[G.R. No. 143130. July 10, 2000] thereafter.

thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
ELSA NATIVIDAD, et al. vs. RONALD TUNAC, et al. contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
SECOND DIVISION (Id., p. 128)
Gentlemen: In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less by his
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 10 2000. parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two became lovers
G.R. No. 143130. (Elsa Natividad, et al. vs. Ronald Tunac, et al.) before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction contemplated by the Code
Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where the defendant is in a position of moral
This case originated in a complaint for damages filed by petitioner Elsa Natividad against respondent ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We fail to see any of these circumstances in this case.
Ronald Tunac for breach of promise to marry. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Quezon City In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the families of the
rendered judgment for petitioner, ordering respondent to pay moral and exemplary damages, but, on parties. That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's miscarriage, is already
appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a relationship gone awry.
It appears that petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in Barangay For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents, petitioners Marino and Clarita Natividad and Very truly yours,
respondent Eusebio and Elisa Tunac, resided. At age nineteen (19), the two became lovers. One day, (Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS
Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to get the bio-data which he G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
needed in connection with his application for employment. Upon arrival at the boarding house, they
found no one there. Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and, once inside, started kissing
Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss of her virginity, but Ronald
appeased her by promising to marry her.
Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June 1992. Ronald
reassured her, again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald and his
parents, accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's house and asked her
parents for the hand of their daughter.
The two families agreed to have the wedding in January 1993 as Elsa's sister had gotten married that
year, and they thought it was not good to have two weddings in a family within the same year.
Meanwhile, Elsa started living with Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for the baby to
be born. Unfortunately, on December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby which died after
five (5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge from the hospital, the two families decided that
Elsa should go back to her parents so her mother could take care of her during her postnatal period.
During said period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house.
It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards the former
occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed
Elsa that he no longer wanted to get married to her. Hence, this case. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
Petitioners succinctly contend they are suing respondents not merely because Elsa became pregnant vs.
but because Ronald reneged on his promise to marry her after their agreement had already been much HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
publicized in their town.
This contention has no merit. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, our laws do not provide
for a right to relief for cases arising purely from a breach of one's promise to marry another, the chapter Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
on breach of promise to marry proposed by the Code Commission having been deleted by Congress in
enacting the Civil Code apparently because of lessons from other countries, particularly the United Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
States and England, that the action readily lends itself to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men (Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, 14 May 1949, 2352). DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In cases where this Court has allowed moral or exemplary damages arising from similar circumstances,
there was found moral seduction or misrepresentation (Gashem Shookat Basksh v. Court of Appeals
(219 SCRA 115 (1993)); Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals (109 Phil. 629 (1960)). In Baksh, it was held - This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the
[T]hat where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial
court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty
lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other
hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20
August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that
they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester,
which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the
petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living
with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore
and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed
for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her
such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as
averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged
as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed
to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents
nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his
place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and
finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was
unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety
and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and
P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the
stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment,
Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City,
College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3,
1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October
1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter
damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic)
litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue
who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her,
she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent
and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for
the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting
friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and
(g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have
offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to
the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and
courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim
was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the
private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after
they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his
love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he
went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get
married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with
members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that
occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to
marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep
 with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would
tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine
at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the
following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but
defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live
with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her
that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That
was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City.
Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay
captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant
insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod
City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is
still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them
of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started
preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited
many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the
case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not
dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the
trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court
made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already
29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio
lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would
(sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made
by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and
defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because
of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be
photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those
depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's
pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where
he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27,
1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and
employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on
April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her
daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga,
Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them?
And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal
of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic)
Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where
defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff
resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal
(pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character
and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he
openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a
common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in
Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not
surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and
promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy
his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that
made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
(sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to
their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs,
and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our
women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of
our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions
of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein
the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem,
he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to
marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem
upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives
and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good
moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage
had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with
the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in
relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement.
Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his
love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in
view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis,
it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also
raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to
the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity
to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly
overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked
any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh
all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to
enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v.
Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance
Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in
this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code,
from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The
history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that
no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish
in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made,
or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no
crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for
breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong
has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible
for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-
delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is
an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such
as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine
legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised
Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of
Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the
private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished
under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was
above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to
marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not
only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant —
who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had
been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such
seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced.
The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse,
or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante,
9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction
(43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to
depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have
that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting
her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of
sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be
swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively
because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not
 have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21
of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed
by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from
this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra
vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan.
29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT
be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral
seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding
presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but
in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without
any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the
woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that
there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive
the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl
sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty
years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there
should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and
there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at
fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or
later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . .
(Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and
without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is
in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth,
inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive.
Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be
his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life
of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have
been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress
not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience
about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her
after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal
fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that
she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the
party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent
to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by
one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less,
equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one
is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this
Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in
the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to
protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning
and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his
bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair
today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a
scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE
MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and
motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2,
1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this
stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any
of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for
resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel
filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated
that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the
possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September
8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the
parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel
informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has
appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable
negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant
filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must
be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38,
Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he
has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as
scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of
merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun
Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on
evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October
30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to
receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's
consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus
had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557,
October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is
contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action
for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept.
30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a
promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated
from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated
with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The
bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased
(Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with
accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest
assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is
raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the
award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the
same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this
case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion,
however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby
affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 206806 June 25, 2014
ARCO PULP AND PAPER CO., INC. and CANDIDA A. SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
DAN T. LIM, doing business under the name and style of QUALITY PAPERS & PLASTIC
PRODUCTS ENTERPRISES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Novation must be stated in clear and unequivocal terms to extinguish an obligation. It cannot be
presumed and may be implied only if the old and new contracts are incompatible on every point.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision2 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 95709, which stemmed from a complaint3 filed in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City,
Branch 171, for collection of sum of money.
The facts are as follows:
Dan T. Lim works in the business of supplying scrap papers, cartons, and other raw materials, under
the name Quality Paper and Plastic Products, Enterprises, to factories engaged in the paper mill
business.4 From February 2007 to March 2007, he delivered scrap papers worth 7,220,968.31 to Arco
Pulp and Paper Company, Inc. (Arco Pulp and Paper) through its Chief Executive Officer and President,
Candida A. Santos.5 The parties allegedly agreed that Arco Pulp and Paper would either pay Dan T.
Lim the value of the raw materials or deliver to him their finished products of equivalent value.6
Dan T. Lim alleged that when he delivered the raw materials, Arco Pulp and Paper issued a post-dated
check dated April 18, 20077 in the amount of 1,487,766.68 as partial payment, with the assurance that
the check would not bounce.8 When he deposited the check on April 18, 2007, it was dishonored for
being drawn against a closed account.9
On the same day, Arco Pulp and Paper and a certain Eric Sy executed a memorandum of
agreement10 where Arco Pulp and Paper bound themselves to deliver their finished products to
Megapack Container Corporation, owned by Eric Sy, for his account. According to the memorandum,
the raw materials would be supplied by Dan T. Lim, through his company, Quality Paper and Plastic
Products. The memorandum of agreement reads as follows:
Per meeting held at ARCO, April 18, 2007, it has been mutually agreed between Mrs. Candida A.
