CD No.

2a CASES:

Case #16

Doctrine:
Psychological incapacity is not a medical but a legal concept. It is a
personal condition that prevents a spouse to perform marital obligations in
relation to a specific person that may exist at the time of marriage but may
have revealed through behavior subsequent to ceremonies. It need not be
a mental or personality disorder. It need not be a permanent and incurable
condition. The testimony of a psychologist or psychiatrist is not mandatory
in all cases. The totality of evidence must show clear and convincing
evidence to cause the declaration of nullity of marriage.

Case Title: Yolanda E. Garlet vs. Vencidor T. Garlet, GR. No. 193544;
August 2, 2017

Facts:
Yolanda Garlet (petitioner) and Vencidor Garlet (respondent) became
intimately involved upon partying and drinking liquor which resulted to the
latter getting pregnant. Vencidor doubted if he fathered the child, refused
to provide support, and even urged Yolanda to have an abortion.
Disagreeing with the proposed abortion, she gave birth to (Michael) out of
wedlock and worked in Japan as a cultural dancer to support their son.
Sometime in 1992, Yolanda instructed Vencidor to scout for a real property
for investment to which a 210-square meter lot was bought in Morong,
Rizal. The title, however, was registered under
Vencidor’s name. He also sold a 69-square meter portion of the same
property to his in-laws without consent and mortgaged the property, forcing
Yolanda to redeem it for 50,000 php.
Despite these, the two still got married on March 4, 1994, ending up
with a second child (Michelle). During the marriage, however, the family
relied on Yolanda as the breadwinner, forcing her to go back to Japan to
work upon the exhaustion of her savings. She also found out that Vencidor
squandered her hard-earned money, pawned her jewelry, incurred debts in
her name, and even allowed a male friend to sleep in the master’s bedroom
upon returning to the Philippines. Issues of gambling, drinking, and
womanizing were also raised. Such prompted Yolanda to file a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Vencidor's psychological
incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations to Yolanda and their
children, which Ms. De Guzman assessed to have stemmed from
Vencidor’s Narcissistic Personality Disorder in her Psychological Report.
The RTC declared the marriage of Yolanda and Vencidor null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity of respondent in accordance
with Art. 36 of the Family Code.
o The property relation between the petitioner and respondent under
Article 147 of the Family Code was dissolved Custody of the children,
Michael and Michelle, awarded to the petitioner subject to visitorial right of
the respondent once a week at the most convenient time of the said
children.
o Support of 3, 000 php a month and at least one-half of the cost of
their education were also directed
o The petitioner also shall revert to the use of her maiden name.
 The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the RTC judgment, finding
that the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its
incapacitating nature and the incapacity itself were not sufficiently
explained.
o Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied
for being filed out of time. Hence, the filing of instant petition before the
Supreme Court.

Issues:
WON Vencidor Garlet’s (Respondent) negative character traits and
vices (alleged drinking, gambling, womanizing, and refusal to find a job)
constitute psychological capacity and hence be a valid ground for the nullity
of his marriage with Yolanda Garlet (Petitioner)?

Held:
No. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of
petitioner's evidence is insufficient to establish respondent's psychological
incapacity. Yolanda imputes almost every imaginable negative character
trait against Vencidor, but not only do they not satisfactorily constitute
manifestations of psychological incapacity as contemplated in the Family
Code, but are also riddled with inconsistencies that are sometimes
contradicted by her own evidence.
- It appears that Vencidor took on several jobs (refusal to look for a
job per se is not indicative of a psychological defect).
 - Vencidor’s alleged drinking and gambling vices were based on
hearsay evidence and thus, no probative value.
- Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity.
- Utter lack of factual basis for 'Vencidor's purported sexual infidelity.
(sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that a spouse is suffering
from psychological incapacity, Navales v. Navales).
- Verbal exchange between the parties in the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos, reveals that Vencidor only hid Yolanda's money and jewelry as a
desperate attempt to stop Yolanda from leaving him, taking with her the
children. In fact, Vencidor repeatedly expressed concern about saving their
marriage, offering to return the money and jewelry back to Yolanda as long
as they stay together. It was Yolanda who categorically stated that she no
longer wanted to live with Vencidor, offering to the latter P300,000 cash,
the Pila property, the jeepney and the tricycle, just for Vencidor to leave
their marital home.
The court also held that Ms. De Guzman's sources and methodology
is' severely lacking the requisite depth and comprehensiveness to judicially
establish respondent's psychological incapacity. She merely relied on the
information given by petitioner. To put it simply, Ms. De Guzman is saying
that Vencidor was a spoiled child, and while it can be said that Vencidor
has grown up to be a selfcentered and self-indulgent adult, it still falls short
of establishing his psychological incapacity characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability, so as to render Vencidor's marriage
to Yolanda void ab initio.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 21, 2010 and
Resolution dated August 24, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 89142 are AFFIRMED. So Ordered, Leonardo – De Castro, J.
Case #17

