immigrants or permanent residents abroad to register
A. SUFFRAGE for voting provided he/she: (a) executes an affidavit
AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC
Facts
This case stemmed from a hearing called by Senator
Raul Roco, heeding the call of the youth, requesting
the COMELEC to conduct a two-day special
registration of new voters. The COMELEC,
however, in a resolution, denied such request. Thus,
petitioners filed the case seeking the issuance of a
writ of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of new voters and to
declare Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189 or the Voter’s
Registration Act unconstitutional insofar as it caused
the disenfranchisement of petitioners.
Issue
W/N the SC may do so
Ruling
NO. The right of suffrage must be exercised in
accordance with the Constitution, and must yield to
laws crafted by Congress. The act of registration is
part and parcel of the right to vote and an
indispensable part in the election process.
Proceeding from this, the State, in the exercise of its
police power, may enact laws to safeguard and
regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate
purpose of conducting honest, orderly, and peaceful
elections. Moreover, petitioners cannot invoke Sec.
28 of R.A. 8436 which gives the COMELEC the
power to fix other periods for the conduct of “pre-
election acts” because the SC held that this section
should be interpreted in the light of the remaining
period before the day of election as well as the
conduct of other pre-election matters. In this case, the
COMELEC itself in its Comment painstakingly
emphasized the “operational impossibility” of
conducting special registrations. It is never the intent
of the legislature to require government agencies to
do the impossible.
Macalintal v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Sec. 5
(d) of R.A. 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act for allegedly violating Sec. 1, Art. V of the
Constitution which requires that a voter must be a
resident of the Philippines for at least one (1) year
and in the place where he proposes to vote at least six
(6) months immediately preceding the elections. Sec.
5 (d) of R.A. 9189 essentially grants Filipino
Daverick Pacumio | UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
indicating his/her intent to resume actual/physical
residence in the Philippines not later than three (3)
years from approval of his/her registration; and (b)
that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country.
Issue
W/N Sec. 5(d) is constitutional
Ruling
YES. Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution mandates
Congress to provide a system for voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad. The SC held that this is an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Sec.
1, Art. V of the Constitution with respect to qualified
Filipinos abroad. Congress enacted the law in
compliance with the mandate of Sec. 2, Art. V of the
Constitution. The affidavit required in Sec. 5(d) is
not only proof of the intention of the immigrant to
resume residency in the Philippines but, more
significantly, serves as an explicit expression that he
had not, in fact, abandoned his domicile of origin.
Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition
of Philippine under R.A. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. Before the may
2004 elections, petitioners sought recognition from
the COMELEC as “overseas absentee voters” which
the latter denied in a letter stating that it is the
COMELEC’s position that as Filipinos who merely
re-acquired their citizenship, petitioners are
considered as regular voters thus, subject to the
requirement of one (1)-year actual residency under
Sec. 1, Art. V of the Constitution. This prompted
petitioners to file the instant petition for certiorari
and mandamus.
Issue
W/N petitioners and others similarly situated who
have reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 may vote as an absentee voter under R.A. 9189
Ruling
YES. There is no provision in R.A. 9225 requiring
“duals”, like petitioners, to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines
before they can vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225
implicitly grants under Sec. 5 the same right of
suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A.
9189. In effect, the SC ruled that R.A. 9225 expanded
the coverage of overseas absentee voting. Thus,
“duals” under R.A. 9225 may now exercise the right
of suffrage through the absentee voting scheme and
as overseas absentee voters.
Kabataan Party-List v. COMELEC
Facts
President Aquino III signed into law R.A. 10367 or
the Biometrics Law which mandates the COMELEC
to implement a mandatory biometrics registration
system for new and registered voters. Non-
compliance therewith before the deadline of
application for registration shall cause the
registration of voters to be deactivated. Petitioners
assail the constitutionality of the Biometrics Law on
the ground that it is an additional, substantial
qualification not found in the constitutional provision
prescribing the qualifications of voters where there is
penalty of disqualification, among other grounds.
Issue
W/N the Biometrics Law as well as the COMELEC
resolutions implementing the same are null and void
Ruling
NO. The Constitution prescribes the qualifications
for the exercise of the right of suffrage as follows:
first, one must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must
not be disqualified by law; and third, he must have
resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and
in the place where he intends to vote for at least six
(6) months immediately preceding the elections. It is
implicit in the second requirement that the State may
regulate the right of suffrage by imposing certain
disqualifications subject to the restriction that the
same does not amount to a “literacy, property, or
other substantive requirement.” Disqualifications
and deactivation is not novel to R.A. 10367, as R.A.
8189 or the Voter’s Registration Act also lays down
certain statutory disqualifications. In fine, the SC
held that the biometric requirement is not a
“qualification” to the exercise of suffrage, but a mere
aspect of the registration procedure, which the State
has the right to reasonably regulate, per the SC’s
ruling in AKBAYAN-Youth v. COMELEC.
Francisco v. COMELEC
Facts
Francisco filed before the COMELEC a Petition for
Disqualification under Sec. 68 of the OEC against
Nieto, a re-electionist for the mayoralty post in
Cainta, Rizal. Francsico alleged that Nieto violated
Secs. 261(v) and 104 of the OEC by making financial
contributions out of government coffers on Aprils 1-
2, 2016, or within the 45-day period within which
expending of public funds was prohibited by the
OEC. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed
the complaint on the ground that there was no prior
finding that Nieto was suffering from a
disqualification, relying on Poe-Llamanzares v.
COMELEC in which the SC held that “to disqualify
a candidate, there must be a declaration by a final
judgement of a competent court that the candidate
sought to be disqualified is guilty or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.” The COMELEC 2nd Div. ruling was
affirmed by the En Banc.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC may take cognizance of the
instant case despite lack of a prior judgement holding
Nieto guilty of committing an election offense
Ruling
YES. In this regard, the SC revisited its disquisition
in Poe. The essence of a disqualification proceeding
under Sec. 68 of the OEC is to bar a person from
becoming a candidate due to his possession of a
disqualification which could be found either by a
competent court or by the COMELEC itself. To hold
otherwise, as the COMELEC in this case did, would
render nugatory the remedy of Sec. 68 as the period
of filing a petition for disqualification under the same
is limited to the period between the last day of filing
until the date of proclamation which, in the present
scheme of things, could take only weeks. Moreover,
the basis of a petition for disqualification under Sec.
68 could only be committed within 45 days before
the day of election. It would be practically impossible
for a petitioner to obtain a judicial decision within
such short period. On the other hand, the basis of a
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC under
Sec. 78, which is what is involved in Poe, is the
material misrepresentation of a candidate involving
his eligibility or qualification for the office to which
he seeks election enumerated under Sec. 74.
B. COMELEC
Goh v. Bayron
Facts
Petitioner filed a recall petition against Mayor
Bayron due to loss of trust and confidence. The
COMELEC found the recall petition sufficient in
form and substance, but suspended the funding of
any and all recall elections until the resolution of the
funding issue. Thereafter, it promulgated Resolution
No. 9882 which states that the COMELEC does not
have an appropriation or line budget to serve as a
contingency fund for the conduct of recall elections
under the 2014 GAA. Petitioner asserts that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
failing to rule that the 2014 GAA provides for an
appropriation line item budget to serve as a
contingency fund for the conduct of recall elections;
and that the COMELEC may lawfully augment any
supposed insufficiency in funding for the conduct of
recall elections by utilizing its savings.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in saying that the 2014 GAA does not
provide for appropriation to allow the COMELEC to
perform its constitutional duty to conduct recall
election
Ruling
YES. The 1987 Constitution expressly grants the
COMELEC the power to administer and enforce all
laws, rules, and regulations relative to the conduct of
recall, among others. The 1987 Constitution not only
granted the COMELEC fiscal autonomy, but also
granted its Chairman the authority to augment items
in the appropriation from its savings. The 2014 GAA
provides such authorization to the Chairman.
Cipriano v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy and ran
for SK Chairman in a barangay in Pasay City and
won. Unknown to her, the COMELEC, motu
proprio, passed a resolution which cancelled her
COC on the ground that she was not a registered
voter in the barangay where she ran. Petitioner then
moved to reconsider the COMELEC resolution and
argued that a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a COC may only be conducted upon petition by any
registered candidate under Sec. 78 of the OEC.
Moreover, petitioner argues that she was denied due
process when her COC had been cancelled without
her even knowing of the same. The COMELEC,
however, affirmed the assailed resolution, invoking
its administrative power to enforce and administer
election laws. It claims that in the exercise of such
power, it may motu proprio deny or cancel the COCs
of candidates who are found to be unqualified for the
position they are seeking.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC resolution is valid
Ruling
NO. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without
proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel the
COC filed in due form. When a candidate files
his/her COC, it is a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC to receive and acknowledge its receipt
pursuant to Sec. 76 of the OEC. Moreover, the denial
or cancellation of a COC does not involve the
exercise of COMELEC’s administrative powers, but
rather, its quasi-judicial powers which involve the
determination of whether a material representation in
the COC is false or not and whether a candidate is
eligible for the position or not. These things entail a
determination of fact where both parties must be
allowed to adduce evidence in support of their
contentions.
