HINDU L A W : ITS CHARACTER AND EVOLUTION

U, C. SARKAR *

There are certain conspicuous features of Hindu law, which at

once differentiate it from other systems of law—ancient and modern.
Though it was lawyers' law, still originally it was not exactly like posi-
tive law, 1 as the expression is understood in modern jurisprudence—
specially, the Analytical school of the West. But many revolutionary
changes, legislative and otherwise, have been introduced into Hindu
law—which has virtually to be re-written now in the modern context.
Hindu law was not the command of any earthly sovereign ; nor
was it established by any political authority. At one time, Hindu law
was supposed to be of divine origin. But this was only a theory which
was peculiar to the earlier stages of human thought and found con-
venient to explain away many things, which could not otherwise be
done. This theory, like other theories of the earlier periods, attri-
buted everything to God or religion. The ancient Hindu law was
made by human agents like the sages and philosophers—in the same
way as law is made to-day by human legislators.
The Hindu legislators were not the kings but the sages, who might
be rightly regarded as semi-divine beings on account of their highly
philosophical speculation and far-sightedness including deep sympathy
for social dealings of man with man. They were the leaders and
philosophers for the people. The sages were not only great philo-
sophers, but they were also quite sensitive to the working and the
development of the society. It was these leaders of thought who gave
the Hindu law as we find embodied in the Dharmasutras, the Dharma-
sastras, the Arthasastra of Kautilya, as elucidated and elaborated by
the different Nibandhas and the commentaries of the later epochs.
The status of the king was regarded as subordinate to and included
in the society of that period. There was, of course, the king, but he
himself was subject to the " r u l e of l a w " , as formulated and enun-
ciated by the social philosophers and the sages of the time. The king
was not entitled to make any law himself; he was simply to execute
the law and apply it in deciding disputes for which he had both

* M.A., M.L., LL.D., Principal, Law College, Chandigarh.

1. Mooka Kona v. Ammakutti, 51 Mad. I (F.B.).

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original and appellate jurisdiction. King's edict does not mean any
legislative Act passed by the king, but it means his judicial decisions
as the highest tribunal. That the king simply executed and never
formulated law, except through adjudication, will be corroborated by
the texts of N a r a d a 2 and Brihaspati. 3 According to Ramaswami
Aiyangar " Medhatithi rightly declared that a king cannot make
law over-riding Dharma" and " also that the evidence of history does
not disclose any exercise of alleged legal power of independent legis-
lations...the king cannot make a new innovative". Professor
J. D. M. Derret 4 is unable to agree with the views of Aiyangar refer-
red to above. 5 It is difficult to accept the assertions of Prof. Derret
without some reservations. Though he is emphatically of the opinion
that " despite the opinion of Medhatithi, as expressed in his com-
mentary on Manu (VII, 13), rulers ' d i d ' legislate from time to
time...often in such a manner as clearly to contradict the views not
only of the Smritis, but also of eminent contemporary jurists ", still
in the first place, it must be said that in the Dharmasutras and the
Dharmasastras themselves no legislative competence was recognised
in behalf of the kings; and in the second place, the references given
by him showing the sources of the examples of royal enactment almost
exclusively indicate a period subsequent to the composition of the
Dharmasutras and the Dharmasastras. The ancient Indian sages
not only made new laws but they also made provisions for repealing
certain existing laws and practices. This can be very objectively seen
from the treatment of the section on what is termed u Kali-varjjya,"
which implies and includes practices and customs not to be observed
or followed in the Kali age. The treatment of Kali-varjjya is to be
found in more or less all the Dharmasastras. These topics have been
subject to critical examination 6 even by the modern courts and

27 X V I I I , 19, 23, 33,52.

3. II, 18-27.
4. See the Contribution for the Fourth Conference (1954) of the International
Academy of Comparative Law in Section I.D. 2 (Law, Religion and Morals).
5. Introduction by Dr. S. K. Aiyangar to " Hindu Administrative Institutions "
of Dexshitar, pp. 32-34. " The administrative machinery was not entrusted with the
legislative or the law-making functions... Therefore, the king and his agents, who
carried on the Government were as much subject to law as the subjects themselves...
This absence of legislative power in the administration takes away the important
influence that had the tendency to make the ruler degenerate into an autocrat."
6. Inderun v. Ramaswami 13 M.I.A. 147 ; Padma Kumari v. Suraj Kumari 28 All.
458; Bai Gulab v. Jeevanlal 46 Bom. 871.

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 U. C. SARKAR 215

legislatures. Reference may be made in this context to " Loka-vidvista "

and " Apaddharma " which also have got some legislative elements in
them.
Thus Hindu law was made not by kings but by the sages who
though had no political authority had the fullest social authority
commanding the highest reverence. Necessarily, the legislations by
the sages were not in the shape of enactments but in the form of
scriptural literature, which had come down to us. This literature
enshrining the speculation of the sages was undoubtedly the result of
their mature inspiration and supreme realisation, which was given the
colour of revelation or recollection. The theory of revelation was not
without its practical significance. This belief practically supplied the
sanction behind the Sruti and the Smriti injunctions, as the sanction
of political sovereignty was necessary for positive law.
A careful and critical examination of the contents of the Smritis
will readily indicate that most of the rules and principles were more
or less found in common in all the sages. Sometimes the language
itself was identical. This can be explained only on the hypothesis
that the authors of the Smritis did not necessarily propound anything
absolutely new, they simply reproduced or reduced to writing what
was otherwise being actually followed by the society in practice from
some earlier time. The Smritis do not give us the earliest stage of
the society. As a matter of fact, the Smriti epoch implies a fairly
advanced society with considerable progress in diverse ways.
We have no evidence or indication of the still earlier or the earliest
stage of the Hindu society. No society or people begins with some ready
made customs or practices, far less with any written or codified law.
This is generally true of more or less every system of law. Hindu law
was also not an exception. So, even prior to the society of the
Smriti era, there were other stages of the society, in which customs and
practices were growing gradually and imperceptibly to be crystalised
only after a considerable length of time. In this sense, it is substan-
tially correct to say that Hindu law was essentially based on
customs and usages of the population, which was an admixture of the
Aryans and the Non-Aryans. The term Non-Aryan should not be
used in a despicable sense. In view of the Mahenjodaro relics, it is
difficult to say what was the actual extent of the contribution of each
of these classes of people, who ultimately went to constitute the Hindu
community and society. Thus with the Aryan settlement in India, an
admixture of population of the Aryans and the Non-Aryans took

