RET. JUDGE VIRGILIO ALPAJORA vs ATTY. RONALDO ANTONIO V. CALAYAN, A.C.
Position of complainant
No. 8208
DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
Before the Court is a Counter-Complaint1 filed by complainant (Ret.) Judge Virgilio
Alpajora (Complainant) against respondent Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan
(Respondent), which originated from an administrative complaint filed by the latter
against the former before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for ignorance of the law and/or issuance of undue order. The
administrative complaint against Judge Alpajora was dismissed by the Court in a
Resolution,2 dated March 2, 2009, on the ground that the matters raised therein
were judicial in nature. In his Comment/Opposition with Counter-Complaint to
Discipline Complainant,3 complainant charged respondent with (a) filing a malicious
and harassment administrative case, (b) propensity for dishonesty in the allegations
in his pleadings, ( c) misquoting provisions of law, and ( d) misrepresentation of
facts. Complainant prayed for respondent's disbarment and cancellation of his
license as a lawyer.
The Antecedents
Prior to this case, an intra-corporate case docketed as Civil Case No. 2007-10 and
entitled "Calayan Educational Foundation Inc. (CEFI), Dr. Arminda Calayan, Dr.
Bernardita Calayan-Brion and Dr. Manuel Calayan vs. Atty. Ronalda A. V. Calayan,
Susan S. Calayan and Deanna Rachelle S. Calayan, " was filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City designated as commercial court and presided by
Judge Adolfo Encomienda. Respondent was President and Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of CEFI. He signed and filed pleadings as "Special Counsel pro se" for
himself. Court proceedings ensued despite several inhibitions by judges to whom
the case was re-raffled until it was finally re-raffled to complainant. Thereafter,
complainant issued an Omnibus Order,4 dated July 11, 2008 for the creation of a
management committee and the appointment of its members. That Order
prompted the filing of the administrative case against the Judge Alpajora. The
administrative case against complainant was dismissed. The Court, however,
referred the comment/opposition with counter-complaint filed by complainant in
the administrative case against him to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
appropriate action. The OBC deemed it proper to re-docket the counter-complaint
as a regular administrative case against respondent. Thus, in a Resolution,5 dated
June 3, 2009, upon recommendation of the OBC, the Court resolved to require
respondent to submit his comment on the counter-complaint. In its Resolution,6
dated September 9, 2009, the Court noted respondent's comment and referred the
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. After a mandatory conference before the IBP, both
parties were directed to submit their respective verified position papers.
Complainant alleged that he partially tried and heard Civil Case No. 2007-10, an
intra-corporate case filed against respondent, when he later voluntarily inhibited
himself from it on account of the latter's filing of the administrative case against
him. The intra-corporate case was previously tried by Presiding Judge Adolfo
Encomienda (Presiding Judge Encomienda) until he voluntarily inhibited after
respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Recuse and a Supplement to Defendant's
Urgent Motion to Recuse on the grounds of undue delay in disposing pending
incidents, gross ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency. 7 The motions came
after Presiding Judge Encomienda issued an order appointing one Atty. Antonio
Acyatan (Atty. Acyatan) as receiver, who was directed to immediately take over the
subject corporation. After Presiding Judge Encomienda inhibited himself, the case
was re-raffled to the sala of Executive Judge Norma Chionglo-Sia, who also inhibited
herself because she was about to retire. The case was referred to Executive Judge
Eloida R. de Leon-Diaz for proper disposition and re-raffle. 8 The case was finally
raffled to complainant. 9 Complainant averred that the administrative case against
him by respondent was brought about by his issuance of the omnibus order, dated
July 11, 2008, where he ordered the creation of a management committee and
appointment of its members. Meanwhile, the RTC resolved that Atty. Acyatan
continue to discharge his duties and responsibilities with such powers and authority
as the court-appointed receiver. The trial court also authorized the foundation to
pay Atty. Acyatan reimbursement expenses and professional charges. Complainant
claimed that his order was not acceptable to respondent because he knew the
import and effect of the said order - that he, together with his wife and daughter,
would lose their positions as Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary, respectively, and
as members of the Board ofTrustees of the CEFI. 10
Complainant further claimed that before the records of Civil Case 2007-10 was
transmitted to his sala and after he had inhibited from said case, respondent filed
thirteen ( 13) civil and special actions before the RTC of Lucena City. 11 Atty.
Calayan also filed two (2) related intra-corporate controversy cases - violating the
rule on splitting causes of actions - involving the management and operation of the
foundation. According to complainant, these showed the propensity and penchant
of respondent in filing cases, whether or not they are baseless, frivolous or
unfounded, with no other intention but to harass, malign and molest his opposing
parties, including the lawyers and the handling judges. Complainant also revealed
that respondent filed two (2) other administrative cases against a judge and an
assisting judge in the RTC of Lucena City, which were dismissed because the issues
raised were judicial in nature. 12 Complainant also disclosed that before his sala,
respondent filed eighteen ( 18) repetitious and prohibited pleadings. 13 Respondent
continuously filed pleadings after pleadings as if to impress upon the court to finish
the main intra-corporate case with such speed. To complainant's mind, the ultimate
and ulterior objective of respondent in filing the numerous pleadings, motions,
manifestation and explanations was to prevent the takeover of the management of
CEFI and to finally dismiss the case at the pre-trial stage. Complainant further
revealed that due to the series of motions for recusation or inhibition of judges,
there is no presiding judge in Lucena City available to try and hear the Calayan
cases. Moreover, respondent filed nine (9) criminal charges against opposing
lawyers and their respective clients before the City Prosecutor of Lucena City. In
addition, there were four ( 4) administrative cases filed against opposing counsels
pending before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. 14 Based on the foregoing,
complainant asserted that respondent committed the following: ( 1) serious and
gross misconduct in his duties as counsel for himself; (2) violated his oath as lawyer
for [a] his failure to observe and maintain respect to the courts (Section 20(b), Rule
138, Rules of Court); [b] by his abuse of judicial process thru maintaining actions or
proceedings inconsistent with truth and honor and his acts to mislead the judge by
false statements (Section 20(d), Rule 138); (3) repeatedly violated the rules of
procedures governing intra-corporate cases and maliciously misused the same to
defeat the ends of justice; and (4) knowingly violated the rule against the filing of
multiple actions arising from the same cause of action.
Position of respondent
In his Position Paper, 15 respondent countered that the subject case is barred by
the doctrine of res judicata. According to him, the counter-complaint was
integrated with the Comment/Opposition of complainant in the administrative case
docketed as A.M. OCA LP.I. No. 08-2968-RTJ filed by respondent against the latter.
He stressed that because no disciplinary measures were levelled on him by the OCA
as an outcome of his complaint, charges for malpractice, malice or bad faith were
entirely ruled out; moreso, his disbarment was decidedly eliminated. 16
Respondent argued that the doctrine of res judicata was embedded in the OCA's
finding that his complaint was judicial in nature. 17 He likewise averred that the
conversion of the administrative complaint against a judge into a disbarment
complaint against him, the complaining witness, was hideously adopted to deflect
the charges away from complainant. Respondent insisted that the counter-
complaint was not sanctioned by the Rules of Court on disbarment and the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent also claimed that the
counter-complaint was unverified and thus, without complainant's own personal
knowledge; instead, it is incontrovertible proof of his lack of courtesy and
obedience toward proper authorities and fairness to a fellow lawyer. 19 Further,
respondent maintained that complainant committed the following: ( 1) grossly
unethical and immoral conduct by his impleading a non-party; 20 (2) betrayal of his
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR); 21 (3) malicious
and intentional delay in not terminating the pre-trial, 22 in violation of the Interim
Rules because he ignored the special summary nature of the case;23 and ( 4)
misquoted provisions of law and misrepresented the facts. 24 Lastly, it was
respondent's submission that the counter-complaint failed to adduce the requisite
quantum of evidence to disbar him, even less, to cite him in contempt of court
assuming ex gratia the regularity of the referral of the case. 25
Report and Recommendation Of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,26 the Investigating Commissioner noted that,
instead of refuting the allegations and evidence against him, respondent merely
reiterated his charges against complainant. Instead of asserting his defense against
complainant's charges, the position paper for the respondent appeared more to be
a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 2, 2009 rendered bf the
Supreme Court, dismissing the administrative case against complainant. In any case,
based on the parties' position papers, the Investigating Commissioner concluded
that respondent violated Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules ofCourt,28 Rules 8.01,
10.01to10.03, 11.03, 11.04, 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR29 and, thus, recommended
his suspension from the practice oflaw for two (2) years,30 for the following
reasons:
First, respondent did not deny having filed four (4) cases against the counsel
involved in the intra-corporate case from which the subject administrative cases
stemmed, and nine (9) criminal cases against the opposing parties, their lawyers,
and the receiver before the Office of the Prosecutor of Lucena City - all of which
were subject of judicial notice. The Investigating Commissioner opined that such act
manifested respondent's malice in paralyzing these lawyers from exerting their
utmost effort in protecting their client's interest.31
Second, respondent committed misrepresentation when he cited a quote from
former Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as a thesis when, in fact, it was a dissenting
opinion. The Investigating Commissioner further opined that describing the
supposed discussions by the judge with respondent's adverse counsels as
contemplated crimes and frauds is not only grave but also unfounded and irrelevant
to the present case. 32
Third, respondent grossly abused his right of recourse to the courts by the filing of
multiple actions concerning the same subject matter or seeking substantially
identical relief.33 He admitted filing pleadings indiscriminately, but argued that it
was within his right to do so and it was merely for the purpose of saving CEFI from
imminent downfall. 34 The Investigating Commissioner opined that the filing of
multiple actions not only was contemptuous, but also a blatant violation of the oath
of lawyer's. 35
Fourth, respondent violated Canon 11 of the CPR by attributing to complainant ill-
motives that were not supported by the record or had no materiality to the case.36
He charged complainant with coaching adverse counsel on account of their alleged
close ties, inefficiency in dealing with his pleadings, acting with dispatch on the
adverse party's motions, partiality to the plaintiffs because he was a townmate of
Presiding Judge Encomienda, and arriving at an order without predicating the same
on legal bases under the principle of stare decisis. 37 According to the Investigating
Commissioner, these charges are manifestly without any basis and also established
respondent's disrespect for the complainant.
Based on the findings, the Investigating Commissioner ultimately concluded:
As a party directly involved in the subject intra-corporate controversy, it is duly
noted that Respondent was emotionally affected by the ongoing case. His direct
interest in the proceedings apparently clouded his judgment, on account of which
he failed to act with circumspect in his choice of words and legal remedies. Such
facts and circumstances mitigate Respondent's liability. Hence, it is hereby
recommended that Respondent be suspended from the practice oflaw for two (2)
years. 39 Consequently, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution40 adopting
and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
It recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration. In a Resolution,41 dated May 4,
2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent's motion for reconsideration
as there was no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the
motion was a mere reiteration of the matters had which already been threshed out.
Hence, pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,42 the
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, together with the whole record of the
case, was transmitted to the Court for final action.
Ruling of the Court
The Court adopts the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. It bears stressing that membership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals
who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character.
Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, in order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession.
When lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices
not only the rights of their client, but also of their colleagues and offends due
administration of justice, appropriate disciplinary measures and proceedings are
available such as reprimand, suspension or even disbarment to rectify their
wrongful acts. The Court, however, emphasizes that a case for disbarment or
suspension is not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is
intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in
order to protect the public and the courts.44 Proceedings to discipline erring
members of the bar are not instituted to protect and promote the public good only,
but also to maintain the dignity of the profession by the weeding out of those who
have proven themselves unworthy thereof.45 In this case, perusal of the records
reveals that Atty. Calayan has displayed conduct unbecoming of a worthy lawyer.
Harassing tactics against opposing counsel
As noted by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not deny filing
several cases, both civil and criminal, against opposing parties and their counsels. In
his motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution, he again
admitted such acts but expressed that it was not ill-willed. He explained that the
placing of CEFI under receivership and directing the creation of a management
committee and the continuation of the receiver's duties and responsibilities by
virtue of the Omnibus Order spurred his filing of various pleadings and/or
motions.46 It was in his desperation and earnest desire to save CEFI from further
damage that he implored the aid of the courts.47
The Court is mindful of the lawyer's duty to defend his client's cause with utmost
zeal. However, professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with
necessary restrictions and qualifications.48 The filing of cases by respondent against
the adverse parties and their counsels, as correctly observed by the Investigating
Commissioner, manifests his malice in paralyzing the lawyers from exerting their
utmost effort in protecting their client's interest.49 Even assuming arguendo that
such acts were done without malice, it showed respondent's gross indiscretion as a
colleague in the legal profession.
Unsupported ill-motives attributed to a judge
As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing
to a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to
the case.50 Here, respondent has consistently attributed unsupported imputations
against the complainant in his pleadings. He insisted that complainant antedated
the order, dated August 15, 2008, because the envelopes where the order came
from were rubber stamped as having been mailed only on August 26, 2008. 51 He
also accused the complainant judge of being in cahoots and of having deplorable
close ties with the adverse counsels;52 and that complainant irrefutably coached
said adverse counsels. 53 However, these bare allegations are absolutely
unsupported by any piece of evidence. Respondent did not present any proof to
establish complainant's alleged partiality or the antedating. The date of mailing
indicated on the envelope is not the date of issue of the said order.
Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the CPR state that:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of attributing
unsupported ill-motives to complainant. It must be remembered that all lawyers are
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence
in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees
the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a
very shaky foundation. 54 Hence, no matter how passionate a lawyer is towards
defending his client's cause, he must not forget to display the appropriate decorum
expected of him, being a member of the legal profession, and to continue to afford
proper and utmost respect due to the courts. Failure to observe candor, fairness
and good faith before the court; failure to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration ofjustice It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards
the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are
entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty
to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely
suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. 55
In his Motion for Reconsideration56 of the Resolution dated February 10, 2014 of
the IBP Board of Governors, respondent wrote: Anent, the Respondent's alleged
commission of falsehood in his pleadings, suffice it to state that if certain pleadings
prepared by the Respondent contained some allegations that turned out to be
inaccurate, the same were nevertheless unintentional and only arose out of the
Respondent's honest misappreciation of certain facts; 57
The records, however, showed that respondent's allegations were not brought
about by mere inaccuracy. For one of his arguments against the complainant,
respondent relied on Rule 9 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies which provides:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Management Committee. - As an incident to any of the
cases filed under these Rules or the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation, A
PARTY MAY APPLY for the appointment of a management committee for the
corporation, partnership or association, when there is imminent danger of: xxx
[Emphasis supplied]
He stressed that the courts cannot motu proprio legally direct the appointment of a
management committee when the Interim Rules predicate such appointment
exclusively upon the application of a party in the complaint a quo.
By employing the term "exclusively" to describe the class of persons who can apply
for the appointment of a management committee, 59 respondent tried to mislead
the Court. Lawyers are well aware of the tenor of a provision of law when "may" is
used. "May" is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. 60 Thus,
when the Interim Rules stated that "a party may apply xx x, " it did not connote
exclusivity to a certain class. It simply meant that should a party opt for the
appointment of such, it may do so. It does not, however, exclude the courts from
ordering the appointment of a management committee should the surrounding
circumstances of the case warrant such. Further, as regards his alleged
misquotation, respondent argues that he should have been cited in contempt. He
found justification in Cortes vs.
B angalan, The alleged offensive and contemptuous language contained in the
letter-complaint was not directed to the respondent court. As observed by the
Court Administrator, "what respondent should have done in this particular case is
that he should have given the Court (Supreme Court) the opportunity to rule on the
complaint and not simply acted precipitately in citing complainant in contempt of
court in a manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than the upholding
of a court's honor."
A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on his
impartiality even if the judge may have been insulted therein. While the power to
punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice, judges, however,
should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contemEt powers for correction
and preservation not for retaliation or vindication. 2 As correctly pointed out by the
Investigating Commissioner, the jurisprudence quoted precisely cautions a judge
against citing a party in contempt, which is totally contradictory to the position of
respondent. He misrepresented the text of a decision, in violation of the CPR.