Baytan v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioners were led by the newly-elected barangay
chairman of Brgy. 18 to register in Precinct No. 83-
A of Brgy. 18. Subsequently, petitioners realized that
their residence is within the jurisdiction of Brgy. 28.
Thus, they proceeded to Precinct No. 129-A to re-
register. Despite having asked for opinion regarding
how to cancel their previous registration, the
COMELEC en banc passed a resolution directing the
Law Department to file an Information against
petitioners for double registration which is
punishable under the OEC. Petitioners assail the en
banc resolution invoking good faith and Sec. 3, Art.
IX-C of the Constitution which provides that election
cases must first be decided by a division of
COMELEC before the en banc may assume
jurisdiction over the same.
Issues
1. W/N petitioners may invoke good faith;
2. W/N Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the Constitution applies.
Ruling
1. NO. The assailed COMELEC en banc resolution
was issued during the preliminary investigation
stage where the only objective is to determine the
existence of probable cause. Petitioners’ defense
of good faith is a matter of evidence best
ventilated during trial.
2. NO. Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the Constitution only
applies in the COMELEC’s exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. The prosecution of election law
violators involves the exercise of COMELEC’s
administrative powers. Thus, the en banc may
directly approve the recommendation of its Law
Department to file an Information against
 petitioners for violating the OEC. There is no
constitutional requirement that the filing of
criminal information must first be decided by a
division of the COMELEC.
Bedol v. COMELEC
Facts
COMELEC formed Task Force Maguindanao to
conduct a fact-finding investigation as to the conduct
of elections and certificates of canvass from the city
and municipalities of Maguindanao. During a fact-
finding activity, petitioner, the Provincial Election
Supervisor in Maguindanao, admitted that while in
his possession, the certificates of canvass were
stolen. Petitioner was also informed in the fact-
finding activity of the next setting of the hearing, but
petitioner failed to appear therein. Subsequently, the
COMELEC issued a contempt charge and a show
cause order against petitioner. Petitioner questioned
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to issue the contempt
charge. The COMELEC en banc then found
petitioner guilty of contempt. Petitioner argues
before the SC that the COMELEC exceeded its
jurisdiction in issuing the contempt charges when it
was performing its administrative function, and not
its quasi-judicial function as the National Board of
Canvassers for the election of Senators.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC may validly cite petitioner in
contempt
Ruling
YES. The COMELEC, through the Task Force
Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial
powers in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations
of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. The effectiveness of quasi-judicial
power vested by law on agencies hinges upon its
authority to compel the attendance of witnesses
during hearings or proceedings. To withhold from
the COMELEC the power to punish individuals, like
petitioner, who refuse to appear during fact-finding
investigations, despite previous order and notice to
attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC’s
investigatory power, which is incidental to its power
to ensure the conduct of honest and credible
elections. Even assuming arguendo that the
COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at
the time it required petitioner’s appearance,
jurisprudence dictates that the powers of the board of
canvassers are not purely ministerial, but are quasi-
judicial in that they determine whether the papers
transmitted to them are genuine election returns
signed by the proper officers.
PADPAO v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of COMELEC
Resolution No. 10015 which bans the bearing,
carrying, or transporting of firearms as well as the
employment, availment, or engagement of the
services of security personnel or bodyguards during
the election period. Petitioners argue that the
COMELEC has no authority under the law and the
Constitution to promulgate rules regarding the
carrying of firearms by private security agencies
(PSAs) like it. Petitioner also insists that the power
to issue rules and regulations relative to the operation
of PSAs is the PNP pursuant to RA 5487.
Issue
W/N Resolution No. 10015 is valid
Ruling
YES. BP 881 and RA 7166 prohibits any person
from bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms in
public places especially during election period, even
if otherwise licensed to do so, unless authorized in
writing by the COMELEC. Sec. 35 of RA 7166 even
mandates the COMELEC to issue rules and
regulations to implement the law. Petitioner’s
insistence that RA 5487 authorizes only the PNP to
regulate its conduct is also untenable because the
language of RA 5487 and its implementing rules are
not so restrictive as to prohibit other government
agencies from imposing additional restrictions
relating to the operations of PSAs under special
circumstances. In this case, the special circumstance
is the election period.
COMELEC v. Noynay
Facts
COMELEC filed Informations for violation of Sec.
261(i) of the OEC against Amor, et al. before the
RTC of Allen, Samar. Herein respondent Judge
Noynay, however, motu proprio directed the
COMELEC to file the cases before the MTC,
pursuant to R.A. 7691, which provides that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over offenses where the
maximum imposable penalty does not exceed 6
years.
Issue
W/N respondent Judge Noynay erred
Ruling
YES. The exclusive original jurisdiction of MTCs
and other first-level courts does not cover criminal
cases which, by specific provisions of law, fall within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs,
regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor. Art.
268 of the OEC is clear in conferring jurisdiction to
hear and decide election cases to the RTCs regardless
of the penalty prescribed.
Aguilar v. COMELEC
Facts
After being defeated by Aguilar in the barangay
elections by 1 vote, Insoy filed an election protest
before the MTC. The MTC ruled in Insoy’s favor.
Aguilar filed his notice of appeal and paid the appeal
fee of Php 1,000.00 to the MTC. The COMELEC
First Division dismissed Aguilar’s appeal. Aguilar
moved to reconsider such dismissal but the
COMELEC First Division denied the MR. Aguilar
filed another MR which the COMELEC First
Division once more denied.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC First Division committed grave
abuse of discretion
Ruling
YES. Aguilar’s MR of the decision dismissing his
appeal was decided by COMELEC First Division,
and not the En Banc, contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which arrogate the authority to decide on the MRs to
the COMELEC En Banc.
Calucag v. COMELEC
Facts
Private respondent filed an election protest before the
MTC praying for the judicial recount of the votes in
the recently-concluded barangay elections. Petitioner
Calucag lost in the judicial recount, and appealed the
MTC decision declaring private respondent the
winner before the RTC. The RTC dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Calucag then filed his
appeal to the COMELEC who dismissed the same for
lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC has the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over election contests involving
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction
Ruling
YES. The SC reiterated its ruling in Flores v.
COMELEC wherein it annulled Sec. 9 of R.A. 6679
which provides that the MTC decision in barangay
election cases may be appealed to the RTCs for being
contrary to the constitutional provision which
provides that the COMELEC shall have the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction
involving elective barangay officials.
Legaspi v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner filed a petition for disqualification against
Germar, Santos, and Esquivel on the gorund of vote-
buying before the COMELEC which was heard by
the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC First
Division disqualified Germar, Santos, and Esquivel.
The latter filed a MR before the COMELEC en banc.
The COMELEC en banc failed to reach the majority
vote of 4. After rehearing, the COMELEC en banc
still failed to reach a majority consensus. Thus, the
en banc simply dismissed the electoral aspect of the
case.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC en banc erred in dismissing the
electoral aspect of the case
Ruling
NO. Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provide for the mechanism when the
COMELEC en banc fails to acquire the majority
decision. First, if the action is originally commenced
in the COMELEC, such action or proceeding shall be
dismissed. Second, in appealed cases, the judgement
or order appealed from shall stand affirmed. Third, in
incidental matters, the petition shall be denied. In this
case, it is the first instance which is applicable, as
according to Mendoza v. COMELEC. In Mendoza,
the SC held the filing of an MR from a decision of a
division in an election is “part” of a single and
integrated process and is “not an appeal” from the
latter to the former. Thus, the COMELEC en banc
correctly dismissed the election case which had been
originally commenced before it.
Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC
Facts
Jalosjos, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative for the 2nd district of
Zamboang Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National
Elections. Private respondent Erasmo then filed a
petition to deny due course to Jalosjos, Jr.’s COC
before the COMELEC, claiming he made material
misrepresentations in his COC when he indicated
therein that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed
Erasmo’s petition for insufficiency in form and
substance. While Erasmo’s MR of the COMELEC
Second Division’s Resolution dismissing his petition
is pending before the en banc, Jalosjos, Jr. won the
elections and was proclaimed as such. Subsequently,
the en banc rendered a decision granting the MR.
Issue
W/N the en banc may validly still do so.
Ruling
NO. The proclamation of a congressional candidate
following the election divests the COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
representative in favor of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Hence, when the
COMELEC en banc rendered its decision on the MR
after Jalosjos, Jr. had been proclaimed as a
representative, it did so without jurisdiction as
jurisdiction over the same pertains only to the HRET
from the moment of Jalosjos, Jr.’s proclamation.
Dimapilis v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner was reelected as punong barangay of
Brgy. Pulung Maragul. The COMELEC Law
Department then filed a petition for disqualification
against petitioner pursuant to Sec. 40(b) of R.A. 7160
claiming that petitioner was barred from running for
a public office since he was suffering from the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to
hold public office as a consequence of his dismissal
from service as then kagawad of Brgy. Pulung
Maragul after being found guilty of grave
misconduct, among others, by the Ombudsman.
Petitioner filed his Answer cum Memorandum
arguing that the COMELEC Law Department cannot
be a proper party to the present petition, among
others. The COMELEC Second Division cancelled
petitioner’s COC and annulled his proclamation as
winner. The COMELEC en banc denied the MR and
affirmed the Second Division.
Issue
W/N COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling petitioner’s COC
Ruling
NO. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is
mandated to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. The
SC had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the
legal duty to cancel the COC of anyone suffering
from the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office, albeit, arising
from a criminal conviction. More significantly, in
Jalosjos v. COMELEC, the SC held that the denial of
due course or cancellation of one’s COC generally
necessitates the COMELEC’s exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions through a petition based on either
Sec. 12 or 78 of the OEC or Sec. 40 of the LGC, when
the grounds therefore are conclusive on account of a
final and executory judgements, as in this case, such
exercise falls within the COMELEC’s administrative
functions. As petitioner’s disqualification stemmed
from the final decision of the OMB, it is incumbent
upon COMELEC to cancel his COC.
Aggabao v. COMELEC
Facts
During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass
of votes (COCV) for the municipalities of Cordon
and San Agustin, Miranda, petitioner’s rival
candidate for congressman for the 4th District of
Isabela, moved for the exclusion of the first copy of
the COCV on the grounds of tampering, duress, and
manifest errors. The Provincial Board of Canvassers
excluded the same. Based on the results, Miranda
garnered the highest number of votes for
Congressman. Petitioner then appealed to the
COMELEC arguing that the PBOC acted without
jurisdiction when it heard Miranda’s Petition for
Exclusion. While the case was pending, the
COMELEC en banc issued a resolution approving
the proclamation of the winners in Isabela, and
subsequently, Miranda was proclaimed the winner.
Petitioner filed the present petition claiming
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in ordering
Miranda’s proclamation when the COMELEC
Second Division hasn’t resolved the appeal yet.
Issue
W/N the SC may take cognizance of the petition
Ruling
NO. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of
the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s jurisdiction begins. In this case, since
Miranda had already been proclaimed, petitioner’s
recourse is with the HRET.
Salva v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioners field a class suit against the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Batangas and the Sangguniang
Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas as well as the
COMELEC before the RTC for annulment of
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which prescribes
the conduct to be observed in the plebiscite to decide
on the issue of abolishing barangay San Rafael and
merging it with Barangay Dacanlao, Calaca,
Batangas. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction ruling that any question regarding an act,
resolution, or decision of the COMELEC must be
brought before the SC.
Issue
W/N the RTC is correct
Ruling
NO. The final orders, rulings, and decisions of the
COMELEC which are reviewable by certiorari by
the SC under the Constitution are those which are
rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Here, COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 was issued by the COMELEC
in the exercise of its administrative functions as it
merely provided for the conduct to be observed in the
plebiscite. It may not be deemed as a final order or
resolution which is reviewable by the SC.
Cagas v. COMELEC
Facts
Bautista filed an election protest against his
opponent, herein petitioner, alleging fraud,
anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying, and violations
of election rules and regulations. The protest was
raffled to the COMELEC First Division. Petitioner
interposed affirmative defenses that Bautista did not
make the requisite cash deposit on time; and that
Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the
acts complained of. The COMELEC First Division
denied the affirmative defenses in an interlocutory
order. Petitioner moved to reconsider but it was
denied. Hence, petitioner commenced the instant
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64
before the SC.
Issue
W/N the SC may take cognizance of the same
Ruling
NO. The SC has no power to review on certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued
by a Division of the COMELEC. The constitutional
provision granting the SC the power to review any
decision, ruling, or order of the COMELEC is limited
to a final decision or ruling of the COMELEC en
banc and not an interlocutory order of a Division
such as that in this case.
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan v.
COMELEC
Facts
Benzonan sought to declare null and void the canvass
conducted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers and
to recall the proclamation of petitioners as duly-
constituted Mayor, Vice Mayor, and members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Glan, Saranggani. This,
Benzonan lodged directly before COMELEC en
banc. The latter declared the proceedings of the
MBOC as well as the proclamations null and void.
Petitioners now filed the present petition.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction over
the case
Ruling
NO. The COMELEC en banc does not have the
authority to hear and decide election cases in the first
instance. This power pertains to the Divisions of the
COMELEC and any decision rendered by the en
banc at the first instance is null and void. The SC
clarified, however, that not all cases relating to
election laws are required to be heard by Division at
the first instance. Cases involving the COMELEC’s
exercise of its administrative functions may be heard
by the en banc at the first instance. But those cases
which involve the exercise of COMELEC’s quasi-
judicial functions, as in the case at bar, should be
heard in Divisions first.
C. QUALIFICATIONS &
DISQUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES
Tan v. Crisologo
Facts
Tan became a US citizen on 19 January 1993. On 26
October 2009, she registered to be a voter in Q.C. on
30 November 2009, she took an Oath of Allegiance
to the Philippines before a notary public in Makati
City. On 01 December 2009, she filed a petition
before the BI to reacquire her Philippine citizenship.
On the same day, Tan filed her COC for
congresswoman of the first district of Q.C. Crisologo
filed a petition before the MeTC seeking to exclude
Tan from the voter’s list because she was not a
Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter
and she also failed to meet the residency requirement
of the law. The MeTC excluded Tan from the voter’s
list, while the RTC reversed the MeTC ruling. The
CA affirmed the MeTC and reversed the RTC ruling.
Issue
W/N Tan can be considered a Philippine citizen at
the time when she registered to vote
Ruling
NO. Tan argues that her availment of the benefits of
RA 9225 should be retroactive in effect. The SC
disagreed. If Tan’s argument would be upheld, then
the words “reacquire” and “retain” in RA 9225
would effectively be rendered meaningless.
D. REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
Palatino v. COMELEC
Facts
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8585 adjusting
the deadline of voter registration from the originally-
set December 15, 2009 to October 31, 2009.
Petitioners assail such resolution and sought for the
declaration of its nullity on the ground of potential
disenfranchisement of millions of voters, as well as
the same being issued contrary to Sec. 8 of R.A. 8189
which amends the continuing system of registration
set by Congress.
Issue
W/N Resolution No. 8585 is valid
Ruling
NO. There is no ground to hold that the mandate of
continuing voter registration cannot be held within
the period set by Sec. 8 of RA 8189 which is during
office hours except within 120 days before the
regular elections. The present case differs from
AKBAYAN-Youth because there, the extension
sought by the petitioners was within the 120-day
prohibitive period for the conduct of voter
registration under RA 8189. Here, the extension
sought is prior to the 120-day prohibitive period
before the 10 May 2010 elections.
E. Inclusion & Exclusion Proceedings
Mercado v. Dysangco
Facts
Prior to the Barangay Elections of May 12, 1997, 48
persons filed with the MTC presided by respondent-
judge Dysangco their respective petitions for
inclusion. 9 of them were supporters of complainant
Cirilo Mercado while the 39 remaining were
supporters of his opponent Alejandro Gonzales. The
39 Gonzales supporters were unable to attend any
hearings set for the case. Thus, complainants were
surprised when on the day of the election, 34 of the
39 carried with them an Order signed by respondent-
judge directing their inclusion in the voter’s list.
Issue
W/N respondent-judge committed gross ignorance of
the law
Ruling
YES. The law mandates municipal judges to do the
following in inclusion, exclusion, and correction
proceedings: (1) decide the petition on the basis of
the evidence presented; (2) conduct a hearing
thereon; and (3) render a decision within 10 days
from the filing of the petition. In this case, since none
of the 39 Gonzales supporters appeared during the
scheduled dates of hearings nor presented their
evidence thereon, respondent-judge had no basis to
declare and order their inclusion in the voter’s list.
Moreover, the petitions of the 39 Gonzales
supporters were filed prior to April 17, 1997 but the
Order granting their petition was issued only on May
9, 1997, clearly beyond the period to decide the case
set by law.
Velasco v. COMELEC
Facts
Velasco’s registration as a voter in Sasmuan,
Pampanga was denied by the ERB. Thereupon, he
filed a petition for inclusion before the MTC. The
MTC granted Velasco’s petition. However, the RTC
reversed and set aside the MTC decision, ruling that
Velasco lost his domicile of origin when he became
a US citizen. Nevertheless, Velasco still filed his
COC and ran for Mayor of Sasmuan. His opponent,
private respondent Panlaqui, filed a petition to deny
due course to or cancel his COC, invoking the RTC
decision denying Velasco’s petition for inclusion as
a voter. Velasco won the elections and was
proclaimed the winner. The COMELEC Second
Division issued a resolution finding Velasco’s
proclamation null and void, finding that he
committed a material misrepresentation when he
claimed in his COC that he is a registered voter of
Sasmuan. The en banc essentially affirmed the
Second Division.
Issue
W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion
Ruling
NO. The ERB denied Velasco’s registration which
denial the RTC subsequently affirmed. Under the
law, this RTC denial is immediately final and
executory. Since Velasco’s knowledge of the RTC
decision at the time he filed his COC is undisputed,
the COMELEC concluded that he committed a
material misrepresentation in his COC in declaring
that he is a registered voter in Sasmuan. That the
COMELEC relied on the RTC ruling in cancelling
Velasco’s COC cannot be considered a legal error as
Sec. 138 of the OEC clearly provides that decisions
of RTC on appeals of petitions for
exclusion/inclusion are immediately final and
executory.
F. Political Parties
Atienza, Jr. v. COMELEC
Facts
The LP held a National Executive Committee
(NECO) meeting to elect new party leaders before
then LP President Drilon’s term expires. The meeting
eventually installed Manuel Roxas II as the LP
President. Herein petitioners Atienza, et al. filed a
petition before the COMELEC to enjoin Roxas from
assuming the LP presidency claiming that the NECO
assembly which elected him was invalidly convened.
Roxas, et al. argue, on the other hand that Atienza, et
al. were deemed resigned by the LP for holding an
illegal election earlier. The COMELEC upheld
Roxas’ election, and refused to rule on the
membership of Atienza, et al. as this was a
membership issue that related to disciplinary action
within the political party.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC may rule on Atienza, et al.’s
membership
Ruling
NO. The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party
disputes is limited. The COMELEC may resolve an
intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case before
it, as an incident of its power to register political
parties. However, the COMELEC does not have
blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies
involving political parties. The issue as regards the
expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the LP was purely a
membership issue which had to be settled within the
party. It is an internal party matter over which the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino v. COMELEC
Facts
The General Counsel of LDP informed the
COMELEC that it is only the Party Chairman, Sen.
Edgardo Angara, of the political party who may
nominate the candidate. Thus, the LDP, merged with
the PDP-Laban, nominated Mr. Fernando Poe, Jr. as
their official candidate for President. On the other
hand, Sen. Angara’s party-mate and Sec. Gen. of
LDP, Rep. Aquino nominated Sen. Panfilo Lacson as
the LDP candidate for President. The COMELEC, in
resolving this issue, divided the LDP into the Angara
Wing, and the Aquino Wing. Petitioner Sen. Angara
assailed the COMELEC resolution.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC resolution is valid
Ruling
NO. In cases like this, the COMELEC has the power
and duty to step in not only to protect the rights of
the party but also the electorate, and ensure the
conduct of orderly elections. The Court was baffled
by COMELEC’s resolution of this issue. It need only
to resort to the Party Constitution in order to ascertain
the proper remedy in this case. The Party
Constitution states that the LDP Sec. Gen. does not
have the authority to nominate candidates. By
dividing the LDP into 2 wings, the COMELEC
planted the seeds of confusion to the electorate. Thus,
Party Chairman Sen. Angara’s nominations should
be upheld, but Rep. Aquino’s should rather be
considered as independent candidates.
Liberal Party v. COMELEC
Facts
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8646
setting August 17, 2009 as the last day of filing of
petitions for registration of political parties.
Subsequently, it promulgated Resolution No. 8752
which provides for the rules for the filing of petitions
for accreditation for the determinations of the
dominant majority party, the dominant minority
party, ten major national parties, and two major local
parties setting the deadline for such on February 12,
2010. On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the
COMELEC a petition for accreditation as the
dominant minority party. On the same date, the NP-
NPC filed a petition for registration as a coalition and
asked for accreditation as the dominant majority
party as well. On April 12, 2010, the COMELEC en
banc granted NP-NPC’s petition for registration as a
coalition. The LP assails the en banc resolution for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC en banc issued the same with
grave abuse of discretion
Ruling
YES. The deadline set by the COMELEC in
Resolution No. 8646 for the registration of political
parties which term includes coalitions, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, is mandatory in nature.
The en banc acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
it granted the registration of NP-NPC as a coalition
beyond the deadline the COMELEC had itself set.
The mandatory deadline is a jurisdictional matter that
should have been satisfied.
G. Party-List Organizations
Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC
Facts
Two different entities, purporting to represent
CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC their
Manifestations to participate in the Party-List System
of Representation. The First Manifestation was
signed by Pia Derla, purporting to be the acting
secretary general of CIBAC, while the Second
Manifestation was submitted by respondents
Chinchona Cruz, and Virginia Jose, as the party’s
vice president and secretary-general, respectively.
Both entities also filed their party-list nominees.
Respondents sought to expunge from the records the
nomination submitted by Pia Derla, naming Lokin,
Jr., et al. as its party-list nominees. The COMELEC
First Division granted the petition, which was
affirmed by the en banc. Petitioner now argues that
the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to resolve the
case as the case involved intra-corporate disputes
cognizable by special commercial courts.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the case
Ruling
YES. When petitioners manifested their intent to
participate in the party-list elections, the invoked the
COMELEC’s authority under the Party-List System
Act to approve their eligibility to participate. The
COMELEC’s jurisdiction to settle the struggle for
leadership within the party is well established. This
singular power to rule upon questions of party
identity and leadership is exercised by the
COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers.
ABC Party-List v. COMELEC
Facts
Respondent Mauricio, Jr. filed with the COMELEC
a petition for the cancellation of registration and
accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-list on the
ground that it is a front for the religious sect Ang
Dating Daan. In addition, Mauricio alleged that
petitioner is receiving support from parties abroad
which is also prohibited. The COMELEC Second
Division dismissed the petition on procedural and
substantive grounds. The Second Division found that
ABC is not a religious sect and is not therefore
disqualified from registration. The COMELEC en
banc partially granted the MR of Mauricio on the
ground that the Second Division’s resolution was
issued without hearing.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the case
Ruling
YES. The Constitution provides that the COMELEC
has the authority to register political parties,
organizations, or coalitions and the authority to
cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds
(i.e., religious sect, receipt of funding from foreign
sources). The COMELEC thus, had jurisdiction over
the instant petition for cancellation of the registration
of ABC Party-list. Petitioner’s assertion that since
ABC Party-list had been proclaimed as one of the
winners in the last May 10, 2010 elections divested
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction to try the instant
case is untenable. Although it is the party-list that is
voted for during the elections, it is not the
organization that sits and becomes a member of the
HReps, but it is the party-list nominee which
becomes a member thereof. Thus, the HRET has
jurisdiction over contests involving the qualifications
of the party-list nominees, as distinguished from the
registration of Party-lists which is under the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, pursuant to the
Constitution.
Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC
Facts
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate
petitions with the SC in an effort to reverse various
resolutions by the COMELEC disqualifying them
from the May 2013 party-list race. The COMELEC,
in its assailed resolutions issued in October,
November and December of 2012, ruled, among
others, that these party-list groups and organizations
failed to represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, their nominees did not
come from a marginalized and underrepresented
sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups
were not truly representative of the sector they intend
to represent in Congress.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion
Ruling
NO. The SC cannot fault the COMELEC for
excluding the petitioners from participating in the
May 2013 elections because it relied on what were
the the prevailing rulings by the SC, specifically in
Ang Bagong Bayani which requires that the political
party, sector, organization, or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Sec. 5 of RA 7941. The SC,
however, abandoned the said ruling, and held that
Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the Constitution is crystal clear
that there shall be a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. The commas that separate national,
regional, and sectoral could only mean that the
framers never intended the national and regional
parties to be at the same time sectoral. Moreover, RA
7941 did not also require national and regional
parties to represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors. Thus, the SC remanded
the case to the COMELEC whilst issuing the
following guidelines:
1. Three different groups may participate in the
party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list
elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative
district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to
a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either
be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in
"well-defined political constituencies." It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are "marginalized and underrepresented" include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" must belong to the sector
they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack
"well-defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
H. CANDIDACY
1. Qualifications of Candidates
Jalosjos v. COMELEC
Facts
Jalosjos lived with his brother, Romeo, Jr. in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos also acquired a
residential property in the same village where his
brother lived, as well as a fishpond in San Isidro,
Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos filed his COC
for governor of Zamboanga Sibugay. Respondent
Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due course
to or cancel the COC of Jalosjos on the ground that
he failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement. The COMELEC Second Division ruled
that Jalosjos failed to prove the residency
requirement by failing to prove his intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
The en banc affirmed the Second Division.
Issue
W/N Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona
fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay
Ruling
NO. The COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos has not
come to settle his domicile in Ipil because he has
merely been staying at his brother’s house. This
circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion.
A candidate is not required to have a house in the
community to establish his residence or domicile in
a particular place. It is sufficient if he should live
there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of
a friend or relative. To hold otherwise would be
adding a property qualification for public office.
Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner was a naturalized Australian citizen. On
September 18, 2006, she filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration
and Indigenous Affairs of Australia. She ran for
mayor in the May 10, 2010 elections and won.
Private respondents filed petitions for quo warranto
against petitioner questioning her eligibility before
the RTC, arguing that she failed to execute a sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer oath. The
RTC declared petitioner disqualified. The
COMELEC affirmed the RTC.
Issue
W/N petitioner is disqualified from running due to
failure to renounce her Australian citizenship
pursuant to Sec. 5 (2) of R.A. 9225.
Ruling
YES. The aforementioned provision provides that
those seeking public office shall make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath. Since petitioner failed to execute her
renunciation of her Australian citizenship under oath,
the same was not valid, and petitioner is ineligible.
Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC
Facts
Respondent Tan filed before the COMELEC a
petition to deny due course to or cancel petitioner’s
COC on the ground that she is not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner countered that the allegation as regards her
American citizenship was not supported by evidence.
During the course of the proceedings, Tan presented
a Manifestation wherein he attached a copy of a blog
which provides a database record of the BI showing
petitioner’s American citizenship and passport as
well as a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner
indicating that petitioner used a US passport when
travelling abroad. The COMELEC First Division
cancelled petitioner’s COC, which was affirmed by
the en banc.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC erred in ruling that petitioner
was not a Filipino citizen
Ruling
NO. Due to respondent Tan’s Manifestation which
effectively established that petitioner was of
American citizenship, the burden of proof shifted
upon petitioner to prove her Filipino citizenship. The
records do not show compliance by petitioner with
the requirements of R.A. 9225 which are: (a) for
petitioner to make an oath of allegiance to the
Philippines before the Consul-General of the
Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (b) for
petitioner to make a personal and sworn renunciation
of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
Facts
Poe ran for president during the May 2016 elections
wherein she indicated that she is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and that her residence in the
Philippines from May 24, 2005 up to May 10, 2016
was 10 years and 11 months in total. Petitions to deny
or cancel her COC before the COMELEC were filed
on the ground, among others, that she cannot be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
was a foundling. The COMELEC cancelled her
COC.
Issue
1. W/N petitioner is a natural-born Filipino Citizen;
and
2. W/N petitioner complied with the residence
requirement.
Ruling
1. YES. There is a high probability the petitioner’s
parents are Filipinos because: (a) her physical
 features resemble that of a Filipino; (b) when she
was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a
municipality composed of 99% Filipinos, there is
also a 99% chance that her biological parents are
Filipinos. Said probability and circumstantial
evidence are admissible under Sec. 4, Rule 128 of
the Rules of Evidence; (c) foundlings are, as a
class, natural-born Filipino citizens based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention wherein though the enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there was also no
restrictive language so as to exclude foundlings
from natural-born Filipino citizens.
2. YES. Petitioner presented overwhelming
evidence which showed that her family relocated
to the Philippines for good. The COMELEC
disregarded the import of these pieces of evidence
which the petitioner presented on the basis of the
position that the earliest date that petitioner could
have started residence in the Philippines was in
July 2006 when her application under R.A. 9225
was approved by the BI.
2. Filing of Certificates of Candidacy
Sinaca v. Mula
Facts
Teodoro Sinaca ran for Mayor of Malimono, Surigao
del Norte, representing LAKAS. Mula sought to
disqualify Teodoro on the ground that he had
previously been convicted of bigamy which is a
crime involving moral turpitude. The COMELEC
granted such. On May 10, 1998, at the same time
Teodoro filed his MR, petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca,
an indepent candidate, withdrew his candidacy for
Sangguniang Bayan member, joined and became a
member of the LAKAS party, and was nominated by
LAKAS as the substitute mayoralty candidate. Mula
then sought to disqualify Sinaca on the ground,
among others, that before he filed his COC as a
LAKAS candidate, he was an independent candidate.
The COMELEC Second Division upheld Sinaca’s
candidacy for mayor, while the en banc disqualified
Sinaca.
Issue
W/N there was a valid substitution in this case
Ruling
YES. There was substantial compliance with the
requirement that the substitute candidate must be of
the same political party as the original candidate and
must be duly nominated as such by the political
party. The fact that Sinaca was an independent prior
to his nomination was immaterial because what is
more significant is the fact that he already withdrew
his candidacy as an independent, and was already a
member of LAKAS when he filed his candidacy as
mayor, and was nominated as such by LAKAS. Even
if Sinaca only became a member of LAKAS after
Teodoro’s disqualification, the substitution by
Sinaca would still be valid as there is nothing in the
law nor the constitution which requires that a
substitute candidate must have been a member of the
party concerned for a certain period before he can be
nominated as such.
Luna v. COMELEC
Facts
Luna filed her COC as substitute for Hans Roger,
who on the same day withdrew his COC. Private
respondents sought to disqualify Luna arguing that
Hans Roger was underage for the position of Vice
Mayor thus, he is deemed not to have validly filed his
COC. The COMELEC granted the petition and found
that Hans Roger, being underage, is deemed not to
have filed his COC for vice mayor. Thus, there could
not be a valid substitution. The en banc affirmed the
division.
Issue
W/N there was a valid substitution
Ruling
YES. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it ruled that Hans Roger did not file
a valid COC on its own, without even a petition for
disqualification pending before it. In effect, the
COMELEC, without the proper proceedings,
cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy and
declared the substitution by Luna invalid.
Martinez III v. COMELEC
Facts
Martinez and Salimbangon were competing
candidates for representative in the fourth district of
Cebu. A person named Edilito C. Martinez ran for
the same post. Petitioner sought to declare Edilito a
nuisance candidate. However, the COMELEC
Second Division rendered its decision declaring
Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate a whole
month after the actual elections. Thus, petitioner
filed an Election Protest which sought to have the
HRET count a good amount of ballots which
indicated the names “Martinez” or “C. Martinez” in
favor of petitioner. The HRET, however, affirmed
the proclamation of Salimbangon in view of the late
issuance of the COMELEC decision.
Issue
W/N the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
Ruling
YES. A nuisance candidate is one who has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole
purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong
candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only
the surname of such candidate will be considered
stray and not counted for either of them. The HRET
in this case failed to give weight to relevant
circumstances that make the will of the electorate
determinable, such as the fact that Edilito C.
Martinez lacked the serious intent to run as he
immediately disappeared after filing his COC; the
fact that Edilito C. Martinez is unheard of in the
community, unlike petitioner who is a well-known
politician therein; and the fact that Edilito C.
Martinez was far from the voters’ consciousness as
he did not even campaign nor formally launch his
candidacy. Petitioner should not be prejudiced by
COMELEC’s inefficiency and lethargy. The
similarity of his surname with Edilito was meant to
cause confusion among the voters and spoil
petitioner’s chances of winning the elections.
Dela Cruz v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner Casimira Dela Cruz filed her COC for vice
mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of
Antique. Subsequently, one Aurelio N. Dela Cruz
also filed his COC for vice mayor. Petitioner then
sought to declare Aurelio a nuisance candidate on the
ground that he filed his COC to cause confusion
among the electorate due to the similarity of their
surnames. The COMELEC First Division declared
Aurelio a nuisance candidate. However, during the
election day, Aurelio’s name still appeared in the
sample ballots, prompting petitioner to request the
COMELEC to order the exclusion of Aurelio’s name
from the list of candidates. COMELEC issued
resolution no. 8844 which directed that the votes cast
for those who have been declared as nuisance
candidates be considered as stray votes. Petitioner
lost the elections, prompting her to file an election
protest praying for the tallying in her favor of the
votes cast for Aurelio and her proclamation as the
duly-elected vice mayor.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion
Ruling
YES. The SC held that the rule in COMELEC
Resolution No. 4116, which was used in Martinez III
v. COMELEC, to the effect that votes cast for
nuisance candidates must be credited or tallied in
favor of the bona fide candidate, is still good law.
The SC held that upholding this rule is more in
keeping with the principle that the appreciation of
ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the electorate in the choice of public officials
will not be defeated by technical infirmities. The SC
noted that the infirmities and delays in the delisting
of nuisance candidates only made possible the very
evils sought to be prevented by the exclusion of
nuisance candidates. Moreover, private respondent
admits that the voters have properly been informed
of Aurelio’s delisting as a nuisance candidate. Thus,
with more reason that the SC should consider the
votes cast for Aurelio in favor of petitioner, the
legitimate candidate.
Talaga v. COMELEC
Facts
Ramon Talaga and Phillip Castillo both filed their
COCs for the position of Mayor of Lucena City.
Castillo then filed a petition to deny due course to or
cancel the COC of Ramon on the ground that he had
already served three terms as Mayor of Lucena.
Castillo alleged that despite knowing that he had
already served three terms, Ramon still filed his
COC. The COMELEC disqualified Ramon. Barbara
Ruby then sought to substitute Ramon. Thereafter,
Ruby won the elections.
Issue
W/N there was a valid substitution
Ruling
NO. Castillo’s petition properly pertained to a
petition to deny due course to or cancel the COC of
a candidate under Sec. 78 of the OEC. Distinction
must be made between a person who is disqualified
under Sec. 68 who is merely prohibited to continue
as a candidate, from a cancellation or denial of due
course of a COC under Sec. 78 which considers a
person to never have filed a COC at all. Since the
denial of Ramon’s petition was anchored on Sec. 78,
he had no right to pass on to his substitute.
Engle v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner and respondent vied for the position of
vice mayor of Babatngon, Leyte. Petitioner’s late
husband, James L. Engle, was the original candidate
for the position who died. Thus, prompting petitioner
to substitute. Private respondent filed a petition to
deny due course to or cancel petitioner’s COC
arguing that she misrepresented that she is qualified
to substitute her husband who was declared an
independent candidate by the COMELEC Law
Department in view of Lakas-CMD’s failure to
submit to the former the authorization of its Leyte
Chapter Chairman Romualdez to sign the CONAs of
Lakas-CMD candidates in Babatngon. It was only on
July 5, 2013 that the COMELEC Second Division
rendered a decision effectively cancelling
petitioner’s COC and annulling her proclamation as
vice mayor.
Issue
W/N there was no valid substitution in this case
Ruling
NO. It is worth noting that despite finding that there
was no material misrepresentation in petitioner’s
COC, the COMELEC still cancelled the same on the
ground of the invalidity of her substitution because
of its late finding that her husband, the original
candidate, was an independent candidate who may
not be substituted. The SC observed that petitioner’s
deceased husband’s name remained in the list
notwithstanding his death. Still, he received twice the
number of votes received by herein private
respondent. The SC held that rules and regulations of
the COMELEC as to matters of form are mandatory
only before the conduct of the elections, but are
directory after the election period. Given the
foregoing, the SC held that the late submission of
Romualdez’s authority to sign the CONA of James
L. Engle to the COMELEC was a mere technicality
that cannot be used to defeat the will of the electorate
in a fair and honest election.
Tagolino v. HRET
Facts
Richard Gomez filed his COC with the COMELEC
vying for congressional office as representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Juntilla filed a
petition seeking to disqualify or declare Richard as
ineligible for the office he was gunning for on the
ground of his failure to comply with the 1-year
residency requirement. In addition, Juntilla prayed
that Richard’s COC be denied due course/cancelled.
The COMELEC First Division granted Juntilla’s
petition without any qualification. Such grant was
affirmed by the en banc. Subsequently, Lucy Torres-
Gomez substituted Richard, and was proclaimed the
winner. Herein petitioner now files a petition for quo
warranto against Lucy Torres on the ground that she
did not validly substitute Richard as his COC was
void ab initio. The HRET, however, dismissed the
quo warranto petition.
Issue
W/N there was a valid substitution in this case.
Ruling
NO. A person whose COC was denied due course or
cancelled under Sec. 78 is deemed to have not been
a candidate at all. Jurisprudence holds that if a
petition prays for the denial of due course
to/cancellation of the COC and the same is granted
by the COMELEC without any qualification, the
cancellation of the candidate’s COC is in order. In
this case, sine Juntilla’s petition also prayed for the
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of
Richard’s COC, and the same was granted by the
COMELEC without qualification, then Richard’s
COC had been cancelled, and no substitution could
validly result therefrom.
Zapanta v. COMELEC
Facts
Alfred Zapanta filed his COC for city councilor of
Antipolo under the ticket of AKSYON. Herein
petitioner Reynaldo Zapanta, on the other hand, filed
his COC as substitute for a Rolando Zonio, as city
councilor under the ticket of Lakas-CMD. Alfred
filed before the COMELEC a petition to declare
Reynaldo a nuisance candidate on the ground that
Reynaldo indicated his nickname to be “Alfred” in
the COC which was also indicated in the official
ballots. The COMELEC Second Division granted
Alfred’s petition. The en banc denied Reynaldo’s
MR, and accordingly ordered the crediting of the
votes counted for Reynaldo to be credited in favor of
Alfred.
Issue
W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion
Ruling
NO. Petitioner was not able to show that the voters
can clearly identify that his chosen nickname
“Alfred” pertains only to him. Petitioner also failed
to deny that he had no campaign materials using the
name “Alfred Zapanta.” However, the SC set aside
the COMELEC ruling, and held that in a multi-slot
office, such as membership in the Sanggunian, a
voter may vote for more than one candidate. Thus, it
is possible that the nuisance candidate and the
legitimate candidate, having similar names, both
receive votes in 1 ballot. In such a case, the votes cast
for the nuisance candidate should no longer be added
to the legitimate candidate, otherwise, the latter
receives two votes from a single voter. Thus, if there
are votes for both Reynaldo and Alfred in this case,
then only one vote shall be counted in the latter’s
favor.
Aratea v. COMELEC
Facts
Lonzanida filed his COC as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales. Rodolfo filed a petition under Sec. 78 of
the OEC to deny due course to or cancel Lonzanida’s
COC on the ground that he committed material
misrepresentation regarding his eligibility as he had
already served 3 terms as mayor. The COMELEC
Second Division cancelled Lonzanida’s COC.
Lonzanida’s MR before the en banc remained
pending during the May 2010 elections, where
Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number
of votes as mayor and vice mayor, respectively.
Aratea then sought DILG’s opinion on whether he
should assume the office of mayor in view of
Lonzanida’s disqualification, which the latter
granted because of the finding that Lonzanida was
previously convicted of a crime with perpetual
special disqualification. The COMELEC en banc
disqualified Lonzanida on the ground that (a) he had
previously served 3 terms as mayor; and (b) he had
been previously convicted of a crime with an
accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification. Antipolo then filed a petition-in-
intervention claiming her right to be proclaimed as
mayor.
Issue
W/N Antipolo should be proclaimed the mayor
Ruling
YES. Antipolo, the second-placer, should be
proclaimed mayor because Lonzanida’s COC was
void ab initio. A cancelled COC is void ab initio, and
could not give rise to a valid candidacy, much less to
valid votes. Lonzanida’s COC was cancelled because
he was ineligible to run for mayor. Whether his COC
is cancelled before or after elections is immaterial
because the cancellation on such ground means he
was never a candidate from the very beginning. Thus,
there was only one qualified candidate in this case for
mayor – Antipolo, who therefore received the highest
number of votes.
Maquiling v. COMELEC
Facts
Arnado was naturalized as an American citizen. He
applied for repatriation and had his citizenship
attained and reacquired. Arnado then filed his COC
as Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Sur. Balua filed
a petition to disqualify Arnado/cancel his COC on
the ground that Arnado had been using his US
Passport in entering and departing from the
Philippines. The case was still pending when Arnado
was proclaimed the winner as mayor. The
COMELEC First Division ruled that Arnado’s use of
his US Passport indicated his lack of intention to
renounce his US Citizenship. Before the en banc,
Maquiling intervened and asked to be proclaimed the
winner of the elections, as the second-placer in the
elections. The en banc reversed the First Division
and ruled that Arnado’s use of a US passport did not
operate to revert back to his status as a US citizen.
Issue
W/N Maquiling should be proclaimed the winner
Ruling
YES. When Arnado used his US passport, he
recanted his renunciation of his US citizenship. Thus,
he was disqualified from becoming a candidate in the
elections. When a person who is not qualified is
voted for and eventually garners the highest number
of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the
qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is
to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. Thus, Maquiling, being the only eligible
candidate, should be proclaimed the winner.
Go v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of
Baybay, Leyte, her COC as mayor of the said
municipality. On the next day, she filed with the
provincial election supervisor of Leyte, whose office
is in Tacloban City, her COC as governor of the
province. Simultaneously therewith, petitioner
attempted to file her affidavit of withdrawal of her
COC as mayor of Baybay, Leyte, with the provincial
election supervisor who refused to accept the same
and directed her to file said affidavit to the municipal
election supervisor’s office in Baybay, Leyte.
Considering the fact that the travel time from
Tacloban to Baybay was 2 hours, petitioner decided
to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax to her
father at Baybay and the latter submitted the same to
the office of the election officer at 12:28AM of
March 1, 2001. Respondents filed a petition to deny
due course to/cancel the COCs of petitioner on the
ground that she filed them concurrently. They also
asked for petitioner to be declared ineligible for both
positions. The COMELEC disqualified petitioner.
Issue
W/N petitioner validly withdrew her candidacy as
Mayor in Baybay, Leyte
Ruling
YES. There was substantial compliance in this case.
Under the law, there is no requirement that the
affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same
office where the COC to be withdrawn was filed.
While it may be true that there is a COMELEC
resolution in this case directing the contrary, the SC
held that such resolution is merely directory, and is
intended for convenience. An administrative
issuance such as the said resolution cannot alter,
modify, or supplant anything in the law which was
not there to begin with.
Santos v. COMELEC
Facts
Respondent Jennifer Roxas filed a petition for
disqualification against her fellow candidate Rosalie
Roxas alleging that the latter is a nuisance candidate
for using the nickname “Jenn-Rose Roxas” which is
similar to respondent’s name. The COMELEC
Second Division granted the petition and declared
Rosalie a nuisance candidate. While the MR was
pending, the elections pushed through wherein
respondent was ousted from the lineup of the
supposed winners. Thus, respondent filed an election
protest praying for the crediting that she be
proclaimed as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. The en banc subsequently denied
Rosalie’s MR and directed the crediting of Rosalie’s
votes in favor of respondent. Herein petitioners argue
that there must be a separate proceeding for such.
Issue
W/N there should be a separate proceeding for the
transfer of votes of Rosalie in favor of respondent
Ruling
NO. The crediting of votes is a logical consequence
of the final decision in the nuisance case because the
vote for the nuisance candidate is considered a vote
for the legitimate candidate. However, the SC in this
case laid down the rule that in a multi-slot office, the
votes of the nuisance candidate is not automatically
credited to the bona fide candidate as there is a
possibility that a voter may have voted for both the
nuisance candidate and the bona fide candidate. In
such cases, the SC held that there could only be one
vote credited in favor of the bona fide candidate.
Otherwise, the bona fide candidate would be entitled
to 2 votes from 1 voter.
I. Campaign
Penera v. COMELEC
Facts
This resolves a MR filed by petitioner of an SC
Decision which disqualified her from running for
office as Mayor for premature campaigning.
Petitioner argues in the case that she was not yet a
candidate at the time of the incident under Sec. 11 of
RA 8436, as amended by Sec. 13 of RA 9369.
Issue
W/N petitioner is liable for premature campaigning
Ruling
NO. A candidate is liable for an election offense only
for acts done during the campaign period, not before.
The law is clear as daylight—any election offense
that may be committed by a candidate under any
election law cannot be committed before the start of
the campaign period. The SC cited the case of Lanot
v. COMELEC which held that one who files a COC
is not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period. This ruling, the SC said was even elevated by
Congress in Sec. 15 of R.A. 8436 which now reads
that, “Any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered
as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy.”
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision
asserts, that partisan political acts done by a
candidate before the campaign period are unlawful,
but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the
campaign period. Neither does the law state that
partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are temporarily lawful, but
becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign
period. This is clearly not the language of the law.
Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision,
which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of
expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
Congress has laid down the law—a candidate is
liable for election offenses only upon the start of the
campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore
the clear and express mandate of the law that “any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within
the filing period shall only be considered a candidate
at the start of the campaign period for which he filed
his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can this Court
turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of
the law that “any unlawful act or omission applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period.
Ejercito v. COMELEC
Facts
A petition for disqualification was filed by
gubernatorial candidate San Luis against herein
petitioner, and his opponent, Ejercito. Among his
causes of action was the allegation that Ejercito
exceeded his expenditures due to television
campaigns. The COMELEC First Division granted
the petition and disqualified Ejercito. The First
Division held that the Exhibits presented by San Luis
were submissions from ABS-CBN Corporation
which contain an advertising contract between the
latter and Scenema Concept International, which
contains the signature of Ejercito. The COMELEC
en banc essentially affirmed the First Division.
Issue
W/N COMELEC erred in disqualifying Ejercito for
an act done by a third party who simply exercised its
right to free expression without the knowledge and
consent of Ejercito
Ruling
NO. The intent of our lawmakers in enacting Sec.
100, 101, and 103 of the OEC was to regulate not just
the election expenses of the candidate but also his or
her contributor/supporter/donor as well as by
including in the aggregate limit of the former’s
election expenses those incurred by the latter. The
phrase “those incurred or caused to be incurred by
the candidate” is sufficiently adequate to cover those
expenses which are contributed or donated in the
candidate’s behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement
that a contribution or donation should bear the
written conformity of the candidate, a
contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as
“any person authorized by such candidate or
treasurer.”
Salvador v. COMELEC
Facts
Salvador, a member of the political party Bagong
Lakas ng Nueva Ecija, ran for mayor. Belena, filed a
complaint-affidavit against Salvador for
overspending, arguing that Salvador spent a total of
Php 449,000 in the 2010 election while the maximum
expenditure allowed by law was only Php 275,667.
Salvador maintained that while he was a member of
a political party, he never received support from
such. The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution
directing its Law Department to file an Information
against Salvador for overspending.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its
discretion
Ruling
NO. Sec. 13, R.A. 7166 makes a distinction between
a candidate without a political party and without
support from any political party; and a candidate with
a political party and who receives support from such
political party. The former is entitled to spend the
P5.00 per voter cap, and the latter is entitled to spend
the P3.00 per voter cap. The word “and” between
“without a political party” and “without support from
any political party” was held by the SC to be a
conjunctive word, meaning both conditions must
concur for the P5.00 cap to apply. In this case,
petitioner merely alleged that he was not supported
by a political party, but clearly admitted that he was
a member of the political party.
Maturan v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner filed his COC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Basilan. Allan Patiño filed a petition for
petitioner’s disqualification on the ground of his
failure to file his SOCE for the 2010 and 2013
elections. Petitioner opposed the same by arguing
that it had been rendered moot by his withdrawal of
his COC last 2013. The COMELEC First Division
disqualified petitioner. The en banc affirmed the
same. Petitioner insists that he is in good faith
because he never though he would be required to file
his SOCE for 2013 since he withdrew his candidacy
that year.
Issue
W/N petitioner may invoke good faith
Ruling
NO. In Pilar v. COMELEC, the SC held that every
candidate, including one who meanwhile withdraws
his candidacy, is required to file his SOCE by Section
14 of R.A. No. 7166. Accordingly, the petitioner
could not invoke good faith on the basis of his having
withdrawn his candidacy a day before the 2013
elections.
J. Board of Election Inspectors & Board of
Canvassers
Agujetas v. CA
Facts
The petitioners, who are members of the provincial
board of inspectors, made an erroneous proclamation
in this case. Thus, a case was filed against them for
violating BP 881. The trial court adjudged them
guilty of violation Sec. 231 of BP 881 or the OEC.
The CA affirmed the trial court. Petitioners fault the
trial court and argue that it is the failure to make a
proclamation on the basis of the Certificate of
Canvass, and not mere erroneous proclamations,
which is punishable under Sec. 262 in relation to Sec.
231 of the OEC.
Issue
W/N an erroneous proclamation is punishable
Ruling
YES. To go by the explanation as proposed by the
petitioners would be tantamount to tolerating and
licensing boards of canvassers to “make an erroneous
proclamation” and still be exculpated by just putting
up The inexcusable defense that the “foul-up resulted
from the erroneous arrangement of the names of
candidates" in one municipality or that “the basis of
their proclamation was the erroneous ranking made
by the tabulation committee.” That would be a neat
apology for allowing the board to be careless in their
important task by simply claiming that they cannot
be held liable because they did their “duty” of
proclaiming the winning candidates on the basis of
the certificate of canvass—even “erroneous”
certificates—which they made.
K. Remedies and Jurisdiction in Election Law
Munder v. COMELEC
Facts
Munder filed his COC as Mayor of Bubong, Lanao
del Sur on 26 November 2009. Respondent Sarip
filed a petition for the disqualification of Munder on
the ground that the latter was not a registered voter
of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. Such petition for
disqualification was filed on 13 April 2010. After
winning the elections, Munder filed his Answer
arguing that the nature of Sarip’s petition was one for
the denial of due course to or cancellation of his
COC, whose period for filing had already prescribed.
The COMELEC Second Division gave credence to
Munder’s arguments and dismissed the case. The en
banc, however disregarded the issue as to the nature
of Sarip’s petition and directly ruled on the issue.
Issue
W/N the en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion
Ruling
YES. The main ground of Sarip in his Petition for
Disqualification—that Munder was not qualified to
run for not being a registered voter therein—was not
included in the enumeration of the grounds for
disqualification. Thus, it is in the nature of a petition
to deny due course to/cancel Munder’s COC. Given
the foregoing, a petition to deny due course to/cancel
a candidate’s COC prescribes within 25 days from
the date the candidate whose COC is sought to be
cancelled filed his/her COC, or 5 days from the last
day of filing of COCs. Since Munder filed his COC
on 26 November 2009, the prescriptive period within
which to file a petition to deny due course to/cancel
the same is only until 21 December 2009. Thus,
Sarip’s petition filed on 13 April 2010 was filed out
of time.
Pasandalan v. COMELEC
Facts
Pasandalan filed before the COMELEC a petition to
nullify the results of the elections in several
barangays in Lanao del Sur on the ground of failure
of elections. Pasandalan argues that on election day,
some Cafgus stationed near the polling place
indiscriminately fired their firearms which caused
people to panic and leave the polling place.
Thereafter, the supporters of Asum, a mayoralty
candidate substituted the voters who left and filled
the ballots with Asum’s name. The COMELEC
dismissed the petition because none of the grounds
relied upon by Pasandalan would justify the
declaration of failure of elections.
Issue
W/N there was a failure of elections in this case
Ruling
NO. The election was held in the 16 protested
precincts as scheduled. At no point was the election
in any of the precincts suspended. Nor was there a
failure to elect because of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes during the
preparation, transmission, custody and canvass of the
election returns. The alleged terrorism was not of
such scale and prevalence to prevent the holding of
the election or to cause its suspension. In fact, the
casting and counting of votes, the preparation,
transmission and canvassing of election returns and
the proclamation of the winning candidate took place
in due course.
