1. Makalintal vs COMELEC, GR No.

157013, July 10, 2003

FACTS:Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act) provides that all citizens
of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18)
years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vicepresident, senators and party-
list representatives.

Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 disqualifies from voting an immigrant or permanent resident who
is recognized as such in the host country, UNLESS he/she executes, upon registration, an
affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of
his/her registration under the said law. -Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of
the same Act empowers the COMELEC to order the proclamation of the winning candidates
(president, vicepresident, senators and party-list representatives).

Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the “Joint Congressional Oversight Committee”
with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the COMELEC.

Arguments of Macalintal: (1) Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,

Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding an election. He cites the ruling of the Supreme Court in Caasi vs.
Court of Appeals, wherein it was held that a “green card” holder immigrant to the United States
is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines; (2) Section 18.5 is
unconstitutional, as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president; (3) Sections 19 and 25 creating the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee are unconstitutional intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC. Should the
rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review
the same via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators.

ISSUES:

(1)

Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution;

(2)

Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional insofar as it involves the
canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president;

RULING:

(1)

No. Contrary to Macalintal’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress
enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the
constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of
absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines
abroad” is not physically present in the country.

The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee
voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is
deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines.

He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His
having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily
imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines.

Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d)
and 8(c) of the law.

x x x x Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same
time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless
pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his
residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. x x x x For
political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile. x x x x

To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by
their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to
return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of
Philippine domicile shall remain.

(2)

Yes. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only
insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to
proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president. Congress
could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as
aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for
president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.” x x
x x The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president
and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

NOTE: Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 was declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect only
to the power given to the Comelec to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for President and Vice-President, which is lodged with Congress under Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution. However, its consitutionality was UPHELD insofar as the
authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and
party-list representatives.

2. AKLAT vs COMELEC, GR No. 162203, April 14, 2004

FACTS: On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as
a party-list organization for purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its petition
that it participated in the 2001 elections but was disqualified by the Comelec as it was
found not to have complied with the guidelines set by the Court in the case of  Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec (Bagong Bayani case)6 for party-list
organizations to qualify and participate as such in the party-list elections. Accordingly,
Aklat "re-organized itself in order that it will comply with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by the Supreme Court"7 in the said case.
the Comelec dismissed the petition stating that Aklat cannot be considered as an
organization representing the marginalized and underrepresented groups as identified
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. 7941). According to the Comelec,
Aklat’s statement that it has re-organized itself does not cure this defect as "there is
nothing in the petition which will help us identify what particular marginalized and
underrepresented group AKLAT is now representing." 8 Further, the Comelec held that
"AKLAT lumped all the sectoral groups imaginable under the classification of regular
members just to convince us that it is now cured of its defect."

Aklat filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 14, 2004, substantially averring
that it has reorganized itself and taken the necessary steps to make it an organization
of, by and for the marginalized and underrepresented groups of society, particularly the
indigenous cultural communities and the youth. To this end, it has allegedly effected a
fundamental change in its purposes as an organization, nature of its membership and
focus of its programs.10

The Comelec denied the motion in its questioned Resolution dated February 13, 2004,
on three grounds, namely: the petition was filed beyond the deadline set by the
Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 for registration of party-list organizations; the petition
was not one for re-qualification as Aklat was never a registered party-list organization
having failed to meet the eight-point guidelines set by the Court in the Bagong
Bayani case; and that its decision not to extend the deadline for registration of party-list
organizations is valid, the Comelec being in the best position to make such a
determination.

In the instant Petition, Aklat asserts that under Section 5 of R.A. 7941, petitions for
registration as a party-list organization may be filed not later than ninety (90) days
before the elections. It therefore had until February 10, 2004, the ninetieth (90th) day
before the elections on May 10, 2004, within which to file its petition. Hence, its petition,
which was filed on November 20, 2003, was filed within the allowed period. Section 5 of
Resolution No. 632012 which requires the filing of such petitions not later than
September 30, 2003, is null and void as it amends R.A. 7941.