Doctrine:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article,21 only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.

Case Title: Sally Go-Bangayan vs. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.; GR. No.
210061; July 3, 2013

Facts:
 Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s
father was against the relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract.
Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered. Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was
bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for
his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of
the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate
children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the
partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated
by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local
civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be
registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial
court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous.

Issues:
1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not
having a marriage license;
 2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property
relations;
3. Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner

Held:
YES. We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-
existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized
without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued
by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The
case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-
existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or
fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
YES. The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code which states: Art. 148. In cases of
cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by
Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance
inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of
properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally
x x x.”
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision
of the CA is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property
covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were
in the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The
property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name
of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of
Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words “married to”
preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of
the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-
ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
3. NO. On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under
the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not
bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null
and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as
the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no
trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract.
However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of
bigamy was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract
without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with
the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together
and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage.

Case #18

Doctrine:
 If the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a
conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologist's
examination and report. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can
come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close
friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the time of marriage, or to
subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already
present at the time of marriage.

Case Title: Manuel R. Bakunawa III vs. Nora Reyes Bakunawa, GR. No.
217993, August 9, 2017

Facts:
Manuel alleged in the lower court that her wife Nora was moody and
mercurial; that their house was often dirty and disorderly was due to the
latter’s Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder; and that this resulted to
Manuel becoming more irritated with Nora and their verbal quarrels
escalated to physical violence. Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia
Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who testified that Manuel has Intermittent Explosive
Disorder, characterized by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not
proportionate to the cause.
The RTC declared the marriage of spouses Bakunawa null and void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code even if it was their son,
Moncho, and not Nora who participated in the psychological assessment.
Nora appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing inter alia that the RTC
erred in finding that the testimony of the psychiatrist is sufficient to prove
the parties' psychological incapacity. CA granted Nora's appeal and
reversed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not according probative
value to the psychological evaluation report and testimony of Dr. Villegas

Held:
No. Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent
Explosive Disorder and that Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality
Disorder which render them psychologically incapacitated under Article 36
of the Family Code, is solely based on her interviews with Manuel and the
parties' eldest child, Moncho. He could not be considered as a reliable
witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to
Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been there at the
time his parents were married. The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did
not administer any psychological tests on Manuel despite having had the
opportunity to do so.
As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by
Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the
latter's psychological evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that he and
Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations
of marriage.
In this case, the supposed personality disorder of Manuel could have
been established by means of psychometric and neurological tests which
are objective means designed to measure specific aspects of people's
intelligence, thinking, or personality.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution dated April 22, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579 are AFFIRME
AFFIRM 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Del

Case #19

Doctrine:
Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill-will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
Psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not a medical one, where the
testimony of a psychologist or psychiatrist as evidence is not mandatory in
declaration of nullity of marriage cases. What the law requires is a mental
illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend essential
marital obligations.

