2019 Poli
the ICMBS per se.
HARD LAW vs. SOFT LAW
Pharmaceutical vs. DOH Secretary Duque, G.R. No. 173034,
9 October 2007.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part
of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through
transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties
or conventional international law must go through a process
prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into
municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have
not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of
the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981
had been transformed into domestic law through local
legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code
that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not
xxx
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft
law" or non-binding norms, principles and practices that
influence state behavior.
"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of
international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946
Statute of the International Court of Justice.32 It is, however, an
expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices
that influence state behavior.33 Certain declarations and
resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this
category.34 The most notable is the UN Declaration of Human
Rights, which this Court has enforced in various cases,
specifically, Government of Hongkong Special Administrative
Region v. Olalia,35 Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, Mijares v.
Rañada and Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v.
Developers Group of Companies, Inc..
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a
specialized agency attached to the UN with the mandate to
promote and protect intellectual property worldwide, has
resorted to soft law as a rapid means of norm creation, in order
"to reflect and respond to the changing needs and demands of its
constituents." Other international organizations which have
resorted to soft law include the International Labor Organization
and the Food and Agriculture Organization (in the form of the
Codex Alimentarius).
1
WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the time
of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Avian
flu outbreaks.
Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international
law binding on WHO member states, it provides an excellent
example of the power of "soft law" in international relations.
International lawyers typically distinguish binding rules of
international law-"hard law"-from non-binding norms,
principles, and practices that influence state behavior-"soft
law." WHO has during its existence generated many soft law
norms, creating a "soft law regime" in international governance
for public health.
x x x
In the Philippines, the executive department implemented
certain measures recommended by WHO to address the
outbreaks of SARS and Avian flu by issuing Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 201 on April 26, 2003 and E.O. No. 280 on February
2, 2004, delegating to various departments broad powers to
close down schools/establishments, conduct health surveillance
and monitoring, and ban importation of poultry and agricultural
products.
It must be emphasized that even under such an international
emergency, the duty of a state to implement the IHR Resolution
was still considered not binding or enforceable, although said
resolutions had great political influence.
Doctrine of Auto-Limitation
Reagan vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-26379, 27 December 1969
People vs. Gozo, L-36409, 26 October 1973
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being
independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over
its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its
power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it
applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its
jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise,
it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution
of its sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or
implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There
may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary
in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the
property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction."7 A
state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable competence.
Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no
longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded
from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does
so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed
with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil.
They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be
diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases
under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the
military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be
foreign territory.
Tanada vs. Angara, 118295, 2 May 1997
2
UN Charter and Other Treaties
Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its
51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights
under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation."47-A Under
Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United
Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with
the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any
state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action." Such assistance includes payment of its
corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but
also in expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the
organization.
Doctrine of Specialty (Speciality)
Lawphil Report on Extradition Treaty
7. The rule of speciality
The rule of speciality (or specialty), which prohibits a Requesting
State from trying an extradited individual for an offense other than
the one for which he was extradited, is a standard provision
included in U.S. bilateral extradition treaties, including the six
under consideration. The Malaysia Treaty (art. 13) contains
exceptions to the rule of specialty that are designed to allow a
Requesting State some latitude in prosecuting offenders for crimes
other than those for which they had been specifically extradited.
Hongkong vs. Munoz, 207342, 7 November 2017
Under the rule of specialty in international law, a
Requested State shall surrender to a Requesting State a
person to be tried only for a criminal offense specified
in their treaty of extradition. Conformably with the
dual criminality rule embodied in the extradition treaty
between the Philippines and the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (HKSAR), however, the
Philippines as the Requested State is not bound to
extradite the respondent to the jurisdiction of the
HKSAR as the Requesting State for the offense of
accepting an advantage as an agent considering that
the extradition treaty is forthright in providing that
surrender shall only be granted for an offense coming
within the descriptions of offenses in its Article 2 insofar
as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other
form of detention for more than one year, or by a more
severe penalty according to the laws of both parties.
X x x
Article 2 of the RP-Hong Kong treaty provides that
surrender of the extraditee by the Requested State to the
Requesting State shall only be for an offense coming within
any of the descriptions of the offenses therein listed insofar
as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other
form of detention for more than one year, or by a more
severe penalty according to the laws o f both parties. The
provision expresses the dual criminality rule. The
determination of whether or not the offense concerned
complied with the dual criminality rule rests on the
Philippines as the requested party. Hence, the Philippines
must carefully ascertain the exact nature of the offenses
involved in the request, and thereby establish that the
surrender of Munoz for trial in the HKSAR will be proper.
On its part, the HKSAR as the requesting party should
prove that the offense is covered by the RP-Hong Kong
Treaty, and punishable in our jurisdiction.
Associative State
3
Province of North Cotabato vs. Govt of RP, G.R. No. 183591,
14 October 2008
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as
presently worded.
X x x
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY,
paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on
GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however,
that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the
Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized
by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of
governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and
administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in
the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be
established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state,
the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the
principal, while maintaining its international status as a state.
Free associations represent a middle ground between integration
and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands
and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of
the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,151
are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free
Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar,
indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their
own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their
international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN
Security Council and by their admission to UN membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall
Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct
foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity
extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine
resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural
relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign
affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the
Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S.
government) regards as relating to or affecting either
government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or
the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and obligation
to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S.
government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using
military areas and facilities within these associated states and
has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country
from having access to these territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international
practice, free association is understood as an international
association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free
Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated
nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the
association consistent with the right of independence. It has
been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states
to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model
4
of free association is actually based on an underlying status of
independence.152
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has
usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on
their way to full independence. Examples of states that have
passed through the status of associated states as a transitional
phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become
independent states.153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are
consistent with the international legal concept of association,
specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into
economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the
commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's
participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of
the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the
BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing
on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection,
and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral
domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the
Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any
foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that
the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated
state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an "associative"
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
Co Kim Cham G.R. No. L-5 17 September 1945
I. Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings made
under Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid
even after the American occupation.
II. Whether or not it was the intention of the Commander in
Chief of the American Forces to annul and void thereby all
judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established
in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.
III. Whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth have
jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions
pending in the courts at the time the Philippine Islands were
reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces
HELD
I
AFFIRMATIVE. [A]ll acts and proceedings of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto
5
government are good and valid. If [the governments
established in these Islands under the names of the
Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or
regime were de facto governments], the judicial acts and
proceedings of those governments remain good and valid
even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines
by the American and Filipino forces.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation being de facto governments, it
necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of
the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of
a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue
of the well-known principle of postliminy in international
law, remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur.
