B Baum..J S Mill On Freedom N Power

Northeastern Political Science Association
J. S. Mill on Freedom and Power

Author(s): Bruce Baum
Source: Polity, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Winter, 1998), pp. 187-216
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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J. S. Mill on FreedomandPower*
BruceBaum
MacalesterCollege
John StuartMill is justlyfamousfor his account of how oppressivesocial

and political power limit individualfreedom. Yethe also powerfullychal-
lenges the equatingoffreedom with an absence of externalconstraintsand
offers an importantcorrectiveto the view thatfreedom and power are
inverselyrelated. Mill's conceptionoffreedom emphasizesthe necessity of
autonomy,a variety of choices and possibilities, and means and opportuni-
ties for self-developmentand self-governmentin relation to thefull range of
forms of power that situatepeople. In this view,freedom and power are
linked in a continuinginterplay,not a simply oppositionalrelationship.
Bruce Baum completedhis Ph.D. at the Universityof Minnesotaand is a

VisitingAssistantProfessor in the Departmentof Political Science at
Macalester College, 1600 GrandAvenue,St. Paul, Minnesota,55105. He
has recentlycompleteda book on John StuartMill'spolitical theory,tenta-
tively entitledJohn StuartMill and the Power of Freedom,to be published
by the Universityof TorontoPress.
In his AutobiographyJohnStuartMill says thathis essay On Liberty"is likely

to survive longer than anythingelse that I have written ..., because ... [it is]
a kind of philosophic text-book of a single truth ...: the importance,to man
and society, of a largevarietyin types of character,and of giving full freedom
to human natureto expand itself in innumerableand conflicting directions."'
Thatessay has had an enormousinfluence on subsequentthinkingaboutindi-
vidual freedom, but also a ratherparadoxicalone because many subsequent
writersmisleadinglyhave cast it as a classic statementof the "negative"view
of freedom. R. H. Huttonstatedin an 1859 review that "Mill's essay regards
'liberty'from first to last in its negative ratherthanits positive significance."2
* I am indebtedto LauraJanara,Jim Farr,and anonymousreviewers for Polity for helpful

comments on earlierdraftsof this article.
1. John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, ed. Currin Shields (Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,
1957), 162.
2. [R. H. Hutton], "Mill on Liberty"[1859], in Mill, On Liberty,ed. David Spitz (New
York:W. W. Norton, 1975), 133. Huttonis identified as the authorof this articleby Alan Ryan.
See Ryan, ed., Mill (New York:W. W. Norton, 1997).
Polity XXXI,Number22
Volume Winter1998
Winter 1998
Polity
188 J. S. Mill on Freedomand Power
Likewise, J. C. Rees, one of Mill's most influentialcontemporaryinterpreters,

says, "Mill is generallyregarded... as a leading exponentof the negative idea
of liberty-'liberty is just the absence of restraint'-which prevailedin Eng-
land until the Idealists."3
According to the negative conception, the presence of freedom is
marked,as Quentin Skinner says, "by the absence of some element of con-
straintthat inhibitsthe agent concernedfrom being able to act independently
in pursuitof his [or her] chosen ends."4Notably, this view implies that there
is an inverse relationshipbetweenfreedom and power such that freedom is
diminished whenever, and insofar as, power is exercised.5Power is under-
stood from this perspectiveas essentiallyrestrictiveor repressivein its effects.
Like freedom,then, it is conceived in negative terms.
At first glance, these appearto be accuratereadings.Mill says, for exam-
ple, that his subject in On Libertyis "Civil, or Social Liberty:the natureand
limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the
individual."6Similarly,he says in The Subjection of Women,"The love of
power and the love of liberty are in eternalantagonism."7Yet a more careful
3. John C. Rees, John StuartMill's 'On Liberty', ed. G. L. Williams (Oxford:Clarendon

Press, 1985), 175. This interpretationof Mill's conceptionof freedomis also defendedby, among
others, IsaiahBerlin, "JohnStuartMill and the Ends of Life," in Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty
(Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1969); David Spitz, "Freedomand Individuality:Mill's Lib-
erty in Retrospect,"in Mill, On Liberty, ed. Spitz; C. L. Ten, Mill on Liberty(Oxford:Oxford
University Press, 1980); John Gray, Mill on Liberty:A Defense (London:Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1983); Fred R. Berger,Happiness,Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philos-
ophy of John StuartMill (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1984); JonathanRiley, Lib-
eral Utilitarianism:Social Choice Theoryand J. S. Mill's Philosophy (Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1988); and WendyDonner,The Liberal Self: John StuartMill's Moral Philos-
ophy (Ithaca:Cornell UniversityPress, 1991).
4. QuentinSkinner,"The Idea of Negative Liberty:Philosophicaland HistoricalPerspec-
tives," in Philosophyin History,ed. RichardRorty,J. B. Schneewind,and QuentinSkinner(Cam-
bridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1984), p. 194.
5. On this point, see Michel Foucault,"The Subject and Power,"in HerbertDreyfus and
Paul Rabinow,Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralismand Hermeneutics,with an afterwordby
and an interview with Michel Foucault, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983),
221. For relatedcritiquesof "classicalliberal"views, cf. HannahArendt,"Whatis Freedom?,"in
BetweenPast and Future(New York:Penguin, 1968); andJohnDewey, "Libertyand Social Con-
trol," in Dewey, Problems of Men (New York:PhilosophicalLibrary,1946). One contemporary
liberaltheoristwho explicitly counterpoisesfreedomand power in the way that I am challenging
is Giovanni Sartori. See Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part Two: The Classic
Issues (Chatham,NJ: ChathamHouse Press, 1987).
6. Mill, On Liberty,in Collected Worksof John StuartMill (Toronto:Universityof Toronto
Press, 1963-1991), vol. 18, 217. Subsequentcitationsto this work will be to this edition and will
be given in parenthesesas follows: OL, 217.
7. Mill, The Subjectionof Women,Collected Works,vol. 21, 337. Subsequentcitations to
this work will given in parenthesesas follows: SW, 337.
Bruce Baum 189
readingreveals that Mill powerfully challenges the negative view of freedom

as merely the absence of external constraintson people's efforts to satisfy
their desires.8It also shows thathe offers an importantcorrectiveto the view
that freedom and power are inversely related. In sum, Mill's conception of
freedom emphasizes the necessity of autonomy,a "varietyof situations"and
possibilities, and means and opportunitiesfor self-developmentand self-gov-
ernment.By analyzingfreedom in light of power strugglesconcerningwork-
ing class and women's suffrage,women's rightsmoregenerally,socialism and
the co-operative movement, British colonialism, public education, and reli-
gious diversity,he conceptualizesthe freedom of individualswith respect to
the political, economic, educational,gender, and family relationshipssituat-
ing them. He shows that freedom and power both have positive and negative
aspects, therebyilluminatingthe complementarityof freedom and power.
Several recent interpretershave noted "positive"aspects of Mill's view
of freedom, but none has directly addressedhis rich view of the interplayof
freedom and power.9I arguethat Mill's conceptionof freedom is best under-
stood, at base, in terms of the capacity of persons for self-determinationand
self-government. Mill consistently attends to ways in which the power of
some persons over others limits the latter's freedom; yet he also highlights
four ways in which the exercise of freedom is integrallyrelated ratherthan
opposed to the exercise of power.First,he maintainsthathaving "powerover
our own character[s]"is a necessary condition of our being fully free.'0This
refers to our capacity for individualityor autonomy,the capacity reflectively
to formulateandpursueourown desires andpurposes.Second, Mill maintains
thatfreedomrequiresthe presenceof the materialresourcesand opportunities
that enable us to realize our aims and purposes. Third, Mill conceives of
"mental freedom" and autonomy not in all-or-nothingterms, but ratheras
capacitiesthatpeople develop to greateror lesser degrees,basically as "devel-
8. On the place of this view of freedom in modem liberalism,see John Gray,Liberalism

(Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1986).
9. On the "positive"aspects of Mill's view of freedom,see G. L. Williams,"Mill's Princi-
ple of Liberty,"Political Studies24 (June 1976): 132-40; G. W. Smith, "J. S. Mill on Freedom,"
in Conceptionsof Libertyin Political Philosophy,ed. Zbigniew Pelczynski and John Gray (New
York:St. Martin'sPress, 1984);"Freedomand Virtuein Politics: Some Aspects of Character,Cir-
cumstancesand Utility from Helvetius to J. S. Mill," Utilitas 1 (May 1989): 112-34; and "Social
Liberty and Free Agency: Some Ambiguities in Mill's Conceptionof Freedom,"in J. S. Mill-
'On Liberty': in Focus, ed. John Gray and G. W. Smith (London:Routledge, 1991); Alan Ryan,
"Property,Liberty,and On Liberty,"in Of Liberty, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths (Cambridge:Cam-
bridge UniversityPress, 1983); Gregory Claeys, "Justice,Independence,and IndustrialDemoc-
racy: The Development of John StuartMill's Views on Socialism,"Journal of Politics 49 (Feb-
ruary 1987): 122-47; and John Skorupski,John StuartMill (London:Routledge, 1989).
10. Mill, A Systemof Logic, Collected Works,vol. 8, 841. Subsequentcitationsto this work
will given in parenthesesas follows: L, 841.
190 J. S. Mill on FreedomandPower
opmentalpowers."" In short,we aremoreor less autonomous and,thus,more

or less free overall-all otherthingsbeing equal-to the degreethat we
developourcapacityto pursuereflectivelyourmoreimportant purposes.At
thesametime,Millarguesthattheextentto whichindividuals developauton-
omydependsupon the extentto which thevarious powerrelationships situat-
ing them-i.e., educational, economic,
political, and
gender, family relations
-cultivate theircapacitiesfor autonomy. Fourth,despiteMill'semphasison
the "sovereignty" of the individualin "self-regarding"matters(OL,224), he
doesnotconceiveof individualfreedomsolelyin termsof theactionsof inde-
pendentindividuals.Freedom,in his view, also involvespracticesof demo-
craticself-government thatenableindividualsto sharein the collectivedeci-
sionmakingwithrespectto key powerrelationships thatgoverntheirlives at
home, at work,andas citizens.In Mill's view, then,freedomencompasses
bothof the two kindsof questionsthatIsaiahBerlinassociateswith"nega-
tive"and"positive"sensesof freedom,respectively: "WhatamI freeto do or
be?"and"Whogovernsme?"'2
Thereis, however,one aspectof the interplaybetweenfreedomand
powerthatMillfailsto addressadequately: therelationship betweenfreedom,
power,andculture.Mill presentsa compellingaccountof practicesof free-
dom thatemphasizereflectivechoice,self-realization, andself-government.
Thisviewhaswideresonancein moder societies-especiallymoder West-
ernsocieties-wheresuchpracticesarebasicto theideaof a freeperson.Yet
Mill underestimates the givennessof some religiousandculturalidentities
andwronglypresentshis notionof peopleas autonomous "choosers"as an
essentialfeatureof all practicesof freedom.Consequently, he fails to appre-
ciatethatfreedomof actionforsomepeopleis morea matterof pursuingtheir
religiousor culturalcommitments ratherthanof choosingtheirreligiousor
culturalidentities.
I will beginby explaininghow Mill distinguishesbetween"freedom"
and"liberty." Thisdistinctionis important to his viewof freedom.ThenI will
discuss his view of how freedominvolves autonomyand how different
degreesof autonomyentaildifferentdegreesof freedom.NextI will address
his viewof theinterplaybetweenfreedomandpower,payingspecialattention
to his accountof theinterplayof freedom,power,andculture.
I. Freedomand Liberty
Millneversystematically
articulates
his conceptionof freedom.Therefore,
to
11. C. B. Macpherson,Democratic Theory:Essays in Retrieval(Oxford:OxfordUniversity

