II.
BURDEN OF PROOF
1.) A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018
ROMEO A. ZARCILLA AND MARITA
BUMANGLAG, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA,
JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated February 9, 2006 filed by
complainants Romeo A. Zarcilla (Zarcilla) and Marita Bumanglag
(Bumanglag) against respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (Atty. Quesada)
for gross misconduct.
The facts are as follows:
On August 5, 2002, complainant Zarcilla executed an Affidavit-
Complaint2 against respondent Atty. Quesada and complainant Marita
Bumanglag, among others, for falsification of public documents docketed as
I.S. No. 02-128-SF. Zarcilla alleged that Bumanglag conspired with certain
spouses Maximo Quezada and Gloria Quezada (Spouses Quezada) and Atty.
Quesada to falsify a Deed of Sale3 dated April 12, 2002 by making it appear
that his parents, Perfecto G. Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla, sold a parcel of
land under TCT No. T-18490 in favor of the Spouses Quezada despite
knowledge that his parents were already deceased since March 4, 2001 and
January 9, 1988, respectively, as per Death Certificates4 issued by the Office
of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Santo Tomas, La Union. Said signing of
deed of sale was allegedly witnessed by a certain Norma Zafe and
Bumanglag, and notarized by Atty. Quesada.
Other than the alleged falsified deed of sale, Zarcilla also claimed that on
March 20, 2002, the Spouses Quezada filed a petition for the administrative
reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 18490 where they presented
the Joint Affidavit of his then already deceased parents, the spouses Perfecto
Zarcilla and Tarcela A. Zarcilla as the petitioners.5 Said Joint-Affidavit of the
Spouses Quezada was again notarized by Atty. Quesada.
However, on October 9, 2002, Bumanglag executed a Counter-affidavit6 in
the same case where she claimed to be the real owner of the property after
Perfecto Zarcilla sold the same to her mother. Bumanglag also stated therein
that she facilitated the sale transaction to the Spouses Quezada which, in
effect, exonerated her co-respondents, including Atty. Quesada, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
xxxx
6. That after the death of my mother I needed money to pay for the expenses
she incurred when she was sick and need medication and all the (sic) to pay
for the expenses of her burial. I offered to sell the property to Spouses MAX
QUEZADA and GLORIA QUEZADA. I showed them the Deed of Sale
between PERFECTO ZARCILLA and my mother. I also showed them the
paper that my mother signed giving me the land;
7. That the Spouses Quezada told me that they will buy the land provided I
will be the one to transfer the said land to their name. They gave me an
advance payment so that I could transfer the land to them. I made it appear
that PERFECTO ZARCILLA sold the property to the said spouses
because the title of the land was still in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla. I
did not have [any] criminal intent when I did it because the land no
longer belong to Perfecto Zarcilla. I did all the subsequent acts like Petition
for Reconstitution in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla because then, the title was
still in his name. However, there was no damage to the heirs of PERFECTO
ZARCILLA because the land had long been sold to my mother and the sons
and daughters no longer had no legal claim to the said land;
8. That SPOUSES MAXIMO QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA did
not falsify any document because I was the one who facilitated the
transaction knowing that the land I was selling really belonged to me.
Not one of my brothers and (sic) sisters never (sic) complained when I
sold the land. I just delivered the document to the Spouses MAXIMO
QUEZADA & GLORIA QUEZADA including the title in their name. I
was paid the balance after the Certificate of Title in their name was finally
delivered.7
All other respondents in the said falsification case, except for Atty. Quesada,
also filed their respective counter-affidavits where they reiterated
Bumanglag's admission.8
In a Resolution9 dated April 14, 2003, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of La Union held Bumanglag only to undergo trial. All other respondents,
including Atty. Quesada who did not even file his counter-affidavit, were
exonerated for insufficiency of evidence.
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Both Zarcilla and Bumanglag filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, but both were denied. Consequently, Bumanglag was
indicted for four counts of falsification of public documents before the
Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, La Union, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 3594, 3595, 3597, and 3598.
However, Zarcilla later on withdrew said cases when he learned that
Bumanglag was not aware of the contents of her counter-affidavit when she
signed the same. He also found out that Bumanglag was deceived by her co
accused, including Atty. Quesada. Thus, upon the motion of Zarcilla, in an
Order10 dated July 27, 2005, the court dismissed all falsification cases against
Bumanglag.
In a Resolution11 dated June 26, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty.
Quesada to file a comment on the complaint against him.
On August 28, 2006, Atty. Quesada file a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Comment12 due to voluminous workload. On September 18, 2006, Atty.
Quesada filed a second motion for extension to file comment. In a
Resolution13 dated November 20, 2006, the Court granted Atty. Quesada's
motions for extension with a warning that the second motion for extension
shall be the last and that no further extension will be given.
On September 26, 2007, due to Atty. Quesada's failure to file a comment on
the complaint against him within the extended period which expired on
October 17, 2006, the Court resolved to require Atty. Quesada to (a) show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt from
such failure, and (b) comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by
submitting the required comment.14
Due to Atty. Quesada's failure to comply with the Show Cause Resolution
dated September 26, 2007, the Court resolved to (a) impose upon Atty.
Quesada, a fine of P1,000.00, and (b) require Atty. Quesada to comply with
the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by filing the comment required therein.15
No payment of fine was made as of January 13, 2009 as evidenced by a
Certification16 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief
Judicial Staff Officer.
Again, failing to comply with the directives of the Court to pay the fine
imposed against him and to submit his comment, the Court, in a
Resolution17 dated February 16, 2009, resolved to (a) impose upon Atty.
Quesada an additional fine of P1,000.00, or a penalty of imprisonment of five
(5) days if said fines are not paid within 10 days from notice, and (b) order
Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 to submit
his comment on the complaint against him. Atty. Quesada was also warned
that should he fail to comply, he shall be ordered arrested and detained by the
National Bureau of Investigation until he shall have made the compliance or
until such time as the Court may order.
Despite repeated notices and warnings from the Court, no payment of fine
was ever made as of September 3, 2010 as evidenced by a Certification18
which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff
Officer. On December 28, 2010, another Certification19 was issued anew
showing no record of payment of fine by Atty. Quesada.
Thus, in a Resolution20 dated March 9, 2011, the Court resolved to (1)
increase the fine imposed on Atty. Quesada to P3,000.00, or imprisonment
often (10) days if such fine is not paid within the prescribed period; and (2)
require Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by
submitting the required comment on the complaint.
No payment of fine was made as of July 12, 2011, as evidenced by a
Certification21 which was issued by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief
Judicial Staff Officer.
It appearing that Atty. Quesada failed to comply with the numerous
Resolutions of the Court to pay the fine imposed upon him and submit
comment on the complaint against him, in a Resolution22 dated August 24,
2011, the Court ordered the arrest of Atty. Quesada, and directed the NBI to
arrest and detain him until he shall have compli[ed] with the Court's
Resolution dated March 9, 2011. Subsequently, the Court issued a Warrant of
Arrest.23
Apparently forced by his looming detention, after five (5) years, Atty.
Quesada filed his Comment24 dated October 10, 2011, in compliance with
Resolution dated June 26, 2006. He claimed that he is a victim of political
harassment, vengeance and retribution, and that the instant case against him
was filed solely for the purpose of maligning his person. Attached to his
compliance was postal money order in the amount of P3,000.00 as payment
for the fine imposed upon him.
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II. BURDEN OF PROOF
In a Letter25 dated October 10, 2011, Atty. Ricardo S. Pangan, Jr., Regional
Director of the NBI, informed the Court that Atty. Quesada voluntarily
surrendered before the agents of the NBI on October 11, 2011, and claimed
that he had already complied with the Resolution of the Court. Atty. Quesada
submitted a copy of his comment and payment of fine, thus, on the same day,
Atty. Quesada was immediately released from custody.
On February 1, 2012, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.26
During the mandatory conference before the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), only Bumanglag and her counsel appeared. Atty.
Quesada failed to appear thereto, thus, the mandatory conference was reset to
July 11, 2012. However, on July 11, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to
appear, thus, the mandatory conference was reset anew to July 25, 2012.
Meanwhile, Bumanglag informed the IBP-CBD that co-complainant Romeo
Zarcilla passed away in 2005.
On July 23, 2012, Atty. Quesada requested that the mandatory conference be
reset due to health reasons. He submitted his Medical Certificate dated May
2, 2012 showing that he underwent a head operation and that he is still on
recovery period.
On July 25, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the parties were
directed to appear on August 23, 2012 and submit their respective verified
position papers. However, on August 23, 2012, only Bumanglag and her
counsel appeared, and Atty. Quesada failed to appear anew. Thus,
considering that the parties were duly notified of the hearing, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On May 30, 2014, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation,
recommended that respondent Atty. Quesada be disbarred from the practice
of law.
In a Resolution No. XXI-2015-097 dated January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of
the IBP-CBD.
RULING
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its
officers.27 The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to
continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an
administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of
a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this
case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite
numerous notices.
However, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial
evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise
its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established
by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. As in this case, considering the
serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary
to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.28
Thus, in the instant case, the allegations of falsification or forgery against
Atty. Quesada must be competently proved because falsification or forgery
cannot be presumed. As such, the allegations should first be established and
determined in appropriate proceedings, like in criminal or civil cases, for it is
only by such proceedings that the last word on the falsity or forgery can be
uttered by a court of law with the legal competence to do so. A disbarment
proceeding is not the occasion to determine the issue of falsification or
forgery simply because the sole issue to be addressed and determined therein
is whether or not the respondent attorney is still fit to continue to be an
officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Accordingly, We decline to
rule herein whether or not the respondent had committed the supposed
falsification of the subject affidavit in the absence of the prior determination
thereof in the appropriate proceeding.29
We, however, noted that Atty. Quesada Violated the notarial law for his act
of notarizing the: (1) Deed of Sale30 dated April 12, 2002 purportedly
executed by and between the spouses Maximo F. Quezada and Gloria D.
Quezada, the buyers, and complainant Zarcilla's parents, the spouses Tarcela
Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla; and the (2) Joint Affidavit31 dated March 20,
2002 purportedly executed by the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto
Zarcilla for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-18490, when in both occasions
3
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla could no longer execute
said documents and appear before Atty. Quesada since they have long been
deceased as evidenced by their death certificates. Tarcela Zarcilla died on
January 9, 1988, while Perfecto Zarcilla died on March 4, 2001.32
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the
necessity of the affiant's personal appearance before the notary public:
xxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization;
and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
Thus, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who
signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated
therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the
document in question, the notary public would be unable to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that
the document is the party's free act or deed. Here, Atty. Quesada's act of
notarizing the deed of sale appeared to have been done to perpetuate a fraud.
This is more evident when he certified in the acknowledgment thereof that he
knew the vendors and knew them to be the same persons who executed the
document. When he then solemnly declared that such appeared before him
and acknowledged to him that the document was the vendor's free act and
deed despite the fact that the vendors cannot do so as they were already
deceased, Atty. Quesada deliberately made false representations, and was not
merely negligent.
Thus, by his actuations, Atty. Quesada violated not only the notarial law but
also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the deed of sale without all the
affiant's personal appearance. His failure to perform his duty as a notary
public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized
document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in
degrading the function of notarization. The responsibility to faithfully
observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment
or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of
his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the
laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the
duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.33
Time and again, We have held that notarization of a document is not an
empty act or routine. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document, thus,
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be
able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.34
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of
the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.
Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons
who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act and deed.35
Aside from Atty. Quesada's violation of his duty as a notary public, what this
Court find more deplorable was his defiant stance against the Court as
demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of the Court's directives to file his
comment on the complaint. Despite several Court resolutions, notices,
directives and imposition of fines for Atty. Quesada's compliance and
payment, he ignored the same for more than five years. Consequently, this
case has dragged on for an unnecessary length of time. More than five (5)
years have already elapsed from the time the Court issued the first Resolution
dated June 26, 2006 which required Atty. Quesada to file his comment until
his eventual submission of comment on October 10, 2011. It took a warrant
of arrest to finally move Atty. Quesada to file his Comment and pay the fines
imposed upon him. While the Court has been tolerant of his obstinate refusal
4
II. BURDEN OF PROOF

