Wassmer vs Velez, 12 SCRA 648

Facts:

 Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love
decided to get married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed
marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone their
wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and
was not heard from again.

 Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared
in default. Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiff  P2.000 as actual damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary
damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.

 Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but
failed, thereby rendered judgment hence this appeal.

Issue:

 Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this

case.

Held:

                Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable

wrong. But formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary
preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it when matrimony is about
to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and unjustifiable to good
customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil
Code.

                When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same,

moral and exemplary damages may not be awarded when it is proven that the
defendanr clearly  acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

Tanjanco vs CA 
18 SCRA 994 
December 17, 1996 
Doctrine: seduction is more than a mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise of
marriage, it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, entrapment, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yield.
Seduction falls under art 21 of the new civil code. 
Facts: 
Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos both are of legal age.  Tanjanco expressed
his undying love and affection for Santos who in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings. Santos consented and acceded to Tanjanco's pleas for carnal knowledge
because off his promise to marriage. Santos then conceived a child as a consequence
and to avoid embarrassment and humiliation she had to resign her job as a secretary
in IBM Inc.,. She was unable to support herself and the baby. She also suffered moral
shock and humiliation because Tanjanco refused to marry her. She prayed
that Tanjanco would be liable for damages. 

Issue: 
Whether or not Santos can claim damages and if the acts of Tanjanco constitutes
seduction. 

Held:  
No she can’t claim for damages because for 1 whole year she maintained sexual
relations with Tanjanco. Such act is not compatible with seduction because there's
voluntariness and mutual passion. Hence, Tanjanco is not liable for damages. 

De Jesus vs Syquia
TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia
CITATION: 58 Phil 866

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop
owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza.  Cesar Syquia, the
defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila
was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop.  He got acquainted with
Antonio and had an amorous relationship.   As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant
and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. 

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor.  On

February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father
confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. 
Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding
her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake.   The defendant ask his friend Dr.
Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in
Manila. 

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines
Street Manila where they lived together for about a year.  When Antonia showed
signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with
another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in
charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be
given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES: 

1.  Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by
defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2.  Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the
father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be
compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the
other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. 
The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.   

 “The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession
of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal
the father's resolution to admit the status”.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court  in refusing to provide
damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on
this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita
Loanco.  Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of
maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month.  They
likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the
order as to the amount of pension.

ON PRIVATE CONTRACTS CASES:

In re Santiago, 70 PHIL 66
FACTS: Atty. Roque Santiago prepared for a married couple (who had been
separated for 9 years) a document wherein it was stipulatet that they
authorize each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing whatever
right of action one might have against the other. When the husband inquired if
there could be no trouble, respondent lawyer simplypointed to his diploma
which was hanging on the wall and said that he would tear off that document if
the contract turns out to be invalid. Pursuant to the contract, the husband
married again.
 ISSUE: Whether Santiago should be disbarred from the practice of law

HELD: Atty. Santiago was suspended from practice of law for a year on the
ground of ignorance of the law or being careless for giving legal advice by
trying to dissolve the marriage through a private contract. The document is
contrary to law, good morals and public order. Marriage is an inviolable social
institution that cannot be made inoperative by the stipulations of the parties.

Selanova v Mendoza 64 SCRA 69Facts:Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with

gross ignorance of the law for preparing and ratifying adocument extrajudicially
liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife.One
condition of the liquidation was that either spouse would withdraw the
complaint foradultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and
that they waived their right toprosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity
either one would commit against the other.Respondent relied on Art 191 of the
old Civil Code that states the husband and wife may agreeupon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.The judge
ratified the document without judicial approval from CFI Negros where the
couplewas residing, making it void assuming arguendo that Art. 191 is still in
effect.Issue:Whether or not the agreement separating the conjugal property and the
spouses is void.Held:It is. Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be
void:1. Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;2. Every
extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnershipof gains or of the absolute community property between husband and
wife.While adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are crimes punishable
by the RPC, anda contract legalizing their commission is contrary to law,
morals and public order, and as aconsequence not judicially recognizable.

Jones v. Hallahan
Annotate this Case

501 S.W.2d 588 (1973)

Marjorie JONES et al., Appellants, v. James HALLAHAN, Clerk of the

Jefferson County Court, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

November 9, 1973.
*589 David Kaplan, Stuart L. Lyon, Louisville, for appellants.

J. Bruce Miller, Louisville, for appellee.

VANCE, Commissioner.