According to the principle of postliminy in international
law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an
enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate
government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few
cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which
for one reason or another it is within his competence to do.
Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not
of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the
extent that they take effect during the continuance of his
control, and the various acts done during the same time by
private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain
good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community
would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state
and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, — it
would be hard for example that payment of taxes made
under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to
the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals
should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive
government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.)
And when the occupation and the abandonment have been
each an incident of the same war as in the present case,
postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as
conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty
as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting
independence to the Philippines and establishing the so-
called Republic of the Philippines.
II
NEGATIVE. The phrase “processes of any other
government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as
constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines
or other governmental agencies established in the Islands
during the Japanese occupation.
[I]t should be presumed that it was not, and could not have
been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using
the phrase “processes of any other government” in said
proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of
said principles of international law.
[T]he legislative power of a commander in chief of military
forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which
has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and
6
before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that
of the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion
and occupation, it is to be presumed that General Douglas
MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative
of the Government and the President of the United States,
constitutional commander in chief of the United States
Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law
of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United
States from the early period of its existence, applied by the
Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the
Hague Conventions of 1907.
III
AFFIRMATIVE. Although in theory the authority the
authority of the local civil and judicial administration is
suspended as a matter of course as soon as military
occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not
usually take the administration of justice into his own hands,
but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer
the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless
absolutely prevented, to respect.
[I]n the Executive Order of President McKinley to the
Secretary of War, “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are
not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and
to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially
as they were before the occupation. This enlightened
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion.”
From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the
conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary
will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative,
executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual
practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of
the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue
local laws and institution so far as military necessity will
permit.
Belligerent occupation
Etorma vs. Ravelo G.R. No. L-718, 24 March 1947
According to the rules of Land Warfare of the United States
Army, belligerent or so-called military occupation is a
question of fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion as a result
of which the invader has rendered the invaded government
incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and that the
invader is in position to substitute and has substituted his
own authority for that of the legitimate government of the
territory invaded." (International Law Chiefly as
Interpreted and Applied by the United States, by Hyde, Vol.
II, pp. 361, 362.) "Belligerent occupation must be both
actual and effective. Organized resistance must be overcome
and the forces in possession must have taken measures to
establish law and order. It doubtless suffices if the occupying
army can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of
troops to make its authority felt within the occupied
district." (Id., p. 364.) "Occupation once acquired must be
maintained . . .. It does not cease, however, . . .. Nor does the
existence of a rebellion or the operations of guerrilla bands
cause it to cease, unless the legitimate government is
reestablished and the occupant fails promptly to suppress
such rebellion or guerrilla operations." (Id., p.365.)
Suspended Allegiance
7
Laurel vs. Misa77 Phil. 856
FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the
Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by
giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot
be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines
was suspended at thattime. Also, he claims that he cannot be
tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since
his acts were against the Commonwealth which was
replaced already by the Republic.
HELD: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes
absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or
sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is
presumed that the Philippine government still had the
power.
Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either
subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se
wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty
that was suspended.
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a
territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government on
the sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is
not transferred to the occupier.
Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the
change of government, there is no such change since the
sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What
happened was a mere change of name of government, from
Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines
Precautionary Principle
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (AM NO. 09-
6-8-SC)
(f) Precautionary principle states that when human
activities may lead to threats of serious and irreversible
damage to the environment that is scientifically plausible
but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish
that threat.
RULE 20
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Section 1. Applicability. - When there is a lack of full
scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between
human activity and environmental effect, the court shall
apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case
before it.
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.
Section 2. Standards for application. - In applying the
precautionary principle, the following factors, among
others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or
health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3)
prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of
the environmental rights of those affected.
Treaty vs. Executive Agreement
Bayan Muna vs. Romulo, G.R> No. 159618, 1 February
2011.
8
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded
between states in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation."32 International agreements may be
in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative
concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive
agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do
not require legislative concurrence and are usually less
formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters
than treaties.33
Under international law, there is no difference between
treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding
effects on the contracting states concerned,34 as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their
powers.35 Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held
valid if it violates the Constitution.36 Authorities are,
however, agreed that one is distinct from another for
accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement
aspect.37 As has been observed by US constitutional
scholars, a treaty has greater "dignity" than an executive
agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond
doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the
President, the Senate, and the people;38 a ratified treaty,
unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any
prior statutory enactment.39
X x x
And lest it be overlooked, one type of executive agreement is
a treaty-authorized44 or a treaty-implementing executive
agreement,45 which necessarily would cover the same
matters subject of the underlying treaty.
But over and above the foregoing considerations is the fact
that––save for the situation and matters contemplated in
Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution46––when a treaty is
required, the Constitution does not classify any subject, like
that involving political issues, to be in the form of, and
ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely
prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of the Senate
by a vote defined therein to complete the ratification
process.
Petitioner’s reliance on Adolfo47 is misplaced, said case
being inapplicable owing to different factual milieus. There,
the Court held that an executive agreement cannot be used
to amend a duly ratified and existing treaty, i.e., the Bases
Treaty. Indeed, an executive agreement that does not
require the concurrence of the Senate for its ratification may
not be used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution,
is the product of the ratifying acts of the Executive and the
Senate. The presence of a treaty, purportedly being subject
to amendment by an executive agreement, does not obtain
under the premises.
The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading,48 as reiterated in
Bayan,49 given recognition to the obligatory effect of
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate:
x x x [T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.
From the earliest days of our history, we have entered
9
executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial
and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and
navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our
courts.
X x x
Evidently, there is, as yet, no overwhelming consensus, let
alone prevalent practice, among the different countries in
the world that the prosecution of internationally recognized
crimes of genocide, etc. should be handled by a particular
international criminal court.
X x x
In light of the above consideration, the position or view that the
challenged RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement ought to be in the
form of a treaty, to be effective, has to be rejected.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent.
The RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement (Agreement)
violates existing municipal laws on the Philippine State’s
obligation to prosecute persons responsible for any of the
international crimes of genocide, war crimes and other
crimes against humanity. Being a mere executive agreement
that is indisputably inferior to municipal law, the
Agreement cannot prevail over a prior or subsequent
municipal law inconsistent with it. The RP-US Non-
Surrender Agreement (Agreement) violates existing
municipal laws on the Philippine State’s obligation to
prosecute persons responsible for any of the international
crimes of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against
humanity. Being a mere executive agreement that is
indisputably inferior to municipal law, the Agreement
cannot prevail over a prior or subsequent municipal law
inconsistent with it.