Case Title: Cortez vs. Cortez, GR. No. 224638, April 10, 2019

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 5, 1990. On June
9, 2003, petitioner filed an Amended Petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage on the ground of his and respondent's psychological
incapacity. He alleged that respondent was introduced to him by the
former's brother and the latter's friend. In February 1990, he was invited to
a birthday party of respondent's cousin at the latter's house, and after
consuming three bottles of beer, he became dizzy and passed out. When
he woke up, he was already in a room with respondent and was clad only
in his underwear and they were covered with a blanket. Respondent's
brother, a policeman, suddenly entered the room and said "May nangyari
na pala sa inyo, dapat panagutan mo iyan." He then went home to his
mother's house in disbelief.
Petitioner claimed that at about the same time, he was already
scheduled to work abroad as a seaman. While at the airport, he was
stopped by a hold-departure order issued by the POEA because of
respondent's complaint as she was then pregnant. He was forced by
respondent's brothers to marry respondent before a Municipal Trial Court
Judge of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Thereafter, he and respondent went to his
agency where he designated her as his allottee. They went to the POEA to
submit their marriage contract and the allotment paper, and he was able to
leave for his seaman duty. They never had a honeymoon nor sexual
intercourse.
Petitioner averred that while he was abroad, respondent gave birth to
a son named John Rol G. Cortez on September 14, 1990. When he came
back to the Philippines in March 1991, he was forced by respondent and
her brothers to attend the child's baptism on March 31, 1993 and paid for it.
He never lived with respondent since his return as he stayed in his sister's
house in Valenzuela City until his departure for abroad on October 16,
1991. While overseas, he was shocked to learn from respondent that she
had given birth to a baby girl on February 3, 1992 who was named Rose
Lyn G. Cortez. The baby was baptized upon his return to the Philippines in
October 1992, and he paid for the expenses. He tried to religiously give
support despite his doubts and reservations. However, in 1994, he came to
know that respondent had a husband and a child in Samar by the name of
Nida Guimbaolibot, thus, he suspended giving support to respondent and
the two children. However, respondent filed a case of abandonment against
him but was later dismissed, as they executed a compromise agreement
for the support of the children.
Petitioner claimed that: upon his return to the Philippines in 1998 from
his work overseas, he subjected himself to a semenal examination which
showed that he had low sperm count and did not have the capacity to
impregnate a woman; he continued giving financial support to avoid being
harassed, but stressed that he never cohabited with respondent; and he
claimed that they got married not out of love but because of respondent's
desire to ensure material support for herself and the children.
In her Answer, respondent alleged that she and petitioner were
introduced by a common friend in 1988; that they began to have a deep
relationship sharing each other's pains and secrets; that she intimated to
petitioner that she had been sexually abused before and bore a child; that
they became sweethearts and he would sleep over at her apartment. When
she got pregnant, they decided to get married on March 5, 1990 before a
Municipal Trial Court Judge of Meycauayan, Bulacan. When petitioner left
for overseas work, they stayed in touch; that he is a responsible husband
who saw to it that his wife be named as his allottee. On September 14,
1990, their son was born and petitioner came home for his baptism. She
declared that she was five months pregnant when petitioner left again for
abroad on October 16 1991 and that the child was baptized upon
petitioner's return in October 1992. She claimed that their marital woes
started in 1994 when petitioner told her that his new year's wish was to be
with another woman, Susan Barry; that they began to have fights and
petitioner left their apartment in 1995. She filed a complaint for
abandonment and demanded support for their children. She learned that
petitioner and Susan Barry are now living together.
Petitioner consulted Dr. Felicitas Artiaga-Soriano, a psychiatrist,
whose psychiatric evaluation report stated that petitioner is a person with
dependency inclination and has a passive aggressive personality disorder,
and was emotionally scarred and bitter for having been forced to marry
respondent without love, hence, he had no intention whatsoever to do the
duties and obligations of a husband and a father. On the other hand, she
found respondent to be suffering from an anti-social personality disorder
and that her deceitfulness and persistence in getting money from petitioner
had traumatized the latter even more. She declared both parties
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage. On July 9, 2012, the RTC denied the petition , the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied. Hence this petition for
review on certiorari filed by petitioner.

Issues:
Whether petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform
marital obligations.
 Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's finding that the totality of
evidence presented by petitioner failed to show that either or both parties
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with their essential marital
obligations which would result in the nullity of their marriage.