Press, 1973), 52-53.
12. IsaiahBerlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty,"in Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 130.
BruceBaum 191
adequatelygrasphis view we needto lookbeyondthewell known"principle

of liberty"he articulatesin On Libertyto clarifyhis analyticallydistinct
notionof whatit meansfor personsto be free."As G. W. Smithpointsout,
this requiresthatwe considerMill's accountof "freewill" in A Systemof
Logic and An Examinationof Sir WilliamHamilton'sPhilosophy to compre-
hendhis underlyingview of freeagency.'4It also requiresus to reckonwith
his analysisof the freedomof individualswithrespectto the political,eco-
nomic,educational,gender,andfamilyrelationships situatingthemin such
works as Principles of Political Economy, Considerationson Representative
Government,and The Subjectionof Women.
Mill'sconceptionof freedomis oftenconfusedwithhis "principle of lib-
erty."Withthe principlehe prescribesa sphereof "self-regarding" choices
and actionswith respectto whichthe freedomof individualsoughtnot be
restricted.Thatis, thelibertyprincipleaddressestheissueof whenindividual
freedomshouldandshouldnotbe restricted.'5 By contrast,his conceptionof
freedomis his view of whatfreedommeansandentails.Mistakingtheprinci-
ple of libertyforMill'sconceptionof freedomgivesriseto threemisconcep-
tions abouthis view of freedom.First,it conveysthe false impressionthat
Millconceivesof freedomin essentiallynegativeterms,withthepresenceof
freedommarkedby the absenceof constraintsor restrictionson people's
effortsto satisfytheirexistingdesires,whatevertheseare.Second,it neglects
important domainsin whichfreedom,accordingto Mill, consistsof sharing
withothersin practicesof collectiveself-government ratherthansimplythe
choicesandactionsof independent individuals.Third,it suggeststhatMill,
likemanyotherliberaltheorists,conceivesof freedomandpoweras inversely
relatedratherthancomplementary butsometimesconflicting.
Mill employsthe concepts"freedom" and"liberty"distinctly,in ways
thatcorrespond to the between
difference his principleof libertyandhis con-
ceptionof freedom.Sincehe doesnot explicitlydistinguishbetweenthemit
wouldbe wrongto overemphasize Still,he generallyuses
this distinction.'6
themin waysthatcapturetheconnotations stemmingfromtheirdifferenthis-
13. See Smith, "J. S. Mill on Freedom,"183-84.

14. Smith, "J. S. Mill on Freedom,"182.
15. Smith, "J. S. Mill on Freedom," 182. The principle of liberty, sometimes called the
"harmprinciple,"entails that a communitycan rightfullyexercise power over the conduct of its
members only to prevent"harmto others"(OL, 223). Its purpose is to secure for individuals a
large degree of freedom of thought and action by protecting them against social and political
interference.
16. Smith, along with several other of Mill's interpreters,uses "freedom"and "liberty"
interchangeably,and he says that Mill does the same. Cf. Smith, "J. S. Mill on Freedom";cf.
Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty";Gray, Mill on Liberty;& Berger, Happiness, Justice, and
Freedom.
tories, etymologies, and connotations.'7Mill typically uses "liberty"and

"individualliberty"to discuss more boundedpracticesof freedom.As Hanna
Fenichel Pitkin notes, "Liberty implies an ongoing structureof controls,
whetherof externallaws and regulationsor the genteel self-controlof the lib-
eral gentleman. That, no doubt is part of its appeal to liberals and ... one
reason why John StuartMill wrote his essay 'On Liberty'ratherthanon free-
dom."'8Mill is articulatingwhat he calls "the principleof individualliberty,"
then, when he says in On Liberty,"Theonly freedomthatdeserves the name,
is thatof pursuingour own good in ourown way, so long as we do not attempt
to depriveothers of theirs, or impedetheir effortsto obtain it" (OL, 293,226,
emphasis added).This freedom is rightfullyboundedby our duties to others,
including the respect we owe to the rights of others (OL, 293, 225-26). It
refers to the freedom of action to which each matureindividualis entitled by
right (OL, 224). Therefore,Mill's "principleof liberty"cannotbe redescribed
as a "principleof freedom"without distortinghis meaning.
Mill typicallyuses "freedom"more broadlyto encompassa widerrange
of practicesof individualself-determinationand collective self-government.'9
He conveys the gist of his conceptionof freedomin a few remarksin The Sub-
jection of Women.He conceives of the "freedomof action of the individual"
as "thelibertyof each to govern his own conductby his own feelings of duty,
and by such laws and social constraintsas his conscience can subscribeto"
(SW, 336).20This involves not just the choices and actions of independent
17. Paul Ziff and HannaFenichel Pitkinexplain thatin Englishfreedomhas a broaderrange

of usage thanliberty,which has more formaland legal connotations.See Ziff, SemanticAnalysis
(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress, 1960); andPitkin,"AreFreedomandLibertyTwins?,"Political
Theory 16 (November 1988): 523-52. The differentroots of the conceptscorrespondto different
contexts of usage and different shades of meaning. Pitkin explains, for instance, that "thefre-
family could characterizeaction as spontaneous,readily or gladly done, done of one's own ac-
cord, even zealously done. The 'liber-'family did not carrythese meanings,despite its use for the
capacity to choose between sin and goodness"(Pitkin,"Are Freedomand LibertyTwins?,"538).
18. Pitkin, "AreFreedomand LibertyTwins?,"543.
19. Thus, Mill uses "freedom"more frequentlythan"liberty"in works such as Representa-
tive Governmentand The Subjectionof Womenwhere he makes more far-rangingarguments
about freedom; and he uses "liberty"much more frequentlyin On Liberty:"liberty"occurs 85
times in On Liberty,excluding the title and chaptertitles, while "freedom"occurs only 46 times;
in The Subjectionof Women,he uses "freedom"30 times and "liberty"only 10 times; and in Rep-
resentativeGovernmenthe uses "freedom"38 times and "liberty"27 times.
20. Although Mill typically uses masculine pronounsgenerically,referringto both women
and men, he was an advocateof women's rightsand even gave some attentionto the problemsof
using sexist language-particularly to the misleading effects of "using the masculinepronoun
where both sexes are equally concerned."See Mill, in The Examiner, 1 June 1834, Collected
Works,vol. 23,729, quotedin SexualEquality:WritingsbyJohn StuartMill, HarrietTaylorMill,
and Helen Taylor,ed. Ann P. Robson and JohnM. Robson (Toronto:Universityof TorontoPress,
1994), xvii.
Bruce Baum 193
individuals, but also practices of democratic self-government that enable

individualsto share in regulatingtheir affairswithin key power relationships
that govern their lives. This emphasis on mutualself-governmentis a central
featureof Mill's view of political freedom. Thus, he asks in The Subjection,
"Whatcitizen of a free countrywould listen to any offers of good and skillful
administration,in returnfor the abdicationof freedom?"(SW, 337).
Mill furtherclarifies his understandingof freedom when he identifies
the most significant obstacles to freedom. He recognizes, of course, the sig-
nificance of legal restraints(OL, 223, 276). But, as I will explain presently,he
also identifies three other significant constraints:psychological constraints
upon people's "mentalfreedom" and autonomy that limit their capacity to
formulatedesires and life plans of their own; a lack of materialresourcesand
opportunitiesfor people to pursue their chosen occupations and ways of
living; and the absence of opportunitiesfor individualsto share in self-gov-
ernmentwith respect to household, workplace,and political institutionsthat
govern their lives.
II. Freedom, Autonomy, and Individuality
The first aspectof Mill's view of the interplayof freedomandpower concerns

what he calls "the power of self-formation,"or "powerover our own charac-
ter"(L, 842, 841). This notion is closely linked to the differencebetween his
notion of the freedom of "pursuingour own good in our own way" and the
empiricistand negative conceptionof freedomthathas been dominantwithin
the Anglo-Americanliberal tradition(OL, 226).21In the latterconception,the
presence of freedom is construedmerely in terms of the absence of external
impedimentson an agent's doing whatevershe or he wants to do; the agent's
existing desires are taken as given.22One implicationof this view is that all
laws by definition limit freedom because they either requireor prohibitcer-
tain actionsand therebyfrustratecertaindesires.Most proponentsof this view
-sometimes called "negative liberty"-acknowledge that some such con-
straintsare desirable, though, since people must not be free to do anything
they might want to do.
For Mill, by contrast, the presence of freedom is quite different from
merely the absence of external impediments to satisfying our unreflective
21. See Smith, "Social Libertyand Free Agency." IsaiahBerlin and BenjaminGibbs have
attributedto Mill a basically negative empiricistview of freedom. Berlin characterizeshim as a
defenderof "thedefinitionof negative libertyas the ability to do what one wishes" (Berlin,"Two
Concepts of Liberty,"139). Cf. BenjaminGibbs, Freedomand Liberation(London:Chattoand
Windus,for Sussex UniversityPress, 1976), 81.
22. Smith, "Social Liberty and Free Agency," 240-41; and RichardB. Friedman,"A New
Explorationof Mill's Essay On Liberty,"Political Studies 14 (October 1966): 281-302.
desires,or doingas we please.Mill'sconceptionof freedomentailsnotionsof

self-development andself-mastery "according to whicha freeagentis some-
onewhois capableof acknowledging forhis desireas 'hisown'
responsibility
becausehe, ratherthanothers,has formedthe characterfromwhichthey
spring."23Millmaintains thatindividualfreedomis oftenrestricted beyondthe
reachof the law by "themoralcoerciveof publicopinion,"a formof social
powerthatcanleadto a "socialtyrannymoreformidable thanmanykindsof
politicaloppression"(OL,223, 220).24 "Societycan and does executeits own
he the
mandates," says,through powers of educationand publicopinion(OL,
220, 282). Thiskindof restraintis particularly insidious"since... it leaves
fewermeansof escape[thanotherrestraints], penetrating muchmoredeeply
into the detailsof social life, and enslavingthe soul itself"(OL, 220). It
restrictspeople'sfreedomof actionby stiflingtheirmentalfreedom.Mill is
concernednotjust with the moreobviouskindsof coercionor compulsion
like "peerpressure" or publicreproach,butalso witha morethoroughgoing
waythat"societyhasnowfairlygot thebetterof individuality" (OL,264).As
he explains in On Liberty,
thedangerwhichthreatens humannatureis nottheexcess,butthedefi-

ciency,of personalimpulsesandpreferences....Not only in whatcon-
cernsothers,but in whatconcernsthemselves,the individualor the
familydo notaskthemselves-whatdo I prefer?orwhatwouldsuitmy
character anddisposition?or,whatwouldallowthebestandhighestin
me to havefairplayandenableit to growandthrive?Theyaskthem-
selves,whatis suitableto my position?whatis usuallydoneby persons
of my stationandpecuniarycircumstances?... I do notmeanthatthey
choosewhatis customaryin preferenceto whatsuitstheirowninclina-
tion.It does notoccurto themto haveanyinclination, exceptfor what
is customary.Thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke: even in what
peopledo forpleasure,conformityis thefirstthingthoughtof; theylike
in crowds;they exercisechoice only amongthingscommonlydone:
peculiarityof taste,eccentricityof conduct,areequallyshunnedwith
crimes: until by dint of not following their own nature they have no
naturetofollow:theirhumancapacitiesarewitheredandstarved:they
become incapableof ... any opinions or feelings of home growth, or
properlytheirown.(OL,264-5,emphasisadded)
23. Smith, "J. S. Mill on Freedom,"211. For Mill, though, freedom does not mean self-
development or self-realization as it does for some theorists of freedom. This is important
because, as John Gray explains, people may freely choose to sacrifice chances for self-develop-
ment for other goals (Gray,Liberalism,58).
24. For related discussions, see Smith, "J. S. Mill on Freedom";and "Social Liberty and
Free Agency."
BruceBaum 195
Millregardsthepowerof educationandopinionto shapehumancharac-

teras ever-presentandunavoidablefeaturesof society(OL,282).25
Therefore,
the merepresenceof such poweris no causefor concern.Problemsarise,
though,whenthe powersof educationandpopularopinionoperateto under-
minepeople'scapacitiesto formulateandpursueaimsandpurposes"properly
their own." When this happenspeople are unfreewith respectto their
expresseddesiresandobjectives.He makesthispointemphatically in an 1850
letterto TheLeaderresponding to a criticwho misconstrued
his warningsin
Principles of Political Economy about the threatthat "communistic"reforms
pose to freedom.Mill explainsthathis concernis not thata communistic
systemwouldmakepeople'slives "inaneandmonotonous" by freeingthem
fromwantandhunger.Thisfreedom,he says,"isa goodin everysenseof the
word."26 His chiefconcernis theprospectof increasedsocialtyranny. He says
thatthe"yokeof conformity" wouldbecomemoreseverein cooperative com-
munitiesif "peoplewouldbe compelledto live as it pleasedothers,not as it
pleasedthemselves." He adds,moreover, thatthiskindof "bondage" is already
a problemin existingcapitalistsocieties,even amongthe rich:"Theydo not
cultivateandfollowopinions,preferences, ortastesof theirown,norlive oth-
erwisethanin the mannerappointedby the worldfor personsof theirclass.
Theirlives are inaneandmonotonousbecause(in short)theyare notfree,
becausethoughtheyareableto live as pleasesthemselves,theirmindsarebent
to anexternalyoke."2ForMill,then,peoplewholackthecapacityto conceive
of desiresandlife plansthatare"properly theirown"arenotreallyself-deter-
mining, even when theyhave sufficient
resources andopportunities "tolive as
pleases themselves." Such persons have some desires and inclinations,but
these are not "of home growth,or properlytheirown" (OL, 264-65).28
ThusMill'sconceptionof freedomdiffersfromthe empiricistnegative
view becausehe insiststhattheissueof whypeopledesirewhattheydesireis
indispensableforassessingtheextentof theirfreedom.29
ForMill,thefreedom
of "pursuing ourown good in ourown way"requireswhathe calls "mental
freedom,"andwhatis now commonlycalledautonomy: the capacityof per-
sons reflectivelyto pursuebeliefs,desires,andpurposesthatare "properly
theirown"(OL,246, 265).
25. See also Mill, Utilitarianism,Collected Works,vol. 10, 218.

26. Mill, "Constraintsof Communism"(Aug. 3, 1850), Collected Works,vol. 25, 1179.
27. Mill, "Constraintsof Communism,"1179, emphasis added.
28. As Berlin points out, conceiving of freedom as simply "the ability to do what one
wishes" is problematicbecause it entails thatfreedomcould be attainedjust as effectively by con-
ditioning people to want less as by enablingthem to satisfy their initial wants. See Berlin, "Intro-
duction,"in Four Essays on Liberty,xxxviii; and "Two Conceptsof Liberty,"139-40.
29. Michael McPherson,"Mill's Moral Theory and the Problem of Preference Change,"
Ethics 92 (January1982); and Smith, "Social Libertyand Free Agency."
Mill articulateshis view of free action most fully in A Systemof Logic

where his chief concern is with the philosophical problem of "liberty and
necessity."This has led some interpreters,notablyJ. C. Rees, to insist thatthis
analysishas no bearingon his view of social andpoliticalfreedom.Rees says,
"No conclusions about the free-will problem entail any particulartheory of
civil or political liberty.Questions abouthumanactions being determinedby
unalterablelaws are not questions about legal or social restraints."3As evi-
dence thatMill agrees, Rees cites Mill's commentthathis subjectin On Lib-
erty is not "the so-called Libertyof the Will so unfortunatelyopposed to the
misnamed doctrineof PhilosophicalNecessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty"
(OL, 217). Yet while Mill's focus on societal restraintsto freedom in On Lib-
erty is distinctfrom the issue of whetherit is possible to speakof humanfree-
dom at all in a causally determinedworld, this point is not decisive. In fact,
the way that Mill addressesthe question of free will is crucial to his broader
conception of freedom.3'
Mill's view of "free will" is close to what is now called a compatibilist
view: he holds that human actions are causally determined,but they can be
free.32People's desires, he says, flow from their charactersratherthan being
spontaneouslychosen, and their characters are produced by their circum-
stances. He conceives of the connection between circumstances,on the one
hand, and characterand desires, on the other, however, as a contingentone
that leaves room for freedom.Thus, he criticizes followers of social reformer
RobertOwen as fatalists for maintainingthat a person's"characteris formed
for him and not by him; thereforehis wishing that it had been formed differ-
ently is of no use; he has no power to alter it" (L, 840, Mill's emphasis).This
is a "granderror,"accordingto Mill, since a personhas, "to a certainextent,
a power to alterhis character"(L, 840). He explains thata person'scharacter
is formed "by his circumstances..., but his own desire to mould it in a par-
ticularway is one of those circumstances,and by no means the least influen-
tial." His character,then, may be "formedby him as one of the intermediate
agents" (L, 840, Mill's emphasis). Mill accepts the Owenite claim that we
cannot directly "will to be differentfrom what we are."He insists, though,
that each of us has potentialpower to shape our own characterthat is similar
to the indirectpower that others have to shape our characterby shaping our
circumstances:"We,when our habits are not too inveterate,can, by similarly
willing the requisite means, make ourselves different. ... We are exactly as
30. Rees, John StuartMill's 'On Liberty', 181.

31. G. W. Smith, "The Logic of J. S. Mill on Freedom,"Political Studies, 28 (June 1980):
238-52; and Skorupski,John StuartMill.
32. Smith, "Social Libertyand Free Agency," 246. For a representativecompatibilistview,
see Phillippa Foot, "Free Will as Involving Determinism,"in Free Will and Determinism,ed.
BernardBerofski (New York:Harperand Row, 1966).
Bruce Baum 197
capableof makingour own character,if we will, as othersare of makingit for

us" (L, 840, Mill's emphasis).33
This response to the free will problemis fraughtwith internaltensions.
Mill says that our will or desire to change our characteris a necessary ingre-
dient to our doing so, but thateven this desire "comes to us either from exter-
nal causes, or not at all" (L, 840). He thereforeprovidesan equivocalresponse
to determinism.Nonetheless, the way that he resolves this problemenriches
his conception of freedom and illuminatesthe way in which autonomyis rel-
evant to the issue of free will. By emphasizingour potentialpower of self-for-
mationhe illuminatesconditions of autonomousagency underwhich we can
claim our desires and purposes as our own in the relevantsense that is com-
patible with determinism.34
Mill's accountof "ourfeeling of moral freedom"is particularlyinstruc-
tive in this regard.He says,
A person feels morally free who feels thathis habits or his temptations
are not his masters,but he theirs:who even in yielding to them knows
that he could resist. ... It is of course necessary, to renderour con-
sciousness of freedom complete, thatwe should succeed in makingour
characterall we have hitherto attemptedto make it; for if we have
wished and not attained,we have, to thatextent not the power over our
own character,we are not free. Or at least, we must feel that our wish,
if not our character,is strongenough to conquerour characterwhen the
two are broughtinto conflict.... And hence it is said with truth,that
none but a person of confirmedvirtue is completely free. (L, 841)
Mill's wordinghere is deceptive.He appearsto conceive of freedom,as Smith

says, "as, essentially, the exercise of virtue."35Such a moralized view is
deeply problematicand illiberal since it entails that people achieve true free-
dom only when they act "rightly"or in accordancewith their "best self." On
such a view, people could be compelled to "choose rightly"in the name of
freedom.36 Mill is betterunderstood,however, as insistingon autonomyrather
than the exercise of virtue as a condition of being "completelyfree."His key
33. Mill refersto this power as the power of "self-culture"or "self-education"in "Bentham"
(Collected Works,vol. 10, 98). I examine Mill's view of power more fully in forthcomingwork.
34. Cf. John Christman,"Constructingthe Inner Citadel: Recent Work on Autonomy,"
Ethics, 99 (October 1988): 14.
35. Smith, "Freedomand Virtuein Politics," 116.
36. Smith, "Social Libertyand Free Agency,"244; and Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty,"
134. JohannGottlieb Fichte provides a strikingexample of the potentialfor authoritariangover-
nance entailed in such notions. He says, "Tocompel men to adoptthe right form of government,
to impose Right upon them by force, is not only right,but the sacredduty of every man who has
the insightandthe powerto do so" (Fichte,quotedin Berlin,"TwoConceptsof Liberty,"151, n. 1).
claim in this regardis that we are fully free agents only to the extent that we
are able to exercise "powerover our own character[s]"(L, 841). Thus, when
he says "thatnone but a person of confirmedvirtue is completely free," his
point is thatonly such personsmanifestlywield sufficient"powerover [their]
own character[s]"to ensurethattheirdesires andpurposesare formedby them
rather than for them. Persons "of confirmed virtue" tend to exhibit the
strengthof will or characternecessary to pursuetheir more consideredaims
and purposes even when this requires them to forego their more transient
desires.37In his view, then, being "completely free" is directly related to
autonomousagency and only indirectlyto virtuousaction. He does not con-
strue freedomas the exercise of virtue.
Mill furtherrefines his view of free action in On Liberty.He contends
that people are fully free only to the extent that their desires and impulses
reflect "their own individual character[s]"-i.e., to the extent that they
achieve "individuality"(OL, 262). He says, "Where,not the person's own
character,but the traditionsand customs of otherpeople are the rule of con-
duct, there is wanting one of the principle ingredientsof humanhappiness"
(261). Later he equates attainingindividualitywith "having character":"A
person whose desires and impulses are his own-are the expression of his
own nature,as it has been developed andmodifiedby his own culture-is said
to have character.One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no
character,no more than a steam engine has character"(OL, 264). In turn,he
regardshaving characteras a necessaryconditionof the freedomto pursueour
own mode of life.
The gist of Mill's argumentis that we can justifiably claim our desires
and purposes as "properlyour own" only insofar as we reflectively choose
them in light of our own charactersand circumstances.He clarifies his view
of the kind of criticalreflectionrequiredin the course of criticizingunreflec-
tive obedience to custom. He says,
To conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or