Balag vs. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, 3 July 2018
The contempt order issued against petitioner simply stated
that he would be arrested and detained until such time that
he gives his true testimony, or otherwise purges himself of
the contempt. It does not provide any definite and concrete
period of detention. Neither does the Senate Rules specify a
precise period of detention when a person is cited in
contempt.
X x x
The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the
inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries
in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of
the legislative inquiry under which the said power is
invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its
process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the
subject of investigation before it was within the range of
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony
called relates to that subject.[52] Accordingly, as long as
there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent
power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised.
10
Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the
exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there
is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained
witness.
PCA Arbitration Case
Republic vs. Arigo, G.R. No. 206510, 16 September 2014
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) Case Araullo
vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, 1 July 2014
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn... unobligated
allotments under the DAP... were not savings, and the use of
such... appropriations contravened Section 25(5),... Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
X x x
the GAAs should expressly authorize the... transfer of funds.
X x x
b.2. Second Requisite There were... no savings from which
funds could... be sourced for the DAP
The petitioners claim that the funds used in the DAP the
unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated
allotments were not actual savings within the context of
Section 25(5), supra, and the relevant provisions of the
GAAs. Belgica argues that "savings" should be...
understood to refer to the excess money after the items that
needed to be funded have been funded, or those that needed
to be paid have been paid pursuant to the budget.[146] The
petitioners posit that there could be savings only when the
PAPs for which the... funds had been appropriated were
actually implemented and completed, or finally
discontinued or abandoned. They insist that savings could
not be realized with certainty in the middle of the fiscal year;
and that the funds for "slow-moving" PAPs could not be
considered as savings... because such PAPs had not actually
been abandoned or discontinued yet.[147] They stress that
NBC No. 541, by allowing the withdrawn funds to be
reissued to the "original program or project from which it
was withdrawn," conceded that the PAPs from which the...
supposed savings were taken had not been completed,
abandoned or discontinu
We partially find for the petitioners.
The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the
purse. Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what
PAPs to fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for each
PAP
The... second principle is that the Executive, as the
department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is
expected to faithfully execute the GAA and to spend the
budget in accordance with the provisions of the GAA
The third principle is that in... making the President's power
to augment operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes
the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing,
Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it
delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive.
11
But Congress does not... thereby allow the Executive to
override its authority over the purse as to let the Executive
exceed its delegated authority... fourth principle is that
savings should be actual. "Actual" denotes something that
is real or substantial, or something that exists... presently in
fact, as opposed to something that is merely theoretical,
possible, potential or hypothetical.[150]
The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings
strictly against expanding the scope of the power to
augment.
Xxx
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or
unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as
unalloted or... unreleased. They have not yet ripened into
categories of items from which savings can be generated.
Section 25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their
offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are
prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the
guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we
call such transfers of funds... cross-border transfers or
cross-border augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section
25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to
the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate
President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the
Speaker; the Judiciary, with... respect to the Chief Justice;
the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their
respective Chairpersons.
The respondents justified all the cross-border transfers
thusly:
The Constitution does not prevent the President from
transferring savings of his department to another
department upon the latter's request, provided it is the
recipient department that uses such funds to augment its
own appropriation. In such a case, the
President merely gives the other department access to public
funds but he cannot dictate how they shall be applied by that
department whose fiscal autonomy is guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-
border transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5),
supra, disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed.
Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid,
were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra.
Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed... funds despite the
original revenue targets... not having been exceeded was
invalid
The petitioners point out that a condition for the release of
the unprogrammed funds was that the revenue collections
must exceed revenue targets; and that the release of the
unprogrammed funds was illegal because such condition
was not met.[191]
X x x
Doctrine of operative fact was applicable
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the
law or executive act prior to the determination of its
12
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced
consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or... executive
act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no
effect.
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of
operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer
be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on
the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are
concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper
tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative
and other liabilities.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the
petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES
the following acts and practices under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541
and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine
of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the
implementing agencies, and the declaration of the
withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year
and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings... contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the
Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices
outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that
were not covered by any appropriation in the General
Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of
unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification
by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections
exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the
conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations
Acts.
Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, 4 July 2017
Martial Law by Digong
1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under
the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis.
It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of
Article VIII. The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding”
appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of
questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases.
It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a
matter to be resolved by the Court.
13
2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look
into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and
not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court
expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President
could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of
all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation.
To require him otherwise would impede the process of his
decision-making.
b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a
condition for the declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A plain reading of
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the
President’s power to declare martial law is not subject to
any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion
or rebellion and that public safety requires it.
c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole
discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the
revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since
the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the
President, the determination of this Court as to whether
there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must
be based only on facts or information known by or available
to the President at the time he made the declaration or
suspension which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him
to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at
the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how
far the past events should be from the present depends on
the President.
3. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in
an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground
of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress
may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. The power
to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress
are not only totally different but likewise independent from
each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential
proclamation.
4. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual
basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public
safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur;
and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe
that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the
standard of proof in determining the existence of either
invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law,
and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most
practical and most expedient standard by which the
President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence
of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the writ. To require him to satisfy a higher
standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his
emergency powers.
5. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual
basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to
14
the calibration of the President’s decision of which among
his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation. To
do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive
domain of the Executive and an infringement on the
prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President.
6. a.) Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does not make
Proclamation No. 216 vague. The term “other rebel groups”
in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in
the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text
of Proclamation No. 216 refers to “other rebel groups”
found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of
reference in its Whereas clauses.
b.) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make
Proclamation No. 216 vague. Operational guidelines will
serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the
proclamation.
There is no need for the Court to determine the
constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders
issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its
review. Any act committed under the said orders in violation
of the Constitution and the laws should be resolved in a
separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court
wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing
into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in
the exercise of its power to revoke.
7. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
By a review of the facts available to him that there was an
armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a
portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of
any of his power and prerogatives, leading the President to
believe that there was probable cause that the crime of
rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety
requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion.
Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism,
which has a broader scope covering a wide range of
predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various
means by which terrorism can be committed.
Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao. For a declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence of 1.)
actual rebellion or invasion and 2.) the public safety
requirement.