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place even in the pre-historic times having effects and counter-effects

on the different rules and customs prevailing amongst each of these
sections of the population.
The entire body of Hindu law of to-day is no longer based on or
derived from the scriptural literature. It is now only in certain
respects that the Hindus are to be governed by the original shastric
Hindu law—which again is not authoritative as such but which had
been made applicable to the Hindus only in certain specific matters
subject to legislative amendment, on the authority of the British
Parliament and ultimately the Indian legislature.
1. Hindu law, religion and society
The real distinction between strict Hindu law and the Western
conception of positive law has to be sought in the constitution of the
Hindu society, as governed by the Hindu religion, based on Varna and
Asrama. Positive law is the fruit of political organisation whereas
Hindu law was primarily the result of social organisation.
I n ancient India, originally, society was the organisational unit
rather than the state. There was, no doubt, the king ; but he was, in
a sense subordinate to the Brahmin, who was supposed to be the head
of the society. In course of time, of course, the king came to assert
his own position, with the result that the Brahmin was later on con-
fined only to the religious and sacerdotal duties, whereas the king
emerged out as the head of the state or the political society.
Varna and Asrama were the two main props on which the ancient
Indian society was supposed to have been based. As a matter of
fact, Hindu religion came to be known as Varnasrama Dharma. It
was for this reason that all juristic speculations were concentrated on
and saturated with these two fundamental conceptions. The Varna
or caste system might be regarded as a social or group institution,
whereas the Asrama was meant for the regulation of the life of an
individual. 7 The sages were never unduly conservative or orthodox,
as they were generally believed to have been. They could, and in
fact they did, perceive that with the changes in the society, the law
also had to be changed, 8 The sages not only made laws; they also had
to amend and repeal laws according to the exigencies of the situations.
The laws that were made by them were very comprehensive and

7. Vide the author's Epochs in Hindu Legal History, Chapter II, 2, pp. 23-24.
8. Parasara specified the different Smritis for the different ages Satya, Treta,
Dvapara and Kali.

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 U. C. SARKAR 217

rational. They made provisions for all regulations beginning with

the daily routine of an individual and ending with the religious and
secular duties of all members of the society.
The different stages or Asramas of life have been given in so
elaborate and detailed a fashion that no aspect of human life was left
undiscussed or unprovided for. Undoubtedly, the stage of the house-
holder was rightly regarded as the most important of all the stages.
The last two stages again were the peculiar conceptions of the ancient
Indian philosophy on life. The richness of the Upanishadas and all
other philosophical speculations could be attributed to these stages of
the span of human life. The stage of Brahmacharyya or studentship
again, for instance, was a conspicuous achievement of the Hindu
society. Now-a-days, the discipline of the students has become a
problem not only to the educational institutions but also to the states.
But what a wonderful discipline it must have been, when in ancient
India, the students had to submit to the Gurukulam—irrespective of
their social position and wealth. Studentship at that time was regard-
ed as apart from the status and it was never based on the system of
contract, as it is to-day.
Casteism is now condemned ; but it can by no means be denied
that whatever is best in Indian culture and whatever is best in the
achievements of the Indian philosophy are due mainly to the Brah-
mins, who on account of the caste system, having the advantage of a
sort of division of labour, could exclusively devote their attention
which alone could have crowned their efforts with success. The
Brahmins and the sages also were not blind to the defects of caste
system. Most of the Sutra-writers and Smriti-writers clearly mention
that a-Brahmin is not a real Brahmin at all simply because he happens
to be born in a Brahmin's family. To be a real Brahmin, he must
have the necessary virtues also, A Brahmin without the requisite
qualifications cannot be called a real Brahmin, as an elephant made
of wood cannot be called an elephant. 9 The strongest defence of
caste system thus came from the Gita where it was said by the Lord
that the four castes were created by Him in accordance with quality
and work. In the dawn of the Indian civilization, the difference of

9. According to one of the verses, quoted by Baudhayana, an unlearned Brah-

min has nothing in him except the name like an elephant made of wood or an
antelope made of leather. The same analogy was used by Vasistha also. (Vide the
writer's Social Legislation with Reference to India).

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castes seems to have been unknown and it was introduced and

stereotyped artificially at a later stage. In the Rig Veda, 1 0 it had only
once been mentioned that there were four castes and that they origi-
nated from the different limbs of Purusa who had one thousand eyes,
one thousand feet and so forth. The enumeration of the four different
castes stereotyped in later literature both religious and secular, is thus
come across only once in the Rig Veda and that also in the Purusa
hymn of the tenth Mandaia, which is supposed by scholars to belong
to a much later period. It is quite natural that in subsequent periods,
along with the growth of several other artificial social institutions and
restrictions, caste-system also became a deep rooted system in the
Hindu society, with the result that the philosophy of caste restriction
had a very important bearing on ancient Hindu law—both civil and
criminal. In fact, there was hardly any topic, which was not
influenced by the consideration of the caste. Gotra, 11 adoption,
marriage, 12 determination of the amount of interest, realisation of
debts, infliction of punishment for crimes, 13 distribution of treasure,
veracity of witness, 14 appointment of judges, 15 infliction of capital
punishment, application of the ordeals— not to multiply topics--were
more or less determined with reference to the question of caste in
Hindu law. Originally, there could not be anything inherently wrong
in the scheme of caste system which purported to secure the advantage
of administration. Even to-day, Education, Defence, Commerce and
Labour are the most important portfolios for the purpose of Govern-
ment. Besides the four principal castes there were several sub-castes16
and mixed castes n also.
If we look at the evolution of the Hindu society, we can easily
find that everything was done and every person lived for the society—

10. X. 90.
11. The twice-born alone have gotras. The Sudras follow the gotra of their
preceptors.
12. Narada, 1 1 , 5 ; Manu, III, 12, 24.
13. Narada, XV. XVI, 22-27, Manu, III, 267-270.
14. Manu, VIII, 80, 123; Narada, 1, 199 j Brihaspati, III, 22.
15. Manu, VIII. 20-21.
16. Kayasthas were held to be Sudras by the Calcutta High Court, Raj Coomar
Lall v. Bissesur Dyal (1884) 10 Cal. 688. Ajit v. Nirode (1916) 90 C.W.N. 901 ; Bhola-
nath v. Emperor (1924) 51 Cai. (488). The Vaidays and the Sadgopas of Bengal are
Sudras; {Rajnandin v. Ashwini (1941) 1 Cal. 457; Durgadas v. Saniosh (1945)1
Cal. 17).
17. Gautama enumerated not fewer than 28 mixed castes based on Anuloma
and Pratiloma marriages.