Santos and Mr. Eric Sy that ARCO will deliver 600 tons Test Liner 150/175 GSM, full width 76 inches at
the price of ₱18.50 per kg. to Megapack Container for Mr. Eric Sy’s account. Schedule of deliveries are
as follows:
....
It has been agreed further that the Local OCC materials to be used for the production of the above Test
Liners will be supplied by Quality Paper & Plastic Products Ent., total of 600 Metric Tons at ₱6.50 per
kg. (price subject to change per advance notice). Quantity of Local OCC delivery will be based on the
quantity of Test Liner delivered to Megapack Container Corp. based on the above production
schedule.11
On May 5, 2007, Dan T.Lim sent a letter12 to Arco Pulp and Paper demanding payment of the amount of
7,220,968.31, but no payment was made to him.13
Dan T. Lim filed a complaint14 for collection of sum of money with prayer for attachment with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 171, Valenzuela City, on May 28, 2007. Arco Pulp and Paper filed its
answer15 but failed to have its representatives attend the pre-trial hearing. Hence, the trial court allowed
Dan T. Lim to present his evidence ex parte.16
On September 19, 2008, the trial court rendered a judgment in favor of Arco Pulp and Paper and
dismissed the complaint, holding that when Arco Pulp and Paper and Eric Sy entered into the
memorandum of agreement, novation took place, which extinguished Arco Pulp and Paper’s obligation
to Dan T. Lim.17
Dan T. Lim appealed18 the judgment with the Court of Appeals. According to him, novation did not take
place since the memorandum of agreement between Arco Pulp and Paper and Eric Sy was an
exclusive and private agreement between them. He argued that if his name was mentioned in the
contract, it was only for supplying the parties their required scrap papers, where his conformity through
a separate contract was indispensable.19
On January 11, 2013, the Court of Appeals20 rendered a decision21 reversing and setting aside the
judgment dated September 19, 2008 and ordering Arco Pulp and Paper to jointly and severally pay Dan
T. Lim the amount of ₱7,220,968.31 with interest at 12% per annum from the time of demand;
₱50,000.00 moral damages; ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages; and ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees. 22
The appellate court ruled that the facts and circumstances in this case clearly showed the existence of
an alternative obligation.23 It also ruled that Dan T. Lim was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees due
to the bad faith exhibited by Arco Pulp and Paper in not honoring its undertaking.24
Its motion for reconsideration25 having been denied,26 Arco Pulp and Paper and its President and Chief
Executive Officer, Candida A. Santos, bring this petition for review on certiorari.
On one hand, petitioners argue that the execution of the memorandum of agreement constituted a
novation of the original obligation since Eric Sy became the new debtor of respondent. They also argue
that there is no legal basis to hold petitioner Candida A. Santos personally liable for the transaction that
petitioner corporation entered into with respondent. The Court of Appeals, they allege, also erred in
awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to respondent who did not show proof that
he was entitled to damages.27
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that there was no
proper novation in this case. He argues that the Court of Appeals was correct in ordering the payment
of 7,220,968.31 with damages since the debt of petitioners remains unpaid. 28 He also argues that the
Court of Appeals was correct in holding petitioners solidarily liable since petitioner Candida A. Santos
was "the prime mover for such outstanding corporate liability."29 In their reply, petitioners reiterate that
novation took place since there was nothing in the memorandum of agreement showing that the
obligation was alternative. They also argue that when respondent allowed them to deliver the finished
products to Eric Sy, the original obligation was novated.30
A rejoinder was submitted by respondent, but it was noted without action in view of A.M. No. 99-2-04-
SC dated November 21, 2000.31
The issues to be resolved by this court are as follows:
1. Whether the obligation between the parties was extinguished by novation
2. Whether Candida A. Santos was solidarily liable with Arco Pulp and Paper Co., Inc.
3. Whether moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees can be awarded
The petition is denied.
The obligation between the
parties was an alternative
obligation
The rule on alternative obligations is governed by Article 1199 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 1199. A person alternatively bound by different prestations shall completely perform one of them.
The creditor cannot be compelled to receive part of one and part of the other undertaking.
"In an alternative obligation, there is more than one object, and the fulfillment of one is sufficient,
determined by the choice of the debtor who generally has the right of election." 32 The right of election is
extinguished when the party who may exercise that option categorically and unequivocally makes his or
her choice known.33
The choice of the debtor must also be communicated to the creditor who must receive notice of it since:
The object of this notice is to give the creditor . . . opportunity to express his consent, or to impugn the
election made by the debtor, and only after said notice shall the election take legal effect when
consented by the creditor, or if impugned by the latter, when declared proper by a competent court. 34
According to the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court, the original contract between
the parties was for respondent to deliver scrap papers worth ₱7,220,968.31 to petitioner Arco Pulp and
Paper. The payment for this delivery became petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s obligation. By
agreement, petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper, as the debtor, had the option to either (1) pay the price
or(2) deliver the finished products of equivalent value to respondent. 35
The appellate court, therefore, correctly identified the obligation between the parties as an alternative
obligation, whereby petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper, after receiving the raw materials from respondent,
would either pay him the price of the raw materials or, in the alternative, deliver to him the finished
products of equivalent value.
When petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper tendered a check to respondent in partial payment for the scrap
papers, they exercised their option to pay the price. Respondent’s receipt of the check and his
subsequent act of depositing it constituted his notice of petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s option to pay.
This choice was also shown by the terms of the memorandum of agreement, which was executed on
the same day. The memorandum declared in clear terms that the delivery of petitioner Arco Pulp and
Paper’s finished products would be to a third person, thereby extinguishing the option to deliver the
finished products of equivalent value to respondent.
The memorandum of
agreement did not constitute
a novation of the original
contract
The trial court erroneously ruled that the execution of the memorandum of agreement constituted a
novation of the contract between the parties. When petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper opted instead to
deliver the finished products to a third person, it did not novate the original obligation between the
parties.
The rules on novation are outlined in the Civil Code, thus:
Article 1291. Obligations may be modified by:
(1) Changing their object or principal conditions;
(2) Substituting the person of the debtor;
(3) Subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. (1203)
Article 1292. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitute the same, it is
imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on
every point incompatible with each other. (1204)
Article 1293. Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one, may
be made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the consent of the
creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives him the rights mentioned in Articles 1236 and 1237. (1205a)
Novation extinguishes an obligation between two parties when there is a substitution of objects or
debtors or when there is subrogation of the creditor. It occurs only when the new contract declares so
"in unequivocal terms" or that "the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each
other."36
Novation was extensively discussed by this court in Garcia v. Llamas: 37
Novation is a mode of extinguishing an obligation by changing its objects or principal obligations, by
substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third person to the rights of the
creditor. Article 1293 of the Civil Code defines novation as follows:
"Art. 1293. Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one, may be
made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the consent of the
creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives him rights mentioned in articles 1236 and 1237."
In general, there are two modes of substituting the person of the debtor: (1) expromision and (2)
delegacion. In expromision, the initiative for the change does not come from — and may even be made
without the knowledge of — the debtor, since it consists of a third person’s assumption of the obligation.
As such, it logically requires the consent of the third person and the creditor. In delegacion, the debtor
offers, and the creditor accepts, a third person who consents to the substitution and assumes the
obligation; thus, the consent of these three persons are necessary. Both modes of substitution by the
debtor require the consent of the creditor.
