Guagua National Colleges v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

188492, August 28, 2018

FACTS: The Board of Trustees of petitioner Guagua National Colleges approved the funding of its
retirement program out of the 70% net incremental proceeds arising from tuition fee increases.
GNC-Faculty Labor Union and GNC Non-Teaching Maintenance Labor Union challenged the
petitioner's unilateral decision by claiming that it violated Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728
(Government Assistance To Students and Teachers In Private Education Act) which mandates that
said 70% increase in tuition fees shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other
benefits of the teaching and non-teaching personnel.

After hearing the parties, Voluntary Arbitrator Froilan M. Bacungan ruled in favor of GNC, holding
that retirement benefits fell within the category of "other benefits" that could be charged against
the 70% net incremental proceeds.

Upon receipt of the decision on June 16, 2008, the respondents filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension praying that the Court of Appeals grant them an extension of 15 days from July 1, 2008,
within which to file their petition for review. The CA issued a resolution granting the same and
respondents filed their petition within the extended period.

Subsequently, the petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss, asserting that pursuant to Article 276 of
the Labor Code, the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator had already become final and executory
after 10 calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.

ISSUE: WON respondent’s petition for review was filed out of time.

RULING: No. Article 276 is an amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6715. Prior to the effectivity of
thereof, the predecessor provision stated that voluntary arbitration decisions or awards would
be final, unappealable and executory. Despite such immediately executory nature of the
decisions and awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators, however, the Court ruled in 1984 in Oceanic
Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero that the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators involving
interpretations of law were within the scope of the Court's power of review through petitions for
certiorari.

In the 1995 Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees case,
however, the Court pronounced that decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators are
appealable to the CA.

In said case, the Court cited Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., wherein it ruled that the
awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the
same legal effect as judgments of a court. It also cited Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero,
et al., wherein it ruled that a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of his/her functions acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity. Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether
acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency independent of, and
apart from, the NLRC since his/her decisions are not appealable to the latter.
Under Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the CA is granted exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions. Thus, the remedy of appeal by petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court became available to the parties aggrieved by the decisions or awards of the
Voluntary Arbitrators or Panels of Arbitrators.

In succeeding cases, the Court variantly applied either the 15-day or the 10-day period under
Rule 43 and Article 276, respectively, as the time within which to appeal the decisions or awards
of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panels of Arbitrators.

However, in the 2010 ruling in Teng v. Pagahac, the Court clarified that the 10-day period set in
Article 276 of the Labor Code gave the aggrieved parties the opportunity to file their motion for
reconsideration, which was more in keeping with the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Only after the resolution of the motion for reconsideration may the aggrieved party
appeal to the CA by filing the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15
days from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43.

University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union v. University of Santo Tomas,

G.R. No. 203957, July 30, 2014

FACTS: University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) claims that, pursuant to the provisions
of its 1996-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement, University of Santo Tomas’s (UST)
contributions to the medical and hospitalization fund of UST’s faculty members should have been
cumulative, with the amount appropriated for each year carried over to the succeeding years.
Thus, it demanded from the latter the remittance of ₱65,000,000.00 plus legal interest thereon,
representing the deficiency in its contributions. UST, however, contends that the demanded
benefits were not meant to be given annually but rather as a one-time allocation or contribution
to the fund.

USTFU thereafter filed against UST a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice
on account of gross violation of an economic provision of the CBA. UST sought the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It contended that the case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators because it
involves the interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the CBA and the conflict
between the herein parties must be resolved as grievance under the CBA and not as unfair labor
practice.

ISSUE: WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: No. Article 217(c) of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiter shall refer to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as provided in the CBA those cases that involve
the interpretation of said agreements. Article 261 of the Labor Code further provides that all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA, including
violations of said agreement, are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Excluded from this original and exclusive jurisdiction
is gross violation of the CBA, which is defined in Article 261 as flagrant and/or malicious refusal
to comply with the economic provisions of the CBA.

In the instant case, however, a reading the pertinent portions of the 1996-2001 CBA along with
those of the Labor Code reveals that UST and USTFU’s misunderstanding arose solely from their
differing interpretations of the CBA’s provisions on economic benefits, specifically those
concerning the fund. Despite the allegation that UST refused to comply with the economic
provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA, UST’s refusal cannot be characterized as flagrant and/or
malicious inasmuch as UST’s literal interpretation of the CBA was, in fact, what led USTFU to file
its complaint. Therefore, it was clearly error for the LA to assume jurisdiction over the present
case.

Ace Navigation Co., Inc. v. Teodorico Fernandez, G.R. No. 197309, October 10, 2012

FACTS: Respondent Teodorico Fernandez, a seaman, filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint for disability benefits against petitioner Ace Navigation Co., Inc.

The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint contending that the labor arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the dispute. It noted that Section 29 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC) provides that in cases of claims and disputes arising from a Filipino seafarer’s
employment, the parties covered by a CBA shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Thus, they
argue that since herein parties are covered by the AMOSUP-TCC or AMOSUP-VELA CBA, herein
dispute should be settled through the grievance machinery and mandatory voluntary arbitration.

Fernandez opposed the motion. He argued that inasmuch as his complaint involves a money
claim, original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case is vested with the labor arbiter.

ISSUE: WON herein dispute should be referred to voluntary arbitration.

RULING: Yes. In Vivero v. Court of Appeals, the Court noted that the law allows parties to submit
to voluntary arbitration other labor disputes, including matters falling within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code. However, the
parties’ submission agreement must be expressed in unequivocal language.

Herein, Article 14 of the parties’ CBA uses an unequivocal or unmistakable language which
mandatorily requires the parties to submit to the grievance procedure any dispute or cause of
action they may have against each other. Thus, Fernandez’s contention that his complaint for
disability benefits is a money claim that falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter is untenable.
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that its upholding the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator
or panel of voluntary arbitrators over the present dispute is in recognition of the State’s express
preference for voluntary modes of dispute settlement, such as conciliation and voluntary
arbitration as expressed in the Constitution, the law and the rules.