develop in [a person] any of the qualities which are the distinctive
endowmentof a humanbeing. The humanfaculties of perception,
judgment,discriminativefeeling, mental activity, and even moral
preference,are exercised only in making a choice. He who does
anythingbecause it is the custom, makes no choice. He who lets
37. Accordingto Mill, actions can only be counted as virtuouswhen they springfrom deci-
sions made after deliberation("Remarkson Bentham'sPhilosophy,"Collected Works,vol. 10).
Thus, he conceives of "thepersonof confirmedvirtue"in Utilitarianismnot just as someone who
has "a confirmedwill to do right,"but also as a person who has the strengthof characterneces-
sary to make and pursuereflective and deliberatechoices (Utilitarianism,238 and 237).
BruceBaum 199
theworld,orhis ownportionof it, choosehis planof life forhim,

hasno needof anyotherfacultythantheape-likeoneof imitation.
(OL,262, emphasisadded)
Thisdoes notmeanthatwe canneverfreelychooseto do whatis customary
or conventional.It doesentail,though,thatwe freelyfollowcustomsor con-
ventionsonly when we do so aftera processof criticalreflectionthrough
whichwe self-consciously affirmthecustomsor conventionsas ourown.
the
Although contemporary terminologyof autonomyandheteronomy
is foreignto Mill,theseconceptsreferto preciselythesortsof distinctions
that
Millmakes.38 Accordingto Mill,we aremorefullyfree,all otherthingsbeing
equal, to the extent that we choose our aims, purposes,and life plans
autonomously-i.e.,throughcriticalreflectionuponthenormsandtraditions
we confront.Onlysuchautonomous agentsarefully self-determining in the
sense of pursuing their own good in their own way. In contrast,those who
unquestioningly follow customandthoseto whomit "doesnot occur... to
haveanyinclination,exceptfor whatis customary" areother-directed rather
thanself-determining, heteronomous ratherthanautonomous. Theirconduct
is governedor directedby desiresandinclinationsthat,as JohnGraysays,
they have internalizedfromtheir"socialandculturalenvironment without
eversubjectingthemto criticalevaluation."39
Thus,whatdistinguishesMill'sconceptionof freedomfrommoralized
conceptionsis thathe construes"completely free"actionin termsof a partic-
ularmodeof choosingratherthanin termsof a particular rangeof "right"
choices.4He emphasizesthedegreeof autonomy, orpowerovertheircharac-
ters,thatpeopleexercisein the processof determining theirown courseof
conduct.Mill insists,moreover,that"differentpersons... requiredifferent
conditionsfortheirspiritualdevelopment...," andthat"itis important to give
the freestscope possibleto uncustomary things"(OL, 270, 269). What is
important,in his view, is the of
capacity people to determine the courses of
theirown lives. By contrast,moralizedconceptionsof freedomfocuson the
38. Gray,Mill on Liberty,71. Mill uses the word autonomyonly once in French,and in a
waythatconnotes"independence" or "freedomfrominterference" ratherthanthecurrentsense
of thewordin philosophy of action.Inan 1871letterto EmileAcollas,he says,"Quanta la partie
philosophique, vous savezprobablement parmonEssaisurla Libert6,dansquel sens et avec
quelleslimitesj'entendsnotreprinciplecommon,celuide 1'autonomie de l'individu."
["Asto the
philosophicalparty,youprobably knowfrommyEssayon Liberty,in whatsenseandwithwhat
limitsI understandourcommonprinciple,thatof theautonomy of theindividual."]See Letterto
Emile Acollas, September20, 1871, Collected Works,vol. 17, 1831-32.
39. Gray,Mill on Liberty,76.
his viewof freeactionis relatedto butdistinctfromhis viewof thecapac-
40. Accordingly,
ity for higher pleasures.Cf. Donner, The Liberal Self, ch. 6-8; and Smith, "Social Liberty and
Free Agency."
ends chosenby agentsas the distinguishing markof whetheror not their

actionsare trulyfree. People are trulyfree, in the latterview, when they
choose ends that are "worthchoosing."41
Still, thesepointsdo not completelyclearMill of the chargethathis
emphasison autonomyhasmoralisticandpotentiallyrepressiveimplications.
As we haveseen,Millmaintainsthatonlypeoplewhosecapacitiesfor auton-
omyhavebeenfullydevelopedcanbe "completely free."At firstglance,then,
his view of freedomseemsto openthedoorto paternalistic interference with
the conductof personswho are less thanfully autonomous-e.g.,due to
"inveterate" of character"-without
habitsor "infirmities thisbeingcounted
as a restrictionof theirfreedom(L, 840; U, 212). Thatis, it seemsto entail
thatcertainpeoplecan be "forcedto be free"since they are incapableof
"completelyfree"actionwithoutexternalintervention. He appearsto treat
themlike childrenwho lack the maturityto takefull responsibility for their
own lives (OL,226, 224).42 As I will explain,though,Mill'sway of address-
ing this issue is moresubtleandless menacingthanit first appearsto be,
althoughhis view of "completely free"agencyis notwithoutlimitations(see
sectionV, below).
III. Degreesof Autonomy,Degreesof Freedom
AlthoughMill maintainsthatonly peoplewho have fully developedtheir

capacitiesfor autonomycan be "completelyfree"agents,he by no means
regardsthemas theonlypersonscapableof meaningful freedom.Ratherthan
offeringa simpledichotomybetweenthe fully autonomous (or "completely
free")andcompletelyheteronomous agents,Millrecognizesvaryingdegrees
offreedomcorresponding to differentdegreesof autonomyandheteronomy.43
He insiststhatit is notonly"personsof decidedmentalsuperiority whohave
a justclaimto carryouttheirlives in theirownway"(OL,270). "Ifa person
possessesanytolerableamountof commonsenseandexperience," he says,
"hisownmodeof layingouthis existenceis thebest,notbecauseit is thebest
in itself,butbecauseit is his own mode"(OL,270). Mill'sunderstanding of
the significanceof autonomyfor judgmentsaboutfreedomandunfreedom
canbe aptlyredescribed in termsof the distinctionmadeby somecontempo-
rary philosophers of action between anomic, autarchic, and autonomous
agents.4Theseconceptsenableus to distinguisha varietyof differentcon-
41. Berlin, "Two Conceptsof Liberty,"132-34.

42. Smith, "J. S. Mill on Freedom,"199; and "Social Libertyand Free Agency."
43. Skorupski,John StuartMill, 254.
44. StanleyI. Benn, "Freedom,Autonomy,and the Conceptof a Person,"Proceedingsof the
AristotelianSociety 76 (1975-76): 109-30; and Gray,Mill on Liberty.
BruceBaum 201
straintstofreedomthatareimportant for Mill.

First,thereis theunfreedom of personswhoaresufficientlyautonomous
to chooseaimsandpurposesthatare"properly theirown,"butwhoface sig-
nificant externalimpedimentsto their freedom of action (e.g., Andrei
Sahkarov orNelsonMandeladuringtheiryearsin prison).Second,thereis the
unfreedomof thosepersonswhosemindsare "bowedto the yoke,"andto
whom"itdoes not occur... to haveany inclination,exceptfor whatis cus-
tomary"(OL,264-65).As Graysays,sucha personmaybe freewithrespect
to a particular"actionin so farashis [orher]doingthatactionis notprevented
by the forcibleor coerciveintervention of another."45
It wouldbe misleading,
though, to describe them as fullyor even substantiallyfree.The"freedom" of
suchpersonsis basicallythe limitedfreedomof thosewhomStanleyBenn
calls"anomic"agentsandHenryFrankfurt calls"wantons": theylackcapac-
itiesof criticalreflectionandstrengthof will to sucha degreethattheirdesires
andinclinationsaretheirown only in a superficialsense.46 Thisis notjust a
hypotheticalproblem.Peoplesometimesfindthemselvesin suchoppressive
andrestrictivecircumstances thatthey learnto acceptor acquiesceto their
oppression.Mill regardssuch personsas largelyunfreesince they cannot
pursue their own good in a meaningfulsense.
Finally,thereis the freedomandunfreedomof thosepersonswho lack
full autonomy, butpossessa "tolerable amountof commonsenseandexperi-
ence"(OL,270). Mill regardsthis situationas typicalof mostpeople.Their
freedomcorresponds to whatBennandGraycall the freedomof autarchic
As
agents. Grayexplains,this notionrefersto the freedomof a personwho
"whileenjoying(overa wide rangeof actions)the negativefreedomwhich
coversthe absenceof bothforceandcoercion,also exercisesunimpaired all
thenormalcapacitiesandpowersof a rationalchooserby referenceto which
as rationalself-direction Suchpersonspossessin somemeasure
is defined."47
the capacityto determinetheir"ownmode"of life insofaras theycanarticu-
latereasonsfor theiractions(OL,270).Theyarenotcompletelyunreflective
or impulsivelike anomic(or heteronomous) persons;but they often fail to
exercisethe "second-order" of autonomous
characteristic
capacity, agents,to
45. Gray,Mill on Liberty,74. Jon Elster identifies a closely relatedbut distinct phenomena
of "sour grapes." This is where persons who may have full capacity for autonomousagency
restrictivelyadapttheir preferencesto "second-best"options in light of the constraintsthey face.
See Elster,Sour Grapes (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1983), ch. 3.
46. Frankfurtexplains that "wantons"are motivated strictly by first-orderdesires-i.e.,
desires that they do not reflect upon in light of more consideredobjectives. In contrast,persons
with unimpairedcapacities for rationalaction have the capacityto form second-ordervolitions-
i.e., the capacityto will what they want to will. See HenryG. Frankfurt,"Freedomof the Will and
the Concept of a Person,"TheJournal of Philosophy 68 (January1971): 5-20.
47. Gray,Mill on Liberty,74.
reflect criticallyupon theirmore immediatedesires in light of theirmore con-

sidered aims and purposes.'4Therefore,when people "exercise choice only
among things commonly done" and "like in crowds" (OL, 265), they are
neither completely free nor completely unfree. Moreover, this kind of con-
formist conduct may be even more common today than in Mill's time.
People's charactersand desires are now shaped by ever more sophisticated
global communicationsmedia, while sources of immediategratificationand
amusementhave multiplied.
These distinctionsare often difficultto make with respectto the conduct
of actualpersons. Nonetheless, they illuminatethe subtletyof Mill's concep-
tion of freedom and they have a considerableheuristic value. Mill wisely
rejects the false dichotomy of either regardingpeople as free only when they
are fully autonomousor regardingpeople as fully free even when they arehet-
eronomous.Instead,he maintainsthat people have differentdegrees of free-
dom and unfreedom,all other things being equal, in proportionto their rela-
tive autonomy or heteronomy.Rather than saying that only persons "of a
better than ordinarymould" are capable of free action and that most others
must be "forced to be free" throughexternal intervention,his view is more
subtle and compelling.49He insists that (virtually)all personstend to develop
the capacity for autonomous action to the extent their educations and life
experiences cultivate their capacities for reasoning,judgment, deliberation,
and self-control.Therefore,his conceptionof freedomdoes not open the door
to paternalismin the name of freedom in any simple sense.5
Mill regardsautonomyas a necessary but not a sufficient condition of
freedom.He clearly recognizes thatpeople may be fully autonomousand yet
be largely unfree due to externalimpediments.At the same time, his account
of free action has one furtherqualitative dimension that is significant for
thinking about social and political aspects of freedom. While he rejects the
view that freedomconsists in exercising choice among things "worthdoing,"
he highlights an importantsense in which the quality of the choices and pos-
sibilities open to people is importantfor assessing theirfreedom.He construes
48. Gerald Dworkin explains that autonomy "is not merely an evaluative or reflective
notion, but includes as well some ability both to alterone's preferencesand to make them effec-
tive in one's actions and, indeed, to make themeffective because one has reflectedupon themand
adoptedthem as one's own." See GeraldDworkin,The Theoryand Practice of Autonomy(Cam-
bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1988), 17.
49. The first phraseis from Mill, "Utility of Religion,"CW 10, 411.
50. As Smith points out, though,Mill's view is more clearly paternalisticwith regardto per-
sons with "infirmitiesof character"or "inveterate"habits(Utilitarianism,212; L, 840; and Smith,
"Social Libertyand FreeAgency,"247). Moreover,as I will explain later,Mill's view is strongly
paternalisticwith respect to non-Westerncultures.He justifies this stance with the ethnocentric
claim thatjust as childrenneed others to take care of them so do "statesof society in which the
race itself may be consideredin its nonage"(OL, 224).
Bruce Baum 203
freedomin termsof choices and opportunitiesthatenable people to determine

their own "planof life" or "mode of existence" ratherthan as their ability to
do whatever they desire. What is crucial, then, is not simply the numberof
choices open to us, but also the significance of the choices and possibilities
for "pursuingour own good in our own way."5'The extent of a person'sfree-
dom, then, depends more on her power to pursuemore considered aims and
purposes than on her capacity to satisfy "vague and transientdesires" (OL,
261). Therefore,such things as freedomto express beliefs and opinions, free-
dom of religion and conscience, freedom to choose among differentways of
life, opportunitiesto choose careers or modes of work, and opportunitiesto
share in self-governmentwith respect to spheres of power that govern our
lives are particularlyimportantfor assessing the extent of our freedom.
IV. Freedom and Power
Mill recognizes thatpower is often exercised in ways that diminish freedom,

both rightfullyand wrongfully.Earlyin On Libertyhe considershow the "lib-
erty of action"of individualsmay be limitedby "physicalforce in the form of
legal penalties,"as well as by "the moral coercion of public opinion" (OL,
223). The more innovative partof his argumentis his attentionto four ways
in which freedomis directlyrelatedto a positive aspect of power thathe high-
lights in "Bentham":"the power of making our volitions effectual."52I have
already discussed the most basic aspect of this relationship:"the power of
self-formation,"which is basically the capacity for autonomousaction. Mill
also emphasizes three other ways that freedom is directly relatedto the exer-
cise of power:the necessity of materialresourcesand opportunitiesfor people
effectively to pursue their aims and purposes;the necessity of opportunities
for people to share in practicesof self-governmentwith respect to the power
relationships that govern their lives; and the role of what Mill calls "the
powers of education"in cultivatingor stifling people's capacitiesfor freedom
of thoughtand action.
Regarding the significance of material resources, Mill maintains that
people requirecertain materialresources-including educationalopportuni-
ties, occupationalchoices, and a certainlevel of disposable income-to exer-
cise meaningful freedom. He says, for example, that women to a greater
extent thanmen areunableto entermarriagesfreelybecause existing laws and
customs deny them the "power of gaining their own livelihood." Conse-
51. As Berlin says, the extent of a person's freedomdepends not just on "how many doors
are open,"but also on "how open they are, [and]upon theirrelativeimportance"to his or her life
(Berlin, "Introduction,"xxxix-xl).
52. Mill, "Bentham,"96.
quently,ratherthanmarriage being"whollya matterof choice"forwomen,it

is "somethingapproaching a matterof necessity;something,at least,which
everywomanis understrongartificialmotivesto desire."5He makesa simi-
larpointin thecourseof comparingtheconstraints to andprospectsforfree-
domofferedby various"communist" andsocialistreformprogramsto those
foundin capitalistEngland.Concerningthe existingsystemhe says, "The
generalityof labourers in thisandmostothercountrieshaveas littlechoiceof
occupation or freedom of locomotion,arepracticallyas dependenton fixed
rulesandon thewill of others,as theycouldbe on anysystemshortof actual
Mill'sview,in short,is thata sufficientlevel of materialresources
slavery."54
"tomakeourvolitionseffectual"is a necessaryconditionof the freedomof
pursuingourownaims,purposes,andlife plans.
Withrespectto practicesof self-government, Mill extendsthe demo-
cratictendenciesof the liberaltradition.He addressesquestionsaboutfree-
dom with respectto the varioussocial and politicalpowerrelationships in
whichpeople'schoicesandactionsareembedded. Theseincludepoliticaland
economicinstitutions,genderrelations,maritalandfamilyrelations,educa-
tional institutionsand practices,and spiritualand recreationalactivities.
Accordingly, he conceivesof theextentof people'sfreedompartlyin termsof
theiropportunities to sharein self-governmentwithrespectto keypowerrela-
tionshipsthatgoverntheirlives.Thus,politicalfreedomis nottheabsenceof
statepowerorlegalrestraints, butrathera matterof eachpersonbeing"under
no otherrestraints than... [the]mandatesof societywhichhe has a sharein
imposing,andwhichit is opento him,if he thinkswrong,publiclyto dissent
from,andexerthimselfactivelyto get altered."55 Similarly,he conceiveseco-
nomicfreedomnot just in termsof the economicactivitiesof independent
individuals,but also in termsof extendingthe "democratic spirit"intoeco-
nomicenterprises. He says thatco-operativeeconomicenterprisesthatgive
associatedworkersanequalvoicein management wouldextend"thefreedom
and independenceof the individual... [to] the industrialdepartment" in
moder societies.56 His emphasison mutualself-government as a component
of freedomis alsoevidentin his notionof maritalpartnerships in whichmen
andwomenwouldsharein governing"theaffairsof [their]families"(SW,
290-92).
Mill also addressesthe interplaybetweenfreedomand power with
respectto how the varioussocial relationships situatingpeopleshapetheir
53. Mill, "Essayon Marriageand Divorce,"in J. S. Mill and HarrietTaylorMill, Essays on

Sex Equality,ed. Alice Rossi (Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1970), 77.
54. Mill, Principles of Political Economy,Collected Works,vols. 2 and 3, 209.
55. Mill, Considerationson RepresentativeGovernment,CollectedWorks,vol. 19, 411,432.
56. Mill, Principles of Political Economy,763.
Bruce Baum 205
capacities for self-formation or autonomy. He sees the various social and

political relationshipssituatingpeople not only as the field of their possible
choices and actions, but also as "powers of education"(OL, 282; U, 218).
That is, they are educative relationshipsthat shape people's charactersand
cognitive capacities.57In Mill's view, the potential for autonomousagency is
a basic humanattribute,but it mustbe developed.Accordingly,we achieve this
potentialonly to the degree thatthe social and political relationshipssituating
us call forth and exercise our faculties of reasoning,judgment, deliberation,
and imagination,and encourage us to think for ourselves. People, in short,
must be educatedfor freedom, and such educationdepends not just on qual-
ity schooling-"education" in the narrowsense-but also on mental cultiva-
tion (on balance at least) within all of their social and political relationships.
V. Freedom, Power, and Culture
Mill's understandingof rationalautonomyas a conditionof "completelyfree"

agency betrays one significant limitation of his account of the relationship
between freedom and power. His view of free action is culturallybounded
ratherthanuniversal.He illuminatesto some extent how the religious andcul-
tural commitments of subjugatedgroups, such as women, often perpetuate
their subjection;but his understandingof this problemis limited by his non-
interpretiveapproachto social reality.58In particular,he fails adequatelyto
grasphow religious and culturaltraditionsand identitiesare sources of mean-
ing and value as well as media of power and domination.In turn,he does not
addresshow the exercise of power and practicesof freedom are themselves
culturallyshaped.
Mill displays both the strengthsand limitationsof his approachwhen he
challenges the ideological power manifestwhen culturaltraditionsperpetuate
oppression through repressive modes of education or socialization. In The
Subjectionof Womenhe is eloquent abouthow English women are educated
for subordination."All women,"he says, "arebroughtup from the very ear-
liest years in the belief thattheir ideal characteris the very opposite to thatof
men; not self-will, ... but submission, and the yielding to the control of
others"(SW, 271). Thus, he rejects the claim that women accept their subor-
dinate status "voluntarily."He points out instead that many women "do not
accept it" and, concerning those who apparentlydo accept it, he insists that
men, preferring"not a forced slave but a willing one, ... have thereforeput
everythingin practice to enslave their minds,"including "the whole force of
57. Mill, "InauguralAddressDelivered to the Universityof St. Andrews,"Collected Works,

vol. 21, 217.
58. See Skorupski,John StuartMill, 275-82.
education" (SW,270-1,emphasisadded).Thus,to theextentthatwomenhave

learnedthis"moralityof submission," theirmentalfreedomhas beenstifled
so thattheirfreedomof actioncannotbe assessedsimplyin termsof whether
or not they areunimpededto pursuetheirunreflectivedesires(SW,294; cf.
OL,290).
Millrightlyemphasizesthattraditions areembeddedwithinandexpres-
sive of relationsof power,includingthe patriarchal power of men over
women.Still,his analysisis limitedbecausehe gives shortshriftto the sym-
bolicorhermeneutical aspectof religiousandculturaltraditionsandcustoms.
He tendsto regardreligiousandculturalidentitiesandcommitments aseffects
of poweror signsof intellectual"immaturity"and"civilizational"backward-
ness. Thus,he underemphasizes theirimportance as sourcesof meaningand
value.59
Thismeans,in turn,thatMill also fails to graspadequatelyhow many
"mature," rationalagents-men aswellas women-enacttraditional religious
or culturalnormsandpracticesas free agents.Thisproblemis evidentin an
important passagefromOnLibertythatI quotedearlier.Mill says,"Tocon-
formto custom,merelyas custom,doesnoteducateor developin [a person]
anyof thequalitieswhicharethedistinctiveendowment of a humanbeing ...
He whodoes anythingbecauseit is thecustom,makesno choice"(OL,262).
Anyonewhodoessomething"becauseit is thecustom"is notfullyfreein his
view becauseshe or he is actinguponpremises"takenfromauthority, not
fromreason"(OL,251). Theconductof suchpersonsis in effectdirectedby
othersratherthanself-determined. Mill says,"Notthe person'sown charac-
ter,butthe traditions or customsof otherpeoplearetheruleof conduct"; the
is
person permitting "the or
world, his own of
portion it, [to] choosehis plan
of life forhim"(OL,261-2).
For Mill, then,peoplecan enacta customor traditionas "completely
free"agentsonly insofaras they reflectivelychoosetheirguidingreligious
andculturalcommitments andvalues.Evenwhenagentsself-consciously act
59. He says in RepresentativeGovernmentthatthe "improvement"of humansocieties grad-

ually leads people to abandonthe "inveteratespiritof locality.""Experienceproves,"he says, "it
is possible for one nationalityto merge and be absorbedin another:and when it was originallyan
inferioror more backwardportionof the humanrace the absorptionis greatly to its advantage"
(Considerationson RepresentativeGovernment,417, 549). On occasion he exhibits a more subtle
appreciationfor the meaning and significance of religious and culturalvalues and of the need to
take account of agents self-understandings(see esp. Considerationson RepresentativeGovern-
ment, 570; "Carlyle'sFrench Revolution,"Collected Works,vol. 20). Still, he never fully inte-
gratesthese interpretiveimpulsesinto his approachto free action andsocial criticism.See Bhikhu
Parekh,"SuperiorPeople: The narrownessof liberalismfrom Mill to Rawls," TheTimesLiterary
Supplement(February25, 1994): 11-13; and Bruce Baum, "Feminism,Liberalism,and Cultural
Pluralism:J. S. Mill on MormonPolygyny,"The Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (September
1997): 230-53.
Bruce Baum 207
in accordancewith a valued traditionor belief system, their conduct is not

fully free if they have not reflectively chosen their fundamentalbeliefs and
commitmentsin the first place. In this regard,Mill insists upon a ratherradi-
cal view of critical reflection about received moral and religious beliefs as a
necessary condition of being a "completely free" agent. He fleshes out this
view in an 1868 letter concerningthe properrole of parentsin teachingtheir
childrenabout religion:
I do not think that there should be any authoritativeteaching at all on

such subjects. I think parentsought to point out to their childrenwhen
the children begin to question them, or to make observationsof their
own, the various opinions on such subjects, & what the parentsthem-
selves think the most powerful reasons for & against. Then, if the par-
ents show a strongfeeling of the importanceof truth& also of the dif-
ficulty of attainingit, it seems to me that young people's minds will be
sufficiently preparedto regardpopularopinion or the opinions of those
aboutthem with respectfultolerance,& may be safely left to form def-
inite conclusions in the course of maturelife. (Oct. 29, 1868, CW 16,
1469, Mill's emphasis)6
People canfreely choose their religion and their religiously informedvalues,

in his view, only when they arenot broughtup andinstilledwith the belief that
any one religion is uniquelytrueor right.61This is a plausibleaccountof being
free with respect to our religious and culturalidentitiesand commitments.At
the same time, though, it brings to light the idealized and de-contextualized
characterof Mill's notion of "completely free" action. Taken to its logical
conclusion, Mill's ideal entails that we are fully free only insofar as we are
60. In the same letterhe says, "I do not thinkit righteitheroneself to teach, or to allow any
one else to teach one's children,authoritatively,what ever that one does not from the bottom of
one's heart& by the clearest light of reason,believe to be true.... One assuredlyhas no right to
incumberthe reason & entangle the conscience of one's children"(Letterto CharlesFriend,Oct.
29, 1869, Collected Works,vol. 16, 1468-9). Mill's standardof premises takenfrom reason
rather thanfrom authorityrefers to reasons that can be assessed on formal or logical grounds,
independentlyof any appealto receivedtraditionsor supernaturalforces (OL, ch. 2; "Grote'sHis-
tory of Ancient Greece [I]," Collected Works,vol. 11, 290). His view is "radical"in the Enlight-
enment sense of seeking to bringall beliefs and practicesprogressivelyunderthe scrutinyof crit-
ical reasoning.
61. Mill develops this point furtherin "Dr.Whewell on Moral Philosophy,"where he criti-
cizes education within ecclesiastical institutionsin which instructorsmust "vow adherenceto a
set of opinions made up and prescribed"as authoritativetruths.He asks, "how can intellectual
vigour be fosteredby the teachingof those who, even as a matterof duty,would ratherthat their
pupils were weak and orthodox,than strong with freedom of thought?"See Mill, "Dr.Whewell
on MoralPhilosophy,"in Mill, Dissertations and Discussions, vol. 2 (New York:Haskell House
Publishers, 1973; reprintof the 1859 edition), p. 168.
encouragedto choose reflectively our own beliefs and identities - that is,
only insofar as we are not taughtauthoritativelyany one set of religious and
culturalcommitments.This implies not only that all children should have a
secular formal education (which includes the comparativestudy of religious
and culturaltraditions),but also thatthe informaleducationthey receive from
their parentsor guardiansbe thoroughlynon-sectarian.62 It also entails that
people are always more free, in an unequivocal sense, in proportionto the
numberof significant possible ways of life, philosophies, and religious and
culturalidentities that are made available to them. Thus, even the common
practice of parents passing on their religion and culture to their children in
some measureconstrainsthe freedomof the latter.
Mill's standardof "completelyfree" agency hereby obscuresthe given-
ness-i.e., the unchosen character-of key aspects of everyone'ssocial iden-
tities, fundamentalcommitments,and ideas of the good. Therefore,he poses
a false dichotomywhen he warns aboutcases in which "notthe person'sown
character,but the traditionsor customs of other people are the rule of con-
duct"(OL, 261). Our characters,beliefs, and values are inevitably shaped in
some measureby the traditionsand customs of the communities into which
we are bor. Consequently,people always act on the basis of desires, beliefs,
and understandingsthat they appropriatefrom their social context.63More-
over, many (if not most) people choose numerousthings-including impor-
tant things-because they are their customs. Therefore, it is misleading to
speak of people being "completely free" with respect to their aims, beliefs,
values, characters,and social identities.
These points are especially salient when we consider people's freedom
with respectto theirreligiousbeliefs and identities.Many (if not most) people
are authoritativelytaughta particularreligious identity as a matterof course.
Their earliest encounters with religion commonly consist of being taught
62. It is importantto note here that Mill strongly supportsthe right of parentsto determine
the religious education of their children;he does so, however, despite his underlyingnotion of
fully free action. In this regard,he clearly does not consider the goal of maximizingthe freedom
of children as the only value at stake, particularlysocial pluralismand parentalfreedom. Fur-
thermore,Mill acknowledges that childrenmust be taughtauthoritivelysome basic moral prin-
ciples, thoughnot a sectarianview of the good life, as a basis for moralagency and criticalthink-
ing. This is reflected in his interest in a secular "religionof humanity."See, respectively,Mill,
"On Religion and Guardianship"(1846), in Mill, Prefaces to Liberty:Selected Writingsof John
StuartMill, ed. BernardWishy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959); "SecularEducation"(1850), Col-
lected Works,vol. 28, 4; and "The Utility of Religion," Collected Works,vol. 10).
63. Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture
(New York:Oxford University, 1993), 117. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein,Lectures & Conversations
on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril Barrett(Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, n.d), 53-72. Some contexts of choice, of course, are more heterogeneousin this
regardthanothers.
Bruce Baum 209
"their"religiousidentitiesin theirfamiliesand/orcommunitiesas theylearn

theirlanguage,kinship,nationality,and otherbasic featuresof theirsocial
identities.Peoplearerarelybroughtup withtheunderstanding thatthereare
a wide rangeof humanreligiousandspiritualpracticesfromamongwhich
theyarefreeto choosetheirown path.Wetypicallylearnfromourfamilies,
"Weare Catholic(or Jewish,Muslim,Episcopalian,etc.)"-often through
unspokenlessons,suchas familyorcommunity participationin specifickinds
of worshipand rituals.64 Thus, our religious identitiesare always partly
formedby relationships of powerandauthority. Of course,we learnourreli-
gious (or non-religious)identitiesin varyingways dependingupon other
aspectsof oursocialidentitiesandsociallocations(e.g., ournationality, eth-
nicity,genderidentity,"racial"identity,schooling, experiences). this
life Yet
doesnotundermine thegivennessof mostpeople'sreligiousidentities.65Reli-
gious faith typicallyrests on some receivedauthorityand certain"rock-
bottom"beliefsandvaluesthatbelieversdo notgenerallycall intoquestion.66
Manybelieversquestionthemeaningof theirreligiousbeliefs,butregardtheir
religionitself as a basicpartof theiridentitiesratherthanan objectof con-
sciouschoice.67 Therefore,manypeopleconstruefreedomwithrespectto reli-
giousbeliefsor identitiesin termsof the capacityto practicereligionas they
see fit, ratherthanin termsof choosingfundamental religiouscommitments.68
64. Considerthe case of my 6-year-old friend Ben who has been learninghis Jewish iden-
tity fromhis parentsand fromhis Jewish Sundayschool. Recentlyhe askedme, "You'reJewish?"
(His parentshadjust told him thatI am, but I am actuallya non-believerwith an equivocalJewish
identity.) His mom was nearbyand she signaled me to refrainfrom giving him the atheistic and
equivocal response that I would have given him if I had answeredhim morefreely. Therefore,I
simply said, "Yes."This raises the following questions:WouldBen be morefree in a straightfor-
ward way if I had introducedhim at his impressionableage to such alternativepossibilities as
atheism and a non-religious(equivocally)Jewish identity?Whatdoes this mean for the intergen-
erationalbonds thatare partlyconstitutedby parentspassing on such religious and culturaliden-
tities? Cf. Will Kymlicka, MulticulturalCitizenship(Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1996), 90; and
James Nickel, "The Value of CulturalBelonging,"Dialogue, 33 (Fall 1994): 639.
65. The same thing can be said of some aspects of our national,cultural,ethnic, and gender
identities.These identitiesare arguablysocially and politicallyconstructedand, thus, learned,but
this does not mean that we can simply put them on and take them off at will like a change of
clothes.
66. See Ludwig Wittgenstein,Cultureand Value,trans.Peter Winch (Chicago:The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1980), 45e; and TalalAsad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Rea-
sons of Power in Christianityand Islam (Baltimore:The Johns HopkinsUniversityPress, 1993).
67. This argumentmight appearto be controvertedby the frequency of religious conver-
sions. This would be so, however, only if we misleadinglysuppose thatall religious conversions
are somethingpeople consciously choose upon reflection. See TalalAsad, "Commentson Con-
version,"in Conversionsto Modernities:TheGlobalizationof Christianity,ed. Petervan der Veer
(New York:Routledge, 1996); and Baum, "Feminism,Liberalism,and CulturalPluralism."
68. Michael Sandel has recently distinguished these two forms of religious freedom as
"freedomof choice"-the freedom of choosing our own way of life or our own set of beliefs-
Inthislight,Millmisleadinglyconstruesfreedomin anessentialistway
and
-i.e., trans-historically-intermsof reflectivechoice,self-realization,
self-government suchthatanypracticeof freedomas freedommustinclude
theseelements.He maintainsthat"thepeculiarcharacter of themoder world
... is, thathumanbeingsareno longerbornto theirplacein life, ... butare
freeto employtheirfaculties,andsuchfavourable chancesas offer,to achieve
thelot whichmayappearto themmostdesirable" (SW,272-73).Thismodern
ethoshasled peopleincreasingly to construefreedomin termsof thefreedom
to choose-and also to sharein choosing-how theywishto leadtheirlives.
WhatMill fails adequatelyto see is how the practicesof freedomthathe
rightlyregardsas thelogicalexpressionsof themoder ethosof self-determi-
nationarerootedin a particularhistorical and culturalconstellationof social
and political struggles and innovations.For example, the ProtestantRefor-
mationandits aftershocks gaveimpetusto thedevelopment of newideasand
the
practicesof religiousfreedomandfreedomof conscience; development of
moder Europeannation-statesand popularstrugglesfor the extensionof
basic politicalrightsandlibertiesproduceda distinctivelymoder formof
politicalfreedomlinked to representative government;moder capitalist
development andclass-basedstrugglesagainsttheemergentpowerof capital-
ists generatednew and conflictingideas and practicesof "economicfree-
dom";andconceptsandpracticesof sexualandreproductive freedomarealso
distinctlymodem.69 Mostof thesepracticesof freedomemphasizeindividual
choice,self-realization,or self-government;yet religiousfreedomandfree-
domof consciencerequireno comparable presumptions of individualchoice.
Thelatterfreedomsencompassthe"freeexercise"of religiouscreeds,regard-
less of whetherthey are inheritedor freelychosen,as well as spiritualand
philosophicalquestsin whichsomepeopleconsciouslychoosetheirfunda-
mentalspiritualandphilosophical beliefsandcommitments.
Thisbringsus backto my earlierclaimthatdifferenthistoricalconfigu-
rationsof powerandculturehaveproduceddifferentpracticesof freedom.70
and "freedomof conscience"-the freedomto practiceour religion. See Michael Sandel, "Free-
dom of Conscienceor Freedomof Choice?,"in Articles of Faith,Articlesof Peace: TheReligious
Liberty Clauses and the AmericanPublic Philosophy, ed. James Davison Hunterand Os Guin-
ness (Washington,D. C.: Brookings, 1990).
69. On the first two examples, see John Plamenatz,"In What Sense Is Freedoma Western
Idea?"CurrentLaw and Social Problems, vol. 1 (Toronto:University of TorontoPress, 1960);
and J. H. Hexter,"TheBirthof Moder Freedom,"TimesLiterarySupplement(January21, 1983):
51-53.
70. Cf. Michel Foucault, The Uses of Pleasure (New York: Vintage Books, 1986); Serif
Mardin,"Freedomin an OttomanPerspective,"in State,Democracy,and the Militaryin Turkeyin
the 1980s, ed. MetinHeperandAhmetEvin (New York:W.de Gruyter,1988), 23-25; andOrlando
Patterson,Freedom,Volume 1: Freedomin the Makingof WesternCulture(Basic Books, 1991).
BruceBaum 211
Thatis, differentcontextsgeneratedivergentanswersto basicquestionscon-