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 U. C. SARKAR 219

its welfare and improvement. The welfare conception of the society

or the state which was appreciated for the first time in the West only
in the beginning of the present century was practically organised by
the Indian thinkers at the very threshold of the organisation of the
human society, as to be found revealed in the scriptural literature of
the Hindus. We clearly find therein that the life of every one includ-
ing that of the king implied a bundle more of duties than of rights.
Everyone was to do something for the society not only of men but also
of beasts, birds, and plants. Hence there arose a very wide and
genuine conception of charity in India from the very beginning.
Every contribution was with a view to the adding to the welfare of
the society. This also very greatly helped the economic adjustment
and redistribution. It was thus no wonder that in India the society
grew more out of sacrifice than self-indulgence in luxury. The king
would think that it was his duty to satisfy the subjects—whatever the
cost. The rich would think that their riches had been really utilized,
when they were used for the needy persons of the society. Women
would be grateful if they could self-abnegate themselves for others in
the society in general and the family in particular. The Indian joint
family system which was the miniature form of the society was based
essentially on this wide liberality and deep sympathy.
Thus the teaching of the ancient Hindu society was self-sacrifice
for others—for the rest of the society. This is the spiritual achieve-
ment of the Hindu culture and society. Lord Buddha, king Asoka,
and Mahatma Gandhi—to mention only a few —were the natural
consequent of which the distinct Indian culture was the antecedent.
King Asoka conceived and administered a welfare state even several
centuries before the birth of Christ.
We all know that king Asoka was great not so much as a warrior
or a politician but as a winner of the hearts of his subjects by service
and love. He established hospitals and other charitable institutions
not only for men but also for beasts and birds. Many kings ceuld be
named after Asoka, such as, Kaniska and Harsavardhan, who would,
at intervals, empty the entire royal treasury for the people of the
country and they would choose to put on rags. What could be more
conducive to or indicative of the welfare state of which we hear ana
talk so much to-day? It is thus no wonder that Asoka with his social wel-
fare conceptions, achievements and performances has greatly inspired
the model of the present Indian leaders for re-moulding the Indian
society as a socialistic welfare one. The administration of the ancient

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220 HINDU LAW

Indian society—legal or otherwise—was thus based on social welfare.

After her independence, India now advocates this rich heritage of her
culture for the whole world. In other words, India 18 is now not only
striving for an Indian welfare state ; she is also striving for a world
welfare state in which all nations and individuals will live as members
of the self-same family fraternised by love, peace, tolerance and co-
existence, as implied by the discipline of " Pancha Shila ".
2. Hindu law—an admixture of positive law, religion and morality
The ancient Hindu law was, no doubt, mixed up with religion,
morality and social and domestic usages and customs including the
daily routine even for the individuals. Thus we find that the sages
gave us the different Sutra literatures which contain the earliest ela-
borate rules of the society from the stand-points of religion, domestic
duties and the mutual relations between the different members of the
society. Hence we have got the Srautasutras, the Grihyasutras and
the Dharmasutras. The Dharmasastras, again were practically ela-
borations of the Dharmasutras. This is the most interesting feature
of the ancient Hindu law founded as it was most comprehensively on
Varna and Asrama. The law was clearly conceived in a very compre-
hensive manner covering all the conceivable aspects of human life.
This aspect of ancient Hindu law has not been studied critically. In
this sense, the sociological studies of ancient Hindu law will reveal its
strength rather than its weakness, its merits rather than its demerits.
It does not require any re-iteration that law and society are most
inextricably connected with each other— one being the means to the
other which is the end. Thus law is a social concomitant. This close
relation again is primarily responsible for the corresponding changes
in law when there are changes in the society. Sociology has been
resorted to as a special and independent study in the West, quite
recently, connected as it has been with the sociological method of
studying law and jurisprudence. The sociology of law has been
defined 19 " as that part of the sociology of the human spirit which
studies the full social reality of law beginning with its tangible and
externally observable expressions in effective collective behaviours and
in the material basis.' 5
The precise relation between sociology and law has been best
illustrated by Maurice Hauriou, who says that " a little sociology

18. Vide the writer's Social Legislation with Reference to India, p p . 22-23.
19. Dr. Gurvitch, Sociology of Law, p. 48.

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 U. C. SARKAR 221

leads away from the law, but much sociology leads back to i t " . It
can be said conversely also that a little law leads away from sociology
but much law leads back to it. The latter phrase has been emphasised
by Roscoe Pound, who maintains that "perhaps the most significant
advance in the modern science of law is the change from the analy-
tical 20 to the functional standpoint " which requires that judges,
jurists and lawyers should constantly keep in view the relation
between law and living social reality." 31 Hence it can be said that
for a systematic prediction 2'2 of what tribunals will do, the sociology
of law gives the jurist 2 3 an objective description of the social reality
of the law valid in a given milieu. 21
The original elasticity and self-adequacy of the ancient Indian
society were disturbed to a very great extent during the Muslim and
the British administration, when India had to come in contact with
foreign pepole and alien civilisation. But India could, nevertheless,
manage to have remained firm enough not to have lost her
original character, though at the same time, as a matter of fact, she
could manage to accommodate for the reception and assimilation of
the alien elements which thus combined together determined the shape
of the subsequent Hindu society, as it is to-day. Hence when we have
to consider the present Hindu society, we have to accept the social

20. Gardozo rightly says, " A fruitful parent of injustice is the tyranny of
concepts".
21. The jurists according to Dr. Gurvitch are concerned with the questions of
the 'quid juris 1 while the sociologists are concerned with the description of the
" quid facti "—in the sense of reducing social facts to the relation of forces. The
reality of the society behind the jural phenomena might be regarded by the lawyer
as " the law behind the law ".
22. According to Justice Holmes also, " the life of the law has not been logic; it
has been experience". Cf. Sociology and Law in the Social Sciences and their Inter-
relations (New York, 1927), edited by W. F. Ogburn and A. A. Golden Weiser,
pp. 325-26.
23. Roscoe Pound, Interpretation of Legal History (1923), pp. 141-47. The History
of the System of Common Law (1939), pp. 15-16. The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928)—
Justice Gardozo.
24. A reference may be made in passing to what is known as German socio-
logical " formalism " and American "behaviourism". (Vide F. All. Port. Insti-
tutional Behaviour, 1933, pp. 238 et seq. Social Psychology 1924, pp. 148etseq). Analysing
the different character of the social reality, Durkheim says that sociology is the study
of cultural patterns, social symbols and collective spiritual values and ideas in the
functional relations with social structure and concrete historical situations of the
society —which varies from epoch to epoch and from structure to structure.