to comply with its directives, he shamelessly ignored the same and wasted As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold the dignity and
the Court's time and resources. authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is
shown by a lawyer's obedience to court orders and processes.38 Considering
And even with the submission of his comment, he did not offer any apology
Atty. Quesada's predisposition to disregard not only the laws of the land but
and/or any justification for his long delay in complying with the
also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral
directives/orders of this Court. We surmised that when Atty. Quesada finally
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. Worse, with his repeated
complied with the Court's directives, his compliance was neither prompted
disobedience to this Court's orders, Atty. Quesada displayed no remorse as to
by good faith or willingness to obey the Court nor was he remorseful of his
his misconduct which, thus, proved himself unworthy of membership in the
infractions but was actually only forced to do so considering his impending
Philippine Bar. Clearly, Atty. Quesada is unfit to discharge the duties of an
arrest. There is, thus, no question that his failure or obstinate refusal without
officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
justification or valid reason to comply with the Court's directives constitutes
disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of Court, amounting to gross IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find respondent ATTY.
misconduct and insubordination or disrespect.36 JOSE C. QUESADA JR. GUILTY of gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing
Atty. Quesada's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of
membership in the legal profession. He is, thus, ordered DISBARRED from
this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself
the practice of law and his name stricken-off of the Roll of Attorneys,
alone is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. His cavalier attitude
effective immediately. We, likewise, REVOKE his incumbent notarial
in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from
disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of
being commissioned as a notary public.
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court's Resolution is "not to
be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
inadequately, or selectively." Atty. Quesada's obstinate refusal to comply which shall forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent. All the
with the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; Courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall
it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which this disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative
Court will not tolerate."37 and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: SO ORDERED.
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do
so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