It further maintains that it has complied with the eight-point guidelines set in the Bagong
Bayani case. Allegedly, Aklat has a total membership of over 4,000 persons who belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented groups. It has established information and
coordination centers throughout the country for the benefit and in representation of
indigenous cultural communities, farm and factory workers including fisherfolk and the
youth. Aklat also asserts that it is different from Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng
Industria ng Aklat (A.K.L.A.T.) which was previously de-registered by the Comelec.
Because of all these, Aklat contends that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion
when it denied its petition for re-qualification.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied its petition
for re-qualifaction?

RULING: The Court ruled in the negative.

The Office of the Solicitor General stating that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions. According to the OSG, Resolution No.
6320 is not in conflict with and is, in fact, germane to the purpose of R.A. 7941. It was
within the scope of the authority granted to the Comelec that it issued Resolution No.
6320 setting the deadline for filing petitions for registration under the party-list system
on September 30, 2003. In line with the purpose of R.A. 7941 to enable marginalized
sectors to actively participate in legislation, the Comelec must be given sufficient time to
evaluate all petitions for registration, at the same time allowing oppositions to be filed to
the end that only those truly qualified may be accredited under the party-list system.
Besides, Republic Act No. 8436 13 allows the Comelec to change the periods and dates
prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts to ensure their accomplishment.

The OSG further maintains that the petition for re-qualification failed to comply with the
provisions of Resolution No. 6320. According to the OSG, the petition was not properly
verified there being no showing that Mr. Dominador Buhain, the signatory of the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was duly authorized by Aklat to
verify or cause the preparation and filing of the petition on its behalf. Moreover, Aklat
was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on October 20,
2003, a month before it filed its petition for re-qualification. Hence, it has not existed for
a period of at least one (1) year prior to the filing of the petition as required by Section 6
of Resolution No. 6320. The OSG also points out that Aklat failed to support its petition
with the documents required under Section 7 of Resolution No. 6320, namely: a list of
its officers and members particularly showing that the majority of its membership
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent, and a
track record or summary showing that it represents and seeks to uplift the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society.

Moreover, the OSG notes that the incorporators and directors of Aklat are invariably
known as pillars of the book publishing industry or authors. Hence, even as re-
organized, Aklat remains to be an association of authors, book publishers, and
publishing companies, rather than the organization of indigenous cultural communities,
farm and factory workers, fisherfolk and youth it claims to be.

Verily, the Comelec has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
enforce and administer election laws. This power includes the determination, within the
parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the accomplishment of certain pre-
election acts like filing petitions for registration under the party-list system. This is
exactly what the Comelec did when it issued its Resolution No. 6320 declaring
September 30, 2003, as the deadline for filing petitions for registration under the party-
list system. Considering these, as well as the multifarious pre-election activities that the
Comelec is mandated to undertake, the issuance of its Resolution No. 6320 cannot be
considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Neither is there grave abuse of discretion in the Comelec’s denial of Aklat’s petition on
the ground that it failed to substantiate its claim that it represents the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society. It should be noted that it was Aklat which asserted
in its petition before the poll body that it has re-organized and is now applying for re-
qualification after its de-registration for failure to comply with the guidelines set forth in
the Bagong Bayani case. Thus, the Comelec cannot be faulted for relying on its earlier
finding, absent any evidence in Aklat’s petition to the contrary, that Aklat is not an
organization representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, but is
actually a business interest or economic lobby group which seeks the promotion and
protection of the book publishing industry.

Significantly, Aklat and A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the same incorporators. In fact,
four (4) of Aklat’s six (6) incorporators 14 are also incorporators of A.K.L.A.T. 15 This
substantial similarity is hard to ignore and bolsters the conclusion that the supposed re-
organization undertaken by Aklat is plain window-dressing as it has not really changed
its character as a business interest of persons in the book publishing industry.
3. Chavez vs COMELEC, GR No. 162777, August 31, 2004
Facts: Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain
establishments to endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were
set up showing petitioner promoting the products of said establishments. 