Novation may also be extinctive or modificatory. It is extinctive when an old obligation is terminated by
the creation of a new one that takes the place of the former. It is merely modificatory when the old
obligation subsists to the extent that it remains compatible with the amendatory agreement. Whether
extinctive or modificatory, novation is made either by changing the object or the principal conditions,
referred to as objective or real novation; or by substituting the person of the debtor or subrogating a
third person to the rights of the creditor, an act known as subjective or personal novation. For novation
to take place, the following requisites must concur:
1) There must be a previous valid obligation.
2) The parties concerned must agree to a new contract.
3) The old contract must be extinguished.
4) There must be a valid new contract.
Novation may also be express or implied. It is express when the new obligation declares in unequivocal
terms that the old obligation is extinguished. It is implied when the new obligation is incompatible with
the old one on every point. The test of incompatibility is whether the two obligations can stand together,
each one with its own independent existence.38 (Emphasis supplied)
Because novation requires that it be clear and unequivocal, it is never presumed, thus:
In the civil law setting, novatio is literally construed as to make new. So it is deeply rooted in the Roman
Law jurisprudence, the principle — novatio non praesumitur —that novation is never presumed.At
bottom, for novation tobe a jural reality, its animus must be ever present, debitum pro debito — basically
extinguishing the old obligation for the new one.39 (Emphasis supplied) There is nothing in the
memorandum of agreement that states that with its execution, the obligation of petitioner Arco Pulp and
Paper to respondent would be extinguished. It also does not state that Eric Sy somehow substituted
petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper as respondent’s debtor. It merely shows that petitioner Arco Pulp and
Paper opted to deliver the finished products to a third person instead.
The consent of the creditor must also be secured for the novation to be valid:
Novation must be expressly consented to. Moreover, the conflicting intention and acts of the parties
underscore the absence of any express disclosure or circumstances with which to deduce a clear and
unequivocal intent by the parties to novate the old agreement.40 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, respondent was not privy to the memorandum of agreement, thus, his conformity to the
contract need not be secured. This is clear from the first line of the memorandum, which states:
Per meeting held at ARCO, April 18, 2007, it has been mutually agreed between Mrs. Candida A.
Santos and Mr. Eric Sy. . . .41
If the memorandum of agreement was intended to novate the original agreement between the parties,
respondent must have first agreed to the substitution of Eric Sy as his new debtor. The memorandum of
agreement must also state in clear and unequivocal terms that it has replaced the original obligation of
petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper to respondent. Neither of these circumstances is present in this case.
Petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s act of tendering partial payment to respondent also conflicts with their
alleged intent to pass on their obligation to Eric Sy. When respondent sent his letter of demand to
petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper, and not to Eric Sy, it showed that the former neither acknowledged nor
consented to the latter as his new debtor. These acts, when taken together, clearly show that novation
did not take place. Since there was no novation, petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s obligation to
respondent remains valid and existing. Petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper, therefore, must still pay
respondent the full amount of ₱7,220,968.31.
Petitioners are liable for
damages
Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract
where the breach is due to fraud or bad faith:
Art. 2220. Willfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. (Emphasis supplied)
Moral damages are not awarded as a matter of right but only after the party claiming it proved that the
breach was due to fraud or bad faith. As this court stated:
Moral damages are not recoverable simply because a contract has been breached. They are
recoverable only if the party from whom it is claimed acted fraudulently or in bad faith or in wanton
disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
and oppressive or abusive.42
Further, the following requisites must be proven for the recovery of moral damages:
An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met, to wit: (1)first, there must be an
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there
must be culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 43
Here, the injury suffered by respondent is the loss of ₱7,220,968.31 from his business. This has
remained unpaid since 2007. This injury undoubtedly was caused by petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s
act of refusing to pay its obligations.
When the obligation became due and demandable, petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper not only issued an
unfunded check but also entered into a contract with a third person in an effort to evade its liability. This
proves the third requirement.
As to the fourth requisite, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be awarded
in the following instances:
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Breaches of contract done in bad faith, however, are not specified within this enumeration. When a
party breaches a contract, he or she goes against Article 19 of the Civil Code, which states: Article 19.
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Persons who have the right to enter into contractual relations must exercise that right with honesty and
good faith. Failure to do so results in an abuse of that right, which may become the basis of an action
for damages. Article 19, however, cannot be its sole basis:
Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis
of an actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so that an actionable tort may
arise when it is alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21.44
Article 20 and 21 of the Civil Code are as follows:
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21.Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
To be actionable, Article 20 requires a violation of law, while Article 21 only concerns with lawful acts
that are contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy:
Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as basis for an injury. It allows recovery should the act
have been willful or negligent. Willful may refer to the intention to do the act and the desire to achieve
the outcome which is considered by the plaintiff in tort action as injurious. Negligence may refer to a
situation where the act was consciously done but without intending the result which the plaintiff
considers as injurious.
Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries that may be caused by acts which are not necessarily
proscribed by law. This article requires that the act be willful, that is, that there was an intention to do
the act and a desire to achieve the outcome. In cases under Article 21, the legal issues revolve around
whether such outcome should be considered a legal injury on the part of the plaintiff or whether the
commission of the act was done in violation of the standards of care required in Article 19. 45
When parties act in bad faith and do not faithfully comply with their obligations under contract, they run
the risk of violating Article 1159 of the Civil Code:
Article 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith.
Article 2219, therefore, is not an exhaustive list of the instances where moral damages may be
recovered since it only specifies, among others, Article 21. When a party reneges on his or her
obligations arising from contracts in bad faith, the act is not only contrary to morals, good customs, and
public policy; it is also a violation of Article 1159. Breaches of contract become the basis of moral
damages, not only under Article 2220, but also under Articles 19 and 20 in relation to Article 1159.
Moral damages, however, are not recoverable on the mere breach of the contract. Article 2220 requires
that the breach be done fraudulently or in bad faith. In Adriano v. Lasala: 46
To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach must be palpably wanton,
reckless and malicious, in bad faith, oppressive, or abusive. Hence, the person claiming bad faith must
prove its existence by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. It is, therefore, a question of intention, which can
be inferred from one’s conduct and/or contemporaneous statements. 47 (Emphasis supplied)
Since a finding of bad faith is generally premised on the intent of the doer, it requires an examination of
the circumstances in each case.
When petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper issued a check in partial payment of its obligation to respondent, it
was presumably with the knowledge that it was being drawn against a closed account. Worse, it
attempted to shift their obligations to a third person without the consent of respondent.
Petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s actions clearly show "a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud."48 Moral damages may, therefore, be awarded.
Exemplary damages may also be awarded. Under the Civil Code, exemplary damages are due in the
following circumstances:
Article 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Article 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide
whether or not they should be adjudicated.
Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proven, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
In Tankeh v. Development Bank of the Philippines,49 we stated that:
The purpose of exemplary damages is to serve as a deterrent to future and subsequent parties from the
commission of a similar offense. The case of People v. Ranteciting People v. Dalisay held that:
Also known as ‘punitive’ or ‘vindictive’ damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to
serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms
are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity
and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly
inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly
reprehensible conduct of the defendant—associated with such circumstances as willfulness,
wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud—that
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species
of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either
case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from
similar conduct in the future.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The requisites for the award of exemplary damages are as follows:
(1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only
after the claimant's right to them has been established;
(2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the
amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; and
(3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or
malevolent manner.51
Business owners must always be forthright in their dealings. They cannot be allowed to renege on their
obligations, considering that these obligations were freely entered into by them. Exemplary damages
may also be awarded in this case to serve as a deterrent to those who use fraudulent means to evade
their liabilities.
