this people was necessary to redeem Palestine with its work and civi-
lizing contribution (UNSCOP, A/AC.13/PV.26). The second most important
argument was the right granted by the international agreements based on the
1917 Balfour Declaration (Laqueur, 1969: 18–20), betrayed, according to the
Jewish Agency, by the 1939 White Paper. The third argument was the persis-
tence of anti-Semitism in Europe, calling for Jewish migration to a safe place
shielded from the ambitions of Amin al-Husseini (the grand mufti of Jerusalem
and Palestinian Arab religious and political leader, known as a philo-Nazi). The
displaced-persons issue was thus linked to the Palestinian question, placing
moral pressure on the UN, whose members were mostly sensitized by the Nazi
genocide (UNSCOP, A/AC.13/PV.26). The civilizing and modernizing benefits
conferred on the Arabs by the Jews in their recent migrations operated as
another argument, one that assumed an attitude of civilizing superiority of
Western origin (UNSCOP, A/AC.13/PV.16).
Lastly, another argument was the denial of Palestinian nationalism, consid-
ered the fiction of an elite that had mobilized an uncouth and naïve mass
inspired by petty interests and a violent message (UNSCOP, A/AC.13/PV.21
and A/AC.13/PV.31). This rationale justified the possibility of a forced “trans-
fer” of Palestinian Arabs to other Arab countries in the region (Masalha, 2008)
because it presumed a common national identity of the former with a broader
Arab nation. The Zionist positions were radicalized after the Twenty-second
Zionist Congress in December 1946, in which the leadership of Ben Gurion and
Abba Hillel Silver over and above Chaim Weizmann was reaffirmed (Weizmann,
1949: 604–605).

The Arab Stance

While Mufti Husseini was relentless in his boycott of UNSCOP (García

Granados, 1949: 50), with the exception of King Abdullah I of Jordan, whom the
committee expressly visited, the representatives of the Arab League attended
its final sessions (UNSCOP, A/AC.13/PV.38, A/AC.13/PV.39). The League
rejected the Jewish Agency’s charge of philo-Nazism and concentrated its argu-
ments on questioning the legitimacy of the Mandate in imposing Zionist aspi-
rations on the true titleholders of the territory. It rejected the Balfour Declaration
and upheld the status of Palestinians as an interested party capable of deciding
the future of the territory of the defeated Ottoman Empire, denied by Britain
and the League of Nations on the basis of the right of conquest following World
War I. Its second core rationale fell into a pseudoscientific realm of genealogies
and the formation of “races,” refusing to recognize the Jews as a people and
therefore their right to Palestinian land. It also criticized terrorism and the vio-
lence inherent in the Zionist claims.
In addition, the League maintained that the projected Arab state should have
the power to regulate immigration in its territory in order to safeguard the
30   LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

rights of the Palestinian people while guaranteeing those of the Jewish minor-
ity already residing there. It added that Palestine could no longer sacrifice itself
to alleviate European guilt. Ultimately it rejected the civilizing benefits of
Jewish immigration, deploring the displacement of Arabs. Moreover, it argued
the economic unviability of a Jewish state. It also pointed to an evident pro-
Zionist bias of several members of UNSCOP, among them the delegates from
Uruguay and Guatemala.

The Uruguayan Position

From the time that UNSCOP began to operate, the questions asked in hear-
ings by the Uruguayan delegate, Enrique Rodríguez Fabregat, demonstrated a
position critical of British imperialism and in sympathy with the Zionist posi-
tions (UNSCOP, A/AC.13/PV.24: 10).
In presenting the majority plan of UNSCOP to the General Assembly on
September 3, 1947, the delegate left no room for doubt (General Assembly,
A/364, Add.1:57):

The creation of a Jewish State will be the territorial solution to the European
Jewish problem and will make partial amends for the terrible biases that . . . the
Jewish people have suffered, while still exposed to new injustices and racial
discrimination. . . . Hence the urgent need to provide a territorial solution to
the Jewish problem. And to do so basically in Palestine. . . . Europe’s Jews are
demanding that today, as survivors of Nazi extermination, capable of enduring
the harshest ordeals . . . in order to obtain the land twice promised them: in the
promise by their God on Mount of Revelation and in the promise of the Nations
in 1922 in San Remo, detailing the provisions of the Mandate.