Held:
Thus, the antecedence can be traced to his rearing and family
environment making him a person with dependency inclination and
passive-aggressive in traits. As said, his psychological incapacity stems
from his traits and his not loving the respondent from the very beginning.
That is where gravity comes in as that is obviously, solid evidence, that he,
from the beginning had no intentions whatsoever to do the duties and
obligations of a husband and a father.
We find that the report failed to show how petitioner’s personality
traits incapacitated him from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. On the contrary, the report established that because petitioner
was forced to marry respondent without love, he had no intention to do his
full obligations as a husband. Mere “difficulty,” “refusal,” or “neglect” in the
performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is
different from “incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition or illness.
Notably, petitioner admitted that it was only when he learned in 1994
that respondent had a child prior to their marriage in 1990 that he stopped
giving support to respondent and their two children; that because of the
abandonment case filed against him and the threats coming from
respondent’s brothers if he would stop supporting respondent and the
children that he entered into a compromise agreement with respondent
regarding the financial support for their children; that despite giving support,
however, he refused to live with respondent. Petitioner’s showing of ill-will
and refusal to perform marital obligations do not amount to psychological
incapacity on his part.
Petitioner’s claim of lack of realization that he has marital obligation to
perform as husband to respondent is not a consideration under Article 36 of
the Family Code as what the law requires is a mental illness that leads to
an inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital obligations.
We, likewise, agree with the CA’s and the RTC’s findings that
respondent was not shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her marital obligations. As the CA found, respondent was shown to be
a caring wife and a loving mother to her children. The findings and
conclusions made by Dr. Soriano that respondent did not have the mind,
will and heart to perform the obligations of marriage as she did not show
concern for petitioner and was just contented to get money from the latter
cannot be given credence. There was no other basis for Dr. Soriano to
arrive at such finding other than the information supplied by petitioner. To
make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse’s psychological
condition based on the information fed by only one side is not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence. Moreover, such finding was contradicted by respondent’s
letters to petitioner which were attached to petitioner’s Reply filed with the
RTC where she wrote how much she wished for petitioner’s good health
and safety; that the money she received from petitioner’s allotment was
used to pay for the house rental, children’s education and other incidental
expenses; that she would like to save money to buy a house for the future
of their children; and that she asked for forgiveness for nagging him
because of jealousy and that she still loves him. Respondent had shown
that she is capable of fulfilling her marital obligations and that she valued
her marriage as she even opposed the petition for annulment of her
marriage and participated in the trial of the case.

Case #20

Doctrine:
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not constitute as
psychological incapacity as mentioned in Article 36 of the Civil Code, it is
the same when a person refuses or shows unwillingness to assume
essential obligations of marriage. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute
as psychological incapacity, it must be established as a disordered
personality, completely preventing the person from performing the essential
obligations of the marital state.

Case Title: Castillo vs. Republic, GR. No. 214064, Feb. 6, 2017

Facts:
Mirasol and Felipe started as friends and eventually became
sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol caught Felipe having an affair
with his former girlfriend which caused their relationship to broke off. With
the intervention of their parents, they eventually reconciled. In 1984, they
got married and blessed with two children in 1992 and in 2001.
In 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of their
marriage. She alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious
prompting her to believe that the same was made in heaven. However,
after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe resumed womanizing. Mirasol
alleged that Felipe’s irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman,
not communicating with her wife, and not supporting their children for a
period of not less than ten years without any reason, constitute a severe
psychological disorder.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared the marriage between
Mirasol and Felipe null and void. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering from psychological
incapacity, thus, incapable of performing marital obligations due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the
RTC determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and
Felipe on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that in order for sexual infidelity to constitute
as psychological incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must be
established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely
preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be
faithful to his spouse. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
Furthermore, the presentation of any form of medical or psychological
evidence to show the psychological incapacity, however, do not
automatically mean that the same would be ensured the granting of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It must always base on the
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on
the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
The Court finds that there was insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Felipe’s sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can be equated
with psychological incapacity as provided by law. Aside from the
psychologist, petitioner did not present other witnesses to substantiate her
allegations on Felipe’s infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed
that their relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is
considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value. Hence, the
petition for review was denied, and their marriage still subsists.