In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence
perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed
not only against government forces or establishment but
likewise against civilians and their properties. There were
bomb threats, road blockades, burning of schools and
churches, hostages and killings of civilians, forced entry of
young male Muslims to the group, there were hampering of
medical services and delivery of basic services,
reinforcement of government troops, among others. These
particular scenarios convinced the President that the
atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public
safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
9. a.) The calling out power is in a different category from
the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend
15
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55.
The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed
Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law. Even
so, the Court’s review of the President’s declaration of
martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily
entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular
purpose.
b.) Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216
result in the nullification of the acts of the President done
pursuant thereto. Under the operative fact doctrine,” the
unconstitutional statute is recognized as an “operative fact”
before it is declared unconstitutional.
***
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region. The Court
FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as
CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated
Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Belgica vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on…
1.) …separation of powers
YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded
post-enactment authority (a) to identify the projects they
desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork
Barrel allocations; (b) and in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Thus, legislators have been, in one form or
another, authorized to participate in “the various
operational aspects of budgeting,” violating the separation
of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Informal
practices, through which legislators have effectively
intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must
be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
unconstitutional treatment.
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power
YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-
delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as
settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress.
3.) …checks and balances
YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit.
Legislators make intermediate appropriations of the PDAF
only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law.
Thus, actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and are
thus put into effect without veto consideration. This kind of
16
lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a
budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President’s
power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the
President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire
P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification
feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of
P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships,
medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of
historical materials, construction of roads, flood control,
etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves
the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President’s power of item veto.
4.) …accountability
YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be
tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this
very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs
afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.”
Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
project implementation renders them susceptible to taking
undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same
post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate
himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork
Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this
area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes
is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts
and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while it is possible that the close operational proximity
between legislators and the Executive department, through
the former’s post-enactment participation, may affect the
process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the
domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an
improper subject of judicial assessment.
6.) …local autonomy
YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the
system which actually belies the avowed intention of
“making equal the unequal.” The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a
17
result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To
add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and
Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the
Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive
funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator
control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils
(LDCs), instrumentalities whose functions are essentially
geared towards managing local affairs. The programs,
policies and resolutions of LDCs should not be overridden
nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national
officers that have no law-making authority except only when
acting as a body.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
WON the following phrases are unconstitutional insofar as
they constitute undue delegations of legislative power:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910
relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said
phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and,
in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines”
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential
Social Fund may be used “to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects”. This gives him carte
blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority”.
The law does not supply a definition of “priority
infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the
President without any guideline to construe the same. To
note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure”
is too broad of a classification since the said term could
pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects” must be
stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section
8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law.
SPARK vs. QC, G.R. No. 225442, 8 August 2017.
18
Void for Vagueness
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness
doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly
identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances,
which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair
warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or
required so that one may act accordingly.49 The void for
vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim.
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any
ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the
age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the
Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void
for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are
no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew
violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not
explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents
are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in
statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically,
RA 9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child
may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In
the absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of
other persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence.
PARENS PATRIAE
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty
to aid parents in the moral development of their children,70
and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill
their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that
"[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of
the parental role, may be important to the child's chances
for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.
Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that
parents and others, teachers for example, who have the
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled
to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility."71
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal
restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. As will be later
discussed at greater length, these ordinances further
compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of
juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which
19
necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents
to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar
vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more
exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements
that operate during the night; their moral well-being is
likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making
detrimental decisions during this time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew
Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) -
accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in
child-rearing. hus, in all actuality, the only aspect of
parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents'
prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places
without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours.
73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all
plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor
force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or
control their minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew
Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable -
infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her
child.
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a
fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to
move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within
the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general
concept of liberty.
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public
interest justify restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move
from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this
right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads,
the State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this
right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided
by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically
the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within
the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the
probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second
requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law,"
our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's
duty to afford special protection to children. Particularly
20
relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly
authorizes local government units, through their city or
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew
Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny
test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon
City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which
provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this
interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides
for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise
their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew
hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been
construed to include parental permission as a constructive
form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception
to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement,
however, is left to the discretion of the local government
unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared
unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon
City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid
in accordance with this Decision.
Rodriguez Amparo case G.R. No. 191805, 15 November
2011
First issue: Grant of interim reliefs
These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court
before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo
petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted
before a final... adjudication of the case is made. In any case,
it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of
amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of
the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the
privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no... need to issue a
temporary protection order independently of the former.
The order restricting respondents from going near
Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit
In Estrada v. Desierto,[73] we clarified the doctrine that a
non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit,
even for acts committed during the latter's tenure. We
emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with
disfavor upon the... presidential privilege of immunity,
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs
the vindication of a right
The presidential immunity from suit exists only in
concurrence with the president's incumbency
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear
that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential
immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny
that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or... accountable for the
abduction of Rodriguez.
21
Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo
proceedings
To attribute responsibility or accountability to former
President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of
command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in
Rubrico v. Arroyo,[77] command responsibility pertains to
the "responsibility... of commanders for crimes committed
by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict."[78] Although originally used for
ascertaining criminal complicity, the command...
responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil
cases for human rights abuses.
Thus, it is our... view that command responsibility may
likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege
of the writ of amparo.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied
to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine
the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and
has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable... the Court to devise remedial
measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command
responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to
address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the
courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a)
responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established
by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever
way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance,
and (b) accountability, or the measure of... remedies that
should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement
in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and... who carry the burden of
disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although
there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative
liabilities, the... doctrine of command responsibility may
nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and
accountability within these foregoing definitions.
a. Command responsibility of the President
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now
be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of
the military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced... disappearances. We
rule in the affirmative.
o hold someone liable under the doctrine of command
responsibility, the following elements must obtain:... the
existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the
accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his
subordinate;... the superior knew or had reason to know that
the crime was about to be or had been committed; and... the
22
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed
forces,[85] necessarily possesses control over the military
that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine. [86]
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that
although international tribunals apply a strict standard of
knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be
established through circumstantial evidence.[... eanwhile, as
to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to
note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the
president has the power to effectively command, control and
discipline the military.
Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that
on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston
Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had
knowledge of and information on, and should have known
that a climate of enforced disappearances had been...
perpetrated on members of the NPA.[92] Without even
attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports,
Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue
military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report
states that there is a policy... allowing enforced
disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do
not automatically impute responsibility to former President
Arroyo for each and every count of forcible
disappearance.[93] Aside from Rodriguez's general
averments, there is no... piece of evidence that could
establish her responsibility or accountability for his
abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that
she should have known about the violation of his right to life,
liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate,
punish... or prevent it.
Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of
respondents in G.R. No. 191805
totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably
prove... the responsibility and accountability of some
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life,
liberty and security.
a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the
responsibility or accountability of respondents for the
violation of or threat to Rodriguez's right to life, liberty and
security.
Tthe soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September
2009, and... detained and tortured him until 17 September
2009.
n assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of
Appeals correctly relied on the medical finding that the
injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the
maltreatment inflicted on him by the soldiers of the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of... the Philippine
Army. Further, the kind of injuries he sustained showed that
he could not have sustained them from merely falling, thus
making respondents' claim highly implausible.
23
b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation
amounted to a violation of or threat to Rodriguez's rights to
life, liberty and securit... y.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the
violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security
may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public
official
In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo[114] that the right to security of
a person includes the positive obligation of the government
to ensure the observance of the duty to investigate
Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their... families,
and bringing offenders to the bar of justice
In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R.
No. 191805 are responsible or accountable for the violation
of Rodriguez's right to life, liberty and security on account
of their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official
investigation of his ordeal... in the hands of the military.
Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit,
Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only
conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting no efforts to
take Ramirez's account of the events into consideration.
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official
investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his right
to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must
be held responsible or accountable.
From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was
successful in proving through substantial evidence that
respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit,
Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and
Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the...
violation of Rodriguez's rights to life, liberty and security on
the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6
September to 17 September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair
and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus,
the privilege of the writs... of amparo and habeas data must
be granted in his favor.
It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a)
maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of
respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the
application of the command responsibility doctrine to
amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to
prove... through substantial evidence that former President
Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of
his rights to life, liberty and property.
Saluday vs. People GR 215305 3 April 2018
In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by
Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a
reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a
vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a
reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco
merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally
24
intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray
and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport
terminals where passengers may further be required to open
their bags and luggages. Considering the reasonableness of
the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds
no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a
warrant.
Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage
inspection done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if
he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered ''yes,
just open if' based on petitioner's own testimony. This is
clear consent by petitioner to the search of the contents of
his bag.
Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court Jays down
the following guidelines.1âwphi1 Prior to entry, passengers
and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine
inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. In
this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines
can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be
frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be
required instead to open their bags and luggages for
inspection, which inspection must be made in the
passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she
can validly be refused entry into the terminal.
While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government
agents or the security personnel of the bus owner in the
following three instances. First, upon receipt of information
that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the
bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route
to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects.
This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land
upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal
articles carried by a passenger onboard. Second, whenever
a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger
can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to
the same routine inspection by government agents or private
security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at
the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able
to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it
possible for these passengers to evade the routine search at
the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at
designated military or police checkpoints where State agents
can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the
passengers and their bags or luggages.
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their
effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of
the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following
conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as
to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive
and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being
searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any
cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule.
Second, neither can the search result from any
discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling,
stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the
fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with
disabilities, children and other similar groups should be
protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be
confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence
seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced
that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no
evidence was planted against the accused.
25

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the
safety of others may be put at risk. Given the present
circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public
transport buses and their terminals, just like passenger
ships and seaports, are in that category.
Jimenez vs. Cabangbang
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or
not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview
of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in
Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen
in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or
not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance
of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this
category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open
letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November
14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
defendant caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or
about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer
or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding
made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is
not absolutely privileged.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in
question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is
false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to
expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and
ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these
allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with
the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same,
it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when
plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication
is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were
aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they
were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the
aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly
implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said
coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much
less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Jardeleza vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, 19 August 2014.
Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the
“unanimity rule,” contemplate a doubt on the moral
character of an applicant?
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified
applicant is challenged. - In every case where the integrity
26
of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for
nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of
all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the
favorable consideration of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits
the rule that a higher voting requirement is absolute in cases
where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply
put, when an integrity question arises, the voting
requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a
judicial post becomes “unanimous” instead of the “majority
vote” required in the preceding section.[
Even as Jardeleza was verbally informed of the invocation
of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later
asked to explain himself during the meeting, these
circumstances still cannot expunge an immense perplexity
that lingers in the mind of the Court.
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was
the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the
Council and to instantaneously provide those who are
willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the
opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of his
physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a
reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was
merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be,
right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be
too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-
marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only
during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues
became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014,
Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to
affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances
preclude the very idea of due process in which the right to
explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but to
provide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient
time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the
occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise.
There was a misapplication of the “unanimity rule” under
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to Jardeleza’s legal strategy
in handling a case for the government.
While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of
insider trading fall within the contemplation of a “question
on integrity” and would have warranted the application of
the “unanimity rule,” he was not afforded due process in its
application.
The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate
applications for judicial posts, exercises full discretion on its
power to recommend nominees to the President. The sui
generis character of JBC proceedings, however, is not a
blanket authority to disregard the due process under JBC-
010.
Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when,
contrary to the JBC rules, he was neither formally informed
of the questions on his integrity nor was provided a
reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that
Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist
submitted to the President for the vacated position of
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the
27
unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se,
but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of
procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means
does the Court intend to strike down the “unanimity rule”
as it reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom in its
selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a
blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and
the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the
Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a
nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the
JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due
process.
In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a
party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction.[52] This rule may well be
applied to the current situation for an opposing view
submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To this,
the Court shall not concede. As the branch of government
tasked to guarantee that the protection of due process is
available to an individual in proper cases, the Court finds
the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that it is assigned
to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009 must be deemed to have never come into
operation in light of its erroneous application on the original
ground against Jardeleza’s integrity. At the risk of being
repetitive, the Court upholds the JBC’s discretion in the
selection of nominees, but its application of the “unanimity
rule” must be applied in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able to
secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to
propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC,
nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position
of Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the
shortlist submitted to the President.
Constitutional Revision
Santiago vs. Roco, GR No. 127325, 19 March 1997
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory.
Quo Waranto vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, 19 June 2018
28
Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct
proceedings, although both may result in the ouster of a
public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the
relief of "ouster", while impeachment affords "removal."
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine a person's right or title to a public office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment. 11 It is the proper action
to inquire into a public officer's eligibility12 or the validity
of his appointment. 13 Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination
of the right to the use or exercise of the office.
Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process
undertaken by the legislature to determine whether the
public officer committed any of the impeachable offenses,
namely, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal
of public trust. 14 It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility
for appointment or election, or challenge the legality of his
assumption of office. Conviction for any of the impeachable
offenses shall result in the removal of the impeachable
official from office. 15
The OSG 's quo warranto petition challenged respondent's
right and title to the position of Chief Justice. He averred
that in failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and
net worth as a member of the career service prior to her
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court,
respondent could not be said to possess the requirement of
proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member of the
Judiciary. The OSG thus prayed that respondent's
appointment as Chief Justice be declared void.
Clearly, the OSG questioned the respondent's eligibility for
appointment as Chief Justice and sought to invalidate such
appointment. The OSG's petition, therefore, is one for quo
warranto over which the Court exercises original
jurisdiction.
As the Court previously held, "where the dispute is on the
eligibility to perform the duties by the person sought to be
ousted or disqualified a quo warranto is the proper action."
16
Respondent harps on the supposed intent of the framers of
the Constitution for impeachable officers to be removed only
through impeachment. 17 However, a circumspect
examination of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission will reveal that the framers presumed that the
impeachable officers had duly qualified for the position.
Indeed, the deliberations which respondent herself cited 18
showed that the framers did not contemplate a situation
where the impeachable officer was unqualified for
appointment or election.
Respondent, however, argues that quo warranto petitions
may be filed against the President and Vice-President under
the PET Rules "only because the Constitution specifically
permits" them under Section 4, Article VII. According to
respondent, no counterpart provision exists in the
Constitution giving the same authority to the Court over the
Chief Justice, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions and the Ombudsman. Respondent, thus,
asserts that the Constitution made a distinction between
elected and appointive impeachable officials, and limited
29
quo warranto to elected impeachable officials. For these
reasons, respondent concludes that by constitutional design,
the Court is denied power to remove any of its members.24
The Court is not convinced. The argument, to begin with,
acknowledges that the Constitution in fact allows quo
warranto actions against impeachable officers, albeit
respondent limits them to the President and Vice-President.
This admission refutes the very position taken by
respondent that all impeachable officials cannot be sued
through quo warranto because they belong to a "privileged
class" of officers who can be removed only through
impeachment.25 To be sure, Lecaroz, etc. did not distinguish
between elected and appointed impeachable officers.
Furthermore, that the Constitution does not show a
counterpart provision to paragraph 7 of Section 4, Article
VII for members of this Court or the Constitutional
Commissions does not mean that quo warranto cannot
extend to non-elected impeachable officers. The authority to
hear quo warranto petitions against appointive impeachable
officers emanates from Section 5(1) of Article VIII which
grants quo warranto jurisdiction to this Court without
qualification as to the class of public officers over whom the
same may be exercised.
Respondent's insistence that she could not be removed from
office except through impeachment is predicated on Section
2, Article XI of the Constitution. It reads:
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
(Emphasis ours)
By its plain language, however, Section 2 of Article XI does
not preclude a quo warranto action questioning an
impeachable officer's qualifications to assume office. These
qualifications include age, citizenship and professional
experience - matters which are manifestly outside the
purview of impeachment under the above-cited provision.
Lack of qualifications for appointment or election is
evidently not among the stated grounds for impeachment. It
is, however, a ground for a quo warranto action over which
this Court was given original jurisdiction under Section 5(1)
of Article VIII.
Quo warranto, not impeachment, is the constitutional
remedy prescribed to adjudicate and resolve questions
relating to qualifications, eligibility and entitlement to
public office.
The long line of cases decided by this Court since the l 900's,
which specifically explained the spirit behind the rule
providing a prescriptive period for the filing of an action for
quo warranto, reveals that such limitation can be applied
only against private individuals claiming rights to a public
office, not against the State.
Corona vs. Senate, G.R. No. 200242, 17 July 2012
30

Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a
public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided
in the Constitution. Petitioner was impeached through the
mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner
that he claims was accomplished with undue haste and
under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable
cause. Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding
with the trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged
partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were
apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings.
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded
with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required
majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately
accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his
office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the
process of screening applicants and nominees, and the
President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new
Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from
among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably,
the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted
by supervening events and his own acts.1âwphi1
Lagman vs. Pimentel, GR 235935, 6 February 2018
Extension of Proclamation of Proclamation of Martial
Law/Suspension of Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus
The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the
Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus. Such silence, however, should
not be construed as a vacuum, flaw or deficiency in the
provision. While it does not specify the number of times that
the Congress is allowed to approve an extension of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only
limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to
extend such proclamation or suspension are that the
extension should be upon the President's initiative; that it
should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or
rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that it is
subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual
basis upon the petition of any citizen.limited only to a
determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
By its plain language, the Constitution provides such scope
of review in the exercise of the Court's sui generis authority
under Section 18, Article VII, which is principally aimed at
balancing (or curtailing) the power vested by the
Constitution in the Congress to determine whether to extend
such proclamation or suspension.
Congressional check on the President's martial law and
suspension powers thus consists of:
First. The power to review the President's proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or
suspension. The review is "automatic in the sense that it may
be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension is made."97 The Congress'
decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot be
set aside by the President.
Second. The power to approve any extension of the
proclamation or suspension, upon the President's initiative,
31
for such period as it may determine, if the invasion or
rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two
factual bases for the extension of the proclamation of
martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and
(b) public safety requires the extension.
Saugisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, 12 January 2016
2. The plain meaning of the Constitution prohibits the entry
of foreign military bases, troops or facilities, except by way
of a treaty concurred in by the Senate - a clear limitation on
the President's dual role as defender of the State and as sole
authority in foreign relations.
3. The President, however, may enter into an executive
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if
(a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty.
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of
Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with which
they are concluded. As culled from the afore-quoted
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past
Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars,208
executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the
implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or
agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the details of a
treaty;209 (2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of
the Legislature;210 or (3) in the exercise of the President's
independent powers under the Constitution.211 The raison
d'etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional
or legislative authorizations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law
distinguishing treaties, international agreements, and
executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in
form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate
concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional
directive. There remain two very important features that
distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate
them into terms of art in the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an
express or implied authorization under the Constitution,
statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the
validity and effectivity of executive agreements under
serious question for the main function of the Executive is to
enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the
Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of
these rules.214 In turn, executive agreements cannot create
new international obligations that are not expressly allowed
or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered
superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of
the acts of the Executive and the Senate215 unlike executive
agreements, which are solely executive actions.216 Because
of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is
regarded as being on the same level as a statute.217 If there
is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes
precedence over one that is prior.218 An executive
agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that
are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
32
ineffective.219 Both types of international agreement are
nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the
Constitution.220
There are constitutional provisions that restrict or limit the
President's prerogative in concluding international
agreements, such as those that involve the following:
a. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within
Philippine territory221
b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts,
which must be pursuant to the authority granted by
Congress222
c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant
to a law concurred in by a majority of all the Members of
Congress223
d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the
Philippines, of foreign loans that must be previously
concurred in by the Monetary Board224
e. The authorization of the presence of foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities in the country must be in the form
of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate.225
f. For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5, the
concurrence of the Senate is required, should the form of the
government chosen be a treaty.
The practice of resorting to executive agreements in
adjusting the details of a law or a treaty that already deals
with the presence of foreign military forces is not at all
unusual in this jurisdiction.
Rights in Contiguous Zone and EEC
Magallona vs. Ermita, GR 187167 16 August 2011
UNCLOS III is a multilateral treaty regulating, among
others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines],
contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits.23
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are
enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific
basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are
drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic
starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones
and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on
archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea,
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms
for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the
33
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In
turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-
based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic
zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Within the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the
following rights under UNCLOS III:
Article 58. Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive
economic zone. —
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal
or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of
this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of
navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of
the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated
with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables
and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of
this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of
international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so
far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
xxxx
Beyond the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the
freedom of the high seas, defined under UNCLOS III as
follows:
Article 87. Freedom of the high seas. —
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or
land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules
of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to
Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other
installations permitted under international law, subject to
Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in
section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and
XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for
34
the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in
the Area.
Territorial Sea
The territorial sea is regarded as the sovereign territory of the
state, although foreign ships (military and civilian) are allowed
innocent passage through it, or transit passage for straits; this
sovereignty also extends to the airspace over and seabed
below. Adjustment of these boundaries is called, in
international law, maritime delimitation.
A state's territorial sea extends up to 12 nautical miles from its
baseline.
Contiguous Zone
The contiguous zone is a band of water extending farther from
the outer edge of the territorial sea to up to 24 nautical miles
from the baseline, within which a state can exert limited
control for the purpose of preventing or punishing
"infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea"
he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not
be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private
and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government
is removed the moment they are sued in their individual
capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official
acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith,
or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Exclusive Economic Zone
An exclusive economic zone extends from the baseline to a
maximum of 200 nautical miles, thus it includes the contiguous
zone.[3] A coastal nation has control of all economic resources
within its exclusive economic zone, including fishing, mining, oil
exploration, and any pollution of those resources. However, it
cannot prohibit passage or loitering above, on, or under the
surface of the sea that is in compliance with the laws and
regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the
provisions of the UN Convention, within that portion of its
exclusive economic zone
beyond its territorial sea
Arigo vs. Swift
G.R. No. 206510, 16 September 2014
The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act
or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself.
The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.
35

The doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification
given by Justice Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against
the authority which makes the law on which the right
depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are
other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In
the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local
jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par
in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals
and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case,
"unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of
Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships
from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the
latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave
the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and
regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for
damages caused by their warships or any other government
vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay
appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the USS
Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has
announced the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific
team which will "initiate discussions with the Government of
the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in
Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine
scientists." The US team intends to "help assess damage and
remediation options, in coordination with the Tubbataha
Management Office, appropriate Philippine government
entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific
experts from Philippine universities."39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at
the cost of the violator is also a major relief that may be
obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under
the Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may
grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment
and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other
litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a
program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment,
the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to
contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to
the control of the court.1âwphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive
Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation
measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these
issues impinges on our relations with another State in the
context of common security interests under the VFA. It is
settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive
and legislative-"the political" --departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
36
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
or decision."40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs
prayed for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and to
nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec.
Zamora,41 the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United
States as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the United States government. The VF A
being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required
as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and
provisions.42 The present petition under the Rules is not the
proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of
the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.
Pollo vs. Constantino 181881 18 October 2011
Privacy; subjective and objective test
Existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-
fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable (objective)
In Mancusi v. DeForte33 which addressed the reasonable
expectations of private employees in the workplace, the US
Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth
Amendment rights with regard to an office at union
headquarters that he shared with other union officials, even as
the latter or their guests could enter the office. The Court thus
"recognized that employees may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy against intrusions by police."
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy
in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means.
This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to
ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes.
One of the factors stated in O’Connor which are relevant in
determining whether an employee’s expectation of privacy in
the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace
privacy policy.48 In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth
Circuit held that a state university employee has not shown
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer
files where the university’s computer policy, the computer user
is informed not to expect privacy if the university has a
legitimate reason to conduct a search.
A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is
justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct.
37
Carroll vs. US
Search of a moving vehicle
Search without a warrant of an automobile, and seizure therein
of liquor subject to seizure and destruction under the
Prohibition Act, do not violate the Amendment, if made upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the officer, that the vehicle contains
such contraband liquor.
practically since the beginning of the Government, the Fourth
Amendment has been construed as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search for contraband in a store,
dwelling-house, or other structure for the search of which a
warrant may readily be obtained, and a search of a ship, wagon,
automobile, or other vehicle which may be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.
Thee seizure is legal if the officer, in stopping and searching the
vehicle, has reasonable or probable cause for believing that
contraband liquor is being illegally transported in it.
Lao Gi vs. CA G.R. No. 81798 29 December 1989
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the
nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a
harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting
the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of
such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the
provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly
on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation
proceedings.
Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
as amended, it is provided:
c No alien shall be deported without being informed of
the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a
hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or
omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and
concise language to enable a person of common understanding
to know on what ground he is intended to be deported and
enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment. Before any
charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation
must be conducted to determine if there is a sufficient cause to
charge the respondent for deportation.
Placer vs. Villanueva
GR L-60349-62, 29 December 1983.
The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it
calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the
issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied from
the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the
investigating officer that the offense complained of has been
committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that
38
the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order
for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause before issuing , a warrant or order
of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification and
require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable
cause.
Uy vs. BIR
G.R. No. 129651, 20 October 2000
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to
meet the test of particularity, especially since witness Abos had
furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to
be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific
description of these documents from said photocopies instead
of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of
a generic term or a general description in a warrant is
acceptable only when a more specific description of the things
to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity
available will invalidate a general description in a warrant.35
The use by the issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of
books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash
register books, sales books or records, provisional & official
receipts," "production record books/inventory lists, stock
cards," "sales records, job order," "corporate financial
records," and "bank statements/cancelled checks" is therefore
unacceptable considering the circumstances of this case.