Moreover, in defense of the multiple pleadings he filed, respondent avers that
there is no law or rule that limits the number of motions, pleadings and even cases
as long as they are sufficient in form and substance and not violative of the
prohibition against forum shopping. 63 He maintains that his pleadings were filed
in utmost good faith and for noble causes, and that he was merely exercising
his constitutionally protected rights to due process an d speedy disposition.
Ironically, Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil and
criminal cases, and even administrative cases against different trial court judges
relating to controversies involving CEFI, in fact, runs counter to
the speedy disposition of cases. It frustrates the administration of justice. It the
degradesdignity and integrity of the courts. A lawyer does not have an
unbridled right to file pleadings, motions and cases as he pleases. Limitations can be
inferred from the following rules:
1. Rules of Court
a. Rule 71, Section 3. Indirect Contempt to be Punished After Charge and
Hearing. - After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
( c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of
a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
( d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;
2. Code of Professional Responsibility
a. Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
b. Canon 10, Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
c. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
d. Canon 12, Rule 12.shall04-A lawyer not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a Judgment or misuse Court processes.

Respondent justifies his filing of administrative cases against certain judges,

including complainant, by relying on In Re: Almacen (Almacen). 65 He claims that
the mandate of the ruling laid down in Almacen was to encourage lawyers' criticism
of erring magistrates. 66 In Almacen, however, it did not mandate but merely
recognized the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respect;uz terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. 7 In addition, the Court therein emphasized that these criticisms
are subject to a condition, to wit: But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism
that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander
of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. Indubitably, the acts of
respondent were in violation of his duty to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers and his duty to never seek to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer. In his last ditch attempt to escape liability, respondent
apologized for not being more circumspect with his remedies and choice of words.
He admitted losing objectivity and becoming emotional while pursuing the cases
involving him and the CEFI. The Court, however, reiterates that a lawyer's duty, is
not to his client but primarily to the administration of justice. To that end, his
client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to, and must always, be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and
honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
client's cause, is condemnable and unethical. 70 For having violated the CPR and
the Lawyer's Oath, respondent's conduct should be meted with a commensurate
penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines - Board of Governors dated September 28, 2013. Accordingly,
Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan is found GUILTY of violating The Lawyer's Oath
and The Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby ordered SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or a similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe
penalty. Let copies of this decision be furnished the: (a) Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and ( c) the
Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personal
records of the respondent. SO ORDERED.
GENE M. DOMINGO vs ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., A.C. No. 5473
DECISION
PERCURIAM:
A disbarred lawyer who is found to have committed an offense that constitutes
another ground prior to his eventual disbarment may be heavily fined therefor. The
Court does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction over his other disbarrable act or
actuation committed while he was still a member of the Law Profession.
THE CASE
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment instituted by Gene Domingo
(complainant) against Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), 1 alleging that the
latter deliberately and feloniously induced and persuaded the former into releasing
almost half a million pesos on the false pretense of having performed and
accomplished legal services for him.
Antecedents
The complainant is an American citizen of Filipino descent. During a visit to the
Philippines in 2000, he sought the services of a lawyer to handle the cases to be
filed against his cousin Melchor Arruiza and to work on the settlement of the estate
of his late mother Judith Arruiza.2 In April 2000, petitioner met respondent, a
lawyer recommended by a friend. Petitioner informed respondent about his need
for the services of a lawyer for the rescission of Melchor Arruiza's adoption and for
the settlement of his mother's estate.3 The complainant alleged that the
respondent represented to him that he would take on the cases in behalf of the law
firm of Agabin Verzola Hermoso Layaoen & De Castro, where he worked as an
associate. He assured petitioner that the law firm was able and willing to act as his
legal counsel in the cases he intended to institute against his adopted brother, and
to undertake the transfer of his mother's properties to his and his children's names.
4 Trusting the representations of respondent, the complainant agreed to engage
respondent and his law firm, and paid the initial amount of P80,000.00. Being based
in the United States of America, the complainant maintained constant
communication with respondent often through electronic mail (e-mail) and
sometimes by telephone to get updates on the cases. The complainant alleged that
based on his correspondences with respondent, the latter made several
misrepresentations, as follows:
[a)] He [had] filed the annulment of adoption of Melchor Arruiza in Abra, stating
that the hearing would commence by the end of May 2000; and that the trial had
been brought to completion;
[b)] He was processing the transfer of the titles of the properties [in the names of
petitioner and his children;]
[c)] He processed the cancellation of the adverse claim of Melchor Arruiza
annotated on the two titles of the properties, claiming that he was there at the
Land Registration Authority in Quezon City for the final approval of the cancellation;
[d)] He was processing the payment of taxes and other fees on the properties
to be transferred, including capital gains tax, transfer tax, registration fees and
documentary stamp tax;
[e)] That he was negotiating with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to reduce the
tax from P.80,000.00 to P.10,000.00;
[f)] That the new titles in the names of petitioner's children would be ready by July
20, 2000;
[g)] That the new titles in the children's names were issued;
[h)] That Melchor Arruiza opposed the cancellation of the adoption, and boasted
that he knew many big time politicians in Abra who would help him;
[i)] That the Judge x x x handling the case for the cancellation of the adoption
[would] rule in petitioner's favor only if he would give to the Judge 10% of the
value of the property in Better Living Subdivision, Parafiaque City;
Li)] That the Judge agreed on x x x P.200,000.00 but he (respondent) needed an
additional P.50,000.00 "for the boys" in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court;
[k)] That the Judge [already wrote] a decision in petitioner's favor, but [for his
protection insisted upon a kaliwaan of the copy of the decision and the
payment;]
[l)] That the Judge received the money and [already promulgated the] decision in
petitioner's favor;
[m)] That said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals and eventually to
the Supreme Court where respondent was working doubly hard to influence [a
favourable] outcome;
[n)] That the Supreme Court had to meet en bane on the decision of the Abra
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge in petitioner's favor; and
[o)] That in consideration of all the above transactions, he (respondent) needed
money [totalling] P433,002.61 [as payment to the Judge, BIR and related agencies,
actual expenses and legal fees], [but requested] the payment in staggered amounts
and on different dates. 5
Based on the respondent's representation as to how justice was achieved in the
Philippines, the complainant was constrained to give to the respondent the
requested amounts in the belief that he had no choice. 6 The complainant would
repeatedly request the original or at the very least copies of the decisions and the
titles by e-mail, facsimile (fax) or courier service, but respondent repeatedly failed
to comply with the requests, giving various reasons or excuses. The respondent
even volunteered to meet with the complainant in the United States of America to
personally deliver the promised documents. The respondent never went to the
United States of America to meet with the complainant. He also did not tum over
the requested documents to the latter. Even worse, the respondent ultimately tried
to avoid the complainant by cutting off communications between them.
Given the respondent's evasion, the complainant decided to write the law firm of
Agabin Verzola Hermoso Layaoen & De Castro to inform them of the fraudulent
actions of the respondent. 7 The complainant was surprised to be informed by the
law firm that he had never been its client. 8 The law firm also told him that the
respondent had been forced to resign from the law office because of numerous
complaints about his performance as a lawyer.9 Hence, the complainant terminated
the services of the respondent for refusal to respond and to surrender the alleged
documents in his possession. He engaged the services of another law firm to verify
the status of the cases allegedly brought by respondent in petitioner's behalf. The
new law firm secured a certification from the R TC of Abra to the effect that no case
against Melchor Arruiza had been filed. The complainant also discovered that none
of the representations of the respondent, as enumerated above, had come to pass
because all of such representations were sham and intended to induce him to remit
almost half a million pesos to the respondent. 10 On July 24, 2001, the complainant
filed his complaint for disbarment in this the Court accusing the respondent of
committing acts in violation of Canons 1, 2, 13, 15 & 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 11 On August 22, 2001, the Court required the respondent to
comment. 12 In his comment dated October 21, 2001, 13 the respondent denied
the accusations, and countered as follows:
a) Petitioner wanted to have the adoption of Melchor D. Arruiza by his late mother
Judith D. Arruiza granted by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dolores-San
Juan in the Province of Abra annulled because he had not been informed about the
adoption which affected his inheritance, particularly with respect to the two parcels
of land located in Parafiaque City. Petitioner related to respondent why he
(petitioner) filed the action for annulment of adoption in the RTC in Parafiaque City,
but Branch 258 of the RTC dismissed the petition on January 19, 2000 for lack
ofjurisdiction over the case;
b) Following the dismissal of the case, petitioner desperately wanted to revive it in
the RTC in Abra. Petitioner also wanted the annotation of rights, title and interest of
Melchor Arruiza as a legally adopted son of his late mother on the two titles
cancelled, and to have the properties transferred in the names of petitioner's
children;
c) Respondent explained to petitioner that it would be very hard to revive the case
because the order of adoption issued25,on May 1979 had long become final and
executory;
d) It would also be inconvenient for petitioner to pursue the cancellation case
considering that he was a permanent resident of the United States of America and
the need for his personal presence at the R TC in Abra to testify against his adopted
brother;
e) Respondent further told petitioner that his law firm at the time did not allow its
members to handle personal cases, especially if the cases were filed in far flung
provinces; and that the particular case of annulment of the judgment of adoption,
being a special proceeding, would take years to finish inasmuch as the losing party
would likely elevate the matter up to the Supreme Court and would be very costly
in terms of expenses and attorney's fees;
f) Respondent claimed that petitioner still profusely pleaded with him to pursue the
case no matter how much it would cost him, as long as his adopted brother was
prevented from inheriting from the estate of his mother;
g) Respondent triedsometotalk sense into petitioner, particularly that it was only
just and fair that his adopted brother would inherit from their mother, but
petitioner could not be swayed;
h) Even though respondent sensed the greediness, wickedness and scheming design
of petitioner, he still accepted the engagement to handle the case of annulment of
the judgment of adoption, as well as to have the annotations at the back of the
titles cancelled and eventually have the properties transferred in the names of
petitioner's children;
i) Respondent proposed that petitioner pay P500,000.00, more or less, as the total
package of expenses and attorney's fees; petitioner agreed to the proposal and
promised to remit the amount by installment upon his return to the United States
of America, and to send the special power of attorney authorizing respondent to
bring the case against Melchor Arruiza;
j) As a means of protecting the interest of petitioner, respondent offered to issue a
check for P500,000.00 as a security for the amount to be remitted by petitioner
from his United States of America account; his offer of the check was to give a sign
of his good faith, because his primary aim was to provide the best and effective
legal services petitioner needed under the circumstances;
k) Respondent then prepared an affidavit of self-adjudication for petitioner
respecting the two properties registered in the name of petitioner's late
mother; he caused the publication of the affidavit in a tabloid;
1) Respondent informed petitioner that there was no way for him to win the
annulment case unless he personally appeared and testified against his adopted
brother, but petitioner said that he could not personally testify because he feared
for his life due to Abra being an NPA- infested area;
m) On August 27, 2001, respondent went on and filed the complaint for annulment
of the adoption in the RTC in Abra, docketed as Civil Case No. 1989, even without
any firm assurance from petitioner that he would personally appear in court;
n) After the filing of the case, petitioner started making unreasonable demands, like
having an immediate decision from the RTC in Abra in his favor, the cancellation of
the adverse claim of his adopted brother on the titles of the properties, and
transferring the titles in the names of petitioner's three children;
o) Respondent tried to explain to petitioner that his demands were impossible to
meet because civil and special proceedings cases take years to finish inasmuch as
the aggrieved parties would elevate the cases up to the Supreme Court; and that
the cancellation of the adverse claim would depend on the outcome of the case
they filed, but his refusal and to appear testify was still a problem;
p) Petitioner still adamantly insisted that respondent comply with his demands, or
else he would sue him if he did not. 1
On November 26, 2001, the Court referred the complaint for disbarment and the
comment to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision. 15
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP conducted hearings. The case
was then submitted for resolution after the complainant and the respondent
submitted their manifestation and reply/counter manifestation, respectively.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated September 6, 2002, 16 the IBP-CBD found
the respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility with
respect to negligence in the performance of his duties towards his client, and
recommended the penalty of reprimand with a stem warning that a repetition of
the offense would warrant a more severe penalty. It ruled that the proceeding
before it was basically a disciplinary proceeding; that it could only decide on the
fitness of respondent to continue in the practice of law; 17 that it could not go
beyond the sanctions that could be imposed under the Rules of Court; that it had
the power to require the restitution of the client's money as part of the penalty;
that it could only order the restitution of whatever amount that was given by
petitioner to respondent but not other monetary claims of petitioner like travel and
plane fare and litigation expenses, which were properly within the jurisdiction of
other authorities; 18 and that, accordingly, it ordered respondent to immediately
deliver to petitioner the amount of P513,000.00, plus interest computed at the legal
rate. In Resolution No. XV-2002-597 passed on October 19, 2002, 19 the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation dated
September 6, 2002 of the Investigating Commissioner. On January 14, 2003, the
complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 praying that Resolution No. XV-
2002-597 be reconsidered and set aside, and that the appropriate penalty of
disbarment, or, at the very least, suspension be imposed the respondent. On
January 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed and adopted Resolution No.
XV-2003-4921 denying the complainant's Motion for Reconsideration on the ground
that the Board had no jurisdiction to consider and resolve the matter by virtue of its
having already been endorsed to the Court. Meanwhile, on January 29, 2003, the
Court issued a resolution: (1) noting the resolution of the IBP-CBD reprimanding the
respondent; and (2) directing him to inform the IBP of his compliance with the
resolution.22 After the IBP denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, the
complainant filed his petition dated March 6, 2003 .23 On April 3, 2003, the
respondent filed his Manifestation and Motion praying that the resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors be reconsidered and set aside. On April 30, 2003, the Court
noted the IBP's denial of the complainant's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
jurisdiction, and the respondent's Manifestation and Motion; and took cognizance
of the March 6, 2003 petition of the complainant, and required the respondent to
file his Comment.25 On October 20, 2003, the Court took note of the respondent's
Comment with Motion for Reconsideration, and required the complainant to file his
Reply.26 After requesting an extension of time to file his Reply, the complainant
filed his Reply on December 8, 2003.27
Ruling of the Court
In its findings, the IBP concluded that the respondent was guilty of negligence in the
performance of his duties to his client, and recommended that: (a) he be
reprimanded with a stem warning that any repetition of his conduct would be dealt
with more severely; and ( b) he be ordered to return the sums of money totalling
P513,000.00 he had received from the complainant. After reviewing the established
circumstances of the case, the Court accepts the findings against the respondent
but modifies the recommended penalty considering that his violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility constituted deliberate defraudation of the client instead
of mere negligence.
Firstly, the respondent misled the complainant into thinking that it would be his law
firm that was to take on the case. Secondly, despite the fact that he had intimated
to the complainant that it would be highly unlikely to still have the adoption decree
nullified due to the decree having long become final and executory, he nonetheless
accepted the case. Thirdly, he told the complainant that he had already instituted
the action for the annulment of the adoption despite not having yet done so.
Fourthly, he kept on demanding more money from the complainant although the
case was not actually even moving forward. Fifthly, he continued to make up
excuses in order to avoid having to furnish to the complainant the requested copies
of court documents that, in the first place, he could not produce. And, lastly, he
claimed that he intended to return the money to the complainant but instead sent
the latter a stale check. All these acts, whether taken singly or together, manifested
the respondent's dishonesty and deceit towards the complainant, his client, in
patent violation of Rule 1.01 28 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility. We note
that the respondent filed the case for the annulment of the adoption decree only
on August 27, 2001 29 after the complainant had sent him the demand letter dated
April 10, 2001.30 Such filing was already during the pendency of the administrative
investigation of the complaint against him in the IBP. Had the complainant not
threatened to charge him administratively, he would not have filed the petition for
annulment of the adoption at all.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Court has consistently held, in respect of this Rule, that the mere failure of the
lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.
