INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT v. LITTON, GR No.

191525, 2017-12-13

Facts:

Atty. Emmanuel T. Santos (Santos), a lessee to two (2) buildings owned by Litton... owed the latter rental
arrears as well as his share of the payment of realty taxes.

Litton filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Santos before the MeTC of Manila. The MeTC ruled
in Litton's favor and ordered Santos to vacate A.I.D. Building and Litton Apartments and to pay various
sums of money representing unpaid arrears, realty taxes, penalty, and attorney's fees.

the judgment was not executed.

On 11 November 1996, the sheriff of the MeTC of Manila levied on a piece of real property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 187565 and registered in the name of International Academy of
Management and Economics Incorporated (I/AME), in order to execute the judgment against Santos.

indicated that such was "only up to the extent of the share of Emmanuel T. Santos."

I/AME claimed that it has a separate and distinct personality from Santos; hence, its properties should
not be made to answer for the latter's liabilities.

Upon motion for reconsideration of I/AME, the MeTC reversed its earlier ruling and ordered the
cancellation of the annotations of levy as well as the writ of execution.

Petitioner avers that its right to due process was violated when it was dragged into the case and its real
property made an object of a writ of execution in a judgment against Santos.

It argues that since it was not impleaded in the main case, the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction
over it.

Petitioner I/AME argues that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only to stock
corporations, and not to non-stock, nonprofit corporations such as I/AME since there are no
stockholders to hold liable in such a situation but instead only members. Hence, they do not have
investments or shares of stock or assets to answer for possible liabilities. Thus, no one in a non-stock
corporation can be held liable in case the corporate veil is disregarded or pierced.

The petitioner also insists that the piercing of the corporate veil cannot be applied to a natural person -
in this case, Santos - simply because as a human being, he has no corporate veil shrouding or covering
his person.

Issues:

The issues boil down to the alleged denial of due process when the court pierced the corporate veil of
I/AME and its property was made to answer for the liability of Santos.

Ruling:
The piercing of the corporate veil is premised on the fact that the corporation concerned must have
been properly served with summons or properly subjected to the jurisdiction of the court a quo.
Corollary thereto, it cannot be subjected to a writ of execution meant for another in violation of its right
to due process.

There exists, however, an exception to this rule: if it is shown "by clear and convincing proof that the
separate and distinct personality of the corporation was purposefully employed to evade a legitimate
and binding commitment and perpetuate a fraud or like wrongdoings."

The resistance of the Court to offend the right to due process of a corporation that is a nonparty in a
main case, may disintegrate not only when its director, officer, shareholder, trustee or member is a
party to the main case, but when it finds facts which show that piercing of the corporate veil is merited.

In determining the propriety of applicability of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, this Court, in a
number of cases, did not put in issue whether a corporation is a stock or non-stock corporation.

In the United States, from which we have adopted our law on corporations, non-profit corporations are
not immune from the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Their courts view piercing of the
corporation as an equitable remedy, which justifies said courts to scrutinize any organization however
organized and in whatever manner it operates. Moreover, control of ownership does not hinge on stock
ownership.

As held in Barineau v. Barineau:[36] [t]he mere fact that the corporation involved is a nonprofit
corporation does not by itself preclude a court from applying the equitable remedy of piercing the
corporate veil. The equitable character of the remedy permits a court to look to the substance of the
organization, and its decision is not controlled by the statutory framework under which the corporation
was formed and operated. While it may appear to be impossible for a person to exercise ownership
control over a nonstock, not-for-profit corporation, a person can be held personally liable under the
alter ego theory if the evidence shows that the person controlling the corporation did in fact exercise
control, even though there was no stock ownership.

The concept of equitable ownership, for stock or non-stock corporations, in piercing of the corporate
veil scenarios, may also be considered. An equitable owner is an individual who is a non-shareholder
defendant, who exercises sufficient control or considerable authority over the corporation to the point
of completely disregarding the corporate form and acting as though its assets are his or her alone to
manage and distribute.

The piercing of the corporate veil may apply to corporations as well as natural persons involved with
corporations. This Court has held that the "corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be
pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation.”

Like Arcilla, Santos: (1) was adjudged liable to pay on a judgment against him; (2) he became President
of a corporation; (3) he formed a corporation to conceal assets which were supposed to pay for the
judgment against his favor; (4) the corporation which has Santos as its President, is being asked by the
court to pay on the judgment; and (5) he may not use as a defense that he is no longer President of
I/AME (although a visit to the website of the school shows he is the current President).

This Court agrees with the CA that I/AME is the alter ego of Santos and Santos - the natural person - is
the alter ego of I/AME. Santos falsely represented himself as President of I/AME in the Deed of Absolute
Sale when he bought the Makati real property, at a time when I/AME had not yet existed.

We borrow from American parlance what is called reverse piercing or reverse corporate piercing or
piercing the corporate veil "in reverse."

"in a traditional veil-piercing action, a court disregards the existence of the corporate entity so a
claimant can reach the assets of a corporate insider. In a reverse piercing action, however, the plaintiff
seeks to reach the assets of a corporation to satisfy claims against a corporate insider."

