Montejo vs. COMELEC G.R. No.

118702, March 16, 1995

Facts:

The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte,
was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into a regular province, 8
municipalities of the third district composed the new province. As a consequence, the composition of
the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution
of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where
it transferred the Municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of
the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another legislative district.

Held:

The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of
redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the
COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made.Consistent with the limit of its
power to make minor adjustments; Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority
to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an
imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the issue
involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner’s remedy lies with
Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to
reapportion. The Court held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second
district and themunicipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.
MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003

FACTS:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of
the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and
material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and
lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement in Section 1
of Article V of the Constitution.

(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be
proclaimed as winners by Congress.

(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committeecreated in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating
the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.

HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It
disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country.
However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared
for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also
state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for
the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of
the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, and a
resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an
election.

However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court may have
to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of thecontroversy: Affidavit for without it, the presumption
of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is
deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to have lost his domicile by
his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of
registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor
or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.
Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No.
9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to vote, the
Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law is found to
be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was conscious of this probability and
provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right
of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on
the date of the elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is
prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent of
the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers, which is to grant
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of
suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally
defective.

(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it.
The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for President and Vice
President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the
winning candidatesonly for Senators and Party-list Reps.

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules
& Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
MASTURA vs. COMELEC

285 SCRA 493, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen were
congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995 elections. In the
canvassing of votes, Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the
Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the
objection, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the production and examination of the election
returns of the Municipality of Matanog. In the course of the examination four (4) ballot boxes were
produced and opened. Upon examination and comparison of the copies of the election returns of the
MTC Judge and the COMELEC, the COMELEC Second Division found that, indeed, the Certificate
of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog had been tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC
Second Division issued the herein assailed Order of 29 February 1996 annulling the Certificate of
Canvass of Matanog.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether
there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting
centers.

Held: We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled
jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there
exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers.
Corollarily, once the election returns were found to be falsified or tampered with, the COMELEC can
annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners
on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the members of the board or
proclaim the winners itself. That the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog was
tampered with is a factual finding of the COMELEC. Absent any showing of abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court should refrain from reviewing the same, and must accord
it instead the respect it deserves. The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be
disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence
in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as
the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC - created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself - on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The
COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it.
For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
Domino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani
indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected
for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his
declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a
registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of
Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency
requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
based on his own Voter’s Registration Record and his address indicated as 24
Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at

least 1 year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections

Held: The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications
for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for
business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.

Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and
that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as
shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the
Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming
that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has
established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.

A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be

deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997
does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be
indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender
the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original
domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no
matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or
change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in
Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the
reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack
of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act
of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of
residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in
this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.
Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006

Facts:

Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage
under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow
petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners field to comply with the requirement
of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1 year residency.

Ruling:

Yes. There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish residence and physically
stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Congress enacted RA 9189
pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, identifying in its Section 4 of the said Act
who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another
country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule under the Section 5(d) of the same
Act.

By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional Commission provided for an exception
to actual residency requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of 1987 Constitution, with respect to qualified
Filipinos abroad. Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country may be allowed to
vote even though they do not fulfill the residency requirement of said Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.
Atong paglaum vs. comelec

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT
vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections
in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified
as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections
will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political
constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the
intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is
that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for
the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system
itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower
house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic
Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
“marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as
they are ideologically marginalized.
Banat vs. Comelec

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made
a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners
at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of
the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-
list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision
that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to
fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the
3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally,
the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be
from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the
number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were
220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats
Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow
that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those
which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million
votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60
seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of
parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment
of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
isguaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than
2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters)
are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were
able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus
17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in
the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number
of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-
percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats
because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and
there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists
and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the
likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from
the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in
the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the
marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7
other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the
Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and
the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in
the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.
Adherence vs. Datumanong

Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act
No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other
Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV
of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law."

ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225 unconstitutional?

HELD: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.
9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.