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II. BURDEN OF PROOF
2.) A.C. No. 8658, April 24, 2017
FRANCIS C. ARSENIO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOHAN A.
TABUZO, Respondents.
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Before this Court is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated June 18, 2010 filed by
Francis C. Arsenio (Arsenio), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Johan A.
Tabuzo (Atty. Tabuzo) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
The Facts
This case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Arsenio before
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against JS
Contractor, a recruitment agency.2 During a scheduled hearing on May 10,
2000, Atty. Tabuzo, the Overseas Employment Adjudicator who was
assigned to hear the case, asked him to sign three blank sheets of paper to
which Arsenio complied.
A week after the scheduled hearing, Arsenio asked Atty. Tabuzo the reason
why he was made to sign blank sheets of paper. Atty. Tabuzo angrily said,
"Bwiset! Napakakulit mo, doon mo malaman mamaya pagdating ng kalaban
mo!" Thereafter, Arsenio called up the office of Senator Rene Cayetano who
advised him to make a clarification regarding the signed sheets of blank
paper. Arsenio then approached Atty. Tabuzo but the latter again shouted at
him saying, "Bwiset! Goddamit! Alam mo ba na maraming abogado dito sa
POEA na nagbebenta ng kaso?" Atty. Tabuzo further said, "Sabihin mo sa
Cayetano mo at abogado mo na baka masampal ko sa mga mukha nila ang
pinirmahan mong blanko! Sabihin mo na ang pangalan ko ay Atty. Romeo
Tabuzo at kung hindi ka bumalik bukas ay mawawala ang kaso mo!''3
Arsenio later on discovered that his case against JS Contractor was
dismissed. Hence, he filed a complaint against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo before
the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019
or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. "
In a Resolution4 dated February 1, 2002, Graft Investigation Officer II
Wilfred Pascasio ordered that an Information be filed against Atty. Romeo
Tabuzo upon finding of probable cause against him.
Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging, among others, that
there is no Atty. Romeo Tabuso in the POEA and that he was never handed
any copy of summons. He claimed that he was merely taking the initiative in
filing the said motion to clear his name as he believed he was the person
referred to in the earlier Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. Nonetheless,
such motion was subsequently denied in an Order dated July 16, 2002.
Meanwhile, in a Decision dated December 6, 2011, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City acquitted Atty. Tabuzo for violation of RA
No. 3019.
Subsequently, Arsenio filed the present Complaint-Affidavit before this
Court. In a Resolution5 dated November 24, 2010, this Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
docketed the case as CBD Case No. 11-2912, entitled "Francis C. Arsenio v.
Atty. Johan Tabuzo".
In his Omnibus Comment with Motion to Dismiss,6 Atty. Tabuzo denied the
accusations against him, claiming that the alleged unethical acts are baseless.
He averred that he had never acted in any conduct unbecoming of a public
officer or uttered invectives and other alleged acts. To support his claim, he
attached the Affidavits7 of two (2) Overseas Employment Adjudicators
(OEA) who occupied the tables immediately adjacent to him in the
Recruitment Regulations Branch. In said Affidavits, the OEAs attested to the
effect that no such incident or any untoward event that called for attention
transpired. Atty. Tabuzo also said that his constitutional right to due process
was violated since he was not notified of the case against him before the
Office of the Ombudsman as he was never served nor had personally
received Orders from such Office.
The Resolutions of the IBP Commissioner and Board of
Governors
In his Report and Recommendation,8 Investigating Commissioner Atty.
Eldrid Antiquierra recommended that reprimand be imposed upon Atty.
Tabuzo. The Investigating Commissioner ruled in such wise on the basis of
the sworn affidavit of Arsenio and the Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
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II. BURDEN OF PROOF
In a Resolution dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved
to adopt and approve with modification the said Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner upon finding that Atty.
Tabuzo violated the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 8.019 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, the IBP Board of Governors suspended
Atty. Tabuzo from the practice of law for three months.
Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.10
The Issue
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis
to disbar Atty. Tabuzo.
The Court's Ruling
After examining the records of this case, the Court resolves to dismiss the
instant disbarment complaint.
A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant
relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks
of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the
public and the courts.11
Jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in disbarment proceedings,
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.12 In the recent case of Reyes
v. Nieva,13 this Court had the occasion to clarify that the proper evidentiary
threshold in disbarment cases is substantial evidence.
In this case, noteworthy is the fact that the reason advanced by the IBP-CBD
in recommending reprimand against Atty. Tabuzo is its consideration of the:
(1) Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, which states that
there was probable cause against Atty. Tabuzo for violating RA 3019; and
(2) Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio, which alleges that Atty. Tabuzo made
offensive statements.
However, a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented reveals that the degree
of proof indispensable in a disbarment case was not met.
Firstly, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is predicated
on the fact that the allegations of Arsenio were uncontroverted; hence, the
Office of the Ombudsman concluded that such allegations were true.
However, there was a seeming discrepancy as to the name of Atty. Tabuzo
when a case against him was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Undisputedly, the case before said Office was filed against a certain Atty.
Romeo Tabuso, when the name of herein respondent is Atty. Johan Tabuzo.
As such, the respondent claimed that he failed to controvert Arsenio's claims
because he never received any notice or order from the Office of the
Ombudsman. In fact, the said Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
was made on the basis of the complaint of Arsenio alone since Atty. Tabuzo
failed to file his answer.14 However, a reading of the RTC Decision reveals
that Arsenio was able to verify the identity of Atty. Johan Tabuzo, not as
Atty. Romeo Tabuso, even before he filed his complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman. It is confusing, therefore, why there was discrepancy as to
the name of herein respondent when a clarification was already made.
Nevertheless, Atty. Tabuzo was acquitted15 in a criminal case filed against
him on the basis of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Despite such acquittal, a well-settled finding of guilt in a criminal case will
not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, the acquittal does not necessarily exculpate one
administratively.16 Thus, it is proper to deal with the other evidence
presented by Arsenio.
The Court, thus, finds that the Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio failed to
discharge the necessary burden of proof. In his Sworn Affidavit, Arsenio
merely narrated that Atty. Tabuzo uttered offensive statements and no other
evidence was presented to substantiate his claim. Emphatically, such
Complaint-Affidavit is self-serving.
Summarily, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman together
with the Affidavit of Arsenio cannot be considered as substantial evidence.
For one, the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was decided on the
basis of the failure of Atty. Tabuzo to controvert the allegations of Arsenio.
Also, the Complaint-Affidavit was not sufficient as no evidence was further
offered to prove the allegations contained therein.While the quantum of
evidence required in disbarment cases is substantial evidence, this Court is
not persuaded to exercise its disciplinary authority over Atty. Tabuzo.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolved to DISMISS the
disbarment complaint against Atty. Johan A. Tabuzo. SO ORDERED.
7
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
3.) THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 9090, August 31, 2016
TEODORO B. CRUZ, JR., Complainant, v. ATTYS. JOHN G. REYES,
ROQUE BELLO AND CARMENCITA A. ROUS-
GONZAGA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration1 of the Resolution2 of the Court dated
22 August 2012 finding respondent Atty. John G. Reyes guilty of
"negligence of contumacious proportions" and suspending him from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
The Facts
The present case arose out of a petition for disbarment filed by Atty. Teodoro
B. Cruz, Jr. (complainant) charging respondent Atty. John G. Reyes
(respondent) with intentional misrepresentation, knowingly handling a case
involving conflict of interest, falsification, knowingly alleging untruths in
pleadings and unethical conduct, based on the following incidents:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryThe First Incident
(Intentional Misrepresentation and Knowingly Handling a Case
Involving Conflict of Interest)
Complainant alleged that respondent entered his appearance as counsel for
Mayor Rosito Velarde (Mayor Velarde) of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, in an
election protest case that was on appeal before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The case, entitled "Racquel 'BIBI' Reyes de Guzman,
Protestant, versus Mayor Rosito Velarde, Protestee," originated from the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calabanga, Branch 63, Camarines Sur.
According to the petition for disbarment, "an incident occurred" in the course
of the trial which forced Mayor Velarde to bring an incident up to the
COMELEC on certiorari.3chanrobleslaw
While the case was being tried at the RTC level, protestant Raquel Reyes De
Guzman (De Guzman) was represented by the Sales Law Office of Naga
City, although Atty. Roque Bello (Atty. Bello), who indicated in the
pleadings that his address is in Cainta, Rizal, was the chief counsel. Mayor
Velarde, on the other hand, was represented by Atty. Gualberto Manlagnit
(Atty. Manlagnit) from Naga City. Atty. Manlagnit prepared the pleadings in
connection with the appeal to the COMELEC but, according to complainant,
unknown to Atty. Manlagnit, another pleading was filed before the
COMELEC, which pleading was apparently prepared in Cainta, Rizal but
was signed by respondent whose given address is in Quezon
City.4chanrobleslaw
Complainant explained that De Guzman used to be allied with former
Speaker Arnulfo Fuentebella (Speaker Fuentebella) under the Nationalist
People's Coalition (NPC) party, whereas Mayor Velarde was a member of
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) party, led by Camarines Sur
Governor Luis R. Villafuerte (Gov. Villafuerte). The Fuentebellas and the
Villafuertes are known to be politically at odds with each other. However, De
Guzman subsequently changed her political allegiance and became affiliated
with the Villafuertes by transferring to the LDP party. Mayor Velarde, on the
other hand, became an ally of the Fuentebellas under the
NPC.5chanrobleslaw
According to complainant, Atty. Bello agreed to represent De Guzman in the
election protest case because she was a political ally of Speaker Fuentebella.
Complainant emphasized that Atty. Bello has always represented the political
interests of the Fuentebellas. There is, therefore, no doubt that Atty. Bello is
the lawyer of the Fuentebellas.6 As a result, with the sudden shifting of the
political loyalty of De Guzman and Mayor Velarde, Atty. Bello suddenly
stopped appearing for De Guzman in the protest case without formally
withdrawing as her counsel.7 Mayor Velarde now had to be defended by
Atty. Bello because he is already an ally of the Fuentebellas. However, Atty.
Bello cannot actively defend Mayor Velarde because he appeared for De
Guzman before the RTC.8 Thus, complainant concluded, Atty. Bello found
the expedient of passing the case to his clandestine partner, respondent Atty.
Reyes, making the latter guilty of representing conflicting interests,9 in
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
8
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
The Second Incident
(Falsification, Knowingly Alleging Untruths in Pleadings and Unethical
Conduct)
On or before 15 December 2003, former Speaker Fuentebella filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Congressman of the 3rd District of
Camarines Sur. Complainant also filed a COC for the same position.
Subsequently, a certain Ebeta P. Cruz (Ebeta) and a certain Marita
Montefalcon Cruz-Gulles (Marita) likewise filed their respective COCs for
the aforementioned position. The former is an indigent laundry woman from
San Jose, Camarines Sur, while the latter was a former casual laborer of the
municipal government of Tigaon, Camarines Sur.10 Clearly, both Ebeta
Marita had no real intention of running for the position for which they filed
their COC, but were merely instigated to do so in order to confuse the
electorate of the district, to the disadvantage of complainant. Consequently,
complainant filed a petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance
candidates.11chanrobleslaw
In connection with the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance
candidates, complainant filed a Memorandum with the COMELEC through
the Office of the Camarines Sur Provincial Election Supervisor (PES).
Pertinent portions of the Memorandum were quoted by the complainant in
his petition for disbarment,12 to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. Complainant received a copy of the Verified
Answer of Marita signed by respondent as counsel, whose given address is in
Quezon City;
2. From the Answer, it was made to appear that Marita caused the
preparation thereof, read the allegations therein contained, and understood
them. It was also made to appear that Marita signed the verification;
3. During the hearing at the PES in San Jose, Pili, Camarines Sur, on 23
January 2004, respondent appeared and:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a.) on record, admitted that the signature appearing on the Verified Answer is
his;
b.) officially manifested that he was hired by Marita as her counsel to prepare
the Verified Answer;
c.) officially confirmed that the allegations in the Verified Answer were
supplied by Marita; and cralawlawlibrary
d.) said that Marita was in his office in Quezon City when she "signed" the
Verified Answer.
4. Marita arrived at the hearing to file a formal withdrawal of her COC. She
was immediately put on the witness stand wherein she testified
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
a.) she did not know respondent;
b.) she never solicited his legal services, particularly, to file the Verified
Answer;
c.) she never supplied the allegations contained in the Answer;
d.) the signature appearing in the Answer is not her signature;
and cralawlawlibrary
e.) she could not have signed the verification in the Answer in Quezon City
on 15 January 2004 because she was in Bicol on that
date.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petition for disbarment also alleged that respondent admitted to Attys.
Adan Marcelo Botor and Atty. Manlagnit - complainant's counsels in the
petition for disqualification before the PES-COMELEC — that Atty. Bello
merely gave the Verified Answer to him already signed and
notarized.14chanrobleslaw
For his part, respondent narrated the following version of the events:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryAnent the first incident, respondent alleged that
he first met Atty. Bello sometime in May, 2003 when the latter was
introduced to him by a friend. A few months after their meeting, Atty. Bello
called him up to ask if he could handle a case to be filed with the COMELEC
since Atty. Bello had so many cases to handle. The case would be to secure a
9
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction from the COMELEC.15chanrobleslaw
According to respondent, he informed Atty. Bello that he has never before
handled an election case, much less one with an application for a TRO with
Preliminary Injunction. Atty. Bello assured him that things would be difficult
at first, but he would assist respondent and things will tuna out easier. Due to
the assurance given and his desire for a more comprehensive experience in
law practice, respondent agreed to accept the case. Since he made it clear
from the start that he has no knowledge or experience in election cases, he
was never part of the preparations in connection with the case. Atty. Bello
simply called him up for a meeting when the pleading was ready so that he
could sign the same. They agreed to meet somewhere in Timog, Quezon City
and after he read the pleading and sensing that there was no problem, he
signed the same inside Atty. Bello's car. Thereafter, he attended the initial
hearing of the case, during which, the parties were required to submit their
respective Memoranda.16chanrobleslaw
Respondent claimed that up to that point, there were no indications about the
true nature of the case. However, when he was preparing the required
Memorandum, he found telltale signs. After his two appearances before the
COMELEC and the submission of the Memorandum, respondent declared
that he never knew what happened to the case as he formally withdrew
therefrom immediately upon knowing the circumstances of the case. He
maintained that he cannot be held guilty of representing conflicting interests
because he never handled any previous case involving either of the parties in
the COMELEC case. Moreover, he was not properly apprised of the facts
and circumstances relative to the case that would render him capable of
intelligently deciding whether or not to accept the case. He likewise did not
receive a single centavo as attorney's, acceptance or appearance fees in
connection with the case. He agreed to handle the same simply to
accommodate Atty. Bello and to improve his skills as a lawyer and never for
monetary considerations.17chanrobleslaw
With respect to the second incident, respondent related that he was at home
in Pangasinan on 17 January 2004 when he received a call from Atty. Bello
asking him to attend a hearing in Camarines Sur. He declined the request
three times due to his tight schedule. Atty. Bello pleaded, saying that even on
Saturdays, hearings could be scheduled. Thus, even if he did not want to
attend the hearing due to its distance and because of his full calendar, he
could not refuse because he really did not schedule appointments and/or
hearings on Saturdays. All that was told him regarding the case was that a
congressional candidate was being disqualified and a lawyer is needed to
defend him and his candidacy. Respondent alleged that according to Atty.
Bello, the candidate was qualified and financially capable of funding his
campaign. Nevertheless, he clarified from Atty. Bello if the candidate is not a
nuisance candidate and Atty. Bello allegedly replied: "Qualified na qualified
naman talaga eh." Respondent added that it was not disclosed to him that the
disqualification case involved a candidate for the third congressional district
of Camarines Sur. He was simply informed that the scheduled hearing of the
disqualification case would be on 23 January 2004 in Naga
City.18chanrobleslaw