Dibaratun v. COMELEC
Facts
Respondent Abubakar filed a petition before the
COMELEC to declare a failure of elections in certain
barangays in Lanao del Sur and to annul the
proclamation of petitioner Dibaratun. Abubakar
alleged that on the election day, Dibaratun’s son,
Gaffar, got inside the polling place and was caught
with 3 ballots containing the name of Dibaratun.
When confronted, Gaffar fired up and the ballots in
the ballot box were substituted by Gaffar’s
companions with ballots voting for Dibaratun. The
COMELEC en banc granted the petition. Dibaratun
now claims that Abubakar’s petition was in the
nature of a pre-proclamation controversy which was
filed out of time.
Issue
W/N the en banc committed grave abuse of
discretion
Ruling
NO. Anent the propriety of the declaration of failure
of elections, the SC gave credence to the en banc’s
factual findings and determinations. The SC agreed
with the COMELEC that the election was suspended
before the closing of the voting due to violence. Only
10 voters were able to cast their votes out of 151
registered voters; hence, the votes not cast would
have affected the result of the elections. The
concurrence of these two conditions caused the
COMELEC en banc to declare a failure of elections.
Moreover, A petition to declare a failure of elections
is neither a pre-proclamation controversy as
classified under Sec. 5 (h), Rule 1 of the Revised
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, nor an election case.
Lucman v. COMELEC
Facts
During the canvassing of votes, private respondent
objected to the inclusion of ten election returns
although only six of them are subject of this case on
the following grounds: (a) that the election returns
are obviously manufactured; (b) the returns are
falsified; and (c) the returns are incomplete. The
municipal board of canvassers overruled such
objections and declared petitioner as the winning
candidate. Private respondent filed with the
COMELEC an appeal from the ruling of the board
alleging massive fraud and irregularities;
employment of force, threat, or intimidation upon the
voters; double voting; padding of ballots; and the
existence of flying voters, among others.
Issue
W/N the appeal by private respondent of the board’s
decision makes a case for pre-proclamation
controversy
Ruling
NO. A pre-proclamation controversy any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or
directly with the Commission, or any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns. In this case the
initial objections raised by private respondent before
the board were proper for a pre-proclamation
controversy, i.e., election returns are manufactured
and/or falsified, they are not authentic, etc. however,
on appeal, private respondent raised matters such as
massive fraud and irregularities, force, threat, or
intimidation, among others, which pertain to the
conduct of the elections. A pre-proclamation
controversy is limited to the examination of the
election returns on their face.
Abayon v. COMELEC
Facts
Abayon and Daza both ran for Governor in the
province of Northern Samar. On 19 May 2007,
Abayon filed a pre-proclamation protest before the
provincial board of canvassers to exclude the
certificates of canvass of the municipalities of Capul,
Rosario, and Bobon, which was docketed as SP No.
07-037. On 21 May 2007, Abayon filed a petition to
annul the proclamation of Daza as the winning
candidate. On 29 June 2007, Abayon filed an election
protest. The COMELEC First Division dismissed
Abayon’s election protest for being filed out of time.
Citing Villamor v. COMELEC, First Division held
that for a petition for annulment of proclamation to
suspend the running of the period to file an election
protest, it should be based on a valid pre-
proclamation issue. The en banc denied Abayon’s
MR. Abayon maintains that SP 07-037 upon which
the petition for annulment of proclamation was
based, was a pre-proclamation controversy.
Issue
W/N the election protest was filed out of time.
Ruling
YES. An election protest must be filed within 10
days from the proclamation. The 10-day period may
be suspended by a petition for annulment of
proclamation which is based on a pre-proclamation
controversy. SP 07-037, upon which the petition for
annulment of proclamation was based, is not a pre-
proclamation controversy. The grounds relied
thereon were that a voter was abducted; a political
leader killed; threats preventing the holding of
campaign sorties; intimidation of voters; and acts of
terrorism. These matters properly pertain to an
election protest, but are not within the enumerated
grounds for a pre-proclamation controversy under
Sec. 243 of OEC.
Villamor v. COMELEC
Facts
On 13 May 2004, Villamor was proclaimed the
Mayor of Carmen, Cebu. On 17 May 2004, private
respondent filed a petition for the annulment of
petitioner’s proclamation alleging as grounds the
illegal composition of the MBC and its proceedings.
Subsequently, on 24 May 2004, private respondent
filed an election protest before the RTC. The RTC
dismissed the case for being filed out of time.
However, it reversed itself upon the filing of private
respondent of his MR.
Issue
W/N the RTC prematurely took cognizance of the
case despite the pendency of a pre-proclamation
controversy
Ruling
NO. The filing of an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a
pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to an
abandonment of one already filed. Thus, private
respondent’s subsequent filing of the election protest
on 24 May 2004 amounted to the abandonment of the
pre-proclamation controversy earlier filed.
Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo
Facts
Fernando Poe, Jr. filed this election protest against
GMA. However, pending resolution of the PET, FPJ,
the protestant, died. Thus, FPJ’s widow, Mrs. Jesusa
Sonora Poe, filed a motion to substitute the deceased
protestant.
Issue
W/N a widow may substitute a dead protestant
Ruling
NO. While in Vda. De Mesa v. Mencias, the SC
previously ruled that substitution and intervention
may be done in protests where the protestant dies, the
SC limited the same to substitution/intervention by
the real-party-in-interest. In other words, only a RPI
may substitute a dead protestant. In Vda. De Mesa,
the SC allowed the vice-mayor to substitute the
deceased protestant who is a mayoralty candidate
because if the protest succeeds, the vice-mayor will
have to assume the mayoralty post. In this case,
however, Mrs. FPJ denies any claim to the august
office of the president. The protestant’s widow is not
a RPI.
Rosal v. COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner was proclaimed the mayor of Legaspi City.
Private respondent filed an election protest against
petitioner contesting the results of the election in all
of the 520 precincts which functioned during the
elections. Thereafter, private respondent manifested
that only 79 of the ballot boxes out of the 520
remained intact. On this score, petitioner filed a
motion for technical examination of the ballots. The
COMELEC Second Division denied the motion.
Issue
W/N the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s
motion
Ruling
YES. The purpose of an election protest is to
ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed is the
true and lawful choice of the people. In an election
protest where what is involved is the number of votes
of each candidate, the best and most conclusive
evidence are the ballots themselves. the superior
status of the ballots as evidence of how the electorate
voted presupposes that these were the very same
ballots actually cast and counted in the elections. The
Second Division adopted a manifestly unreasonable
procedure, one totally unfit to address the single most
vital threshold question in an election protest,
namely, whether the ballots found in the ballot boxes Ruling
during the revision proceedings were the same Yes. The Court ruled that this was grave abuse of
ballots that were cast and counted in the elections. discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Provincial and city prosecutors are mere
L. Prosecution of Election Offenses deputies of the COMELEC that may be relieved from
deputation. And this act by the COMELEC may not
Gonzales v. People be interfered with or overruled by the trial court. On
Facts the exemption of witnesses in vote-buying from
The prosecution alleged that in the early morning of prosecution of vote- selling, the Court ruled that
February 12, 2012, while conducting a surveillance under the law on prosecution of vote-buying and
for a drug operation, PO2 Recto and PO1 Congson voteselling, any person guilty therefor who
saw herein petitioner in an alleyway carrying a fan voluntarily gives information and willingly testifies
knife in his right hand. When apprehended, the on the violations shall be exempt from prosecution
operatives recovered shabu from petitioner’s and punishment for the offense with reference to
possession. The RTC found Gonzales guilty of which their information and testimony were given,
violating Sec. 261 (q) of the OEC. without prejudice to their liability for perjury and
Issue false testimony.
W/N the prosecution adequately established
Gonzales’ guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Ruling
NO. The prosecution failed to establish its allegation
that, immediately before and at the time of his arrest,
Gonzalez was holding a knife in a public place — the
critical elements of the crime of violation of Section
261(p)(q) of the OEC. Aside from the testimony of
PO1 Congson, the prosecution did not present any
other evidence that would corroborate his version
leading to Gonzalez’ arrest. On the other hand,
Gonzales presented 3 witnesses to corroborate his
claim that he was arrested at his home or, at the very
least, rendered doubtful the prosecution’s version
that Gonzales was arrested on the street by the police
in the regular performance of their duties.

COMELEC v. Español
Facts
The Law Department of the COMELEC filed an
Information in the RTC Br. 90 presided by
respondent judge, charging therein Kawit, Cavite
Municipal Mayor Poblete, et at. of vote-buying.
Later, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in I. S.
No. 1-991080 found probable cause to charge the
witnesses in the votebuying case of vote-selling.
Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00 were
assigned to respondent judge, but refused to dismiss
the same despite motion by the COMELEC.

Issue
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion