2019 Poli
application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate
a) Void-for-vagueness doctrine.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially
invalid if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application."140 "[A] statute
or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such
instance, the statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle."141
b) Vagueness doctrine applies
only in free speech cases.
The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they
are called in American law, First Amendment cases.142 A facial
challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to
one which is overbroad because of possible "'chilling effect' on
protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech.
A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a
crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain
himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a
crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into
silence."143
It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a special
for testing the validity of penal statutes.
HARD LAW vs. SOFT LAW
Pharmaceutical vs. DOH Secretary Duque, G.R. No. 173034,
9 October 2007.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part
of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through
transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties
or conventional international law must go through a process
prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into
municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have
not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of
the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
1
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981
had been transformed into domestic law through local
legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code
that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not
the ICMBS per se.
xxx
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft
law" or non-binding norms, principles and practices that
influence state behavior.
"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of
international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946
Statute of the International Court of Justice.32 It is, however, an
expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices
that influence state behavior.33 Certain declarations and
resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this
category.
Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international
law binding on WHO member states, it provides an excellent
example of the power of "soft law" in international relations.
International lawyers typically distinguish binding rules of
international law-"hard law"-from non-binding norms,
principles, and practices that influence state behavior-"soft
law." WHO has during its existence generated many soft law
norms, creating a "soft law regime" in international governance
for public health.
x x x
In the Philippines, the executive department implemented
certain measures recommended by WHO to address the
outbreaks of SARS and Avian flu by issuing Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 201 on April 26, 2003 and E.O. No. 280 on February
2, 2004, delegating to various departments broad powers to
close down schools/establishments, conduct health surveillance
and monitoring, and ban importation of poultry and agricultural
products.
It must be emphasized that even under such an international
emergency, the duty of a state to implement the IHR Resolution
was still considered not binding or enforceable, although said
resolutions had great political influence.
Doctrine of Auto-Limitation
Reagan vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-26379, 27 December 1969
People vs. Gozo, L-36409, 26 October 1973
any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a
restriction of its sovereign rights
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being
independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over
its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its
power.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or
implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There
may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary
in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the
property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
2
capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction."7 A
state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable competence.
Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no
longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded
from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does
so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed
with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil.
They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be
diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases
under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the
military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be
foreign territory.
Tanada vs. Angara, 118295, 2 May 1997
UN Charter and Other Treaties
Limit Sovereignty
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of
its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign
rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation."47-
A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give
the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations
is taking preventive or enforcement action." Such assistance
includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in
administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peace-
keeping operations of the organization.
Doctrine of Specialty (Speciality)
Lawphil Report on Extradition Treaty
7. The rule of speciality
The rule of speciality (or specialty), which prohibits a
Requesting State from trying an extradited individual for an
offense other than the one for which he was extradited, is a
standard provision included in U.S. bilateral extradition treaties,
including the six under consideration. The Malaysia Treaty (art.
13) contains exceptions to the rule of specialty that are designed
to allow a Requesting State some latitude in prosecuting
offenders for crimes other than those for which they had been
specifically extradited.
Hongkong vs. Munoz, 207342, 7 November 2017
Under the rule of specialty in international law, a Requested
State shall surrender to a Requesting State a person to be tried
only for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of
extradition. Conformably with the dual criminality rule
embodied in the extradition treaty between the Philippines and
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR),
however, the Philippines as the Requested State is not bound to
extradite the respondent to the jurisdiction of the HKSAR as the
Requesting State for the offense of accepting an advantage as
an agent considering that the extradition treaty is forthright in
providing that surrender shall only be granted for an offense
coming within the descriptions of offenses in its Article 2
insofar as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other
form of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe
penalty according to the laws of both parties.
X x x
Article 2 of the RP-Hong Kong treaty provides that surrender of
the extraditee by the Requested State to the Requesting State
shall only be for an offense coming within any of the
descriptions of the offenses therein listed insofar as the offenses
3
are punishable by imprisonment or other form of detention for
more than one year, or by a more severe penalty according to
the laws o f both parties. The provision expresses the dual
criminality rule. The determination of whether or not the offense
concerned complied with the dual criminality rule rests on the
Philippines as the requested party. Hence, the Philippines must
carefully ascertain the exact nature of the offenses involved in
the request, and thereby establish that the surrender of Munoz
for trial in the HKSAR will be proper. On its part, the HKSAR
as the requesting party should prove that the offense is covered
by the RP-Hong Kong Treaty, and punishable in our
jurisdiction.
Associative State
Province of North Cotabato vs. Govt of RP, G.R. No. 183591,
14 October 2008
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as
presently worded.
X x x
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY,
paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on
GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however,
that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the
Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized
by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of
governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and
administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in
the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be
established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state,
the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the
principal, while maintaining its international status as a state.
Free associations represent a middle ground between integration
and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has
usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on
their way to full independence. Examples of states that have
passed through the status of associated states as a transitional
phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become
independent states.153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are
consistent with the international legal concept of association,
specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into
economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the
commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's
participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of
the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the
BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing
on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection,
and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral
domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the
4
Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any
foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that
the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated
state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an "associative"
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
Co Kim Cham G.R. No. L-5 17 September 1945
[A]ll acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and
valid. If [the governments established in these Islands under the
names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of
the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or
regime were de facto governments], the judicial acts and
proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and
the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows
that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of
those governments, which are not of a political complexion,
were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle
of postliminy in international law, remained good and valid after
the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur.
According to the principle of postliminy in international law, the
fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes
again into the power of its legitimate government of
sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the
effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or
another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done
under his control, when they are not of a political complexion,
administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect
during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done
during the same time by private persons under the sanction of
municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social
life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as
between the state and the individuals the evil would be scarcely
less, — it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made
under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the
general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals should
be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ."
(Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the
occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of
the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even
though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time
substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do
5
apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and
establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines.
The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and
may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to
administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes
of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental
agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation.
Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil
and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as
soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader
does not usually take the administration of justice into his own
hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to
administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless
absolutely prevented, to respect.
[I]n the Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary
of War, “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually
abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were
before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.”
From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the
conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will
for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive
and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such
arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations
which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and
institution so far as military necessity will permit.
Belligerent occupation
Etorma vs. Ravelo G.R. No. L-718, 24 March 1947
According to the rules of Land Warfare of the United States
Army, belligerent or so-called military occupation is a question
of fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion as a result of which the
invader has rendered the invaded government incapable of
publicly exercising its authority, and that the invader is in
position to substitute and has substituted his own authority for
that of the legitimate government of the territory invaded."
(International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by
the United States, by Hyde, Vol. II, pp. 361, 362.)
"Belligerent occupation must be both actual and effective.
Organized resistance must be overcome and the forces in
possession must have taken measures to establish law and
order. It doubtless suffices if the occupying army can, within
a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make its
authority felt within the occupied district." (Id., p. 364.)
"Occupation once acquired must be maintained . . .. It does
not cease, however, . . .. Nor does the existence of a rebellion
or the operations of guerrilla bands cause it to cease, unless
the legitimate government is reestablished and the occupant
fails promptly to suppress such rebellion or guerrilla
operations." (Id., p.365.)
Suspended Allegiance
Laurel vs. Misa77 Phil. 856
FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the
Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by
giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot
be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines
was suspended at thattime. Also, he claims that he cannot be
tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since
6
his acts were against the Commonwealth which was
replaced already by the Republic.
HELD: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes
absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or
sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is
presumed that the Philippine government still had the
power.
Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either
subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se
wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty
that was suspended.
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a
territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government
on the sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier.
Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the
change of government, there is no such change since the
sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What
happened was a mere change of name of government, from
Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines
Precautionary Principle
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (AM NO. 09-
6-8-SC)
(f) Precautionary principle states that when human
activities may lead to threats of serious and irreversible
damage to the environment that is scientifically plausible
but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish
that threat.
RULE 20
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Section 1. Applicability. - When there is a lack of full
scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between
human activity and environmental effect, the court shall
apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case
before it.
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.
Section 2. Standards for application. - In applying the
precautionary principle, the following factors, among
others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or
health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3)
prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of
the environmental rights of those affected.
Treaty vs. Executive Agreement
Bayan Muna vs. Romulo, G.R> No. 159618, 1 February
2011.
Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded
between states in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation."32 International agreements may be
in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative
7
concurrence after executive ratification; or (2) executive
agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do
not require legislative concurrence and are usually less
formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters
than treaties.33
Under international law, there is no difference between
treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding
effects on the contracting states concerned,34 as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their
powers.35 Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held
valid if it violates the Constitution.36 Authorities are,
however, agreed that one is distinct from another for
accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement
aspect.37 As has been observed by US constitutional
scholars, a treaty has greater "dignity" than an executive
agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond
doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the
President, the Senate, and the people;38 a ratified treaty,
unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any
prior statutory enactment.39
X x x
And lest it be overlooked, one type of executive agreement is
a treaty-authorized44 or a treaty-implementing executive
agreement,45 which necessarily would cover the same
matters subject of the underlying treaty.
But over and above the foregoing considerations is the fact
that––save for the situation and matters contemplated in
Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution46––when a treaty is
required, the Constitution does not classify any subject, like
that involving political issues, to be in the form of, and
ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely
prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of the Senate
by a vote defined therein to complete the ratification
process.
Petitioner’s reliance on Adolfo47 is misplaced, said case
being inapplicable owing to different factual milieus. There,
the Court held that an executive agreement cannot be used
to amend a duly ratified and existing treaty, i.e., the Bases
Treaty. Indeed, an executive agreement that does not
require the concurrence of the Senate for its ratification may
not be used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution,
is the product of the ratifying acts of the Executive and the
Senate. The presence of a treaty, purportedly being subject
to amendment by an executive agreement, does not obtain
under the premises.
The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading,48 as reiterated in
Bayan,49 given recognition to the obligatory effect of
executive agreements without the concurrence of the Senate:
x x x [T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.
From the earliest days of our history, we have entered
executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial
and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and
navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our
courts.
8
X x x
Evidently, there is, as yet, no overwhelming consensus, let
alone prevalent practice, among the different countries in
the world that the prosecution of internationally recognized
crimes of genocide, etc. should be handled by a particular
international criminal court.
X x x
In light of the above consideration, the position or view that the
challenged RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement ought to be in the
form of a treaty, to be effective, has to be rejected.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent.
The RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement (Agreement)
violates existing municipal laws on the Philippine State’s
obligation to prosecute persons responsible for any of the
international crimes of genocide, war crimes and other
crimes against humanity. Being a mere executive agreement
that is indisputably inferior to municipal law, the
Agreement cannot prevail over a prior or subsequent
municipal law inconsistent with it. The RP-US Non-
Surrender Agreement (Agreement) violates existing
municipal laws on the Philippine State’s obligation to
prosecute persons responsible for any of the international
crimes of genocide, war crimes and other crimes against
humanity. Being a mere executive agreement that is
indisputably inferior to municipal law, the Agreement
cannot prevail over a prior or subsequent municipal law
inconsistent with it.
Balag vs. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, 3 July 2018
The contempt order issued against petitioner simply stated
that he would be arrested and detained until such time that
he gives his true testimony, or otherwise purges himself of
the contempt. It does not provide any definite and concrete
period of detention. Neither does the Senate Rules specify a
precise period of detention when a person is cited in
contempt.
X x x
The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the
inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries
in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of
the legislative inquiry under which the said power is
invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its
process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the
subject of investigation before it was within the range of
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony
called relates to that subject.[52] Accordingly, as long as
there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent
power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised.
Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the
exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there
is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained
witness.
PCA Arbitration Case
9
Republic vs. Arigo, G.R. No. 206510, 16 September 2014
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) Case Araullo
vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, 1 July 2014
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn... unobligated
allotments under the DAP... were not savings, and the use of
such... appropriations contravened Section 25(5),... Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
X x x
the GAAs should expressly authorize the... transfer of funds.
X x x
b.2. Second Requisite There were... no savings from which
funds could... be sourced for the DAP
The petitioners claim that the funds used in the DAP the
unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated
allotments were not actual savings within the context of
Section 25(5), supra, and the relevant provisions of the
GAAs. Belgica argues that "savings" should be...
understood to refer to the excess money after the items that
needed to be funded have been funded, or those that needed
to be paid have been paid pursuant to the budget.[146] The
petitioners posit that there could be savings only when the
PAPs for which the... funds had been appropriated were
actually implemented and completed, or finally
discontinued or abandoned. They insist that savings could
not be realized with certainty in the middle of the fiscal year;
and that the funds for "slow-moving" PAPs could not be
considered as savings... because such PAPs had not actually
been abandoned or discontinued yet.[147] They stress that
NBC No. 541, by allowing the withdrawn funds to be
reissued to the "original program or project from which it
was withdrawn," conceded that the PAPs from which the...
supposed savings were taken had not been completed,
abandoned or discontinu
We partially find for the petitioners.
The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the
purse. Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what
PAPs to fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for each
PAP
The... second principle is that the Executive, as the
department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is
expected to faithfully execute the GAA and to spend the
budget in accordance with the provisions of the GAA
The third principle is that in... making the President's power
to augment operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes
the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing,
Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it
delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive.
But Congress does not... thereby allow the Executive to
override its authority over the purse as to let the Executive
exceed its delegated authority... fourth principle is that
savings should be actual. "Actual" denotes something that
is real or substantial, or something that exists... presently in
fact, as opposed to something that is merely theoretical,
possible, potential or hypothetical.[150]
10

The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings
strictly against expanding the scope of the power to
augment.
Xxx
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or
unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as
unalloted or... unreleased. They have not yet ripened into
categories of items from which savings can be generated.
Section 25(5), supra, has delineated borders between their
offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are
prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the
guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we
call such transfers of funds... cross-border transfers or
cross-border augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section
25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to
the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate
President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the
Speaker; the Judiciary, with... respect to the Chief Justice;
the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their
respective Chairpersons.
The respondents justified all the cross-border transfers
thusly:
The Constitution does not prevent the President from
transferring savings of his department to another
department upon the latter's request, provided it is the
recipient department that uses such funds to augment its
own appropriation. In such a case, the
President merely gives the other department access to public
funds but he cannot dictate how they shall be applied by that
department whose fiscal autonomy is guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-
border transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5),
supra, disallowing cross-border transfers was disobeyed.
Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid,
were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra.
Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed... funds despite the
original revenue targets... not having been exceeded was
invalid
The petitioners point out that a condition for the release of
the unprogrammed funds was that the revenue collections
must exceed revenue targets; and that the release of the
unprogrammed funds was illegal because such condition
was not met.[191]
X x x
Doctrine of operative fact was applicable
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the
law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced
consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or
disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or... executive
act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no
effect.
11

In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of
operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer
be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on
the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are
concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper
tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative
and other liabilities.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the
petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES
the following acts and practices under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541
and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine
of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the
implementing agencies, and the declaration of the
withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year
and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings... contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the
Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices
outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that
were not covered by any appropriation in the General
Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of
unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification
by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections
exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the
conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations
Acts.
Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, 4 July 2017
Martial Law by Digong
The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the
extraordinary powers of: a) calling out the armed forces; b)
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and c)
declaring martial law.112 These powers may be resorted to
only under specified conditions.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the
powers of the Commander-in-Chief by revising the
"grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the
manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, and
review of presidential action."1
1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under
the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis.
It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of
Article VIII. The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding”
appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of
12
questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases.
It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a
matter to be resolved by the Court.
2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look
into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and
not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court
expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President
could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of
all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation.
To require him otherwise would impede the process of his
decision-making.
b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a
condition for the declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A plain reading of
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the
President’s power to declare martial law is not subject to
any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion
or rebellion and that public safety requires it.
c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole
discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the
revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since
the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the
President, the determination of this Court as to whether
there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must
be based only on facts or information known by or available
to the President at the time he made the declaration or
suspension which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him
to Congress. These may be based on the situation existing at
the time the declaration was made or past events. As to how
far the past events should be from the present depends on
the President.
3. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in
an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground
of lack sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress
may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. The power
to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress
are not only totally different but likewise independent from
each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential
proclamation.
4. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual
basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public
safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur;
and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe
that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the
standard of proof in determining the existence of either
invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial law,
and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most
practical and most expedient standard by which the
President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence
of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the writ. To require him to satisfy a higher
standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his
emergency powers.
13
5. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual
basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to
the calibration of the President’s decision of which among
his graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation. To
do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive
domain of the Executive and an infringement on the
prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President.
6. a.) Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does not make
Proclamation No. 216 vague. The term “other rebel groups”
in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when viewed in
the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text
of Proclamation No. 216 refers to “other rebel groups”
found in Proclamation No. 55, which it cited by way of
reference in its Whereas clauses.
b.) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make
Proclamation No. 216 vague. Operational guidelines will
serve only as mere tools for the implementation of the
proclamation.
There is no need for the Court to determine the
constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational
guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other orders
issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its
review. Any act committed under the said orders in violation
of the Constitution and the laws should be resolved in a
separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court
wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing
into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in
the exercise of its power to revoke.
7. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
By a review of the facts available to him that there was an
armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a
portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief Executive of
any of his power and prerogatives, leading the President to
believe that there was probable cause that the crime of
rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety
requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion.
Rebellion may be subsumed under the crime of terrorism,
which has a broader scope covering a wide range of
predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various
means by which terrorism can be committed.
Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao. For a declaration of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence of 1.)
actual rebellion or invasion and 2.) the public safety
requirement.
In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence
perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group were directed
not only against government forces or establishment but
likewise against civilians and their properties. There were
bomb threats, road blockades, burning of schools and
churches, hostages and killings of civilians, forced entry of
young male Muslims to the group, there were hampering of
medical services and delivery of basic services,
reinforcement of government troops, among others. These
particular scenarios convinced the President that the
atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public
safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
14
9. a.) The calling out power is in a different category from
the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55.
The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed
Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law. Even
so, the Court’s review of the President’s declaration of
martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily
entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular
purpose.
b.) Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216
result in the nullification of the acts of the President done
pursuant thereto. Under the operative fact doctrine,” the
unconstitutional statute is recognized as an “operative fact”
before it is declared unconstitutional.
***
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region. The Court
FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as
CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated
Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Belgica vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on…
1.) …separation of powers
YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded
post-enactment authority (a) to identify the projects they
desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork
Barrel allocations; (b) and in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Thus, legislators have been, in one form or
another, authorized to participate in “the various
operational aspects of budgeting,” violating the separation
of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Informal
practices, through which legislators have effectively
intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must
be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
unconstitutional treatment.
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power
YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-
delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as
settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress.
3.) …checks and balances
YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit.
Legislators make intermediate appropriations of the PDAF
only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law.
Thus, actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
15
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and are
thus put into effect without veto consideration. This kind of
lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a
budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President’s
power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the
President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire
P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification
feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of
P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships,
medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of
historical materials, construction of roads, flood control,
etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves
the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President’s power of item veto.
4.) …accountability
YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be
tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this
very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs
afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.”
Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of
project implementation renders them susceptible to taking
undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same
post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate
himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork
Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this
area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes
is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts
and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while it is possible that the close operational proximity
between legislators and the Executive department, through
the former’s post-enactment participation, may affect the
process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the
domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an
improper subject of judicial assessment.
6.) …local autonomy
YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the
system which actually belies the avowed intention of
“making equal the unequal.” The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
16
without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a
result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized
metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To
add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and
Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the
Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive
funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator
control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils
(LDCs), instrumentalities whose functions are essentially
geared towards managing local affairs. The programs,
policies and resolutions of LDCs should not be overridden
nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national
officers that have no law-making authority except only when
acting as a body.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
WON the following phrases are unconstitutional insofar as
they constitute undue delegations of legislative power:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910
relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said
phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and,
in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines”
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential
Social Fund may be used “to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects”. This gives him carte
blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority”.
The law does not supply a definition of “priority
infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the
President without any guideline to construe the same. To
note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure”
is too broad of a classification since the said term could
pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance
the priority infrastructure development projects” must be
stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section
8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law.
17
SPARK vs. QC, G.R. No. 225442, 8 August 2017.
Void for Vagueness
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness
doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly
identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances,
which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair
warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or
required so that one may act accordingly.49 The void for
vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim.
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any
ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the
age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the
Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void
for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are
no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew
violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not
explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents
are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in
statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically,
RA 9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child
may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In
the absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of
other persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence.
PARENS PATRIAE
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty
to aid parents in the moral development of their children,70
and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill
their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that
"[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of
the parental role, may be important to the child's chances
for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.
Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that
parents and others, teachers for example, who have the
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled
to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility."71
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal
restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. As will be later
discussed at greater length, these ordinances further
18
compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of
juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which
necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents
to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar
vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more
exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements
that operate during the night; their moral well-being is
likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making
detrimental decisions during this time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew
Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) -
accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in
child-rearing. hus, in all actuality, the only aspect of
parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents'
prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places
without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours.
73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all
plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor
force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or
control their minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew
Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable -
infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her
child.
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a
fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to
move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within
the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general
concept of liberty.
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public
interest justify restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move
from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this
right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads,
the State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this
right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided
by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically
the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within
the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the
probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second
requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law,"
our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's
19
duty to afford special protection to children. Particularly
relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly
authorizes local government units, through their city or
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew
Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny
test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon
City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which
provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this
interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides
for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise
their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew
hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been
construed to include parental permission as a constructive
form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception
to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement,
however, is left to the discretion of the local government
unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared
unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon
City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid
in accordance with this Decision.
Rodriguez Writ of Amparo case G.R. No. 191805, 15
November 2011
The privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted,
necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party.
Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of
amparo, there is no... need to issue a temporary protection
order independently of the former. The order restricting
respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under
the privilege of the writ.
Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit
In Estrada v. Desierto,[73] we clarified the doctrine that a
non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit,
even for acts committed during the latter's tenure.
The presidential immunity from suit exists only in
concurrence with the president's incumbency
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear
that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential
immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny
that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or... accountable for the
abduction of Rodriguez.
Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo
proceedings
Command responsibility may likewise find application in
proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied
to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine
the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and
has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
20
complained of, so as to enable... the Court to devise remedial
measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command
responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to
address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the
courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
The president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be
held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings
and enforced... disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command
responsibility, the following elements must obtain:... the
existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the
accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his
subordinate;... the superior knew or had reason to know that
the crime was about to be or had been committed; and... the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof.
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that
although international tribunals apply a strict standard of
knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be
established through circumstantial evidence.[... eanwhile, as
to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to
note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the
president has the power to effectively command, control and
discipline the military.
Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that
on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston
Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had
knowledge of and information on, and should have known
that a climate of enforced disappearances had been...
perpetrated on members of the NPA.[92] Without even
attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports,
Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue
military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report
states that there is a policy... allowing enforced
disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do
not automatically impute responsibility to former President
Arroyo for each and every count of forcible
disappearance.[93] Aside from Rodriguez's general
averments, there is no... piece of evidence that could
establish her responsibility or accountability for his
abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that
she should have known about the violation of his right to life,
liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate,
punish... or prevent it.
Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of
respondents in G.R. No. 191805
totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably
prove... the responsibility and accountability of some
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life,
liberty and security.
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official
investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his right
to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must
be held responsible or accountable.
21

From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was
successful in proving through substantial evidence that
respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit,
Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and
Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the...
violation of Rodriguez's rights to life, liberty and security on
the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6
September to 17 September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair
and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus,
the privilege of the writs... of amparo and habeas data must
be granted in his favor.
It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a)
maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of
respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the
application of the command responsibility doctrine to
amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to
prove... through substantial evidence that former President
Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of
his rights to life, liberty and property.
Saluday vs. People GR 215305 3 April 2018
In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by
Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a
reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a
vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a
reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco
merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally
intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray
and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport
terminals where passengers may further be required to open
their bags and luggages. Considering the reasonableness of
the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds
no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a
warrant.
Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage
inspection done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if
he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered ''yes,
just open if' based on petitioner's own testimony. This is
clear consent by petitioner to the search of the contents of
his bag.
Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court Jays down
the following guidelines.1âwphi1 Prior to entry, passengers
and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine
inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. In
this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines
can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be
frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be
required instead to open their bags and luggages for
inspection, which inspection must be made in the
passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she
can validly be refused entry into the terminal.
While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government
agents or the security personnel of the bus owner in the
following three instances. First, upon receipt of information
that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the
bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route
to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects.
This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land
upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal
22
articles carried by a passenger onboard. Second, whenever
a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger
can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to
the same routine inspection by government agents or private
security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at
the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able
to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it
possible for these passengers to evade the routine search at
the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at
designated military or police checkpoints where State agents
can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the
passengers and their bags or luggages.
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their
effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of
the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following
conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as
to the manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive
and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being
searched, minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any
cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule.
Second, neither can the search result from any
discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling,
stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the
fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with
disabilities, children and other similar groups should be
protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be
confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence
seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced
that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no
evidence was planted against the accused.
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the
safety of others may be put at risk. Given the present
circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public
transport buses and their terminals, just like passenger
ships and seaports, are in that category.
Jimenez vs. Cabangbang
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or
not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview
of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in
Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen
in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or
not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance
of the acts in question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this
category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open
letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November
14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
defendant caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or
about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing
23
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer
or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding
made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is
not absolutely privileged.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in
question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is
false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to
expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and
ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these
allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with
the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same,
it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when
plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication
is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were
aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they
were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the
aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly
implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said
coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much
less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Jardeleza vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, 19 August 2014.
Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the
“unanimity rule,” contemplate a doubt on the moral
character of an applicant?
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides (unanimity rule):
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified
applicant is challenged. - In every case where the integrity
of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for
nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of
all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the
favorable consideration of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits
the rule that a higher voting requirement is absolute in cases
where the integrity of an applicant is questioned. Simply
put, when an integrity question arises, the voting
requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a
judicial post becomes “unanimous” instead of the “majority
vote” required in the preceding section.[
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was
the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the
Council and to instantaneously provide those who are
willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the
opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of his
physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a
reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was
merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be,
right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be
too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-
marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only
during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues
became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014,
Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to
affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances
preclude the very idea of due process in which the right to
explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but to
provide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient
time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the
occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise.
24
While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of
insider trading fall within the contemplation of a “question
on integrity” and would have warranted the application of
the “unanimity rule,” he was not afforded due process in its
application.
The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate
applications for judicial posts, exercises full discretion on its
power to recommend nominees to the President. The sui
generis character of JBC proceedings, however, is not a
blanket authority to disregard the due process under JBC-
010.
Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when,
contrary to the JBC rules, he was neither formally informed
of the questions on his integrity nor was provided a
reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that
Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist
submitted to the President for the vacated position of
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the
unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se,
but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of
procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means
does the Court intend to strike down the “unanimity rule”
as it reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom in its
selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a
blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and
the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the
Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a
nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the
JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due
process.
In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a
party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction.[52] This rule may well be
applied to the current situation for an opposing view
submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To this,
the Court shall not concede. As the branch of government
tasked to guarantee that the protection of due process is
available to an individual in proper cases, the Court finds
the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that it is assigned
to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009 must be deemed to have never come into
operation in light of its erroneous application on the original
ground against Jardeleza’s integrity. At the risk of being
repetitive, the Court upholds the JBC’s discretion in the
selection of nominees, but its application of the “unanimity
rule” must be applied in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able to
secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to
propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC,
nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position
of Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the
shortlist submitted to the President.
Constitutional Revision
Santiago vs. Roco, GR No. 127325, 19 March 1997
25
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory.
Lambino vs. Comelec
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the
basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a
people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit
Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based
alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply
with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For
following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People
The unbending requirement is that the people must first see
the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to
signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.1 Moreover, "an initiative signer must be
informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of
that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive
and misleading" which renders the initiative void
Quo Waranto vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, 19 June 2018
Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct
proceedings, although both may result in the ouster of a
public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the
relief of "ouster", while impeachment affords "removal."
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine a person's right or title to a public office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment. 11 It is the proper action
to inquire into a public officer's eligibility12 or the validity
of his appointment. 13 Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
a quo warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination
of the right to the use or exercise of the office.
Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process
undertaken by the legislature to determine whether the
public officer committed any of the impeachable offenses,
namely, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal
26
of public trust. 14 It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility
for appointment or election, or challenge the legality of his
assumption of office. Conviction for any of the impeachable
offenses shall result in the removal of the impeachable
official from office. 15
The OSG 's quo warranto petition challenged respondent's
right and title to the position of Chief Justice. He averred
that in failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and
net worth as a member of the career service prior to her
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Court,
respondent could not be said to possess the requirement of
proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member of the
Judiciary. The OSG thus prayed that respondent's
appointment as Chief Justice be declared void.
Clearly, the OSG questioned the respondent's eligibility for
appointment as Chief Justice and sought to invalidate such
appointment. The OSG's petition, therefore, is one for quo
warranto over which the Court exercises original
jurisdiction.
As the Court previously held, "where the dispute is on the
eligibility to perform the duties by the person sought to be
ousted or disqualified a quo warranto is the proper action."
16
Respondent harps on the supposed intent of the framers of
the Constitution for impeachable officers to be removed only
through impeachment. 17 However, a circumspect
examination of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission will reveal that the framers presumed that the
impeachable officers had duly qualified for the position.
Indeed, the deliberations which respondent herself cited 18
showed that the framers did not contemplate a situation
where the impeachable officer was unqualified for
appointment or election.
Respondent, however, argues that quo warranto petitions
may be filed against the President and Vice-President under
the PET Rules "only because the Constitution specifically
permits" them under Section 4, Article VII. According to
respondent, no counterpart provision exists in the
Constitution giving the same authority to the Court over the
Chief Justice, the members of the Constitutional
Commissions and the Ombudsman. Respondent, thus,
asserts that the Constitution made a distinction between
elected and appointive impeachable officials, and limited
quo warranto to elected impeachable officials. For these
reasons, respondent concludes that by constitutional design,
the Court is denied power to remove any of its members.24
The Court is not convinced. The argument, to begin with,
acknowledges that the Constitution in fact allows quo
warranto actions against impeachable officers, albeit
respondent limits them to the President and Vice-President.
This admission refutes the very position taken by
respondent that all impeachable officials cannot be sued
through quo warranto because they belong to a "privileged
class" of officers who can be removed only through
impeachment.25 To be sure, Lecaroz, etc. did not distinguish
between elected and appointed impeachable officers.
Furthermore, that the Constitution does not show a
counterpart provision to paragraph 7 of Section 4, Article
VII for members of this Court or the Constitutional
27
Commissions does not mean that quo warranto cannot
extend to non-elected impeachable officers. The authority to
hear quo warranto petitions against appointive impeachable
officers emanates from Section 5(1) of Article VIII which
grants quo warranto jurisdiction to this Court without
qualification as to the class of public officers over whom the
same may be exercised.
Respondent's insistence that she could not be removed from
office except through impeachment is predicated on Section
2, Article XI of the Constitution. It reads:
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
(Emphasis ours)
By its plain language, however, Section 2 of Article XI does
not preclude a quo warranto action questioning an
impeachable officer's qualifications to assume office. These
qualifications include age, citizenship and professional
experience - matters which are manifestly outside the
purview of impeachment under the above-cited provision.
Lack of qualifications for appointment or election is
evidently not among the stated grounds for impeachment. It
is, however, a ground for a quo warranto action over which
this Court was given original jurisdiction under Section 5(1)
of Article VIII.
Quo warranto, not impeachment, is the constitutional
remedy prescribed to adjudicate and resolve questions
relating to qualifications, eligibility and entitlement to
public office.
The long line of cases decided by this Court since the l 900's,
which specifically explained the spirit behind the rule
providing a prescriptive period for the filing of an action for
quo warranto, reveals that such limitation can be applied
only against private individuals claiming rights to a public
office, not against the State.
Corona vs. Senate, G.R. No. 200242, 17 July 2012
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a
public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided
in the Constitution. Petitioner was impeached through the
mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner
that he claims was accomplished with undue haste and
under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable
cause. Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding
with the trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged
partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were
apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings.
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded
with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required
majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately
accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his
office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the
28
process of screening applicants and nominees, and the
President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new
Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from
among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably,
the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted
by supervening events and his own acts.1âwphi1
Lagman vs. Pimentel, GR 235935, 6 February 2018
Extension of Proclamation of Proclamation of Martial
Law/Suspension of Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus
The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the
Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus. Such silence, however, should
not be construed as a vacuum, flaw or deficiency in the
provision. While it does not specify the number of times that
the Congress is allowed to approve an extension of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only
limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to
extend such proclamation or suspension are that the
extension should be upon the President's initiative; that it
should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or
rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that it is
subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual
basis upon the petition of any citizen.limited only to a
determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof.
By its plain language, the Constitution provides such scope
of review in the exercise of the Court's sui generis authority
under Section 18, Article VII, which is principally aimed at
balancing (or curtailing) the power vested by the
Constitution in the Congress to determine whether to extend
such proclamation or suspension.
Congressional check on the President's martial law and
suspension powers thus consists of:
First. The power to review the President's proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and to revoke such proclamation or
suspension. The review is "automatic in the sense that it may
be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension is made."97 The Congress'
decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension cannot be
set aside by the President.
Second. The power to approve any extension of the
proclamation or suspension, upon the President's initiative,
for such period as it may determine, if the invasion or
rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two
factual bases for the extension of the proclamation of
martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and
(b) public safety requires the extension.
Saugisag vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, 12 January 2016
2. The plain meaning of the Constitution prohibits the entry
of foreign military bases, troops or facilities, except by way
of a treaty concurred in by the Senate - a clear limitation on
the President's dual role as defender of the State and as sole
authority in foreign relations.
29
3. The President, however, may enter into an executive
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if
(a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty.
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of
Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with which
they are concluded. As culled from the afore-quoted
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past
Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars,208
executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the
implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or
agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the details of a
treaty;209 (2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of
the Legislature;210 or (3) in the exercise of the President's
independent powers under the Constitution.211 The raison
d'etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional
or legislative authorizations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law
distinguishing treaties, international agreements, and
executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in
form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate
concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional
directive. There remain two very important features that
distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate
them into terms of art in the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an
express or implied authorization under the Constitution,
statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the
validity and effectivity of executive agreements under
serious question for the main function of the Executive is to
enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the
Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of
these rules.214 In turn, executive agreements cannot create
new international obligations that are not expressly allowed
or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered
superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of
the acts of the Executive and the Senate215 unlike executive
agreements, which are solely executive actions.216 Because
of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is
regarded as being on the same level as a statute.217 If there
is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes
precedence over one that is prior.218 An executive
agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that
are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective.219 Both types of international agreement are
nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the
Constitution.220
There are constitutional provisions that restrict or limit the
President's prerogative in concluding international
agreements, such as those that involve the following:
a. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within
Philippine territory221
b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts,
which must be pursuant to the authority granted by
Congress222
30
c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant
to a law concurred in by a majority of all the Members of
Congress223
d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the
Philippines, of foreign loans that must be previously
concurred in by the Monetary Board224
e. The authorization of the presence of foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities in the country must be in the form
of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate.225
f. For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5, the
concurrence of the Senate is required, should the form of the
government chosen be a treaty.
The practice of resorting to executive agreements in
adjusting the details of a law or a treaty that already deals
with the presence of foreign military forces is not at all
unusual in this jurisdiction.
Rights in Contiguous Zone and EEC
Magallona vs. Ermita, GR 187167 16 August 2011
UNCLOS III is a multilateral treaty regulating, among
others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines],
contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines],
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits.23
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are
enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific
basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are
drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic
starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones
and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on
archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea,
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms
for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In
turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-
based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic
zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Within the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the
following rights under UNCLOS III:
Article 58. Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive
economic zone. —
31
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal
or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of
this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of
navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of
the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated
with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables
and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of
this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of
international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so
far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
xxxx
Beyond the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the
freedom of the high seas, defined under UNCLOS III as
follows:
Article 87. Freedom of the high seas. —
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or
land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules
of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to
Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other
installations permitted under international law, subject to
Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in
section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and
XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for
the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in
the Area.
Territorial Sea
The territorial sea is regarded as the sovereign territory of the
state, although foreign ships (military and civilian) are allowed
innocent passage through it, or transit passage for straits; this
sovereignty also extends to the airspace over and seabed below.
Adjustment of these boundaries is called, in international law,
maritime delimitation.
A state's territorial sea extends up to 12 nautical miles from its
baseline.
Contiguous Zone
32
The contiguous zone is a band of water extending farther from
the outer edge of the territorial sea to up to 24 nautical miles
from the baseline, within which a state can exert limited control
for the purpose of preventing or punishing "infringement of its
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations
within its territory or territorial sea"
he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed
the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This
situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-
settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond
the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Exclusive Economic Zone
An exclusive economic zone extends from the baseline to a
maximum of 200 nautical miles, thus it includes the contiguous
zone.[3] A coastal nation has control of all economic resources
within its exclusive economic zone, including fishing, mining,
oil exploration, and any pollution of those resources. However,
it cannot prohibit passage or loitering above, on, or under the
surface of the sea that is in compliance with the laws and
regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the
provisions of the UN Convention, within that portion of its
exclusive economic zone
beyond its territorial sea
Arigo vs. Swift
G.R. No. 206510, 16 September 2014
The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act
or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself.
The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.
The doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification
given by Justice Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against
the authority which makes the law on which the right depends."
[Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other
practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case
of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local
jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par
in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals
and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly
vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17
Q. B. 171]
Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from
the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s
territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the
territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations
of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused
by their warships or any other government vessel operated for
non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
33

To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay
appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the USS
Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has
announced the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific
team which will "initiate discussions with the Government of
the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation options in
Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine
scientists." The US team intends to "help assess damage and
remediation options, in coordination with the Tubbataha
Management Office, appropriate Philippine government
entities, non-governmental organizations, and scientific experts
from Philippine universities."39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the
cost of the violator is also a major relief that may be obtained
under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the Rules,
viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court
may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the
protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and
the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation
expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program
of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of
which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special
trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the
court.1âwphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive
Branch on the matter of compensation and rehabilitation
measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these
issues impinges on our relations with another State in the
context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled
that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-
"the political" --departments of the government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed
for in the petition to order a review of the VFA and to nullify
certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec.
Sec. Zamora,41 the VFA was duly concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the
United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the United States government. The VF A being
a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a
matter of international law to abide by its terms and
provisions.42 The present petition under the Rules is not the
proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of
the Writ of Kalikasan is hereby DENIED.
Pollo vs. Constantino 181881 18 October 2011
Privacy; subjective and objective test
Existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-
fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the
34
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable (objective)
In Mancusi v. DeForte33 which addressed the reasonable
expectations of private employees in the workplace, the US
Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth
Amendment rights with regard to an office at union
headquarters that he shared with other union officials, even as
the latter or their guests could enter the office. The Court thus
"recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation
of privacy against intrusions by police."
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in
anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means. This
implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that
the computer resources were used only for such legitimate
business purposes.
One of the factors stated in O’Connor which are relevant in
determining whether an employee’s expectation of privacy in
the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace
privacy policy.48 In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth
Circuit held that a state university employee has not shown that
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files
where the university’s computer policy, the computer user is
informed not to expect privacy if the university has a legitimate
reason to conduct a search.
A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is
justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct.
Carroll vs. US
Search of a moving vehicle
Search without a warrant of an automobile, and seizure therein
of liquor subject to seizure and destruction under the Prohibition
Act, do not violate the Amendment, if made upon probable
cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the officer, that the vehicle contains
such contraband liquor.
practically since the beginning of the Government, the Fourth
Amendment has been construed as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search for contraband in a store, dwelling-
house, or other structure for the search of which a warrant may
readily be obtained, and a search of a ship, wagon, automobile,
or other vehicle which may be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Thee seizure is legal if the officer, in stopping and searching the
vehicle, has reasonable or probable cause for believing that
contraband liquor is being illegally transported in it.
Lao Gi vs. CA G.R. No. 81798 29 December 1989
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the
nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a
harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such
person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions
of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal
procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.
35
Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
as amended, it is provided:
c No alien shall be deported without being informed of the
specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a
hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or
omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and
concise language to enable a person of common understanding
to know on what ground he is intended to be deported and enable
the CID to pronounce a proper judgment. Before any charge
should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation must be
conducted to determine if there is a sufficient cause to charge
the respondent for deportation.
Placer vs. Villanueva
GR L-60349-62, 29 December 1983.
The judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause before issuing , a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face
of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of
the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of a probable cause.
Uy vs. BIR
G.R. No. 129651, 20 October 2000
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet
the test of particularity, especially since witness Abos had
furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be
seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific
description of these documents from said photocopies instead of
merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a
generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable
only when a more specific description of the things to be seized
is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available
will invalidate a general description in a warrant.35 The use by
the issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of books of
accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register
books, sales books or records, provisional & official receipts,"
"production record books/inventory lists, stock cards," "sales
records, job order," "corporate financial records," and "bank
statements/cancelled checks" is therefore unacceptable
considering the circumstances of this case.
People vs. Linsangan, G.R. No. 88589, 16 April 1991
The appellant was not denied due process during the custodial
investigation.1âwphi1 Although he was not assisted by counsel
when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in
his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated
for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime;
the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana a
cigarettes (People vs. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47; People vs.
Macuto, 176 SCRA 762; Mejia vs. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457).
His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on
the P10-bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the
testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while he was
actually engaged in selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of
the arresting party. The trial court gave more credence to their
categorical declarations than to the appellant's denials (People
vs. Tan, 145 SCRA 614)
People vs. Ang Chun Kit
36
GR 109232, 29 December 1995.
With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we already
said in People v. Morico that "when an arrested person signs a
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station he does not
admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any
incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a
statement of the accused's being booked and of the date which
accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may
be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police
themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be
the basis of a judgment of conviction." 23
But as in the cases of Mauyao and Morico, accused Ang Chun
Kit's conformity to the questioned documents has not been a
factor in his conviction since his guilt has been adequately
established by the detailed and unshaken testimonies of the
officers who apprehended him. Hence even disregarding the
questioned documents we still find the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board,
G.R. No. 157870, 3 November 2008
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165,
the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing
for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the
constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from
the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they
seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting
their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In
the case of private and public employees, the constitutional
soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy
and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons
charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal
offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.
The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical
to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are
not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When
persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons
thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug
testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this
case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Stonehill vs. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, 19 June 1967
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized.
37

None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued
the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws.
Central Bank vs. Morfe, G.R. L-20119, 30 June 1967
the Organization commenced Civil Case No. 50409 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, an original action for "certiorari,
prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction and/or writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction," against said municipal
court, the Sheriff of Manila, the Manila Police Department, and
the Bank, to annul the aforementioned search warrant, upon the
ground that, in issuing the same, the municipal court had acted
"with grave abuse of discretion, without jurisdiction and/or in
excess of jurisdiction" because: (a) "said search warrant is a
roving commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the
word 'and others' in the search warrant . . . permits the
unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have no
relation whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and
At the outset, it should be noted that the action taken by the
Bank, in causing the aforementioned search to be made and the
articles above listed to be seized, was predicated upon the theory
that the Organization was illegally engaged in banking — by
receiving money for deposit, disbursement, safekeeping or
otherwise, or transacting the business of a savings and mortgage
bank and/or building and loan association, — without first
complying with the provisions of R.A. No. 337, and that the
order complained of assumes that the Organization had violated
sections 2 and 6 of said Act.
We are satisfied, however, in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in this case, that the Municipal Judge did not commit
a grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was probable
cause that the Organization had violated Sections 2 and 6 of the
aforesaid law and in issuing the warrant in question, and that,
accordingly, and in line with Alverez vs. Court of First Instance
(64 Phil. 33), the search and seizure complained of have not
been proven to be unreasonable.
People vs. Veloso JOHN DOE WARRANTS
G.R. No. L-23051, 20 October 1925
Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable
that the application for the search warrant, the affidavit, and the
search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to
be seized. But the affidavit and the search warrant did state that
"John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building
occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the
building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation
of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not be
forgotten that the Organic Act requires a particular description
38
of the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized,
and that the warrant in this case sufficiently described the place
and the gambling apparatus, and, in addition, contained a
description of the person to be seized.
As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling
apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at
No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe
was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could
identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
DFA vs. BCA Int’l Corp. GR 210858, 29 June 2016
Deliberative Process Privilege
Deliberative process privilege is one kind of privileged
information, which is within the exceptions of the constitutional
right to information. In In Re: Production of Court Records and
Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and
Employees as Witnesses, 36 we held that:
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as
privileged communication. Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC
provides:
Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. - Court sessions
are executive in character, with only the Members of the
Court present. Court deliberations are confidential and
shall not be disclosed to outside parties, except as may be
provided herein or as authorized by the Court.
Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the rule in his
concurring opinion to the Court Resolution in Arroyo v. De
Lima (TRO on Watch List Order case): the rules on
confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to "freely
discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding
unpopular positions" or fear of humiliation for one's comments.
The privilege against disclosure of these kinds of
information/communication is known as deliberative process
privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process of
reaching a decision. "Written advice from a variety of
individuals is an important element of the government's
decision-making process and that the interchange of advice
could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose those
recommendations;" the privilege is intended "to prevent the
'chilling' of deliberative communications."
The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary. We have in
passing recognized the claim of this privilege by the two other
branches of government in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
In Akbayan v. Aquino, 37 we adopted the ruling of the U.S.
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co,38 which
stated that the deliberative process privilege protects from
disclosure "advisory opinions, recommendations, and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated."
Traditionally, U.S. courts have established two fundamental
requirements, both of which must be met, for the deliberative
process privilege to be invoked.43 First, the communication
must be predecisional, i.e., "antecedent to the adoption of an
agency policy." Second, the communication must be
deliberative, i.e., "a direct part of the deliberative process in that
it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or
39
policy matters." It must reflect the "give-and-take of the
consultative process."
Thus, "[t]he deliberative process privilege exempts materials
that are 'predecisional' and 'deliberative,' but requires disclosure
of policy statements and final opinions 'that have the force of
law or explain actions that an agency has already taken.
The deliberative process privilege can also be invoked in
arbitration proceedings under RA 9285.
"Deliberative process privilege contains three policy bases: first,
the privilege protects candid discussions within an agency;
second, it prevents public confusion from premature disclosure
of agency opinions before the agency establishes final policy;
and third, it protects the integrity of an agency's decision; the
public should not judge officials based on information they
considered prior to issuing their final decisions."
Under RA 9285,54 orders of an arbitral tribunal are appealable
to the courts. If an official is compelled to testify before an
arbitral tribunal and the order of an arbitral tribunal is appealed
to the courts, such official can be inhibited by fear of later being
subject to public criticism, preventing such official from making
candid discussions within his or her agency. The decision of the
court is widely published, including details involving the
privileged information. This disclosure of privileged
information can inhibit a public official from expressing his or
her candid opinion. Future quality of deliberative process can be
impaired by undue exposure of the decision-making process to
public scrutiny after the court decision is made.
Accordingly, a proceeding in the arbitral tribunal does not
prevent the possibility of the purpose of the privilege being
defeated, if it is not allowed to be invoked. In the same manner,
the disclosure of an information covered by the deliberative
process privilege to a court arbitrator will defeat the policy bases
and purpose of the privilege.
In Re Production of Court records case
To qualify for protection under the deliberative process
privilege, the agency must show that the document is both (1)
predecisional and (2) deliberative.
Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in
nature are thus protected and cannot be the subject of a subpoena
if judicial privilege is to be preserved.
Under the law, therefore, the Members of the Court may not be
compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings against the
Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about information
they acquired in the performance of their official function of
adjudication, such as information on how deliberations were
conducted or the material inputs that the justices used in
decision-making, because the end-result would be the disclosure
of confidential information that could subject them to criminal
prosecution. Such act violates judicial privilege (or the
equivalent of executive privilege) as it pertains to the exercise
of the constitutional mandate of adjudication.
Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be
subject to any compulsory process in relation to the performance
of their adjudicatory functions.
40
With respect to Court officials and employees, the same rules
on confidentiality that apply to justices and judges apply to
them. They are barred from disclosing (1) the result of the raffle
of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included
in the agenda of the Court’s session, and (3) the deliberations of
the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending
before it. They are subject as well to the disqualification by
reason of privileged communication and the sub judice rule. As
stated above, these rules extend to documents and other
communications which cannot be disclosed.
Genuino vs. De Lima
GR 197930 17 April 2018
Unconstitutionality of Hold Departure Orders and Watch List
Orders
constitutionality of Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No.
41, series of 2010, otherwise known as the "Consolidated Rules
and Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of
Hold Departure Orders, Watchlist Orders and Allow Departure
Orders," on the ground that it infringes on the constitutional
right to travel.
There are only three considerations that may permit a restriction
on the right to travel: national security, public safety or public
health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit
provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court80 providing for
the impairment. The requirement for a legislative enactment was
purposely added to prevent inordinate restraints on the person's
right to travel by administrative officials who may be tempted
to wield authority under the guise of national security, public
safety or public health.
To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a
legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and
concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for
approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently
designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which
the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987.
It is, however, important to stress that before there can even be
a valid administrative issuance, there must first be a showing
that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid. It is valid
only if there is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented
by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.92
A painstaking examination of the provisions being relied upon
by the former DOJ Secretary will disclose that they do not
particularly vest the DOJ the authority to issue DOJ Circular No.
41 which effectively restricts the right to travel through the
issuance of WLOs and HDOs.
Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling law
from which DOJ Circular No. 41 must derive its life.
Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities relied
upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test and
sufficient standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to establish
the existence of the enabling law that will justify the issuance of
the questioned circular.
It bears emphasizing that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is an implement of due process which essentially
41
benefits the accused as it accords an opportunity for the
presentation of his side with regard to the accusation.108 The
accused may, however, opt to waive his presence in the
preliminary investigation. In any case, whether the accused
responds to a subpoena, the investigating prosecutor shall
resolve the complaint within 10 days after the filing of the same.
The point is that in the conduct of a preliminary investigation,
the presence of the accused is not necessary for the prosecutor
to discharge his investigatory duties. If the accused chooses to
waive his presence or fails to submit countervailing evidence,
that is his own lookout. Ultimately, he shall be bound by the
determination of the prosecutor on the presence of probable
cause and he cannot claim denial of due process.
The DOJ therefore cannot justify the restraint in the liberty of
movement imposed by DOJ Circular No. 41 on the ground that
it is necessary to ensure presence and attendance in the
preliminary investigation of the complaints. There is also no
authority of law granting it the power to compel the attendance
of the subjects of a preliminary investigation, pursuant to its
investigatory powers under E.O. No. 292. Its investigatory
power is simply inquisitorial and, unfortunately, not broad
enough to embrace the imposition of restraint on the liberty of
movement.
That there is a risk of flight does not authorize the DOJ to take
the situation upon itself and draft an administrative issuance to
keep the individual within the Philippine jurisdiction so that he
may not be able to evade criminal prosecution and consequent
liability. It is an arrogation of power it does not have; it is a
usurpation of function that properly belongs to the legislature.
OSG vs. Ayala Land, GR 177056, 18 September 2009
Definition of Taking
Malls could not be obliged to provide free parking spaces in
their malls.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking
police power to justify the regulation by the State, through the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials, of privately
owned parking facilities, including the collection by the
owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the
public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in
totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees
from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the
State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the
parking facilities remain/s with respondents, the prohibition
against their collection of parking fees from the public, for the
use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or
confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring
that respondents devote a portion of the latter's properties for use
as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public
access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an
excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not
only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their
properties as they wish, they are further prohibited from
profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom the
expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required
parking facilities.
42
The ruling of this Court in City Government of Quezon City v.
Judge Ericta38 is edifying. Therein, the City Government of
Quezon City passed an ordinance obliging private cemeteries
within its jurisdiction to set aside at least six percent of their total
area for charity, that is, for burial grounds of deceased paupers.
According to the Court, the ordinance in question was null and
void, for it authorized the taking of private property without just
compensation.
City of Manila vs. Estrada, GR 7749, 9 September 1913
The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to
which the owner of condemned property is entitled under the
law.
Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of the land
(property) taken. Anything beyond that is more and anything
short of that is less than compensation. To compensate is to
render something which is equal to that taken or received. The
word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation;" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full,
ample. "Just compensation," therefore, as used in section 246 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, means a fair and full equivalent for
the loss sustained."
The commissioners' power is limited to assessing the value and
to determining the amount of the damages. There it stops; they
can go no further. The value and damages awarded must be a
just compensation and no more and no less.
This court, after an examination of the evidence, found that the
awards as fixed by the majority of the commissioners and the
trial court were grossly excessive; that a just compensation for
the land taken was P10 per square meter, and, in a short opinion,
rendered judgment accordingly.
The above provisions of law gives the court the right to increase
or decrees the amount awarded by the commissioners.
Custodial Investigation; when it begins
People vs. Domantay, GR 130612, 11 May 1999
This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation,
that is, "when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person
as a suspect."
R.A. No. 7438 has extended the... constitutional guarantee to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested
but has merely been "invited" for questioning.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the
Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996,[37]
he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal
slaying of Jennifer Domantay.
already under... custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed
in Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution applied to him.
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was
neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For
this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is
inadmissible.
43
We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-
appellant's confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is
admissible.
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the
jail when he was interviewed was "tense and intimidating" and
was similar to that which prevails in a custodial
investigation.[42] We are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was
interviewed while he... was inside his cell. The interviewer
stayed outside the cell and the only person besides him was an
uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be
interviewed, but instead, he agreed.
We do not think the presence of the police officers exerted any
undue pressure or... influence on accused-appellant and coerced
him into giving his confession.
People vs. Tan, GR 117321, 11 February 1998
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by
law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as
soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the
suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process
of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was
invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly
admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to
convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of
appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel,
are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
even if the same be initiated by mere invitation.
Beltran vs. Samson, GR 32025, 23 September 1929
The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders
desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the
petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the
purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is
something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the
fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the
case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish
a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is
more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of
producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say
that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a
document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of
his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to
furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the
present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the
petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is
a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the
fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But
even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens
without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no
reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution.
44
United States vs. Tan Teng (23 Phil., 145) defendant did not
oppose the extraction from his body of the substance later used
as evidence against him.
The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to
prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial.
or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions
or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime.
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to
be a witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be
material.
Ong Siu Hong case
To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is
along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before
the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken
from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan
Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to
be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction of
the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold
that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused
of crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of
this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial
compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling
confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission
of a crime.
Valid Deleggation of Legislative Power; Completeness and
Sufficient Standard Test
Eastern Shipping Line vs. POEA, GR 76633, 18 October 1988
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents
of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what
the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there
is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness
test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step
into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule
and its non-delegation the exception.
Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The
growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar
45
and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected to reasonably comprehend. Specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems
attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may
not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to
be experts in the particular fields.
Power of Subordinate Legislation
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers
in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies.
With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies
the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of
the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the
broad policies laid down in statute by “filling in” the details
which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one
such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed
thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases
without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA
(and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard
guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That
standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in
creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to
"fair and equitable employment practices."
People vs. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, 6 November 1937
The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes
an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to
the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and
void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which
reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine
for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial
boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation
officer.
It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the
provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any
person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant
inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation
of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the
result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the
counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument,
46
one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the
salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse
or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in
operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means
that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law
would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one
province while another person similarly situated in another
province would be denied those same benefits. This is
obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for
all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for
the salaries of the probation officers in their respective
provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the
obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and
every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all
the provincial boards.
Reyes vs. HRET, GR 221103, 16 October 2018
• WoN Rule 6 is unconstitutional
o NO. Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant
additional powers to the Justices but rather maintains the
balance of power between the members from the Judicial and
Legislative departments as envisioned by the framers of the
1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of the three Justices
is meant to tone down the political nature of the cases involved
and do away with the impression that party interests play a part
in the decision-making process.
o Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires the presence
of at least one Justice and four members of the Tribunal to
constitute a quorum. This means that even when all the Justices
are present, at least two members of the House of
Representatives need to be present to constitute a quorum.