Since the award of exemplary damages is proper, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit may also be
recovered.
Article 2208 of the Civil Code states:
Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded[.]
Petitioner Candida A. Santos
is solidarily liable with
petitioner corporation
Petitioners argue that the finding of solidary liability was erroneous since no evidence was adduced to
prove that the transaction was also a personal undertaking of petitioner Santos. We disagree.
In Heirs of Fe Tan Uy v. International Exchange Bank,52 we stated that:
Basic is the rule in corporation law that a corporation is a juridical entity which is vested with a legal
personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the people
comprising it. Following this principle, obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its
directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. A director, officer or employee of a corporation
is generally not held personally liable for obligations incurred by the corporation. Nevertheless, this legal
fiction may be disregarded if it is used as a means to perpetrate fraud or an illegal act, or as a vehicle
for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues.
....
Before a director or officer of a corporation can be held personally liable for corporate obligations,
however, the following requisites must concur: (1) the complainant must allege in the complaint that the
director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the officer was guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) the complainant must clearly and convincingly prove such
unlawful acts, negligence or bad faith.
While it is true that the determination of the existence of any of the circumstances that would warrant
the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction is a question of fact which cannot be the subject of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court can take cognizance of factual issues if the findings of
the lower court are not supported by the evidence on record or are based on a misapprehension of
facts.53 (Emphasis supplied)
As a general rule, directors, officers, or employees of a corporation cannot be held personally liable for
obligations incurred by the corporation. However, this veil of corporate fiction may be pierced if
complainant is able to prove, as in this case, that (1) the officer is guilty of negligence or bad faith, and
(2) such negligence or bad faith was clearly and convincingly proven.
Here, petitioner Santos entered into a contract with respondent in her capacity as the President and
Chief Executive Officer of Arco Pulp and Paper. She also issued the check in partial payment of
petitioner corporation’s obligations to respondent on behalf of petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper. This is
clear on the face of the check bearing the account name, "Arco Pulp & Paper, Co., Inc." 54 Any obligation
arising from these acts would not, ordinarily, be petitioner Santos’ personal undertaking for which she
would be solidarily liable with petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper.
We find, however, that the corporate veil must be pierced. In Livesey v. Binswanger Philippines: 55
Piercing the veil of corporate fiction is an equitable doctrine developed to address situations where the
separate corporate personality of a corporation is abused or used for wrongful purposes. Under the
doctrine, the corporate existence may be disregarded where the entity is formed or used for non-
legitimate purposes, such as to evade a just and due obligation, or to justify a wrong, to shield or
perpetrate fraud or to carry out similar or inequitable considerations, other unjustifiable aims or
intentions, in which case, the fiction will be disregarded and the individuals composing it and the two
corporations will be treated as identical.56 (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Court of Appeals, petitioner Santos was solidarily liable with petitioner Arco Pulp and
Paper, stating that:
In the present case, We find bad faith on the part of the [petitioners] when they unjustifiably refused to
honor their undertaking in favor of the [respondent]. After the check in the amount of 1,487,766.68
issued by [petitioner] Santos was dishonored for being drawn against a closed account, [petitioner]
corporation denied any privity with [respondent]. These acts prompted the [respondent] to avail of the
remedies provided by law in order to protect his rights.57
We agree with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Santos cannot be allowed to hide behind the corporate
veil.1âwphi1 When petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s obligation to respondent became due and
demandable, she not only issued an unfunded check but also contracted with a third party in an effort to
shift petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper’s liability. She unjustifiably refused to honor petitioner corporation’s
obligations to respondent. These acts clearly amount to bad faith. In this instance, the corporate veil
may be pierced, and petitioner Santos may be held solidarily liable with petitioner Arco Pulp and Paper.
The rate of interest due on
the obligation must be
reduced in view of Nacar v.
Gallery Frames58
In view, however, of the promulgation by this court of the decision dated August 13, 2013 in Nacar v.
Gallery Frames,59 the rate of interest due on the obligation must be modified from 12% per annum to
6% per annum from the time of demand.
Nacar effectively amended the guidelines stated in Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals, 60 and we have
laid down the following guidelines with regard to the rate of legal interest:
To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines laid down in the case of Eastern Shipping
Linesare accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as follows:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-
delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on
"Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages,
the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated
in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum
to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at
the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code),
but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which
time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be
6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by
then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013,
shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed
therein.61 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
According to these guidelines, the interest due on the obligation of ₱7,220,968.31 should now be at 6%
per annum, computed from May 5, 2007, when respondent sent his letter of demand to petitioners. This
interest shall continue to be due from the finality of this decision until its full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED in part. The decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 95709 is AFFIRMED.

Petitioners Arco Pulp & Paper Co., Inc. and Candida A. Santos are hereby ordered solidarily to pay
respondent Dan T. Lim the amount of ₱7,220,968.31 with interest of 6% per annum at the time of
demand until finality of judgment and its full satisfaction, with moral damages in the amount of
₱50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of
₱50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of
Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint
upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against
defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the
costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a
majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 —
through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before
they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on
the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the
plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on
Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On
February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida,
she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where
the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in
consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the
province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of,
nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages.
Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon
the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe
to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does
not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our
Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser
no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49),
being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its
parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same
was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that
lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to
invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of
the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can
not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs.
Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must
be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the
deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help,
support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ.
Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art.
2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis
for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions
of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority
opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion;
and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of
the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure
the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee
does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His
only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since
he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the
abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the
medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion
to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal
cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of
which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical
necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely
condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on
record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical
Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as
the facts may warrant.
G.R. No. L-30538 January 31, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BONIFACIO TIROL and CIRIACO BALDESCO, defendants-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
Review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch III, in Criminal Case No. 360,
dated March 31, 1969, imposing on Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco Baldesco the death penalty for each of
the seven (7) murders and an indeterminate sentence for each of the two (2) frustrated murders.
The following facts appear uncontroverted.
In the evening of December 4, 1965, while Kosain Manibpol was sleeping with his family in their house
at Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato, he was awakened by the barking of their dogs. When he got up to
investigate, he saw two persons outside their house who had already come up. They were Beatingco,
Jr. and Julian Casian He asked them what they came for, and they answered that they wanted to
borrow part of his land, to which he consented. After he gave his consent, Kulas Bati suddenly arrived,
flashed his flashlight on his face and boxed him. When he fell to the floor, the rest of his assailant's
companions, numbering more than ten, who were afl armed with bladed weapons and firearms, also
came and hacked or boloed him, his wife and his seven children, resulting in the death of his wife,
Kadidia Kalangtongan and his six children, namely, Daduman Malaguianon Locaydal Pinangcong,
Baingkong and Abdul Rakman all surnamed Kusain He and one of his daughters, Undang Kosain who
was about six years old, survived although wounded. They were able to run to the houses of their
neighbors, and were later brought to the municipal building where they reported to the police and were
given medical attention.
For the death of Kosains wife and his six children, as well as for the wounding of himself and his
daughter Undang, fourteen (14) persons were charged (p. 3, Vol. II, rec with multiple murder and double
frustrated murder by the Matalam Chief of Police, and these were: Nicolas Bate, Beatingco Junior,
Ruperto Diosma Pablo Diosma Lorenzo Canio Durico Sugang Teofilo Baldesco, Ciriaco Baldesco,
Julian Casiag Nick Bunque a certain Miestizo Sofring Romualdo, and Bonifacio Bautista [later amended
to Bonifacio Tirol p. 29, Vol. 11, record of the fourteen, only Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol were
apprehended, while the rest remain at large.
On February 17, 1966, after the second stage of prehn iinary investigation was waived by accused
Ciriaco Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol, the acting Provincial Fiscal of Cotabato filed the following
information (p. 37, Vol. II, rec.) against the two:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Acting Provincial Fiscal accuses Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco
Baldisco of the crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder, committed as
follows:
That on or about December 4, 1965, in Kobalangasan Barrio Lampayan, Matalam,
Province of Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, in company with Nicolas Bate, Beatingco Junior, Ruperto Diosma
Pablo Diosma Lorenzo Canio Durico Sugang Teofilo Baldesco, Julian Casiag Nick
Bunque Miestizo Sopring Romualdo and Bonifacio Bautista who are still at large,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with
bladed weapons and firearms did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kilt taking advantage of
the cover of the night, attack, stab and shoot Kadidia Kalangtogan Duaduman Kosain
Malaguianon Kosain Locayda Kosain Penangcong Ko Biacong Kosain and Abdul
Rakman Kosain who as a result thereof, sustained mortal wounds which directly
caused their death and Kosain Manibpol and Undang Kosain sustained serious
wounds which ordinarily would have caused their death, thus performing all acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of double murder as a consequence
thereof, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the accused, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said
Kosain Manibpol and Undang Kosain which prevented their death.
Contrary to law, especially Articles 248 and 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution relied mainly on the testimonies of the two survivors, Kosain Manibpol and his
daughter Undang Kosain to prove the guilt of the accused. The only other witness presented by the
prosecution was the municipal health officer who issued the death certificates of the deceased and the
medical certificate of Kosain.
Kosain Manibpol 33 years old, widower and resident of Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato, declared on
direct examination that at about 8:00 P.M. on December 4, 1965, more than ten (10) persons, all armed,
entered his house in Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato. Two persons, Beatingco Junior and Julian
Casian came ahead, immediately after he got up from his sleep to check what was causing the barking
of their dogs which awakened him. When he asked why they were there, the two answered that they
wanted to borrow his land, to which he consented. Suddenly, Kulas Bate arrived, flashed his flashlight
on his face and boxed him. When he fell to the floor, the rest of the armed men came and hacked or
boloed not only him but also Ws wife and seven children. Among the assailants he recognized aside
from the three above-named, were Bonifacio Tirol, Ciriaco Baldesco, Ruperto Diosma Florencio Cafio
Dorico whose family name he forgot, Teofilo Baldesco, a certain mestizo and Sopring Romualdo. He
actually saw Ciriaco Baldesco hacking his wife with a bolo, and the "bungi" harelipped Bonifacio Tirol
hacking his eldest daughter. He had known Bonifacio Tirol for two years before the incident and Ciriaco
Baldesco for a longer period. His wife and six of his children died as a result of the sudden attack. He
himself was wounded at the outer part of his right arm, at the back of his right wrist and on his forehead,
and his chest was badly beaten; but he survived because he was able to run to the house of a neighbor
named Angcogan (t.s.n., pp. 1-10, Vol. III, rec.).
On cross-examination, Kosain testified that when he was investigated by the police, he was not sure of
the surname of accused Bonifacio, so he stated that it may be Bautista. He learned later that the
surname was Tirol He admitted that he was confused when he stated earlier that he had known
Bonifacio Bautista for one year and Bonifacio Tirol for two years. Bonifacio Bautista and Bonifacio Tirol
are one and the same person. He further declared that after he had fallen down as a result of the blow
by Kulas Bate, Sopring immediately hacked him. It was after he fell that he was able to observe the
stabbing and slashing of his family, because his assailants must have thought him dead. He later fled to
the house of Angcogan who ran away because of fear, but returned afterwards with companions and
went to their house to verify what happened (pp. 10-24, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
On questioning by the court, Kosain testified that on the night of December 4, 1965 he slept with a
petroleum fight burning in their house as in fact they always slept with their house righted because their
youngest child would cry if there was no light. When he was attacked he was not able to shout for help
because he was caught unaware. His eldest daughter, Danonan (Daduman) was the one who pleaded
with their assailants not to hack them as they had no fault, but she was also hacked and hit at the
abdomen. At this stage he interchanged the assailants of his wife and children by saying that Bonifacio
Tirol hacked his wife and Ciriaco Baldesco hacked his eldest child (p. 29, t s. n Vol. III, rec.).
Undang Kosain about 6 years old, resident of Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato, corroborated the
testimony of her father, Kosain Manibpol that she and her father are the only two in the family now, after
her mother, sisters and brother had been killed by more than ten armed men who entered their house
and attacked their family. Among their more than ten assailants, she knows only three, namely, Kulas
Bati, Ciriaco Baldesco and another person whom she remembers only as "bungi" (harelipped). Of the
three she knows only two were in court, namely Ciriaco Baldesco and the "bungi" Bonifacio Tirol She
Identified them by touching the shoulders of Baldesco and Tirol (p. 65, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.). She
remembers Tirol distinctly because of his appearance as "bungi." She did not see who hacked her
mother, but she saw "bungi" hack his younger brother and sister. Her elder sisters were hacked by
Baldesco. She herself was hacked at her back by Kulas Bati She showed in court her scar at the back
of her left shoulder going diagonally to the spinal column and measuring about 6 inches long and 3/4 of
an inch wide, which appear to have scars of stiches. Afterwards, she went to the house of a neighbor
named Antalig.
In answer to the court's questions, Undang declared that she had three older sisters, two younger
sisters and one younger brother. Her elder sisters were Danonang (Daduman), Maguianon
(Malaguianan) and Lakaida (Locayda). Her younger sisters were Inangkong (Penangkong) and
Bayangkong (Benangkong), and her younger brother was Abdul Rakman They all died when more than
ten men went inside their house wle they were lying down on the mat. She did not see who hacked their
father, but she saw Bonifacio Tirol hacking her three elder sisters, and Ciriaco Baldesco hacking his
younger brother. They used kalsido or bolo. The other men were also armed with boloes, and one of
them, Kulas Bati was with a firearm. There was light inside their house at that time. Besides, it was
moonlight night. Before the night of the hacking incident, she used to see Bonifacio Tirol passing by
their house in going to the house of Kulas Bati which is near their house. She has not seen Ciriaco
Baldesco before (t.s.n., pp. 69-75, Vol. III, rec.).
On cross-examination, Undang testified that she used to see Ciriaco Baldesco at their store where her
family buys things. The house of Baldesco is near the schools of her elder sisters. She sometimes went
with them to school. Her oldest sister was hacked by Baldesco at the abdomen. Her two other elder
sisters were likewise hacked by Baldesco at the abdomen. Her younger brother was hacked by
Bonifacio Tirol Their house was lighted at that time, aside from the fact that it was bright because of the
round moon. The accused Baldesco and Tirol were dressed in white and dark clothes. The color of the
dark clothes was black, She does not know of any trouble between Ciriaco Baldesco or Bonifacio Tirol
and her father (t.s.n., PP79-85, Vol. III, rec.).
The defense of both accused is alibi, and neither of them disputed the facts established by the
prosecution except to deny involvement in the crimes alluded to them.
Accused Ciriaco Baldesco, 48 years old, married and residing at Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato,
testifying on his own behalf, declared that on December 4, 1965, he went home at about 6:00 P.M. after
pasturing his carabao. He took his supper at 6:00 P.M. and listened to the radio up to 9:00 P.M..
Thereafter, he went to sleep (t.s.n., pp. 125- 130, Vol. Ill, rec.).
To bolster his alibi, Baldesco presented Demetrio Riparip 25 years old, single, a former teacher at
Kabalangasan Elementary School and boarder in the house of Baldesco, who declared that he took his
supper with the latter at his house at about 6:00 P.M. on December 4, 1965. Then he went to sleep at
7:00 P.M.. He did not wake up till the following morning (t.s.n., pp. 96-112, Vol. III, rec.).
A daughter of Baldesco, Teofista Baldesco, 21 years old, married, housekeeper and residing at
Lampayan, Matalam, Cotabato, likewise corroborated Baldesco's testimony that family, consisting of her
father, mother, brother, and sister took supper in their house after 6.00 P.M., then listened to the radio
up to 9:00 P.M.. They went to sleep at 9:00 P.M. (t.s.n., pp. 115-117, Vol. III, rec.).
Accused Bonifacio Tirol, 31 years old, married and residing at Kabalangasan Matalam, Cotabato,
likewise testified on his own behalf. He declared that he was in Salat, a part of Kabacan Cotabato, from
December 2 to 7, 1965, seeking employment as a laborer in the logging firm of Felipe Tan. He left
Kabalangasan at 10:00 A.M., took a motorboat and arrived in Salat at 5:00 P.M. He did not see the
manager, Felipe Tan, of the logging firm until December 6, 1965, and so he was able to return to
Kabalangasan only on December 7, 1965. While in Salat, he stayed in the camp where his friend Rufino
Duan was staying. When he returned to Kabalangasan his family had already evacuated out of fear for
revenge, because of the massacre of the fimily of Kosain He went to Malamaing another barrio of
Matalam, where he found his family. In Malamaing they stayed in the house of a Cebuano named
Kulas. They never went back to Kabalangasan because they were afraid that Kosains family might take
revenge on them (t.s.n., pp. 131-142, Vol. III, rec.).
His wife Nicolasa Tirol, 30 years old and residing at Paco, Kidapawan, Cotabato, confirmed Tirol's
absence from Matalam from December 2 to 7, 1965 while he was looking for a job in Salat. She also
stated that she evacuated her family because she was warned that the family of Kosain might take
revenge on them (t.s.n., pp. 145-151, Vol. III, rec.).
A friend from the logging company, Rufino Duan 23 years old, single and residing at Paco, Kidapawan,
Cotabato, likewise corroborated Tirol's testimony that he was in Salat from December 2 to 7. 1965. The
said accused stayed with him in the camp he is occupying while he was at Salat for seven (7) days,
looking for work. In order to go to Salat froni Kabalangasan one has to take a ride on a truck (t.s.n., pp.
1 18122, Vol. III, rec.).
After trial, the trial court rendered its decision (pp. 6-28, Vol. I, rec.) dated March 31, 1969, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the herein accused, Bonifacio Tirol and Ciriaco
Baldesco, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder of seven (,7)
persons, namely: Daduman Klantongan Kosain [also written in the transcript of steno-
type notes as Danonan and Dananong Baingkong Kosain [also written in the
transcript as Bai Ingkong]; Abdul Kalatogan Kosain [also written in the transcript as
Abdul Rakman Kadidia Kalantongan Malaguianon Kosain Locayda Kosain [also
written Lokaidal Pinangkong Kosain [also written Maningdongi and Binangkong and
of the crime of Frustrated Murder of Kosain Manibpol [also written as Kusain
Manedpoll and Undang Kosain and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
supreme penalty of death for each of the seven murders of the seven deceased, and
to an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS for each of the two Frustra Murders of the two wounded persons and to
indenuiify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the seven deceased with the sum
 of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) for each of the seven deceased, or FORTY-
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P42,000.00) in all, and pay the costs, fifty-fifty.
It appearing that the accused have been detained, they each should be credited one-
half (1/2) of their preventive imprisonment in the cases of two frustrated murders.
The penalty herein imposed for each of the seven murders being the maximum —
death — the records of this case are hereby automatically elevated to the Supreme
Court.
Let copy of this Judgment be furnished the Philippine Constabulary and the NBI at
Cotabato City, and the Police Department of Matalam, Cotabato, so that they may
exert efforts to apprehend the other culprits who committed the crimes herein dealt
with.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, accused Baldesco and Tirol, contend in their joint brief:
FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR:
The lower court erred in admitting in the death certificates issued by the doctor who
did not personally view and examine the victims, but whose findings therein were
based upon the sketch prepared by the police.
SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR:
The lower court erred in disregarding the testimony of both accused despite the
convincingly strong evidence showing that they were not at the scene of the crime on
4 December 1965, and therefore their non-participation in the crime charged.
THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR:
The lower court erred in not granting new trial even as the complaining witness
himself made a voluntary extra-judicial admission by means of a sworn statement
(affidavit) that he merely involved accused Baldesco for a consideration.
FOURTH ASSIGNED ERROR:
The evidence failed to establish conspiracy among the accused.
FIFTH ASSIGNED ERROR:
The decision is contrary to law. (p. 98, Vol. I, rec.)
During the pendency of this appeal, or on October 23, 1977, appellant Baldesco died in the New Bilibid
Prison Hospital (p. 192, Vol. I, rec.) so that on January 28, 1978, We resolved to dismiss this case
insofar as the criminal liability of the said appellant is concerned. Following the doctrine in People vs.
Sendaydiego (81 SCRA 124, 134), this appeal will bd resolved insofar as Baldesco is concerned only
for the purpose of determining his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his
estate may be liable.
Appellants would like the court to reject the death certificates of the victims on the ground that they are
hearsay evidence, since the doctor who issued them did so on the strength of the sketch furnished by
the police, without personally examining the bodies of the victims.
WE find no error in the admission of said exhibits "as part of the testimony of the witnesses" (p. 9, Vol. I
and p. 95, Vol. III, rec.). The fact of death of the victims is not in issue. The testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that the victims died because of stab wounds inflicted by the armed men who
entered their residence on the night of December 4, 1965 remain uncontroverted. That death came to
the deceased by foul means is a moral and legal certainty. Their death certificates therefore are only
corroborative of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Appellants would likewise have the Court give credence to their defense of alibi, alleging that they have
presented convincingly strong evidence showing that they were not at the scene of the crime on
December 4, 1965. This contention is devoid of merit. The rule is well settled, to the point of being trite
that the defense of alibi, which is easy to concoct, must be received with utmost caution, for it is one of
the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused (People vs. Castafieda, 93 SCRA 58, 69;
People vs. Cortez, 57 SCRA 208).
Moreover, the alibi of both appellants cannot prevail over the positive Identification of the prosecution
witnesses Identifying and pointing to the accused as among the group of armed men which massacred
the victims (People vs. Tabion, 93 SCRA 566, 570; People vs. Angeles, 92 SCRA 433). The two
survivors, Kosain and his 6-year old daughter positively Identified both accused as two of the more than
ten persons who entered their house on December 4, 1965 and participated in the hacking and boloing
of their family. Accused Tirol was even more distinctly and positively recognized as the "bungi"
harelipped who hacked some of the victims. The credibility of these two prosecution witnesses was
never successfully assailed. The inconsistencies attributed to Kosain Manibpol refer to minor details
(i.e., about the length of time he had had known one of the two persons who first came up to his
residence on the pretext of borrowing his lot — pp. 15-16, Vol. III, rec., in relation to Exhibits "I" and "2",
pp. 5 & 17, Vol. II, rec.), which do not affect his credibility. The apparent inconsistency in his testimony
as well as that of 6-year old Undang Kosain whose credibility was never questioned, as to who among
the armed men hacked or attacked which victim is likewise insufficient to destroy their credibility,
considering that the presence of a number of armed men simultaneously participating in the unlawful
aggression could really be confusing. As noted by the trial court, it would be unnatural if the witnesses
who were themselves victims of the horrible deed were not confused during that terrifying massacre
committed together by more than ten persons (p. 27, Vol. I, rec.). What is important is the positive
Identification of the two accused appellants as having been in that group and who participated in the
concerted attack on the hapless victims. "Alibi is unavailing once the accused is positively Identified by
one without motive to charge falsely said accused, specially with a grave offense that could bring death
by execution on the culprit" (People vs. Estante, 92 SCRA 122).
The weakness of appellant Baldesco's defense lies in the fact that his house where he purportedly
stayed from 6:00 P.M. of December 4, 1965 to the following day — is only about one kilometer from the
house of the victims, the scene of the crime, according to his own daughter and witness, Teofista
Baldesco (p. 116, Vol. III, rec.). And although Baldesco himself testified that the victims' house is more
than three (3) kilometers from his, it still does not belie the fact that he could easily go there if he wanted
to, considering that both residences are within the same barrio of Kabalangasan.
So also is the house of Tirol located in the same barrio. According to him, his house is about 11/2
kilometers from that of the victim. He wants to impress upon this Court, however, that he was not in his
house when the incident occurred but in another town looking for a job in a logging company. The trial
court correctly rejected this theory because of the inconsistencies noted in Tirol's evidence. Said the
trial court:
The alibi of Bonifacio Tirol is unbelievable. His witness Rufino Duan testified that from
Kabalangasan where Bonifacio Tirol lived to Salat where Bonifacio was supposed to
be on December 4, 1965, people would take a truck ride of the PTC but Bonifacio
Tirol declared that he went to Salat by speedboat, and went home to Kabalangasan
by banca. Duan testified that Salat is very far from Kabalangasan because it takes
one day to reach it from there; but Bonifacio Tirol declared that he started at
Kabalangasan by motorboat at 10:00 A.M., and arrived at Salat at 5:00 P.M. or seven
hours only. He modified this afterwards, in the cross-examination, by testifying that
from his house in Kabalangasan to the log pond where he took the speedboat, he had
to walk from 6:00 A.M. to 10:00 A.M. or for 3 hours; fixing the time from his home to
Salat at 10 hours, But this testimony about the log pond cannot be believed. He
testified he did not know where the log pond was located; that was the first time he
went there. How he located a long pond at a place he did not know is certainly
beyond belief. Of course, he said, Rufino told him where to pass, but that was a long
time ago. Bonifacio Tirol further testified that when he went home to Kabalangasan he
took a banca at Salat at 3:00 dawn and arrived in his house at Kabalangasan at 9:00
in the morning, or 6 hours. He changed the time of arrival to 10:00 A.M. when
questioned by the Court about it. When asked by the Court why the difference in the
period of time of travel he reasoned out that the motorboat in going to Salat was
going upstream, and the paddled banca in going to Kabalangasan was going
downstream. Even, if that were so, the difference cannot be three or four hours.
xxx xxx xxx
But even granting that Bonifacio really went to Salat on the 2nd to look for work, there
was no physical impossibility for him to be in Kabalangasan on the evening of the 4th
which was a Saturday. The testimony of Duan that he saw Bonifacio of the 4th in the
evening cannot be believed because of his interest and its improbability. Why should
Bonifacio wait for the manager on a Saturday evening when the next day was a
Sunday, therefore not a work day? (pp. 2425, Vol. I, rec.).
It is a well-settled doctrine that for alibi to be acceptable, it must be shown that the place where the
accused was alleged to when the offense was committed must be located at such a distance that it is
well nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime (People vs. dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-30912,
April 30, 1980; People vs. Mercado, et al., L- 39511-13, April 28,1980; People vs. Malibay, 63 SCRA
421).
As to appellant Baldesco, the testimonies of his witnesses do not at all bolster his alibi. Demetrio
Riparip stated that he took supper with Baldesco at 6:00 P.M. on December 4, 1965, after which he
slept at 7:00 P.M. and did not wake up until the next morning (p. 109, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.). Baldesco's
daughter, Teofista, on the other hand, testified that she took supper at 6:00 P.M. with her father,
mother, brother and sister (p. 116, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.), without mentioning the presence of Riparip in
their house; then she listended to the radio with her father, mother, brother and sister up to 9:00 P.M.
and went to sleep afterwards. These testimonies do not rule out the possibility that he could have left
the house that same evening while the rest of his family were sound asleep and returned late that night
or early the following morning.
The third assigned error is likewise bereft of merit. Counsel for appellants contends that the trial court
erred in not granting a new trial even as the complaining witness himself made a voluntary extrajudicial
admission by means of sworn statement (affidavit) that he merely involved accused Baldesco for a
consideration. The trial court rejected the motion for new trial on the -round that it was filed out of time
(p. 97, Vol. II rec.).
Section 9, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court requires that in all cases in which the death penalty is impo
the records should be forwarded to this Court within twenty (20) days but not less than fifteen (15) days
from rendition of judgment. This 20-day period is not rigid or absolute nor jurisdictional, and may be
shortened or extended (People vs. Bocar, 97 Phil. 398). However, the extension of period is for the
purpose of enabling the lower court to comply with the mandatory requirement of elevating the records
for review, and not to lengthen the minimum period within which trial courts may modify or alter their
decision. As enunciated in People vs. Bocar, supra, the reason for the 15-day minimum requirement is
such that within that period, the trial court may on its own motion with the consent of the defendant,
grant a new trial. Within that period the trial court may modify its judgment by reducing the penalty or
fine, or even set it aside altogether and acquit the accused.
In the case at bar, the motion for new trial was filed on April 28,1969 (pp. 92-94, Vol. II, rec.) or twenty-
eight days after rendition of the judgment on March 31, 1969 (p. 90, Vol. II, rec.). Although a 15-day
extension from April 21, 1969 was granted to the lower court within which to forward the record of this
case (p. 30, Vol. I, rec.), that extension did not affect the 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial.
But even granting that the said motion were filed on time, the -game does not merit a favorable action.
The ground relied on is an alleged newly-discovered evidence, referring to a sworn statement (p. 94,
Vol. II, rec.) executed on April 17, 1969 by a certain Romualdo Diosma barrio captain of barrio
Lampayan, Matalam, Cotabato. In the said affidavit, the affiant declared that he was shocked to learn
that the accused were sentenced to death; that Kosain Manibpol the principal witness, had confided to
him that he was only interested in commercializing or making money out of his case, which is why he
implicated the accused Baldesco; that Kosain Manibpol had persuaded him to convince Feliciano
Codoy, a son-in-law of Baldesco, to give him Kosain one carabao so that he wili drop the case; that
Kosain Manibpol also personally demanded from Codoy one carabao so that he Will not testify against
Baldesco; that he (affiant) even went with Kosain to see Codoy in November, 1967 to persuade him to
give a carabao to Kosain but Codoy refused; and that Kosain realizing the wrong he had done, was
willing to tell the truth regarding the non-involvement and non-participation of Baldesco in the crime
charged, but it was too late to tell the court because the case was already submitted for decision; and
that it was a common knowledge in their barrio that Baldesco was not among the band that killed
Kosains family.
This so-called "extra-judicial admission," referring to Diosmas sworn statement is not the kind of newly-
discovered evidence contemplated in Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. Well-settled is the rule
that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly- discovered evidence, it must be shown
that: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and (d) it must be to the merits as ought to produce a The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was not proven, hence it may not be
different result, if admitted [Jose vs. CA, 70 SCRA 258]. appreciated.

The very affidavit of Diosma indicates that the so-called extra-judicial admission of Kosain was already
available during the trial, otherwise, he would not have demanded from Feliciano Codoy personally one
carabao so that he will not testify against accused Baldesco.
For how could he have offered not to testify against Baldesco if the trial was already concluded? Codoy
should have been presented as a defense witness if such was the fact, together with some other barrio
residents who had knowledge, as was allegedly "public knowledge in our barrio," that Baldesco was not
involved in the crime. The purported extrajudicial admission is a last-minute concoction.
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the crime having been committed in the dwelling place of the
victims who had not given any provocation, likewise can be appreciated.
Considering that there is no mitigating circumstance, the trial court did not err in imposing the maximum
penalty provided for in Article 248.
Since the penal liability of appellant Ciriaco Baldesco had been extinguished by his death on October
23, 1977, only his civil liability remains to be determined which can be recovered from his estate.

Appellants also point out as error that the evidence failed to establish conspiracy. While it has been held The civil liability of both appellants for each of the seven victims of the seven murders is hereby raised
that conspiracy must be established by positive evidence, direct proof is not essential to show it, since to P12,000.00 and their civil liability for each of the two victims of the two frustrated murders is hereby
by its very nature it is planned in utmost secrecy (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA 760). increased to P8,000.00. The civil liability arising from the crime of 2 or more accused is solidary.

In the rase of People vs. Madai Santalani (93 SCRA 316, 330), We held: "Conspiracy implies concert of
design and not participation in every detail of the execution. If it is proved that two or more persons
aimed, by their acts, at the accomplishment of some unlawful object each doing a part so that their acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiments, conspiracy may be inferred although no actual
meeting between them to conspire is proved, for the prosecution need not establish that all the parties
thereto agreed to every detail in the execution of the crime or that they were actually together at all
stages of the conspiracy" (see also People vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285).
In this case under review, it has been clearly established that the appellants and their cohorts acted in
unison when they went up the house of Kosain Manibpol and attacked their victims in a manner
showing singleness of purpose — the massacre of the entire family of Kosain The fact that two survived
is of no moment. The intention to kill all of them was most patent.
WHEREFORE APPELLANTS BONIFACIO TIROL AND CIRIACO BALDESCO ARE HEREBY
SENTENCED TO (1) INDEMNIFY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY KOSAIN MANIBPOL AND UNDANG
KOSAIN AS THE ONLY SURVIVING HEIRS OF THE SEVEN MURDER VICTIMS IN THE SUM OF
TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS FOR EACH OF THE SEVEN MURDER VICTIMS; AND
(2) INDEMNIFY JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY KOSAIN MANIBPOL IN THE SUM OF EIGHT
THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS AND UNDANG KOSAIN ALSO IN THE SUM OF EIGHT THOUSAND
(P8,000.00) PESOS AS THE TWO VICTIMS OF THE TWO FRUSTRATED MURDERS.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, the fifth assigned error, i.e., that the decision is contrary to law, need not be considered
separately. The prosecution evidence has clearly established the guilt of the accused appellants. In
addition, there are more incriminating evidence that emanate from the appellants themselves. The trial
court had taken judicial notice of the escape of accused Baldesco from police custody on December 15,
1965, (p. 27, Vol. II, rec.), and his subsequent re-arrest while en route to Davao (p. 28, Vol. II, rec.). On
the other hand, accused Tirol himself had testified that after coming from Salat, he left his house and
never returned, for the reason that the members of his family were afraid of some vendetta because of
the massacre of Ko Manibpols family (pp. 141-142, Vol. II, rec.). The trial court noted that this fear was
entertained even before the chief of police could ffle a complaint and before a warrant of arrest could be
issued. These actuations could only indicate a sense of guilt. As the trial court pointed out, fear of
reprisal or retaliation could only haunt one who is aware of his wrong doing (p. 26, Vol. I, rec.).

The trial court did not err in finding the accused guilty of murder of seven (7) persons, qualified by
treachery, and of two frustrated murders. There was treachery because the accused and their
companions made a deliberate surprise attack on the victims. They perpetrated the killings in such a
manner that there was no risk to themselves. Treachery has absorbed the circumstance of nighttime,
taking advantage of superior strength, employing means to weaken the defense, and that the crime was
committed by a band.
G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death
benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel)
and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of
Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim
for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which
reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to
any employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children,
brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental
insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of
the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single,
this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be
presented (e.g. death certificate).4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano,
had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. 5 According
to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal
Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other
death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series
of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, 8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to
Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October
2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether
Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties
proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant
to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did
not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired
juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The
Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe
Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were
able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel,
whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was
able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between
his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as
opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same
compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the
CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel
who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor
legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the
laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate
the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for
the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which
existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 16 of the Civil Code,
contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it
never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel
reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the
term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was
delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever
acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of
the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed
automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the
definition of dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have qualified the parent-
employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to the legally accepted
definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies,
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given
the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that
the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an
unborn child constituted "company practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a
Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered
employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable elements
must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; and (3) such
dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under
Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be
present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such dependent
must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be presented. 18
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent
occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the
fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child,
legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner
Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine
Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of ₱16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,19 under
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement leave
with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had occurred. The
death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since
what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did
not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by
the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status
of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had.
Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and other death
benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution
dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used in
the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the
grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no
arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned
on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus
could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event
causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate
relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term "death of a
legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA.
Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court,
however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss
of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits
are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and
support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental
Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this
crucial point.20
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño
is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration23 of
Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical
personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA
are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an
employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and
accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of
a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or
sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g.,
death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the
CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for
bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms
"death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same.
Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the
pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of
death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born,
and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general
provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed
by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case
pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover,
while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself
defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself
without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition, 26 even an unborn child is a
dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life
without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the
CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married
employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification
for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality,
as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general
sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents.
In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164
of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family
Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted,
have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to
death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn
child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA,
Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid
to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved
one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn
child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than
that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits
should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is
specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor,
such should be interpreted in favor of labor.29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be
interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,30 we
pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when
the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be
stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor
Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which
is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy
of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we
are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically
stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must
accord the underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we
declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice
policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution
dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20
November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P.
Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00),
respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental
Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.