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realities and make adequate allowances for them. The present Hindu
society has been the resultant of three distinct currents and cross-
currents—the original Hindu contribution and the subsequent impacts
with the Muslims and the Britishers along with their civilisation.
The attention of the Privy Council also was drawn to this aspect
of admixture of positive law and religion and morality in Hindu law.
The following observation of the Privy Council in Sri Bahtsu v. Sri
Balusu25 explains the whole question thus: "Their Lordships had
occasion in a later case26 to dwell upon the mixture of morality, religion
and law in the Smritis. They then said "AH these old text books and
commentaries are apt to mingle religion and moral considerations, not
being positive laws with rules intended for positive laws." They now
add that the further study of the subject necessary for the decision of
these appeals has still more impressed them with the necessity of great
caution in interpreting books of mixed religion, morality and law, lest
foreign lawyers accustomed to treat as law what they find in authori-
tative books and to administer a fixed legal system should too hastily
take for strict law precepts which are meant to appeal to the moral
sense and should thus fetter individual judgment in private affairs
and should also introduce restrictions into Hindu society and impart
to it inflexible rigidity never contemplated by the original law givers.
The term Dharma, as used in the Dharmasutras, and the Dharma-
sastras, could not mean only positive law pure and simple. It was a
term with a much wider connotation including religious, social, moral,
domestic and other regulations including legal rules as well.
As a matter of fact, the term was used in the most comprehensive
sense to cover and regulate the conduct of an Arya or a Hindu from
all points of view. It is for this reason that in the Smriti literature,
we find more of social and religious than purely legal matters. The
work which actually stood for positive law in the Smriti literature is
Vyavahara. In the Smritis, chapters on Vyavahara have been diffe-
rentiated from those on Prayaschitta, Acara and the like. So, the
early sages also could actually discriminate between what was purely
positive law and what was simply religious and social law. Yajna-
valkya 27 lays down that a violation of the rule of law or an established

25. (1899) 26 A.A. 113. 136; and also B. G. Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit (1915) 42
I.A. 135, 149.
26. Rao BalwantSinfk v. Rani Kishore (1898) 25 LA. 54, 69.
27. II, 5.

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 U. C. SARKAR 223

usage results in one of the breaches of law. Narada 28 also explains

that the practice of duty having died out among mankind, actions of law
(Vyavahara) have been introduced and the king has been appointed to
decide them, as he has an authority to punish. The tendency to differen-
tiate law from other allied matters was visible even in the earlier
Dharmasastras but ultimately in Narada and Brihaspati, we find that
they had confined themselves only to legal discussions. Thus like a
true jurist, Narada begins his disquisition with the object and necessity
of administration of justice, then he deals with certain preliminary
principles of general application and ultimately proceeds with the
discussion of the different topics of law and procedure, in the most
scientific, systematic and precise way indulging in more division and
sub-division of the topics of law.
A really comprehensive legal study includes the different aspects
and phases of the society. Thus in the words of Roscoe Pound :
"Jurisprudence, Ethics, Economics, Politics and Sociology are distinct
enough at the core, but shade out into each other; when we look at
the core or chiefly at the core, the analytical distinctions are sound
enough. But we shall not understand even that core and much less
the debatable grounds beyond unless we are prepared to make conti-
nual deep incursions, from each into each of the other. All the social
sciences must be co-workers and emphatically all must be co-workers
with jurisprudence." 29 It is quite evident that the ancient Hindu 30
jurists consciously and competently conceived and applied the sociolo-
gical or the true synthetic method. A synthetic jurist must take into
account the past with the Historical school and must have an eye to
the future as well with the Philosophical school for a proper under-
standing and appreciation of the present with the Analytical school.
At the same time, the growth of the society as a whole in its various
aspects should be considered by a jurist to acheive the ideal result.
As in the story of the Upanishad, the different Western schools of
studying jurisprudence, like the blind men, have hitherto touched and
felt the different parts of the elephant's body and their dispute regard-
ing the character of the subject can be satisfactorily solved only by
the knowledge of the entirety. The movement towards this desired
synthesis had only begun in the West in the beginning of the present

28. Sacred Book of the East Series, Vol. X X X I I I , 8, 5.

29. Law and Morals, p. 119.
30. Vide the writer's Epochs in Hindu Legal History, p. 32.

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224 HINDU LAW

century, whereas it attained perfection with the Hindu jurists even

at the time of the Smritis.
3. Actual administration of Hindu law as contained in the Smritis
Though progressively limited in its scope, Hindu law even to-day
is the law for the Hindus, at least in certain matters, subject to
modification by the legislature and the operation of certain valid
customs. 31 . The entire Hindu society of the ancient period was actually
and effectively governed by the Hindu law as it is to be seen in the
ancient texts—followed by the Nibandhas and the commentaries.
Besides these text books on Hindu law, there was no other guide or
code for the society. The kings even had to conduct themselves
according the rules of the Smriti texts. Some of the Western scholars
who came in contact with these Smriti texts, were led to believe that
these texts of law were never actually followed for the purpose of
administration of the society. Maine, Nelson, Burnell and Ellis were
the most prominent among them. But this was clearly the result of
their imperfect knowledge and superficial observations. Thus accord-
ing to Sir Henry Maine 32 the Smriti law "does not as a whole represent
a set of rules ever actually administered in Hindusthan. It is in great
part an ideal picture of that, which in the view of the Brahmins ought
to be the law." But this is not borne out by evidence. Thus it has
been rightly pointed out: "No unbiased student of the Smriti literature
can assert that the system whose beginning and developments are
traceable from stage to stage was wholly imaginary. The rules laid
down are so detailed and practical and their development is so natural
that they must have been the result of actual experience in the daily
administration of justice.
The Dharmasastra works had been produced from the different
parts of the country and some of the commentaries and the Nibandhas
were produced under royal patronage 3 3 or by authors who were
themselves associated with public administration as Ministers or
judges... Why should they all have indulged in the pastime of writing
about a system of judicial administration which never existed ?
Dr. Jolly also rightly says that the Smritis represented existing

31. Customs have been greatly modified by recent legislation.

32. Ancient Law, (12 Edn.) 17, 18.
33. For an enumeration of the most important authors and their works see
Mayne's Hindu law and Usage, 1 Ith Edn., p. 3, Cf. Jolly, Tagore Law Lectures, pp. 27,
28, 32.

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 U. C. SARKAR 225

practice". 34 That the law was actually administered is quite clear from
the contemporary literature 3 5 and also from certain judgments s 6
which have been fortunately preserved in Sanskrit. From these judg-
ments it can be most confidently said that every word therein can be
referrable 37 to the Smriti texts of ancient Indian law. As a matter of
fact, the actual administration of the ancient Indian law can be seen
also in the judicial administration of the Marathas 38 and Maharaja
Ranjit Singh. 39 The life of an individual including that of a king
was, as it has already been said, a bundle more of duties than of
rights. 40 The kings also were subject to the rule of law and they were

34*. The Hindu Judicial System, by S. Varadachariar, Judge, Federal Court,

pp. 231 et seq.
35. Reference may be made to the Sanskrit Drama Mricchakatikam, which gives
a very realistic picture not only regarding the broad points of the then judicial
system but also of some minute details in an actual trial scene. Act IX of the Drama
contains the trial in question. The allegations were that Vasantasena, a prostitute,
was murdered by a merchant Carudatta; evidence was taken and Carudatta was
found guilty of murder, though as a matter of fact, Vasantasena was not murdered
at all. In spite of the utmost care taken by the judge, in examining witnesses and
taking evidence, by curious coincidence, Carudatta was adjudged guilty, though
happily enough, Vasantasena physically appeared in the execution ground where-
upon Carudatta could be released.
36. (a) The Jayapatra (judgment) in the case of Tularam Sharma znd Others (Plain*
tiffs) v. Mani Nath Sharma (Deft.).
(b) The Javanese Jayapatra in the case of Dharma v. Jabwal.
(c) The caste judgment given by king Shambhuji, son of Sivaji.
(d) The Syen^avijatidharmavinirnaya of the time of Shivaji; (for the detailed
discussions and comments on these judgments, vide the author's Epochs in Hindu
Legal History, Chapter, XII),
37. The first of the above judgments is a unique document throwing an in-
exhaustible flood of light or) the actual working of the ancient Indian law of the
Smritis even in comparatively recent times. This judgment was fully examined by
Dr. K. P. Jayaswal according to whom every line in the judgment is referrable to the
Hindu Law texts (JBORS, 1G20, pp. 248-58).
38. The whole administration and the judicial system of the Marathas in
general and Shivaji in particular were essentially based and modelled upon the
ancient Dharmasastras and the Arthasastra. (Vide the Judicial System of the Marathas
by V. T. Gune and the Tagore Law Lectures by K. P. Jayaswal).
39. F<rom the account of the judicial system of Maharaja Ranjit Singh it will
be clearly seen that the administration of justice under the Maharaja was essentially
based on the customs and tenets of the text books on Hindu law. (Vide Maharaja
Ranjitsingh, by Sita Ram Kohli, written in Punjabi).
40. The primary duty of the king was to protect and please the subjects. The
Indian kings never thought ©f self-indulgence in luxury. On the contrary, there
were many wholesome doctrines accepted by the ancient kings. Thus if the stolen

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 226 HINDU LAW

responsible not only for their own acts but also even for the acts of
others taking place within their administration. 41
The doctrine of " rule of law " was recognised in ancient India
from the very beginning. Hence it was not a legacy of the
British rule in India. Even in ancient and medieval India,
kings 42 and judges 43 were alike subject to the rule of law like the
subjects themselves. Thus if a theft could not be detected or the
stolen property could not be recovered, the king was to compensate
the aggrieved person out of his own treasury ; sometimes the villagers
and sometimes the officers concerned were to make good the loss.

property could not be recovered, the aggrieved party was to be compensated from
the royal treasury.
41. This idea has been very effectively illustrated by an episode described in
the " Uttar Ramcharita ' \ a Sanskrit drama, written by Bhavabhuti, During the
reign of Rama, in Ayodhya, a Brahmin lost his young son ; the Brahmin'tame to the
king and demanded why his young son had died a premature death. There must
have been, as alleged by the Brahmin, something wrong with the king or his adminis-
tration- The king Rama also could not summarily dismiss the Brahmin, He sent
his emissaries to enquire what the transgression might have been. It was, however,
found on enquiry that a Sudra was practising penance against the injunctions of the
scripture. It was concluded that the penance practised by the Sudra was the cause
of the death of the Brahmin's son. The Sudra was killed as a punishment.
42. On account of the operation of the rule of law, nobody could be above the
law.
The king himself, not to speak of other members of his family, was equally
subject to the law like the ordinary subjects. According to the story of the king
Bimbisara, as recorded by Heuen Tsian, it is said that in order to prevent fire which
became rather frequent at that time, the king passed a law that anybody in whose
house fire broke out would be banished. One day fire broke out in the capital itself
whereon the king said to his ministers, " I wish to maintain the laws of the country,
I myself must be banished; hence I am going into e x i l e " . With these words, the
king gave up the government to his eldest son and retired to the forest. (For the
case of Prince Jaiia v. Sudatta, see the writer's Epochs in Hindu Legal History, p. 101).
43. Kautilya made elaborate provisions regarding the conduct and character of
the judges so that they might readily inspire the confidence of the litigants. Thus if
a judge ever browbeats or unjustly drives out or silences any of the litigants in his
court, he shall be first of all punished with the first amercement. If he defames or
abuses anyone of them, punishment shall be doubled. Again, if the judge does not
ask what ought to be asked or leaves out what he himself has asked, teaches or
reminds, he will be punished with the middle-most amercement. If a judge does not
enquire into necessary circumstances, makes unnecessary delay in discharging his
duty, postpones work with spite, causes parties to leave the court by tiring them with
delay, evades or causes to evade statements that lead to the settlement of a case, helps
witnesses, giving them clues or resumes cases already settled or decided, he be
punished with the highest amercement. If he repeats the offence he shall both be

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 U. G. SARKAR 227
u
This was the rule enjoined not only by Kautilya but also more or
less by all the writers of the Dharmasastras 15 and the Dharmasutras. 46
Similarly, the Mughal emperors also adhered to this doctrine to a very
considerable extent. Shahjahan would compel the officials to com-
pensate the injured persons when thieves escaped or when the stolen
property could not be recovered. Again Akbar also was not only a
great ruler, he was also a great administrator of justice and equity.
According to him justice was the divine element in monarchy. " If
I were guilty of an unjust act ", says Akbar, " I would rise in judg-
ment against myself. What shall I say then of my sons, my kindreds
and others"? Mannuci says of Jahangir that if any official went
wrong in the matter of administration of justice, he would be thrown
in front of the lions that were kept in the Hall of Audience. Of
Shahjahan also it has been said that the officials were subject to rather
unusually cruel punishment for any act of oppression on the subject.
He used to keep in his court baskets full of poisonous snakes. The
officers guilty of oppression and tyranny were to be bitten by these
snakes. They would not be removed from his presence unless they
breathed their last. The above instances go to illustrate the loftiest
principles of administrative law in ancient and medieval India.
Regarding their views that the Hindu law of the Smriti was never
actually administered in practice, the Western scholars had certain
reasons to be misled. In the first place, their knowledge about the
contents of the literature and the actual administration of the society
was not as intimate as it should have been ; in the second place, it
was a fact that the law in the real sense of the term actually occupied
a very small fraction of the entire volume of the Smriti literature; in
the third place, there was substance in the observation of Mayne that
the rules of the Smritis were expressed in the form of ' should *

punished with double the above fine and dismissed. When a judge or a commissioner
imposes an unjust fine in gold, he shall be fined either double the amount of the fine
or eight times the amount of imposition, which is either more or less than the pre-
scribed limit; again if a judge or a commissioner imposes an unjust corporal punish-
ment, he shall himself be either condemned to the same punishment, or made to pay
twice the amount of the ransom leviable for the kind of injustice. Lastly, when a
judge falsifies whatever is a true amount or declares as true whatever amount is
false, he shall be fined eight times the amount (vide Kautilya's Artkasastra, 224,
225).
44. Ibid, Chapter X V I .
45. Yajnavalkya, II, 272; Narada, XIV, 12-17, 27.
46. Gautama, X, 46-47.

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 228 HINDU LAW
u
ought". But it has to be remembered that the Smriti literature was
not presented in the same form as a legislative enactment. And more-
over, the expression should or ought was understood by everybody
concerned in the sense of must. The admixture of the purely legal
rules with religious and social regulations also was greatly responsible
for this initial confusion or mis-understanding. Happily this initial
misconception was not to be found persistent, in the subsequent
Western authors who were in a better position to understand and
appreciate the real nature and contribution of the Smriti law in view
of the progressively increasing fruits of researches.
4. Hindu law—compared and contrasted with other ancient systems
of law
The Hindu law is one of the most ancient, comprehensive and
highly developed systems of law. From the perusal of the different
legal topics and the modes in which they were treated in the
different Dharmasutras and the Dharmasastra, it can be clearly asserted
that the Hindu jurists even of the earliest epoch developed quite a rich
legal system to be favourably comparable with any other known systems
of law as of Rome, Babylonia, Egypt or Greece. Thus according to the
provisions of the XII Tables 47 of Rome, there were retaliation and
extreme form of Patria Potestas even to kill sons, and there was also
the most cruel form of law there according to which a debtor could be
killed and his flesh distributed amongst the different creditors even
without any regard for the principle of pro rata distribution.
The Code 48 of Hammurabi illustrates that capital punishment
could be inflicted even for offences like trifling theft. There was also
sorcery in ancient Babylonia. Extreme form of Lex Talionis prevailed
there : " Thus if a builder 49 builds a house for any one and do not
build it solid and the house which falls down and kills the owner, one
should put that builder to death. If it kills the §on 50 of the owner of
the house one shall put the son of the builder to death." There are
also several other 51 similar illustrations.
Ancient Accadian 52 laws give us the laws of the Accadians, who
were one of the earliest tribes of Babylonia. The Code consists of

47. 11,6.
48. Translated by W. W. Davis.
49. Ibid, Section 229, as reprinted in the Evolution of Law series, Vol. II.
50. Ibid, Section 230.
51. Ibid, Sections 209, 210, 116,
52. Translated by A. H Sayce.

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 U. C. SARKAR 229

18 sections only dealing mostly with the mutual rights of the different
members of the family and the master and the servant. There is
hardly any other topic of civil or criminal law in it.
The Edict of Hamharb 53 is the most important Edict of the 19th
Dynasty which has come down to us from Egypt. The Edict only
provides for punishment of public officers including judges, who would
perpetrate oppression and injustice on the subjects of his Majesty. 54
The Hebrew law also inflicted the death penalty but not on the
innocent child of the perpetrator but direct on the guilty person.
According to this system 55 " the father shall not be put to death for
the children neither shall the children be put to death for the father.
Every man shall be put to death for his own sin ".
The laws of Grotyn 5 6 discovered in Crete, provide formulas
mainly for slavery, though there are references to partition, adoption
and suretyship as well.
According to the Hindu law, the creditor, far from indulging in
killing the debtor and taking his flesh, would remain contended by
taking recourse to the process of u Dharna " which was nothing but
a moral pressure put on the debtor to compel him to pay the debt
himself lest some serious calamity might befall him. This was quite
in consonance with the ethical and philosophical background, as
supplied for Hindu law.
Reference might be made to innumberable points of law where
the ancient Hindu jurists very clearly set certain rules for practical
guidance in discriminating truthful and false witness : " An un-
truthful witness constantly shifts his position, licks the corner of his
lips, his fore-head sweats, his countenance changes colour, his mouth
dries up, he falters in his speech and very often contradicts himself,
he does not look up and is slow in returning answers and contorts his
lip ; such a person, who exhibits an unnatural aspect either in mind,
body, word or action is esteemed false, whether putting forward a
claim on his own account or giving evidence in another's cause.
Reliable witnesses generally possess the following qualities:

53. Translated by J. H. Breadsted.

54. Ibid, XII, 16.
55. Deut: 24, 16.
56. Translated by H. J. Roby.

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230 HINDU LAW

They are religious, generous, of respectable family, addicted to

veracity, lovers of virtue, candid, having off-spring, wealthy, con-
formers to traditional and written law." 57
Sometimes it is alleged that in Hindu law there were ordeals for
adjudication of cases. But there were many wholesome checks on the
application of the ordeals, if any. In the first place, the ordeals were
to be resorted to only in absence of human witness: " I n litigation
documents should besought first; in absence of documents witnesses;
in absence of witnesses recourse may be taken to ordeals — this is the
injunction of the wise men." 5 8 In the second place, ordeals could be
applicable when both the parties were agreeable and when the plain-
tiff or the complainant declared himself ready to take the punishment
himself in case of defeat.59 In the third place, it was practically a
religious appeal and hence could not be applicable to the unbelievers,
irreligious persons, Vratyas and great criminals. 60 Thus if these
characteristics of the ordeals are minutely examined and analysed, it
will be found indirectly that in many of them, curiously enough, the
doctrine of presumption of innocence in favour of the accused persons
will be evident. In many cases, again, there could not be any cer-
tainty about the result—the element of chance or lottery remaining
predominant. It may also be mentioned here that no ordeals were
mentioned in the Dharmasutras ; Manu also just alluded to only two
of them ; the types of ordeals were multiplied only by the later Smriti
writers. It was, however, not peculiar to Hindu law alone. Trials
by ordeal were to be found in England also even upto 1819, when the
Parliament abolished the last ordeal by an Act of Parliament. 61 As
regards the nature and occasion for applying ordeals in trial of cases
it has been very significantly said by Maitland :
" If two of litigants, the one contradicts the other flatly if the
plain " Y o u d i d " of the one is met by the straight-forward " Y o u
lie " of the other ; here is a problem which man cannot solve.
He is unable yet to weigh testimony against testimony to cross-
examine witnesses, to piece together the truth out of little bits of

57. Vide Dr. P. N. Sen, Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence (Tagore Law Lectures);
Narada, 1, 193, 196.
58. It is an oft-quoted couplet from the Hitopadesa, the exact authorship being
unknown.
59. Vide Asahaya and Narada, I, 157.
60. Narada, 1, 332, 338.
61. Thorton's case in Maitland's English Legal History, pp. 62-63.

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 U. C, SARKAR 231

evidence. He has recourse to the super-natural. He adjudges that

one or other of the two parties is to prove his case by an appeal to
God 5'.62
Lastly, parallel sets of courts of law and equity had to be resorted
to both in Rome as well as in England. But no such differentiation
was necessiated for the genius of the Hindu jurists, though there were
two classes of people —the Aryans and the Non-Aryans—in India also
(as in Rome where there were the Patricians and the Plebians). The
same courts and administrators in Hindu law applied what was strict
law along with what might be regarded as equity. Herein lies the
superiority of the ancient Hindu jurists, who could be inflexible and
at the same time accommodating enough to make their original law
suitable to the needs of the hour, in keeping with the growth and
progress of the society.
5. Origin and development of Hindu Law
Hindu law is undoubtedly one of the most ancient systems of law.
Mayne 6 3 does not at all exaggerate when he says that "Hindu law has
the oldest pedigree of any known system of jurisprudence and even
now it shows no signs of decreptitude." Nothing, of course, is known
definitely about the earliest authors of the Srutis of the Smritis—their
personal history, time or place. It is not correct or necessary to hold
the view that Hindu law is of divine origin. No doubt, in the scrip-
tural literature there are many references to divine mediums and
sources, but to be quite scientific and accurate, the speculations, produc-
tions and promulgations—in whatever form—must be regarded as
strictly human. Definite informations are not possible because these
authors flourished long ago and they did not leave anything behind
them for their personal identification. The different authors, who
were responsible for the different scriptural literature were undoubtedly
outstanding and extraordinarily capable persons living the simplest and
the most honest type of life having no other complicated pursuits in
life except philosophical and sociological speculation. They were neces-
sarily far superior to the ordinary run of the population and they were
thus rightly regarded as semi-divine personalities out of reverence.
So far as the origin of Hindu law is concerned, there were also
other religious and philosophical associations for which it was usually

62. Ibid, p . 61.

63. Hindu Law and Usage, 1st Ed. Preface.

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232 HINDU LAW

regarded as of divine orgin. The genesis of this juristic and theolo-

gical speculations must be sought in the conception of Rita or Natural
Order presided over by the Vedic Deity Varuna. This will also explain
the relation between law and dharma. Apart from the Sruitis, the
earliest epoch in the history of Hindu law was the Dharmasutras,
The second epoch was the Arthasastra of Kautilya and the early
Dharmasastras of Manu and Yajnavatkya. The Smritis of Narada,
Brihaspati and Katyayana represented the latest epoch in the original
contribution which was subsequently followed mainly by the Nibandhas
and the commentaries. Eeven to a cursory reader, the Dharmasastras
are the true index of the golden age in Hindu Legal History. The
history of Hindu law can be, like the general history of India, viewed
from the point of view of the Hindu period, the Muslim period and the
British period and thereafter. During the first period, that is, the
Hindu period, Hindu law developed quite independently without any
extraneous influence 64 in view of peculiar constitution of the Hindu
society, which was primarily based on Varna and Asrama. In the
second period, the growth of Hindu law was arrested, though at the
same time, there was hardly any influence of Muslim law upon it.
This might be explained by the presence of the fundamental points of
similarity between the basic 65 doctrines of the two systems. After the
Musilm conquest and the consolidation of the Muslim rule in India,
the growth of Hindu law was no longer untrammelled. The Hindus
were governed by their own laws and that was also in the sphere of
civil law. Criminal law was administered by the Muslim rulers and
their officers. During this period, the Hindus mostly decided their
disputes by arbitrations and Panchayats among themselves. The
British rule in India, however, gave a definite direction to the growth

64. According to G. P. Sherman the earliest development of law took place in

Babylon...The Babylonian system also influenced and moulded the ancient Hindu
Law as found in the institutes of Manu ". (Roman Law in Modern World, Vol. 1,
p. 19). There seems to be no truth in this assertion. It is too far-fetched to say that
Hindu law, as propounded by Manu was moulded or even influenced in any way by
the Babylonian law. As a matter of fact, no trace of such extraneous influence could
be found in the whole of the Smriti literature, which developed independently and
quite in isolation by the Hindu jurists themselves alone. During the time when the
Smritis were composed, there could not be any possible means of very frequent inter-
course either social or philosophical. An examination of the code of Hammurabi
also will lend support to this contention, as there are very few points of similarity
between the two famous codes of Manu and Hammurabi.
65. See the writer's Epoch in Hindu Legal History, Ch. X .

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 U. C. SARKAR 233

of Hindu law though not always in keeping with its orthodox genius.
Many foreign juristic principles were introduced into Hindu Law
through legislation and adjudication under the garb of its application
and interpretation. Though in a sense, Hindu law was relatively
static during the Muslim period, it became dynamic in the British period.
The Hindu system of law was naturally saturated with British influence
which was not an unmixed blessing.
Whether the changes brought about by the British rulers in the
shape of legislative Acts and decided cases were exclusively good, bad
or mixed for the Hindus is a question, which cannot be fully answered
by jurispudence alone. The correct answer will depend on the ap-
proach to the question from the standpoints of religious, social and
cultural sentiments. It has also to be remembered in this connection
that with the progress and consolidation of the British rule in India,
the Hindu society assumed a peculiar character because of its contact
with the Western education and civilization. The recent codification
of Hindu law in certain important branches was neither an imperative
necessity nor an unmixed blessing. As a matter of fact, to an
impartial observer, the spirit of the recent legislation on Hindu law had
been virtually for the accentuation and acceleration of the tendencies
that had already been manifest in the modifications and innovations
effected by the British administration. 66 Though the Muslim rule was
greatly responsible for suppressing and arresting the progress of the
Hindu society in its natural and orthodox channel, the British rule was
again responsible for expanding and liberalising it in various directions*
The Dharmasutras, the Dharmasastras, the Arthasastra of Kautilya
along with the Nibhandhas and the commentaries reveal a state of the
society in which the Hindu law was highly developed both in its civil
and criminal sides including their substantive as well as adjective
aspects. But this highly elaborate and perfectly developed system of
Hindu law was greatly eclipsed 67 by the Muslim legal system when
the Muslim rulers succeeded in establishing and consolidating an empire
in India. Though the Hindu law did not die out during the Muslim
rule in India, it almost ceased to have the official prominence and
recognition. The distinction between the personal laws of the Hindus
and Muslims began in India with the Muslims and were maintained

66. Ibid., Introduction, pp. 1-4.

67. Even at the present time, it is clearly seen that all legal terms other than
English are of Perso-Arabic origin. No Sanskrit term has ever survived except in
certain Sanskrit judgments themselves.

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234 HINDU LAW

by the British rulers also. Warren Hastings began with the general
proposition that the Hindus should be governed by the laws of their
Sastras and the Muslims should be governed by the laws of their Koran.
The policy thus enunciated towards the very early years of the British
rule in India was on the whole scrupulously adhered to throughout the
whole administration. And furthermore, for an effective and sincere
realisation of this scheme, Hindu and Muslim Law officers were appo-
inted to help the foreign judges by correctly interpreting their own
laws. These posts were, however, abolished after the passing of the
Act (XI) of 1864. In course of time, however, with the Britishers the
tendency was to reduce the scope of the distinctions to the minimum.
They began to widen the scope of the common or the general law at
the cost of the range of the personal laws. As a matter of fact, many
laws were passed to make the law, as far as feasible, uniform for the
Hindus and the Muslims. The Indian penal Code, the Indian
Contract Act, the Indian Evidence Act, the Civil Procedure Code and
the Transfer of Property Act are some of the most important legisla-
tive enactments to show that the differences between the two systems
of personal laws, as they originally existed, were being gradually
obliterated.
From the above brief historical sketch, it is quite obvious that
originally Hindu law was territorial in character being applicable to
all the inhabitants of Aryavarta or India. But after the advent of
the Muslims it could no longer claim to be absolutely territorial; it
was confined to the community of the Hindus alone. Thereafter, in
pursuance of the British policy of uniformity of personal laws, as far
as possible, certain general and common laws were passed reserving
only some definite and specific matters like marriage, adoption, etc.
to be governed by pure Hindu law, as derived from the Sastras—sub-
ject further to the operation of certain legislative enactments and
customs and usages unless they were immoral and against public
policy. These specific subjects again were going to be codified and
amended by the Hindu Code Bill. Though the Hindu Code Bill could
not be passed as a whole, some fragments thereof comprising marriage,
succession, adoption, guardianship, etc. had been passed into
laws. A few topics of Hindu law still remain to be codified and
amended in pursuance of the policy followed in this connection.
These topics are co-parcenary, partition, re-union etc. Thus specially
after the recent legislation on Hindu law, codifying and amending it
substantially, the scope for looking into the original provisions of

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 V. C. SARKAR 235

Hindu Law, as enshrined in the Dharmasastras will necessarily be

limited. Again, as it has been observed the Hindu law is not appli-
able to the Hindus on account of its shastric authority but by some
legislative sanction accorded to it by the legislature during the
British administration. It does not require any re-iteration that
the nature and scope of the present day Hindu law are considerably
different from the provisions of the original Hindu law, as they were
made by the authors of the Dharmasutras and the Dharmasastras.
The society for which the original Hindu law was prescribed has
undergone drastic changes—partly on account of natural and in
herent evolution and partly on account of certain extraneous reasons
due to India's contact with the Muslims and the Britishers, who had
different culture, religion and social considerations. But still Hindu
law survived too long, mainly in its original form. The necessity
was felt in different quarters in different forms to amend the original
Hindu law in view of the social changes that had taken place, so that
there might be a harmonious consonance between the needs of the society
and the purpose of the law. Though there might not be exact agree-
ment among the different thinkers and interests regarding the quan-
tum and the quality of such changes and modifications, it was being
progressively realised that to stick to the original form of Hindu law
enjoined several centuries back would clearly be an anachronism. But
that does not again necessitate that everything ancient and time-
honoured should be changed only for the sake of change. Changes
within reasonable limits and for rational purposes cannot be objected
to. But if the changes are to be foisted on the Hindu society against
its own genius only on account of some extraneous influence, they are
sure to be resented. This resentment could be very well seen in the
storm of protest and criticism that were raised against the Hindu Code
Bill. The Hindu law as we have it today in its present form, has
considerably secularised, modernised and rationalised the original
conception of Hindu law which was essentially religious, sufficiently
orthodox and considerably conservative. No system of law can ignore
the social context and the social needs. If the Hindu society had
changed beyond recognition, it is no wonder that the reciprocal changes
also should be pre-eminently noticeable in the different conceptions
and principles of Hindu law.

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