"Reverse-piercing flows in the opposite direction (of traditional corporate veil-piercing) and makes the
corporation liable for the debt of the shareholders."

It has two (2) types: outsider reverse piercing and insider reverse piercing. Outsider reverse piercing
occurs when a party with a claim against an individual or corporation attempts to be repaid with assets
of a corporation owned or substantially controlled by the defendant.[52] In contrast, in insider reverse
piercing, the controlling members will attempt to ignore the corporate fiction in order to take advantage
of a benefit available to the corporation, such as an interest in a lawsuit or protection of personal assets.

Outsider reverse veil-piercing is applicable in the instant case. Litton, as judgment creditor, seeks the
Court's intervention to pierce the corporate veil of I/AME in order to make its Makati real property
answer for a judgment against Santos, who formerly owned and still substantially controls I/AME.

In the U.S. case Acree v. McMahan,[54] the American court held that "[o]utsider reverse veil-piercing
extends the traditional veil-piercing doctrine to permit a third-party creditor to pierce the veil to satisfy
the debts of an individual out of the corporation's assets."

This notwithstanding, the equitable remedy of reverse corporate piercing or reverse piercing was not
meant to encourage a creditor's failure to undertake such remedies that could have otherwise been
available, to the detriment of other creditors.

Reverse corporate piercing is an equitable remedy which if utilized cavalierly, may lead to disastrous
consequences for both stock and non-stock corporations. We are aware that ordinary judgment
collection procedures or other legal remedies are preferred over that which would risk damage to third
parties (for instance, innocent stockholders or voluntary creditors) with unprotected interests in the
assets of the beleaguered corporation.[57] Thus, this Court would recommend the application of the
current 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure on Enforcement of Judgments. Under the current Rules of Court
on Civil Procedure, when it comes to satisfaction by levy, a judgment obligor is given the option to
immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon to satisfy the judgment. If the
judgment obligor does not exercise the option, personal properties, if any, shall be first levied and then
on real properties if the personal properties are deemed insufficient to answer for the judgment.[58] In
the instant case, it may be possible for this Court to recommend that Litton run after the other
properties of Santos that could satisfy the money judgment - first personal, then other real properties
other than that of the school. However, if we allow this, we frustrate the decades-old yet valid MeTC
judgment which levied on the real property now titled under the name of the school. Moreover, this
Court will unwittingly condone the action of Santos in hiding all these years behind the corporate form
to evade paying his obligation under the judgment in the court a quo. This we cannot countenance
without being a party to the injustice. Thus, the reverse piercing of the corporate veil of I/AME to
enforce the levy on execution of the Makati real property where the school now stands is applied.
CIR v CA & YMCA
GR No 124043, October 14, 1998

FACTS:
In 1980, YMCA earned an income of 676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop
owners, like restaurants and canteen operators and 44,259 from parking fees collected from non-
members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR issued an assessment to YMCA for deficiency taxes which included
the income from lease of YMCA’s real property. YMCA formally protested the assessment but the CIR
denied the claims of YMCA. On appeal, the CTA ruled in favor of YMCA and excluded income from lease
to small shop owners and parking fees. However, the CA reversed the CTA but affirmed the CTA upon
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether the rental income of YMCA is taxable

RULING:
Yes. The exemption claimed by YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording of then Section 27 of
the NIRC which mandates that the income of exempt organizations (such as the YMCA) from any of their
properties, real or personal, be subject to the tax imposed by the same Code. While the income received
by the organizations enumerated in Section 26 of the NIRC is, as a rule, exempted from the payment of
tax in respect to income received by them as such, the exemption does not apply to income derived
from any of their properties, real or personal or from any of their activities conducted for profit,
regardless of the disposition made of such income.

Digest #2

Facts:
The main question in this case is: “is the income derived from rentals of real property owned by Young
Men’s Christian Association of the Philippines (YMCA) – established as “a welfare, educational and
charitable non-profit corporation” – subject to income tax under the NIRC and the Constitution? In
1980, YMCA earned an income of P676,829 from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop
owners, like restaurants and canteen operators and P44k form parking fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the rental income of the YMCA taxable

Ruling:
Yes. The exemption claimed by the YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording of the last
paragraph of then Sec. 27 of the NIRC; court is duty-bound to abide strictly by its literal meaning and to
refrain from resorting to any convoluted attempt at construction. The said provision mandates that the
income of exempt organizations (such as YMCA) from any of their properties, real or personal, be
subject to the tax imposed by the same Code. Private respondent is exempt from the payment of
property tax, but nit income tax on rentals from its property.
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed
because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.

The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal
weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.

In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until
November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem
recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until
such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report
every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check
would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not
report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of
company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those
similarly situated were not treated the same.

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period covering a
total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective immediately.”

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his
weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.

NLRC affirmed.

CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he
repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination
was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.

ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would
thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease.
That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose
weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory
hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “*t+he issue is could I bring my weight
down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight
attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his
dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA
correctly puts it, “*v+oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the
employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all
just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent
found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”

NOTES:

The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national
origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for
performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the
test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid
“provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.”