Case #21

Doctrine:
The requirement of a prior judicial declaration of nullity under Article
40 of the Family Code, which is for purposes only of remarriage, should not
have been extended to criminal cases.
The crime of bigamy is committed by any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage while validly married to another. (See
Article 349, Revised Penal Code).
Case Title: Pulido vs. People, GR No. 220149, July 27, 2021

Facts:
Pulido and Arcon were married on September 5, 1983 in a civil
wedding at the Municipal Hall of Rosario Cavite. In 2007, Pulido stopped
going home to their conjugal dwelling. Upon confrontation, Arcon found out
that Pulido has an affair with Baleda and they were married on July 31,
1995.
In December 2007, Arcon filed bigamy case against Pulido and
Baleda.
Pulido defended that both of his marriage was void ab initio. His
marriage with Arcon is void due to lack of marriage license, and his
marriage to Baleda is also void due to lack of marriage ceremony.
Baleda on the other hand claimed that she only knew Pulido's prior
marriage sometime in April 2007 and that she filed a Petition to Annul their
marriage before the filing of the bigamy case. The court even declared
their marriage null and void for being bigamous on October 25, 2007.
The trial court convicted Pulido of bigamy but acquitted Baleda.
Appeals and motions of Pulido were likewise denied. The court ruled
in reliance with the provision of Art. 40 of the Family Code.
Meanwhile in 2015, the court in a civil case declared Arcon and
Pulido's marriage null and void. A decree of absolute nullity of their
marriage was issued in 2016.

Issues:
 Whether Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void ab initio marriage in a bigamy case.

Held:
No. The court in this case abandons its earlier rulings and hold that a
judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab
initio prior prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case.
Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or
second second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for
bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are
secured.
The court based the foregoing conclusion and justification on the
following:
Retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage in criminal
prosecutions for bigamy.
The court stressed out that the nullity of a void ab initio marriage,
being inexistent under the eyes of the law can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between parties at any time, whether before of
after death of either or both the spouses. A void marriage is ipso facto void
without need of any judicial declaration of nullity. This requirement is
necessary under Art. 40, where the law treated a void ab initio marriage as
valid for purposes of remarriage.
Thus, being inexistent from the beginning, the void first marriage
does not qualifies nor satisfies one of the essential elements of bigamy
which requires the existence of a prior valid marriage. Logically, there is no
first marriage to begin with. As for the retroactive effect of a void ab initio
marriage, there is nothing to annul nor dissolve as the judicial declaration of
nullity merely confirms the inexistence of such marriage. This also explains
why the second element of bigamy which requires that the former marriage
has not been legally dissolved or annulled is wanting in the case of void ab
initio prior marriage. The RPC provision regarding bigamy pertains to
contracting a subsequent marriage when a voidable or valid first marriage
is still subsisting.
In the same vein, when the accused contracted a subsequent void ab
initio marriage, which is void other than it being bigamous, it has the effect
of not having entered into a subsequent marriage at all because the same
is inexistent from the beginning. Thus, negates existence of one of the
elements of bigamy which requires that the accused contracts a second or
subsequent marriage. A subsequent judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of the second marriage merely confirms its inexistence.
In both instances, the accused may validly raised the defense of a
void ab initio marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity.
Article 40 of the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity for purposes of remarriage but not as a defense in bigamy.
The Court clarifies that the requirement under Art. 40 (Final judgment
requiring the previous marriage void) need not be obtained only for
purposes of remarriage. The word "solely" under Art. 40 qualifies the "final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" and not "for purposes of
remarriage".
In effect, the judicial declaration of absolute nullity may be invoked in
other instances for purposes other than remarriage. Nonetheless, other
evidence, testimonial or documentary, may also prove the absolute nullity
of the previous marriage in the said instances. Hence, such previous void
marriage need not be proved solely by an earlier judgment of court
declaring it void. For purposes of remarriage, the only evidence to prove a
void marriage is the final judgment declaring its absolute nullity. In other
cases, the absolute nullity of a marriage may be proved by evidence other
than such judicial declaration.
Case #23

Doctrine:
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in
favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary,
the presumption is of great weight.
Case Title: Restituto M. Alcantara vs. Rosita A. Alcantara, GR. No.
167746; August 28, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of
marriage against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8
December 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person
who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee,
arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married on the
same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in
Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated
without the parties securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways
and lived separate lives. In her Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their
marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of
Carmona, Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he
has three children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial
court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.
Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his
marriage with the Rosita was celebrated, there was no marriage license
because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with
a “fixer” who arranged everything for them.
He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued
to them, neither he nor the Rosita was a resident of the place.
The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
cannot be given weight because the certification states that “Marriage
License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara
and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage contract bears the number
7054033 for their marriage license number.

Issues:
Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

Held:
No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio. To be considered void on the
ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence
of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at
the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that
no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by
the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is
precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage
license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in
the regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on
the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.
Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that
neither of the parties are residents of the city or municipality which issued
the same is a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of the
marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does
not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held
that it is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical
error. It does not detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
hands, petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to
the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the
requisite marriage license. Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the
Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a
marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the
situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle
Case #24

Doctrine:
A husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen.

Case Title: Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, GR. No. 196049;
June 26, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without
the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married in
Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and
started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to re-establish
their relationship. Fujiki then helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan declaring her marriage in Maekara void on the ground
of bigamy.
Later, back in the Philippines, Fujiki filed a petition for a Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the RTC. However, the trial court
dismissed the petition maintaining that Fujiki lacks personality file the
petition.

Issues:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

Held:
Yes, a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact
of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Section 1 of the said rule provides for who may file such petition, to
wit:
Sec. 1: Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
In this case, there is no doubt that the prior spouse, Fujiki, has a
personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. Thus, he has the
legal personality to file the petition. PETITION GRANTED.
Case #25

Doctrine:
Molina Doctrine; There are eight guidelines, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts
and clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

Case Title: Kalaw vs. Fernandez, GR No. 166357, Jan. 14, 2015
Facts:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed
expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations
of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s
experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her
duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form
of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision
dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the
ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity.

Issues:
Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

Held:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that
Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the
previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were
just given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
 The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA
have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of
certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly
and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters
to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some
resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue
of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity
that no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence,
every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity
as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not
endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on
the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment.
Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and
incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must
be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for
the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates
to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null
and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
 There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically
incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is
important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the
party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the
record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid
for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value
only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s
findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would
justify their exclusion as evidence.
Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological
and emotional temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved
credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role
of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be
accorded due importance and respect.
 The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such
expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of
all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the
nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and
competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent
within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the
conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were
largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore
be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s
factual premises.
The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for
the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article
36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider
as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.”
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental
duties
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have
delimited our determination of the presence or absence of psychological
incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully
appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she
made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and
responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of
very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture
of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong
playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young
children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her
mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but
also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her
willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion
of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating
their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and
escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s
moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a
parent to safeguard and protect her children.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19,
2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the
psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Case #26

Doctrine:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as void.

Case Title: Lucio C. Morigo vs. People, GR. No. 145226; February 06,
2004

Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four
years. The lost contacts when the school year ended. When Lucio received
a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore, constant communication took
place between them. They later became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia
returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in
Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came
back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30,
1990 in Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted on January 17,
1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992,
appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On
September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place.

Issues:
 Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from
the bigamy case.

Held:
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there
was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.
The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage
when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not
commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

Case #27

Doctrine:
The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under
the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except
during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of
during its effectivity.

Case Title: Juliano Llave vs. Republic; GR. No. 169766; March 30, 2011

Facts:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita
twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in
Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an
RTC Judge on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos
civil status was indicated as divorced. On November 23, 1994, private
respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A.Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib
Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of
Sen. Tamanos Legitimate children with Zorayda,filed a complaint with the
RTC for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and
Sen.Tamano for being bigamous.The complaint alleged,inter alia, that Sen.
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
Summons were served to Estrellita but she failed to file an Answer.
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to
Dismiss on February 20, 1995, argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim
Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.The RTC denied, leaving
Estrellita to file a petition for certiorari, referred to the CA. Regarding the
nullity case filed by Zorayda in the RTC, hearings there were repeatedly
postponed at the instance of Estrellita. The CA then denied Zoraydas
Motion to Dismiss, prompting her to file a petition of certiorari with the SC,
which still upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC. Meanwhile, the RTC declared
the marriage between Estrellita And Sen. Tamano void. The CA affirmed.