31 Despite the fact that the complainant engaged his services and advanced sums
of money to cover the court fees and related expenses to be incurred along the
way, the respondent did not file the petition for annulment. His conduct was
reprehensible because it amounted to dishonesty and plain deceit. His filing of the
petition for annulment later on did not mitigate his sin because he did so only
because he had meanwhile received the complainant's demand letter that
contained the threat of filing administrative charges against him. Moreover, he
repeatedly did not inform the complainant on the actual status of the petition
although the latter regularly sought to be updated. Instead, the respondent kept on
making up excuses and conjured up pretenses to make it appear that the case was
moving along. His conduct of accepting money for his legal services in handling the
annulment of the adoption decree, and of failing to render the contracted legal
services violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Also, the highly fiduciary
and confidential relation of attorney and client required that he as the lawyer
should promptly account for all the funds received from, or held by him for, the
complainant as the client. Furthermore, the respondent did not abide by the
mandate of Canon 15 that required members of the Legal Profession to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients.
In their conversations, the respondent told the complainant that the judge handling
the case would rule in their favor only if he would be given 10% of the value of the
property at Better Living Subdivision, Parafiaque, and that the handling judge
consequently agreed on the fee of 1!200,000.00 but needed an additional 1!
50,000.00 "for the boys" in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In doing
so, the respondent committed calumny, and thereby violated Rules 15.06 and 15.07
of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and
principles of fairness.
Members of the Bench are tasked with ensuring that the ends of justice are served.
Such negative imputations against them and the collegial bodies of the Judiciary on
the part of the respondent tended to erode the trust and confidence of the people
in our judicial system. The Court should not take such conduct of the respondent
lightly considering that the image of the Judiciary was thereby diminished in the
eyes of the public; hence, the Court must severely the reprove respondent. The
respondent's commission of various offenses constituting professional misconduct
only demonstrated his unworthiness to remain as a member of the Legal
Profession. He ought to be disbarred for such offenses upon this complaint alone. A
review of his record as an admitted member of the Bar shows, however, that in Que
v. Revilla, Jr.,34 the Court had disbarred him from the Legal Profession upon finding
him guilty of violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon
10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. In view of his prior disbarment, we can no longer impose the appropriate
penalty of disbarment as deserved because we do not have double or multiple
disbarments in this jurisdiction.35 In the meanwhile, on February 15, 2016, the
respondent filed a so-called Most Respectful Motion to Dismiss36 in which he
adverted to the earlier submission through his Manifestation filed on April 24,
201537 of the copy of the amicable settlement he had concluded with the
complainant to the effect that, among others, he had already paid back to the
latter, through his lawyer (Atty. Hope Ruiz Valenzuela), the amount of P650,000.00
"as full and complete settlement of the Complainant's claims against the
Respondent." He thereby sought the dismissal of the complaint out of "justice and
fairness." In the resolution promulgated on September 22, 2015, the Court merely
noted without action the Manifestation dated April 21, 2015.38 The Most
Respectful Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the amicable settlement between
the parties cannot be granted. Although the amicable settlement obliterated the
legal obligation to return to the complainant the amounts obtained by deceit, the
respondent was not entitled to demand the dismissal of the charges against him for
that reason. He ought to have known that his professional responsibilities as an
attorney were distinct from his other responsibilities. To be clear, the primary
objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline
the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove
from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their Lawyer's Oath has
proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of
the Bar.39
Moreover, the practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions.40
Every attorney is a vanguard of our legal system, and, as such, is expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also a very high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people's faith and confidence in
the legal system are ensured.41 He must then conduct himself, whether in dealing
with his clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at all times.42
Any violation of the high moral standards of the Legal Profession justifies the
imposition on the attorney of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.43 Verily, the respondent's deceitful conduct as an attorney rendered
him directly answerable to the Court on ethical, professional and legal grounds
despite the fact that he and the complainant had amicably settled any differences
they had that might have compelled to the complainant bring the complaint against
him. In fine, the gravity of the respondent's professional misconduct and deceit
should fully warrant his being permanently barred from reinstatement to the ranks
of the Philippine Bar and from having his name restored in the Roll of Attorneys.
However, circumstances attendant in his case should be considered and
appreciated in mitigating the penalty to be imposed.44 The first of such
circumstances related to the context of the engagement between the parties. Upon
reflecting on the adverse effects on his inheritance from his late mother of his
cousin's adoption by her, the complainant had engaged the respondent's legal
services and representation for the purpose of nullifying or undoing the adoption.
At the outset, the respondent was candid in explainingthat to the complainant the committed the offense complained of herein before the Court disbarred him in A.C.
prosecution of the case would be complicated mainly because the adoption had 7054. Meting the stiff fine despite his disbarment is a way for the Court to assert its
been decreed in 1979 yet, and also because the complainant, as a permanent authority and competence to discipline all acts and actuations committed by the
resident of the United States of America, would be thereby encountering difficulties members of the Legal Profession. The Court will not waver in doing so. But the fine
and high costs, aside from untold inconvenience due to his physical presence in the comes with the stem warning to the respondent that he must hereafter genuinely
country being needed every now and then.45 The respondent's candid explanations affirm his remorse and start to demonstrate his readiness and capacity to live up
notwithstanding, the complainant persisted in pursuing the case, impelling the once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the
respondent to take on the engagement. Bar in good standing and of every officer of the Court;55 otherwise, he would be be
sanctioned with greater severity.
Another circumstance is that the respondent had already returned to the
complainant the amount of P650,000.00 the former had received from the latter on WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR.
account of the professional engagement. The returned amount was in full and GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 15.06 and 15.07 of Canon 15, and
complete settlement of the latter's claims.46 Judicial precedents exist in which the Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but, in view of his
Court treated the return in full of the money the respondent attorneys had received continuing disbarment, hereby METES the penalty of FINE of Pl00,000.00. This
from their complaining clients as mitigating circumstances that lowered the decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
penalties imposed.47 For sure, the voluntary restitution by the respondent herein
of the amount received in the course of the professional engagement, even if it
would not lift the sanction meted on him, manifested remorse of a degree on his Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator
part for his wrongdoing, and was mitigating in his favor. for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and
And, thirdly, the Court cannot but note the respondent's several pleas for judicial guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and ( c) the Office of the Bar
clemency to seek his reinstatement in the ranks of the Philippine Bar.48 He has Confidant to be appended to the respondent's personal record as a member of the
backed up his pleas by adverting to his personal travails since his disbarment. He Bar.
claims, too, that his health has been failing of late considering that he had been
diagnosed to be suffering from chronic kidney disease, stage five, and has been
undergoing dialysis three times a week. 49 His advancing age and the fragile state SO ORDERED.
of his health may also be considered as a mitigating factor. 50 In addition, it is
noteworthy that he has been devoting some time to Christian and charity pursuits,
like serving with humility as a Lay Minister at St. Peter Church in Quezon City and as
a lecturer regular on the Legal Aspects of Marriage. 51 Pleas for judicial clemency
reflected further remorse and repentance on the part of the respondent. 52 His
pleas appear to be sincere and heartfelt. In human experience, remorse and
repentance, if coupled with sincerity, have always been regarded as the auspicious
start of forgiving on the part of the offended, and may eventually win even an
absolution for the remorseful. The Court will not be the last to forgive though it
may not forget. In view of the foregoing circumstances, perpetual disqualification
from being reinstated will be too grave a penalty in light of the objective of
imposing heavy penalties like disbarment to correct the offenders. 53 The penalty
ought to be tempered to enable his eventual reinstatement at some point in the
future. Verily, permanently barring the respondent from reinstatement in the Roll
of Attorneys by virtue of this disbarrable offense will deprive him the chance to
return to his former life as an attorney. To start the respondent on the long road to
reinstatement, we fine him in the amount of Pl00,000.00, a figure believed to be a
fair index of the gravity of his misdeeds. Less than such amount might undeservedly
diminish the gravity of his misdeeds. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that he
TOMAS P. TAN, JR. vs. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, A.C. No. 9000
DECISION
DEl.1 CASTILLO, J.:
This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint1 filed by Tomas P. Tan, Jr.
(complainant) against Atty ..Haide V. Gumba (respondent), and for which
respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six months. The issues now
ripe for resolution arc: a) whether respondent disobeyed a lavviul order of the
Court: by not abiding by the order of her suspension; and b) whether respondent
deserves a stiffer penalty for such violation. •
Factual Antecedents
According to complainant, in August 1999, respondent obtained from him a
P.350,000.00 loan with 12% interest per annum. Incidental thereto, respondent
executed in favor of complainant an undated Deed of Absolute Sale2 over a 105-
square meter lot !ocated in Naga City, and covered by Transfor Certificate of Title
No. 20553 under the name of respondent's father, Nicasio Vista. Attached to said
Deed was a Special Power of Attomey4 (SPA) executed by respondent's parents
authorizing her to apply for a loan with a bank to be s~cured by the subject
property. Complainant and respondent purportedly agreed that if the latter failed
to on or before August 2000, complainant may register the Deed of Absolute Sale
with the Register of Deeds (RD).5Respondent failed to pay her loan when it foll due.
And despite repeated demands, _she failed to settle her obligation. Complainant
attempted to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the RD of Naga City but to no
avaiJ because the aforesaid SPA only covered the authority of respondent to
mortgage the property to a bank, and not to sell it. Complainant argued that if not
for respondent's misrepresentation, he would not have approved her Imm. He
added that respondent committed dishonesty, used and her skill as a lawyer and
her moral ascendancy over him in securing the loan. Thus, he prayed that
respondent be sanctioned for her infraction. We agree with the findings and
conclusion of the IBP, but find that a reduction of the recommended penalty is
called for, pursuant to the principle that the appropriate penalty for an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.[12] Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer
may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[13] Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity
and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Here, respondent’s actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending
money to her through the use of documents and false representations and taking
advantage of her education and complainant’s ignorance in legal matters. As
manifested by complainant, he would have never granted the loan to respondent
were it not for respondents misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the
property and if respondent had not led him to believe that he could register the
open deed of sale if she fails to pay the loan.[14] By her misdeed, respondent has
eroded not only complainants perception of the legal profession but the publics
perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be
disciplined, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
We further note that after filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Responsive
Pleading, respondent wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of the IBP-CBD to file
her answer and to appear for the mandatory conferences despite due notice.
Respondent should bear in mind that she must acknowledge the orders of the IBP-
CBD in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP.[15] Complainant
now asks that respondent be disbarred. We find, however, that suspension from
the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. It is worth stressing that
the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be
imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of
the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should not be decreed.[16] In this case, the Court finds the penalty of suspension
more appropriate but finds the recommended penalty of suspension for one year
too severe. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a
suspension of six months is sufficient. After all, suspension is not primarily intended
as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.[17]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found administratively
liable for grave misconduct. She is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS, effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be spread
in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice thereof be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED.
ILUMINADA D. YUZON vs ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, A.C. No. 10684
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This administrative case arose from a Complaint1 filed by Iluminada Yuzon Vda. de
Rodriguez (Iluminada) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on
Bar Discipline (JBP-CBD) seeking to disbar Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron (Atty. Agleron ),
for misappropriating the amount of P.582,000.00 which the respondent lawyer
received in trust from the complainant.
Complainant's Position
Iluminada alleged that sometime on December 23, 2008, she gave Atty. Agleron the
amount of Php400,000.00, and on January. 12, 2009, the amount of P.600,000.00 in
Managers Check, or the total amount of One Million Pesos (Pl ,000,000.00) meant
for the purchase of a house and a lot of one Alexander Tenebroso (Alexander),
situated at Mati, Davao Oriental. However, since the intended purchase did not
materialize, Iluminada demanded the return of the aforesaid amounts that she
entrusted to Atty. Agleron, which the latter failed to return. On February 24, 2009,
Iluminada, through her lawyer Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil (Atty. Vivencio), through a
letter, demanded the return of the amount of P750,000.00. On March 2, 2009, Atty.
Agleron replied through a letter and explained that he already returned the amount
of P418,000.00, and that the remaining balance is only P,582,000.00 which shall be
paid upon payment of his client who borrowed the said amount for his emergency
operation after an accident which took place on January 13, 2009. Iluminada also
alleged that she filed an Estafa case under Article 315, paragraph l(B) of the Revised
Penal Code against Atty. Agleron.
Respondent's Position
Atty. Agleron, among others, claims that the amount of One Million Pesos
(Pl,000,000.00) was delivered to him at the Office of the Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Co., Davao City upon the maturity of two (2) postdated checks issued by
Reverend Pastor Apollo Quiboloy (Rev. Quiboloy); that the amount of P600,000.00
was delivered on December 15, 2008, and the other check which matured on
January 15, 2009, in the amount of P400,000.00, were all deposited with the
Philippine National Bank, Mati Branch for safekeeping, while awaiting for the
finalization of the transaction with Alexander regarding the acquisition of the house
subject of Civil Case No. 2287:-7-2007, then pending in the Municipal Trial Court of
Mati, Davao Oriental; and that the total amount of P438,000.00 was delivered to
herein Iluminada on different occasions, as per her request, and that the balance of
I!582,000.00 was never misappropriated and/or converted to the personal use and
benefit of Atty. Agleron as the said amount was borrowed for the emergency
operation of a client who, at that time has nobody to tum to for help. Thus, Atty.
Agleron's infraction should not warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of
disbarment. Atty. Agleron prayed that, if he be found guilty, the lesser penalty of
fine should be imposed considering he rendered almost fifty (50) years of service in
the government, and he is also an Officer and Member of the IBP, Davao Oriental
Chapter.
Report and Recommendation
After the mandatory conference on January 17, 2012 and upon a thorough
evaluation• of the evidence presented by the parties in their respective position
papers, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report and Recommendation, dated March 30,
2012, finding Atty. Agleron to have violated Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Agleron
administratively liable and recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for on~ (1) year. This ruling is based on Atty.
Agleron's admission that he is still in possession of the amount of P582,000.00.
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner is convinced that Atty. Agleron is guilty of
Gross Misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 for violating his duty to his client by
converting and using his client's money. Accordingly, the penalty of suspension of
one ( 1) year from the practice of law in any court was imposed on Atty. Agleron.
The various mitigating factors: that Atty. Agleron has been a Member and Officer of
the IBP Davao Oriental Chapter; that he has been in the practice of law, as Assistant
and later on as Provincial Fiscal; and, that he was able to retire from the
government service for a span of almost fifty (50) years sans any disciplinary records
were taken into consideration. The Commissioner also recommended the return to
Iluminada of the amount of P582,000.00 with legal interest of twelve percent (12%)
from May 5, 2010, with warning that a repetition of similar act shall be dealt with
more severely. In a Resolution3 dated August 31, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation. Atty. Agleron
moved for reconsideration,4 whereas Iluminada moved for a partial
reconsideration5 explaining that the penalty meted on Atty. Agleron dilutes the
very essence of the offense charged. However, both were denied by the IBP Board
of Governors through a Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-3296 dated May 4, 2014.
Atty. Agleron filed with this Court an Urgent Motion for the Immediate Lifting of the
Order of Suspension dated August 31, 2013,7 and affirmed by Resolution No. XXI-
2014-3298 dated May 4, 2014, of the IBP Board of Governors. Thus, this Court
issued a Resolution9 dated January 18, 2016 referring to the Office of the Bar
Confidant ( OBC) Atty. Agleron' s Urgent Motion for the Immediate Lifting of the
Order of Suspension.
The OBC recommended that the merit of this case be finally resolved by this Court
for the proper determination of the order of suspension imposed on Atty. Agleron.
The OBC further recommended that Atty. Agleron's Urgent Motion for the
Immediate Lifting of the Order of issued Suspension by the IBP on August 31, 2013,
be denied.
The Issue before the Court: The basic issue, in this case, is the effectivity of the
order of suspension imposed on Atty. Agleron.
The Court's Ruling
The Court resolves to adopt the findings of fact of the IBP.