He defended partition as the only possible solution and as necessary to do

justice to a people recognized as a nation with a right to the territory, granting
legitimacy to the association of the Palestinian problem with that of the dis-
placed persons and the commitments deriving from the Balfour Declaration.
The increased humanitarian consciousness regarding the Nazi genocide also
played an important role.
From the start, Rodríguez Fabregat maintained an inflexible defense of the
legitimacy of the British Mandate (AHC, A/AC.14/SR.6: 33), although he crit-
icized the British imperialist interests that violated their guardianship obliga-
tions.4 The fresh memory of the failure of the League of Nations and the concern
for the possible disparagement of the UN explain that position: questioning the
Mandate could undermine the legitimacy of the resolution debated (since the
decision-making authority was based on the legacy of the League of Nations)
and compromise the power of the UN in general to resolve similar problems.

Internal Debate, Opposing Pressures, And Decision

Making In Uruguay

The decision-making process examined here occurred during the presiden-

cies of Tomás Berreta and his successor, Luis Batlle Berres. By 1938 the country
 Adrover / URUGUAY AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM   31

had begun a process of “democratic normalization” following the dictatorship

of Gabriel Terra with the administrations of Alfredo Baldomir (1938–1942) and
Juan José de Amézaga (1943–1947). During the war, the Uruguayan govern-
ment was increasingly committed to the Allies, especially after the conflict
reached its shores (in the Battle of the River Plate). This coincided with the
strengthening of the political sectors that promoted that stance, mainly
Batllismo and Nacionalismo Independiente, which had suffered repression
under Terra, while the influence of neutralist sectors such as Herrerismo was
weakening (D’Elía, 1986; Frega et al., 2008).5 Between 1947 and 1948 Uruguayan
foreign relations were led by Eduardo Rodríguez Larreta (a key figure in the
country’s pan-Americanist alignment) and then by Mateo Marques Castro and
Daniel Castellanos.

Action By The Jewish Lobby

The Jewish community in Uruguay, especially in Montevideo (where it was

largely concentrated), was numerically significant (25,000 in 1938) and,
strengthened by the migration of refugees prior to and during the war,
amounted to approximately 50,000 during the 1950s (Feldman, 2001: 185;
Raicher, 2003: 18). Its community organizations were fortified during the 1940s,
achieving a degree of unity with the creation of the Israeli Central Committee
of Uruguay. Its commitment to the Zionist cause grew during the war, and the
creation of the Jewish Agency office in Montevideo (led first by Rabbi Isaac
Algazi and later by Jacobo Hazán) marked an important milestone. These insti-
tutions carried out various actions aimed at persuasion (in favor of a pro-Zion-
ist stance) of the public and the country’s political elite. These actions involved
publications aimed at the Jewish community to encourage Zionist activism,
calls to meetings and public events, radio programs, distribution of flyers and
posters, interviews with renowned politicians, and messages and propagandis-
tic publications sent to government institutions (Avni and Raicher, 1986: 23).
The most effective influence on the political elite, however, was their personal
relations with key members of the legislative and executive branches and the
diplomatic service (Avni and Raicher, 1986: 37–59).
The Jewish Agency’s local office created a “committee of friends” of the
Zionist cause composed of important non-Jewish figures in Uruguay’s political
and cultural life: the Comité Uruguayo Pro-Palestina (Pro-Palestine Committee
of Uruguay—CUPP) was founded on July 8, 1944, and headed by Augusto
Turenne. Its members included Héctor Paysée Reyes (a major supporter of the
Zionist cause in the General Assembly), Jaime Bayley (delegate to the UN), the
Batllista politician Hugo Fernández Artucio, the Catholic Party deputy Tomás
Brena, the socialist leader José Pedro Cardoso, and important Uruguayan intel-
lectuals of the time including Celedonio Nin y Silva, Emilio Oribe, Alberto Zum
Felde, and Carlos Sabat Ercasty. The CUPP held various meetings and confer-
ences, concluding with “a brilliant public event in Montevideo’s Ateneo, with
an enthusiastic audience of some 5,000 people” (CUPP, 1945: 1). Some of the
speeches were published in a pamphlet whose goal, in addition to combating
anti-Semitism, was to advocate for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.
Turenne declared (CUPP, 1945: 6):
32   LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

We would like Uruguay’s voice to join the universal clamor so that, by his-
torical right, national relevance, and the unspeakable suffering endured over
long years, the Jewish people may have the right to live where more than two
millennia ago it was capable of organizing a civilization, creating an ideo-
logical line that is the root of current Christian civilization, and preserving a
sense of unity, unique in history, in the midst of the most dire historical devel-
opments.

The Jewish Agency’s influence on the CUPP can be seen in the committee’s
publications and in the correspondence of its leadership, with Rajel Sefaradí
Yardén, head of the Latin American Division of the Jewish Agency, reporting
on its activities (Avni and Raicher, 1986: 60–61).
The Zionist movement’s publicity also sought to influence Uruguay’s
Foreign Ministry and may have had some impact on the development of its
stance. According to Hazán (quoted in Avni and Raicher, 1986: 31; see also Tov,
1983: 258), there was frequent communication between them:

In 1947, we presented the Jewish Agency as a Jewish government, as yet unrec-

ognized, but a government in fact, and we obtained . . . credentials to be pre-
sented to the president at the time, Mr. Tomás Berreta, and to the Foreign
Minister, Eduardo Marques Castro. This gave us an unofficial status before the
government, and like the population and government, despite British pres-
sure, they were pro-Jewish. According to the norm, we held a status that at
least allowed us to enter the Ministry of Foreign Relations as if we were diplo-
mats. . . . The various foreign ministers that held the office were all very favor-
ably inclined toward Israel and we had regular discussions, went to make
requests and to stress that they maintain a favorable line.

Hazán also recalls his telephone conversations with Batlle Berres’s secretary,
Juan Carlos Schauritch (whom he calls “a very close friend”), and had been the
family doctor of Rodríguez Fabregat’s mother, developing a familiarity that
allowed him to serve as a liaison in his first meeting with Moshe Tov (who suc-
ceeded Rajel Sefaradí Yardén in his post) in the United States (Tov, 1983: 47;
Daniel Rodríguez Oteiza, interview, Montevideo, May 10, 2016).
Thus a close relationship was formed between members of the Uruguayan
delegation and members of the Zionist movement prior to the start of the
UNSCOP sessions. Tov highlights the influence of Hazán on the Uruguayan
government (Tov, 1983: 258):

I remember that during one of the roughest Assemblies at the United Nations,
Professor Fabregat admitted that on a certain issue of debate, it was absolutely
necessary for him to receive precise instructions and have freedom of action in
order to maneuver his position in the Latin American bloc. I merely had to
telegraph Hazán; . . . he quickly obtained an audience with the foreign minis-
ter, whom he convinced that we were in the right, and within a few hours
Fabregat had the ensuing cable with the appropriate instructions in his hands.

The Voice Of The British Community In Montevideo

The archives I consulted did not corroborate Rosa Perla Raicher’s (2003: 181)
theory that there was British pressure on the Uruguayan government in favor
 Adrover / URUGUAY AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM   33

of support of its interests in the Palestine question. The Uruguayan ambassador

in London, during a key time in the trade and finance negotiations with Britain
(Loy, 2000), was aware of the new geopolitical reality: “Britain has lost ground;
the United States and the Soviet Union are taking over many of its former
spheres of influence.” Nevertheless he felt that, given the Labour victory, a rap-
prochement with that country was necessary and advantageous: “This is a
decisive moment for recovering and improving positions” (Roberto MacEachen
to Marques Castro, 9/18/1947, Archivo Histórico-Diplomático del Ministerio
de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Oriental del Uruguay, [hereafter AHD-
MMRREE], Fondo Gran Bretaña, File 15). The difficulties and diplomatic pres-
sures that the Palestine problem may have meant for relations between the two
countries have yet to be fully documented.
In this phase of the investigation, reading just the Sun, the voice of the British
community in Montevideo, can provide some idea of how this community,
which represented powerful interests in Uruguay, attempted to exert pressure
on decisions by the government. The tone of this newspaper’s editorials, very
concerned about the Palestinian problem, varied throughout the period. Until
May 1947 they were confident that the partition option would fail in the UN.
Later, when this solution was approved, defying their predictions, their anti-
Zionist tone was more heated, bordering on anti-Semitism. The Sun’s opinion
on the Zionist movement was “We look upon political Zionists as the worst
enemies of Jewry today, and we shall continue to campaign against them as
long as we can lift a pen” (September 27, 1947). Finally, following approval of
the partition, an extensive editorial argued that the UN had received a mortal
wound, destroying its own legitimacy by acting against its own charter in “a
case of suicide” (December 2, 1947). Despite the immensely critical attitude of
those who defended partition that led the Sun to make harsh statements about
the Guatemalan delegation, it was extremely cautious with the equally com-
mitted Uruguayan support for this solution. This is apparent in the editorial
commenting on Uruguayan recognition of the State of Israel, considered regret-
table. Nevertheless, the opportunity to raise suspicions about the motivations
for this recognition was not lost (Sun, May 21, 1948):

In conformity with what we consider to be the proper conduct of a foreign

newspaper published in any country, we refrain to comment on the above
decree in any way. We nevertheless allow ourselves to express the hope that
Uruguay’s recognition of the Zionist State will not in any way diminish the
readiness she has always shown to admit displaced Jews. . . . We express this
hope because we have been informed on reliable authority that several Latin
American countries will limit the immigration of Jews on the ground that they
now have their own country in Palestine to which they can go.

An Incipient Pro-Arab Sector

In contrast to the activities of Zionist lobby and the pro-Zionist organiza-

tions, the pro-Arab view never had the same force, access to the media, or
number of supporters. Both the demographic weight and the activist commit-
ment of Uruguay’s Arab community seem to have been limited. According to
assessments by Israeli diplomatic staff in Uruguay in 1950, the Arab population
34   LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

(immigrants and descendants) was about 15,000 (Raicher, 2003: 175), although
it probably included a good number of non-Muslim Lebanese. The first public
expression found in an anti-Zionist Arab organization, the Arab Committee in
Defense of Palestine, appeared in the pages of Marcha for December 5, 1947:
“We are especially pleased to inform you that an Arab Pro-Palestine Defense
Committee has been formed in Montevideo whose primary goal is to raise
awareness of the problems of our brothers and sisters and to fight for the
defense of their legitimate rights.” A transcription of two very terse telegrams
addressed to the Uruguayan delegation to the UN, expressing solidarity with
the Arab cause in Palestine, followed.
No reference to this organization or to its publicity was found in the govern-
ment archives. This contrasts with the situation of the Zionist lobby and pro-
Zionist sectors, which had the support of an international institution (the
Jewish Agency), a solid discourse, substantial capacity to generate and dis-
seminate publicity, and, perhaps most important, a foothold in Jewish commu-
nity organizations and networks of contacts previously established with
government and diplomatic figures. Further, the late emergence of the pro-
Arab petition limited its success once the Uruguayan stance had been clearly
presented at the UN.
In Argentina the pro-Arab sector was better organized and carried out a larger
publicity offensive (see Comité Árabe Pro Ayuda a Palestina, 1948). The relation
between the Uruguayan and Argentine committees has yet to be ascertained, and
in fact Uruguay’s publicity employs the lines established by the office of the Arab
League in Río de Janeiro, which apparently did not have much influence even in
Brazil (Vigevani and Kleinas, 2000: 98).