People vs. Linsangan, G.R. No. 88589, 16 April 1991
The appellant was not denied due process during the custodial
investigation.1âwphi1 Although he was not assisted by counsel
when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in
his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated
for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime;
the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana
a cigarettes (People vs. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47; People vs.
Macuto, 176 SCRA 762; Mejia vs. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457). His
conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the
P10-bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the
testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while he
was actually engaged in selling marijuana cigarettes to a
member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more
credence to their categorical declarations than to the
appellant's denials (People vs. Tan, 145 SCRA 614)
People vs. Ang Chun Kit
GR 109232, 29 December 1995.
With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we
already said in People v. Morico that "when an arrested person
signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station he
does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to
any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a
statement of the accused's being booked and of the date which
accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may
be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police
themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be
the basis of a judgment of conviction." 23
39

But as in the cases of Mauyao and Morico, accused Ang Chun
Kit's conformity to the questioned documents has not been a
factor in his conviction since his guilt has been adequately
established by the detailed and unshaken testimonies of the
officers who apprehended him. Hence even disregarding the
questioned documents we still find the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board,
G.R> No. 157870, 3 November 2008
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165,
the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing
for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily
from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of
the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons
charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal
offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.
The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of
being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do
not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their
right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool
for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
Stonehill vs. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, 19 June 1967
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been
40
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued
the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws.
Central Bank vs. Morfe, G.R. L-20119, 30 June 1967
the Organization commenced Civil Case No. 50409 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, an original action for "certiorari,
prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction and/or writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction," against said municipal
court, the Sheriff of Manila, the Manila Police Department, and
the Bank, to annul the aforementioned search warrant, upon
the ground that, in issuing the same, the municipal court had
acted "with grave abuse of discretion, without jurisdiction
and/or in excess of jurisdiction" because: (a) "said search
warrant is a roving commission general in its terms . . .;" (b)
"the use of the word 'and others' in the search warrant . . .
permits the unreasonable search and seizure of documents
which have no relation whatsoever to any specific criminal act
. . .;" and
At the outset, it should be noted that the action taken by the
Bank, in causing the aforementioned search to be made and
the articles above listed to be seized, was predicated upon the
theory that the Organization was illegally engaged in banking
— by receiving money for deposit, disbursement, safekeeping
or otherwise, or transacting the business of a savings and
mortgage bank and/or building and loan association, —
without first complying with the provisions of R.A. No. 337, and
that the order complained of assumes that the Organization
had violated sections 2 and 6 of said Act.
We are satisfied, however, in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in this case, that the Municipal Judge did not commit
a grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was probable
cause that the Organization had violated Sections 2 and 6 of
the aforesaid law and in issuing the warrant in question, and
that, accordingly, and in line with Alverez vs. Court of First
Instance (64 Phil. 33), the search and seizure complained of
have not been proven to be unreasonable.
People vs. Veloso JOHN DOE WARRANTS
G.R. No. L-23051, 20 October 1925
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable
that the application for the search warrant, the affidavit, and
the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the
person to be seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant
did state that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the
building occupied by him, and which is under his control,
namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used in
violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must
not be forgotten that the Organic Act requires a particular
description of the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized, and that the warrant in this case sufficiently
41
described the place and the gambling apparatus, and, in
addition, contained a description of the person to be seized.
As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling
apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at
No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe
was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could
identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
DFA vs. BCA Int’l Corp. GR 210858, 29 June 2016
Deliberative Process Privilege
Deliberative process privilege is one kind of privileged
information, which is within the exceptions of the
constitutional right to information. In In Re: Production of
Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court
Officials and Employees as Witnesses, 36 we held that:
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged
communication. Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC provides:
Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. - Court sessions are
executive in character, with only the Members of the Court
present. Court deliberations are confidential and shall not be
disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided herein
or as authorized by the Court.
Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the rule in his
concurring opinion to the Court Resolution in Arroyo v. De Lima
(TRO on Watch List Order case): the rules on confidentiality will
enable the Members of the Court to "freely discuss the issues
without fear of criticism for holding unpopular positions" or
fear of humiliation for one's comments. The privilege against
disclosure of these kinds of information/communication is
known as deliberative process privilege, involving as it does the
deliberative process of reaching a decision. "Written advice
from a variety of individuals is an important element of the
government's decision-making process and that the
interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced the
government to disclose those recommendations;" the privilege
is intended "to prevent the 'chilling' of deliberative
communications."
The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary. We have in
passing recognized the claim of this privilege by the two other
branches of government in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
In Akbayan v. Aquino, 37 we adopted the ruling of the U.S.
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co,38 which stated
that the deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure
"advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions
and policies are formulated."
Traditionally, U.S. courts have established two fundamental
requirements, both of which must be met, for the deliberative
process privilege to be invoked.43 First, the communication
must be predecisional, i.e., "antecedent to the adoption of an
agency policy." Second, the communication must be
deliberative, i.e., "a direct part of the deliberative process in
that it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal
42
or policy matters." It must reflect the "give-and-take of the be impaired by undue exposure of the decision-making process
consultative process." to public scrutiny after the court decision is made.

Thus, "[t]he deliberative process privilege exempts materials
that are 'predecisional' and 'deliberative,' but requires
disclosure of policy statements and final opinions 'that have
the force of law or explain actions that an agency has already
taken.
The deliberative process privilege can also be invoked in
arbitration proceedings under RA 9285.
Accordingly, a proceeding in the arbitral tribunal does not
prevent the possibility of the purpose of the privilege being
defeated, if it is not allowed to be invoked. In the same manner,
the disclosure of an information covered by the deliberative
process privilege to a court arbitrator will defeat the policy
bases and purpose of the privilege.

"Deliberative process privilege contains three policy bases:

first, the privilege protects candid discussions within an agency;
second, it prevents public confusion from premature disclosure
of agency opinions before the agency establishes final policy;
and third, it protects the integrity of an agency's decision; the
public should not judge officials based on information they
considered prior to issuing their final decisions."

Under RA 9285,54 orders of an arbitral tribunal are appealable

to the courts. If an official is compelled to testify before an
arbitral tribunal and the order of an arbitral tribunal is appealed
to the courts, such official can be inhibited by fear of later being
subject to public criticism, preventing such official from making
candid discussions within his or her agency. The decision of the
court is widely published, including details involving the
privileged information. This disclosure of privileged
information can inhibit a public official from expressing his or
her candid opinion. Future quality of deliberative process can

43