On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Senator.

On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section
32:

 Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls
and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on
print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who
subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be
immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station
within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio
station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature
campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the
COMELEC's Law Department. He replied, by requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to
how he may have violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter, this time asking the
COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that the
billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as
paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.

The COMELEC, however, ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to
cover them from public view pending the approval of his request.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez filed a petition for prohibition with the SC, asking that the
COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges the Court to declare the
assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-
impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto
law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition of billboards and other forms of private endorsements
by candidates a valid exercise of police power?
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative.
A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit
premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize
the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer
candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure
and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid reason for the
exercise of police power as held in National Press Club v. COMELEC, 2 wherein the petitioners
questioned the constitutionality of Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited the
sale or donation of print space and air time "for campaigning or other political purposes,"
except to the COMELEC. The obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as
practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying
the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests." This Court ruled therein that this
objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by
extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society,
and by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the poverty
line.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements
and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election
Code, "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" is defined as an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.
Activities included under this definition are:

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons

for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a
candidate

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate;

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or

against the election of any candidate for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or

oppose the election of any candidate; or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse
certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name
and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political
character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC
was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the
display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates
for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products
would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the
disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their
faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly,
an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay
private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing
the public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This,
without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning:

4. Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC, G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995
Facts: Comelec  promulgated  Resolution No.  2772 which allowed  Comelec to procure free 
print space of not less than  1/2 page in at least one newspaper  of general circulation in every
province  or city for use as ‘Comelec Space’. The ‘Comelec  Space’ shall be allocated, through
lottery, by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the
newspaper, magazine or periodical is  circulated to enable the candidates to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public   issues and their platforms and programs of government –
in short, dissemination of vital election information.

Furthermore,  the resolution  stated that no newspaper  or publication shall allow to  be printed
or published in the  news, opinion, features, or other sections  of the newspaper or publication
accounts or  comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate  or political party by
unduly or repeatedly referring to or including  therein said candidate or political party.
However, unless the facts and  circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will
respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publication
that the accounts or views  published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.

Comelec directed  several newspapers,  which previously gave  2 pages during the 1992
elections, to provide  free print spaceof not less than 1/2 pagefor  use as ‘Comelec Space’.

Petitioner’s  contention: Resolution  No. 2772 was unconstitutional  and void; they claimed that
there was taking of private property for public use  without just compensation. It also
constituted impositions of involuntary servitude. And that the resolution violated freedom of
speech, of the press and of expression.

Respondent’s  contention: SolGen  claims that Resolution  No. 2772 does not impose upon any
obligation as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance
with that Resolution. And even if the  questioned Resolution and its implementing letter
directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the
police power of the State.

Issue: Whether or not  the Comelec, through  the subject resolution,  validly exercised its power
of eminent domain and police power.

Ruling: No.  To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space”  amounts to “taking”
of private personal property for  public use or purposes. The resolution failed to specify  the
intended frequency of such compulsory “donation”: only once during the period from 6 March
1995 (or 21 March  1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as
Comelec may direct during the same  period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of
private property. The  monetary value of the compulsory “donation,” measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban
areas, may be very substantial indeed. The taking of private   property for public use is, of
course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of “just compensation”
(Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for “Comelec 
space” is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission, whether the
Resolution is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper
publishers to “donate” free print space  for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps
an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as the Resolution attempts to suggest. The
threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined
here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The
element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been
suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for  election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print
space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and
the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not
casually to be assumed. The resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain.

Thus,  public funds,  not publishers solely,  should bear costs for public information  of electoral
processes. The economic costs  of informing the general public about the qualifications  and
programs of those seeking elective office are most appropriately  distributed as widely as
possible throughout our society by the utilization  of public funds, especially funds raised by
taxation, rather than cast solely on one small  sector of society, i.e., print media enterprises.
The benefits which flow from a heightened level  of information on and the awareness of the
electoral process are commonly thought to be community-wide; the burdens should be
allocated on the same basis.
  Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on  the part of Comelec) to show
that the police power —essentially  a power of legislation —has been constitutionally delegated
to respondent Commission. Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in the
legitimate exercise  of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance
in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power.  Section 2 is a
blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national
emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately  and without regard to the
individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing parts of
the country, to take private property of newspaper  or magazine publishers. No attempt was
made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space
confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only
reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does
not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

The  distinction  between paid  political advertisements  on the one hand and news  reports,
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on
the other hand, can realistically be given operative meaning only in actual cases  or
controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts.At all events, the
Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative  action on the part of
Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of its
members has sustained actual or imminent injury by  reason of Comelec action under Section 8.
Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought to
be raised — whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise
of the Comelec’s power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution is not ripe for  judicial
review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the
constitutionality of Section 8.

5. Diocese of Bacolod etc. vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
FACTS
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with approximately six feet (6′)
by ten feet (10′) in size, for public viewing within the vicinity of San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. One of the tarpaulins stated: “Conscience Vote” and lists of candidates as either
“(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X”
mark.The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the
RH Law. 

Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified as comprising “Team Patay,”
while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay. 

When the said tarpaulin came to the attention of Comelec, it sent a letter to Bishop Navarra
ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin because it was in violation of Comelec
Resolution No. 9615 as the lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’)
by three feet (3’); otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against the
latter. 

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech,
Bishop Navarra, et al. prayed for the Court to declare the questioned orders of Comelec as
unconstitutional, and permanently restraining the latter from enforcing them after notice
and hearing. 

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which the Comelec
has the power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute an abridgment of
freedom of speech.

RULING: 

It is not election propaganda.

While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or
party-list group. 

Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the second paragraph of
Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining “political advertisement” or “election
propaganda.” 

The caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech. That petitioners
chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue—and
a complex piece of legislation at that—can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype
the candidates and party- list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts
were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the
example of petitioners. 

But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our

fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides
space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but
also in judgment of the acts of others. 

6. Mitmug vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 106270-73 February 10, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG and private respondent DATU GAMBAI
DAGALANGIT were among the candidates for the mayoralty position of Lumba-Bayabao
during the 11 May 1992 election. There were sixty-seven (67) precincts in the municipality.

The voter turnout during the May 11 1992 election in Lumba-Bayabao was low,
particularly in 49 precincts where the average voter turnout was 22.26%. Five of these
precincts did not conduct actual voting at all.

Consequently, COMELEC ordered the holding of special elections on 30 May 1992 in the
five precincts which failed to function during election day, and on 30 July 1992 for a sixth
precinct.

Mitmug filed a petition seeking the annulment of the special election conducted on 30 May
1992 alleging various irregularities such as the alteration, tampering and substitution of
ballots. But on 13 July 1992, COMELEC considered the petition moot since the votes in the
subject precincts were already counted.

There were also several petitions filed with the COMELEC seeking the declaration of failure
of election in some or all of the precincts of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur

Thereafter, a new board of Election Inspectors was formed to conduct the special election
set for 25 July 1992. Mitmug impugned the creation of this Board. Nevertheless, on 30 July
1992, the new Board convened and began the canvassing of votes. Finally, on 31 July 1992,
Dagalangit was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.
On 3 August 1992, Mitmug instituted the instant proceedings seeking the declaration of
failure of election in forty-nine (49) precincts where less than a quarter of the electorate
were able to cast their votes. He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to enjoin Dagalangit from assuming office.

On 10 August 1992, Mitmug lodged an election protest with the Regional trial Court of
Lanao del Sur disputing the result not only of some but all the precincts of Lumba-Bayabao,
del Sur.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a failure of election in some or all of the precincts in Lumba-
Bayabao, Lanao del Sur.

RULING: The Supreme Court held in negative.

Under Sec. 2, Rule 26 of COMELEC Rules and Procedure, before COMELEC can act on a
verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must
concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law
or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless results in failure to elect; and, second,
the votes not cast would affect the result of the election.

Here, not all elements were present. The first requisite is missing. An actual voting and
election by the registered voters in the questioned precincts have taken place; hence the
results thereof cannot be disregarded and excluded. 

Considering that there is no concurrence of the two (2) conditions in the petitions seeking
to declare failure of election in forty-three (43) more, precincts, there is no more need to
receive evidence on alleged election irregularities.

There can be failure of election in a political unit only if the will of the majority has been
defiled and cannot be ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded respect.
After all, there is no provision in our election laws which requires that a majority of
registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate
must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballots
cast. 25 Thus, even if less than 25% of the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their
votes, the same must still be respected. There is prima facie showing that private
respondent was elected through a plurality of valid votes of a valid constituency.

7. Sambarani vs COMELEC, GR No. 160427, September 15, 2004

FACTS: The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality
of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio
advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an
aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast
time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their
right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the
forth coming elections.

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station”
airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC
approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

RULING: YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregatebased” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates
and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does
not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction
on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially

so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits
on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the
electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message
through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily
understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly
hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his
political speech.
8. Montejo vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995
Facts:Biliran was originally a municipality of the 3rd District of the province of Leyte. It
was later converted into a sub-province then a regular province. COMELEC sought to
remedy the consequent inequality of the distribution of inhabitants, voters and
municipalities in the province of Leyte by promulgating Resolution No. 2736 where it
transferred (in Sec 1 thereof) the municipality of Capoocan of its 2nd District and
Palompon of its 4th District to its 3rd District. Cong. Montejo of the 1st District of Leyte
sought to annul said Sec of Res. No. 2736 on the ground that it violates the principle of
equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, he prays to transfer the
municipality of Tolosa from his district to the 2nd District of the province.

Issue: May the Court transfer the Municipality of Tolosa of the 1st District to the 2nd
District of Leyte as prayed for?

Held: No. The court held Sec 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void and conceded that the
conversion of Biliran to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution
of voters in the legislative districts and, as such, could devalue a citizen’s vote in violation of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. However, what is prayed for involves an
issue of reapportionment of legislative districts and remedy for such lies with Congress in
accordance to Art VI, Sec 5(4). While this Court can strike down an unconstitutional
reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as Montejo would want the
Court to do by directing COMELEC to transfer Tolosa from the 1st District to the 2nd
District. Transferring a municipality from one district to another is a substantive (not
minor) change.

9. Regina Ongsiako Reyes vs COMELEC, GR No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Facts: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative
of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended
petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations
regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship.
Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013
a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the
petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of
her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the
COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on
June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has
yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

Issues:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member
of the House of Representative.

Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for
office

RULING: Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of
Representative.

In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the
Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case
at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s
oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in
compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved the ruling if the
COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons
his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he
chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of
his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case,
there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
9225 so as to conclude  that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows
that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she
served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to
July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized
her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her
stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA.

10. Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago vs COMELEC, GR No. 190793, June 19, 2012
FACTS: Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration
with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political
party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections.

COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO
where it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance
with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the partys
organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated
in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July
27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact
that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in
employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying
the laws of organized societies.

MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc
for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23
December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections as a party-list group. COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals
through violent or unlawful means?

HELD: COMELECS Resolutions are sustained.

To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:

x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election
laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our
election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or

coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for
accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next
natural step to follow.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be
denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which
provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be
entitled to accreditation."

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of
vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of
force; that force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and against
public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not
be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881
in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to
participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this
authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking
registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or
unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does not entail any
determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of
qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless
analogously applicable.