cerningfreedom.Forexample,DorothyLeeexplainsthatin traditional Navaho
society in Arizona and New Mexico, learning to be free "involveslearningto
observea largenumberof taboosandprocedures, whichareaspectsof every
act. ... All thiscouldbe seenas inhibiting,or negative,or as interfering with
theindividual; butto theNavahoit is guidancein theacquisitionof anessen-
tial skill-the freedomto act andto be."7'ThisNavahopracticeof freedom
hasstrikingaffinitiesto otherhistoricalpracticesof freedomthatinvolvesim-
ilarmodesof self-discipline,suchas the ancientGreekview of freedomas
"self-mastery," earlyChristianpracticesof "spiritual freedom,"andthelater
Puritans' view of freedom requiring"subjection... [to] the authorityof
as
Christ"andhis worldlyrepresentatives in earlycolonialAmerica.7
One way to regardsuchpracticesof self-disciplineis to startfromthe
perspectiveof moder pluralisticsocieties,as Mill andIsaiahBerlindo, and
thenfindthemwantingas generalconceptionsof freedom.73 we
Alternatively,
canacknowledgethatsuchpracticesareformsof freedomwhilerecognizing
that,as Lee says,theyarenot generalmodelsof freedomfor moder plural-
istic societies,"butratherfoodfor thought,thebasisof new insights.'"4 This
approachoffers a fresh perspectiveon moder practicesof freedomthat
involveanalogousunchosencommitments, andmakespossiblea respectful
consideration of non-modern practices of freedom. Still,thecloseconnection
betweenfreedomand subordination in some non-moder practicesmakes
themsuspectfroma moder perspective-particularly to peoplewithliberal,
democratic, feminist,andsecularcommitments. It is worthrecallingherethat
Westernpracticesof freedomhaveoftencombinedfreedomforsomepersons
withthesubordination of others.Forinstance,thepoliticalfreedomof ancient
Athenianmalecitizensandof propertied whitemenin theante-bellum United
Stateswenthand-in-hand withslaveryandthe subordination of women.Fur-
thermore, Millhimselfinsiststhatexistingpracticesof economicfreedomin
moder capitalistsocietiesconjoinconsiderable freedomandpowerforcapi-
71. DorothyLee,FreedomandCulture(Prentice-Hall, 1959),11.

72. Likethe Hindupractice,thesepracticesalso existedwithindistinctlypatriarchal
cul-
tures.FortheancientGreekpracticeof self-mastery,
see Foucault,TheUsesof Pleasure,78-93;
for earlyChristian freedom,"see Patterson,
"spiritual Freedom,ch. 10-15;andfor thePuritan
view,see JohnWinthrop, "ALittleSpeechon Liberty" (1645),in PoliticalThoughtinAmerica:
An Anthology,ed. Michael B. Levy (Chicago:The Dorsey Press, 1988), 13-14.
73. Mill, OL, 265-66; and Berlin, "Two Conceptsof Liberty,"135ff. Mill promotesrespect
for "the religious feelings of the [Indian] people" (Considerationson RepresentativeGovern-
ment, 570; cf. OL, 240-41n). Yet his view of fully free action, in league with his historicalevo-
lutionism,undergirdshis supportof Britishcolonial rule in India until the time when the Indian
people "have become capable of improvementby free and equal discussion," independentof
appealsto inheritedtraditions(OL, 224; Considerationson RepresentativeGovernment,ch. 18).
74. Lee, Freedomand Culture,p. 14.
talists with unfreedomand subordinationfor the laboringclasses.75Accord-

ingly, one of the great merits of Mill's account of freedom and power is his
insistence that democraticand critically reflective ways of organizingrela-
tions of power and authority,including the authorityof received traditions,
uniquely foster the equal freedomof all persons.76
In sum, to comprehendthe interplayof freedom,power, and culture,we
need a more pluralistic approachthan Mill offers. Along with recognizing
how modem practicesof freedomemphasizeautonomy,choice, and self-real-
ization-at least in principle-we need to recognize that people in various
contexts also exercise freedom in carryingout religious and culturalcommit-
ments that they have not reflectively chosen. At the same time, we must not
jump to the false conclusion thatany enactmentof culturalor religious norms
and rules is an expressionof freedomregardlessof the power dynamicsunder
which it occurs.
Distinguishingfree from unfree agency is not simply a matterof distin-
guishing conduct that emanates from conscience ratherthan from external
authority.This distinction is untenablesince people's fundamentalreligious
and culturalbeliefs and commitmentsare always partly constitutedby some
externalauthorities-e.g., parents,teachers,ministers,rabbis,or, in moreper-
nicious cases, missionariesand colonial educators.Yet this crucial point can
be elaboratedin ways that leave us without any adequateconception of free
agency. For instance, Stanley Fish argues that just as it makes no sense to
speakof actionsfreefrom all constraintssince people always act withinback-
ground conditions that make some actions possible while making others
unavailable,"it follows, too, thattherecan be no continuumwhich differenti-
ates institutionsor structuresas being more or less constrained,or more or
less free."77As Mill points out, such situational"constraints"are not equally
constraining(or freedom-generating)for all people. The effects of asymme-
tries of power,includingrelationshipsof oppression,leave differentlysituated
people with differentdegrees of freedom.This is one of Mill's key insights in
The Subjection of Women:while many women and men may do things
75. I develop this point more fully in "J. S. Mill's Conceptionof Economic Freedom,"His-
tory of Political Thought(forthcoming).The broaderhistoricalintertwinementof freedom with
slavery (and otherforms of subordination)is OrlandoPatterson'scentraltheme in Freedom.
76. He also contends that the kind of free action he promotesis uniquely conducive to full
humanflourishing(OL, ch. 3). This claim, however, is harderto substantiateas a universaltruth
about human beings than Mill suggests. See John Gray, "Postscript,"in Mill on Liberty: A
Defense, 2nd edition (London:Routledge, 1996); and Parekh,"SuperiorPeople."
77. Fish adds, "Ratherthan a continuum,what we have is ... an arrayof structuresof con-
straint,no one of which is more constrainingthan any other."See Stanley Fish, Doing What
Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theoryin Literaryand Legal Studies
(Durham:Duke UniversityPress, 1989), 459.
BruceBaum 213
becausethey are traditionalor customary,this tendencyis particularly bur-

densometo women.Pervasivepatriarchal traditionsandrelationships sharply
constraintheiravailablechoices and possibilitiesrelativeto those of men
(SW,272-82).78 Womento a fargreaterextentthanmenfindthemselvesin sit-
uationswheretheyface extremelyseverepenaltiesfor non-compliance with
rulesof conductprescribed by theirinheritedreligious and culturaltraditions.
This was true,for example,of the practiceof self-immolation by widowed
(usuallyuppercaste) Hindu women in India,and it is true of practicesof
"femalecircumcision" in SahelianAfrica(particularly Sudan,Somalia,and
Mali),some Arab and
countries, parts of Asia.79
Women in suchcircumstances
often yield to prevailingnormsand practiceswithoutfreelyconsentingto
them.80
Freedom,therefore,requiresnotjustthatthewomenandmenareagents
ratherthanpassiveobjectsof theirsocialandpoliticalpractices,butalsothat
theirconductrepresents theirown way of affirminga valuedway of life in a
meaningfulsense.Mill rightlyinsiststhatto affirmfreelyan inheritedreli-
gious or culturalidentity,a personmustbe in a positionto freelyrejectthis
identityor way of life withoutexcessivecost to herselfor himself(see OL,
290). Moreover,he rightlyinsiststhatpeopleare unfreewith respectto a
receivedcustominsofaras theyreduceit to a "hereditary creed,... received
passively,notactively"(OL,248). Still,we needa moreinterpretive andplu-
ralisticaccountthanMill offersof how the interplayof powerandculture
shapespossibilitiesfor free agency.Suchan accountmustnot prejudgejust
when agencyshouldbe regardedas free,but it can offer some guideposts.
First,like Mill, we shouldbe waryof regardingactionstakenundernotably
constrainedconditionsas an exercise of freedom.Second, since people
alwaysstartwith some pre-givenconceptsandunderstandings, we oughtto
take seriouslytheirown self-understandings-their own reasonsfor doing
78. For a similar view, see Nancy Hirshmann,"Towarda Feminist Theory of Freedom,"
Political Theory24 (February1996): 57-63.
79. Regardingself-immolationin India,A. L. Basham explains that in medieval times the
lot of widows was so hard that "it is not surprisingthat women often immolatedthemselves on
theirhusbands'funeralpyres."Throughself-immolationa widow would escape the hardshipsof
widowhood and be recognized as "a virtuouswoman"(satt). Despite legal prohibitionsenacted
in the nineteenthcentury,therehave been some recent acts of self-immolationin India.See A. L.
Basham, The Wonderthat WasIndia (New York:Grove Press, 1959), 187; John StrattonHawley,
ed., Sati, the Blessing and the Curse: The Burningof Wivesin India (New York:OxfordUniver-
sity Press, 1994); and GayatriChakravortySpivak, "Canthe SubalternSpeak?,"in Colonial Dis-
course and Postcolonial Theory:A Reader, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Christman(New
York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1994).
80. Nicole-Claude Mathieu, "When Yielding is Not Consenting: Material and Psychic
Determinantsof Women'sConsciousnessand Some of Their Interpretationsin Ethnology"(Part
2), FeministIssues 10 (Spring 1990): 81-82; and Spivak, "Canthe SubalternSpeak?"
214 J. S. Millon FreedomandPower
whattheydo andtheirconceptionsof freedom.Third,insofaras peopleare