Without this rule, it would be possible for five members of the
House of Representatives to convene and have a quorum even
when no Justice is present. This would render ineffective the
rationale contemplated by the framers of the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions for placing the Justices as members of the HRET.
• WoN Rule 69 is unconstitutional
o NO. The ambiguity referred to by Reyes is absurd and
stems from an erroneous understanding of the Rules. As pointed
out by the HRET in its Comment, a member of the Tribunal who
inhibits or is disqualified from participating in the deliberations
cannot be considered present for the purpose of having a
quorum.
o In addition, Rule 69 clearly shows that the Supreme
Court and the House of Representatives have the authority to
designate a Special Member or Members who could act as
temporary replacement or replacements in cases where one or
some of the Members of the Tribunal inhibit from a case or are
disqualified from participating in the deliberations of a
particular election contest when the required quorum cannot be
met. There is no basis to Reyes's claim that a member who
inhibits or otherwise disqualified can sit in the deliberations to
achieve the required quorum.
• WoN Rules 15 and 17 is unconstitutional
o NO NEED TO RESOLVE. The Court takes judicial
notice that in its Resolution No. 16, Series of 2018, dated 20
September 2018,[10] the HRET amended Rules 17 and 18 of the
2015 HRET Rules. As amended, Rules 17 and 18 now read:
RULE 17. Election Protest. - A verified protest
contesting the election or returns of any Member of the House
of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same
office within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election year,
if the winning candidate was proclaimed on or before said date.
However, if the winning candidate was proclaimed after
June 30 of the election year, a verified election protest shall be
47
filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of proclamation. x x
xx
RULE 18. Quo Warranto. - A verified petition for quo
warranto on the ground of ineligibility may be filed by any
registered voter of the congressional district concerned, or any
registered voter in the case of party-list representatives, within
fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election year, if the
winning candidate was proclaimed on or before said date.
However, if the winning candidate was proclaimed after June 30
of the election year, a verified petition for quo warranto shall be
filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of proclamation. The
party filing the petition shall be designated as Reyes, while the
adverse party shall be known as the respondent. x x x x
o The recent amendments, which were published in The
Philippine Star on 26 September 2018 and took effect on 11
October 2018, clarified and removed any doubt as to the
reckoning date for the filing of an election protest.
Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec, GR 203766, 2 April 2013
oreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of
Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows
again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral
parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-
list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list
system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to
sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making
the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies
under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure
ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat,
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the
party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is
to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving
as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from
the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
Trillanes vs. Pimentel, GR 179817, 27 June 2008
48
On the generality and permanence of his requests alone,
petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable
leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:
x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,45 it
is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the
call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than
the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and
echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the
people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly
in prison.
Baguilat vs. Alvarez, GR 227757, 25 July 2017
Prior to the Speakership Election held on July 25, 2016, then-
Acting Floor Leader Rep. Fariñas responded to a parliamentary
inquiry from Rep. Atienza as to who would elect the Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives. Rep. Fariñas then
articulated that: (a) all those who vote for the winning Speaker
shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for other
candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain
from voting shall likewise be considered part of the Minority;
and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of
the Minority.[13] Thereafter, the election of the Speaker of the
House proceeded without any objection from any member of
Congress, including herein petitioners. Notably, the election of
the Speaker of the House is the essential and formative step
conducted at the first regular session of the 17th Congress to
determine the constituency of the Majority and Minority (and
later on, their respective leaders), considering that the Majority
would be comprised of those who voted for the winning Speaker
and the Minority of those who did not. The unobjected
procession of the House at this juncture is reflected in its Journal
No. 1 dated July 25, 2016,[14] which, based on case law, is
conclusive[15] as to what transpired in Congress:
Logically speaking, the foregoing circumstances would show
that the House of Representatives had effectively adopted Rep.
Fariñas' proposal anent the new rules regarding the membership
of the Minority, as well as the process of determining who the
Minority Leader would be. More significantly, this
demonstrates the House's deviation from the "legal bases" of
petitioners' claim for entitlement to the reliefs sought before this
Court, namely: (a) the "long-standing tradition" of automatically
awarding the Minority Leadership to the second placer in the
Speakership Elections, i.e., Rep. Baguilat; and (b) the rule[21]
that those who abstained in the Speakership Elections should be
deemed as independent Members of the House of
Representatives, and thus, they could not have voted for a
Minority Leader in the person of Rep. Suarez.[22] As will be
explained hereunder, the deviation by the Lower House from the
aforesaid rules is not averse to the Constitution.
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
49

Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House
of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire
membership. Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers other than the
Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these
officers are chosen is something within its sole control.[23]T
he method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely
a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method
must be prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself, not
by [the] Court."[25]
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI[26] of the
Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole
authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its proceedings."
These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern
to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority [of
the House of Representatives]."
By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal,
political branch of government which, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with.
To rule otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the realm
of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of
powers doctrine.[33] Verily, "[i]t would be an unwarranted
invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void [only]
because [it] thinks [that] the House has disregarded its own rules
of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to
seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself."[34]
Avelino vs. Cuenco, 4 March 1949
Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the
court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the
respondent, Mariano Cuenco, contending that the latter had not
been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute
a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate.
Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has
jurisdiction.
Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the
majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the
business of the Senate, because, firstly, the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at
least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez,
and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of
Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority
of the Senate of twenty-three senators.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House”
shall constitute a quorum, “the House: does not mean “all” the
50
members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the
House”. There is a difference between a majority of “the
House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore
an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less
one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum.
The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter.
The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the
rightful President of the Senate, since the office depends
exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule
of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority.
At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in
order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of
opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,
the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein
involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court dismissed the
petition on the ground as it involved a political question.
Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Astorga vs. Villegas, GR L-23475, 30 April 1974.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065
never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the
Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not
the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the
issue.
Enrolled Bill Doctrine: As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of
the President of the Senate, and of the Chief Executive, carries,
on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. This is in recognition of respect due to coequal and
independent departments.
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers
of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department
of the government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that
the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the
invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this
declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the
attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
Approval of Congress, not signatures of the officers, is essential.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It
is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and
the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure
any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is
the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential.
When courts may turn to the journal: Absent such attestation as
a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no
51
enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should be
consulted.
Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this
Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose.
The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments
were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President
and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they
withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest
error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of
the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and
holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied
and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT
DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE
VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND
ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR
HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA"
is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not
become law.
Casco vs. Gimenez, G.R. No. L-17931
the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde"
and not "urea and formaldehyde" (claimed to be in the approved
bill of Congrees) — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in
the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
CIR vs. Lasalle, GR 196596, 9 November 2016
Further, a plain reading of the Constitution would show that
Article XIV, Section 4 (3) does not require that the revenues and
income must have also been sourced from educational activities
or activities related to the purposes of an educational institution.
The phrase all revenues is unqualified by any reference to the
source of revenues. Thus, so long as the revenues and income
are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes, then said revenues and income shall be exempt from
taxes and duties.81
Thus, when a non-stock, non-profit educational institution
proves that it uses its revenues actually, directly, and exclusively
for educational purposes, it shall be exempted from income tax,
VAT, and LBT. On the other hand, when it also shows that it
uses its assets in the form of real property for educational
purposes, it shall be exempted from RPT.
52
Parenthetically, income and revenues of non-stock, non-profit
educational institution not used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes are not exempt from duties
and taxes. To avail of the exemption, the taxpayer must factually
prove that it used actually, directly and exclusively for
educational purposes the revenues or income sought to be
exempted.
That the Constitution treats non-stock, non-profit educational
institutions differently from proprietary educational institutions
cannot be doubted. As discussed, the privilege granted to the
former is conditioned only on the actual, direct and exclusive
use of their revenues and assets for educational purposes. In
clear contrast, the tax privilege granted to the latter may be
subject to limitations imposed by law.
We spell out below the difference in treatment if only to
highlight the privileged status of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions compared with their proprietary
counterparts.
While a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is
classified as a tax-exempt entity under Section 30 (Exemptions
from Tax on Corporations) of the Tax Code, a proprietary
educational institution is covered by Section 27 (Rates of
Income Tax on Domestic Corporations).
To be specific, Section 30 provides that exempt organizations
like non-stock, non-profit educational institutions shall not be
taxed on income received by them as such.
Section 27 (B), on the other hand, states that "[p]roprietary
educational institutions ... which are nonprofit shall pay a tax of
ten percent (10%) on their taxable income .. . Provided, that if
the gross income from unrelated trade, business or other activity
exceeds fifty percent (50%) of the total gross income derived by
such educational institutions ... [the regular corporate income
tax of 30%] shall be imposed on the entire taxable income ... "92
By the Tax Code's clear terms, a proprietary educational
institution is entitled only to the reduced rate of 10% corporate
income tax. The reduced rate is applicable only if: (1) the
proprietary educational institution is nonprofit and (2) its gross
income from unrelated trade, business or activity does not
exceed 50% of its total gross income.
Succession of President
At the start of the term[edit]
If a President was elected but failed to qualify - the Vice
President who was elected will act as President until the
President qualifies.
If there was no President elected - the Vice-President who was
elected will act as President until a President is elected and
qualifies.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-
elect dies or has become permanently disabled - the Vice
President who was elected becomes President.
If neither President and Vice-President had been chosen or had
qualified, or if both had died or had become permanently
disabled - the Senate President or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House, will act as President until a President or a
Vice-President is chosen and qualifies
During the Term
53
If the President dies, becomes permanently disabled, is removed
from office, or resigns - the Vice-President becomes the
President and serves the unexpired term.
If both the President and the Vice President die, become
permanently disabled, are removed from office, or resign - the
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, will act as President until a
President or Vice-President is elected and qualifies.
If the Acting President dies, becomes permanently disabled, is
removed from office, or resigns, Congress shall, by law, provide
who shall serve as President. He shall serve until the President
or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and
be subject to the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.
De Castro vs. JBC,
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department),
provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department),
states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of
a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same
character, in that they affect the power of the President to
appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section
16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear,
54
would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
ADMU vs. Capulong, Aquila Hazing
1993
due process in student disciplinary proceedings
There was no denial of due process, more particularly
procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School,
notified and required respondent students to submit their written
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent
students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges.
The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled
out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice
and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position
to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial
court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It
is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent
students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as
petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.
Roy vs. Herbosa, 207246, 18 April 2017
Other than PLDT, the petitions failed to join or implead other
public utility corporations subject to the same restriction
imposed by Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. These
corporations are in danger of losing their franchise and property
if they are found not compliant with the restrictive interpretation
of the constitutional provision under review which is being
espoused by petitioners. They should be afforded due notice and
opportunity to be heard, lest they be deprived of their property
without due process.
Not only are public utility corporations other than PLDT
directly and materially affected by the outcome of the petitions,
their shareholders also stand to suffer in case they will be forced
to divest their shareholdings to ensure compliance with the said
restrictive interpretation of the term "capital". As explained by
SHAREPHIL, in five corporations alone, more than Php158
Billion worth of shares must be divested by foreign shareholders
and absorbed by Filipino investors if petitioners' position is
upheld.
Petitioners' disregard of the rights of these other corporations
and numerous shareholders constitutes another fatal procedural
55
flaw, justifying the dismissal of their petitions. Without giving
all of them their day in court, they will definitely be deprived of
their property without due process of law. 6
This is highlighted to clear any misimpression that the Gamboa
Decision and Gamboa Resolution made a categorical ruling on
the meaning of the word "capital" under Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution only in respect of, or only confined to,
respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT). Nothing is further from the truth. Indeed, a fair reading
of the Gamboa Decision and Gamboa Resolution shows that the
Court's pronouncements therein would affect all public utilities,
and not just respondent PLDT.
The Gamboa Decision already held, in no uncertain terms, that
what the Constitution requires is "[fJull [and legal] beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock,
coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights x x x must rest in
the hands of Filipino nationals x x x." 11 And, precisely that is
what SEC-MC No. 8 provides, viz.: "x x x For purposes of
determining compliance [with the constitutional or statutory
ownership], the required percentage of Filipino ownership shall
be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding shares
of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the
total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not
entitled to vote x x x." 12
Cruz vs. DENR, 135385, 6 December 2000
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural
communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct
sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership
and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands,
and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The
ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under
customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the
same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the
community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years
from date of transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the
ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the
transfer is for an unconscionable consideration.33
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs
are given the right to self-governance and empowerment,34
social justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve and
protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community
56
intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences
and technologies.
Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property
of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of
the public domain.
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held
under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs
by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously until the
present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings with
government and/or private individuals or corporations.
Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas,
and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands,
forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds,
burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and
other natural resources. They also include lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same
conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to
lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed
but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual
or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not
limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private
forests, swidden farms and tree lots.x\
Gutierrez vs HOR, GR 193459, 15 February 2011
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads:
“No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.”
However, the term “initiate” means to file the complaint and
take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the
complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said
complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the
complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice
COMELEC power over internal party issues
Atienza vs. Comelec
188920, 16 February 2020
Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their
expulsion from the party impacts on the party leadership issue
or on the election of respondent Roxas as president so that it was
indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim.
Under the circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et
al.’s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be
settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over which
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
Although political parties play an important role in our
democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its
citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument.
The discipline of members by a political party does not involve
the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the
due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against
the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political
57
party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in
relation to other party members, correspond to those that may
have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their
charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members
whose rights under their charter may have been violated have
recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but
not as a due process issue against the government or any of its
agencies.
Pimentel vs. Ermita, GR 164978, 13 October 2005
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its
temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an
office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent
occupant to the office.16 In case of vacancy in an office
occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an
alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter
ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must
necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very
nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while
Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the
permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it
expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting
appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292
states that "[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent person
to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch."
Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a
person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.
Petitioners assert that Section 17 does not apply to appointments
vested in the President by the Constitution, because it only
applies to appointments vested in the President by law.
Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law.
"Law" refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress,
municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to
law, and judicial decisions.17
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an
acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to
consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as
expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III
of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent
abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to
circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting
Capacity
58
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective
upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended
only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments
may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way
of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.
Sarmiento vs. Mison
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President
alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
It is apparent, that there are four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such
officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present
bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it
would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
59
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a
bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed
out, while the 1935 Constitution includes “heads of bureaus”
among those officers whose appointments need the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the
other hand, deliberately excluded the position of “heads of
bureaus” from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted
within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to
receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Bautista vs. Salonga
Commission on Appointment confirmation not necessary for
CHR Commissioner.
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence
of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to
which are to be made with the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the
President of the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made without
the review or participation of the Commission on Appointments.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: dissenting:
I believe that the appointments of the chairman and the members
of the Commission on Human Rights by the President require
review and confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
in view of the following provision of Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution:
SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution....
In my view, the "other officers" whose appointments are vested
in the President in the Constitution are the constitutional
officers, meaning those who hold offices created under the
Constitution, and whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for in the Charter. Those constitutional officers are the
chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
namely: the Civil Service Commission (Art. IX-B), the
Commission on Elections (Art. IX-C), the Commission on Audit
Art. IX-D), and the Commission on Human Rights (Sec. 17,
XIII). These constitutional commissions are, without excaption,
declared to be "independent," but while in the case of the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, the 1987 Constitution expressly provides
that "the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments" (Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-B; Sec. 1[2], Art. IX - C and
Sec. 1[2], Art. IX-D), no such clause is found in Section 17,
Article VIII creating the Commission on Human Rights. Its
absence, however, does not detract from, or diminish, the
President's power to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners
60
of the said Commission. The source of that power is the first
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution for:
(1) the Commission on Human Rights is an office created
by the Constitution, and
(2) the appointment of the Chairman and Commissioners
thereof is vested in the President by the Constitution.
Therefore, the said appointments shall be made by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, as
provided in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Flores vs Drilon
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective
official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso
directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor
of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and
CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution
prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective
official will work for his appointment in an executive position
in government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts
as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without
need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed”
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of
Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject
proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective
official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the
compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically
authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the
power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no
choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power
of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment
involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence,
when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint
an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the
President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively
eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and
constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the
qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of
SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is
manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since
the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains
all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may
however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is
an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA;
hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however
remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official
61
are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de
facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled
to such benefits.
Joson vs. Exec Sec GR 131255, 20 May 1998
(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the
Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined;
(b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity
of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who
continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly barging violently
into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the
company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct. The
allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit
of two (2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Respondent who is the chief executive of the province is in a
position to influence the witnesses. Further, the history of
violent confrontational politics in the province dictates that
extreme precautionary measures be taken.
“(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal
investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5 of
A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the
Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to consider
whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision does
not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine
whether a formal investigation would be conducted. The
records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal
investigation. There is nothing in the Local Government Code
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23
that provide that administrative cases against elective local
officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O.
No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the
parties to submit their respective memoranda but this is only
after formal investigation and hearing.
“(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains
the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to
investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline
evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining
Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local
government officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the
power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority.
This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s
claim.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
Monsanto vs. Factoran
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the
power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts
62
the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the
law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private,
though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the
existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is
forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does
not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It
involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no
amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been
suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial
proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they
were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would
explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot
go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court
cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed
by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service
of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by
pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil
liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing
due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation.
Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves
the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does ""nor work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself,
it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the
63
law precisely as though he had committed no offense. (section
10[6], Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State vs. Blalock, 62
N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402., 403;
Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285, 296; State ex rel Anheuser—Busch
Brewing Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick
vs United States, N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271; 236 U.S., 79; 59
Law. ed., 476.)
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that,
in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he
should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged
and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that
the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation.
Constantino vs. Cuisia
the president has borrowing powers and that the President may
contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country with
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no
distinction whatsoever, and the fact that a debt or a loan may be
onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the President can
delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident
exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the
decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is
made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance,
primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve
its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals. If the President were to personally exercise
every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have
to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a
welter of time-consuming detailed activities, the propriety of
incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the
many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting
countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate,
obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining
and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often
than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the
documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would
negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective
expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would
unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the
government. The act of the Cuisia et al are not unconstitutional.
Vinuya vs. Romulo
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department
has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan.
This is a political question involve questions of foreign
relations. It is well-established that “the conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to
the executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
or decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large elements
of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance
or imperil.
The question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is
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a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts
but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive
Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of
the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of
such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of
knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and
especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up
petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign
policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region.
For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means
available for individuals to bring a claim within the international
legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By
taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in
the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international
law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may
exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to
whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State
is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf
it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected,
they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is
resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to
furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions
remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect
the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes
obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not
shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated
jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was
signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international
crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of
jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in
international law has been used as a legal term describing
obligations owed by States towards the community of states as
a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of a State towards the international community as a
whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to
norms that command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
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considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do
not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Maceda vs. Vasquez
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious
misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for
the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge,
having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide
cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service?
As this question had not yet been raised with, much less resolved
by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present
criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by

this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches
into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of

petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination
of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his
pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to
make such a determination . . . In fine, where a criminal
complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action
on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.

The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three

branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its

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