The appellants, each of whom is a female person, seek review of a judgment

of the Jefferson Circuit Court which held that they were not entitled to have
issued to them a license to marry each other.

Appellants contend that the failure of the clerk to issue the license deprived
them of three basic constitutional rights, namely, the right to marry; the right of
association; and the right to free exercise of religion. They also contend that
the refusal subjects them to cruel and unusual punishment.

The sections of Kentucky statutes relating to marriage do not include a

definition of that term. It must therefore be defined according to common
usage.

Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, defines marriage as

follows:

"A state of being married, or being united to a person or persons of the

opposite sex as husband or wife; also, the mutual relation of husband and
wife; wedlock; abstractly, the institution whereby men and women are joined
in a special kind of social and legal dependence, for the purpose of founding
and maintaining a family."

The Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia defines marriage as:

"The legal union of a man with a woman for life; the state or condition of being
married; the legal relation of spouses to each other; wedlock; the formal
declaration or contract by which a man and a woman join in wedlock."

Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, defines marriage as:

"The civil status, condition or relation of one man and one woman united in
law for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties
legally incumbent upon those whose association is founded on the distinction
of sex."
Kentucky statutes do not specifically prohibit marriage between persons of the
same sex[1] nor do they authorize the issuance of a marriage license to such
persons.

Marriage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue licenses for
that purpose. For a time the records of marriage were kept by the church.
Some states even now recognize a common-law marriage which has neither
the benefit of license nor clergy. In all cases, however, marriage has always
been considered as the union of a man and a woman and we have been
presented with no authority to the contrary.

It appears to us that appellants are prevented from marrying, not by the

statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County Court Clerk of Jefferson
County to issue them a license, but rather by their own incapability of entering
into a marriage as that term is defined.

A license to enter into a status or a relationship which the parties are

incapable of achieving is a nullity. If the appellants had concealed from the
clerk the fact that they were of the same sex and he had issued a license to
them and a ceremony had been performed, the resulting relationship would
not constitute a marriage.

This is a case of first impression in Kentucky. To our knowledge, only two

other states have considered the question and both of them have reached the
same result that we reach in this opinion. Baker *590 v. Nelson, 291 Minn.
310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question, 409 U.S. 810, 93 S. Ct. 37, 34 L. Ed. 2d 65; Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 67 Misc.2d 982, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499.

Baker v. Nelson considered many of the constitutional issues raised by the

appellants here and decided them adversely to appellants. In our view,
however, no constitutional issue is involved. We find no constitutional sanction
or protection of the right of marriage between persons of the same sex.

The claim of religious freedom cannot be extended to make the professed

doctrines superior to the law of the land and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145. We do
not consider the refusal to issue the license a punishment.

In substance, the relationship proposed by the appellants does not authorize

the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is not a
marriage.

The judgment is affirmed.

 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
Brief Fact Summary. Same-sex couples filed suit after being denied marriage
licenses by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. Synopsis of Rule
of Law. Massachusetts cannot prevent homosexual couples from getting
married.

Baker v. State
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs are same sex couples denied marriage licenses
in their respective towns. Plaintiffs sued their respective towns and the state of
Vermont for declaratory relief.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Under the State Constitution “Common Benefits”

clause, the state is required to offer same sex couples the same protections
opposite-sex couples are afforded.

Facts. Plaintiffs are three same sex couples that were denied marriage licenses
in their respective towns. Plaintiffs sued seeking declaratory relief from the
refusal to issue the marriage licenses. The Defendants are the State of Vermont
and the respective towns. The trial court found for the Defendants on the basis
that the marriage statute furthers the state’s interest in promoting the link
between procreation and child rearing. Plaintiffs appealed.
Issue. May the State of Vermont exclude same-sex couples from the benefits
and protections afforded to opposite-sex married couples?

Held. The State is constitutionally required to extend to same sex couples the

common benefits and protections afforded to married opposite-sex couples.
Whether this ultimately takes the form of inclusion within the marriage laws
themselves or a parallel domestic partnership system or some other statutory
equivalent is up to the state legislature.
The Vermont Constitution “Common Benefits” clause requires that the state
government be instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the
people and not for the particular advantage of a single person or set of persons.

Dissent. The dissent focused on the court’s limited role is dictating public morals
and its view that this decision did just that. Also, the court disagreed with the
approach the court took which ordered the legislature to provide a remedy, but
failed to rule whether the state marriage laws were constitutional or not.
Note however, that the dissenting justice agrees that same-sex couples should
be given the right to marry.
Concurrence. The concurring justice focused on his disagreement with the
analytical framework the majority utilized to reach this decision. Specifically, the
concurring justice believed the majority now requires a much higher standard of
justification for state legislation and this would come into conflict with the narrow
role he perceived for the state courts.
Discussion. The court focused their discussion on the state constitutional
requirements. The prohibition against same-sex marriage was found in violation
of the common benefits clause. But, the court refused to rule the definition of
marriage and the statute unconstitutional. Rather, it put the burden on the state
legislature to craft an alternative solution that would give same-sex couples
equal rights as married cou

[G.R. No. 27972. October 31, 1927.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FELIPE

SANTIAGO, Defendant-Appellant.

Fausto C. Cuizon, for Appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY BY

MARRIAGE WITH INJURED GIRL; ILLEGAL MARRIAGE. — After the accused
had consummated the crime of rape upon a girl of the age of 15, niece of his
deceased wife, he procured a marriage ceremony to be celebrated on the
same day between himself and the girl, with the evident purpose of
extinguishing his criminal liability under the proviso to section of Act No. 1773
of the Philippine Commission, and without any intention on his part of living
maritally with the girl. Held: That the consent of the girl to the performance
of the marriage was vitiated by duress and that the marriage ceremony had
been performed as a mere device of the accused to escape punishment. Such
marriage is therefore illegal and constitutes no obstacle to the prosecution of
the accused for the offense.

2. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; COMMISSION OF OFFENSE IN AN

UNINHABITED PLACE. — An aggravating circumstance must be as clearly
proved as any other element of the crime; and in the instant case the court
refused to find that the aggravating circumstance of the commission of the
offense in an uninhabited place was proved, it appearing that the offense was
committed only a few paces from an important highway and that, after the
commission of the offense, food was procured by the accused from a woman
who lived near to the scene of the crime.

DECISION

STREET, J.:

This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija, finding the appellant, Felipe
Santiago, guilty of the offense of rape and sentencing him to undergo
imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion
temporal, with the accessories prescribed by law, requiring him to endow the
offended party, Felicita Masilang, in the amount of P500, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, requiring him also to recognize and
maintain, at P15 per month, the offspring, if there should be any, as a
consequence of the rape, and requiring him further to pay the costs.

The deceased wife of the appellant was the aunt of Felicita Masilang, aged 18,
who was the injured girl in this case. She is therefore appellant’s niece by
marriage, and she calls him uncle. Both are residents of the municipality of
Gapan, in the Province of Nueva Ecija. On November 23, 1926, the appellant
asked Felicita, who was then about 18 years of age, to accompany him across
the river on some errand. The girl agreed and they went over the river
together into the municipality of San Leonardo. After crossing the river, the
appellant conducted the girl to a place about twenty paces from the highway
where tall grass and other growth hid them from public view. In this spot the
appellant manifested a desire to have sexual intercourse with the girl, but she
refused to give her consent, and he finally, notwithstanding her resistance,
accomplished his purpose by force and against her will.

After the deed had been done the appellant conducted the girl to the house of
his uncle, Agaton Santiago, who lived not far away. They arrived here about
11 a. m., and remained for several hours. In the course of the afternoon
Agaton Santiago brought in a protestant minister who went through the
ceremony of marrying the couple. After this was over the appellant gave the
girl a few pesos and sent her home. Her father happened to be away that
night, but upon his return the next day, she told him what had happened, and
this prosecution for rape was started.

The trial court found that the offense of rape had been committed, as above
stated, and that the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the
appellant hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of his act. We
concur in this view of the case. The manner in which the appellant dealt with
the girl after the marriage, as well as before, shows that he had no bona fide
intention of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be considered
binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of
essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the
wrongdoer.

Case Digest: Republic vs Albios

G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013
This is a case of MARRIAGE FOR CONVENIENCE.
FACTS
Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American
citizen. She later on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had
any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any
of their essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him
the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went
their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and
never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not
pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition
for citizenship. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
The RTC ruled in her favor.
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that
when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to
explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for
the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA,
however, upheld the RTC decision.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the
marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of
$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be
declared null and void.
RULING:
No, respondent’s marriage is not void.
The court said:
“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and
the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as
to fully comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.”
The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared
valid.”
“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in
violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court
cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.”