Since respondent was in Pangasinan and due to the fact that the deadline for
the filing of the necessary pleading was nearing, Atty. Bello advised
respondent that he would just prepare the Answer and sign for respondent's
name in the pleading. Respondent maintained that he would not have agreed
to Atty. Bello's proposal, had it not been for the pressed urgency, trusting that
he would not get into any trouble.19chanrobleslaw
While waiting for the scheduled date of the hearing to arrive, he wondered
why he has not been furnished a copy of the pleading or given additional
instructions relative to the case. Atty. Bello, in the meantime;, has ceased to
communicate with him and suddenly became inaccessible. He thus toyed
with the impression that he was being left out of the case for reasons he could
not then understand.20chanrobleslaw
According to respondent, he was able to get a copy of the Answer only when
he was already in Naga City and it was only then and there, while reading it,
that he realized that the case was, in reality, about a nuisance candidate and
that the client he was to appear for was, indeed, a nuisance candidate. What
was even more surprising to him was that the copy of the Answer that was
given to him was unsigned: neither by him nor by his supposed client. It was
likewise not notarized. Finding the indefensibility of his client and in order
not to make matters worse, he opted to appear and just submit the case for
resolution. To prove this point, respondent alleged that all he had with him
10
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
for the hearing were only the unsigned and unnotarized Answer, the petition
to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates, his case calendar and
nothing else. Fie had not in his person any evidence whatsoever in support of
the defense of his client. Respondent added that even at this point, he had no
knowledge that his supposed client "had already jumped ship." More
importantly, he did not know that her signature on the Answer was forged,
precisely because the copy of the Answer that1 was given to him was
unsigned.21chanrobleslaw
Before the start of the hearing, respondent started looking for his client but
she could not be found. He, nevertheless, proceeded to the hearing for it was
immaterial to him whether she was present or not as ho had already planned
to simply submit the case for resolution. Unfortunately, respondent claimed,
the proceedings before the PES started as a casual conversation with the
lawyers for herein complainant and went on to a full trial, "wittingly or
unwittingly."22chanrobleslaw
Respondent admitted that, during the hearing, he acknowledged; that the
signature appearing on the Answer was his. He alleged that despite his
personal aversion and objection to certain allegations in the Answer, he could
not anymore deny the signature above his printed name, even if it was only
signed for and in his behalf, because he had previously agreed, although
unwillingly, that his name be signed in the pleading. It, therefore, came as a
surprise to him that of all the questions that can be asked of him during the
trial, he was questioned about his signature. Belatedly he realized that he
should have objected to the line of questioning as he was being presented as
an unwilling witness for therein petitioner. However, without sufficient
exposure in the legal practice and wanting of the traits of a scheming lawyer,
he failed to seasonably object to the line of questioning.23chanrobleslaw
Nevertheless, respondent vehemently denied complainant's allegation that he
admitted having seen Marita sign the document in his presence. According to
him, he vividly recalls his response to the then query whether or not Marita
signed the document in his presence as: "I suppose that is her signature."
Likewise, when queried further on the ideal that the pleading should be
signed by Marita in his presence as her counsel, he allegedly responded:
"While it is the ideal, sometimes we lawyers, like you and I, sign documents
even if the client is not around due to our busy schedules." He pointed out to
the two lawyers of herein complainant that whether Marita signed the
Answer in his presence or not is inconsequential since he was not the notary
public who notarized the Answer. He argued that his signature pertains to the
allegations in the Answer, while the signature of his client forms part of the
verification and certification and that it is the duty of the notary public to see
to it that the person signing the pleading as a party is really the person
referred to in the verification/certification.24chanrobleslaw
Finally, respondent declared that except for the modest appearance, cum
transportation fees that he received, there was no monetary consideration for
handling the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates. He
explained that when the case was offered to him, it was in haste and under a
tenor of urgency that the only impression he got was that the client was well-
to-do and could wage a decent campaign and was really a qualified
candidate. He repeated the words of Atty. Bello: "qualified na qualifed sya."
He emphasized that all he wanted was to expand his experience and practice
as a lawyer.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
In his report and recommendation dated 17 April 2007, Investigating
Commissioner Edmund T. Espina found respondent guilty of the charges
against him and recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for
one (1) month. The report, in part, reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It taxes the undersigned Commissioner's imagination, however, that
respondent disclaims any knowledge in the above incidents and that he was
just a "willing victim" of the rather scheming tactics of a fellow lawyer, who,
surprisingly he did not even thought (sic) of running after and holding liable,
even after all these charges filed against him. Be that as it may, it cannot be
denied that respondent himself had knowledge of and allowed himself to be
used by whoever should be properly held liable for these fraud and
misrepresentation.
As regards the second incident, respondent argues that he could not be held
guilty of forgery, misrepresentation, and other related offenses. x x x If at all,
respondent was forced to unwittingly represent an 'unwilling' client, all in the
name of accommodation. Undersigned Commissioner disagrees.
Respondent violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent should have evaluated the situation first before
11
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
agreeing to be counsel for an unknown client. x x x
Undersigned Commissioner finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action
against respondent for the various misrepresentations and later, admissions
before the COMELEC when confronted with his "supposed client", claiming
that it was Arty. Roque [sic] who merely gave him instructions and whose
requests he merely accommodated. x x x
His shortcomings when he accepted to be a counsel for an unknown client in
the COMELEC protest (first incident) is in itself, already deplorable but to
repeat the same infraction in the petition for disqualification (in the second
incident) constitutes negligence of contumacious proportions. It is even
worse that respondent has attempted to mitigate his liability by professing
ignorance or innocence of the whole thing, a matter that, too, is inexcusable.
Clearly, it is a lame excuse that respondent did offer. By his own confession,
he was woefully negligent.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 19 September 2007, Resolution No. XVIII-2007-99 was passed by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) resolving
to adopt and approve the above report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. It thereafter forwarded the report to: the
Supreme Court as required under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.27chanrobleslaw
On 22 August 2012, the Court issued the questioned Resolution adopting the
above-quoted findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner. The Court,
however, increased the period of suspension from the recommended one (1)
month to one (1) year. The same Resolution also resolved
to:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx
2. IMPLEAD Attys. Roque Bello and Carmencita A. Rous-Gonzaga in this
administrative proceedings; and cralawlawlibrary
3. REMAND the whole records of this case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for further Investigation, report and recommendation with respect
to the charges against ATTY. ROQUE BELLO and ATTY. CARMENCITA
A. ROUS-GONZAGA.
Respondent is now before us seeking a reconsideration of the aforementioned
Resolution insofar as the penalty imposed against him is concerned.
Respondent points out that from the very start, he had been very candid as to
the factual backdrop of the present case. He never denied that he should have
evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be a counsel for an unknown
client. He does not refute, nor does he argue against, the finding of the
Commission on Bar Discipline that he was remiss in his duties as a lawyer
when he accommodated the requests of a fellow lawyer to represent an
unknown client. However, respondent argues, such negligence is not the
negligence "of contumacious proportions" warranting the imposition of the
penalty of suspension. Likewise, such negligence is not tantamount to having
knowledge of the alleged fraud and misrepresentation, for the simple reason
that he did not know the details of the election case until its hearing on 23
January 2004 in Naga City. He maintains that if such fraud and
misrepresentation really exists, his "only fault was that he allowed himself to
be duped to unwittingly represent an 'unwilling' client, all in the name of
accommodation."
Our Ruling
We find respondent's motion for reconsideration partially meritorious.
Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or the suspension of
a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the said administrative penalties28 and the burden of proof rests
upon the complaint.29 "Preponderance of the evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief compared to the presented contrary
evidence."30 In the case at bar, complainant failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence in support of his claim that respondent "knowingly"
handled a case involving conflict of interest, "knowingly" alleged untruths in
pleadings, and that he "intentionally" committed misrepresentation and
falsification.
In connection with the first incident, complainant alleged that respondent
perpetrated acts constituting intentional misrepresentation and knowingly
12
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
handling a case involving conflict of interest when he appeared as counsel
for Mayor Velarde in the COMELEC case. Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts." Jurisprudence has provided three
tests in determining whether a violation of this rule is present in a given case,
to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in
behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client. Thus, if a lawyer's argument for one client has to be opposed by that
same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether
the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former
client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.31 (Emphasis omitted)
Based on the foregoing criteria, there must be a previous lawyer-client
relationship in order for the liability to attach. Clearly, respondent cannot be
held liable under any of the three aforementioned tests because he was never
a counsel for either party in the COMELEC case prior to the filing of the said
action. Complainant, however, would have us believe that respondent is the
"furtive" or "clandestine" partner of Atty. Bello so as to justify his accusation
that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Complainant,
however, failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his allegation.
The mere fact that respondent agreed to handle a case for Atty. Bello does
not - alone - prove that they are indeed partners. This Court is inclined to
give more weight and credence to the explanation proffered by respondent:
that is, he accepted the case without being fully aware of the real facts and
circumstances surrounding it. His narration is straightforward enough to be
worthy of belief, especially considering that he withdrew from the case after
he realized its true nature, as evidenced by the "Withdrawal as Counsel"32 he
filed before the COMELEC.
With respect to the charge of intentional misrepresentation, complainant
failed to specify which act of respondent constituted the alleged offense. If
the alleged misrepresentation pertains to the act of respondent of signing the
pleading prepared by Atty. Bello, we do not agree with complainant and the
same cannot be considered as misrepresentation since respondent specified in
his Comment that he read the pleading before he affixed his signature
thereto. He was, therefore, aware of the statements contained in the pleading
and his act of signing the same signifies that he agreed to the allegations
therein contained. On the other hand, if the misrepresentation alleged by
complainant refers to the allegations in the pleading filed by respondent
before the COMELEC, again, it cannot be said that there was "intentional"
misrepresentation on the part of respondent since, as admitted by respondent
and as complainant himself asserted, the allegations therein contained were
supplied by Atty. Bello, which allegations, at that time the pleading was
signed, respondent did not know were inaccurate. As pointed out above, as
soon as the true nature of the situation revealed itself, respondent withdrew
from the case.
Regarding the second incident, complainant claimed that, in connection with
the petition to declare Marita as a nuisance candidate, respondent committed
falsification and knowingly alleged untruths, not only in Marita's Verified
Answer to the disqualification case against her, but during the hearing of the
case, as well. As with the first incident, respondent maintained that he
accepted the case without being fully aware of the circumstances relative
thereto, this time because of the insistence and urgency with which Atty.
Bello made the request.
We earlier noted respondent's candor in explaining his cause. His candidness
about the events leading to this administrative complaint against him is
demonstrated by the following declarations he made: (1) having agreed to
have his name signed in the pleading on his behalf, he cannot now deny the
signature above his printed name;33 (2) he believed the assurances of his
fellow lawyers (counsels for herein complainant) that whatever may have
been said in confidence between them will not be revealed to anybody for
whatever reason;34 and (3) he failed to seasonably object to the line of
questioning relative to his signature on Marita's Answer, thereby
incriminating himself and making him an unwilling witness for the opposing
party, because of his insufficient experience in the legal practice and as a
result of his lack of the traits of a scheming lawyer.35 These straightforward
13
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
statements, coupled with the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges against him until the contrary is proven,36 keep us from treating
respondent's proffered explanation as an indication of mendacity.37 This
Court is, therefore, compelled to give him the benefit of the doubt and apply
in his favor the presumption that he acted in good faith, especially
considering the failure of complainant to present clear and convincing
evidence in support of his allegations.
Thus, with respect to the charge that respondent "knowingly" alleged
untruths in the supposed Verified Answer of Marita, he admitted that
Marita's Answer was prepared by Atty. Bello, whom respondent likewise
authorized to sign his name on the pleading on his behalf. This statement was
corroborated by complainant himself when he alleged in his petition for
disbarment that "Atty. John Reyes admitted to the two counsels of then
candidate Teodoro Cruz, Jr. x x x that the Answer was merely passed to him
by Atty. Bello already signed and notarized." Consequently, respondent
cannot be held liable for "knowingly" alleging untruths for the simple reason
that the allegations in the Answer were not supplied by him.
Neither can respondent be held guilty of falsification in connection with the
forged signature of Marita. "The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence."38 Complainant merely
alleged that Marita's signature in the Answer "was forged either by Attorney
Roque Bello or respondent x x x"39 and that respondent falsified or caused
the falsification of the signature because "he is the one who presented the
same to the COMELEC, hence, presumed to be the one who falsified the
same."40 Other than this presumption and bare allegation, complainant has
not adduced any proof in support thereof. As a result, this Court cannot give
any merit to his accusation.
The same is true in connection with complainant's allegation that respondent
falsely testified and made misrepresentations during the nuisance candidate
case hearing before the PES by manifesting that he is the lawyer of Marita,
that the allegations in the Answer were supplied by Marita and that Marita
was in his office when she signed the Answer's verification. Apart from his
allegations, complainant has not presented any evidence, as for instance, the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) of the proceedings, to prove that
respondent indeed made the statements attributed to him and to enable this
Court to properly evaluate the transgressions ascribed to respondent.
It is well to note that respondent vehemently denied having admitted seeing
Marita sign the Verification before his presence in his office in Quezon City.
He insisted that his response, when queried about Marita's signature, was
that: "I suppose that is her signature." This Court finds it unreasonable -
illogical, even - that after having admitted the blunders he committed in this
case, he would now deny this particular circumstance, unless he was in fact
telling the truth. In any case, as explained by respondent, it is of no moment
whether or not he saw Marita sign the Verification since he was not the
notary public who notarized the Answer. Respondent's signature in the
Answer refers to the allegations therein, whereas the signature of Marita
forms part of the Verification which states that "she has caused the
preparation of the foregoing Answer and has read the contents thereof which
are true and correct of her own personal knowledge." Respondent is,
therefore, correct when he pointed out that it is the responsibility of the
notary public administering the oath to make sure that the signature in the
Verification really belongs to the person who executed the same.
It must be emphasized that "the Court exercises its disciplinary power only if
the complainant establishes [his] case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence. x x x When the pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly
balanced or when doubt exists on the preponderance of evidence, the
equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the party carrying the
burden of proof."41chanrobleslaw
The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be said that respondent has no
liability at all under the circumstances. His folly, though, consists in his
negligence in accepting the subject cases without first being fully apprised of
and evaluating the circumstances surrounding them. We, nevertheless, agree
with respondent that such negligence is not of contumacious proportions as
to warrant the imposition of the penalty of suspension. This Court find the
penalty of suspension for one (1) year earlier imposed on respondent too
harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed. "The power to disbar
or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
14
II. BURDEN OF PROOF

an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension
be imposed as a penalty."42 The penalty to be meted out on an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion taking into consideration
the facts surrounding each case.43chanrobleslaw

In this connection, the following circumstances should be taken into

consideration in order to mitigate respondent's responsibility: first respondent
exhibited enough candor to admit that he was negligent and remiss in his
duties as a lawyer when he accommodated the request of another lawyer to
handle a case without being first apprised of the details and acquainted with
the circumstances relative thereto; and second, since this is his first offense,
respondent "is entitled to some measure of forbearance."44chanrobleslaw

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent's Motion for

Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court
dated 22 August 2012 is hereby modified in that respondent Atty, John G.
Reyes is REPRIMANDED for his failure to exercise the necessary prudence
required in the practice of the legal profession. He is further WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

15
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
4.) Second DIVISION
November 6, 2017
A.C. No. 10333
CORNELIO V. YAGONG, Complainant
vs.
CITY PROSECUTOR NEOPITO ED G. MAGNO and ASSISTANT
CITY PROSECUTOR DON S. GARCIA, Respondents
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The present case is an administrative complaint filed by Cornelio V. Yagong
against City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and Assistant City Prosecutor
Don S. Garcia for alleged violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
David Flores charged complainant Cornelio V. Yagong and his neighbor,
Jimmy Coronel, with violation of Presidential Decree (PD) 16121 and theft,
respectively, before the City Prosecution Office of Island Garden City of
Samal, Davao del Norte. Yagong claimed that when he filed his Counter-
Affidavit on January 2, 2012, respondents City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G.
Magno and Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia had already come out
with their Resolution indicting them of said criminal cases. He contended
that Magno and Garcia were bias and partial, and into the scheme of money-
making for a favorable resolution. Thus, he filed the present administrative
complaint.
On the other hand, Magno and Garcia insisted that in resolving cases filed
before their office, they are only guided by the concepts of prevailing laws
and jurisprudence in conducting Preliminary Investigations. They filed the
proper Information against Yagong in the performance of their official
functions. As a matter of procedure, the complaint against Yagong and
Coronel was raffled among the associate prosecutors for Preliminary
Investigation. The case was then assigned to Garcia for evaluation as to the
existence of probable cause to warrant indictment. After a thorough
examination of all the evidence adduced by the parties, Garcia found the
existence of probable cause. In his capacity as the Approving Authority,
Magno authorized the consequent filing of the Criminal Information for
Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against Yagong.
On January 30, 2016, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against Magno and Garcia, to wit:2
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint filed against respondents - City
Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and Associate City Prosecutor Don S.
Garcia is hereby DISMISSED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
On September 24, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XXII-2016-542,3 which adopted the foregoing recommendation, hence:
RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the findings and
recommendation of the IBP that the instant administrative complaint must be
dismissed.1âwphi1
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the
power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the
most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that
he is innocent of the charges proffered against him until the contrary is
proved, and that, as an officer of the court, he has performed his duties in
accordance with his oath. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is
upon the complainant and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only
if the former establishes its case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence. Considering the serious consequence of disbarment, this Court has
consistently held that only a clear preponderant evidence would warrant the
imposition of such a harsh penalty. It means that the record must disclose as
free from doubt a case that compels the exercise by the court of its
disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done, as well as the
motivation thereof, must be clearly demonstrated.4
16
II. BURDEN OF PROOF

Here, Y agong miserably failed to discharge said burden.

Indubitably, Magno and Garcia were only performing their official duties of
ascertaining whether or not probable cause exists in the case before them,
and filing the necessary Information if probable cause is found present. A
preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the prosecutor to prepare his Complaint or Information. It is not a trial
of the case on the merits and has no objective except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the respondent is guilty thereof. In the conduct of preliminary
investigation, the prosecutor does not decide whether there is evidence
beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of respondent. A prosecutor merely
determines the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding
information if he finds it to be so. In the exercise of their powers and in the
discharge of their functions and responsibilities, prosecutors enjoy the
presumption of regularity. This presumption of regularity includes the public
officer's official actuations in all the phases of his work.5
The Court reiterates that protection is afforded to members of the Bar who
are at times maliciously charged. Yagong's failure to discharge its burden of
showing that the acts of the respondent lawyers truly violated the CPR and
the Lawyer's Oath warrants the dismissal of the instant administrative
complaint.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Court DISMISSES the instant Complaint against City Prosecutor Neopito
Ed G. Magno and Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia for utter lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

17
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
5.) FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5333, March 13, 2017
ROSA YAP PARAS, Complainant, v. JUSTO DE JESUS
PARAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the disbarment complaint1 (1995
complaint) filed by Rosa Yap Paras (complainant) against her husband Justo
de Jesus Paras (respondent) for which he was suspended from the practice of
law for a year. The issues before the Court now are (a) whether respondent
should be held administratively liable for allegedly violating his suspension
order and (b) whether his suspension should be lifted.
The Facts
In a Decision2 dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended respondent from
the practice of law for six (6) months for falsifying his wife's signature in
bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year for
immorality and abandonment of his family, with the penalties to be served
simultaneously.3 Respondent moved for reconsideration4 but the Court
denied it with finality in a Resolution5 dated January 22, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion6 to declare in contempt and
disbar respondent and his associate, Atty. Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo),
alleging that respondent continued to practice law, and that Atty. Enojo
signed a pleading prepared by respondent, in violation of the suspension
order.7 Moreover, complainant claimed that respondent appeared before a
court in Dumaguete City on February 21, 2001, thereby violating the
suspension order.8 On March 26, 2001, complainant filed a second motion
for contempt and disbarment,9 claiming that, on March 13, 2001, Atty. Enojo
again appeared for Paras and Associates, in willful disobedience of the
suspension order issued against respondent.10 Complainant filed two (2) more
motions for contempt dated June 8, 200111 and August 21, 200112 raising the
same arguments. Respondent and Atty. Enojo filed their respective
comments,13 and complainant filed her replies14 to both comments. Later on,
respondent filed a Motion to Lift Suspension15 dated May 27, 2002,
informing the Court that he completed the suspension period on May 22,
2002. Thereafter, respondent admitted that he started accepting new clients
and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift Suspension.16 Also,
complainant manifested that respondent appeared before a court in an
election case on July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of his motion to lift
suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Court referred the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and recommendation.17
On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory
Order18 on the status of respondent' suspension, essentially inquiring whether
respondent can resume his practice prior to the Court's order to lift his
suspension.19 Meanwhile, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received
the same inquiry through a Letter20 dated March 21, 2003 signed by Acting
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Judge Romeo Anasario of the Second
MCTC of Negros Oriental. Accordingly, the Court referred the foregoing
queries to the OBC for report and recommendation.21
In a Report and Recommendation22 dated June 22, 2004, the OBC
recommended that the Court issue an order declaring that respondent cannot
engage in the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted by the
Court.23 Citing case law, the OBC opined that the lifting of a lawyer's
suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Court's
decision and an order from the Court lifting the suspension is necessary to
enable him to resume the practice of his profession. In this regard, the OBC
noted that: (a) respondent's suspension became effective on May 23,
2001 upon his receipt of the Court resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration with finality; and (b) considering that the suspensions were
to be served simultaneously, the period of suspension should have ended on
May 22, 2002.24 To date, however, the Court has not issued any order lifting
the suspension.
Soon thereafter, in a Resolution25 dated August 2, 2004, the Court directed
the IBP to submit its report and recommendation on the pending incidents
referred to it. Since no report was received until 2013, the Court was
constrained to issue a Resolution26 dated January 20, 2014, requiring the IBP
to submit a status report regarding the said incidents. In response, the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline sent a letter27 to the Court, conveying that the
Board of Governors had passed a Resolution dated April 15, 2013 affirming
respondent's suspension from the practice of law.28 However, in view of the
pendency of respondent's motion for reconsideration before it, the IBP
undertook to transmit the case records to the Court as soon as said motion is
18
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
resolved.29 Thereafter, in a letter30 dated September 22, 2015, the IBP
advised the Court that it denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. The
Court received the records and relevant documents only on February 15,
2016.31
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation32 dated January 16, 2012, instead of
resolving only the pending incidents referred to the IBP, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner examined anew the 1995 complaint filed against
respondent which had been resolved with finality by the Court in its Decision
dated October 18, 2000 and Resolution dated January 22, 2001. The
Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years for falsifying his wife's signature in
the bank loan documents and for immorality.33
In a Resolution34 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation dated January 16, 2012, with
modification decreasing the recommended penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.35 Aggrieved, respondent Filed a motion for
reconsideration,36 alleging that his administrative liability based on the
charges in the 1995 complaint had been settled more than a decade ago in the
Court's Decision dated October 18, 2000. He added that to suspend him anew
for another year based on the same grounds would constitute administrative
double jeopardy. He stressed that the post-decision referral of this case to the
IBP was limited only to pending incidents relating to the motion to declare
him in contempt and his motion to lift the suspension. Such motion was,
however, denied in a Resolution dated June 7, 2015.37
The Issues Before the Court
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent should be
administratively held liable for practicing law while he was suspended; and
(b) whether the Court should lift his suspension.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters referred to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation pertain to respondent's alleged
violation of the suspension order and his request for the Court to lift the
suspension order. However, the IBP Investigating Commissioner evidently
did not dwell on such matters. Instead, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
proceeded to determine respondent's liability based on the 1995 complaint
filed by herein complainant – which was already resolved with finality by no
less than the Court itself. To make things worse: (a) the IBP Board of
Governors failed to see the IBP Investigating Commissioner's mishap, and
therefore, erroneously upheld the latter's report and recommendation; and (b)
it took the IBP more than a decade to resolve the instant matters before it.
Thus, this leaves the Court with no factual findings to serve as its basis in
resolving the issues raised before it.
Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which
may not be dispensed with, except for valid and compelling reasons,38 as it is
essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues
raised.39 Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the Court usually remands
the administrative case to the IBP for further proceedings.40 However, in
light of the foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent's own admission
that he resumed practicing law even without a Court order lifting his
suspension, the Court finds a compelling reason to resolve the matters raised
before it even without the IBP's factual findings and recommendation
thereon.
According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles,
practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and
experience."41 During the suspension period and before the suspension is
lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing law.42 It must be stressed,
however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse
of the suspension period.43 The lawyer must submit the required documents
and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she
resumes the practice of law.44
In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent's suspension
period became effective on May 23, 2001 and lasted for one (1) year, or until
May 22, 2002. Therafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting of his
suspension. However, soon after this filing and without waiting for a Court
order approving the same, respondent admitted to accepting new clients and
cases, and even working on an amicable settlement for his client with the
Department of Agrarian Reform.45 Indubitably, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without waiting for the Court order lifting the suspension
order against him, and thus, he must be held administratively liable therefor.
19
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to
any lawful order of a superior court and willfully appearing as an attorney
without authority to do so – acts which respondent is guilty of in this case –
are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law,46 to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, prevailing case
law47 shows that the Court consistently imposed an additional suspension of
six (6) months on lawyers who continue practicing law despite their
suspension. Thus, an additional suspension of six (6) months on respondent
due to his unauthorized practice of law is proper. The Court is mindful,
however, that suspension can no longer be imposed on respondent
considering that just recently, respondent had already been disbarred from
the practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
in Paras v. Paras.48 In Sanchez v. Torres,49 the Court ruled that the penalty of
suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had
been previously disbarred.50 Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the
lawyer's administrative liability for recording purposes in the lawyer's
personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court held that respondent therein
should be suspended from the practice of law, although the said penalty can
no longer be imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the same
manner, the Court imposes upon respondent herein the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although the said
penalty can no longer be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment, but
nonetheless should be adjudged for recording purposes. That being said, the
issue anent the propriety of lifting his suspension is already moot and
academic.
As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a pleading dated
February 21, 200151 and indicating therein the firm name Paras and
Associates, Atty. Enojo conspired with respondent to violate the suspension
order.
Complainant's contention is untenable.
As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of representing clients
before the courts. Thus, he can sign pleadings on their behalf. The Court
cannot give credence to complainant's unsubstantiated claim that respondent
prepared the pleading and only requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore,
the pleading averted to by complainant was dated February 21, 2001, when
respondent's suspension was not yet effective. Thus, the contempt charge
against Atty. Enojo must be denied for lack of merit.
As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to meticulously, diligently, and
efficiently act on the matters referred to it for investigation, report, and
recommendation, and to submit its report with reasonable dispatch so as to
ensure proper administration of justice. Any inordinate delay cannot be
countenanced.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby
found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months. However, considering that respondent has already been
previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed.
The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in contempt is DENIED for
lack of merit.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.
Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
20
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
6.) EN BANC
May 31, 2016
A.C. No. 5179
DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
1 the Municipal Mayors League of Surigao del Norte.
Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Rene 0. Medina on December 10, 1999.2
Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle
sideswiped respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao
City.3 Respondent alighted from his car and confronted complainant.
Respondent allegedly snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila sa
aka?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap complainant,
and then left.4
Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate
number of respondent's car.5 Complainant later learned that the driver of the
car was Atty. Rene 0. Medina, a provincial board member of Surigao del
Norte.6
According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and
humiliated."7 Respondent's act showed arrogance and disrespect for his oath
of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted gross
misconduct. 8
Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit,9 Manuel Cuizon's
Affidavit, 10 and a letter11 dated October 27, 1999 signed by Mayor Arlencita
E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of Surigao del
Norte Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that respondent slapped
complainant and caused him great humiliation. 12 Thus, respondent should be
administratively penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of authority:
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4,
1999 in Surigao City, committed by Provincial Board Member Rene O.
Medina.
The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie Ricafort,
a tricycle driver, causing great humiliation on the person. We believe that
such conduct is very unbecoming of an elected official. Considering the
nature and purpose of your Office, it is respectfully submitted that
appropriate action be taken on the matter as such uncalled for abuse consists
of gross misconduct and abuse of authority.
Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of
Thank you very much for your attention and more power.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter13
(Emphasis in the original)
Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the
signatures of 19 Mayors of different municipalities in Surigao Del Norte.14 In
his Comment, 15 respondent denied slapping complainant. He alleged that the
incident happened while he was bringing his 10-year-old son to school. 16 He
further alleged that complainant's reckless driving caused complainant's
tricycle to bump the fender of respondent's car.17 When respondent alighted
from his car to check the damage, complainant approached him in an
unfriendly manner. 18 Respondent pushed complainant on the chest to defend
himself. 19 Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move
against his son and himself, respondent asked complainant if his tricycle
suffered any damage and if they should wait for a traffic officer.20 Both
parties agreed that they were both too busy to wait for a traffic officer who
would prepare a sketch. 21 No traffic officer was present during the
incident.22
Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of
attacks on radio programs by the Provincial Governor's allies, accusing him
21
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
of slapping the tricycle driver.23 He alleged that complainant's Affidavit was
caused to be prepared by the Provincial Governor as it was prepared in the
English language, which was unknown to complainant.24 Respondent was
identified with those who politically opposed the Provincial Governor.25
According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might
have arisen out of the incident during the conciliation proceedings before the
Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Washington, Surigao
City. 26 During the proceedings, respondent explained that he pushed
complainant because of fear that complainant was carrying a weapon, as he
assumed tricycle drivers did.27 On the other hand, complainant explained that
he went near respondent to check if there was damage to respondent's
car.28 As part of the settlement, respondent agreed to no longer demand any
indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle to his car.29
Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification30 dated October 27,
2006 of the Officer-in-Charge Punong Barangay stating that the case had
already been mediated by Punong Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and was
amicably settled by the parties.31
On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.32
Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines on July 20, 2007.33 Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) noted
the Certification from Barangay Washington, Surigao City attesting that the
case between the parties had already been settled. 34
Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be the
reason why the complainant has not been appearing in this case[.]"35 The
Mandatory Conference was reset to September 21, 2007.36
In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only
respondent appeared.37 Hence, the Commission proceeded with the case
exparte.38
In his Report39 dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama recommended
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 60 days from notice for
misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend
for the suspension of Atty. Rene O. Medina from the practice of law for a
period of sixty ( 60) days from notice hereof due to misconduct and violation
of Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in an
scandalous manner that tends to discredit the legal profession. 40 (Emphasis
in the original)
Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there
was indeed a slapping incident.41 The slapping incident was witnessed by one
Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1) the photocopy of Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit
attached to complainant's complaint;42 and (2) the signatures on the League
of Mayors' letter dated October 29, 1999 of the Surigao Mayors who believed
that respondent was guilty of gross misconduct and abuse of authority and
should be held administratively liable.43
On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors issued the Resolution 44 adopting and approving with modification
Commissioner De La Rama's recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A "; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's misconduct and
violation of Canon 7. 03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
behaving in a scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O. Medina is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for thirty (30) days.45 (Emphasis in
the original)
Respondent moved for reconsideration 46 of the Board of Governors' August
14, 2008 Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
Board of Governors in the Resolution47 dated March 22, 2014.
We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held
administratively liable.
There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.
Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident
happened.48 He stresses complainant's seeming disinterest in and lack of
22
II. BURDEN OF PROOF

participation throughout the case and hints that this administrative case is instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance of and harassment
politically motivated.49 committed by its officers.
It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers with baseless allegations. This
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers only if
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life,
allegations of misconduct are established.50 A lawyer is presumed to be
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the presumption
that his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath.51 Thus, the burden of By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on
proof still rests upon complainant to prove his or her claim.52 the face hints of a character that disregards the human dignity of
another.1awp++i1 Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa
In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is
ako?"
preponderance of evidence, 53 or evidence that is superior, more convincing,
or of "greater weight than the other."54 ("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse
the profession as a tool for bullying, harassment, and discrimination.
In this case, complainant discharged this burden.
This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by
During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama-as the
perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective of the nobility of the profession.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors also adoptedfound that
As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted the privilege to
the slapping incident actually occurred. 55
serve the public, not to bully them to submission.
The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his
Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. 62 This Court has
signed and notarized Affidavit;56 complainant's Affidavit was also supported
the power to impose disciplinary sanctions to lawyers who commit acts of
by the signed and notarized Affidavit57 of a traffic aide present during the
misconduct in either a public or private capacity if the acts show them
incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed complainant of
unworthy to remain officers of the court. 63
respondent's plate number.58
This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against
In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent,59 Commissioner De
lawyers are sui generis. 64 They are neither civil nor criminal in nature. They
La Rama gave weight to the letter sent by the League of Mayors and ruled
are not a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as a
that "the people's faith in the legal profession eroded"60 because of
matter of public interest and as a means to determine a lawyer's fitness to
respondent's act of slapping complainant.61 The Integrated Bar of the
continue holding the privileges of being a court officer. In Tiaya v. Gacott:65
Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and adopted this finding.
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors,
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
strengthened complainant's allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim that it
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
shows the political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as
complainant's credibility and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures
an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's act. It reflects the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
public's reaction to respondent's display of arrogance.
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
protected from lawyers who are no longer fit for the profession. In this

23
II. BURDEN OF PROOF

responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there

can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 66
As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers
are mere witnesses. They are not indispensable to the proceedings. It is the
investigative process and the finding of administrative liability that are
important in disciplinary proceedings. 67
Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines is not a bar against a finding of administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
are ADOPTED and APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina is
found to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of
respondent as attorney, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

24
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
7.) THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 8677, June 15, 2016
MARITA CABAS, Petitioner, v. ATTY. RIA NINA L. SUSUSCO AND
CHIEF CITY PROSECUTOR EMELIE FE DELOS
SANTOS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is an Administrative Complaint filed by Marita Cabas (Cabas)
against respondents Atty. Ria Nina L. Sususco (Atty. Sususco) and Prosecutor
Emilie Fe Delos Santos (Pros. Delos Santos), docketed as A.C. No. 8677 for
gross dereliction of duty and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6033.
In her Affidavit-Complaint1 dated July 7, 2010, Cabas, an indigent, narrated
that on January 11, 2010, she, together with two more complainants, filed a
complaint for malicious prosecution against a certain Mauricio Valdez before
the City Prosecutor's Office of Olongapo City. She alleged that they were
falsely accused of Estafa by Mauricio Valdez and were in fact acquitted in an
Order dated December 4, 2009.
On May 21, 2010, Cabas filed an Ex Parte Urgent Motion to Resolve the
Case before the Prosecutor's Office, which was received on the same day.
On June 3, 2010, Cabas filed anew a Second Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve the
Case, and was received on the same day by the Prosecutor's office.
On June 23, 2010, a Third Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve the Case was again
filed and was received on June 24, 2010.
On July 1, 2010, Cabas received a copy of the Resolution dated March 28,
2010, dismissing her complaint.
Cabas accused respondents of dereliction of duty and violation of R.A. No.
6033 for their failure to immediately and promptly decide the criminal case
for malicious prosecution she filed, notwithstanding the fact that they availed
of the benefits granted by law to indigents under R.A. No. 6033.
Cabas pointed out that said complaint should have been resolved in two (2)
weeks after the complaint was filed with the City Prosecutor's Office
pursuant to R.A. No. 6033. Thus, the instant complaint.
On August 11, 2010, the Court resolved to require respondents to file their
comments relative to the complaint filed against them.2chanrobleslaw
In their Comments, both respondents denied that they are guilty of
dereliction of duty and of violation of R.A. No. 6033.
Atty. Sususco averred that the complaint for malicious prosecution filed by
Cabas, docketed as I.S. No. III-10-INV-10A-00049, was assigned to her on
March 9, 2010 after the partial detail of Senior State Prosecutor Edwin
Dayog, to whom the case was first assigned for investigation, was revoked
on January 15, 2010 pursuant to DOJ Department Order No. 32. To support
her claim, Atty. Sususco submitted the Affidavit3 of Jaime P. Navarro,
attesting to the fact that the case was assigned to the former only on March 9,
2010.
Atty. Sususco further explained that on March 28, 2010, she issued a
Resolution4 recommending the dismissal of the case. Later on, along with the
entire records of the case, the same was forwarded by her secretary, Mrs.
Marjory F. Ramos, to the Office of City Prosecutor Emilie Fe Delos Santos
for review and approval. To support her claim, Atty. Sususco attached to her
comment a photocopy of said Resolution and the Affidavit5 of Esperanza Del
Rosario, Senior Administrative Assistant I of OCP-Olongapo City and a
certified copy of the pertinent page6 of the logbook showing the receipt of
said Resolution.
Atty. Sususco likewise alleged that her March 28, 2010 Resolution was
finally approved on June 18, 2010 and released on June 24, 2010.
For her part, Pros. Delos Santos denied that she was negligent of her duties
as City Prosecutor of Olongapo. In fact, she claims that she has indeed
approved the Resolution dated March 28, 2010 on June 18, 2010, and that the
Office of the City Prosecutor released the same on June 24, 2010.
25
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
Pros. Delos Santos further explained that she was on leave from March 15,
2010 to April 13, 2010, and that 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Evangel ine
Tiongson was designated as officer-in-charge. Thereafter, she was on
vacation leave from April 14, 2010 to April 16, 2010 and from April 26,
2010 to April 27, 2010. Again, from April 19, 2010 to April 23, 2010, she
was also on sick leave. To support her allegations, Pros. Delos Santos
attached copies of her leave forms.7chanrobleslaw
Finally, with regard to the unresolved motions of Cabas, both Atty. Sususco
and Pros. Delos Santos insisted that there was no longer a need to resolve
them as Resolution dated March 28, 2010 rendered said motions as moot and
academic.
On October 20, 2010, the Court then resolved to refer the instant case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation/decision.8chanrobleslaw
Mandatory conferences between the parties were set on March 10, 2011.
Both parties were likewise directed to submit their verified position papers.
In her Position Paper, Cabas maintained that respondents are guilty of
dereliction of duty and deliberate violation of R.A. No. 6033 because it took
almost six (6) months before respondents resolved the criminal complaint she
filed.
Cabas pointed out that pursuant to R.A. No. 6033, the complaint she filed as
an indigent should have been resolved in two (2) weeks after the complaint
was filed with the City Prosecutor's Office of Olongapo City. Nonetheless,
despite several motions to resolve said complaint, the same remained
unresolved for several months.
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2013, the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Pros. Delos Santos guilty
of dereliction of duty for failing to promptly discharge the duties of her
office, and recommended that she be reprimanded. However, the IBP-CBD
dismissed the charges against Atty. Sususco for lack of merit.
The IBP-CBD found Atty. Sususco to have discharged her duties with
facility, promptness and without unnecessary delay considering that the case
was assigned to her only on March 9, 2010. Despite the lapse of nineteen
(19) days, Atty. Sususco was able to provide reasonable explanation to show
that the delay in the resolution of the case was unintentional.
However, as to the charges against Pros. Delos Santos, the IBP-CBD posits
that the latter failed to properly explain the delay in approving or rejecting
the recommendation of Atty. Sususco. Pros. Delos Santos failed to explain
why she was not able to rule on Atty. Sususco's recommendation from the
time said Resolution and the records of the case were forwarded to her office
on March 28, 2010.
In a Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-469 dated April 16, 2013, the IBP-
Board of Governors adopted and approved in toto the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On August 28, 2013, Pros. Delos Santos moved for reconsideration. She
explained that she was not remiss in her duties as prosecutor. She claimed
that while she had in fact failed to account for the 48 days of delay upon her
return from leave, she assumed that the commission was aware of her heavy
workload as a City Prosecutor.
Pros. Delos Santos presented a Certification from Jaime Navarro,
Administrative Officer III of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo
City, certifying that said office received a total of 856 cases from January to
June 2010. Mr. Navarro also certified that from January 1 to March 31, 2010,
a total of 444 cases were referred to Pros. Delos Santos for approval and for
which 377 cases or 85% were approved, resolved and/or disposed.
Pros. Delos Santos further added that she also concurrently heads the Task
Force for numerous scam and kidnapping cases. She is likewise tapped to
attend to tasks assigned by the DOJ, such as preparing and implementing
action plans, attending conferences, among others.
Finally, Pros. Delos Santos pointed out that in her twenty-four (24) years in
government service, nineteen (19) years as prosecutor, she had maintained an
untarnished record. She, thus, prayed that the complaint against her will be
likewise dismissed.
26
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
In a Notice of Resolution No. XXT-2014-273 dated May 3, 2014, the IBP-
Board of Governors resolved to grant respondent Delos Santos' motion for
reconsideration after finding merit in the latter's explanation. Thus, as regards
respondent Delos Santos, Resolution No. XX-2013-469 dated April 16, 2013
was reversed and set aside and, accordingly, the penalty imposed upon her
was reduced to stern warning.
RULING
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-Board of
Governors.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized
by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons
may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. It denotes a flagrant
and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. In cases
involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is
flagrant and palpable.9chanrobleslaw
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding
of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further,
the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence.10 In the present case, there is
no sufficient, clear and convincing evidence to hold both Atty. Sususco and
Pros. Emilie Fe Delos Santos administratively liable for Gross Neglect of
Duty.
As noted by the IBP, Atty. Sususco, although the subject case was assigned
belatedly to her, was able to discharge her duties with promptness, and was
in fact able to submit the Resolution on March 28, 2010.
As to the liability of Pros. Emilie Fe Delos Santos of gross neglect of duty,
we likewise find no proof to support such allegation.
In order to be guilty of gross neglect of duty, it must be shown that
respondent manifested flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness to
perform a duty. However, in the instant case, Pros. Delos Santos' delay in the
approval of the resolution cannot be said as flagrant and prompted by
culpable refusal or unwillingness to perform her official duties. As found by
the IBP, there was documentary evidence to show that Pros. Delos Santos
was on approved leave during the most part of the period where the delay
took place. It cannot be likewise said that she failed to perform her duties as
she in fact approved the Resolution dated March 28, 2010, albeit, delayed by
48 days. Indeed, considering her heavy caseload, surely there will be backlog
during her absence which she also has to attend to, thus, resulting in the
delay of the approval of subject resolution.
Moreover, under Section 4 of R.A. No. 6033, any willful or malicious refusal
on the part of any fiscal or judge to carry out the provisions of this Act shall
constitute sufficient ground for disciplinary action which may include
suspension or removal, however, in the instant case, there was no showing of
malice or bad faith on the part of Pros. Delos Santos with regard to her
failure to review the subject resolution.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Resolution of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and DISMISS the
charges against Atty. Ria Nina L. Sususco for lack of merit. We
likewise AFFIRM the REVERSAL of the Resolution of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and,
accordingly, DISMISS the charges against Prosecutor Emilie Fe Delos
Santos. However, Prosecutor Emilie Fe Delos Santos is hereby STERNLY
WARNED to be circumspect in the performance of her duties, and that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED
27
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
8.) SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8667, February 03, 2016
INOCENCIO I. BALISTOY, Petitioner, v. ATTY. FLORENCIO A.
BRON, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari,1 to nullify the May
10, 2013 resolution2 of the Board of Governors (BOG) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) dismissing the complaint-affidavit for
disbarment3 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) by the
complainant Inocencio I. Balistoy (Balistoy) against the respondent Atty.
Florencio A. Bron (Atty. Bron).
The Facts
Balistoy was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-105743 (civil case),
entitled Inocencio I. Balistoy v. Paul L. Wee and Peter L. Wee, for damages,
pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Manila. Atty. Bron
was the counsel for the defendants, the Wee brothers.
On March 5, 2003, Atty. Bron filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Issuance of Order to Show Cause with Counterclaim4 in the case. Paul and
Peter executed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping for
the motion, exhibiting. Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No.
12249877,5 issued on January 9, 2003 in Quezon City, for Paul, and CTC
No. 1385810, issued on January 29, 2003,6 in Manila, for Peter. On January
20, 2004, Atty. Bron filed an Answer7 for the defendants who exhibited CTC
No. 122498778 for Paul and CTC No. 12249883 for Peter,9 both CTCs issued
on January 9, 2003, in Manila.
Meantime, Balistoy discovered that the CTCs exhibited by Paul and Peter
had already expired and that the CTC Paul used for the answer had the same
number as the CTC he showed for the motion to dismiss, but the place of
issue was changed from Manila to Quezon City.
Balistoy went to the Office of the Treasurer of the City of Manila and the
Bureau of Internal Revenue in Quezon City to verify the discrepancies in the
CTCs of Paul and Peter. Manila Treasurer Liberty M. Toledo issued a
certification10 stating that CTC No. 12249877 "was not among those allotted
by the BIR to the City of Manila in the year 2003." On the other hand, Eloisa
C. Tamina, the Chief of the Accountable Forms Division of the BIR, Quezon
City, certified11 that the CTCs bearing serial numbers CC1200312249877
to CC1200312249883, and CC1200212249877 to CC1200212249883 were
issued to the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila, on September
26, 2003, and to the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga, on October 2, 2002,
respectively.
Regarding the civil case, Balistoy learned that Atty. Bron and his clients
failed to appear at the hearing on September 6, 2006. This prompted Judge
Lucia P. Purugganan of the RTC, Branch 30, to issue an order12 on the same
day, declaring the defendants were deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence, and that the case was considered submitted for decision.
According to the order, when the case was called for the reception of
evidence on September 6, 2006, Atty. Bron appeared in the morning of that
day and manifested before the clerk of court that one of the defendants'
nephews suffered injuries in a vehicular accident,13 thus, the reason for their
failure to attend the hearing.
The defendants moved for reconsideration14 of the order. This time, Balistoy
faulted Atty. Bron for his "inconsistent allegations" in the motion. He alluded
to Atty. Bron's claim that at 9:00 o'clock in the morning of September 6,
2006, Paul told him by phone that he suffered knee injuries in a vehicular
accident and had to be lifted to a clinic along Aurora Blvd., in Quezon City
for medical attention.15 Atty. Bron attached to the motion the medical
certificate (unsigned)16 dated November 27, 2006, of a Dr. Joy M. Villano
who attended to Paul.
On June 20, 2007, Atty. Bron moved for a resetting of the hearing17 on the
ground that Paul, who was scheduled to testify on that day and who had just
arrived from Malaysia with a fever, was placed under quarantine. Judge
Purugganan granted the motion18 subject to the submission of proof that Paul
had indeed been quarantined on June 20, 2007. In compliance, Atty. Bron
submitted a medical certificate19 dated June 18, 2007, stating that Paul had a
28
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
fever and was under the care of a Dr. Pierette Y. Kaw.
Balistoy also verified the authenticity of the medical certificate and
discovered that it did not come from the NAIA; and that the NAIA arrival
logbook showed that Paul was not registered as a passenger coming from
Malaysia on June 18, 2007.20
Armed with his discoveries, Balistoy filed the present complaint.
Atty. Bron's Position
In a comment21 dated October 9, 2010, as required by the Court,22 Atty. Bron
prayed for a dismissal of the complaint as it was filed, he claimed, in
retaliation for his diligent discharge of his duties as counsel for the Wee
brothers. He offered the following arguments:
1. The notarial act of January 21, 2004
Atty. Bron knows Paul and Peter Wee so well such that he could have
notarized the jurat in the verification of the pleadings he filed in their defense
with or without their community tax certificates (CTCs). To prove his point,
he claimed that his law office assigned the Wee brothers to him as clients,
but aside from that, they had engaged him (in 2001 and 2002) in their
individual businesses as labor and business law consultant.
On Balistoy's claim that the CTCs exhibited by Paul and Peter were falsified,
Atty. Bron maintained that he did not "procure" the subject CTCs, nor had he
the opportunity, at the time of the execution of the notarial act, to verify
whether the CTCs were duly issued by the proper authorities. Moreover, he
added, Balistoy had already filed a criminal complaint regarding the disputed
CTCs.
2. The Motion for Reconsideration
Atty. Bron moved to reconsider the RTC's September 6, 2006 order to clarify
why he asked for a resetting of the hearing. His failure to present evidence on
that day was due to lack of witnesses and not because he was unprepared for
the hearing. He claimed he was at the court premises as early as 10:00
o'clock in the morning of that day waiting for Paul to testify, but the latter
figured in an accident on his way to the court; the other witness, a Ms.
Concepcion Ramos, was not also available as she was not aware that she
would be presented on that day. Likewise, he did not "procure" Paul's
accident or his medical certificate.
3. The June 20, 2007 resetting
The same predicament, Atty. Bron stressed, may be said of the June 20, 2007
incident — he was present in court, while his witness (Paul) was not
available. Paul's executive secretary, a Ms. Jacqueline Francisco, informed
him that Paul had just arrived from Malaysia and was advised to go on self-
quarantine. Again, he said he did not "procure" the medical certificate Paul
presented to the court and had no opportunity to verify its authenticity.
Neither did he manifest before the court that the NAIA issued a medical
certificate to Paul or that the court ordered him (Atty. Bron) to secure a
medical certificate from the NAIA.
4. Respondent in good faith
In conclusion, Atty. Bron stressed that in performing the notarial act for his
clients, or moving for reconsideration of the September 6, 2006 RTC order
and asking for the postponement of the June 20, 2007 hearing, he had acted
in good faith and without the slightest intention to cause prejudice to
Balistoy.
Referral to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
In a resolution23 dated January 13, 2011, the Court referred the complaint to
the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. The IBP's
Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the case to Commissioner Oliver A.
Cachapero.
Comm. Cachapero required the parties to submit position papers on the case.
In his submission,24 Balistoy reiterated the allegations in his complaint-
affidavit. He insisted that Atty. Bron committed deceit, gross misconduct,
malpractice, and clear violations of the law and the rules on notarial practice.
29
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
For his part,25 Atty. Bron again asked for a dismissal of the complaint on
grounds that (1) his performance of notarial functions in 2003 and January
2004 is not a violation of the notarial rule which took effect on August 1,
2004;26 and (2) the complaint has no basis, it being just a manifestation of
Balistoy's obsession to get even with those who, he believed, did him wrong
like the Wee brothers who, allegedly, were responsible for his loss of
livelihood, and their lawyer, who ruined his life.
Atty. Bron argued that even if the notarization of a document presented by
parties whose CTCs had expired is an offense punishable by the rules, he
cannot be penalized for his performance of notarial acts before the effectivity
of the rules in August 2004.
Even on the assumption that the notarial rules can be given retroactive effect,
Atty. Bron argued, he cannot be made liable for violating the rules; neither is
he guilty of gross misconduct in handling the civil case against the Wee
brothers. Regarding the CTC issue, Atty. Bron clarified that it was not he, but
the secretary in his law office, who indicated the particulars of the subject
CTCs in the verification and certification attached to the motion to dismiss
the civil case.
On the other hand, in the preparation of the answer which he himself
encoded, he asked for the presentation of the current CTCs of the Wee
brothers, but no new CTCs were produced; he was thus compelled to accept
their old CTCs as he was pressed for time for the filing of the pleading. In
any case, he stressed, the CTCs were merely exhibited to him and he had no
hand in securing them.
In regard to his alleged misrepresentations in relation to the non-appearance
of the defendants at the hearings of the civil case, Atty. Bron maintained that
in the two instances when the hearing was postponed, Paul Wee gave him
medical certificates which he had no hand in obtaining and the physicians
who issued the certificates were not known to him. At any rate, he explained,
the reconsideration of the RTC's September 6, 2006 order was addressed to
the sound discretion of the court.
The IBP Action
In his report and recommendation27 dated September 26, 2011, Comm.
Cachapero recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.
While he was convinced that Paul Lee or someone acting in his behalf
"rigged" his CTC No. 12249877, particularly the actual place where it was
issued, Comm. Cachapero found Balistoy to have failed to adduce evidence
that Atty. Bron was aware of his client's fraudulent, deceitful or dishonest
act. He also failed to present proof that Atty. Bron had discovered the same
fraud or deception and failed to rectify it by advising his client, or if his
client refuses, by doing something such as informing the injured person or
his counsel so that they may take appropriate steps.28
The same is true with respect to the submission of two medical certificates to
the RTC which Balistoy described were falsified. Comm. Cachapero found
no clear and convincing proof of Atty. Bron's participation in the supposed
falsification.
On May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) passed Resolution N.
XX-2013-56529 adopting and approving Comm. Cachapero's
recommendation and dismissing the complaint.
The Petition
Undaunted, Balistoy now asks the Court to set aside the IBP resolution,
contending that the IBP BOG erred when it declared that there is no
substantial evidence to make Atty. Bron liable for violation of the rules on
notarization and for gross misconduct in the practice of law.
Balistoy insists that Atty. Bron prepared, notarized, and filed a motion to
dismiss and an answer to the civil case, knowing that the CTCs his clients
showed him were fraudulent, thereby consenting to a wrongdoing. Further,
Atty. Bron submitted a falsified medical certificate for his client Paul Wee
who was supposedly quarantined upon arrival from Malaysia, in compliance
with a court order for him to present proof that Paul could not attend the
hearing on June 20, 2007.
30
II. BURDEN OF PROOF
Balistoy submits that the documentary evidence he presented in relation to
Arty. Bron's "wrongdoings" is sufficient proof of the charges against him.
Atty. Bron's Comment
In a comment30 dated May 14, 2014, Atty. Bron prays that the petition be
dismissed for Balistoy's failure to move for reconsideration of the IBP BOG's
resolution dismissing his complaint. He submits that such a failure resulted in
the IBP BOG resolution attaining finality.
In support of his position, Atty. Bron cites the concurring opinion31 in Oca v.
Atty. Daniel B. Liangco,32 which in turn-cited the Court's June 17 Resolution
in B.M. No. 1755 where the Court emphasized the application of Section 12,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, thus: In case a decision is rendered by the
BOG [Board of Governors] that exonerates the respondent or imposes a
sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a
motion for reconsideration within the 15-day period from notice. If the
motion is denied, said party can file a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court with this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for reconsideration is filed, the
decision shall become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall
be furnished this Court.
Referral of the Case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
On July 28, 2014, the Court referred33 the case to the OBC for evaluation,
report and recommendation. On April 28, 2015, the OBC submitted its
report,34 recommending that the disbarment case be dismissed for
"insufficient evidence proving Respondent's participation in the fraudulent or
deceitful acts."35
The OBC stressed that while Balistoy's discoveries are enough to cast doubt
on the validity of the CTC's, they are not conclusive to warrant Atty. Bron's
disbarment as Balistoy failed to clearly prove that Atty. Bron was aware of
his clients' fraudulent acts at the time he notarized the documents or that he
did not take steps to correct the situation.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The IBP BOG committed no reversible error in dismissing the complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Bron. As the IBP's Comm. Cachapero and the OBC
aptly concluded, Balistoy failed to sufficiently prove that Atty. Bron was
aware of his clients' fraudulent and deceitful acts in relation to the
presentation of their CTCs, particularly Paul Wee, and the submission of the
medical certificates to the RTC, again, with respect to Paul.
Like Comm. Cachapero, the OBC noted that based on the records, Paul's
CTC (No. 12249877) might have been tampered with, specifically in regard
to the place of its issuance. It stressed- that the two CTCs with identical
numbers had been issued by the BIR to both the treasurers of Manila and
Quezon City, and both certificates were issued to him in Manila and in
Quezon City. The OBC considered "this scenario highly improbable" as the
assignment of CTC numbers is sequential, which means that no set of
numbers is repeated or assigned twice; moreover, the certificates that were
supposedly issued to the Wee brothers were discovered to have been issued
by the BIR to the treasurer of Taguig, and not to the treasurer of Manila or
Quezon City.
We concur with the conclusion of Comm. Cachapero and the OBC that the
presentation of the Wee brothers' "tampered" CTCs for the pleadings in the
civil case, and Paul's medical certificates in compliance with a court order,
do not warrant Atty. Bron's disbarment. There is nothing in the records that
clearly indicates that Atty. Bron had knowledge of his clients' fraudulent and
deceitful acts with respect to their CTCs, or having known of their defects, he
had done nothing to correct their invalidity. The same observation applies to
the submission of Paul's medical certificates to the RTC.
Under the circumstances, we find no evidence that Atty. Bron had a hand in
the falsification of the Wee Brothers' CTCs or Paul's medical certificates,
although we have reservations over his claim that he did not have the
opportunity to determine their genuineness. In any event, as the lawyer
maintained, his notarization of the motion to dismiss and the answer in the
civil case did not give merit to the Wee brothers' defense nor did it weaken
Balistoy's case.36 Neither did the submission of Paul's medical certificates
31
II. BURDEN OF PROOF

constitute a gross misconduct in the practice of law by Atty. Bron as the

evidence do not show that he was the one who "procured" the medical
certificates or caused Paul's getting sick in Malaysia. In sum, Balistoy failed
to discharge the burden of proof in his bid to disbar Atty. Bron.

In Siao Aba, et al. v. Atty. Salvador De Guzman, Jr., et al.,37 the Court
stressed that "In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof." There is no such proof in this case.

Further, In Ricardo Manubay v. Atty. Gina C. Garcia,38 the Court held: "A
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault
or deficiency in moral character, probity or good demeanor. The lawyer's
guilt, however, cannot be presumed. Allegation is never equivalent to proof
and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability." Again, Balistoy failed to
provide clear and convincing evidentiary support to his allegations against
Atty. Bron.

The foregoing notwithstanding, we find it necessary to impress upon Atty.

Bron that as a member of the Bar and a notary public, he could have
exercised caution and resourcefulness in notarizing the jurat in the pleadings
he filed in the civil case by seeing to it that the CTCs presented to him were
in order in all respects. That he failed to do so betrays carelessness in his
performance of the notarial act and his duty as a lawyer.39 For this, he
should be reprimanded.39

In the light of the above discussion, we find no need to discuss the question
of procedure raised by Atty. Bron.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. The complaint for disbarment against Atty. Florencio C. Bron
is DISMISSED. Atty. Bron, however, is REPRIMANDED for his lack of
due care in notarizing the motion to dismiss and the answer in Civil Case No.
03-105743.

SO ORDERED.

32