Issues:
1 Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano is
void
 2. Whether or not Zorayda had standing to file the nullity case

Held:
The petition is denied.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.The only law in
force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims
alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the
Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
For Estrellita, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim
personal laws.However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita.As ruled in
Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this
law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed
certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.In view of Sen.
Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him,
their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as voidab initio.
Third issue: Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, "Only an aggrieved or
injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages." This refers to the
"aggrieved or injured spouse," as in bigamy cases. If Estrellitas
interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing
an action.Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated. Zorayda and Adib
filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November
1994.While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who
can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage
has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which
may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
DENIED.
Case #28

Doctrine:
Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code: (Molina Doctrine-as it is called today); 1) The burden of proof
to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity;
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a. Medically or
clinically identified; b. Alleged in the complaint; c. Sufficiently proven by
experts; and d. Clearly explained in the decision; 3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage: 4) The
incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically incurable; 5)
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage; 6) The essential marital
obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code; 7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our Courts. 8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the State.

Case Title: Republic vs. Roridel Olaviano Molina; GR. No. 108763,
February 13, 1997

Facts:
Roridel, respondent is married to Reynaldo who was born with a son.
After a year of marriage Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibilit” as a husband and a father -since he preferred spending time
and squandering money on his friends, dependency on parents and
dishonesty in regards to their finances. Ryenaldo was relieved form his
job, and the respondent then became the breadwinner of the family. They
had a huge fight which resulted to Roridel’s resignation and weny to Baguio
to live with her parents and after few weeks, Reynaldo left and abandons
them.
IN 1990, Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Allegedly, Reynaldo had shown psychological capacity who fails
to perform essential marital obligation and it would be to the couples’ best
interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them
from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
Reynaldo admitted that they can no longer live together but
contended that their misunderstanding is due to Roridel’s failure to run the
household and manage the finances.

Issues:
 Whether or not the opposing and conflicting personalities of the
spouse can render the marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

Held:
NO. The rule on “psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (no physical) incapacity but to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly to the marriage, this psychological incapacity
must be characterize y a) gravity. b) juridical antecedence, and c)
incurability.
It appears in the case to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright
“refusal” or “neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personality in no wise
constitute psychological juridical antecedence nor its incurability.”
During its deliberations, the court in view of the novelty of Art. 36 of
the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts in
interpreting and applying it, the court decided to invite two Amiri Curiae,
who submitted following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36. 1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff; 2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a)
medical or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently
proven by experts and; d) clearly explained in the decisions; 3) the
incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of
the marriage; 4) such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable; 5) such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage; 6) the essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Arts. 68 up to 71 of the FC as regards the husband and wife, as well as Art
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation (s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decisions; 7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines while not controlling or decisive should
be given great respect by our courts; 8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.

Case #29

Doctrine:
Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has
been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by
experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she
married him prove that her psychological incapacity was have existed even
before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence
of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from
contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable
to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love,
trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic
Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and
not of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this
Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried
to reconcile with her but her behavior remains unchanged.

Case Title: Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne Reyes, GR. No. 155800;
March 10, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26
years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first
meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel at the Manila City
Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding at the Sta. Rosa de Lima
Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. Out of their
union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months
later.
On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to
respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He
asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity,
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things,

Issues:
Is his wife psychologically incapacitated?

Held:
Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage.
She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark
about her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is
immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year
of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever
such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it
likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as
borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life
was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More
disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish
truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and
the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling
lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them,
were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the
legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the
corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One
unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any
legal or emotional commitments.
Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68,
in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the
trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be
able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect.