Department of Economics, University of The Punjab Pakistan Economic and Social Review

CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
Author(s): ABDUL RAOOF and ABDUL RAUF BUTT

Source: Pakistan Economic and Social Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 25-41
Published by: Department of Economics, University of the Punjab
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Pakistan Economic and Social Review
Volume XXXV, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 25-41
CORRUPTION IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
ABDUL RAOOF and ABDUL RAUF BUTT*
Abstract. Corruption in international business concerns the

making of unlawful payment to the politicians, government
officials and, sometimes, to mafia of a host country. The
causes of corruption are multi-dimensional. They include
cultural, economic, political, legal and institutional factors and
vary from one country to other.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was passed in 1977

to prohibit the bribes and gifts to foreign officials as method of
influencing business and government decisions and to limit the
payment of fees, gifts, or bribes to low ranking government
officials, and to mandate financial reporting of such
expenditures. Organization of Economic Cooperation
Development has also made certain recommendations to reduce
corruption in international business.
At present, corruption in international business is quite

prevalent. The laws of many countries against the corruption in
international business are not comprehensive and in some cases
they are non-existent. The purpose of this study is to discuss
the dimensions and cases of corruption in international
business and explore solutions to reduce it.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bribery and corruption are facts of doing business in
many places. Business and political scandals in the United
States, Europe and Japan are testimony to this fact. Publicity
around illicit payments by the US-based multinational
companies, MNCs in the mid-1970s culminated in the passage
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977.
The authors are Ph.D. Scholar at School of Business, Nova Southeastern

University, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, USA, and Professor of Economics at
University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan, respectively.
26 Pakistan Economic and Social Review
Besides the harmful effect on the moral fabric of the

society, corruption has economical costs. Many issues that make
sense in one culture, when viewed through a different cultural
perspective, would appear inappropriate. Lobbying legislators
and government agencies is an accepted legal practice in the
United States. Some other nations would consider it influence
peddling and mislabeling of buying votes and favours. Giving
gift to chiefs and elders is not only considered right by the
natives of many societies, but purifying and sanctifying. But
these are declared to be bribes by the Western law. While the
FCPA (1977) forbids the US firms to participate in illegal
payments, it cannot prevent corrupt actions of other MNCs,
which may be getting business contracts through illicit means
(Fatehi, 1996).
The FCPA (1977) was passed to help define appropriate
ethical and legal behaviour, limiting the payment of fees, gifts,
or bribes to low ranking government officials, and mandating
financial reporting of such expenditures. The issue of moral
imperialism, forcing US standards on others, remain
unresolved. However, few countries have passed similar
legislation (Pitman and Sanford, 1994).
In one instance, Lockheed Corporation, an American
multinational company, paid an estimated $25 million in
concealed payments to Japanese officials in connection with the
sale of its Tristar L-1011 aircraft to Japan (Singer, 1991). These
bribes led to the resignation and subsequent criminal conviction
of the Japanese Prime Minister Kankuie Tanaka. As a result of
the related hearing and reaction of the American public, the
Justice department, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began investigating
international bribery by American business firms.
To force disclosure, the SEC held out the threat to
multinational firms that it would withhold clearance of securities
for trading on the national exchanges unless they made full
disclosure of foreign financial transactions. As a result, 450
companies, including more than 100 of the Fortune 500,
admitted to making questionable foreign payments, totaling over
$300 million (Longenecker and Moore, 1988).
RAOOF and BUTT: Corruption in International Business 27
After the FCPA was passed, some American firms

complained that they were losing orders to Japanese and
European competitors where bribery was sometimes not only
legal but tax free, since it could be claimed as a legitimate
business expense. Bribery, some claimed, is customary and
often necessary to transact business in many countries. Many
business people consider bribes and gifts to be part of the cost
of doing business in a foreign country.
Numerous foreign critics condemned the United States'

"holier-than-thou" attitude about the payment of bribes and
gifts. Within the American culture, certain types of bribery are
common business practice. For instance, golf outings, dinners,
tickets for sporting events, use of luxury condos in resort areas,
and types of wining, dining, and gift giving and accepting are
routine in many firms (Pitman and Sanford, 1994).
In the aftermath of the Watergate hearing and the passage

of the FCPA, many companies adopted codes of conduct for
their employees. Subsequent studies have indicated that by
1988, 85 percent of the 2,000 largest American companies had
a written, internal code of ethics that provided managers with
ethical guidelines and training regarding unlawful payments to
foreign officials (Singer, 1991).
Some researchers see corruption as part of the ethos of
developing societies as they go through the modernization
process. For example, traditional practices of gift-giving find
their ways into the formal, modern operation of civil society.
Some functionalists see corruption as an impediment to
development, since it detracts and undermines the rational order
of things and brings unacceptable behaviours into mechanism.
Others conceptualize it as a "form of coercion, namely
economic coercion".
Still others believe that it can serve as an incentive to
development, since it cuts through bureaucracy and unleashes
economic forces in the market that could remain stagnant under
a dormant bureaucracy. Finally, some see it as being
unacceptable and unethical behaviour in the context of moral
order (Werhane and Andrade, 1985). Some believe that
corruption is almost inevitable in government affairs. There is

always a political market for facilitating services and beneficial
decisions because the monopoly of power exercised by
government invites corruption (Banfield, 1975). Therefore, the
firms involved in international business may treat the host
government as a variable in the set of production factors
towards the pursuit of their business objectives (Boddewyn and
Brewer, 1994).
One of the causes of corruption is the effort of
international firms to obtain extra-market process benefits
through government support. Perrow (1986) has argued that the
growth of large international firms has been mainly because of
government support and have little to do with organizational
efficiency. Through government support, such firms raise
prices, eliminate competitors or collude with them, obtain
favourable regulations, and deny such benefits to others by
raising barriers of entry and mobility (Cantwell, 1991; Teece,
1981; Yamin, 1991). Political payments are lawful in Canada,
but in the United States they are illegal when made to
candidates or parties in federal elections, and also in the state
and municipal elections of many states (Jacoby, Nehemkis and
Eells, 1977). In France, foreign payments to middleman are
considered legitimate business tax deductions. Germany has
similar rules (Borrus, Toy and Trautman, 1995). The level of
economic crime and corruption worldwide is unprecedented and
it's growing, says Mark Pieth, Chairman of an anti-bribery task
force at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) (Miles, 1995).
Japanese and West European companies are doing
whatever it takes to get big-dollars business in all parts of the
world. "Western European and Japanese companies pay
whatever the market will bear, up to 10 percent commissions,"
asserts the executive of the Houston-based maker of gas-fired
electricity plants. Considering that energy contracts run to $1
billion and up a pop, the commission amounts to nice piece of
change (Miles, 1995).
II. SOME RELATED DEFINITIONS

Political Payment. It means any transfer of money or
anything of value made with the aim of influencing the
behaviour of politicians, political candidates, political parties,
or government officials and employees in their legislative,
administrative, and judicial actions (Jacoby, Nehemkis and
Eells, 1977).
Bribe. Any valuable thing given or promised, or any
person acting in an official or public capacity to violate or
forbear from his duty, or to improperly influence his behaviour
in the performance of his duty (Black's Law Dictionary, 1968).
Extortion. It is the act of compelling payment by means

of threats of injury to person, property or reputation or the
corrupt demanding or receiving by a person in office of a fee
for services which should be performed graciously, or, where
compensation is permissible, of large fee than justified, or of a
fee not due (Black's Law Dictionary, 1968).
Tipping. In the ideal sense, it is the giving of a small
gratuity in appreciation of good service, voluntarily and without
expectation of any quid pro quo. In purpose and effect, pure
tipping is quite distance from either bribery or extortion, being
given neither to induce the servant to perform services beyond
his normal duties nor to deter him from withholding normal
services (Jacoby, Nehemkis and Eells, 1977).
III. CASES OF CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS
A German high-tech company identified by sources
as Siemens, allegedly offered bribes in connection with bid on
11 contracts from 1987 to 1994. It won 7 of the deals (Judge,
1995).
France warned an African government that it would
withdraw government guarantees on outstanding loans if Alcatel
didn't win a $20 million telecom switching contract.
A secret report prepared by the Commerce

Department, with the help of US spies, cites scores of shady
business deals that have cost American companies billions in

lost contracts during the past two years.
Japanese company win a $ 30 million super

computer order from Brazil. The Bank of Japan said it would
credit the purchase against Brazil's debt to Tokyo.
Former French President Francois Mitterrand,
leading a trade mission to Honoi, demanded a 20% share of
Vietnam's telecom market as a condition of French foreign aid.
President Clinton called King Fahd of Saudi Arabia
in 1993 to lobby for Boeing Co. and McDonnell Douglas
Corporation. One US official said, "if we are going to provide
a security umbrella for a country, it's reasonable to expect our
companies to get treated fairly."
Some US companies find creative ways to skirt the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. To secure a mining venture in a
developing nation, an American company recently flew officials
from the country to the US, put them up in a fancy hotel for a
week, and gave them a wad of cash for a shopping spree.
Officials of Airbus Industry, the European airframe
consortium, threatened to block entry to the European Union for
Turkey and Malta if those nations' carrier bought US planes
(Borrus, Toy and Trautman, 1995).
The president of the Commercial Bank of China was
sentenced to death for accepting a bribe of $3,480. Two months
later, eight bank accountants in Beijing, Hainan Province, were
executed for embezzling more than $6.9 million.
American companies in China must routinely deal

with fraudulent letters of credit and a bureaucracy that as often
as not manipulates the financing of trade and public projects for
personal gains.
According to Tsang Shu-ki, a professor and banking
expert at Hong Kong's Baptist College, Chinese banks lent
between $13 billion and $25 billion through unofficial channels
in 1992. HG Asia Limited, a Hong Kong stockbroker, estimates
that by the end of year 1992, 47 percent of China's currency
was held outside the official banking system.

The Agricultural Bank of China, in June 1994,
announced that it would not honour 201 fraudulent letters of
credits worth more than $10 billion, an amount equivalent to
12.5 percent of China's total 1992 imports (Hamlin, 1994).
Billionaire businessman Alfredo Harp Helu, head of
the financial group that controls Banmex, Mexico's biggest
bank, was kidnaped last year. He was released after two months
in captivity when the abductors were paid sum of $30 million.
Shortly after, another billionaire Mexican businessman, Angel
Losada Moreno, heir to a super market fortune, was also
kidnaped. The amount of ransom paid for his release was not
revealed.
Brazil's President Ferdinando Collar de Mello was
impeached for taking $20 million from the public till.
Lockheed agreed to pay Dr. Talaka, the company's
Egyptian agent and a member of Egyptian parliament, $1.8
million in fees in exchange for lobbying successfully for the sale
of three air cargo planes worth $79 million to Egyptian
military. Besides having to pay a $25 million penalty, the
defense company was hit with a three-year ban on cargo plane
exports.
Foreigners expect the local corporate mafia, pay off
if they wish to operate in Russia. Pay $3,000 to the Ministry of
Atomic Energy to visit a nuclear complex and pay $200 to
$1000, depending upon rank to interview a former KGB official
(Miles, 1995).
The corrupt military officers in Haiti uses his
position in Army to maximize the revenue of his family
household. The professional soldier is the chief entrepreneur of
his household. His goal is to maximize his gain and not simply
to care for his family, but also to prepare for his retirement
from military. Serving as an informal broker between the
government and the business community is a sure way to
maximize one's household revenue. The army's ability to
interface with civil society through the police force provides a
source of extra-legal income (Laguerre, 1994).
IV. THE MODES AND PURPOSES OF

UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS
The methods of making unlawful payments are legion and
innovative. Jacoby, Nehemkis and Eells (1977) have described
some modes and purposes of such payments as follows:
Most payments are made in currency rather than by

check, in envelopes personally delivered by a
trusted emissary to the recipient or his representative
at an agreed rendezvous.
The payments are also made into numbered Swiss
bank accounts at the order of the payee. Double
assurance of the payee's anonymity is gained if he
puts title to Swiss account in a Liechtenstein trust.
Offshore corporations are used to make and to
receive payoffs.
Payments can also be made in the form of expensive
gifts of property, such as watches, jewelry, oil
paintings, negotiable securities, country homes,
automobiles, or aircraft.
Gift of services are a popular mode of payoff. Some

examples of gifts of services include: a rent-free
villa on French Riveria; the occupancy of a
fashionable London flat complete with servants and
a chauffeured Rolls-Royce; picking up the tab for an
Arab or African minister and his entourage at the
George Cinq Hotel in Paris.
It is not unusual for a European arms supplier to
provide a Middle East defense minister or an
influential Asian politician with a small fortune in
gambling chips to be used in an evening's at a
Monte Carlo casino. Slot machine and other
gambling winnings with no out-of-pocket losses
permitted by the hosts, are used by the Russian
guests to purchase much-priced American luxury
goods.
The payer of bribe can sell the recipient a property

at a deflated price under the market value.
Similarly, US companies having corruption motives

can finance valuable services for government
officials and politicians. The children of government
officials and politicians are given scholarships and
educational expenses at American universities.
Ailing family members of their families receive
paid-up medical care at the best American hospitals.
Their indigent relatives are put on the corporate
payroll as consultants with a handsome annual fee
for performing ephemeral services. Contributions
are made to the payee's favourite charitable
organization.
Still another ploy is the making of corporate loans to
the foreign officials, evidenced by an interest
bearing note, which the company never intends to
collect.
An ingenious way in which a company can bribe a
public official, or in which the official can extort a
payment, is through the sale of property owned by
the official to the company at an inflated price.
Another ingenious mode of transmitting a bribe or

an extortion is by overtoiling and kickback which is
frequently done where a company sells goods or
services to a foreign corporation.
The purposes of unlawful payments in international
business include: to reduce political risks, to avoid threats and
harassment, to reduce inflated taxes, to induce foreign
government employees to perform their duties, and to obtain or
retain business.
V. SIGNIFICANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL

MANAGEMENT
The mode of expression of corruption in international
business is always insidious. Because of the nature of the
operation, it is hidden, veiled and underground in the informal
arena. No formal written contract is delivered to an

international manager. The contract is through oral
communication so that it cannot be documented and used to
prosecute an individual. Maneuvers are carried out behind the
scenes to conceal the identity of the actors.
In all cultures, the corruption is affected by people who
are aware of the limits of the formal arena and do not mind
slipping back and forth as a way to strengthen their economic
position in society. Over time, corruption stabilizes a group
because it creates internal bonds. Members of the corrupt clique
tend to help each other. It can also be disruptive in the sense
that it brings about disunity and distrust in the group when the
participation in corrupt practices is not the intention of every
member of the group.
Corruption also reproduces itself over time because the
agents recruit members according to the law of supply and
demand. The inefficiency of the political and economic systems
causes the actors to bring their corruption schemes into the
underground where they are protected by secrecy and where
they can flourish and reproduce themselves in the shadow of the
formal system.
Corruption affects the organization of involved systems. It
produces multiplicity of power centres located between the
formal and naturalized informal systems. Power centres have
dynamic character and they develop and then collapse when
they have outlived their usefulness. Corruption constructs a
parallel network of power centres. At some times, individual
actors can establish themselves as power centres with a network
of associates without necessarily being known as a leader.
Corruption creates new poles of attraction in any organization
and thereby decreases the effectiveness of hierarchy. It provides
multiple points of connection with civil society that may
eventually outweigh the formal and institutional powers links in
any society. These points constitute alternative power centres
that cater to the parasitic business needs of their clientele and
provide to a international business organization, alternative
points of influence on the decision making systems of any
society.
The productive aspects of corruption include its ability to

unlock and speed up the processes of rigid systems. It fills the
interstices of rigid bureaucratic systems, allows their decom
position, and provides new impetus for their recomposition.
Corruption brings both money and power in societies to those
who can access to their decision makers through the offers of
personal gains.
International business community often needs to seek
protection, support and collaboration of the decision makers of
host countries. Protection is needed to guard against theft; to
pressure those who owe money to pay up especially if they
happen to be government officials; to deal efficiently with a
local bureau, for example, to secure an exit visa or registration
permit or to clear merchandise through customs; to maintain
monopoly over a sector of the economy, or even to intercede on
behalf of a client or acquaintance in trouble with the law or the
government (Laguerre, 1994).
In the period of crisis and the interim between the collapse
of one regime and the installation of another in a host country,
international business community is most vulnerable. Businesses
are burned by the mob and international businessmen are jailed
or exiled. Many international business vanish at this time.
Therefore, during the crisis and interim periods, international
business community expands a great deal of energy and other
resources to create and maintain a healthy relationship with the
decision makers of a host country.
International business management can pay small amount
of money to low ranking government employees to compensate
for their extra efforts to speed up a concerning decision making
process. Though FCPA makes it a federal offense for American
corporations to offer or provide payments to officials of foreign
governments for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business,
the act however does not prohibit grease payments to foreign
government employees whose duties are primarily ministerial or
clerical, since such payments are sometimes required to
persuade the recipients to perform their normal duties (Pitman
and Sanford, 1994).
The FCPA regulates only US international business

companies and not the concerning decision makers of host
countries. It can only be effective practically, if it is backed by
the fair implementation of local comprehensive laws. The
corruption in long run is injurious to the health of both national
and international business systems. It destroys fair competition
and creates distrust in the legitimacy of a political regime. It
also increases the cost of doing business that is eventually paid
by the consumers of a host country in terms of higher prices and
low quality of goods and services.
VI. SOME SOLUTIONS

Battling corruption in international business involves
combined changes in cultural, institutional, legal, and economic
factors in a given society. Jacoby, Nehemkis and Eells (1977)
have recommended following paradigmic developments to
curtail the corruption:
The shifting of loyalties from family, clan, and tribe

to nation-states.
The opening of institutionalized channels to enable

business enterprise to influence political decision
making.
The diffusion of education.
The emergence of an economically strong and

politically articulate middle class, which historically
has found corruption inefficient and morally
repugnant.
The transfer of wealth and power from small circle
of politicians or dictators to other social groups.
The growth of local industry which will reduce the

importance of contraband markets.
The paying of adequate salaries to civil servants,
thereby reducing their dependence on a private
system of political payments.
The development of strong, independent legal
traditions in which uniform, impersonal rules and

standards prevail instead of the arbitrary discretion
of civil servants.
The growth of the professions ? accounting, law,

engineering, teaching, civil service, which infuse
their members and eventually widen circles of
society, with strict canons of professional
behaviour.
International business community can sometimes seek

protection against extortion through their embassy. But to make
the efforts of embassy work something must be given in return
to local decision makers. Sometimes the embassy is able to help
reposition the concerning officer, to arrange a reciprocal favour
such as a visa for the officer or his family member to visit the
United States, or to form some other covert relationship of
mutual benefit.
Laguerre (1994) has recommended reforms in the system

of overregulation for international business. He maintains that
overregulation prohibit individuals from conducting business
unless they pay bribes or are themselves in positions of
bypassing the excessive regulatory structure. By lowering or
eliminating the regulations and extortionist taxes to a level
where avoidance costs are greater than the costs of complying
with them, most of the corruption would be eliminated. Other
anti-corruption solutions lie in the proper related training of
international management. Pitman and Sanford (1994) have
proposed a check-list of the conduct of US international
business managers which include evaluating the legality of
payments, differentiating between outright bribes and variable
bribes, maintaining close contacts with local business agents on
the issue of doubtful payments and the possibility of some legal
ways, learning about the provisions of FCPA, seeking guidance
from the Department of Justice, full briefing on the customs and
laws regarding ethical behaviour prior to entering a foreign zone
of operation, and understanding both the legal and the moral
issues and concerns of the environments in which to operate
their business.
Jacoby, Nehemkis and Eells (1977) have proposed a

number of ways to reduce foreign corrupt payments including
an audit committee of outside directors, an internal audit staff
reporting directly to the audit committee, and a vigilant external
public auditor reporting directly to audit committee.
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) recently adopted recommendations to
remedy the corruption in international business. The
Organization held a symposium in Paris in March 1995. Non
member countries were also invited to join the fight against
corruption. OECD has recommended each country to review its
criminal, civil and administrative laws and regulations and to
take concrete steps. In terms of international cooperation, each
OECD country is called upon to consult and otherwise
cooperate with appropriate authorities through such means as
sharing information, strengthening or setting-up arrangements
for mutual legal, judicial and administrative assistance. Other
international organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the
United Nations, and international financial bodies such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund etc. are also
to be consulted on ways of combating corruption effectively.
The implementation of the recommendation will be
monitored by a working group which will carry out regular
reviews of steps taken by member countries. The group
involved will also examine specific issues relating to corruption
such as the criminalization of corrupt practices and their tax
treatment and close cooperation with OECD Fiscal Affairs
Committee (Small, 1995).
VII. CONCLUSION
Corruption in international business stems from many
factors in various societies. This study reveals that the causes of
corruption may be combined cultural, economic, legal,
political, and institutional arrangements in host countries.
International business firms make unlawful payments to foreign
officials or mafia to protect their business interests against many
political and economic risks. Thus, the corruption increases the
cost of doing international business and may render low quality
of goods and services. However, the corruption is not without

beneficial effects: it unlocks the inefficient bureaucratic systems
and speeds up their decision making process.
FCPA has made some progress to prohibit US
international business firms to make unlawful payments to
foreign officials. However, some US firms are losing business
orders to Japanese and European competitors, where bribery is
sometimes not only legal but tax free, since it can be claimed as
a legitimate business expense. Various cases of corruption in
international business have surfaced after the passage of FCPA.
The modes and purposes of the corruption in international
business are many. However, in many cases they are covert.
The solutions to reduce corruption in international
business and consequently to ensure fair competition include
transforming cultural, economic, political and legal factors in
various countries and agreeing on minimum acceptable standard
international laws against the corruption. A simple application
of FCPA and the recommendations of OECD may only place
the US or OECD member countries international business firms
at disadvantage in comparison to the firms from other countries.
The authors wish to conclude the findings of this study by

quoting remarks of US Secretary of State, Cyrus R. Vance, at
the Law Day ceremonies of the University of Georgia on April
30, 1977 (Jacoby, Nehemkis and Eells, 1977):
"We must always keep in mind the limits of our
power and of our wisdom. A sure formula for defeat
of our goals would be a rigid, hubristic attempt to
impose our values on others."
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CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

Author(s): ABDUL RAOOF and ABDUL RAUF BUTT

Department of Economics, University of the Punjab is collaborating with JSTOR to

Abstract. Corruption in international business concerns the

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was passed in 1977

At present, corruption in international business is quite

The authors are Ph.D. Scholar at School of Business, Nova Southeastern

Besides the harmful effect on the moral fabric of the

After the FCPA was passed, some American firms

Numerous foreign critics condemned the United States'

In the aftermath of the Watergate hearing and the passage

corruption is almost inevitable in government affairs. There is

II. SOME RELATED DEFINITIONS

Extortion. It is the act of compelling payment by means

III. CASES OF CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL

A secret report prepared by the Commerce

business deals that have cost American companies billions in

Japanese company win a $ 30 million super

American companies in China must routinely deal

was held outside the official banking system.

source of extra-legal income (Laguerre, 1994).

IV. THE MODES AND PURPOSES OF

Most payments are made in currency rather than by

Gift of services are a popular mode of payoff. Some

The payer of bribe can sell the recipient a property

Similarly, US companies having corruption motives

Another ingenious mode of transmitting a bribe or

V. SIGNIFICANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL

arena. No formal written contract is delivered to an

The productive aspects of corruption include its ability to

The FCPA regulates only US international business

VI. SOME SOLUTIONS

The shifting of loyalties from family, clan, and tribe

The opening of institutionalized channels to enable

The emergence of an economically strong and

The growth of local industry which will reduce the

The development of strong, independent legal

traditions in which uniform, impersonal rules and

The growth of the professions ? accounting, law,

International business community can sometimes seek

Laguerre (1994) has recommended reforms in the system

Jacoby, Nehemkis and Eells (1977) have proposed a

of goods and services. However, the corruption is not without

The authors wish to conclude the findings of this study by

Borrus, Toy and Trautman (1995), A world of greased palms.

Jacoby, Nehemkis and Eells (1977), Bribery and Extortion in

Perrow, C. (1981), Markets, hierarchies and hegemony. In A.

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