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its
passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the
cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as
imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.

The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or
based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of
his moral character.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.

COMELEC,et al.

GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700

March 8,2016

Perez, J.:
FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9,
2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally
adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN
ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to Theodore
Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized
American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating

medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005. She then quitted
her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went home for good to the
Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new
Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to
Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen
since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as
Filipinos. The Comelec en banccancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in
want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed
misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-
6 that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied
the constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her
physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as
an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents
there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are
Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128,
Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as
based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to
definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to
the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN
Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she
satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently)
coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in
acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to
the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and
intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for
Presidency was granted by the SC.
Ah Chong 15 Phil. 488
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.

Lesson: mistake of fact, definition of felony

Laws: Article 1 RPC, Art 3 RPC

FACTS:
• August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some trying to force
open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer
and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon
forcing his way into the room. The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped
to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just
above the knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be an unlawful aggression) which had been placed
against the door. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck
out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual who is a house boy
or muchacho who in the spirit of mischief was playing a trick on him
• Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
• There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of which took place
in a house where he was employed as cook so he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.
• trial court held it as simple homicide

ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts,
does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them
to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true
state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.

HELD: trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime
NO.
• GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in
order that the actor may be held criminally liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8
of the code
• Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
o A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though
the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
o voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act
o "malice" signifying the intent
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention
were so
o “ Actus me incito factus non est meus actus” - an act done by me against my will is not my act
• GR: courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal WITHOUT regard to the intent of the doer
• EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed
• ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
• defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he
was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he
believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and
that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling
into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent
danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
Tañada, L. M. et al vs. Hon. J.C. Tuvera et al

G.R. No. L-63915

April 24, 1985

En Banc

Facts:

Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette the unpublished Executive Issuances such as; Presidential Decrees, Proclamations,
Executive Orders, general orders, letters of implementation, and administrative orders. In defense,
respondents stated that the petitioners have no legal personality in the case citing sec. 3 of rule 65 of
the Rules of Court which lays-out the requirement for filing for a Writ of Mandamus. Petitioners
contended that the issue touches the public and thereby does not require any special circumstance to
institute an action. On the other hand, respondents stated that publication of the mentioned issuances
is not a sine qua non requirement as the Law provides its own affectivity date as stated in Art. 2 of the
Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not publication affects the validity of the Executive Issuances.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the respondents to publish the Executive Issuances of
general application, and further stated that failure for publication would render the Issuances no
binding force and effect.

It was explained that such publication is essential as it gives basis to the legal maxim known as
ignorantia legis non excusat. Thus, failure to publish would make create injustice as would it would
punish the citizen for transgression of the law which he had no notice.

The court declared that Presidential issuances with general application without publication would be
inoperative and null and void. However, some justices in their concurring opinions made a qualification
stating that publication is not an absolute requirement for the publication. As Justice Fernando stated
that, publication is needed but it must not only confined in the Official Gazette because it would make
those other laws not published in the Official Gazette bereft of any binding force or effect.
CHUA-QUA vs. CLAVE G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990 Labor Law, Illegal Dismissal

FEBRUARY 14, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioner was employed in Tay Tung High School, Inc. as the class adviser in the sixth grade where
Bobby Qua was enrolled in. Since it was the policy of the school to extend remedial instructions to its
students, Bobby Qua was imparted such instructions in school by petitioner. In the course thereof, the
couple fell in love and got married in a civil ceremony. Petitioner was then 30 years old while Bobby Qua
was 16 years old. Consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, and their marriage was
ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church wedding.

Private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at Bacolod City an
application for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following ground: “For
abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued
employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral values, of the school.”

Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay.

The Labor Arbiter, without conducting any formal hearing, granted the clearance to terminate the
employment of petitioner.

The NLRC unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and ordered petitioner’s reinstatement
with backwages,

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner committed serious misconduct or breached the trust reposed on her by her
employer or committed any of the other grounds enumerated in the Labor Code which will justify the
termination of her employment.

RULING:

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion.

As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to
show that immoral acts were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he
concluded that “it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what
transpired during those times.” In reversing his decision, the NLRC observed that the assertions of
immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to support such claim.
With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the
alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private
respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If
the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends
substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But,
definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality.
The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be
considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted
and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the
parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.
 CAYETANO vs. MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

Facts: Renato Cayetano questioned Christian Monsod’s nomination by

President Corazon Aquino as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Cayetano stated that Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary
requirement of practicing law for at least 10 years. However, despite Cayetano’s
objection, the Commission on Appointments (COA) still confirmed Monsod’s
appointment.

Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse

of discretion in confirming Monsod’s appointment.

Held: No. COA’s power to give consent to the nomination of the COMELEC
chairman by the President is mandated by the Constitution under Article IX,
Section 1 (2), Sub Article C. It provides:

“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”

The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion to whom it is so

vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualification required by law. Therefore, there is no occasion for the Supreme
Court to exercise its corrective power since COA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion based on the evidence presented.