M&G v.

Tackett

Let’s talk about the facts in the M&G v. Tackett case.

Who are our parties in the case?

What is the issue in this case?

What are the retirees arguing?

What is the employer arguing in this case?

When M&G Polymers USA, LLC (M&G) purchased the Point Pleasant Polyester Plant in 2000, it
entered into a CBA covering its union employees. Pursuant to the CBA, retirees, along with their
surviving spouses and dependents, would “receive a full Company contribution towards the cost of
[health care] benefits” and that such employee benefits would be provided “for the duration of [the]
Agreement.”

So we have a dispute about the Collective Bargaining Agreement? Who here has experience dealing
with a collective bargaining agreement? Management side or employee? For those of you who are
not familiar with CBAs, it is a written legal contract between an employer and organized labor
(union). CBAs are typically result of an extensive negotiation process between those two parties
regarding wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.

What was the issue with the CBA in this case? What was it missing?

The agreement did not state whether the retiree health care benefits would extend beyond the
expiration of the CBA.

What does the Court state in this case?

According to the Court, to determine whether retiree health-care benefits survive the expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement, courts should apply ordinary contract principles. The justices
further concluded that the court should not presume that such benefits vest for life in the absence
of an applicable CBA provision.

“Courts should not construe ambiguous writings to create lifetime promises,” Justice Clarence
Thomas wrote on behalf of the unanimous Court. “Retiree health care benefits are not a form of
deferred compensation,” he added.

The Court discussed the Yard Man decision? What did the Yard Man decision?

Under Yard Man, the Sixth Circuit Court held that that, “when ... parties contract for benefits which accrue
upon achievement of retiree status, there is an inference that the parties likely intended those benefits to
continue as long as the beneficiary remains a retiree.” According to the Court, the Sixth Circuit erred in
relying on the Yard-Man decision because it rested upon principles that are incompatible with
ordinary principles of contract law: “Yard-Man violates ordinary contract principles by placing a
thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits in all collective-bargaining agreements. That
rule has no basis in ordinary principles of contract law. And it distorts the attempt to ascertain the
intention of the parties.”

Young v. UPS

Let’s talk about Young v. UPS

Who are our parties?

What happened in this case?

Just to recap:

Peggy Young worked as a driver for UPS. When she became pregnant in 2006, her doctor
recommended that she not lift more than 20 pounds, but her job required that she lift packages up
to 70 pounds.

She asked for a light-duty assignment, but UPS declined, citing a company policy that only workers
injured on the job and facing other limited circumstances could qualify. Unable to return to work,
Young lost her health insurance. She later returned to UPS two months after giving birth.

What is the issue in this case?

Young sued UPS arguing that its refusal to allow her to return to work violated the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, which states that:

“women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work . . . .”

Well, does UPS denial of an accommodation amount to discrimination?

What did Young argue?

Young argued she was “similar in [her] inability to work” as someone who, say, pulled her back while
lifting a package on the job. She argued that the law means what it says, i.e., the person who injures
her back on the job and needs temporary light duty is in a situation no different than hers and thus
cannot be treated differently.

How did UPS counter that?

UPS countered that the term “other persons” in the law was more limited, referring only to workers
who were in Young’s situation — i.e., those whose disabling condition occurred off the job. Using
that standard, it treated Young the same as it would treat a worker who pulled her back lifting her
infant child. Both could be denied light duty because they were injured off the job.

So what did the Court decide in this case? Walk me through the analysis?

In its decision, the Supreme Court found that lawyers for both sides were too categorical in their
approaches.

Young’s lawyers were arguing that employers should offer pregnant workers anything they offer to
any other group of employees, no matter the reason. But the court said this doesn’t make sense
because sometimes an employer might treat workers differently for reasons of seniority or other
legitimate reasons.

What did the court find?

Left with what it found to be to untenable positions, the Court cut a path down the middle. The
majority agreed with Young that generally an employer shouldn’t be allowed to treat a pregnant
worker differently than a non-pregnant worker. The Court agreed with UPS that “other workers”
does not mean that an employer must apply the same benefits to a pregnant worker as it provides
to any other worker in the company. So the Court struck a compromise finding that an employer
could not treat a pregnant worker differently than a non-pregnant work unless the employer had a
good non-discriminatory reason.

In practice, it would be something like a tennis match. A pregnant employee could get a lawsuit over
the net by arguing that her employer violated the law when it refused to give her, for instance, a
light-duty assignment while giving non-pregnant workers similar changes.

The employer could then knock the lawsuit back over the net by showing that it had a good, non-
discriminatory reason to treat pregnant workers differently.

The pregnant employee could then lob the lawsuit back over the net again if she could show that the
reason offered by the employer was just a cover story for discrimination. A jury would then
determine which side it believed offered the best evidence.

Note that this type of framework is well established in employment law. The tennis match that I
referred to is called “burden shifting” and courts have long used it after the Supreme Court
established it in McDonnell Douglas vs. Green.

HYPO
Mach Mining v. EEOC

Who are the Parties?

What is the issue in this case?

After investigating a sex discrimination charge against petitioner Mach Mining, LLC, respondent
EEOC determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that the company had engaged in
unlawful hiring practices. The Commission sent a letter inviting Mach Mining and the complainant to
participate in informal conciliation proceedings and notifying them that a representative would be
contacting them to begin the process. About a year later, the Commission sent Mach Mining another
letter stating that it had determined that conciliation efforts had been unsuccessful. The Commission
then sued Mach Mining in federal court. In its answer, Mach Mining alleged that the Commission
had not attempted to conciliate in good faith. The Commission countered that its conciliation efforts
were not subject to judicial review and that, regardless, the two letters it sent to Mach Mining
provided adequate proof that it had fulfilled its statutory duty. The District Court agreed that it could
review the adequacy of the Commission's efforts, but granted the Commission leave to immediately
appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the Commission's statutory conciliation obligation
was unreviewable.

Why do we care about whether the conciliation process was adequate?

Before suing an employer for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) must first "endeavor
to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion." 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(b). Once the Commission determines that
conciliation has failed, it may file suit in federal court. §2000e-5(f)(1).

What is the holding?

“By its choice of language, Congress imposed a mandatory duty on the EEOC to attempt conciliation
and made that duty a precondition to filing a lawsuit…[However] The appropriate scope of judicial
review of the EEOC's conciliation activities is narrow, enforcing only the EEOC's statutory
obligation to give the employer notice and an opportunity to achieve voluntary compliance. This
limited review respects the expansive discretion that Title VII gives the EEOC while still ensuring that
it follows the law. No judicial review of whether EEOC engaged in good faith negotiations?

Thus, although the EEOC conciliation process is subject to judicial review, it is reviewable only to
determine if the EEOC engaged in the process at all.