Here, there is no question as to whether or not the respondent lawyer
misappropriated the amount of money the complainant entrusted to him, since
Atty. Agleron already admitted the same, in clear violation of his fiduciary duty to
his client. Jurisprudence is instructive that a lawyer's failure to return upon demand
the monies he/she holds for his/her client gives rise to the presumption that he/she
has appropriated the said monies for his/her own use, to the prejudice and in
violation of the trust reposed in him/her by his/her client. Proceeding from the
premise that indeed Atty. Agleron merely wanted to help another client who is
going through financial woes, he, nevertheless, acted in disregard of his duty as a
lawyer with respect to Iluminada. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as
well as of professional ethics. It is of no moment as well that Atty. Agleron's
property has been subjected to a levy; 12 thus, his claim in his Urgent Motion for
the Immediate Lifting of the Order of Suspension 13 that with such levy he has even
overpaid Iluminada, considering that the total value of his property is ~2,912,000.00
is bereft of merit. Levy is defined as the act or acts by which an officer of the law
and court sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of the loser's Gudgment
debtor's) property for the purpose of eventually conducting an execution sale to the
end that the writ of execution may be satisfied, and the judgment debt, paid. 14
Thus, there must be an execution sale first before he can claim that he already
complied with his legal obligation.
Further, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) when he failed to return upon demand the
amount Iluminada entrusted to him, viz.: CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN
TRUST ALL MONIES AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of
this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client. 16 Thus, a lawyer's failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case,
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. As to the issue on when is the
effectivity of the order of suspension, the OBC aptly explained in its Report and
Recommendation dated February 16, 2016, that the Court merely noted the IBP's
Notice of Resolution which suspended Atty. Agleron from the practice of law and
that such act does not imply the approval of the same. Here, this Court is yet to
finally resolve first the merit of this administrative case. Thus, the effectivity of the
order of suspension has not actually commenced and it is erroneous on Atty.
Agleron's part to claim in his Motion 18 dated August 6, 2015, that he has already
served the one (1) year suspension from the date of the issuance of the IBP Notice
of Resolution on August 31, 2013, to August 31, 2014, is bereft of merit.
Jurisprudence is instructive that as guardian of the legal profession, this Court has
the ultimate disciplinary power over members of the Bar to ensure that the highest
standards of competence, honesty and fair dealing are maintained. 19 Verily, this
Court has the final say on imposition of sanctions to be imposed on errant members
of both bench and bar, this Court has the prerogative of making its own findings
and rendering judgment on the basis thereof rather than that of the IBP, OSG, or
any lower court to whom an administrative complaint has been referred to for
investigation and report. 20
Section 12 of Rule 139-B reads:
Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors. -
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines
that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it
shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron is hereby held GUILTY of Gross
Misconduct in violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as
Rules 16.01and16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely. Respondent is also ORDERED to PAY complainant
the amount of Five Hundred Eighty-Two Thousand Pesos (P582,000.00), with twelve
percent (12%) interest from the date of demand until June 30, 2013 and six percent
(6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record
of respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
ROMAN DELA ROSA VERANO vs. ATTY. LUIS FERNAN DIORES, JR.,
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case stemmed from a letter-complaint1 filed with the Court on
February 2, 2011 by complainant Roman Dela Rosa Verano (Verano) against
respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr. (Atty. Diores) for deceit, malpractice, gross
ignorance of the law and violation of the Lawyer's Oath for surreptitiously using
Verano's parcel of land to secure bail bonds in connection with at least 61 cases of
Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) that had been filed
against Atty. Diores.2
The salient facts, as borne by the records, are the following:
On April 11, 2006, Verano executed a Special Power of Attomey3 (SP A) in favor of
Atty. Diores authorizing the latter to use Verano's parcel of land covered by TCT No.
T-77901 (subject property) as guaranty to obtain a bail bond for particular criminal
cases4 that had been filed against Atty. Diores.
Verano was surprised when he subsequently discovered that Atty. Diores executed
a Memorandum of Agreement5 (MOA) dated August 31, 2006 with Visayan Surety
and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety) in order to use the subject property as
guarantee to obtain bail bonds for at least 61 cases of Estafa and Violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 that had been filed against him, which included, among others, Criminal
Case Nos. CBU-48996 and CBU-49706, which were filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Cebu City (RTC). Verano alleged that he did not authorize Atty.
Diores to enter into such MOA, much less to use the subject property as collateral
for bail bonds of the more than 61 Estafa cases filed against the latter which were
other than those he authorized under the SPA, causing great loss and damage to
Verano. Thereafter, the aforementioned RTC branch, through Presiding Judge Ester
M. Veloso, promulgated a Joint Judgment6 dated November 16, 2009 in the said
Criminal Case Nos. CBU-48996 and CBU-49706 together with Criminal Case Nos.
CBU-50599, CBU-50279, CBU-50335 and CBU-51277, finding Atty. Diores guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of Estafa through false pretenses and
fraudulent means under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code by engaging in
a Ponzi scheme,7 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused Luis F. Diores, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of the crime of Estafa and sentences him as
follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-50599, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the off ended party Irene
Lumapas the sum of [₱]3,050,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from June
2, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-48996, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the offended party Calixto
Ventic the sum of [₱]500,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from December
7, 1998 until such time that the amount is paid in full;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-49706, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the offended party Lilia Amy
Ursal the sum of [₱]416,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from March 2,
1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full;
(4) In Criminal Case No. CBU-50279, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the offended party Rolando
Chiu the sum of [₱]660,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from May 4, 1999
until such time that the amount is paid in full;
(5) In Criminal [Case] No. CBU-50335, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the offended party Philholina
Villamor the sum of [₱]200,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from May 8,
1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full; and
(6) In Criminal Case No. CBU-51277, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as max, and to pay the offended party John Michael
Velez the sum of [₱]2,100,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from August 2,
1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full. SO ORDERED
Thus, Verano filed this letter-complaint against Atty. Diores. In its Resolutions dated
March 9, 20119 and November 28, 2011,10 the Court directed Atty. Diores to file
his comment on the letter-complaint. However, Atty. Diores failed to file any
comment despite notice. Consequently, in its Resolution11 dated July 25, 2012, the
Court considered as waived the filing of Atty. Diores' comment, and referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. At the scheduled mandatory conference before the IBP on April
1, 2013,12 only Verano appeared together with his counsel, Atty. Manuel F. Ong.
Atty. Diores, on the other hand, failed to appear despite notice.13 Thereafter,
Verano filed his position paper,14 adding that subsequent to the filing of the letter-
complaint before the Court, Atty. Diores had jumped bail in some of his criminal
cases and had failed to serve his sentence on some of the decided cases against him
which had already become final and executory.15 Atty. Diores, on the other hand,
failed to file his position paper. After due proceedings, Commissioner Eldrid C.
Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera) rendered a Report and Recommendation16
on June 18, 2013, finding Atty. Diores guilty of deceit in violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), holding that Atty. Diores:
(1) took undue advantage of the trust reposed on him by Verano by secretly
entering into the subject MOA; (2) jumped bail on some of the criminal cases and
failed to serve sentence in those where he was duly convicted by final judgment;
and (3) refused to comply with the orders of the Court and the IBP to submit his
comment and position paper, and to attend the mandatory conference. The
dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is recommended
that respondent be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.18
In its Resolution19 dated October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve the said Report and Recommendation, but recommended that
Atty. Diores be disbarred, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A ", and considering that Respondent is liable for deceit in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility aggravated by his
recalcitrance to legal orders in his refusal to comply with the resolution of the
Supreme Court for him to file Comment and his deliberate failure to file his Position
Paper with the IBP and attend the Mandatory Conference before the Investigating
Commissioner, Atty. Luis Fernan Diores[, Jr.] is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.20 After a judicious
examination of the records and submissions of the parties, the Court has no
compelling reason to diverge from the factual findings of Commissioner Antiquiera
and the recommended penalty of the IBP Board of Governors. In dealing with
clients or other people, lawyers are expected to observe the highest degree of good
faith, fairness and candor, both in their private and professional capacities.
Thus, any form of deception or fraudulent act committed by a lawyer in either
capacity is not only disgraceful and dishonorable, but also severely undermines the
trust and confidence of people in the legal profession, violates Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the CPR, and puts the lawyer's moral character into serious doubt as a member of
the Bar, rendering him unfit to continue his practice of law.21 Moreover, a lawyer
has the duty to obey lawful orders of a superior court and the IBP. Willful
disobedience to such orders, especially to those issued by this Court, is a sufficient
ground to disbar a lawyer or suspend him from the practice of law under Section
27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.23 In this case, Commissioner Antiquiera
observed that while there was an SPA executed by Verano in favor of Atty. Di ores
for the latter to use Verano's land as guarantee for the bail bonds, it only authorized
Atty. Diores to use the same for specific criminal cases, and not for the other
criminal cases filed against him. In addition, Atty. Diores failed to file his comment
to Verano's letter-complaint filed against him despite two (2) notices from the Court
ordering him to do so, failed to attend the mandatory conference and file his
position paper despite orders from the IBP, and jumped bail in the criminal cases
filed against him. The Court agrees with Commissioner Antiquiera's observation.
While the SPA executed by Verano empowered Atty. Diores, in his private capacity,
to use the subject property as guaranty for his bail bond in some of his criminal
cases, this did not grant him carte blanche to use the said property to secure bail
bonds in his other criminal cases which were not included in the SP A, much less
enter into a MOA with Visayan Surety for the said purpose. Such act not only
violates the trust granted to him by Verano, but also shows doubt as to his moral
character.
Moreover, the fact that Atty. Diores jumped bail in the criminal cases filed against
him, failed to file a comment in the instant case despite notice from the Court, and
also failed to attend the mandatory conference and file his position paper when he
was directed to do so by the IBP, shows his propensity to willfully disobey the
orders - of the Court, no less - and other judicial authorities, including the IBP,
which is a grave affront to the legal profession, and which should be penalized to
the greatest extent. As for the recommended penalty, the Court agrees with, and
hereby adopts, the IBP's recommendation that Atty. Diores should be disbarred, in
view of the totality of infractions he had committed, compounded by his conviction
for six (6) counts of Estafa by the RTC. It is also well-settled that Estafa, which is an
act of defrauding another person, whether committed through abuse of confidence,
false pretenses or other fraudulent acts,24 is a crime involving moral turpitude25
which is also a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and a ground to disbar or
suspend a lawyer as gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Here, Atty. Diores was convicted of not only one, but six (6) counts of Estafa
through false pretenses and fraudulent means under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. Such conviction simply shows his criminal tendency to defraud
and deceive other people into remitting to him their hard-earned money, which the
legal profession condemns in the strongest terms. This, together with his willful
disobedience of court orders and his act of using Verano's subject property as
guaranty for his bail bond outside the criminal cases wherein he was authorized,
cements his utter unfitness to continue exercising his duties as a lawyer. Thus, the
Court will not hesitate to adopt the penalty of the IBP and hereby disbar Atty.
Diores to protect the trust and confidence of the people in this noble profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr. is found GUILTY of Deceit in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Willful
Disobedience to a Lawful Order of the Court and Conviction for Estafa, both in
violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1âwphi1 He is hereby
DISBARRED, and his name is ordered STRICKEN FROM the Roll of Attorneys effective
immediately upon the date of his receipt of this Decision.
Atty. Diores is hereby DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court
that his disbarment has commenced, copy furnished to all courts and quasi-judicial
bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel. Let copies of this Decision
be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to Atty. Di ores' personal record as a member of the Bar. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10564, MANUEL L. VALIN AND HONORIO L. VALIN vs. ATTY. ROLANDO T.
RUIZ
DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
Before the Court is an Administrative Complaint1 filed by complainants Manuel L.
Valin (Manuel) and Honorio L. Valin (Honoria) with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) committing forgery and
falsification of a deed of absolute sale, in breach of his lawyer's oath and in violation
of the laws. The complainants averred that they are two of the surviving children of
their deceased parents, spouses Pedro F. Valin (Pedro) and Cecilia Lagadon (Cecilia).
Pedro was the original registered owner of a parcel of land (subject land) located in
San Andres, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, with an area of 833 square meters and covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P- 3275(S ). Pedro died on December 7,
1992 while he was in Oahu, Honolulu, Hawaii.3 Several years later, Honorio
discovered that the subject land has been transferred to respondent, the godson of
Pedro, resulting in the cancellation of OCT No. P-3275(S), and the issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11655(s)4 in the name of respondent. He
learned from the Register of Deeds of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (RD) that the subject
land was conveyed to respondent in consideration of ₱10,000.00 by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale (subject deed),5 dated July 15, 1996, and executed in
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan purportedly by Pedro with the alleged consent of his
spouse, Cecilia. The complainants alleged that the subject deed was obviously
falsified and the signatures therein of Pedro and Cecilia were forgeries because
Pedro was already dead and Cecilia was in Hawaii at that time. They also asserted
that Pedro's Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 2259388, which was used to
identify Pedro in the deed, was also falsified as it was issued only on January 2, 1996
long after Pedro's death. The complainants pointed to respondent as the author of
the falsifications and forgeries because the latter caused the registration of the
subject land unto his name and because he was the one who benefited from the
same. In his Answer,6 respondent claimed that Rogelio L. Valin (Rogelio), one of the
children of Pedro and Cecilia, sold the subject land to him sometime in 1989
allegedly in representation of Pedro. He recalled that Rogelio approached him for
financial assistance to defray the expenses of the surgical operation of his son.
Rogelio offered to sell the subject land and claimed that it was his share in their
family's properties. Respondent agreed to buy the subject land out of compassion.
He asked Rogelio for his authority to sell the subject land but the latter claimed that
he could not locate his authority from his parents in their house.7 Respondent
claimed that he knew that it was hard to transfer the title because the title owner,
Pedro, was out of the country at the time of the sale and without a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) for the purpose; thus, Rogelio undertook to transfer the title.8
Respondent also denied having knowledge regarding the execution of the subject
deed in 1996. He insisted that he neither falsified the said deed and Pedro's CTC No.
2259388 nor forged the signatures of Pedro and Cecilia as it was Rogelio who
processed the transfer of the title of the subject land in his name. He explained that
when the subject land was sold in 1989, Rogelio, as the vendor, undertook to
process the transfer of the title of the subject land. Respondent further clarified
that in 1996, he instructed his house helper, Judelyn Baligad (Baligad), to sign the
release of the title in his name because at that time he was busy to go to the RD to
sign the release for himself as per instruction of Rogelio's messenger.9 In their
Reply,10 the complainants stressed that the document, which was a falsified deed,
was executed in 1996. They also pointed out that records from the RD revealed that
on August 19, 1996, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-11655(s) was released
to Baligad, the housemaid of respondent. In fact, respondent admitted in his
answer that he instructed Baligad to pick up the said copy from the RD as he was
busy at that time. Thus, respondent's sweeping denial of any knowledge with
respect to the subject deed is unmeritorious and his claim of good faith must be
denied. In his Rejoinder,11 respondent imputed the falsification of the deed to
Rogelio arguing that he must have forged the signatures of his parents in his
attempt to have the title of the subject land transferred to respondent. After the
parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was submitted for the
IBP-CBD's resolution.
Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation,12 dated April 26, 2011, the IBP-CBD found
respondent to be unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney. It reasoned
that as the beneficiary of the falsified deed, respondent was presumed to be the
author thereof. The IBP-CBD opined that he failed to overcome this presumption
despite his attempt to deflect the blame to Rogelio for his failure to adduce
evidence in support of his claim. The IBP-CBD also dismissed respondent's claim
that the transaction was a private one and not in connection with his profession. It
emphasized that good moral character and moral fitness transcends the
professional personality of a lawyer. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In
its Resolution No. XX-2013-207,13 dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP Board) resolved to adopt and approve the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD for the suspension of respondent from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
but the IBP Board denied it in the assailed Resolution No. XXI-2014-98,14 dated
March 21, 2014.
Dissatisfied, respondent filed a petition before the Court arguing that:
I. THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES - BOARD OF GOVERNORS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED MARCH 20, 2013 AND
MARCH 21, 2014 BY CONCLUDING [RESPONDENT] HAS COMMITTED A
MISCONDUCT IN HIS PRACTICE OF LAW AND AS A CONSEQUENCE RECOMMENDED
HIS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW;
II. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES - BOARD OF
GOVERNORS HAS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS IN THE
CHARGES AGAINST THE [RESPONDENT] FOR SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, MUCH MORE
AS A BASIS FOR HIS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW AS THE EXTANT OF
THE RECORDS IS DEVOID OF ANY SUPPORT AND FOR BEING GLARINGLY
ERRONEOUS.15
Respondent avers that in 1989, he initially declined to buy the subject property
from Rogelio because he could not produce his authority to sell the land; that he
sympathized with Rogelio, thus, he was convinced to buy the subject property with
the understanding that the latter would take the necessary steps to transfer the
title in respondent's name; that he acted in good faith in dealing with Rogelio in his
private capacity and he paid ₱26,000.00 for the consideration of the sale; that the
subject deed executed in 1996 does not show any participation on the part of
respondent; and that the written authority to sell of Rogelio actually existed and is
attached in his petition, but it was not presented before the IBP. In a Resolution,16
dated October 14, 2014, the Court required the complainants to file their comment
within ten (10) days from notice thereof. The complainants, however, failed to file
the required comment within the stated period.17 On March 1, 2016, the case was
submitted for resolution.18
The Court's Ruling
The Court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP-CBD and the
recommendation of the IBP Board. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach
at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition
of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.19
Further, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the
land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from
consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the
best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to
his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the
rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the CPR. In this light, Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the CPR provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice."20 It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law
during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him.
Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney's right to
practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on
conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney.21 In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers,
the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof.22 In this case, the complainants allege that respondent breached
his lawyer's oath and violated the law because he falsified the subject deed of sale
in 1996 to acquire the land of Pedro even though the latter died in 1992. On the
other hand, respondent claims that he had nothing to do with the sale in 1996;
rather, he imputes the execution of the subject deed and its registration to Rogelio,
brother of the complainants. The Court finds that respondent violated the lawyer's
oath, Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR.
Respondent's disclaimer as to his participation in the forged deed of absolute sale is
incredible as he benefited from it As pointed out in the IBP-CBD Report and
Recommendation:
The respondent would like the Commission to believe that Rogelio Valin authored
the falsification of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1996, present the same
to the Register of Deeds so that a new title can be issued in his name. Such
allegations are specious at best. No evidence had been adduced by the respondent
to substantiate such allegation. "Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are
not equivalent to proof' (Real vs. Belo, 513 [SCRA] 111). Moreover the Commission
finds it unbelievable that after seven (7) years, Rogelio Valin will be bothered by his
conscience for not fulfilling his commitment to transfer OCT No. P-3275(s) in the
name of his father, Pedro Valin, to the name of the respondent by falsifying a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1996 and making it appear that his deceased father,
Pedro Valin, sold OCT No. P-3275 to herein respondent and in the process risk being
sued for falsification of public documents. Moreover, records will show that Rogelio
Valin was one of the complainants who filed cases against the respondent in
connection with the subject property. Such posturing runs counter to respondent's
insinuation that Rogelio Valin was the culprit in the falsification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1996.23 From the time that the sale of the subject land
was negotiated in 1989 until it was executed and registered through the subject
deed in 1996, there were patent irregularities, which respondent cannot ignore.
First, in 1989, respondent admitted that he entered into with Rogelio a contract of
deed of sale over the subject property owned and registered to Pedro without any
SPA. As a lawyer, he knows that "[w]hen a sale of a piece of land or any interest
therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise,
the sale shall be void."24 Respondent even admitted that it would be difficult to
transfer the title of the subject land because the title owner Pedro is out of the
country at the time of the sale and without a SPA for that purpose.25 As early as
1989, respondent was aware that the sale of the subject land without proper
authorization was null and void.
Second, in spite of the deficient SPA from Rogelio's father, respondent allowed
many years to pass without probing him regarding the sale of the land. He did not
exert any effort to communicate with Rogelio. In all those times, respondent did not
demand from Rogelio his written authority to sell the subject land to ensure that
the sale would have a mark of regularity considering that he had paid the purchase
price. He continued to ignore the reality that Rogelio was precluded to sell the
subject land without the SPA of his parents. This is obviously contrary to human
experience.
Third, it is a difficult pill to swallow that respondent was oblivious of Pedro's death
in 1992. He admitted in his petition that he is a close family friend and godson of
Pedro.26 Certainly, he could not claim such strong ties to the family of Pedro if he
never heard about the latter's demise. Even after the lapse of four (4) years or in
1996, it would be arduous to believe that respondent was still ignorant of the
demise of his close family friend and godfather.
Fourth, in 1996, respondent directed his house helper Baligad to sign the release of
the title in his name. He admitted in his answer that he instructed Baligad to go to
the RD and sign for him the release of the title because he was busy at that time.27
Conchita P. Baustita, a former employee of the RD, also attested that Baligad indeed
came to the RD to sign the release of the title in behalf of respondent on August 19,
1996.28 Evidently, respondent was knowledgeable that the title was issued in his
name because he instructed his house helper to finalize the release of the title.
Respondent was neither surprised nor doubtful of the title's release in his name in
1996. He never attempted to contact Rogelio to verify if he was the one who
transferred the property to his name. He also did not immediately request the
production of his authority to sell the subject land. Respondent had the opportunity
and resources to verify the veracity of the subject deed in 1996, which caused the
transfer of Pedro's land to him. Regrettably, he continued to feign ignorance of the
irregularities that attended the transaction.
Fifth, the subject deed executed in 1996 was readily available at the RD.
Respondent could have effortlessly and briefly verified the said deed, which was the
basis of the transfer of the title to him. It is to be noted that the subject deed was
not signed by Rogelio on behalf of Pedro; rather, it was purportedly signed by Pedro
personally and confirmed by Cecilia. Evidently, the sale contemplated by the said
deed was not anymore a sale through an agent, which was the original agreement
of respondent and Rogelio back in 1989. The consideration stated in the subject
deed, in the amount of ₱l 0,000.00, did not reflect the alleged purchase price of
₱26,000.00 given by respondent in 1989.
Further, the subject deed was executed in Tugegarao, Cagayan when respondent
knows fully well that Pedro and Cecilia are residing in Hawaii as early as
1989.1âwphi1 In the same light, it would be impossible to notarize the subject deed
in 1996 before a notary public considering that Pedro was already dead. Also, the
subject deed mentioned CTC No. 2259388, dated January 2, 1996, issued to Pedro,
which is patently falsified because Pedro has passed away at that time. Again,
respondent did not bother to even read the subject deed of sale which contains
obvious and palpable irregularities; rather, he continued to disregard them for his
own convenience.
Sixth, as a lawyer, respondent is fully aware of the requisites for the legality of deed
of sale and its registration. He knows how important it is to ensure that the
registered instrument is complete and regular on its face. He is also duty-bound to
denounce illegally acquired deeds of sale, which deceive and betray the general
public. Instead of assailing its validity, respondent continuously and completely
utilized to his benefits the subject land obtained through the falsified deed. As
reflected in TCT No. T-11655(s), he even mortgaged the subject land to Philippine
National Bank, Sanchez Mira Branch as a security for a loan.29 In fine, the Court is
convinced that respondent is the author or, at the very least, has connived with the
author of the subject deed and Pedro's CTC for his personal benefits. Respondent
incessantly closed his eyes until he became blind to the anomalies surrounding the
sale of the subject land. Whether through deliberate intent or gross negligence, he
participated in the successful registration and release of the title that originated
from an absolutely falsified deed of sale. As discussed above, there have been
numerous occasions that respondent could have stopped and noted the red flags
apparent throughout the transaction. Disappointingly, he chose to profit from the
falsified deed, devoid of any empathy that his actions would damage innocent third
persons. Respondent's acts are inconsistent with the sacred oath to do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any. Respondent cannot finger point
culpability to Rogelio. Respondent’s attempts to impute the falsification of the
subject deed and Pedro's CTC to Rogelio because it was the latter who allegedly
promised to transfer the title of the subject land.
The Court is not convinced.
It is highly unbelievable that, after seven (7) years and without any communication
or notice whatsoever,30 Rogelio will suddenly process the transfer of Pedro's
property to respondent out of sheer goodwill and that he was willing to move to
great lengths to fulfill his promise by falsifying the signature of his dead father in
disposing his parents' land. Curiously, respondent failed to show proof that he
demanded from Rogelio to effect the transfer the subject land; respondent did not
even see him anymore after 1989.31 Rogelio has left for Hawaii and have been
residing there up to the present.32 Further, the subject deed of sale does not even
reflect the name of Rogelio, but it was signed by Pedro and Cecilia. The sale
manifested by the said deed was not anymore a sale through an agent, which was
the agreement between respondent and Rogelio back in 1989. Rogelio does not
have any more participation in the subject deed. Indubitably, since respondent is
the ultimate beneficiary of the falsified deed of sale, he is presumed to be the
author of the subject deed.
The purported written authority of Pedro is immaterial. In his last ditch attempt to
evade responsibility, respondent presented for the first time on appeal a purported
written authority, dated September 13, 1989, signed by Pedro permitting Rogelio to anything to verify the validity of the subject deed and its registration in spite of the
sell the subject land.33 The said authority is originally captioned as a special power numerous badges of fraud. He is presumed the author as he was the only
of attorney; however, it bore an erasure and it reads as an authorization of beneficiary thereof. Because of his actions, the complainants were deprived with
attorney. The written authority, however, is irrelevant and incredible in light of the their share as compulsory heirs. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the
circumstances in the present case. Respondent plainly admitted that the title owner recommendation of the IBP-CBD and the resolution of the IBP Board that
Pedro is out of the country at the time of the sale and Rogelio was without a SPA for respondent should be meted with the penalty of suspension from the practice of
that purpose.34 Thus, the Court wonders how the said written authority law for two years.
suspiciously conjured itself out of thin air when respondent had confessed that it
was not existing at the time of the alleged sale in 1989. Further, the purported WHEREFORE, Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz is found guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath,
written authority deserves scant consideration. The said authority was allegedly Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court
executed by Pedro at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan on September 13, 1989. However, hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years effective
respondent earlier admitted that in 1989, Pedro was out of the country,35 thus, he immediately, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will
could not have signed the same. The written authority is immaterial because Pedro be dealt with even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt
died in 1992 and it had lost its force and effect then. It cannot be used for any of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take
purpose whatsoever. Moreover, the subject deed in 1996 was not anymore a sale effect. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to
through an agent as it was purportedly signed by Pedro and Cecilia personally. Thus, be entered into respondent Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz's records. Copies shall likewise be
the written authority is irrelevant in the subject deed. In any case, respondent must furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
face the music in view of his questionable actions regarding the registration and Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned. SO ORDERED.
release of the subject title through the falsified deed. That the transaction is private
in nature, not in relation to the practice of law, is not an excuse; Respondent
violated the lawyer's oath and Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR when he participated
and benefited from the falsified deed. Even though he acted in his personal capacity
in the improper sale and registration of the subject, he is not excused from liability.
A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts
which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable
opinion of the public. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may
not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.36 Jurisprudence provides different ranges of penalties in cases where the
lawyer participates in the execution of a falsified deed involving a dead party. In
Magaway v. Avecilla,37 the erring lawyer notarized a deed of sale even though the
party was already dead for 27 years and he was suspended from the practice of law
for one year. In Serzo v. Flores,38 the erring lawyer notarized a deed of absolute
sale when one of the parties had long been dead and he was suspended from the
practice of law for two years. On the other hand, in Sicat v. Ariola, Jr.,39 the Court
imposed the ultimate penalty of disbarment against a lawyer who falsified a special
power of attorney, which led to the wrongful encashment of a check worth
₱3,700,000.00 to the prejudice of the government. In Velasco v. Doroin,40 two
erring lawyers forged a deed of sale and they forced complainant to sign the deed
of extrajudicial settlement to deprive her of her share. One of the lawyers was
suspended indefinitely; while the other was disbarred for absconding the criminal
case against him. In this case, respondent participated in the registration and
release of subject title in his favor with the use of the falsified deed of sale. Pedro
has long been dead when the subject deed was executed. Respondent did not do
A.C. No. 10333, CORNELIO V. YAGONG, vs. CITY PROSECUTOR NEOPITO ED G.
MAGNO
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The present case is an administrative complaint filed by Cornelio V. Yagong against
City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia
for alleged violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
David Flores charged complainant Cornelio V. Yagong and his neighbor, Jimmy
Coronel, with violation of Presidential Decree (PD) 16121 and theft, respectively,
before the City Prosecution Office of Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte.
Yagong claimed that when he filed his Counter-Affidavit on January 2, 2012,
respondents City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and Assistant City Prosecutor
Don S. Garcia had already come out with their Resolution indicting them of said
criminal cases. He contended that Magno and Garcia were bias and partial, and into
the scheme of money-making for a favorable resolution. Thus, he filed the present
administrative complaint. On the other hand, Magno and Garcia insisted that in
resolving cases filed before their office, they are only guided by the concepts of
prevailing laws and jurisprudence in conducting Preliminary Investigations. They
filed the proper Information against Yagong in the performance of their official
functions. As a matter of procedure, the complaint against Yagong and Coronel was
raffled among the associate prosecutors for Preliminary Investigation. The case was
then assigned to Garcia for evaluation as to the existence of probable cause to
warrant indictment. After a thorough examination of all the evidence adduced by
the parties, Garcia found the existence of probable cause. In his capacity as the
Approving Authority, Magno authorized the consequent filing of the Criminal
Information for Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against Yagong. On January 30,
2016, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Magno and
Garcia, to wit:2 WHEREFORE, the instant complaint filed against respondents - City
Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and Associate City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia is
hereby DISMISSED. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. On September 24, 2016, the IBP
Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXII-2016-542,3 which adopted the
foregoing recommendation, hence: RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner dismissing the complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the findings and
recommendation of the IBP that the instant administrative complaint must be
dismissed. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such,
the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the most
imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. As a
rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
proffered against him until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the
court, he has performed his duties in accordance with his oath. In disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and the Court will
exercise its disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence. Considering the serious consequence of
disbarment, this Court has consistently held that only a clear preponderant
evidence would warrant the imposition of such a harsh penalty.
It means that the record must disclose as free from doubt a case that compels the
exercise by the court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act
done, as well as the motivation thereof, must be clearly demonstrated.4
Here, Yagong miserably failed to discharge said burden.
Indubitably, Magno and Garcia were only performing their official duties of
ascertaining whether or not probable cause exists in the case before them, and
filing the necessary Information if probable cause is found present. A preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to
prepare his Complaint or Information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no objective except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is guilty
thereof. In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not decide
whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of respondent. A
prosecutor merely determines the existence of probable cause, and to file the
corresponding information if he finds it to be so. In the exercise of their powers and
in the discharge of their functions and responsibilities, prosecutors enjoy the
presumption of regularity. This presumption of regularity includes the public
officer's official actuations in all the phases of his work.5
The Court reiterates that protection is afforded to members of the Bar who are at
times maliciously charged. Yagong's failure to discharge its burden of showing that
the acts of the respondent lawyers truly violated the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath
warrants the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court DISMISSES the instant
Complaint against City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and Assistant City
Prosecutor Don S. Garcia for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5573, GIZALE O. TUMBAGA vs. ATTY. MANUEL P. TEOXON,
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Gizale O.
Tumbaga against respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teox.on, charging him with gross
immorality, deceitful and fraudulent conduct, and gross misconduct. The parties
hereto paint contrastive pictures not only of their respective versions of the events
but also of their negative portrayals of each other's character. They are, thus,
separately outlined below.
The Complaint
In a verified complaint1 dated October 9, 2001 filed directly with the Court,
complainant narrated that she met respondent sometime in September 1999. He
was then the City Legal Officer of Naga City from whom complainant sought legal
advice. After complainant consulted with him a few times, he visited her often at
her residence and brought gifts for her son, Al Greg Tumbaga. Respondent even
volunteered to be the godfather of Al Greg. In one of his visits, respondent assured
complainant's mother that although he was already married to Luzviminda Balang,2
his marriage was a sham because their marriage contract was not registered. In
view of respondent's persistence and generosity to her son, complainant believed
his representation that he was eligible to marry her.
Complainant averred that on December 19, 1999, she moved in with respondent at
the Puncia Apartment in Naga City. In April 2000, she became pregnant.
Respondent allegedly wanted to have the baby aborted but complainant refused.
After the birth of their son, Billy John, respondent spent more time with them. He
used their apartment as a temporary law office and he lived there for two to three
days at a time. After Billy John was baptized, complainant secured a Certificate of
Live Birth from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Naga City and gave it to
respondent to sign. He hesitantly signed it and volunteered to facilitate its filing.
After respondent failed to file the same, complainant secured another form and
asked respondent to sign it twice. On February 15, 2001, the Certificate of Live Birth
was registered. Thereafter, complainant related that respondent rarely visited
them. To make ends meet, she decided to work in a law office in Naga City.
However, respondent compelled her to resign, assuring her that he would take care
of her financial needs. As respondent failed to fulfill his promise, complainant
sought assistance from the Office of the City Fiscal in Naga City on the second week
of March 2001. In the early morning of the conference set by said office,
respondent gave complainant an affidavit of support and told her there was no
need for him to appear in the conference. Complainant showed the affidavit to
Fiscal Elsa Mampo, but the latter advised her to have the respondent sign the
affidavit again. Fiscal Mampo was unsure of the signature in the affidavit as she was
familiar with respondent's signature. Complainant confronted respondent about
the affidavit and he half-heartedly affixed his true signature therein. In May 2001,
complainant went to respondent's office as he again reneged on his promise of
support. To appease her anger, respondent executed a promissory note. However,
he also failed to honor the same. In June· 2001, complainant moved out of the
Puncia Apartment as respondent did not pay the rentals therefor anymore. In the
evening of September 9, 2001, respondent raided complainant's new residence,
accompanied by three SWAT members and his wife. Visibly drunk, respondent
threatened to hurt complainant with the bolo and the lead pipe that he was
carrying if she will not return the personal belongings that he left in their previous
apartment unit. As respondent barged into the apartment, complainant sought help
from the SWAT members and one of them was able to pacify respondent.
Respondent's wife also tried to attack complainant, but she too was prevailed upon
by the SWAT members. The incident was recorded in the police blotter. To
corroborate her allegations, complainant attached the following documents to her
complaint, among others: (a) pictures showing respondent lying in a bed holding
Billy John,3 respondent holding Billy John in a beach setting,4 complainant holding
Billy John in a beach setting,5 respondent holding Billy John in a house setting,6 and
respondent and complainant seated beside each other in a restaurant7 ; (b) the
Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John with an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity showing respondent's signature8 ; (c) the
affidavit of support9 executed by respondent; (d) the promissory note10 executed
by respondent; (e) the police blotter entry11 dated September 9, 2001; and (f)
copies of pleadings12 showing the signature of respondent.
Respondent's Answer
In his answer,13 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He asserted
that complainant merely wanted to exact money from him. Respondent alleged
that he became the godfather of complainant's son, Al Greg, but he was only one of
four sponsors. He began to visit complainant's residence to visit his godson. He also
denied being the father of Billy John since complainant supposedly had several live-
in partners. He cited the affidavit of Antonio Orogo, complainant's uncle, to attest
to his allegations. According to the affidavit, Al Greg is the son of the complainant's
live-in partner named Orac Barrameda. Cpmplainant allegedly used Al Greg to
extort money from Alfrancis Bichara, the former governor of Albay, with whom
complainant also had a sexual relationship. Respondent denied that he lived
together with complainant at the Puncia Apartment since he was already married.
As complainant was his kumadre, he would pass by her house whenever he visited
the house of Representative Sulpicio S. Roco, Jr. Respondent was then a member of
Representative Roco's legislative staff. Sometimes, respondent would leave a bag of
clothing in complainant's house to save money for his fare in going to the office of
Representative Roco in the House of Representatives in Quezon City. In one
instance, complainant and her mother refused to return one of his bags such that
he was forced to file a replevin case. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Naga City decided the case in his favor. Respondent also claimed that complainant
falsified his signature in the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John so he filed a
complaint for the cancellation of his acknowledgment therein. Complainant
allegedly made it look like he appeared before Notary Public Vicente Estela on
February 15, 2001, but he argued that it was physically impossible for him to have
done so as he attended a hearing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur that day. He also contended that complainant forged his signature in
the Affidavit of Support. As to the pictures of respondent with Billy John, he argued
that the same cannot prove paternity. He explained that in one of his visits to Al
Greg, complainant left Billy John in his care to keep the child from falling off the
bed. However, complainant secretly took his picture as he was lying in the bed
holding Billy John. As to his picture with Billy John taken at the beach, respondent
alleged that at that time complainant gave Billy John to respondent as she wanted
to go swimming. While he was holding the child, complainant secretly took their
picture. Respondent accused complainant of taking the pictures in order to use the
same to extort money from him. This is the same scheme allegedly used by
complainant against her previous victims, who paid money to buy peace with her.
Respondent further alleged that politics was also involved in the filing of the
complaint as complainant was working in the office of then Representative Luis
Villafuerte, the political opponent of Representative Roco. Respondent attached to
his answer the following documents, among others: (a) the affidavit of Antonio
Orogo14 ; (b) the Decision15 dated May 8, 2006 of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil
Case No. 11546, which is the replevin case; (c) copies of the Minutes of
Proceedings16 and the Order17 of the RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, both dated
January 15, 2001, showing that respondent attended a hearing therein on said date;
and (d) a photocopy18 of respondent's credit card and automated teller machine
(ATM) card showing his signature.
The Proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
The parties appeared before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for a few
hearings and the marking of their respective. evidence. Complainant marked the
following documents, among others, in addition to those already attached to the
complaint: (a) a picture19 showing respondent seated in a restaurant with
complainant hugging him; (b) a receipt20 issued by the Clerk of Court of the MTCC
of Naga City, enumerating the objects (consisting mostly of items of clothing)
returned by complainant to respondent in the replevin case; and (c) receipts21
purportedly showing respondent's payment of the rentals for complainant's
apartment unit.
On motion of complainant, the IBP issued an order22 directing respondent,
complainant, and Billy John to undergo DNA testing in the DNA laboratory of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to determine the child's paternity. Upon
motion23 from respondent, however, the IBP annulled its prior order in the interest
of the speedy disposition of the case.24 On November 14, 2008, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report and Recommendation,25 finding
that respondent maintained an illicit affair with complainant and that he should be
meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years. In the Resolution No.
XVIII-2009-1526 dated February 19, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors approved the
above recommendation and increased the recommended period of suspension to
three (3) years. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration27 of the above
resolution. Attached thereto were: (a) the affidavits28 of Representative Roco and
respondent's wife, Minda B. Teoxon, which allegedly refuted complainant's
contention that respondent lived with complainant at the Puncia Apartment in
Naga City; (b) the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) dated May 10, 200529 in
Civil Case No. 11546 for replevin, wherein complainant supposedly admitted to her
past relationships; and (c) a letter30 from the University of Nueva Caceres that
informed respondent that he was chosen to be the recipient of its Diamond
Achiever Award.
The IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution
No. XX-2012-53931 dated December 14, 2012. The IBP thereafter transmitted the
record of the case to the Court for final action.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the IBP that the actuations of respondent in
this case showed his failure to live up to the good moral conduct required of the
members of the legal profession.
We held in Advincula v. Advincula32 that:The good moral conduct or character
must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their application for admission to the
Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice of law. In this
regard, the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not
only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is
required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but
also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that
he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not
only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much
greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of
legal learning. Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such
conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so
corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. (Citations omitted;
emphasis supplied.) Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the
imposition of the penalty of disbarment or suspension if a member of the Bar is
found guilty of committing grossly immoral conduct, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral .conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
In order to justify the imposition of the above administrative penalties on a member
of the Bar, his/her guilt must first be established by substantial evidence.33 As
explained in Re: Rafael Dimaano,34 substantial evidence or that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court upholds the findings of
the IBP as there is indeed substantial evidence that respondent committed gross
immorality by maintaining an extramarital affair with complainant. One of the key
pieces of evidence that the IBP considered in ruling against respondent is the
Decision dated May 8, 2006 of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil Case No. 11546 for
replevin. In said case, respondent made it appear that he was merely seeking to
recover personal belongings that he left behind at one time in complainant's house.
The items included a traveling bag with various articles of clothing and file folders of
cases that he was handling. He also tried to recover the pieces of furniture that he
allegedly bought for the complainant, which the latter failed to reimburse as
promised. These include a brass bed with foam mattress, a plastic dining table with
six plastic chairs, a brass sala set with a center table, and a plastic drawer. For her
defense, complainant argued that the respondent gradually left the items of
clothing in their apartment unit during the period that they cohabited therein from
time to time. She also said that the furniture were gifts to her and Billy John.
In its decision, the MTCC did rule in favor of respondent.1âwphi1 However, the
following elucidation by the MTCC is quite telling: To the Court, this is one case that
should not have been brought to court because [respondent] could have resorted
to a more diplomatic or tactful way of retrieving his personal belongings rather than
going on record with a lot of pretext and evasion as if the presiding judge is too
naive to appreciate human nature and the truth. [Respondent] would have done
well if he was gentleman, candid and responsible enough to admit his misadventure
and accept responsibility for his misdeeds rather than try to distort facts and avoid
facing the truth. It is not manly.
Of course, the [MTCC] is fully convinced that the personal belongings listed in the
complaint [are] owned by him and the [furniture] that were eventually sold by
[complainant] was bought by him, even without showing any receipts for it.
However, the [MTCC] is not persuaded by his allegation that he left his bag with
[complainant] because he was in a hurry in going to Manila. He boldly declared in
[the trial court] that he has three residences in Naga City and of all places he had to
leave his shirt and underwear with a lady whom he had visited "only twice".
[Respondent] could deny all the way up to high heaven that he has no child with
[complainant] but the [MTCC] will forever wonder why the latter would refuse to
part with the shirts and pants unless she is a bareface extortionist. But to the
[MTCC], she did not appear to be so. In fact, the [MTCC] had the occasion to
observe [complainant] with two little handsome boys who appeared to be her sons.
Hence, this lends credence to the fact that she might have really demanded money
in exchange for the shirts and pants to support her children. Be that as it may, the
[MTCC] is duty bound to apply the law. There is no issue on the ownership of the
personal belongings contained in a bag allegedly left by the [respondent] in the
house of [complainant].
However, as far as the [furniture] is concerned, like the brass bed, sala set, dining
table and plastic drawer, the [MTCC] is not persuaded by [respondent's] claim that
he meant to be paid by [complainant] for it. [Respondent] is a lawyer and although
he is not engage[d] in the buying and selling of [furniture] he should have known
that if he really intended to be paid back for it, he should have asked [complainant]
to [sign] a promissory note or even a memorandum. As it is, he failed to show any
evidence of such an undertaking. That it was a gift of love is more like it.35 The IBP
posited that the above ruling was more than sufficient to prove that respondent
tried to distort the truth that he and complainant did live together as husband and
wife in one apartment unit. The Court agrees with the IBP on this matter. The MTCC
plainly disbelieved respondent's claim that he merely left his bag of clothing in
complainant's house before he left for his place of work in Metro Manila - a claim
which he likewise made in the present case. The trial court further posited that the
pieces of furniture sought to be recovered by respondent were indeed bought by
him but the same were intentionally given to complainant out of love. Clearly, the
MTCC was convinced that respondent and complainant were involved in an illicit
relationship that eventually turned sour and led to the filing of the replevin case. A
perusal of the above decision reveals that the findings and conclusions therein were
arrived at by the MTCC after a trial on the merits of the case. In other words, the
trial court first heard the parties and received their respective evidence before it
rendered a decision. As such, the trial court cannot be accused of arriving at the
aforementioned findings lightly. Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to mistrust
the observations and findings of the MTCC. Respondent did not even point out any
reason for us to do so. While the issues in the replevin case and the instant
administrative case are indeed different, they share a common factual backdrop,
i.e., the parties' contrasting account of the true nature of their relationship. From
the evidence of both parties, the MTCC chose the complainant's version of the
events. Incidentally, it was respondent himself who brought to light the existence of
the MTCC decision in the replevin case when he attached the same to his answer in
the present case to substantiate his narration of facts. Thus, he cannot belatedly
plead that the decision be disregarded after the statements and findings therein
were used against him . Complainant further attached pictures of respondent with
her and Billy John as proof of their romantic relations. A perusal of these pictures
convinces this Court that while the same cannot indeed prove Billy John's paternity,
they are nevertheless indicative of a relationship between complainant ~d
respondent that is more than merely platonic. One of the annexed pictures shows
the couple in a restaurant setting, smiling at the camera while seated beside each
other very closely that their arms are visibly touching. Another picture shows the
couple in the same setting, this time with complainant smiling as she embraced
respondent from behind and they were both looking at the camera. From the facial
expressions and the body language of respondent and complainant in these
pictures, the same unfailingly demonstrate their unmistakable closeness and their
lack of qualms over publicly displaying their affection towards one another. Thus,
the attempts of respondent to downplay his relationship with complainant flop
miserably. Curiously, respondent did not bother to explain the aforesaid pictures. In
his answer to the complaint, respondent only managed to comment on the pictures
of himself with Billy John. Even then, respondent's accounts as to these pictures are
too flimsy and incredible to be accepted by the Court. Respondent previously
admitted to the genuineness of the pictures but not to the alleged circumstances of
the taking thereof.36 However, respondent's allegation that the pictures were
surreptitiously taken by complainant falls flat on its face. The pictures clearly show
that he and Billy John were looking directly at the camera when the pictures were
taken. Moreover, the angles from which the pictures were taken suggest that the
person taking the same was directly in front of respondent and Billy John. In his
motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XVIII-
2009-15, respondent further argued that the pictures were not conclusive and the
admission of the same was not in accordance with the Rules of Court as nobody
testified on the circumstances of the taking of the pictures and the accuracy
thereof.37 The IBP correctly disregarded this argument given that technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict
judicial sense.38 With respect to the affidavit of support, the promissory note, and
the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John that contained an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/ Admission of Paternity, respondent likewise failed to provide
sufficient controverting evidence therefor. In the affidavit of support and the
promissory note, respondent supposedly promised to provide monetary support to
Billy John, whom he acknowledged as his illegitimate son. Respondent verbally
repudiated said documents, pointing out that the same were typewritten while he
used a computer in his office, not a typewriter.39 Respondent further accused
complainant of falsifying his signatures therein and, to prove his charge, he
submitted photocopies of his credit card and A TM card that allegedly showed his
customary signatures. The Court, still, finds this refutation wanting. To the naked
eye, the sample signatures in the credit card and A TM card do appear to be
different from the ones in the affidavit of support, the promissory note, and the
Certificate of Live Birth. However, we likewise compared the sample signatures to
respondent's signatures in his pleadings before the IBP and other documents
submitted in evidence and we find that the signatures in the two sets appear to be
likewise dissimilar, which suggests respondent uses several different signatures.
Thus, respondent's claim of forgery is unconvincing. Moreover, as the IBP noted,
the records of the case do not indicate if he filed criminal charges against
complainant for her alleged acts of falsification.
As to the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John, respondent did file a complaint for
the cancellation of his acknowledgment therein. Thus, the Court will no longer
discuss the parties' arguments regarding the validity of respondent's signature in
said certificate of birth as the issue should be threshed out in the proper
proceeding.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent attached the affidavit of Antonio Orogo
in order to belie complainant's allegations and that she merely wanted to exact
money from respondent. In the affidavit, Orogo claimed that respondent did not
live with complainant in the Puncia Apartment in Naga City. Orogo further accused
complainant and her mother of engaging in the practice of extorting money from
various men since she was just 11 years old. The alleged instances of extortion
involved the complainant falsely accusing one man of rape and falsely claiming to
another man that he was the father of her first child.
The Court can hardly ascribe any credibility to the above affidavit. Given the
materiality of Orogo's statements therein, not to mention the gravity of his
accusations against complainant and her mother, he should have been presented as
a witness before the IBP investigating commissioner in order to confirm his affidavit
and give complainant the opportunity to cross-examine him. For whatever reason,
this was not done. As it is, Orogo's affidavit lacks evidentiary value. In Boyboy v.
Yabut,40 we cautioned that:
It is not difficult to manufacture charges in the affidavits, hence, it is imperative that
their truthfulness and veracity be tested in the crucible of thorough examination.
The hornbook doctrine is that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand
to affirm the averments in their affidavits, those affidavits must be excluded from
the proceedings for being inadmissible and hearsay x x x. (Citation omitted.)

In like manner, the Court cannot give much weight to the affidavits of
Representative Roco and Minda B. Teoxon, both of whom attested to the
statements of respondent regarding his places of residence during the time material
to this case. It should be stressed that said affidavits were executed only on June 15,
2009 or about four months after the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution
No. XVIII-2009-15 on February 19, 2009, which affirmed respondent's culpability for
grossly immoral conduct. This attenuates the credibility of the statements as the
same were only given as corroborative statements at so late a time given the
relevancy thereof.
found guilty of gross immorality. In said case, we considered the absence of
aggravating circumstances such as an adulterous relationship coupled with refusal
to support his family; or maintaining illicit relationships with at least two women
during the subsistence of his marriage; or abandoning his legal wife and cohabiting
with other women. (Citations omitted.)
However, considering respondent's blatant attempts to deceive the courts and the
IBP regarding his true relationship with complainant, we agree with the IBP Board of
Governors that the proper penalty in this instance is a three-year suspension from
the practice of law.

In the face of the accusations and the evidence offered against him, respondent was
duty-bound to meet the same decisively head-on. As the Court declared in Narag v.
Narag41 :
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not
only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a
member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is
assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is
imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the
satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his
name in the Roll of Attorneys. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon GUILTY of gross
immorality and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) years effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be punished with a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a
member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

Unfortunately, respondent failed to prove his defense when the burden of evidence
shifted to him. He could neither provide any concrete corroboration of his denials in
this case nor satisfactorily prove his claim that complainant was merely extorting
money from him.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent should be held liable for
having illicit relations with complainant. As to whether respondent also sired
complainant's second child, Billy John, the Court finds that the same was not
sufficiently established by the evidence presented in this case. The paternity and/or
acknowledgement of Billy John, if indeed he is respondent's illegitimate child, must
be alleged and proved in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal having
jurisdiction to hear the same.

As to the penalty that should be imposed against respondent in this case, the Court
had occasion to rule in Samaniego v. Ferrer,42 that:

We have considered such illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoral conduct

subject to disciplinary action. The penalty for such immoral conduct is disbarment,
or indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the circumstances of the case. A.C. No. 11828, November 22, 2017 - SPOUSES VICENTE v. ATTY. JOJO
Recently, in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr., we ruled that suspension from the practice S. VIJIGA
of law for two years was an adequate penalty imposed on the lawyer who was DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
The relationship between lawyers and clients is a professional relationship as well
as a fiduciary and confidential one. One consequence of such professional
relationship is the obligation of a lawyer to efficiently manage his cases and update
his clients of the status of the same.
ANTECEDENTS: This administrative case stems from the complaint brought by the
Spouses Vicente and Precywinda Gimena (complainants), against Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga
(respondent) for the latter's failure to file the appellants' brief in their behalf,
resulting in the dismissal of their appeal in the Court of Appeals (CA). In their
complaint, Spouses Gimena alleged that they hired the respondent to represent
them in a civil case for nullity of foreclosure proceedings and voidance of loan
documents filed against Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, involving eight
parcels of land (subject properties), docketed as Civil Case No. C-21053, assigned to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 126. After trial on the merits,
the RTC dismissed the action in its Decision dated June 6, 2011. Aggrieved by the
adverse decision, the complainants then brought the case to the appellate court,
docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 98271. On June 7, 2012, the CA issued a notice requiring
complainants, (appellants therein), to file the appellants' brief in accordance with
Sec. 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. Respondent failed to file the brief. As a result,
the CA issued a Resolution2 dated September 21, 2012. On October 11, 2012,
respondent filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the reconsideration of the September
21, 2012 Resolution, citing illness and the damage to his law office due to monsoon
rains, as reasons for his failure to file the appellants' brief.3 The CA granted the
motion in its Resolution dated January 3, 2013, and reinstated complainants'
appeal. Complainants were then given a period of fifteen (15) days within which to
file the required brief. Respondent failed to file the appellants' brief within the
given period. Hence, the CA issued a Resolution4 on March 15, 2013 dismissing the
appeal. Complainants alleged that the March 15, 2013 Resolution became final and
executory and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment of the CA on April 27,
2013. Complainants alleged that throughout the proceedings in the CA, respondent
did not apprise them of the status of their case. They were thus surprised when a
bulldozer suddenly entered their properties. Complainants thereafter inquired on
the status of their case, and it was then that they discovered that their appeal was
dismissed.5 Complainants alleged that respondent violated Canon 17 and 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer. They claimed that
respondent's lapse is not excusable and is tantamount to gross ignorance, neligence
and dereliction of duty. For his part, respondent denied that he abandoned and
neglegted complainants' appeal. He averred that he was able to talk to complainant
Vicente, via telephone, after the CA dismissed the appeal in its Resolution dated
September 21, 2012. Complainant Vicente purportedly told respondent not to
pursue the appeal considering that the subject properties are already in the
possession of the bank.6
FINDINGS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP)
The dispute was set for mandatory conference on August 20, 2014. Only
complainants and their counsel appeared during the conference, despite the notice
being received by respondent.7 Respondent filed an Ex-Parte and Urgent Motion to
Reset the Scheduled Hearing8 to October 1, 2014. Respondent again failed to
appear, and instead, filed another motion9 to reset the hearing to November 5,
2014. Respondent reasoned that he was set to attend hearings on the scheduled
date and time. Investigating Commissioner Arsenio Adriano recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution10 on June 6, 2015, adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-408
CBD Case No. 14-4217 Sps. Vicente and Precywinda Gimena vs. Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", finding the
recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable
laws. Thus, Respondent Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga is hereby found guilty of violation of
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration11 on January 4, 2016. In a Resolution12 dated January 27, 2017,
the Board of Governors denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.
RESOLUTION NO. XXII-2017-788 CBD Case No. 14-4217 Sps. Vicente and Precywinda
Gimena vs. Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga, RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration
there being no new reason and/or new argument adduced to reverse the previous
findings and decision of the Board of Governors.
ISSUE OF THE CASE: Did the respondent violate his ethical duties as a member of
the Bar in his dealings with the complainants?
RULING OF THE COURT: We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP. The
Court finds that the suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper.
The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) is clear. A lawyer owes his client
competent and zealous legal representation.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
Respondent's failure to submit the appellants' brief and update his clients,
complainants herein, of the status of their appeal falls short of the ethical
requirements set forth under the CPR. A lawyer is not required to represent anyone
who consults him on legal matters.13 Neither is an acceptance of a client or case, a
guarantee of victory. However, being a service-oriented occupation, lawyers are
expected to observe diligence and exhibit professional behavior in all their dealings
with their clients. Lawyers should be mindful of the trust and confidence, not to
mention the time and money, reposed in them by their clients. When a lawyer
agrees to act as a counsel, he guarantees that he will exercise that reasonable
degree of care and skill demanded by the character of the business he undertakes
to do, to protect the clients' interests and take all steps or do all acts necessary
therefor.14 The necessity and repercussions of non-submission of an appellant's
brief are provided for in the Rules of Court, to wit: RULE 44 - ORDINARY APPEALED
CASES
Sec. 7. Appellants brief. It shall be the duty of the appellant to file with the court,
within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice of the clerk that all the
evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the record, seven (7) copies of his
legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of service of two (2)
copies thereof upon the appellee.
RULE 50 - DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, Sec 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal, An appeal
may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the following grounds: (e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the
required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by
these Rules; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
As a lawyer, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable of the procedural rules
in appellate practice. He is presumed to know that dismissal is an inevitable result
from failure to file the requisite brief within the period stated in the Rules of Court.
In this case, the fact that the appeal was twice dismissed further highlights
respondent's indifference to his client's cause. Interestingly, respondent failed to
offer any explanation as to why he failed to submit the appellants' brief within the
45-day period from his receipt of the notice to file the same, resulting to the
dismissal of the appeal for the first time. To the mind of this Court, such failure is an
unequivocal indication of his guilt in the administrative charge. Indeed, failure to file
the required pleadings is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as cited above.15 His failure to file the appellants' brief, despite the
CA's grant of leniency in reconsidering its initial dismissal of the appeal further
compounds respondent's inadequacies. In this case, respondent's neglect of his
professional duties led to the loss of complainants' properties and has left them
bereft of legal remedies. They lost their case not because of merits but because of
technicalities, specifically the respondent's failure to file the required pleadings.
Certainly, the situation in the case at bar, is one such evil that the CPR intended to
avoid. Worse, respondent's failure to inform complainants of the unfortunate fate
of their appeal further amplifies his lack of competence and diligence. As an officer
of the court, it was respondent's duty to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client's case. The purpose of
informing the client is to minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and
confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the client's interests.16 This Court fails to find merit to
respondent's claim that complainant Vicente directed him not to pursue the appeal.
If that was true, candor and respect of the courts would have impelled respondent
to file a motion to withdraw their appeal. Further, if indeed it was true that
complainants lost interest in pursuing the appeal, they would not have secured the
services of another counsel and file before the CA a motion to set aside the entry of
judgment. Apropos is this Court's ruling in Reynaldo G. Ramirez v. Atty. Mercedes
Buhayang-Margallo17: A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the
interests of another, use their authority or power for their benefit or fail to
discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is information assymetry between
the principal and the entrusted agent. That is, there are facts and events that the
agent must attend to that may not be known by the principal. This information
assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers are
expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see
their relevance in relation to their causes of action or their defenses. The salience of
these facts is not usually patent to the client. It can only be seen through familiarity
with the relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential
interpretations. More so with the intricacies of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer
that receives the notices and must decide the mode of appeal to protect the
interest of his or her client. Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is
regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that
has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is true that the
client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of
reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that the client discovers the level of
diligence, competence, and accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In
some cases, such as this one, the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer and
the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of indifference or
negligence.18 (Emphasis supplied) True, for respondent's failure to protect the
interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Canon 17 and Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent is reminded that the practice of
law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent
intellectually, academically and morally. The penalty to be meted to an erring
lawyer rests on sound judicial discretion. In cases of similar nature, this Court
imposed penalties ranging from a reprimand to suspension of three months or six
months, and even disbarment in aggravated cases.19 In Rene B. Hermano v. Atty.
Igmedio S. Prado, Jr.20, this Court suspended Atty. Prado from the practice of law
for six months for his failure to file an appellant's brief that could have resulted to
the dismissal of the case had it not been for the intervention of another lawyer. In
Felicisima .Mendoza Vda. De Robosa v. Mendoza and Navarro, Jr.21, respondent
therein was suspended for six months for a similar infraction. Also, in Cesar Talento,
et al. v. Atty. Agustin F. Paneda22, one year of suspension from the practice of law
was imposed to therein respondent for his failure to file the appeal brief for his
client and for failure to return the money paid for legal services that were not
performed. On the other hand, in Fidela Vda. De Enriques v. Atty. Manuel G. San
Jose23, therein respondent's negligence in handling his client's cause merited a
suspension of six months from the practice of law. In this case, the fact that the
complaining parties now stand to lose eight parcels of land which they claim to own
due to respondent's failure to perform his professional and ethical duties, We
deemed justified the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six
months. In affirming the recommendation of the IBP, this Court is mindful of its
earlier ruling in Ofelia R. Somosot v. Atty. Gerardo F. Lara24:
The general public must know that the legal profession is a closely regulated
profession where transgressions merit swift but commensurate penalties; it is a
profession that they can trust because we guard our ranks and our standards well.
The Bar must sit up and take notice of what happened in this case to be able to
guard against any repetition of the respondent's transgressions, particularly his
failure to report the developments of an ongoing case to his clients. Unless the Bar
takes a proactive stance, we cannot really blame members of the public who are
not very well disposed towards, and who may even distrust, the legal profession
after hearing experiences similar to what the complainant suffered. The
administration of justice is served well when we demonstrate that effective
remedies exist to address the injustice and inequities that may result from
transgressions by those acting in the dispensation of justice process.25
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga is SUSPENDED
FOR SIX (6) MONTHS from the practice of law with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is ADMONISHED to
exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties. This Decision
shall take effect immediately upon receipt of Atty. Jojo S. Vijiga of a copy of this
Decision. He shall inform this Court and the Office of the Bar Confidant in writing of
the date he received a copy of this Decision. Copies of this Decision shall be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal
record, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Office of the Court
Administrator is directed to circulate copies of this Decision to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11836 CARLINA P. ROBIÑOL vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG,

DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig (Atty. Bassig)
for violation of Code of Professional Responsibility and Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant Carlina Robiñol (Robiñol) alleged that
respondent rented a house from her in Brgy. Tanong, Marikina City, for a monthly
rental of ₱8,500.00. Said lease, without any written contract, was for a period of
two years, or from June 12, 2010 to August 12, 2012. Upon the start of the lease
agreement, it was agreed that Atty. Bassig will pay a one month advance and
another one month deposit, both of which are equivalent of one month rental
payment. However, he did not comply with the same. Atty. Bassig instead paid the
monthly rental from June 13, 2010 to July 13, 2010.1
Atty. Bassig then paid his rents belatedly from July 2010 to January 2012. However,
after said period, he stopped making any payment, to wit2 :
Month/s covered Payment date Amount paid
July 13, 2010 to August 13, 2010 August 12, 2010 PhP 8,500.00
August 13, 2010 to October 13, 2010 November 24, 2010 PhP
17,000.00
October 13, 2010 to November 13, 2010 October 13, 2010 PhP 8,500.00
November 13, 2011 to December 13, 2011 January 4, 2012 PhP 8,500.00
December 13, 2011 to January 13, 2012 March13, 2012 PhP 8,500.00
Robiñol alleged that the last payment in the amount of ₱l7,000.00, for two months'
rent was made in July 2012, but no receipt was issued upon Atty. Bassig's
instruction. Atty. Bassig told Robiñol that he will be receiving a big amount from his
client and that he will thereafter pay the remaining unpaid rent.3
Believing that Atty. Bassig will remain truthful to his promise, Robiñol allowed him
to stay in the premises. However, when Typhoon Habagat struck Marikina City, Atty.
Bassig left the house because of the heavy flood. When he left, he neither informed
Robiñol of his intended destination nor satisfied his unsettled obligation.4
When the situation in Marikina City got better, Atty. Bassig still failed to return to
his rented house.5
Later on, Robiñol chanced upon Atty. Bassig's daughter and learned that Atty. Bassig
was living with her. Robiñol then went to the said house and demanded payment
from Atty. Bassig. As a consequence, he executed a promissory note6 dated August
18, 2012, undertaking to pay the amount of ₱127,500.00 on installment basis. The
promissory note indicates that half of the amount due would be paid on August 31,
2012 and the other half on September 30, 2012. However, Atty. Bassig reneged on
his obligation.7
Because of the foregoing incidents, Robiñol was constrained to hire a counsel to
protect her interest.1âwphi1 Thus, a demand letter8 was sent to Atty. Bassig on
December 8, 2012.
In an unverified answer, Atty. Bassig acknowledged his obligation to Robiñol and
promised to pay the same within the next two months after the answer was filed.
He maintained that he had difficulty in managing his finances as· he was paying for
his son's medical expenses and his car's monthly amortizations.9
A Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing10 dated January 21, 2015 was issued
by the IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala. However, the Orders dated
February 25, 201511 and March 25, 201512 issued by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) reveals that only Robiñol
appeared in the scheduled mandatory conferences. The latter Order also expunged
the answer filed by Atty. Bassig for lack of verification. In view thereof, the parties
were directed to file their respective position paper.
In a Report and Recommendation dated November 20, 201513 , the IBP-CBD
recommended the suspension of Atty. Bassig from the practice of law for a period
of two years. The IBP Commissioner ruled that Atty. Bassig's failure to file his
answer despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled hearings showed his
resistance to lawful orders and illustrated his despiciency for his oath of office as a
lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction. The fallo thereof reads:
IN VIEW THEREOF, we respectfully recommend that respondent, ATTY. EDILBERTO
P. BASSIG, be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from receipt hereof, from
the practice of law and as member of the Bar.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.14
In a Resolution No. XXII-2016-165,15 CBD Case No. 14-4447, entitled Carlina P.
Robiñol v. Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig, dated February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the recommendation of the IBPCBD and disposed thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
imposing a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years
considering that there was a previous sanction of suspension of two (2) years
against the same Respondent in another disbarment case.
As this Court has disciplinary authority over members of the bar, We are tasked to
resolve the instant case against Atty. Bassig.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant16 and
the proper evidentiary threshold is substantial evidence.17
Here, Robiñol failed to discharge the burden of proof. For one, the evidence
submitted were inadmissible. It must be noted that the receipts showing payment
of Atty. Bassig to Robiñol and the promissory note executed and signed by Atty.
Bassig were photocopies of the original.
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown
that the original is unavailable.18 Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable.-When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
In the case of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Antonio Lagman19 , the
Court held that:
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of
the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due
execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason
for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of
bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. xxx20
In this case, nowhere in the record shows that Robiñol laid down the predicate for
the admission of said photocopies. Thus, aside from the bare allegations in her
complaint, Robiñol was not able to present any evidence to prove that Atty. Bassig
failed to pay his rent and that he had in fact leased a house from Robiñol.
Moreover, We cannot deem Atty. Bassig's failure to file his verified answer and to
attend in the scheduled mandatory conferences as an admission of the allegations
in the complaint. The consequences of such omission are clearly laid down in
Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the IBP, to wit:
Section 5. Non-appearance of parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings.- a) Non-
appearance at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date
shall be deemed a waiver of the right to participate in the proceedings. Ex parte
conference or hearings shall then be conducted. Pleadings submitted or filed which
are not verified shall not be given weight by the Investigating Commissioner.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis-neither purely civil nor
purely criminal. They do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officers.21 While these
proceedings are sui generis, compliance with the basic rules on evidence may not
be altogether dispensed with. More so, in this case when the evidence in
consideration fails to comply with basic rules on admissibility.
Nevertheless, Atty. Bassig is not completely exculpated from any administrative
liability.
It must be noted that Atty. Bassig, despite due notice, repeatedly failed to abide by
the orders of the IBP, i.e. filing a verified answer, appearing in two mandatory
conferences and filing of position paper. In fact, when the IBP ordered him to file a
position paper, it is in view of the expunction of his answer. Notwithstanding, Atty.
Bassig still ignored the directive.
For his behavior, Atty. Bassig committed an act in violation of Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
His attitude of refusing to obey the orders of the IBP indicates his lack of respect for
the IBP's rules and regulations22 , but also towards the IBP as an institution.
Remarkably, the IBP is empowered by this Court to conduct proceedings regarding
the discipline of lawyers.23 Hence, it is but proper for Atty. Bassig to be mindful of
his duty as a member of the bar to maintain his respect towards a duly constituted
authority.
Verily, Atty. Bassig's conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly
called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost
in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court.24 In
disregarding the orders of the IBP, he exhibited a conduct which runs contrary to his
sworn duty as an officer of the court.
As a final note, We commiserate with Robiñol, a nonagenarian, on her unfortunate
circumstances as she should no longer be dealing with this kind of anxiety.
Nevertheless, We sanction Atty. Bassig to pay a fine in the amount of ₱l0,000.00 for
his arrant neglect to maintain acceptable deportment as member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig is hereby
ORDERED to pay a FINE in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00) with the
STERN WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will
result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11822, VICKA MARIE D. ISALOS v. ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by
complainant Vicka Marie D. Isalos (complainant) against respondent Atty. Ana Luz B.
Cristal (respondent) for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02, and
16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) arising from
respondent's alleged failure to account for the money entrusted to her.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that she is the Director and Treasurer of C Five Holdings,
Management & Consultancy, Inc. (C Five), a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines with principal office in Libis, Quezon City.
Respondent was C Five's Corporate Secretary and Legal Counsel who handled its
incorporation and registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).2
Sometime in July 2011, when C Five was exploring investment options, respondent
recommended the purchase of a resort in Laguna, with the assurances that the title
covering the property was "clean" and the taxes were fully paid. Relying on
respondent's recommendation, C Five agreed to acquire the property and
completed the payment of the purchase price.3 Respondent volunteered and was
entrusted to facilitate the transfer and registration of the title of the property in C
Five's name. On September 5, 2011, complainant personally handed the sum of
P1,200,000.00 to respondent at her office in Makati City, as evidenced by Official
Receipt No. 10384 of even date. The said amount was intended to cover the
expenses for the documentation, preparation, and notarization of the Final Deed of
Sale, as well as payment of capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, and other fees
relative to the sale and transfer of the property.5More than a year thereafter,
however, no title was transferred in C Five's name. It was then discovered that the
title covering the property is a Free Patent6 issued on August 13, 2009, rendering
any sale, assignment, or transfer thereof within a period of five (5) years from
issuance of the title null and void. Thus, formal demand7 was made upon
respondent to return the P1,200,000.00 entrusted to her for the expenses which
remained unheeded, prompting C Five to file a criminal complaint for Estafa before
the Makati City Prosecutor's Office, i.e., NPS No. XV-05-INV-13D-1253,8 as well as
the present case for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, i.e.,
CBD Case No. 14-4321. In defense,9 respondent claimed that she paid the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) registration, Mayor's Permit, business licenses,
documentation, and other expenses using the money entrusted to her by
complainant,10 as itemized in a Statement of Expenses11 that she had prepared,
and that she was ready to turn over the balance in the amount of P885,068.00.
However, C Five refused to receive the said amount, insisting that the entire
P1,200,000.00 should be returned.12 Moreover, she pointed out that the criminal
case for Estafa filed against her by C Five had already been dismissed13 for lack of
probable cause.14 As such, she prayed that the disbarment case against her be
likewise dismissed for lack of merit.15
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After due proceedings, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (CBD-IBP) issued
a Report and Recommendation16 dated June 29, 2015, finding respondent
administratively liable and thereby, recommending her suspension from the legal
profession for a period of three (3) years.17 The CBD-IBP found that respondent
actually received the amount of P1,200,000.00 from complainant, which amount
was intended to cover the expenses and payment of taxes for the sale and transfer
of the property to C Five's name. Likewise, it was undisputed that despite demands
from the company to return the said amount, respondent failed to do so. Worse,
she offered a Statement of Expenses with "feigned expenditures" in an attempt to
prove that a portion of the money had already been spent. Thus, the CBD-IBP
concluded that there was dishonesty on the part of respondent and accordingly,
recommended the penalty of suspension.18 In a Resolution19 dated June 30, 2015,
the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the
CBD-IBP's Report and Recommendation dated June 29, 2015, meting upon
respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and
directing the return of the amount of P1,200,000.00 to complainant. In
respondent's motion for reconsideration,20 she maintained that there was no
intention on her part to retain the money and that she was willing to return the
amount of P885,068.00, as shown in her Statement of Expenses, which she claimed
was accompanied by corresponding receipts. Moreover, she averred that on
September 30, 2015, in order to buy peace, she delivered the amount of
P1,200,000.00 to Atty. Anselmo Sinjian III, counsel for complainant,21 as evidenced
by an Acknowledgment Receipt22 of even date. As a consequence, complainant
filed a Withdrawal of Complaint for Disbarment23 before the IBP. In a Resolution24
dated January 26, 2017, the IBP denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.
The Issue Before the Court: The sole issue for the Court's consideration is whether
or not grounds exist to hold respondent administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious review of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and
conclusions of the IBP that respondent should be held administratively liable in this
case. The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As
such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their
four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.25 "Lawyers may,
thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether
in their professional or in their private capacity."26

The CPR, particularly Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, provides:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
RULE 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
RULE 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of
transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately
returned.27 A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is a
gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.28
In this case, it is indubitable that respondent received the amount of P1,200,000.00
from complainant to be used to cover the expenses for the transfer of title of the
subject property under C Five's name. Respondent admitted having received the
same, but claimed that she had spent a portion of it for various expenses, such as
documentation, permits, and licenses, among others, as evidenced by the
Statement of Expenses with attached receipts. However, it has been established
that the registration of the property in C Five's name could not have materialized,
as the subject property was covered by a Free Patent issued on August 13, 2009
which, consequently, bars it from being sold, assigned, or transferred within a
period of five (5) years therefrom. Thus, and as the CBD-IBP had aptly opined,29
there was no longer any reason for respondent to retain the money. Furthermore,
the expenditures enumerated in the Statement of Expenses, except for the
documentation and notarization fees for which no receipts were attached, do not
relate to the purposes for which the money was given, i.e., the documentation and
registration of the subject property. As such, even if official receipts had been duly
attached for the other purposes which, the Court notes, respondent failed to do
despite the opportunity given - the expenditures are not legitimate ones. Hence,
the Court finds respondent to have violated the above-cited rules, to the detriment
and prejudice of complainant.
Respondent's assertion that the instant disbarment case should be dismissed, in
view of the return of the full amount to complainant and the latter's withdrawal of
the complaint against her is specious. Such are not ample grounds to completely
exonerate the administrative liability of respondent. It is settled that a case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of
the complainant,30 the latter not being a direct party to the case, but a witness
who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.31 A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff
and the respondent-lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
"The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct x x x has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice."32 The real
question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.33
With regard to the proper penalty to be meted upon respondent, the Court has, in
several similar cases, imposed the penalty of suspension for two (2) years against
erring lawyers. In Jinon v. Jiz,34 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two
(2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his legal
services, which he never performed. Similarly, in Agot v. Rivera,35 the Court
suspended respondent for the same period for his failure to handle the legal matter
entrusted to him and to return the legal fees in connection therewith, among
others. Considering, however, the return of the full amount of P1,200,000.00 to C
Five, respondent is instead meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal is found guilty of violation of Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
The suspension in the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon receipt by
respondent. Respondent is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the
Court that her suspension has started, copy furnished all courts and quasi-judicial
bodies where she has entered her appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
entered in respondent's personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10547, November 08, 2017 - FREDDIE A. GUILLEN, v. ATTY. AUDIE
ARNADO
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant case is brought about by an administrative complaint which Freddie
Guillen filed against his former business partner, Atty. Audie Arnado, for alleged
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Complainant Freddie Guillen is the registered owner of the City Grill Restaurant. He
then invited respondent Atty. Audie Arnado and a certain Cedric Ebo to join the
restaurant business. Each of them had to shell out P200,000.00 to make up a total
capital of P600,000.00. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was therefore
executed and the business was formally launched in May 2003. At first, everything
went smoothly, until Arnado's sister-in-law and Ebo's son participated in the
management, causing complications in the business operations, which later forced
Guillen and his wife to step down as general manager and operations manager,
respectively. Because of the disagreements among the parties, Guillen offered that
he would waive his claims for profits, provided that Arnado would return the
P200,000.00 that he paid as capital. Arnado allegedly claimed that said refund
would still be subject to the billings of the Arnado and Associate Law Firm.
Thereafter, Guillen was surprised to find out that Arnado had already caused the
incorporation of the restaurant with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
which was approved on February 16, 2004. Guillen was likewise excluded from the
business without the aforementioned refund of his capital. He was further charged
with Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu. Thus, Guillen initiated
the present administrative case. For his part, Arnado admitted the existence and
the contents of the MOA. He also admitted that he caused the incorporation of City
Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation. However, he insisted that the same was done in
accordance with the requirements under the law. Guillen could not validly claim for
a refund, and if he was really entitled, he should simply file an action to that effect.
Arnado likewise contended that Guillen's refund would still be subject to the legal
compensation claim of his law firm. On November 2, 2011, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the censure
of Arnado, thus: WHEREFORE, Taking into consideration the foregoing premises, it
is with deep regret to recommend to the Board of Governors that ATTY. AUDIE
ARNADO [of] Cebu City be CENSURED for his deceitful and dishonest act in violation
of Rule 1.01 of the Code or Professional Responsibility which provides that - A
lawyer shall not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.
So Ordered. RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED. On January 3, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-47,2 which adopted and approved the
aforementioned recommendation, hence: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it
is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent's violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Audie Arnado is hereby CENSURED. Thereafter, Arnado moved for reconsideration
of said Resolution. On March 23, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed another
resolution, Resolution No. XXI-2014-180,3 which denied said motion for
reconsideration and approved its 2013 Resolution, with modification, to wit:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no
cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Further, for taking advantage of his knowledge of the law and for his
deceitful conduct of easing out Complainant from their restaurant business
partnership without his knowledge by registering a corporation under a different
name and style but doing the same line of business and using the same
complements and trade secrets, Resolution No. XX-2013-47 dated January 3, 2013
is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification, and accordingly the penalty imposed on
Atty. Audie Arnado [is] increased from Censure to SUSPENSION from the practice of
law for three (3) months.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Arnado should be suspended
from the practice of law. At the onset, it must be pointed out that the business
name City Grill Restaurant registered under Guillen's name was never dissolved in
accordance with the law. Even Arnado failed to prove that the City Grill Restaurant
business had already been terminated. Although said business name was only used
for a short period of time, the same had already acquired goodwill among the
residents and customers in the locality.
On February 26, 2004, City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation was registered with the
SEC. Although Arnado and Ebo were not included as incorporators, those persons
reflected in the articles of incorporation as the company's incorporators were their
relatives. It is clear that when Arnado caused the incorporation of City Grill-Sutukil
Food Corporation, he was fully aware that City Grill Restaurant was still registered
in Guillen's name. Obviously, he did the same to take advantage of the goodwill
earned by the name of City Grill Restaurant. Arnado was likewise the one who
actually notarized some of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation's legal documents
such as the Treasurer's Affidavit and a letter addressed to the SEC. The IBP Board
thus aptly concluded that Arnado is guilty of taking advantage of his knowledge of
the law and of surreptitiously easing out Guillen from their restaurant business
partnership by registering a corporation under a different but similar name and
style, in the same line of business, and using the same trade secrets. Arnado,
although not reflected as one of the incorporators of City Grill-Sutukil Food
Corporation, has deceived the public into believing that City Grill Restaurant and
City GrillSutukil Food Corporation are one and the same, clearly violating Rule 1.01
of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral,
or deceitful conduct. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law
is imbued with public interest and that a lawyer owes substantial duties, not only to
his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the public,
and takes part in the administration of justice, one of the most important functions
of the State, as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain,
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing.4 Here, Arnado has certainly fallen short of the high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him. On the contrary, he
employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took advantage of Guillen to
secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on others.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Audie Arnado
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and WARNS him that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let
copies of this decision be included in the personal records of Atty. Audie Arnado
and entered in his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let copies of this decision
be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well
as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their information and guidance. SO
ORDERED.