Paras v.

COMELEC
Case No. 196
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
Chapter VI, Page 259, Footnote No. 50
FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent PunongBarangay. The recall election was deferred due to
Petitioner’s opposition that underSec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of theofficial’s
assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular localelection. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set
on the first Mondayof May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context,and it must be considered together and kept
subservient to its general intent. Theevident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during histerm, as
provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law,determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase
“regular local election” toinclude SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recallelection rendering inutile
the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumedthat the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation
should beavoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated,meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 11d, 25b, 27, 36b, 37, 38

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 183517, June 22, 2010
Perez, J.:

Doctrine:
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 cannot be construed as an additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or an
exception to the prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans as aforesaid.

Facts:
With the issuance of PD 1071, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Philippine International Trading Corporation, then
President Marcos issued EO 756, authorizing the reorganization of PITC. On February 18, 1983, President Marcos issued Executive
Order No. 87.

Romero, an officer of petitioner, filed a July 16, 2001 request, seeking from petitioner payment of retirement differentials on the strength
of Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756.

COA Comm. Habitan issued the assailed ruling,stating that Reserve for Retirement Gratuity and Commutation of Leave Credits of
petitioner’s employees did not include allowances outside of the basic salary, said officer ruled that Executive Order No. 756 was a
special law issued only for the specific purpose of reorganizing petitioner corporation. Finding that Section 6 of Executive Order No.
756 was simply an incentive to encourage employees to resign or retire at the height of petitioner’s reorganization, said decision went
on to make the following pronouncements, to wit:"Moreover, RA No. 4968 prohibits the creation of any insurance retirement plan by
any government agency and government-owned or controlled corporation other than the GSIS,

Issue:
Whether Executive Order No. 756 is an additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or an exception to the prohibition
against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans

Held:
No. Time and again, it has been held that every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence – interpretere et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi. Thus, if diverse statutes relate to the
same thing, they ought to be taken into consideration in construing any one of them, as it is an established rule of law that all acts in
pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one law.

Section 6 of Executive Order No. 756 cannot be construed as an additional alternative to existing general retirement laws and/or an
exception to the prohibition against separate or supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans as aforesaid. Aside from the fact
that a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein by
construction, petitioner would likewise do well to remember that repeal of laws should be made clear and express. Repeals by
implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject,
the congruent application of which the courts must generally presume.
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16, 2010
Mutuc vs. COMELEC
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. NO. L-32717

November 26, 1970

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, from using “jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers” on 22 October
1970. Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates “to purchase,
produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin.” It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a
tangible propaganda material, under the phrase “and the like.”

ISSUE:
Whether “jingles” falls down on the prohibited electoral propaganda gadgets of R.A. No. 6132.

RULING:

For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done
cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being
applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in
the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for distribution.

Mutuc v. Comelec
GR L-32717, 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228)
First Division, Fernando (p):7 concur, 2 on leave, 1 concur in separate opinion
Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate for
the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using jingles in his mobile units
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers on 22 October 1970.Petitioner impugned the act of
respondent as violative of his right to free speech.Respondent however contended that the prohibition
was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for
candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets
such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domes tic or foreign origin. It was
its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer
and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase and the like.
Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase and the like.
Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration
are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.It is quite
apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to
as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on th e distribution of gadgets of the
kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for
its distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters,
fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and
concluding with the words and the like. ). Taped jingles therefore were not prohibited.
The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the mi nute resolution of 3
November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited the Comelec from
enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped
jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without pronouncement as to costs

People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
En Banc, Regala (p):7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause
that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant s
plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the
peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Se ction 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview
of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is
excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and
pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the
ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code
Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can
operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.The application of the
rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather
from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term judge
includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions whil e acting in that capacity, including justice
of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. T he intention of the Legislature did not
exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the
justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term judge, including
therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the cour ts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian
Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, an d justices of the peace.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for
trial on the merits.

Gomez v. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners

Case No. 115
No. 32441. March 29, 1930
Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No.209
FACTS:
Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to theadministration of opium. Petitioner claims that his
administration of opium to patientswas not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed bysubsequent Opium
Laws.
ISSUE:
W/N Plaintiff should have his license restored.
HELD:
No, Plaintiff should not have his license restored. The subsequent Opium Lawscannot be held to have impliedly repealed
prior ones as these did not conflict orremove said prior laws. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined term
ofunprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to patients.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 38b

Centano v. Villalon-Pornillos
Case No. 54
G.R. No. 113092 (September 1, 1994)
Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No. 203
FACTS:
In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched afund drive for the purpose of renovating the
chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan. MartinCenteno, chairman of the group, approached Judge Angeles, President of Tikay,and the latter
solicited P 1,500. However, this solicitation was made without a permitfrom the DSWD and as a result, it was contended that Centeno
violated P.D. 1564,which states “Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or publicwelfare purposes shall secure a
permit from the regional Office of the Department ofSocial services and Development.”
ISSUE:
W/N the phrase “charitable purposes” in P.D. 1564 is meant to include
religious purposes.
HELD:
No. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, byinterpretation or construction, be extended to
others. The 1987 Constitution treats thewords “charitable” and “religious” separately and independently from each other.Since P.D.
1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need apermit from DSWD, this means that the framers of the law never
intended to includesolicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. The term “charitable” should bestrictly construed to exclude
solicitations for “religious” purposes. Moreover, since thisis a criminal case, penal law must be construed strictly against the State and
liberallyin favor of the accused.
Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez
Case No. 67
G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961)
Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.95
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation engages in manufactu
ring toilet preparations andhousehold remedies.
Importation of materials including “stabilizers and flavors” isamong those Petitioner imports. For every importation, Petitioner pays the
CentralBank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for thepayment of the cost, transportation and
other charges pursuant to RA 601, theExchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that:
“Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or othercharges incident to the importation into the Philippines of
… stabilizer and flavors …shall berefu nded to any importer making application therefore.”
The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax
ISSUE:
W/N the imports of “dental cream stabilizers and flavors” are subject to a 17%
transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law.
HELD:
No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument:
All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, namely:food products, books supplies/ materials and
medical supplies. The “stabilizers andflavors” the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of foodproducts.
Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is not a food product andtherefore not subject to exemption
Petitioner’s arguments effected the grant of the refund:
RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though “stabilizers andflavors” are preceded by items that might fall
under food products, the followingwhich were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate,cattle, and industrial
starch.
Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and
categorizations posited by the respondent.
LATIN MAXIM:
26, 29, 36

Escribano v. Avila
Case No. 101
G.R. No. L-30375 (September 12, 1978)
Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No. 205
FACTS:
Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato, filed a complaint for libelagainst Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before
the Court of First Instance (now theRTC) to Judge David Avila. Escribano questioned Judge Avila’s authority to conductthe preliminary
investigation of the offense. He contended that the city fiscal ofCotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary
investigation,pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court ofFirst Issuance to conduct preliminary
investigations of written defamations due to anamendment made for Art 360.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conductthe preliminary investigation of the crime of libel
or whether that power is lodgedexclusively in the city attorney of that city.
HELD:
 Yes. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigationsbecause this power is not lodged exclusively in the
city attorney. The enumeration inthe law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct preliminaryinvestigations was designed
to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power butnot to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. The power of the
CFT toconduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of powerfor a judge to hold a preliminary examination
and to issue warrants of arrest andsearch warrants. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigations bythe CFT is the
exception to the rule and not the general rule.
LATIN MAXIM:
9c, 11e, 12, 37

Gomez v. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners

Case No. 115
No. 32441. March 29, 1930
Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No.209
FACTS:
Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to theadministration of opium. Petitioner claims that his
administration of opium to patientswas not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed bysubsequent Opium
Laws.
ISSUE:
W/N Plaintiff should have his license restored.
HELD:
No, Plaintiff should not have his license restored. The subsequent Opium Lawscannot be held to have impliedly repealed
prior ones as these did not conflict orremove said prior laws. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined term
ofunprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to patients.
LATIN MAXIM:
9a, 38b

JMM Promotions v. NLRC

Case No. 136
G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993)
Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No. 21
FACTS:
JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a cashbond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of
P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules.When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA,the
NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond asrequired by Art. 223 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE:
Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond, as requiredby Art. 223 of the Labor Code, considering it
has already posted a cash bond andsurety bond, as required by the POEA?
HELD:
Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of thePOEA Rules shows that, in addition to the
cash and surety bonds and the escrowmoney, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is requiredto perfect an
appeal from a decision of the POEA.
LATIN MAXIM:
6b, 6d, 7a, 12a, 36a, 37