Palestine In The Partisan Press

The Uruguayan press covered the Palestinian problem largely through

cables from foreign press agencies, devoting little editorial space to it. El Debate,
the voice of Herrerismo (the largest political opposition sector), exhibited a
very mild critical tone toward Zionism: it rejected Jewish terrorism and empha-
sized (in a tone that could be interpreted as rejection) the power of the U.S.
Jewish lobby in the UN given that it operated in New York, “the spiritual and
official capital of the Jewish world.” It was even suggested that the Jews would
not comply with the UN decision, since the Jewish Agency itself “did not . . .
rule out the possibility of defending the extremist line of the movement if it did
not obtain full satisfaction of its autonomy demands in the UN” (May 8, 1947).
It is noteworthy that this newspaper was the only one in Uruguay to give space
to an interview with Mufti Husseini (taken from the international press) in
which he advanced his arguments against Zionism (April 15, 1947). A more
recent survey of El Debate has shown that while it continued to adopt anti-
Semitic and philofascist stances (October 20, 1946), later it published editorials
in which the Zionist cause was included among those that, in accordance with
the nationalist definitions of Herrerismo, ought to be accepted (Jlly 20, 1947;
May 16, 1948). The complex and never unanimous stances within this sector
deserve to be examined in depth.
 Adrover / URUGUAY AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM   35

In turn, the voice of Nacionalismo Independiente. El País (December 2,

1947), called for “sanity and common sense” in order to avoid another war
and expressed solidarity with the Zionist cause. Ultimately, it expressed its
agreement with the partition solution: “The Hebrew people have the right to
have place under the sun, as do all others on the earth. This was a millennial
problem, heightened during this century, that needed a solution, and it was
logical to find it by placing them in their traditional land, which according to
history and an old religious legend held their original cradle.” The Nacionalista
El Plata collected several notes written by the U.S. journalist Walter Lippmann
expressing relatively critical support for partition, which he considered inev-
itable in the context of the decline of the old colonial empires. Adopting a
pragmatic stance, he felt that the best solution was the one that created the
least harm in the Near East, especially considering the possibility that the
Soviet Union would seek to exploit the instability to broaden its sphere of
influence. Moreover, he insisted on defending the UN as a guarantor of peace
and rational policy in the face of the realpolitik criteria and the Cold War in
the making. He argued that much of the responsibility for finding solutions
to these issues fell on “small and medium-sized nations” (May 10, December
2, and December 8, 1947).
In the governing Partido Colorado’s publications there was more coverage
of the topic. The Riverista6 La Mañana projected a fairly pessimistic position on
the tensions between the great powers, particularly in light of the Soviet aspira-
tions for intervention that were hidden behind its support for partition. This
was expressed in both its editorials and its cartoons (December 6, 1947). It also
had an affinity with Zionism, agreeing with one of its typical arguments, the
civilizing superiority of the Jews. In addition, it exalted the work of the UN in
terms similar to those of El Plata (April 27, 1947).
El Día (November 13, 1947), representing Batllismo (the majority sector of
the governing party, which controlled the executive branch), was noted for
publishing firsthand information on UN debates, thanks to articles by one of
the Uruguayan delegates, Jaime Bayley. This diplomat was optimistic about the
possible success of what he considered a pro-partition tendency within the
General Assembly, assigning a key role to Rodríguez Fabregat:“We have a great
deal of faith in the righteousness of the cause and in the perseverance, ability,
and fervent dedication to the matter of our permanent delegate to the UN and
rapporteur Rodríguez Fabregat, who is endorsed with zeal and love in his hon-
orable endeavor by García Granados of Guatemala, Zuloaga of Venezuela, and
other prestigious delegates.” Furthermore, the editorials in El Día reflected
critical support for the Zionist cause, considering it just but distancing itself
from the terrorist methods of some of the organizations that supported it, while
at the same time backing the UN’s authority to recommend a solution to the
conflict.
Among the leftist press, the Communist weekly Justicia stood out with a
position that varied throughout the period. Between August and September
1946, a series of notes denounced the machinations of the capitalist powers and
the complicity of the Jewish and Arab elites against their peoples, perpetuating
a conflict situation. Ultimately it declared itself against partition (August 30,
1946):
36   LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

The motto of the Jewish State . . . defended by the most reactionary sectors of
Zionism . . . is a false and antidemocratic one—the Jewish population in
Palestine totals 600,000 while the Arabs number 1,300,000—and provokes a
violent Arab reaction, facilitating the British “divide and rule” policy and the
more daring projects for division, such as the plans for partition of Palestine.
In this way some Zionist leaders have taken positions that border on treason
against the interests of their own people. . . . Moreover, the Arab League serves
to create illusions about an abstract Arab unity and achieving independence
through negotiations, diverting the masses from any real anti-imperialist coop-
eration and from the struggle for effective independence in each Arab country.

This position changed in 1947, once the Soviet Union had committed its sup-
port to partition and it had been approved: “In the Arab peoples’ preparations
for war, the hand that controls the oil consortia in the Near East is not uncon-
nected, given that an Arab-Jewish war would give the Yankee imperialists the
excuse to intervene in the name of peace. This what the USSR delegate sought
to avoid by accepting, in principle, the partition of Palestine” (March 2, 1948).
The arguments in support of partition did not differ from those wielded against
it (anti-imperialist arguments). Justicia did not mention the violent discrepan-
cies between the two nationalisms in dispute, demonstrating a not very realis-
tic trust in the conciliatory doctrine of the Communist Party of Palestine, with
which it was in solidarity (May 14, 1948).
The weekly Marcha, a self-proclaimed independent tribunal, dealt with the
problem in more detail. Initially, it presented only the Zionist arguments, while
maintaining that the viability of the UN was at stake in the success of partition:
the title of one of its articles read “Palestine Is the Touchstone for the UN”
(December 19, 1947). Only in December 1947, because of a reader’s protest, was
space given to a pro-Arab communiqué and to an article by the British scholar
and former anti-Zionist colonial officer William Stace, who asked, “Since when
has it become a principle of justice that in a dispute regarding property or any-
thing else the strong desire of one of the parties to have whatever is in dispute
gives him claim to it?” (December 19, 1947). This provoked angry protests from
Jewish readers, who responded with the typical Zionist arguments.
In sum, the majority of Uruguayan newspapers—privileged creators of
opinion and representatives of the principal sectors of the most important polit-
ical parties in the country—held pro-Zionist views, although the importance
given to the issue varied in different publications. However, this survey, focused
on the papers with the most circulation, remains to be complemented by one of
other, smaller newspapers. The consensus displayed by most of the political
sectors is due, in large part, to the development of Uruguayan political confron-
tation stemming from the Terra dictatorship that displaced the power of
Batllismo through an alliance with the Partido Nacional’s Herrerista sector.
During the latter half of the 1930s and as the war progressed, the sectors in
opposition to Terrismo and Herrerismo built a strong antifascist identity with
respect to their political opponents, accusing them of being philofascists
(Oddone, 1990). According to Feldman (2001: 76), “It was no accident that the
antifascists were anti-Terristas. The sectors opposed to the 1933 coup were true
Batllistas, independent Blancos, Blanco supporters of Dr. Quijano, socialists,
anarchists, and communists, and also those most identified with antifascism
 Adrover / URUGUAY AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM   37

worldwide.” Political leaders linked to these sectors were the driving force of
the antifascist and pro-Allies organizations during the war, with the Ateneo of
Montevideo as their main center for meetings and transmission of ideas. Their
relationship to the Zionist sectors was established in these organizations, where
they combined efforts and created solidarity almost naturally. The exchange of
ideas, political sympathies, and personal ties generated there are important in
explaining the philo-Zionist consensus of the period that followed.

The Palestinian Problem In The General Assembly

The Palestinian problem was rarely raised in the regular sessions of the
General Assembly. Both international affairs committees (whose minutes were
apparently not written down or simply not preserved) debated the issue but
declared themselves in support of the formally constituted State of Israel once
the Uruguayan diplomatic stance had been determined. Therefore there is no
reason to think that the legislature’s work had much influence on the execu-
tive’s pro-Zionist position. The sporadic pronouncements from both houses
were overwhelmingly pro-Zionist. In July 1946 the Nacionalista representative
José Olivera Ubíos was the first to speak in favor of the Zionist cause, express-
ing solidarity with “the population of another tiny land” (Diario de Sesiones de
la Cámara de Representantes de la República Oriental del Uruguay [hereafter
DSCR], Vol. 467, 94). Almost a year later Héctor Paysée Reyes, a Nacionalista
Independiente linked to the CUPP, praised Rodríguez Fabregat’s actions
(although regretting the limited information available on them), but the first
significant exchange of views did not take place until May 1948, spurred by a
letter sent by “distinguished citizens” requesting support for the Jewish state.
Several deputies defended its existence at that time: Batllistas, Nacionalistas
Independientes, and the socialist José Pedro Cardoso spoke out. In addition,
Paysée Reyes underscored the legitimacy of the UN, which was placed on the
line in the decision regarding partition (DSCR, Vol. 467, 273):

It compromises not only the existence of the newly formed state but also some-
thing much larger: the effort made by the civilized world as the war ended and
it became a legal entity in the organization of the UN. With the events in
Palestine it is balancing on the razor’s edge. If the UN is unable . . . to have its
resolution respected, we will have to say, very bitterly, that the UN, the world’s
organized structure, has committed suicide.

On June 2, 1948, in the Senate, in response to the letter cited, the Communist
Party representative Julia Arévalo de Roche led the pro-Zionist defense (Official
Journal of the House of Senators, Vol. 188, 214). Only one discordant voice was
raised in the House of Representatives—that of Deputy Stewart Vargas, an
Herrerista and journalist from El Debate, who was ridiculed:

The Jews have as much to do with Israel or Palestine as I do with Jews, which
is nothing. In addition, to organize Jews into a State, within an Arab nation
where Jews have for centuries exploited the Arabs, is to provoke a war and not
promote peace. (Not supported) This problem is somewhat fictitious, because
the Israelis’ desire to go to Palestine did not come from them: it was proposed
during the last century. . . . (Laughter).
38   LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

The Problem In The Executive Branch

Given the hesitant U.S. stance and its belated support for partition, the pro-
United States alignment of the Berreta and Batlle administrations does not
fully explain their position on the Palestinian problem (although it cannot be
ruled out as a factor that influenced their adoption of a pro-Zionist stance).
Even when the United States proposed trusteeship instead of partition in
1948, Uruguay was opposed. Meanwhile, the executive’s desire to increase
Uruguay’s importance at the diplomatic level—to have renown and initiative
in international politics surpassing what would be expected of a small nation
on the periphery with little power, exploiting its highly valued reputation as
a democratic country in the postwar context—must be considered as an
incentive (Batlle Berres, 1966: 61–62) This attitude was consistent with a com-
mitment to multilateralism that, despite the pan-American alignment of
which Rodríguez Larreta’s doctrine was a clear exponent, was conceived
“from a relatively autonomous position” (Clemente, 2005: 34). Pan-
Americanism, which served to safeguard the country’s security at a regional
level, was complemented by a certain amount of autonomy on issues of sec-
ondary importance (Armand Ugón to Batlle Berres, 11/15/1947, Archivo
General de la Nación, Fondo Luis Batlle y Ordoñez, Uruguay [hereafter AGN-
LBB], Case 109, f. 2), with Palestine apparently one of them. The privileged
space for the advancement of this policy was the UN (Armand Ugón to Batlle
Berres, 10/25/1948, AGN-LBB, Case 110, UN).
Rodríguez Fabregat, a former deputy and former government minister
exiled during Terra’s dictatorship, was a university professor and a journalist
in the United States during World War II, gaining experience in the field of
international relations (Etchegoimberry, 1997: 83–84). This background, along
with a Batllista affiliation and his friendship with Luis Batlle, resulted in his
designation as a representative to the international body and the freedom of
action he was granted. As an official of the Uruguayan delegation in UNSCOP
he was accompanied by Óscar Secco Ellauri and Edmundo Sisto.
At that time, the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry seems to have been experienc-
ing organizational problems and economic difficulties in the diplomatic dele-
gations (Paysée Reyes to Batlle Berres, 4/24/1948, AGN-LBB, Case 110, UN
File, f. 2), compounded by internal disputes, in the case of the UN, among
delegates of different party affiliations (Jaime Bailey to Marcos Battle Santos,
9/23/1947, AGN-LBB, Case 38, Correspondence File). Nevertheless, Uruguay
actively participated in all the committees, presenting projects and amend-
ments and putting forth a clear position as well as a full agenda of extraofficial
meetings with important diplomats, and issued numerous press releases
(Armand Ugón to Batlle Berres, November 1948, Report to the Ministry of
Foreign Relations, November 1948, AGN-LBB, Case 110, UN). It is possible that
some of these extraofficial activities were designed to persuade other delega-
tions in order to obtain the votes necessary to approve Resolution 181 (Rodríguez
Oteiza, interview, May 10, 2016). By comparing the Foreign Ministry’s docu-
ments with the presidential correspondence, it is possible to contend that many
of the UN Uruguayan delegation’s diplomatic instructions were given through
personal correspondence, evading ministerial channels.
 Adrover / URUGUAY AND THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM   39

Final Reflections

Despite the scarcity of official Uruguayan sources, as a tentative conclusion

I would highlight the confirmation of a certain philo-Zionist consensus among
the local political groups. Moreover, it is evident that the Jewish community
outflanked the Arabs in organization, propagandistic power, and capacity for
pressure and that its contacts with key government figures were significant.
While it cannot be definitively concluded that they were instrumental in the
motivations for the Uruguayan diplomatic stance, it is clear that the array of
arguments widely disseminated by the Zionists in the country was adopted by
the Uruguayan diplomatic narrative in the UN. The antifascism of the partisan
sectors that held key posts in the government after Tomás Berreta became pres-
ident constituted a basis for his approach to the Zionist sectors. Although the
nature of British pressure could not be thoroughly analyzed, it is clear that it
was not decisive, partly because of Britain’s declining hegemony in the region
and Uruguay’s new pan-American alignment. Furthermore, the aim of estab-
lishing a strong presence in the UN and projecting the country’s international
importance should be carefully considered in attempting to explain Uruguay’s
stance regarding the Palestinian problem.

Notes

1. There are few general studies of Uruguayan diplomacy during this period (Oddone, 1997)
except for some essays originating outside the field of historiography (Arocena Olivera, 1984:
Gros Espiell, 2001). Instead, historiography has been devoted to case studies (Oddone, 2003) or to
annotated document collections (Rodríguez Ayçaguer, 2004).
2. The Soviet Union negotiated these spheres of influence in a dynamic similar to the tradi-
tional Czarist realpolitik (Leffler and Westad, 2009: 92), something that coincided with the British
approach and contrasted with the U.S. policy inspired by the Kennan report.
3. Regarding the UN documents, I provide the reference code found on the digital archive,
where the number indicates the session of the entity or committee.
4. His questions of the British representatives who appeared before UNSCOP sought to expose
their lack of compliance with their obligations to guarantee health, education, and political auton-
omy to the inhabitants of Palestine. In his memoirs he criticized the 1939 White Paper, which he
considered a disavowal of the commitment of the national Jewish home and a “document of
imperial rank” (Rodríguez Fabregat, 1992: 22).
5. Batllismo was a reformist and statist sector of the Partido Colorado, hegemonic in the gov-
ernment of the country for most of its history. It carried on the ideological legacy of José Batlle y
Ordoñez (1856–1929). Independent Nacionalismo was an offshoot of the Partido Nacional
opposed to Herrerismo and with some points of contact with Batllismo. Herrerismo, led by Luis
Alberto de Herrera, was the hegemonic sector of the Partido Nacional, strongly nationalist,
Hispanicist, and conservative and one of the pillars of the 1933 coup of Gabriel Terra.
6. Riverismo was a rightist sector of the Partido Colorado that opposed Batllist reformism and
was among the supporters of the Terra coup.

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