Republic Act No.

9225 August 29, 2003 (1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress
Assembled:
Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of
a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon
taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines;
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the (b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate

or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine
citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire
PHILIPPINE citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
 ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. V. COMELEC
FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered
and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in
the elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The
COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of
these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that
filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied
with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot
for the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.
HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However,
since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system,
thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying
petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in
the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not
exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that
the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only
for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly
making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional
terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or
type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is
not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the
electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from
the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving
as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is,
apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
 ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from
1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now
Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese
School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte
and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position,
filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The
petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which
she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency
due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term
“residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda
married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained
a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile
of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative
of the First District of Leyte.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in

running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in
favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the
First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for
the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin
by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
 MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO v. COMELEC, GR No. 201716, 2013-01-08
Facts:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national
and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes.
In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially
proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the
functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested
Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the
2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting
May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a
little over one year... and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each
other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy... for the mayoralty seat
Torres lost no time in seeking the former's disqualification... to run,... predicated on the
three-consecutive term limit rule.
On June 16, 2010,... COMELEC... issued a Resolution... finding for Abundo,... accordingly
proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga... private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega)
commenced a quo warranto... action... to unseat Abundo on essentially the same
grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.
Issues:
The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three
terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining one year and one month of the
second... term as a result of an election protest.
whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising
from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered
as full service of the term for purposes of the... application of the three consecutive term
limit for elective local officials.
Ruling:
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo's three successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was
initially deprived of title to, and was veritably... disallowed to serve and occupy, an office
to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the
aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
the Court finds Abundo's case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during
which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an
interruption, which effectively removed Abundo's case from the ambit of the three-
term... limit rule.
during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election
protest in his favor,... Abundo assumed the mayoralty post... for a period of a little over
one year... and one month... it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully
the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months,... Abundo cannot
plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter
of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor... serve the functions of the said
elective office.
The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding
right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed
election winner.
Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that
time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve
such elective office. For... another, not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot
be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the
first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes,... Abundo was not entitled
to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective
interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of
the remaining term.
 BAGUILAT V. SPEAKER ALVAREZ
THIS CASE CONCERNS AN INTERNAL MATTER OF A COEQUAL, POLITICAL BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT WHICH, ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CANNOT BE
JUDICIALLY INTERFERED WITH.
However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the
questioned proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-
pressed to find any attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this
case. By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of
government which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered
with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to
its own breach of the separation of powers doctrine.33 Verily, “[i]t would be an unwarranted
invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative
action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure,
or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself.”
BUT CAN THE COURT STILL INTERFERE WITH THE PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS?
YES. THIS IS THE EXCEPTION. WHILE THE COURT IN TAKING JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS
QUESTIONING AN ACT OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT, WILL NOT REVIEW THE
WISDOM, MERITS OR PROPRIETY OF SUCH ACTION, IT WILL, HOWEVER, STRIKE IT DOWN ON THE
GROUND OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception. While the Court in taking jurisdiction over
petitions questioning an act of the political departments of government, will not review the
wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, it will, however, strike it down on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion.29 This stems from the expanded concept of judicial power, which, under
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, expressly “includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Case law decrees
that “[t]he foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department’s duty and power to strike down
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion: 30
[T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any
of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.31
Accordingly, this Court “will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to
uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the
govemment.”32
TOLENTINO V. SEC OF FIN
FACTS
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various
suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and
it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article
VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet
a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of
the Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the
revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage
of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the
requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
 DAZA V. SINGSON
FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was
among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this
development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and
giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives
consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein
respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from
the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission
on Appointments
HELD:
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as
follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of
allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant
to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
SABIO V. GORDON
FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time
invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG
members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.
RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate
and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is
a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which
the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to
the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,
where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and
that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry.
This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns
the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends
“to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power
of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact;
or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose
or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent
with the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle
of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right
of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the
absence of any constitutional basis.
 GUDANI VS. SENGA
Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and
Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo,
not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen.
Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the
Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day,
Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service. After investigation, the
OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on
willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared
unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their
successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently
enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before
the Senate.
Issue:
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry?
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even
if the President desires otherwise?
3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4
October 2005?
Held:
1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general
rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before
Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the
prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control
over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.
Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the
Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and
obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose
the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes
as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation.
Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as
commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this
petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the
Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to
require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or
actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which
members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s
prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the
legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before
Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and
executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various
constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only
as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of
behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a
similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness
inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation,
such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to
compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.
3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to
be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were
initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been
acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction
has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the
initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4
October 2005.
 BANAT VS COMELEC
Nature: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at
least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following
rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20%
shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least
2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case
of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the
votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list
candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the
2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify
for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not
supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet
the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then
with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the
prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation
(which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat
rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are
allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative
districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987
Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using
the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may
deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted
for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available
to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of
party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower
house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that
only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which
garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical
impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the
100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one
million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one
million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation
of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-
list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number
of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to
also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until
all the additional seats are allocated.
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party
List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision
in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all
party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their
one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from
the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each.
There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please
refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats
for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the
20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of
seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of
the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter
which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so
happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are
still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher
in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes
of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in
their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that
the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the
people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the
party-list system.