neverfullyawareof allthesocialforcesandpowerdynamicsthatshapethem,
theirself-understandings will not tell the whole storyof theirfreedomor
unfreedom.
This last pointhas importantimplications.We need to acknowledge
practicesof freedomthatdo notconformto Mill'ssecularmodernist notionof
reflectivechoice,but we also need to be awareof agents'unarticulated or
barely articulated
formsof The
resistance.81 will
latter indicate
casesin which
peopleyield to religiouslyor culturallyprescribedrulesof conductwithout
freelyenactingthem.Further, prevailingideasandself-understandings about
freedomin all societiesmaybe opento criticism.In thisregard,Millastutely
criticizesmanyprevailingideasaboutfreedomin moder democratizing soci-
eties likehis own.82
Oneimportant objectionto thislineof thoughtis thatwhileconceptions
of freedomsuch as Mill's originatein specificculturalcontexts,they also
"travel"across cultures.83Indeed, Mill's notion of freedom has traveledfar.
Yettwofurtherpointsneedto be appreciated to graspthesensein whichMill's
conceptionof freedomis culture-bound. First,the diffusionof conceptsand
practicesacrossculturestakesplacein partthroughasymmetrical relationsof
power-colonialism,capitalistglobalization, andmigrations-between them.
Thisis not to say thattransplanted conceptionsandpracticesarenecessarily
"inauthentic" in newcontexts.Noris it to denythattheyareoftentransformed
en route.Mypointis thatwe needto takeintoaccounthow theroleof power
in this processcomplicatesthe questionof whenconceptsandpracticesare
freely adopted.4Second,we needto addressthe losses as well as the gains
entailedby suchculturaltraveling.Millimpliesthatwhennon-liberal cultures
adopt (or aretaught or forcedto his of
adopt) conception freedom, changethis
willbe unequivocally progressive andemancipatory. He failsto considerwhat
people withfundamental commitments to non-liberal waysof life mightlose
by adopting his view of conceptionsof the good life as freelychosenand
81. PeterJones, "Bearingthe Consequencesof Belief," TheJournal of Political Philosophy

2 (March 1994): 36; Michael Walzer,"Objectivityand Social Meaning,"in The Qualityof Life,
ed. MarthaNussbaumand AmartyaSen (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1994), 175, 173; and Spivak,
"Canthe SubalternSpeak?,"93.
82. For instance, he persuasively challenges the common view in capitalist democracies
that, in Milton Friedman'swords, "competitivecapitalism [is] ... a system of economic free-
dom." Cf. Milton Friedman,Capitalismand Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962), 4; and Baum, "J. S. Mill's Conceptionof Economic Freedom."
83. I owe this point to an anonymousreviewer for Polity.
84. See Asad, Genealogies of Religion, chs. 5 and 7; James Clifford,"TravelingCultures,"
in CulturalStudies, ed. LawrenceGrossberg,Cary Nelson, and Paula Treicher(New York and
London:Routledge, 1992).
Bruce Baum 215
revisable. For instance, cultural assimilation of the Navaho people into the
modem United States has undoubtedlybroughtthem new practices of free-
dom, but it has also underminedolder practices of freedom that, if Dorothy
Lee is right, entailed distinctive modes of attunementamong them and with
their surroundings.
VI. Conclusions
Mill's developmentalview of individualityand autonomyleads him to artic-

ulate an indispensableaccount of the interrelationshipbetween freedom and
power. Freedom, he maintains,consists of both the absence of burdensome
constraintson people's possible actions and the capacity of persons for self-
determinationand self-government.While recognizing that the exercise of
power often diminishes the freedom of individuals,he shows that there is no
opposition between freedom and power as such. In his view, people are
always embedded within power relationshipsthat shape their capacities for
free action and delimit their field of possibilities. Therefore,the real opposi-
tion is between forms of power that stifle people's autonomyand freedomof
action and forms of power thatsupportfreedom.In this regard,Mill maintains
thatfreedom must not be conceived solely in terms of what we are free to do
or be (or not do or be) within the power relationshipsthatgovern our lives. It
must also be assessed in termsof our opportunitiesto effectively sharein self-
governmentwith respect to the variouspower relationshipssituatingus. This
requires more than merely formal opportunitiesfor self-government since
freedom entails individuals having "influence in the regulation of their
affairs."In the same breath,Mill's argumentimplies that individualscan be
free in reflectively choosing not to participate in processes of collective self-
government.Such choices arefree, however,only when individualshave both
developed capacities for self-governmentand availableinstitutionsand prac-
tices that would enable them, if they so chose, to share meaningfullyin self-
government.He construesfreedom,then, as an "exercise-concept"ratherthan
merely as an "opportunity-concept," to use CharlesTaylor'sterms.The pres-
ence of freedom requiresthat we actuallyexercise a directinginfluence over
our lives.85
Mill recognizes potentialtensions between individuallibertyand demo-
craticself-government,but he regardsboth as indispensableforms of freedom
and neither one as more essential than the other.86 Accordingly,he develops
85. CharlesTaylor,"What'sWrongWith Negative Liberty?,"in Taylor,Philosophyand the

Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge:CambrdgeUniversityPress, 1985),
214.
86. See Baum, "J. S. Mill's Conceptionof Economic Freedom."
216 J. S. Millon FreedomandPower
his principleof liberty-thata communitycanrightfullyexercisepowerover

the conductof its individualmembersonly to prevent"harmto others"(OL,
223)-as a meansto reconciledemocratization of the state,industrialrela-
tions,education,andmaritalrelationswithprotectionfor individualsagainst
tyrannical majorities.
Still,we needa morepluralisticview of freedomthanMill providesto
graspjust how differentcontextsof powerand cultureconstitutedifferent
possibilitiesforfreeagency.Inparticular, we needa view thataccommodates
how individualscanfreelypursuefundamental commitments andbeliefsthat
they have not chosen,
reflectively as well as practices of freedom thatempha-
size reflectivechoice, self-realization, and self-government. Adoptingthis
pluralistic view of freedom,however, should not lead us to overlook Mill's
insight into thespecialsignificance of freedom of choice in modem societies.
Evenmembersof modem(and"modernizing") societieswho areespecially
concernedwithfreelypursuingtheirfundamental religiousor culturalcom-
mitmentstypicallyseekfreedomof choicein otherareasof theirlives.More-
over,it is crucialto appreciatehowMill'snotionof freedomof choicediffers
fromthe "freedomof choice"thatis so widelycelebratedin moderncapital-
ist societies like the UnitedStates.The freedomof choice that matters,
accordingto Mill, is not the limitedfreedomof choosingourfavoriteprod-
uctsin the marketplace. Rather,it is thefreedomof "pursuing ourown good
in ourown way"-the freedomof choosingourown "modeof existence"or
"planof life."It encompassesnotonly ourfield of possibilitiesas independ-
ent individuals, butalsoouropportunities for self-government.

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Northeastern Political Science Association

J. S. Mill on Freedom and Power

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John StuartMill is justlyfamousfor his account of how oppressivesocial

Bruce Baum completedhis Ph.D. at the Universityof Minnesotaand is a

In his AutobiographyJohnStuartMill says thathis essay On Liberty"is likely

* I am indebtedto LauraJanara,Jim Farr,and anonymousreviewers for Polity for helpful

Likewise, J. C. Rees, one of Mill's most influentialcontemporaryinterpreters,

3. John C. Rees, John StuartMill's 'On Liberty', ed. G. L. Williams (Oxford:Clarendon

readingreveals that Mill powerfully challenges the negative view of freedom

8. On the place of this view of freedom in modem liberalism,see John Gray,Liberalism

opmentalpowers."" In short,we aremoreor less autonomous and,thus,more

11. C. B. Macpherson,Democratic Theory:Essays in Retrieval(Oxford:OxfordUniversity

adequatelygrasphis view we needto lookbeyondthewell known"principle

13. See Smith, "J. S. Mill on Freedom,"183-84.

tories, etymologies, and connotations.'7Mill typically uses "liberty"and

17. Paul Ziff and HannaFenichel Pitkinexplain thatin Englishfreedomhas a broaderrange

individuals, but also practices of democratic self-government that enable

II. Freedom, Autonomy, and Individuality

The first aspectof Mill's view of the interplayof freedomandpower concerns

desires,or doingas we please.Mill'sconceptionof freedomentailsnotionsof

thedangerwhichthreatens humannatureis nottheexcess,butthedefi-

Millregardsthepowerof educationandopinionto shapehumancharac-

25. See also Mill, Utilitarianism,Collected Works,vol. 10, 218.

Mill articulateshis view of free action most fully in A Systemof Logic

30. Rees, John StuartMill's 'On Liberty', 181.

capableof makingour own character,if we will, as othersare of makingit for

Mill's wordinghere is deceptive.He appearsto conceive of freedom,as Smith

To conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or

theworld,orhis ownportionof it, choosehis planof life forhim,

ends chosenby agentsas the distinguishing markof whetheror not their

III. Degreesof Autonomy,Degreesof Freedom

AlthoughMill maintainsthatonly peoplewho have fully developedtheir

41. Berlin, "Two Conceptsof Liberty,"132-34.

straintstofreedomthatareimportant for Mill.

reflect criticallyupon theirmore immediatedesires in light of theirmore con-

freedomin termsof choices and opportunitiesthatenable people to determine

IV. Freedom and Power

Mill recognizes thatpower is often exercised in ways that diminish freedom,

quently,ratherthanmarriage being"whollya matterof choice"forwomen,it

53. Mill, "Essayon Marriageand Divorce,"in J. S. Mill and HarrietTaylorMill, Essays on

capacities for self-formation or autonomy. He sees the various social and

V. Freedom, Power, and Culture

Mill's understandingof rationalautonomyas a conditionof "completelyfree"

57. Mill, "InauguralAddressDelivered to the Universityof St. Andrews,"Collected Works,

education" (SW,270-1,emphasisadded).Thus,to theextentthatwomenhave

59. He says in RepresentativeGovernmentthatthe "improvement"of humansocieties grad-

in accordancewith a valued traditionor belief system, their conduct is not

I do not think that there should be any authoritativeteaching at all on

People canfreely choose their religion and their religiously informedvalues,

"their"religiousidentitiesin theirfamiliesand/orcommunitiesas theylearn

Thatis, differentcontextsgeneratedivergentanswersto basicquestionscon-

71. DorothyLee,FreedomandCulture(Prentice-Hall, 1959),11.

talists with unfreedomand subordinationfor the laboringclasses.75Accord-

becausethey are traditionalor customary,this tendencyis particularly bur-

whattheydo andtheirconceptionsof freedom.Third,insofaras peopleare

81. PeterJones, "Bearingthe Consequencesof Belief," TheJournal of Political Philosophy

Mill's developmentalview of individualityand autonomyleads him to artic-

85. CharlesTaylor,"What'sWrongWith Negative Liberty?,"in Taylor,Philosophyand the

his principleof liberty-thata communitycanrightfullyexercisepowerover

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