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Petition For Habeas Corpus of Willie Yu
Petition For Habeas Corpus of Willie Yu
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court
on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. After 1
manifestation and motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a
return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the
return. Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties
2
were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. An internal resolution of
3
7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988
resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending
issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of
warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24
November 1988. On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the
4
aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for
issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November 1988. 5
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5
December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7
December 1988. Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December
6
1988, the basis of which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the
CID Board of Commissioners on 2 December 1988. Petitioner also filed a motion to set
7
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention was filed by
8
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988)
dated 9 December 1988, and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15
13
three (3) days from notice within which to explain and prove why he should still be
considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese
passport. 15
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December
1988 followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988.
16
Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift
temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport
in 1971, valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment
17
before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine
citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued
Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese
passport expired on 20 July 1986. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had
18
renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese
19
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board
of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a
21
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired
22
his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had
23
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special
Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said
TRO have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine
citizenship. The material facts are not only established by the pleadings — they are not
disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and
superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was given by the
Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine
citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has
become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look
into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine
citizenship is meritorious.
SO ORDERED.