Public Officers and Public

Corporations
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez

G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002 AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED,
WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-OWNED
OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as B. THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A
Ombudsman, respondent. PUBLIC OFFICE.

FACTS: On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued C. PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF
Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee for the EXPOCORP WAS NOT A "PUBLIC OFFICER" AS DEFINED UNDER
preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998." The THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.7
Committee was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of
In addition, petitioner in his reply8 invokes this Court’s decision in Uy vs.
the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the
Sandiganbayan,9 where it was held that the jurisdiction of the
Malolos Congress."1
Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of Grade 27 and higher. As
Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. petitioner’s position was purportedly not classified as Grade 27 or
128, "reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the Ombudsman, would
Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the have no jurisdiction over him.
"National Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair the
reconstituted Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laurel is a public officer?
Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were
named Honorary Chairpersons.2
RULING: YES.
Characterized as an "i body," the existence of the Commission "shall
Principle: Power of the Ombudsman
terminate upon the completion of all activities related to the Centennial
Celebrations."3 Like its predecessor Committee, the Commission was
tasked to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to
Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any
Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress." act or omission of any public officer or employee when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between
On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the
"any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad
Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon,
enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer
Senator Coseteng’s privilege speech was referred to the Committee on
or employee.
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon
Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the
On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent citizens’ committee
the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special
to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine
Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation
centennial projects, including its component activities. Former Senator
and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee.
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the
scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Ombudsman to such cases.
Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report No. 30 dated
February 26, 1999. Among the Committee’s recommendations was "the
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary
prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding,
The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the
relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction &
Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any
Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the
investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of
NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even
such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily
in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to
imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving
government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by
public officers and employees by other courts. The exercise
COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of
by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
the said contracts all in violation… of the anti-graft law."
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the
discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other
On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a offenses committed by public officers and employees.
Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the
legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and
encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that
feasance committed by public officers and employees during
he is not a public officer because:
their tenure of office.

A. EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman
LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN
should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special
CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT
Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the
Case Digests
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 Public Officers and Public
Corporations
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez
Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and
control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited
to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to
confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is
mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and
employees of the government and to enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where
the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows
him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any
fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service
to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him work under his
supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct
the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11
(4c) of RA 6770.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees is one of the most important functions of the
Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately
endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a
more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office. A review of the development of
our Ombudsman law reveals this intent.
In addition: The Constitution10 describes the Ombudsman and his
Deputies as "protectors of the people," who "shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations." Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties
vested by the Constitution11 upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to
"[i]nvestigate… any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient."
The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in
R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989."
Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively provide:
x x x.
The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in
relation to Section 13, supra:
SEC 16. Applicability. – The provisions of this Act shall apply
to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.
In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the
government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
First contention: That Laurel, as a Chair of the NCC, is not a public
officer.
Ruling: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested
is a public officer.
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the
delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by
contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties,
and the designation of the position as an office.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the
sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important
characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office
or not.
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive
power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer
the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance."17 The executive
function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as
set forth by law.
Second contention: That Laurel did not receive any compensation.

Ruling: That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation

SEC. 13. Mandate. – The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not
protectors of the people shall act promptly on complaints file
a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It
in any form or manner against officers or employees of the
is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to
corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and
be accepted merely for the public good.23 Hence, the office of
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in
petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary
order to promote efficient service by the Government to the
office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e.,
people.
one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached.24 But it is
a public office, nonetheless.
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
duties:

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
appears to be illegal unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
vs.
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance,
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON.
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of
such cases;
Customs, respondents.
Case Digests

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 Public Officers and Public
Corporations
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez
FACTS: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and
BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board).3 It covers all officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in
excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the
Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any
incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and
the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the
targeted amount of tax revenue.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation.
They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives,
the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best
only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and
incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power
to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard
on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR
and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not,
however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of
revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient
standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic
and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of
the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation
in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not such law conferring such benefits is violative of
the concept of public accountability?
RULING: NO.
Principle: Accountability of Public Officers
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead modest
lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not
for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he
holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all
government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to
the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
3
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in
favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on
the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their
revenue-generation capability and collection.15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required
to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in
advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case
where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.
Application: Petitioners’ claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will
turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and
mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also
purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
equivocal one.16 To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners’ baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that
passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by
law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system
of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office
is not anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it
recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency
and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law
which awards to officers of the customs as well as other parties an
amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in
violation of the laws against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United
States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to
stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in detecting
fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be
entitled to a reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the
enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue
targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the
reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting
or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of
official duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied in
Section 8 of the law.
G.R. No. 159813 August 9, 2006
TONY N. FIGUEROA and ROGELIO J. FLAVIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS: On March 24, 1992, in the RTC of Davao City, the city
prosecutor of Davao, at the instance of one Aproniano Rivera, filed an
Information 2 for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code against the herein petitioners, Tony N. Figueroa
and Rogelio J. Flaviano.
RTC: Found Figueroa guilty as charged. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
Case Digests
 Public Officers and Public
Corporations
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez
First contention: In praying for their acquittal, petitioners attempt to pass
off the subject published article as one that portrays the condition of the
Bankerohan Public Market in general. Citing Jimenez v. Reyes, 5 they
challenge the finding of the two courts below on the libelous or
defamatory nature of the same article which, to them, must be read and
construed in its entirety. It is their posture that the article was not
directed at the private character of complainant Aproniano Rivera but
on the sorry state of affairs at the Bankerohan Public Market.
Our own reading of the entire text of the published article convinces us
of its libelous or defamatory character. While it is true that a publication's
libelous nature depends on its scope, spirit and motive taken in their
entirety, the article in question as a whole explicitly makes mention
of private complainant Rivera all throughout. It cannot be said that
the article was a mere general commentary on the alleged existing
state of affairs at the aforementioned public market because
Rivera was not only specifically pointed out several times therein
but was even tagged with derogatory names. Indubitably, this
name-calling was, as correctly found by the two courts
below, directed at the very person of Rivera himself.
Second contention: It is next contended by the petitioners that Rivera is
a public officer. On this premise, they invoke in their favor the
application of one of the exceptions to the legal presumption of the
malicious nature of every defamatory imputation, as provided for under
paragraph (2), Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rivera is a public officer and thus, the published
article falls within the ambit of privileged communication?
RULING: NO.
Principle: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an
employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office
involve a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that
some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive or judicial, attaches, to be exercised for the public benefit.
Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a
public officer.
Application: Clearly, Rivera cannot be considered a public officer.
Being a member of the market committee did not vest upon him
any sovereign function of the government, be it legislative,
executive or judicial. As reasoned out by the CA, the operation of a
public market is not a governmental function but merely an activity
undertaken by the city (LGU) in its private proprietary capacity.
Furthermore, Rivera's membership in the market committee was
in representation of the association of market vendors, a non-
governmental organization belonging to the private sector.
Indeed, even if we were to pretend that Rivera was a public officer,
which he clearly is not, the subject article still would not pass muster as
Article 354(2), supra, of the Revised Penal Code expressly requires that
it be a "fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks." Even a mere cursory glance at the article reveals that it is
far from being that.
G.R. Nos. 147026-27 September 11, 2009
CAROLINA R. JAVIER, Petitioner,
vs.
4
THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS: On June 7, 1995, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8047,5 or otherwise
known as the "Book Publishing Industry Development Act", was
enacted into law. Foremost in its policy is the State's goal in promoting
the continuing development of the book publishing industry, through the
active participation of the private sector, to ensure an adequate supply
of affordable, quality-produced books for the domestic and export
market.
To achieve this purpose, the law provided for the creation of the
National Book Development Board (NBDB or the Governing Board, for
brevity), which shall be under the administration and supervision of the
Office of the President.
On February 26, 1996, petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board
as a private sector representative for a term of one (1) year.6 During that
time, she was also the President of the Book Suppliers Association of
the Philippines (BSAP). She was on a hold-over capacity in the
following year. On September 14, 1998, she was again appointed to the
same position and for the same period of one (1) year. 7 Part of her
functions as a member of the Governing Board is to attend book fairs to
establish linkages with international book publishing bodies. On
September 29, 1997, she was issued by the Office of the President a
travel authority to attend the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on
October 8-12, 1997.8 Based on her itinerary of travel,9 she was paid
₱139,199.0010 as her travelling expenses.
On February 16, 1998, Resident Auditor Rosario T. Martin advised
petitioner to immediately return/refund her cash advance considering
that her trip was canceled.11 Petitioner, however, failed to do so. On July
6, 1998, she was issued a Summary of Disallowances12 from which the
balance for settlement amounted to ₱220,349.00. Despite said notice,
no action was forthcoming from the petitioner.
On September 23, 1999, Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio, then the Executive
Director of the NBDB, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint against
petitioner for malversation of public funds and properties. She averred
that despite the cancellation of the foreign trip, petitioner failed to
liquidate or return to the NBDB her cash advance within sixty (60) days
from date of arrival, or in this case from the date of cancellation of the
trip, in accordance with government accounting and auditing rules and
regulations.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,14 as amended, and recommended the
filing of the corresponding information.
In an Information dated February 18, 2000, petitioner was charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan.
Javier questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 1.) She is not
a public official who is classified as Grade “27” or higher; 2.) not a public
officer as she only belongs to the Governing Board only as a private
sector representative under RA No. 8047; and 3.) she does not perform
public functions.
On October 10, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
Information,23 averring that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to
hear Criminal Case No. 25867 as the information did not allege that she
is a public official who is classified as Grade "27" or higher. Neither did
the information charge her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory
to a public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public officer or employee
and that she belongs to the Governing Board only as a private sector
representative under R.A. No. 8047, hence, she may not be charged
Case Digests
 Public Officers and Public
Corporations
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez
under R.A. No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan or under any statute
which covers public officials. Moreover, she claimed that she does not
perform public functions and is without any administrative or political
power to speak of – that she is serving the private book publishing
industry by advancing their interest as participant in the government's
book development policy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Javier is a public officer?
RULING: YES.
Application: The fact that the accused does not receive any
compensation in terms of salaries and allowances, if that indeed
be the case, is not the sole qualification for being in the
government service or a public official. The National Book
Development Board is a statutory government agency and the persons
who participated therein even if they are from the private sector, are
public officers to the extent that they are performing their duty therein
as such.
On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution27 denying petitioner’s motion with the following disquisition:
The accused is under the jurisdiction of this Court because Sec. 4 (g)
of P.D. 1606 as amended so provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations;
xxxx
Application: The offense is office-related because the money for
her travel abroad was given to her because of her Directorship in
the National Book Development Board.
The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support
the Philippine book publishing industry. It is a statutory government
agency created by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure
the full development of the book publishing industry as well as for the
creation of organization structures to implement the said policy. To
achieve this end, the Governing Board of the NBDB was created to
supervise the implementation.
A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to conclude
that they partake of the nature of public functions. A public
office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of
the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a
member of the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, so that the purpose of the
government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance
the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national
development. Hence, the fact that she was appointed from the public
sector and not from the other branches or agencies of the government
5
does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office. She
was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the
purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The Governing
Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The
purpose of the law for appointing members from the private sector is to
ensure that they are also properly represented in the implementation of
government objectives to cultivate the book publishing industry.
Definition of public officer: Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is
a public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public
office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing
Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not
make her private person exercising a public function. The fact that she
is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment. Section 7, R.A.
No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive
per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for every meeting
actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of one's appointment, and
whether the compensation one receives from the government is only
nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is
still considered a public officer.
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP.
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA,
SR., Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.
FACTS: The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events
prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno
Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The
Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out
this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found
a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and
corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010,
signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition
instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a
citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being
violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI
of the Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine
Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office
of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and
subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad
hoc body is one.
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To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as
it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and
assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body,
it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to
state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions.
Petitioner’s arguments:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power
to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto
inexistent like the "Truth Commission."
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption
is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not
constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither
laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the
constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or even
a statute."
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle
of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the
powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause.
RULING: 1.) NO; 2.) NO; 3.) YES.
First issue: While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass
muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772,
the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in
the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers
inherent in them. The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental
6
laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the
President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the
President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this
power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does
not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted
full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law.
Second issue: Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution
clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.56 As the
Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole
and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions
of the executive department.57
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to
primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-
judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot
adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said
that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law."58 In
simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of
these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the
judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the
case of administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to
adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cariño v. Commission on
Human Rights.59 Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official
probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation,
of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application
of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow
up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to
search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find
out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an
inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The
dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of
the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass
judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means
"to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."
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In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of
strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, usurpation of the Ombudsman’s primordial duties.
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section
Citations Omitted]
3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is
by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its
function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence
predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and
and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be
the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual
recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their
or modes of review as may be provided by law.60 Even
mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for
respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of
possible indictments for violations of graft laws.
any quasi-judicial power.61

Third issue: Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as

Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
the investigative function of the commission will complement
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the
those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General,
previous administration"87 only. The intent to single out the previous
the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been
overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding
made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.
investigation."62 The actual prosecution of suspected offenders,
Specifically, these are:
much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against
them,63 is certainly not a function given to the commission. The
phrase, "when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to
highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of
that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will
the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all.
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.64
G.R. No. 196425 July 24, 2012
At any rate, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No.
6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner,
government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia, 65 it
was written: vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON.
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared Secretary, Respondents.
with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG
and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The
FACTS: On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public
issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-
employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the
Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate
Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and
corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit
Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate
complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied]. its report and recommendations to the President. Pertinent portions of
E.O.

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the

Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A.
No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government,
the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above
contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the
determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically
out of the PTC’s sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited
to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
7
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring
its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit2 for grave misconduct
against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as
the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely,
Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr.
and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of
Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven
(445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
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Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is
available to him in the ordinary course of law, petitioner has resorted to
the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition upon the following
grounds:
I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE
POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A PUBLIC
OFFICE.
II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE
POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO APPROPRIATE
FUNDS.
III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE
POWER OF CONGRESS TO DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL
POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING
UPON THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.
VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Pichay basically assails the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 13.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 13 is unconstitutional?
RULING: NO.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the
Executive Department under E.O. 292.
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
Principle: The law grants the President this power in recognition of the
recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the
nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient,
the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the
command post of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Application: Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its
functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly
within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated
legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
Principle: Generally, this authority to implement organizational
changes is limited to transferring either an office or a function from the
Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other
way around.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not
vested with quasi-judicial powers.
8
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees
in the government"23 and to "submit its report and recommendations to
the President."24 The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and
recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to
settle controversies and adjudicate cases.
Principle: Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as
such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions
in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-
ODESLA as his fact-finding investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as
Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive
Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution provides:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates
the corresponding power in the President to conduct investigations into
the conduct of officials and employees in the executive department.
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties
of the Ombudsman.
Principle: The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases.
Application: Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an
administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner may
not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent
the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any
event, the Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and
appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no
means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies.
G.R. No. L-23226 March 4, 1925
VICENTE SEGOVIA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO NOEL, respondent-appellant.
FACTS: Vicente Segovia was appointed justice of the peace of
Dumanjug, Cebu, on January 21, 1907. He continuously occupied this
position until having passed sixty-five mile- stones, he was ordered by
the Secretary of Justice on July 1, 1924, to vacate the office. Since that
date, Pedro Noel, the auxiliary justice of the peace has acted as justice
of the peace for the municipality of Dumanjug.
Segovia instituted a quo warranto to inquire into the right of Pedro Noel
to occupy the office of justice of the peace, to oust the latter therefrom,
and to procure reinstatement as justice of the peace of Dumanjug. Noel
filed a demurrer on the ground that it did not allege facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, because Act No. 3107 was constitutional
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and because Mr. Segovia being sixty-five years old had automatically
ceased to be justice of the peace. Trial court ruled in favor of Segovia
and against Noel.

It was argued by the fiscal of Cebu that the trial court erred in ruling that
Section 1 of Act No. 3107 is not applicable to justices of the peace and
auxiliary justices of the peace appointed and acting before said law
went into effect.

Section 1 of Act No. 3107 states: “Justices of the peace and auxiliary
justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached
the age of sixty- five years.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 3107 should be given retroactive

effect?

RULING: NO.

Principle: A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute

operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the
legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express
terms of the statute or by necessary implication.

Application: The language of Act No. 3107 amendatory of section

203 of the Administrative Code, gives no indication of retroactive
effect. The law signifies no purpose of operating upon existing
rights. A proviso was merely tacked on to section 203 of the
Administrative Code, while leaving intact section 206 of the same Code
which permits justices of the peace to hold office during good behavior.
In the absence of provisions expressly making the law applicable to
justices of the peace then in office, and in the absence of provisions
impliedly indicative of such legislative intent, the courts would not be
justified in giving the law an interpretation which would legislate faithful
public servants out of office.

Answering the question with which we began our decision, we hold that
the proviso added to section 203 of the Administrative Code by section
1 of Act No. 3107, providing that justices and auxiliary justices of the
peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of
sixty-five years, should be given prospective effect only, and so is not
applicable to justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the
peace appointed before Act No. 3107 went into force. Consequently,
it results that the decision of the trial court is correct in its findings of fact
and law and in its disposition of the case.

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