EN BANC
[G.R. No. 44257. November 22, 1938.]
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE HONGKONG &
SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK, THE
CHARTERED BANK OF INDIA, AUSTRALIA AND CHINA, THE YOKOHAMA SPECIE BANK, LTD.,
THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, THE PEOPLES BANK & TRUST CO., THE CHINA
BANKING CORPORATION, THE PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., and THE MONTE DE PIEDAD AND
SAVINGS BANK, Defendants-Appellees.
Solicitor-General Hilado, for Appellant.
DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile, Gibbs & McDonough, Duran, Lim & Tuason, Feria & La O,
Ohnick & Opisso, Cavanna, Jazmines & Tianco and Ross, Lawrence, Selph & Carrascoso,
for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT NO. 4007. —
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be
set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BUREAU OF BANKING. — The title of Act No. 4007 is: "An Act to reorganize the
departments, bureaus and offices of the Insular Government, and for other purposes." At the
time of the passage of this Act, the Bureau of Banking was already in existence as one of the
bureaus of the Insular Government. (Act No. 3519.) It seems clear therefore that bureau is
embraced in that title. On the other hand, the contents of section 11 are germane to and
connected with the organization and maintenance of said bureau.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BANKING BUSINESS. — It is now beyond question that the banking business
is so effected with a public interest as to justify its regulation and control under the police
power of the estate. The legislature may establish such reasonable and general regulations of
banking institutions as may be essential to the public safety, and provide for the enforcement
of such regulations by a board or bureau supported by moderate assessments upon those
engaging in the banking business.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL CITY BANK NOT SUBJECT TO TAXATION BY THE PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT. — The National City Bank of New York, one of the herein appellees, being an
agency of the United States, was not subject to taxation by the Philippine Government except
as permitted by Act of Congress. The form of taxation imposed under section 11 of Act No.
4007 was not permitted by any act of Congress. Section 11 of Act No. 4007 is constitutional. It
does not, however, apply to the National City Bank of New York.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The appellees are banking institution doing business in this country. This action was brought
by the appellant to determine the liability of the appellees under section 11 of Act No. 4007.
All the appellees demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that the statutory provision relied upon by the
appellant was unconstitutional. The National City Bank of New York alleged further, in support
of the demurrer filed by it, that there was a misjoinder of parties defendant, and that section
11 of Act No. 4007 did not impose any tax upon national banking associations, in which class it
belonged. The court below sustained the demurrers filed by the appellees, on the sole ground
that the complaint did not allege a cause of action, because the statutory provision involved
was unconstitutional.
The question now presented is the constitutionality of section 11 of Act No. 4007, which reads
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 11. The provisions of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, the total annual
expenses of the Bureau of Banking shall be reimbursed annually to the Government by
assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank
Commissioner. The proportion of expenses of the Bureau of Banking to be assessed against
each such banking institution shall be the same as the proportion which its average total
assets bear to the average total assets of all such banking institutions during the year in which
the expenses were incurred."cralaw virtua1aw library
1. Appellees contend that the subject matter contained in this section is not embraced in the
title of the Act, in violation of section 3 of the Jones Law which provides, among other things:
"That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This provision is similar to those found in the
constitutions of most of the States of the Union. It has been said that the purpose of such a
provision is to prevent the evils of socalled "omnibus bills" and surreptitious or unconsidered
legislation. "The mischief sought to be remedied by the requirement of a single subject or
object of legislation was the practice of bringing together in one bill matters having no
necessary or proper connection with each other but often entirely unrelated and even
incongruous. By the practice of incorporating in proposed legislation of a meritorious
character provisions not deserving of general favor but which, standing alone and on their
own merits, were likely to be rejected, measures which could not have been carried without
such a device and which were sometimes of a pernicious character were often incorporated in
the laws; for, to secure needed and desirable legislation, members of the legislature were, by
this means, often induced to sanction and actually vote for provisions which, if presented as
independent subjects of legislation, would not have received their support. It was also the
practice to include in the same bill wholly unrelated provisions, with the view of combining in
favor of the bill the supporters of each, and thus securing the passage of several measures, no
1
one of which could succeed on its own merits. To do away with this hodge podge or ’log
rolling’ legislation was one, and perhaps the primary, object of these constitutional provisions.
Another abuse that developed in legislative bodies was the practice of enacting laws under
false and misleading titles, thereby concealing from the members of the legislature, and from
the people, the true nature of the laws so enacted. It is surreptitious legislation in this manner
that the subject or object of a law is required to be stated in the title. While the objects of
these constitutional provisions are variously stated, the authorities are agreed that they were
adopted to remedy these and similar abuses. The purposes of these constitutional provisions
have been summarized as follows: (1) to prevent ’log rolling’ legislation; (2) to prevent
surprise, or fraud, in the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles give no
intimation; and (3) to apprise the people of the subject of legislation under consideration."
(25 R. C. L., pp. 834-836.)
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. In Detroit v. Detroit Citizens’
Street R. Co. (184 U.S., 368, 392; 46 Law. ed., 592, 609), the Supreme Court of the United
States quoted with approval the following language of Judge Cooley: "We must give the
constitutional provision a reasonable construction and effect. The Constitution requires no law
to embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. Now, the object may
be very comprehensive and still be without objection, and the one before us is of that
character. But it is by no means essential that every end and means necessary or convenient
for the accomplishment of the general object should be either referred to or necessarily
indicated by the title. All that can reasonably be required is that the title shall not be made to
cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as
having a necessary or proper connection."cralaw virtua1aw library
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. (Carter County v. Sinton, 120 U.S., 517, 522; 30
Law ed., 701, 702.) It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include
the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be
set forth. (Knights Templars’ & Masons’ Life Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U.S., 197; 47 Law.
ed. 139.) The title need not be an abstract or index of the act. In Mahomet v. Quackenbush;
(117 U.S., 508; 29 Law. ed., 982), the General Assembly of the State of Illinois passed an Act
entitled: "An Act to Amend the Articles of Association of the Danvilled, Urbans, Bloomington
and Pekin Railroad Company, and to Extend the Powers of and Confer a Charter upon the
Same." The body of the Act provided that incorporated towns or townships in counties along
the railroad route may subscribe to its capital stock, and further provided the manner of
holding elections in regard to the subscription. The Supreme Court of the United States held
that the title of the act covered the provisions in its body within the purpose of section 23 of
article 3 of the Illinios Constitution of 1848 which provided that: "And no private or local law
which may be passed by the General Assembly shall embrace more than one object, and that
shall be expressed in the title." In the course of its decision, the court said: "The point now
made is that the statute, so far as it undertakes to authorize municipalities to subscribe to the
capital stock of the corporation, is unconstitutional because it embraces two distinct subjects,
one the incorporation of the railroad company, and the other an enlargement of the corporate
powers of municipal corporations, the first of which alone is expressed in the title. This
objection, it seems to us, is fully disposed of by the case of Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. Rock
Island, etc. R.R. Co. (25 Ill., 182), decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1860. There the
title was ’An Act to Incorporate the Rock Island & Alton Railroad Company,’ and the Act,
besides incorporating the company, authorized counties to subscribe to the stock. As to this
the court said, speaking through Chief Justice Caton: ’We think the title of this Act sufficient to
embrace the whole of the law, and that it is a compliance with the constitutional requirement.
All the provisions of the Act are appropriately designed to carry out the object of the
corporation. If it was proper to authorize subscriptions to the stock, it was certainly proper to
enable individuals or counties to subscribe and specify the terms and conditions on which
they might subscribe, and the mode of making the subscription.’
"In States where constitutional provisions like that now under consideration have been
decided to be mandatory, and not directory only, it had generally been held that the
requirement is satisfied if the law has but one general object, and that is clearly expressed in
the title. It is enough if the body of the Act is germane to the title."cralaw virtua1aw library
The title of Act No. 4007 is: "An Act to reorganize the departments, bureaus and offices of the
Insular Government, and for other purposes." At the time of the passage of this Act, the
Bureau of Banking was already in existence as one of the bureaus of the Insular Government.
(Act No. 3519.) It seems clear therefore that the bureau is embraced in that title. On the other
hand, the contents of section 11 are germane to and connected with the organization and
maintenance of said bureau.
2. It is now beyond question that the banking business is so affected with a public interest as
to justify its regulation and control under the police power of the state. (Noble State Bank v.
Haskell, 219 U.S., 104; 55 Law. ed., 112.) "Since banks are indispensable agencies through
which the industry, trade and commerce of all civilized countries and communities are carried
on, the business which they transact, though for private profit, is of a preminently public
nature, and it therefore universally recognized as a proper subject of legislative regulation
under the police power of the state." (3 R.C.L., 379.) The legislature may establish such
reasonable and general regulations of banking institutions as may be essential to the public
safety, and provide for the enforcement of such regulations by a board or bureau supported
by moderate assessments upon those engaging in the banking business. (Oxford v. Love, 250
U.S., 603; 63 Law. ed., 1165.)
3. The National City Bank of New York, one of the herein appellees, being an agency of the
United States, was not subject to taxation by the Philippine Government except as permitted
by Act of Congress. The form of taxation imposed under section 11 of Act No. 4007 was not
permitted by any act of Congress. (Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S., 497; 80 Law. ed.,
351.)
Our conclusion is that section 11 of Act No. 4007 is constitutional. It does not, however, apply
to the appellee, the National City Bank of New York.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with regard to the appellee, the National City Bank of
New York, and reversed as to the other appellees; and the case is remanded to the court
below for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Imperial, JJ., concur.
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Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In so far as the court upholds the power of the Legislature to impose the tax on banks
generally, I agree. The provision here involved was taken from section 21 of the Federal
Reserve Act of the United States. (December 23, 1913, c. 6, sec. 21, 38 Stat., 271; See also for
other acts sec. 482 of Title 12, U.S.C.A.) The imposition is within the taxing power of the State.
In so far also as the decision of the majority implies the rejection of the contention that the
levy is in violation of section 29 of the Jones Law, my coincidence likewise goes. But, I dissent
from so much of the majority opinion as holds that section 11 of Act No. 4007 does not
conflict with paragraph 17 of section 3 of the Jones Law with provides "That no bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed
in the title of the bill." Upon this point, I concur in the conclusion of justice Concepcion.
To set aside a law because of repugnancy to the fundamental law is a serious matter. It is a
power which, in the language of Judge Cooley (Const. Lim., 7th ed., chap. VII, 227, 228), a
judge "conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any
case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility." I have no hesitancy in saying that, when the instant case was submitted for
deliberation, my immediate reaction was to take for granted the validity of the challenged
statute. In the first place, there is the almost time- honored presumption in favor of the
validity of legislative acts. It is only proper, and a merited respect for the judgment of a
coordinate department of the government requires, that we should sustain a legislative act
whenever it is possible to do so. It must be presumed, as courts have always said, that the
legislators and the Executive have been true to their oath to support and respect the
Constitution and that in enacting and approving a particular statute they did not intend to
violate that fundamental law. If there is any doubt as to the validity of a law should be
sustained. So vital is this principle that the new Constitution of the Philippines, while
recognizing the power of the courts, particularly this court, to set aside legislative acts in
contravention thereof, provides for two safeguards against hasty invalidation of statutes.
Section 10 of Article VIII reads: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or law shall
be heard and decided by the Supreme Court in banc, and no treaty or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the court." In
other words, an act of the legislature maybe declared unconstitutional only if (1) after
consideration of all the members of this court (2) two-thirds thereof should agree to take such
action. In the second place, the courts, whenever possible, must give life to the sovereign will
as expressed by the political departments of the government. As stated in the case of Angara
vs Electoral Commission ([1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 23), "the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government." The responsibility for the preservation of our institutions is not the exclusive
concern of the courts. The legislators, as a great jurist has once said, are the guardians of the
liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts. (Holmes, J., in
Missouri, Kansas, & T. R. Co. vs May [1904], 194 U.S., 267, 270; 48 Law. ed., 971,973.) I have
not overlooked the contemporary historical fact that in the United States, the imputed failure
of the highest court to react to popular will as expressed by the representatives of the people
in Congress has given rise to criticism and the submission of various proposals aimed at the
"juvenation" of the court, or calculated to alter entirely the system of judicial authority or
organization provided in the Federal Constitution. Respect for legislature, however, or a desire
to affectuate the legislative will, cannot be carried to the extent of sanctioning a constitutional
breach. A statute may be wise, its purpose may be good, but if it violates the fundamental law
it is bad. As I proceeded to a more careful examination of the facts and went deeper into
fundamental principles, i came to the conclusion that section 11 of Act No. 4007 is
unconstitutional because it violates paragraph 17, section 3, of the Jones Law, which was the
organic law then in force. It is true that constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter
and titles of statues should be construed liberally to uphold, rather than to cripple or impede
proper legislation, but such provisions should be so construed as to prevent trickery or
evasion and to guard against the evils intended to be prevented (59 C.J., pp. 794,795).
Historically, the requirement that the title of a bill should give intimation of its contents was
known in England and practiced there, long before there were parliamentary bodies in
America; but this arose merely from custom and no bill which Parliament enacted in disregard
of the requirement could be set aside by the courts. Just as the first written constitution was
framed in America, so, too, it was there that for the first time a requirement as to the
particularity of the title was inserted in a constitution. The constitution of Georgia, of 1789
declared, "nor shall any law or ordinance pass containing any matter different from what is
expressed in the title thereof." This provisions was copied in other states of the Union. In the
course of time, another principle was embodied in state constitutions, to wit, that the bill shall
treat of only one subject. Sometimes, as in Michigan, New Jersey, Louisiana, and West
Virginia, the word "object" is substituted for "subject." In Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Montana,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Iowa, Oklahoma and Wyoming, it is specifically provided
that so much of the act as is not expressed in the title is void. A typical provision is to be found
in Article IV, section 19, of the Constitution of Indiana of 1851, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith; which
subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which
shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall
not be expressed in the title."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the Federal Constitution and in the state constitutions of Arkansas, North Carolina and most
New England states, there are no title requirements. In Mississippi, the committee of the
legislature to which a bill is referred is required by the constitution to "express in writing its
judgment of the sufficiency of the title." In some states, including Missouri and Montana,
exception is made of general appropriation bills, general revenue bills, or bills adopting codes
or revisions of statutes. In New York and Wisconsin, the provisions apply only to local or
private bills. This was the case under the Philippines Bill of July 1, 1902 which provided "That
no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject,
and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." (Sec. 5, par. 17.) The scope of the
prohibition was broadened in the Jones Law by the omission of the words "private or local."
The provisions of the Jones Law were incorporated in the new Constitution of the Philippines
almost verbatim. And, instead of placing the prohibition on the bill of rights, as was done in
the Philippine Bill and the Jones Law, the framers of the new Constitution placed it under
Article VI which treats of the Legislative Department, the prohibition being essentially a
3
restriction upon legislative procedure.
The insertion of the prohibition in constitutions was motivated by a desire to correct certain
evils. These evils are described by the Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Mahaney
([1865], 13 Mich., 481, 494, 495). Said the court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The history and purpose of this constitutional provision are too well understood to require
elucidation at our hands. The practice of bringing together into one bill subjects diverse in
their nature and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their favor the
advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one of which could
succeed upon its own merits, was one both corruptive of the legislator and dangerous to the
state. It was scarcely more so, however, than another practice, also intended to be remedied
by this provision, by which, through dexterous management, clauses were inserted in bills of
which the titles gave no intimation, and their passage secured through legislative bodies
whose members were not generally aware of their intention and effect. There was no design
by this clause to embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope
and operation, and thus multiplying their number; but the framers of the Constitution meant
to put an end to legislation of the vicious character referred to, which was little less than a
fraud upon the public, and to require that in every case the propose measure should stand
upon its own merits, and that the legislature should be fairly notified of its design when
required to pass upon it." (See also Central Capiz v. Ramirez [1920], 40 Phil., 883; Agcaoli v.
Suguitan [1926], 48 Phil., 676.)
Act No. 4007 is entitled, "An Act to reorganize the departments, bureaus and offices of the
Insular Government, and for other purposes." The purpose, then, of the Act is to reorganize
the various departments, bureaus and offices of the Philippine Government. The
constitutional requirement regarding the subject and title of bills is mandatory. A disregard
thereof is fatal. It is only in this way that the purposes of the constitutional requirement may
be accomplished. Thus, if the subject of an act is more than one, or if the subject though one
is not expressed in the title, the act is void in its entirely or in such parts thereof as violate the
Organic Act. Only such portions of the Act as come reasonably within its title are valid. As we
have seen, in Indiana and at least nine other states, there are constitutional provisions to this
effect. But the absence in other constitutions of similar provisions have not prevented courts
from arriving at the same conclusion. As the authorities uniformly hold, "nothing can validly
be included in the body of a statute which is not expressed in or covered by the title, and all
parts of an act which are not within its title are unconstitutional and void, even though such
provisions might properly have been included in the act under a broader title." (59 C.J., pp.
811, 812.)
"Since these provisions are mandatory, a statute which does not comply with them must be
void either in whole or in part. So much of the subject of a statute as is not expressed in the
title, or is not germane to the subject expressed in the title, is invalid. In other words, where
an act is broader than its title it can only be operative as to that part of it which is indicated by
its title; for the title of an act defines its scope and it can contain no valid provision beyond the
range of the subject or object there stated." (25 R. C. L., p. 840.)
Do the provisions of section 11 come reasonably within the title of Act No. 4007? The majority
hold that they do. I disagree. Said section 11 provides as follows;
"The provisions of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, the total annual expenses of
the Bureau of Banking shall be reimbursed annually to the Government by assessment levied
upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner. The proportion
of expenses of the Bureau of Banking to be assessed against each such banking institution
shall be the same as the proportion which its average total assets bear to the average total
assets of all such banking institutions during the year in which the expenses were
incurred."cralaw virtua1aw library
The foregoing section does not deal with reorganization. It treats of taxation or assessment for
the purpose of taxation. It, therefore, is not covered by the title of the Act. It is, of course,
sufficient if a general subject is stated in the title. All matters having a natural connection
therewith and not foreign thereto are deemed embraced within it. (25 R. C. L., p. 856.) To
require otherwise, to narrowly construe the constitutional provisions to make the title a
complete index of the contents of an act, would make legislation difficult if not impossible. It
would hamper legislation and place statutes under the constant danger of invalidation. It
should be observed, however, that section 11 does not cover a matter germane to the general
subject stated in the title of the Act. One who reads the title will not expect to find that
section in the body of the Act. He would not be put on inquiry as to the contents of the Act.
The fact, therefore, is misleading. It refers to one subject in the title but treats of another in
the body.
". . . while technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express
terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put
on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad." (59 C.J., pp. 804, 805.)
The words "and for other purposes," which close the title, are not sufficient to put any one on
inquiry as to the contents of the Act. Those words do not justify the insertion of section 11.
They cannot be used as a cloak to hide within them all possible legislation. They are
meaningless surplusage. "Nothing which the act could not embrace without them can be
brought in by their aid." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I., p. 302 and cases
cited.)
Act No. 4007 is a reorganization act and should have limited itself to reorganization, like the
similar acts which preceded it. An examination of all the reorganization acts prior to Act No.
4007 reveals that no provision is made for the support or maintenance of any bureau or office
in the Insular Government, directly from the proceeds of taxes collected from private firms or
individuals.
One of the early acts of the Philippine Commission was Act No. 222 entitled, "An Act providing
for the organization of the Departments of the Interior, of Commerce and Police, of Finance
and Justice, and of Public Instruction." It was approved by the Commission on September 6,
1901 and took effect on that same date. The various bureaus and offices were distributed
among the four departments which, by order of the President of the United States of
September 1, 1901, were headed by the four members of the Philippine Commission. A
4
Bureau of Banks, Banking, Coinage, and Currency was to be placed under the executive
control of the Department of Finance and Justice. There was no provision as to how that
bureau or any other bureau or office was to be supported or maintained.
On October 26, 1905, the Philippine Commission enacted "The Reorganization Act" which was
"An Act abolishing certain Bureaus of the Insular Government, reducing the number of
Bureaus by consolidating certain Bureaus with others, prescribing the duties of the various
Bureaus and certain officials thereof, fixing the salaries of Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of
Bureaus and certain other officials thereof, reorganizing the Departments of the Interior,
Commerce and Police, Finance and Justice, and Public Instruction, assigning certain Bureaus to
the immediate and direct executive control of the Governor-General, and for other purposes."
The Act took effect on November 1, 1905. The list of Bureaus of the Insular Government did
not include a Bureau of Banks, Banking, Coinage and Currency but the Department of Finance
and Justice was given "general supervision of banks, banking, coinage, and currency." The Act
provided for the salaries of the various heads of bureaus but did not contain the slightest
intimation that any bureau was to be supported other than by Insular funds duly
appropriated. The supplies furnished or services rendered to any branch of the Insular
Government or any provincial or municipal government by the Bureau of Science, the Bureau
of Supply or the Bureau of Posts were to be paid by the Bureau or local government
concerned. But this does not indicate that the bureau furnishing the supplies or rendering the
service shall be supported directly out of the income they were to receive. Besides, the
income is not derived directly from private individuals. And where income is so derived, as in
the case of sales made and services rendered by the Bureau of Science to the public, the
income derived together with the incomes from branches or local political subdivisions of the
Government were to be "deposited with the Insular Treasurer . . . and . . . considered as
repayments to the appropriation for the Bureau of Science and . . . so credited on the books of
the Auditor." In any event, what is notable is that the income is derived not from taxation but
from sales made or services rendered, in some cases, to the public and, in most cases, to the
various units and instrumentalities of the Government itself.
The action of the President of the United States and the Philippine Commission in establishing
the four executive departments was ratified and confirmed by the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902. Acts Nos. 222 and 1407 were responsible for the establishment of the executive
departments and the different bureaus and offices thereunder, up to 1916 when the Jones Act
of August 29, 1916 went into effect. Section 22 of this Autonomy Act authorized the Philippine
Legislature to provide for the reorganization of the executive departments of the Philippine
Government. Pursuant to this authority, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2666 which
went into effect upon its approval on November 18, 1916. The Act was entitled simply, "An
Act to reorganize the Executive Departments of the Government of the Philippine Islands." Six
executive departments were created, to wit, the Department of the Interior, the Department
of Public Instruction, the Department of Finance, the Department of Justice, the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the Department of Commerce and
Communications. The former Department of Finance and Justice, as we see, was split into
two. To the separate Department of Finance was placed, among other things, "the general
supervision over banks, banking transactions, coinage, currency, and funds the investment of
which may be authorized by existing law." No provision whatsoever, in this short significant
act, authorized the imposition of a tax for the support of any department, bureau or office of
the Insular Government.
Act No. 2666 was followed by Act No. 2803 entitled, "An Act to amend certain provisions of
the Administrative Code, regulating certain details of the functions and authority of the
Executive Departments, and for other purposes." The organization of the various executive
departments and bureaus was not altered except by providing that, "For administrative
purposes the Governor-General shall be considered the Department Head of the Bureau of
Audits, the Bureau of Civil Service, and of all other offices and branches of the service not
assigned by law to any Department." The powers of the Department Heads were amplified
and specifically outlines, but there was no provision as to the way by which a bureau or office
shall be supported.
The general reorganization laws above referred to were followed by Act No. 4007 which is
involved in the present case. It is fitting to again observe that in those prior reorganization acts
no provisions whatsoever existed to the effect that a bureau shall be supported out of funds
derived from taxation. Those acts properly limited themselves to the accomplishment of the
purpose for which they were enacted, namely, the reorganization of the various departments
and the several bureaus and offices under them. That practice was never departed from. It
was only in Act No. 4007 that deviation occurred. This Act did not limit itself to the
accomplishment of the object stated in its title. It went further and provided in section 11
thereof for something which is not germane to the object of reorganization, namely, the
reimbursement annually to the government by assessment, levied upon all banking
institutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner, of the total annual expenses of
the Bureau of Banking. In so doing, the Act ran aground. I do not deny the authority of the
Legislature to adopt such a provision. I concede the power of the Legislature in that regard.
What I do not hold permissible, upon the facts of the present case, is the inclusion in a
reorganization Act of a provision on the subject of taxation. In the majority opinion reference
is made to Mahomet v. Quakenbush (117 U. S., 508; 29 Law. ed., 982) as the principal
authority relied upon in support of the view taken. There is, however, no analogy between
that case and the case at bar. It is clear, under the doctrine of Mahomet case, that a company
may be incorporated and at the same time the municipalities authorized to subscribe to its
capital stock. These matters are one or a least wholly germane to each other. It is not the
situation in our case. I have always been under the impression that to reorganize is not to tax
and that to tax is not to organize and that reorganization and taxation are two different things.
In no way can they be regarded as skin, so far and as far as I can see. Taxation is closer to
police power and eminent domain than it is to reorganization.
The Legislature may reorganize bureaus and offices and do this as many times as it may desire
but this power is subject to the constitutional limitation that the act of reorganization shall
not contain matter foreign to the purpose. I am willing to admit that the Legislature, in
creating bureaus and offices, may provide for the manner by which they are to be supported.
Where a general purpose is stated in the title of an act, the means for the accomplishment of
that general purpose may be provided for in that act. But from this premise to the conclusion
reached by this court, there is, it seems to me, a wide gap. The provisions of section 11 are
not necessary to render effectual the principal object of the statute which is to reorganize the
different departments, bureaus and offices of the government. Besides, at the time of the
passage of Act No. 4007, there was a separate law on the contribution of banks. That was Act
No. 3519, which was one of a series of laws affecting banking institutions enacted by the
Philippine Legislature during the special sessions of 1929. The Act accomplished the desire
5
early expressed in Act No. 222 of creating an independent Bureau of Banking. A whole chapter
(Chapter 41-A) was inserted in the Administrative Code. One of the sections covered by the
chapter is section 1637 which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Examinations into condition of institutions. — It shall be the duty of the Bank Commissioner,
personally or by deputy, at least once in every twelve months, and at such other times as he
may deem expedient, to make an examination of the books of every institution within the
purview of this chapter in order to ascertain its cash and available assets in the Philippine
Islands, and its general condition and method of doing business, and to make report of the
same to the Secretary of Finance, who will transmit a copy of said report to the Governor-
General.
"Every such institution shall afford to the Bank Commissioner, and to his authorized deputy,
full opportunity to examine its books, its cash, its available assets, and general condition, at
any time when requested so to do by the Commissioner: Provided, however, That none of the
reports and other papers relative to the examination of banking institutions shall be open to
inspection by the public insofar as such publicity shall be incidental to the proceedings
hereinafter authorized or necessary for the prosecution of violations in connection with the
business of the bank.
"The total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking shall be reimbursed annually to the
Government to the extent of one-half by assessment levied upon all banking institutions
subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner. The proportion of expenses of the Bureau of
Banking to be assessed against each such banking institutions shall be the same as the
proportion which its average total assets bear to the average total assets of all such banking
institutions during the year in which the expenses were incurred, but the one-half of the total
expenses of the Bureau of Banking assessed against all banking institutions in any one year
shall not exceed sixty thousand pesos. The Bank Commissioner shall by regulation prescribe
the form, manner, and time for the levying and payment of the assessment." ’
There are many other provisions and the means for their enforcement are also stated. The
enactment of Act No. 3519, independently of any previous reorganization act, is a tangible
proof that the members of the Legislature regarded the matters covered by it are foreign to
reorganization.
It should also be observed that Act No. 4007 does not merely incorporate the Banking Law or
a portion thereof, but amends a portion of that law. If a defect in Act No. 3519 was found by
the members of the Legislature, the Act itself should have been amended.
In this connection, it will be advisable to examine the history of the bill which finally was
enacted as Act No. 4007. It is a settled rule that in construing an Act, the proceedings of the
legislature in reference to it may be inquired into and taken into consideration. If in
determining the intention of the lawmaker, we are permitted to look to prior laws on the
subject and to investigate the antecedents or the legislative history of the statute involved
(Director of Lands v. Abaja [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., 991; Loewenstein v. De Guzman [1915], 30
Phil., 416, 419; Tamayo v. Gsell [1916], 35 Phil., 953, 963; Mitsui Bussan Kaisha v. Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation [1917], 36 Phil., 27, 36; Go Chioco v. Martinez [1923], 45
Phil., 256, 270, 276; Portillo v. Salvani [1930], 54 Phil., 543, 546. See also Kepner v. United
States [1904], 195 U.S., 100; 24 Sup. Ct., 797; 49 Law. ed., 114; 11 Phil. 669, 692; Serra v.
Mortiga [1907], 204 U.S., 470; 27 Sup. Ct., 343; 51 Law. ed., 571; 11 Phil., 762, 766; Alzua and
Arnalot v. Johnson [1912], 21 Phil., 308, 331; aff’d. in 231 U.S., 106; 34 Sup. Ct. 27; 58 Law. ed.,
142; United States v. Katz [1925], 271 U.S., 354; 46 Sup. Ct., 513; 72 Law. ed., 986), we may
also avail ourselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining
the construction of a statute of doubtful import (U.S. v. Pons, 34 Phil., 729; Palanca v. City of
Manila and Trinidad, 41 Phil., 125. See also, 59 C.J., pp. 1077-1019; 25 R.C.L., pp. 271, 272; 11
Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, sec. 471, pp. 879-883). More than this "official acts
of the Legislature" are matters judicially recognized (sec. 275, Code of Civil Procedure).
An examination of the proceedings which led to the enactment of Act No. 4007 shows that
section 11 of that Act was not included in the body of the Act when it passed both the House
of Representatives and the Senate of the Philippine Legislature. Act No. 4007 was originally
House Bill No. 1934. It was drafted and introduced in the lower house of the Legislature by the
Committee on Appropriations. The original draft did not contain the provisions now found in
section 11. I have searched the whole records of the discussion of said bill by the lower house
but said provisions were neither touched upon nor introduced by way of amendment. After
passing the House on October 14, 1932, the bill was sent to the Senate, where, with slight
amendments, it was approved on November 4, 1932. The provisions of section 11 do not
appear in the bill as approved by the Senate and which now appears in the Diario de Sesiones
(Vol. VII, pp. 784-787). After such approval by the Senate, the records disclose the following
proceedings to have transpired:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NOVENA LEGISLATURA FILIPINA.
"Segundo Periodo de Sesiones
"INFORME DE CONFERENCIA.
"Habiendose reunido el comite de conferencia sobre los votos en discordia de las dos Camaras
acerca de las enmiendas del Senado al proyecto de ley de la Camara de Representantes No.
1934 titulado:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘An Act to reorganize the Executive and Judicial Departments of the Philippine Government,
by amending certain provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended and for other
purpose,’
y despues de una detenida y completa consideracion, ha acordado recomendar a sus
respectivas camaras lo siguiente que sea aprobado en la forma siguiente que sea aprobado en
la forma siguiente:
(Sgd.) "J. CLARIN
"MANUEL BRIONES
"JUAN NOLASCO
"Conferenciantes por parte del Senado
6
(Sgd.) "LEONARDO FESTIN
"J. ALCAZAREN
"EUGENIO PEREZ
"JUAN LUNA
"FELIPE BUENCAMINO
"P. PECSON
"E. RODRIGUEZ
"Conferenciantes
por parte de la Camara
de Representantes"
To the foregoing report is attached the Act containing all the provisions now to be found in Act
No. 4007, including its eleventh section.
By comparing Act No. 4007 as it is with Bill No. 1934 as finally approved by the Philippine
Senate on November 4, 1932, we shall be able to notice that section 11 of the Act is one of
the few portions of the Act which is not included in the bill as passed by the Senate. It,
apparently, also, is the only provision in the Reorganization Act mentioned which treats of
taxation. It is the only section which does not deal with reorganization.
The enacting clause of Bill No. 1934 passed by the Senate and that of Act No. 4007 are similar
with slight variations.
Sections 1 to 3 inclusive of the Bill passed by the Senate are the same in all respects as
sections 1 to 3 inclusive of Act No. 4007.
Section 4 of the Bill passed by the Senate and the same section of Act No. 4007 are similar
because both deal with the bureaus and offices under the Department of Finance. Section 4
of the Senate Bill, however, differs from section 4 of Act No. 4007 in that the former includes
the Board of Accountancy, Board of Examiners for Marine Officers, and Engineers. On the
other hand, section 4 of Act No. 4007 includes the Division of Purchase and Supply.
Section 5 of the Bill and the equivalent section of Act No. 4007 are similar because both deal
with bureaus and offices under the Department of Public Instruction. They differ, however, in
that the Bill passed by the Senate includes the Board of Private Education, Boards of Medical,
Pharmaceutical, Optical, Dental and Nurses Examiners.
Section 6 of the Bill and the same section of Act No. 4007 are similar because both refer to
bureaus and offices under the Department of Justice with variations, however, in their
provisions.
Section 7 of the Bill and the same section of the Act are similar. Both refer to bureaus and
offices under the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, with slight variations.
Section 8 of the Bill and the same section of the Act are also similar. Both deal with the
bureaus and offices under the Department of Public Works and Communications, with slight
variations.
Section 9 of the Bill is the same as section 9 of the Act. Both refer to bureaus and offices
under the Department of the Interior and Labor.
Section 10 of the Bill is similar to section 10 of the Act because both refer to the creation of
the Bureau of Civil Service, with extensive variations.
Section 11 of the Bill which refers to Manila Harbor Board corresponds to the provisions of
section 13 of Act No. 4007.
Section 11 of Act No. 4007 deals with the reimbursement of the total annual expenses of the
Bureau of Banking to the Government. This section does not have any equivalent in or
similarity to any of the provisions of the Bill passed by the Senate.
Section 12 of the Bill deals with the Philippine Health Service. This is similar to section 14 of
the Act, with variations.
Section 12 of Act No. 4007 deals with the abolition of the Bureau of Supply.
Section 13 of the Bill deals with the repeal of certain sections of the Administrative Code. This
section is similar to section 16 of Act No. 4007, with slight variations.
Section 13 of the Act deals with the Manila Harbor Board. This section is the same as section
11 of the Bill passed by the Senate.
Section 14 of the Bill deals with the abolition of the position of Commissioner of Private
Education. This section is similar to section 17 of Act No. 4007, with variations.
Section 14 of the Act deals with the Philippine Health Service. This is similar to section 12 of
the Bill, with variations.
Section 15 of the Bill deals with the repeal of certain sections of the Administrative Code. This
section is the same as section 18 of the Act.
Section 15 of Act No. 4007 deals with the Commissioner of Health and Welfare, with the rank
and salary of undersecretary, in the office of the Secretary of Public Instruction. This section is
similar to section 12 of the Bill passed by the Senate, with variations.
Section 16 of the Bill passed by the Senate refers to Judicial Districts for Courts of First
Instance. This section is the same as section 20 of Act No. 4007.
Section 16 of the Act deals with the repeals of certain sections of the Administrative Code.
7
This section is the same as section 13 of the Bill passed by the Senate.
Section 17 of the Bill refers to Judges of First Instance for Judicial Districts. This section is the
same as section 21 of the Act.
Section 17 of the Act refers to the abolition of the Office of Commissioner of Private Education
whose powers and duties are to be exercised by the Undersecretary of Public Instruction. This
section is similar to section 14 of the Bill.
Section 18 of the Bill refers to Judges-at-Large. This section is similar to section 24 of the Act.
Section 18 of the Act deals with the repeal of certain sections of the Administrative Code. This
section is the same as section 15 of the Bill.
Section 19 of the Bill refers to the repeal of certain sections of the Administrative Code. This
section is the same as section 25 of the Act.
Section 19 of the Act deals with the Chief of the Bureau of Justice to be known as Solicitor-
General.
Section 20 of the Bill passed by the Senate treats of the abolition of the General Land
Registration Office as a Bureau.
Section 20 of the Act deals with the Judicial Districts for Courts of First Instance. This section is
the same as section 16 of the Bill.
Section 21 of the Bill treats of the Bureau of Commerce. This section is similar to section 29 of
the Act.
Section 21 of the Act treats of Judges of First Instance. This section is the same as section 17
of the Bill.
Section 22 of the Bill refers to the abolition of the National Museum as a separate Bureau.
This section is similar to section 30 of the Act.
Section 22 of the Act refers to section 155 of the Administrative Code regarding detail of
judges to another district or province.
Section 23 of the Bill treats of section 1771-G of the Administrative Code relating to the Fiber
Standardization Board-Transaction of Business. (See section 31 of the Act abolishing said
Board.) .
Section 23 of the Act deals with the permanent station of judges.
Section 24 of the Bill refers to the powers of the Bureau of Purchase and Supply. (See section
12 of the Act abolishing said Bureau.) .
Section 24 of the Act refers to Judges-at-Large. This section is similar to section 18 of the Bill.
Section 25 of the Bill refers to the abolition of the Executive Bureau. This section is the same
as section 33 of the Act.
Section 25 of the Act deals with the repeal of certain sections of the Revised Administrative
Code. This section is the same as section 19 of the Bill.
Section 26 of the Bill refers to the creation of the Office of Commissioner of Labor. This section
is the same as section 34 of the Act, with slight modifications.
Section 26 of the Act deals with the "Places and times of holding court."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Section 27 of the Bill treats of the transfer of the National Library from the Department of
Justice to the Philippine Legislature. This section is similar to section 35 of the Act, with slight
variations.
Section 27 of the Act deals with the qualifications for the Office of Justice of the Peace.
Section 28 of the Bill refers to the transfer of duties and functions of certain departments to
the respective Departments as provided for said Bill. This section is similar to section 36 of the
Act.
Section 28 of the Act deals with the office of register of deeds.
Section 29 of the Bill deals with the power, authority, duty, function or activity entrusted to a
chief of Bureau, Office or Division and the power of review given to the proper Department
Head. This section is the same as section 37 of the Act.
Section 29 of the Act deals with the Bureau of Commerce. This section is similar to section 21
(a) of the Bill.
Section 30 of the Bill refers to the power of the Governor- General or proper Head of
Department to transfer an activity from one division to another and to consolidate offices.
This section is similar to section 38 of the Act with variations.
Section 30 of the Act refers to the abolition of the National Museum as a separate Bureau.
This section is similar to section 22 of the Bill.
Section 31 of the Bill deals with the unexpended balances of funds or appropriations
pertaining to bureaus, etc., abolished or terminated and the manner to their disposition. This
section is the same as section 39 of the Act.
Section 31 of the Act refers to the Fiber Standardization Board. (See section 23 of the Bill.)
Section 32 of the Bill deals with the merger and transfer of the unexpended balances of funds
or appropriations, equipment, etc., with the funds of the Department, bureau or office
concerned. This section is the same as section 40 of the Act.
8
Section 32 of the Act refers to the powers and duties of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry
with regard to the Marine Railway and Repair Shops, to be exercised by the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
Section 33 of the Bill refers to the vacation of positions by specified officers. This section is
similar to section 41 of the Act.
Section 33 of the Act refers to the abolition of the Executive Bureau as a separate Bureau. This
section is the same as section 25 of the Bill.
Section 34 of the Bill deals with the gratuities to be awarded to officials and employees whose
positions are abolished or separated as a consequence of the Reorganization Act. This section
is the same as section 42 of the Act.
Section 34 of the Act deals with the creation of the Office of a Commissioner of Labor in the
Office of the Secretary of the Interior. This section is similar to section 26 of the Bill.
Section 35 of the Bill contains its repealing clause. This section is the same as section 44 of the
Act.
Section 35 of the Act deals with the transfer of the National Library from the Department of
Justice to the Philippine Legislature. It corresponds to section 27 of the Bill.
Section 36 of the Bill deals with the time when said act shall take effect. This section is
equivalent to section 45 of the Act.
Section 36 of the Act refers to the transfer of duties and functions of certain Departments to
the respective Departments as provided for by the Act. This is similar to section 28 of the Bill.
Section 37 of the Act refers to the power, authority, duty, function, or activity entrusted to a
chief of Bureau, Office or Division and the power of review of the proper Department Head.
This section is equivalent to section 29 of the Bill.
Section 38 of the Act refers to the power of the head of the Department to transfer an activity
from one Division to another or to suppress or reduce any activity under his Department. This
section is similar to section 30 of the Bill.
Section 39 of the Act refers to the unexpended balances of funds or appropriation pertaining
to bureaus, etc., abolished or terminated and the manner of deposing them. This section is
similar to section 31 of the Bill.
Section 40 of the Act deals with the merger and transfer of the unexpended balances of funds
or appropriation, equipment, etc. with the funds of Department, Bureau or Office concerned.
This section is similar to section 32 of the Senate Bill.
Section 41 of the Act refers to the vacation of positions by specified officers. It is similar to
section 33 of the Bill.
Section 42 of the Act treats of the gratuities to be awarded to officials and employees whose
positions are abolished or separated as a consequence of the Reorganization Act. It is the
same as section 34 of the Bill.
Section 43 of the Act refers to the power of the Department Head to require the Assistant
Director or Assistant Chief of a Bureau or Office under him to act as chief of any Division. This
section has no equivalent in the Bill passed by the Senate.
Section 44 of Act No. 4007 refers to its repealing clause. This is the same as section 35 of the
Bill.
Section 45 of Act No. 4007 refers to the date of effectivity of the Act. It is similar to the
provisions of section 36 of the Bill passed by the Senate.
I deny the propriety not only of inserting a tax provision in a general reorganization act but
also of amending a portion of an existing law on taxation in such an act. The majority, in
effect, does not only hold that the Legislature may provide for the means by which a given
bureau is to be supported but also that it may determine the rate of the tax to be imposed for
the purpose. Carried to its logical conclusion, the Legislature may determine the tax itself —
because the power to determine the rate implies the power to determine the tax — as well as
the sources and, ultimately, the numerous incidents thereof. Under the theory of the majority,
in a reorganization act, the Legislature may, for instance, provide that the Bureau of Internal
Revenue shall be supported out of the income tax and, for this purpose, amend the schedule
of percentages now contained in the Income Tax Law; or that Department of the Interior shall
be supported out of the real property tax and, at the same time, increase that tax say from
7/8 of 1 per cent to 1 per cent. The instances may be multiplied. I am reluctant to believe that
the majority would yield to this result and yet this is what the decision would lead to. It is not
necessary to point out the disastrous results that will follow. The consideration and approval
of omnibus bills would ensue. The detection of fraud and dexterity in legislation would be
rendered difficult; the constitutional mandate turned into a dead letter, and the life and vigor
of the entire Constitution seriously impaired.
This court has always been eager to give effect to the mandates of the fundamental law.
During its entire period of existence, it has been able to set aside fourteen legislative acts. Of
these, three were premised on the violation of the provisions of the Organic Law regarding
the subject and title of bills. I wish to refer to these cases in support of the view I have taken
in the case at bar.
In Central Capiz v. Ramirez ([1920], 40 Phil., 883), the issue presented was whether Act No.
2874 is limited in its application to public agricultural lands, or whether its provisions also
extend to agricultural lands privately owned, as certain provisions of the Act seemed to
indicate. An examination of the entire Act revealed that the intention of the Legislature was to
limit the application of the Act to public lands. Besides, the title of the Act was, "An act to
amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes."
According to this court, "Under the Act as entitled, any attempt by the Legislature to insert
provisions in the body thereof relating to lands of private ownership would be in violation of
the provisions of the Jones Law and, therefore, null and void." (At p. 889.) This statement
9
applies with equal force to the case now before us.
In Agcaoili v. Suguitan ([1926], 48 Phil., 676), this court, by a close vote, held section 203 of
Act No. 3107 which provided." . . that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years", because the title of the
Act gave no intimation thereof, in violation of the Jones Law. Act No. 3107 was entitled, "An
Act to amend and repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code relative to the judiciary
in order to reorganize the latter; increasing the number of judges for certain judicial districts;
increasing the salaries of judges of Courts of First Instance; vesting the Secretary of Justice
with authority to detail a district judge temporarily to a district or province other than his
own; regulating the salaries of justices of the peace; abolishing the municipal court and justice
of the peace court of the City of Manila and creating in lieu thereof a municipal court with
three branches; regulating the salaries of clerks of court and other subordinate employees of
Courts of First Instance, and for other purposes." This court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Considering that the great weight of authority is to the effect that the provision like the one
above quoted from the Jones Law is mandatory; and considering that there is nothing in the
title of Act No. 3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said Act contains a provision
’that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have
reached the age of sixty-five years,’ we are forced to the conclusion that, the provision is
illegal, void and contrary to the mandatory provision of the Jones Law, . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
I think that in the case at bar the violation of the Jones Law is clearer than in the Agcaoili case.
As the dissenting justices in the latter case observed, "although the provisions of Act No. 3107
are various, they have this is common, that they deal with different parts of the judiciary
establishment and are intended to effect changes in this system alone." According to them,
the words, "An Act to amend and repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code relative
to the judiciary . . .", are general and broad enough to include section 203 relating to the
appointment of justices of the peace. Upon the other hand, in the case at bar, there is
absolutely nothing in the title, as far as I can see, from which the insertion of section 11 in Act
No. 4007 can be justified.
A still stronger case in support of my position is, perhaps, that of Government of the
Philippine Islands v. El Hogar Filipino ([1927], 50 Phil., 399). In that case, the validity of section
3 of Act No. 2792 was challenged on the ground that the subject matter contained in that
section was not expressed in the title of the Act. The title of the Act was as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"An Act to amend certain sections of the Corporation Law, Act Numbered Fourteen hundred
and fifty-nine, providing for the publication of the assets and liabilities of corporations
registering in the Bureau of Commerce and Industry determining the liability of the officers of
corporations with regard to the issuance of stock or bonds, establishing penalties for certain
things, and for other purposes."cralaw virtua1aw library
The first two sections of the Act are amendatory to the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459), and
the third section involved in that controversy is a new section added to the Corporation Law
as section 190 (a), and provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 190. (A) Penalties. — The violation of any of the provisions of this Act and its
amendments not otherwise penalized therein, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, in the
discretion of the court. If the violation is committed by a corporation, the same shall, upon
such violation being proved, be dissolved by quo warranto proceedings instituted by the
Attorney-General or by any provincial fiscal, by order of said Attorney-General: Provided, That
nothing in this section provided shall be construed to repeal the other causes for the
dissolution of corporations prescribed by existing law, and the remedy provided for in this
section shall be considered as additional to the remedies already existing."cralaw virtua1aw
library
This court, in passing upon the constitutional question presented, held that the title of the Act
was defective for failure to express the subject matter of section 3 thereof and declared said
section invalid for repugnance to the constitutional requirement. This court, speaking through
Justice Street, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"But section 3 of Act No. 2792 is challenged by the respondent on the ground that the subject
matter of this section is not expressed in the title of the Act, with the result that the section is
invalid. This criticism is in our opinion well founded. Section 3 of our Organic Law (Jones Bill)
declares, among other things, that ’No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.’ Any law or part of
a law passed by the Philippine Legislature since this provision went into effect and offending
against its requirement is necessarily void.
"Upon examining the entire Act (No. 2792), we find that it is directed to three ends which are
successively dealt with in the first three sections of the Act. But is will be noted that these
three matters all relate to the Corporation Law; and it is at once apparent that they might
properly have been embodied in a single Act if a title of sufficient unity and generally had
been prefixed thereto. Furthermore, it is obvious, even upon casual inspection, that the
subject matter of each of the first two sections is expressed and defined with sufficient
precision in the title. With respect to the subject matter of section 3 the only words in the title
which can be taken to refer to the subject matter of said section are these, ’An Act . . .
establishing penalties for certain things, and for other purposes.’ These words undoubtedly
have sufficient generality to cover the subject matter of section 3 of the Act. But this is not
enough. The Jones Law requires that the subject matter of the bill ’shall be expressed in the
title of the bill.’
"When reference is had to the expression ’establishing penalties for certain things,’ it is
obvious that these words express nothing. The constitutional provision was undoubtedly
adopted in order that the public might be informed as to what the Legislature is about while
bills are in process of passage. The expression ’establishing penalties for certain things’ would
give no definite information to anybody as to the project of legislation intended under this
expression. An examination of the decided cases shows that courts have always been
indulgent of the practices of the Legislature with respect to the form and generality of title,
for if extreme refinements were indulged by the courts, the work of legislation would be
unnecessarily hampered. But, as has been observed by the California court, there must be
some reasonable limit to the generality of titles that will be allowed. The measure of legality is
10
whether the title is sufficient to give notice of the general subject of the proposed legislation
to the persons and interests likely to be affected.
"In Lewis v. Dunne (134 Cal., 291), the court had before it a statute entitled ’An Act to revise
the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California, by amending certain sections, repealing
others, and adding certain new sections.’ This title was held to embrace more than one
subject, which were not sufficiently expressed in the title. In discussing the question the court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘. . . It is apparent that the language of the title of the act in question, in and of itself,
expresses no subject whatever. No one could tell from the title alone what subject of
legislation was dealt with in the body of the act; such subject, so far as the title of the act
informs us, might have been entirely different from anything to be found in the act itself. . . .
"‘We cannot agree with the contention of some of respondent’s counsel — apparently to
some extent countenanced by a few authorities — that the provision of the constitution in
question can be entirely avoided by the simple device of putting into the title of an act words
which denote a subject "broad" enough to cover everything. Under that view, the title, "An
act concerning the laws of the state," would be good, and the convention and people who
framed and adopted the constitution would be convicted of the folly of elaborately
constructing a grave constitutional limitation of legislative power upon a most important
subject, which the legislature could at once circumvent by a mere verbal trick. The word
"subject" is used in the constitution in its ordinary sense; and when it says that an act shall
embrace but "one subject", it necessarily implies — what everybody knows — that there are
numerous subjects of legislation, and declares that only one of these subjects shall be
embraced in any one act. All subject cannot be conjured into one subject by the mere magic
of a word in a title. . .’
"In Rader v. Township of Union (39 N.J.L., 509, 515), the Supreme Court of New Jersey made
the following observation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘. . . It is true, that it may be difficult to indicate, by a formula, how specialized the title of a
statute must be; but it is not difficult to conclude that it must mean something in the way of
being a notice of what is doing. Unless it does this, it can answer no useful end. It is not
enough that it embraces the legislative purpose-it must express it; and where the language is
too general, it will accomplish the former, but not the latter. Thus, a law entitled "An act for a
certain purpose," would embrace any subject, but would express none, and consequently, it
would not stand the constitutional test.’
"The doctrine properly applicable in matters of this kind is, we think, fairly summed up in a
current repository of jurisprudence in the following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘. . . While it may be difficult to formulate a rule by which to determine the extent to which
the title of a bill must specialize its object, it may be safely assumed that the title must not
only embrace the subject of proposed legislation, but also express it clearly and fully enough
to give notice of the legislative purpose.’ (25 R.C.L., p. 853.)
"In dealing with the problem now before us the words ’and for other purposes’ found at the
end of the caption of Act No. 2792, must be laid completely out of consideration. They
express nothing, and amount to nothing as a compliance with the constitutional requirement
to which attention has been directed. This expression (’for other purposes’) is frequently
found in the title of acts adopted by the Philippine Legislature; and its presence in our laws is
due to the adoption by our Legislature of the style used in Congressional legislation. But is
must be remembered that the legislation of Congress is subject to no constitutional restriction
with respect to the title of bills. Consequently, in Congressional legislation the words ’and for
other purposes’ at least serve the purpose of admonishing the public that the bill whose
heading contains these words contains legislation upon other subjects that expressed in the
title. Now, so long as the Philippine Legislature was subject to no restriction with respect to
the title of bills intended for enactment into general laws, the expression ’for other purposes’
could be appropriately used in titles, not precisely for the purpose of conveying information as
to the matter legislated upon, but the purpose of admonishing the public that any bill
containing such words in the title might contain other subjects than that expressed in the
definitive part of the title. But, when Congress adopted the Jones Law, the restriction with
which we are now dealing became effective here and the words’ for other purposes’ could no
longer be appropriately used in the title of legislative bills. Nevertheless, the custom of using
these words has still been followed, although they can no longer serve to cover matter not
germane to the bill in the title of which they are used, But the futility of adding these words to
the style of any act is now obvious." (Cooley, Const. Lim., 8th ed., p. 302.)
"In the brief for the plaintiff it is intimated that the constitutional restriction which we have
been discussing is more or less of a dead letter in this jurisdiction; and it seems to be taken for
granted that no court would ever presume to hold a legislative act or part of a legislative act
invalid for non-compliance with the requirement. This is a mistake; and no utterance of this
court can be cited as giving currency to any such notion. On the contrary the discussion
contained in Central Capiz v. Ramirez (40 Phil., 883), shows that when a case arises where a
violation of the restriction is apparent, the court has no alternative but to declare the
legislation affected thereby to be invalid."cralaw virtua1aw library
It should be observed that in the case the following expression appears on the title of the bill:
"establishing penalties for certain things." It should further be observed that in that case there
is an express admission that the three matters contained in Act no. 2792 "all relate to the
Corporation Law" and "might properly have been embodied in a single Act if a little of
sufficient unity and generality had been prefixed thereto." All the matters contained in the
law, therefore, were found to be germane to each other, and yet the court concluded that the
expression "establishing penalties for certain things" did not express the subject matter
contained in section 3 of Act No. 2792, and in the language of the court, although "These
words undoubtedly have sufficient generality to cover the subject matter of section 3 of the
Act. But this is not enough", because "The Jones Law requires that the subject matter of the
bill’ shall be expressed in the title of the bill.’" There is, to be sure, more unity of the subject t
matter with reference to the three sections contained in Act No. 2792 than in section 11 of
Act No. 4007 with reference to the rest of the sections of that act. Section 3 of Act No. 2792
provides penalties for violation of the Corporation Law as amended, whereas section 11 of Act
No. 4007 deals with the contribution banks, and increases the contribution originally provided
section 1639 of the Administrative Code. In the Hogar case, also, the title refers to penalties
and the heading of section 190 (a) which is the additional section introduced bears the title
"Penalties." Nevertheless, this court declared section 3 of Act No. 2792, containing said
11
section 190 (a), as void, and observed, after referring to the case of Central Capiz v. Ramirez,
supra, that "when a case arises where a violation of the restriction is apparent, the court has
no alternative but to declare the legislation affected thereby to be invalid." This court in the
Hogar case found the violation of the constitutional inhibition apparent "Upon the facts and
under the circumstances just mentioned." and say that in the case at bar the constitutional
infraction is more apparent than in the Hogar case.
The majority of this court clearly depart from the principle laid down in previous cases,
particularly the Hogar case. From the citations and references made, it is on the plea of liberal
interpretation that they do so. I express the opinion, however, that there is neither occasion
nor reason for any departure and that the doctrine laid down in the Hogar case is as good
today as it was when promulgated by this court ten years ago. If conditions have changed
rather points to the necessity of adhering to the doctrine than in departing therefrom. Our
Constitution has substantially incorporated the provision contained in the Jones Law regarding
the subject and title of bills. This means that this provision is a necessary requirement , to
prevent the evils which otherwise would exist in legislation, and which evils I have already
pointed out. In addition, our Constitution, to further surround legislative practice and
procedure with the necessary guarantees against hasty, ill-considered legislation, requires the
printing of bills at least three days prior to its consideration. The insertion of amendments is
also expressly prohibited after the third reading of a bill. (Art. VI, sec. 12, par. 2.) The framers
of our Constitution, therefor not only considered the retention of the provision with reference
to the requirement that bills should contain one subject matter expressed in the title thereof,
but regarded that requirement insufficient, and, as a further guaranty, provided for the
printing of bills three days before their consideration and, in addition, barred the insertion of
amendments after the last reading of a bill. It may also be pointed out that our Constitution
establishes a unicameral legislature. A one-chambered legislature is devoid of a second
-chamber check. More strict adherence to constitutional mandate is thus required,
particularly in times when the executive and legislative departments no longer check one
another. If, then, a change has come to pass, it is one which points to the necessity and
advisability of adhering to the principle announced in the Hogar and previous cases.
In the very language of this court in McGirr v. Hamilton and Abreu (30 Phil., 563,571,572), it
may not be out of place to close this dissent with the words of one of New York’s greatest
judges as found in the case of Oakley v. Aspinwall (3 Comstock [N.Y],
547,568):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is highly probable that inconveniences will result from the following constitution as it is
written. But that consideration can have no weight with me. It is not for us, but for those who
made the instrument to supply its defects. If the legislature or the courts may take that office
upon themselves; or if under color of construction, or upon any other specious ground, they
may depart from that which is plainly declared, the people may well despair of ever being
able to set a boundary to the powers of the government. Written constitutions will be worse
than useless.
"Believing, as I do, that the success of free institutions depends on a rigid adherence to the
fundamental law, I have never yielded to considerations of expediency in expounding it. There
is always some plausible reason for the latudinarian constructions which are resorted to for
the purpose of acquiring power-some evil to be avoided, or some good to be attained, by
pushing the powers of the government beyond their legitimate boundary. It is by yielding to
such influences that constitutions are gradually undermined and finally overthrown. My rule
has ever been to follow the fundamental law as it written, regardless of consequences. If the
law does not work well, the people can amend it; and inconvenience can be borne long
enough to await that process. But, if the legislature or the courts undertake to cure defects by
force and unnatural constructions, they inflict a wound upon the constitution which nothing
can heal. One step taken by the legislature or the judiciary in enlarging the powers of the
government opens the door for another, which will be sure to follow; and so the process goes
on, until all respect for the fundamental law is lost, and the powers of the government are just
what those in authority please to call them."cralaw virtua1aw library
My conclusion is that the government is entitled to collect the percentage fixed in the original
act but not that determined in section 11 of Act No. 4007 because that section is
unconstitutional. I adopt the partial unconstitutionality rule stated in Barrameda v. Moir
([1913], 25 Phil., 44), and other cases and hold that section 11 of Act No. 4007 is
unconstitutional.
Diaz, J., concurs.
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I dissent from the majority opinion.
The Solicitor-General, in the name of the Government, filed a complaint against the Hongkong
& Shanghai Banking Corporation and eight other banking institutions, for the recovery of
certain sums by way of assessments, in conformity with the provisions of section 11 of Act No.
4007.
All the defendants demurred to the complaint. The Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation and the other defendant’s , with the exception of the National City Bank of New
York, founded their demurrers on the ground that the law relied upon in the complaint is
unconstitutional. The demurrer of the National City Bank of New York invoked the same
ground and further alleged that there is a misjoinder of parties and that Act No. 4007, section
11, is not applicable to it because it is a national banking association.
The demurrers being sustained by the court, and the plaintiff failing to amend the complaint,
judgment was rendered dismissing the same, to which exception was taken by the Solicitor-
General who thereafter filed the bill of exceptions which was duly approved.
Every law must have the essential feature that it shall embrace only one subject and that
subject shall be expressed in the title thereof. Such is the provision of section 3 of the Jones
Law.
The same provision is contained in section 12 (1) of Article VI of our Constitution.
In the case of Central Capiz v. Ramirez (40 Phil., 883, 889- 891), in inquiring into the meaning
and scope of the aforesaid Organic Law, this court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
12
"The purpose of this legislative restriction, and the evils sought to be remedied thereby, are
clearly state by Sutherland in his valuable work on Statutory Construction. In section 111 he
says that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have kept
steadily in view the correction of the mischief against which it was aimed. The objects is to
prevent the practice, which was common in all legislative bodies where no such restrictions
existed, of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other or
to the subject specified in the title, by which measures were often adopted without attracting
attention. Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests, and were combined in order to
unite the members of the legislature who favor either in support of all. These combinations
were corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the State. Such omnibus bills sometimes
included more than a hundred sections on as many different subjects, with a title appropriate
to the first section, "and for other purposes."cralaw virtua1aw library
"‘The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the
legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not
knowingly have approved; and not only were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so
that legislative provisions were steadily pushed through in the closing hours of a session,
which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by popular
discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The
constitutional clause under discussion is intented to correct these evils; to prevent such
corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures, by confining each act to one subject of
object; to prevent suprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be
expressed in the title.’
x x x Banking was already in existence as one of the bureaus of the Government, and that,
"‘The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this
provisions are well known. Legislative assemblies, for the dispatch of business, often pass bills
by their titles only without requiring them to be read. A specious title sometimes covers
legislation which, if its real character had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent.
To prevent suprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provisions was
intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision the title of a statute was often
no indication of its subject or contents’."cralaw virtua1aw library
Sutherland, — this court continues, — in his work on Statutory Construction, section 122,
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘The phrase" and for other purposes" expresses no specific purpose and imports indefinitely
something different from that which precedes it in the title. It is, therefore, universally
rejected as having no force or effect wherever, this constitutional restriction operated’." (Citing
numerous cases.) (Page 895.)
See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan (48 Phil., 676). Therefore, the first question requiring solution is
whether the subject matter if section 11 of Act No. 4007 is embraced in the title thereof, as
required by the Jones Law.
The title of the aforesaid Act No. 4007 is worded as follows: "An Act to reorganize the
departments, bureaus and offices of the Insular Government, and for other purposes."
Section 11 of the Act provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The provisions of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, the total annual expenses of
the Bureau of Banking shall be reimbursed annually to the Government by assessment levied
upon all banking institution subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner. The proportion
of expenses of the Bureau of Banking to be assessed against each of such banking institution
shall be the same as the proportion which its average total assets bear to the average total
assets of all such banking institution during the year in which the expenses were
incurred."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is evident from what has been quoted that the provisions of section 11 of the said Act are
absolutely foreign to the reorganization of the departments and offices of the Government,
inasmuch as they reefer exclusively to the levy of an assessment upon the banks. Section 11 is
therefore null and without any effect, for being unconstitutional, in view of the fact that its
subject matter is distinct from and in no way related to that of the law in question, which is
the reorganization of the departments, bureaus and offices of the Government.
We have here not only variety of subject, but failure to express the subject of section 11 in the
Act No. 4007; and the deficiency is not supplied by the addition to the title of the Act of the
phrase "and for other purposes", since, as we have seen, it has been repeatedly decided by
the courts that said phrase does not signify anything.
But the majority contends that at the time of the passage of Act No. 4007 the Bureau of
therefore, it is clear that said bureau is embraced in said title. To this I am agreeable. On the
other hand, — the majority continues, — the contents of section 11 are germane to and
connected with the organization and maintenance of said bureau. From this I dissent, because
the reorganization of the Government is a subject clearly distinct from the revision of an
assessment, of which section 11 treats, thereby amending, without previous notice, section
1637 of the Administrative Code.
The Solicitor-General argues that the court could have rendered judgment, if not under
section 11 of Act No. 4007, under section 1637 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act
No. 3519. I believe that such change, which relates to the basis of the complaint, cannot be
made except by an amendment of the complaint.
I therefore vote for the confirmation of the appealed decision.
13

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109404. January 22, 1996.]
FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & S Delta Village, Petitioner, v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN Y. DRILLON, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY
BOARD (HLURB) AND PROSPERO PALMIANO, Respondents.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
Edwin Y. Chua, for Petitioner.
The Solicitor-General, for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; APPEAL THEREFROM MAY BE TAKEN TO
THE, COURT OF APPEALS. — Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 "appeals from
judgments or final orders of the . . . Office of the President . . . may be taken to the Court of
Appeals . . . ." However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed
submitted for decision one and a half years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to
the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
2. ID.; ID.; DECISIONS THEREOF BECOMES FINAL AFTER THE LAPSE OF 15 DAYS FROM RECEIPT
OF THE COPY UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FILED WITHIN SUCH PERIOD. —
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the (Executive Secretary’s) Decision was filed only
on the 21st. day from receipt thereof. Said decision had become final and executory, pursuant
to Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 which provides that" (d)ecisions/ resolutions/
orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws,
become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof x x x, unless
such period."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. CIVIL LAW; THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS’ PROTECTIVE DECREE (P.D. 957)
GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT AS INFERRED FROM THE INTENTION OF THE LAW. — Respondent
Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive
effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did
not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the
unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the
situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. P.D. 957 was
enacted to provide a protective mantle over citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations
and machinations of ‘unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers’, and such intent is
expressed clearly in its preamble. The legislative intent must have been to remedy the
alarming situation by having P.D. 957 operate retrospectively even upon contracts already in
existence at the time of its enactment. Indeed, a strictly prospective application of the statute
will effectively emasculate it, for then the State will not be able to exercise its regulatory
functions and curb fraudulent schemes and practices perpetrated under or in connection with
those contracts and transactions which happen to have been entered into prior to P.D. 957,
despite obvious prejudice to the very subdivision lot buyers sought to be protected by said
law. And Sections 20, 21 and 23 of P.D. 957 by their very terms, have retroactive effect and will
impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957’s
enactment .
4. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO DEVELOP SUBDIVISION; JUSTIFIES DESISTANCE FROM FURTHER
PAYMENT OF AMORTIZATIONS THEREIN. — As P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the
contracts in question, it follows that Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private
respondent when he desisted from making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner’s
14
failure to develop the subdivision project according to the approved plans and within the time
limit for complying with the same.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment of
amortization by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior to
the enactment of P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree" ?
This is the major question raised in the instant Petition seeking to set aside the decision of the
respondent Executive Secretary dated March 10, 1992 in O.P. Case No. 3761, which affirmed
the order of the respondent HLURB dated September 1, 1987.
On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner and his
co-owner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City.
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed
by the Delta Village Homeowners’ Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority (NHA)
rendered a resolution on January 17, 1979 inter alia ordering petitioner to cease and desist
from making further sales of lots in said village or in any project owned by
him.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with the
Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses
Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended
payment of his amortization, but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses
Relevo, in whose favor title to the said property was registered. Private respondent further
alleged that he suspended his payments because of petitioner’s failure to develop the village.
Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and for
reconveyance of the lot to him.
On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of petitioner to
cancel the contract with private respondent and dismissed private respondent’s complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying P.D. 957,
ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision development and to reinstate private
respondent’s purchase contract over one lot, and as to the other, "it appearing that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 269546 has been issued to . . . spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo . . .,
the management of E & S Delta Village is hereby ordered to immediately refund to the
complainant-appellant (herein private respondent) all payments made thereon, plus interests
computed at legal rates from date of receipt hereof until fully paid." chanrobles.com : virtual
lawlibrary
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and denied
the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed out of
time. Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from judgments or final orders of
the . . . Office of the President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals. . .." However, in order
to hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision one and a half
years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of
speedy justice.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary erred in applying
P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village justified
private respondent’s non-payment of his amortization. Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the
land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in
1976, said law cannot govern the transaction.
We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his
discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those
contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as called from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and
conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a leading authority on
statutory construction stressed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The intent of a statute is the law. . . .. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and
the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of
the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself. and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute . Courts will not follow
the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature
and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. . . .. In construing statutes
the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that
sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the
apparent policy and objects of the legislature.’ 1 (Emphasis supplied.)
It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor the weak and
the disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D.
957 was enacted with no other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless
citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of ‘unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers’, and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than
in its preamble, pertinent portions of which read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent
human settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality
15
of life;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers,
operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to Provide
and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage. sewerage, water systems, lighting systems,
and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering; the health and safety of home and lot
buyers;
"WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
Operators. such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrance, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots
to different innocent purchasers for value;" 2 (Emphasis supplied.)
From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest and unarguable that the legislative
intent must have been to remedy the alarming situation by having P.D. 957 operate
retrospectively even upon contracts already in existence at the time of its enactment. Indeed,
a strictly prospective application of the statute will effectively emasculate it, for then the State
will not be able to exercise its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent schemes and practices
perpetrated under or in connection with those contracts and transactions which happen to
have been entered into prior to P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to the very subdivision lot
buyers sought to be protected by said law. It is hardly conceivable that the legislative authority
intended to permit such a loophole to remain and continue to be a source of misery for
subdivision lot buyers well into the future.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole are certain of its
provisions, viz., Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive
effect and will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D.
957’s enactment:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the
facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water
supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or
condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters letters or in any form of
advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision
or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
"SEC. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. — In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or
disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or
developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its
obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree
unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed
in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
"Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the
preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this
Decree.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"SEC. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made by a buyer in a
subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited
in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or
developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to
develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within
the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the
total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with
interest thereon at the legal rate." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive Secretary, the application of P.D.
957 to the contracts in question will be consistent with paragraph 4 of the contracts
themselves, which expressly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to subdivide, develop and improve the
entire area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the parcels of lands
subject of this contract is a part in accordance with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance
No. 6561, S-66 and the Party of the First Part further binds himself to comply with and abide
by all laws, rules and regulations respecting the subdivision and development of lots for
residential purposes as may be presently in force or may hereafter be required by laws passed
by the Congress of the Philippines or required by regulations of the Bureau of Lands, the
General Registration Office and other government agencies." (Emphasis
supplied)chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary
Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that
Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from
making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner’s failure to develop the subdivision
project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the
same. Such incomplete development of the subdivision and non-performance of specific
contractual and statutory obligations on the part of the subdivision-owner had been
established in the findings of the HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the respondent
Executive Secretary in his assailed Decision. Furthermore, respondent Executive Secretary also
gave due weight to the following matters: although private respondent started to default on
amortization payments beginning May 1975, so that by the end of July 1975 he had already
incurred three consecutive arrearages in payments, nevertheless, the petitioner, who had the
cancellation option available to him under the contract, did not exercise or utilize the same in
timely fashion but delayed until May 1979 when he finally made up his mind to cancel the
contracts. But by that time the land purchase agreements had already been overtaken by the
provisions of P.D. 957, promulgated on July 12, 1976. (In any event, as pointed out by
respondent HLURB and seconded by the Solicitor General, the defaults in amortization
payments incurred by private respondent had been effectively condoned by the petitioner, by
reason of the latter’s tolerance of the defaults for a long period of time.)
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner’s contention that respondent Secretary exceeded his
jurisdiction in ordering the refund of private respondent’s payments on Lot 12 although
(according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the complaint. Respondent Secretary
duly noted that the supporting documents submitted substantiating the claim of non-
development justified such order inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-payment
of amortization on said Lot. 12.
16
Finally, since petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the (Executive Secretary’s) Decision
dated March 10, 1992 was filed only on the 21st day from receipt thereof, said decision had
become final and executory, pursuant to Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated
February 12, 1987, which provides that" (d)ecisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse
of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof . . ., unless a motion for reconsideration
thereof is filed within such period."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, the petition is DENIED due
course and is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 135869 September 22, 1999

RUSTICO H. ANTONIO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE T. MIRANDA, JR., respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Is the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") in an election protest involving a barangay position five (5) days per COMELEC
Rules of Procedure or ten (10) days as provided for in Republic Act. 6679 1 and the Omnibus
Election Code? This is the sole issue posed in the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul the order dated August 3, 1998 of the
Second Division of the COMELEC, 2 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rustico Antonio for
having been filed out of time pursuant to COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and the order
promulgated on October 14, 1998 of the COMELEC en banc, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

17
The antecedents as found by the COMELEC in the order dated October 14, 1998 are:
The parties in this case were rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of Barangay Ilaya, Las
Piñas City, Metro Manila. After the board of canvassers proclaimed protestee-appellant
Rustico Antonio, protestant-appellee Vicente T. Miranda, Jr. filed an election protest docketed
as Election Protest Case No. 97-0017 against Antonio before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Las Piñas City (Branch LXXIX). The trial court rendered a Decision dated 9 March 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court declares the protestant Vicente Miranda as the duly elected Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Ilaya, Las Piñas City, Metro Manila.
Antonio admitted receipt of the above-quoted decision on 18 March 1998. Subsequently,
Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 27 March 1998 or nine (9) days after
receipt thereof. Meanwhile, Miranda moved to execute the trial court's decision. Rustico, in
his Opposition to the Motion for Execution or Execution Pending Appeal, argued against
Miranda's motion for execution. After the trial court denied the motion for execution, the
records of this case was forwarded to the Commission (Second Division).
On 10 August 1998, protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio received from this Commission
(Second Division) an Order dated 3 August 1998 stating as follows:
In the light of the aforequoted rules, protestee RUSTICO ANTONIO, failed to perfect his appeal
within the five (5) days period prescribed for perfecting his appeal, as he filed his Notice of
Appeal only on March 27, 1998 or nine (9) days after receipt of the decision sought to be
appealed.
The Period aforestated is jurisdictional and failure of the protestee to perfect his appeal within
the said period deprives the Commission of its appellate jurisdiction.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
The instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED and We AFFIRM the Order dated 3 August
1998 of this Commission (Second Division). 3
In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the appeal for the
following reasons:
(a) In barangay electoral protest cases, the period of appeal is ten (10) days from receipt of
the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court. This is provided for by Sec. 9 of R.A.
6679 and Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code.
(b) The provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure providing for a five-
day period within which to appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
Court could not prevail upon the express provisions of Rep. Act No. 6679 and Sec. 252 of the
Omnibus Election Code;
(c) Moreover, the COMELEC committed an error of jurisdiction when it disregarded the
provisions of Sections 5, 6 & 7, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring the filing
of briefs by the appellant and the appellee. The questioned resolution of August 3, 1998 was
issued motu propio and without prior notice and hearing. The petitioner was fast tracked;
(d) The alleged winning margin of the private respondent over the petitioner as found by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Piñas is only four (4) votes the results being MIRANDA —
1,171; ANTONIO — 1,167. The people's will must not go on procedural points. "An election
protest involves public interest, and technicalities should not be sanctioned when it will be an
obstacle in the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of its public
officials." [Macasundig vs. Macalanagan, 13 SCRA 577; Vda. De Mesa vs. Mensias, 18 SCRA
533, Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 808; Genete vs. Archangel, 21 SCRA 1178;
Maliwanag vs. Herrera, 25 SCRA 175; De Castro vs. Genete, 27 SCRA 623]
(e) The questioned resolutions violated the above principle because the COMELEC did not
appreciate the contested ballots. 4
In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section 21, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which reads:
Sec. 21. Appeal — From any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal
to the Commission on Elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of appeal from decisions of the
Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial Courts involving barangay officials is governed by
Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Sec. 9 of Republic Act 6679 reads:
Sec. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be filed with the
proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate
of candidacy and has been voted for a barangay office within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest
within thirty (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan
trial court may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the appeal and whose decision on questions of fact shall be final and non-
appealable. For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed.
Similarly, Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. — A sworn petition contesting the election of a
barangay officer shall be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall
decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision of the
municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy
thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within
thirty days from its submission, and whose decisions shall be final.
In applying Section 21 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure rather than Section 9 of Republic
Act 6779 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC rationalized thus:
Antonio asserts that Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election
Code providing for a ten-day period to appeal prevails over the provisions of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. According to Antonio, quasi-judicial bodies, including this Commission,
cannot amend an act of Congress and in case of discrepancy between the basic law and an
interpretative or administrative ruling, the former prevails. Generally, yes. But the situation
herein does not fall within the generic situation contemplated therein.
No less than the 1987 Constitution (Article D X-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C, Section 3) grants
and authorizes this Commission to promulgate its own rules of procedure as long as such rules
concerning pleadings and practice do not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
Hence, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated in 1993 as amended in 1994 is no
ordinary interpretative or administrative ruling. It is promulgated by this Commission pursuant
to a constitutionally mandated authority which no legislative enactment can amend, revise or
repeal.
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21) provides that from the decision
rendered by the court the aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on Elections within
18
five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision. Rule 22 Section 9 (d) of Our Rules of
Procedure further provides that an appeal from decisions of courts in election protest
cases may be dismissed at the instance of the Commission for failure to file the required notice
of appeal within the prescribed period.
In case at bar, Antonio filed his notice of appeal before the trial court on the ninth (9) day
from receipt of the decision appealed from or four (4) days after the five-day prescribed
period to appeal lapsed. Therefore, the present appeal must be dismissed. For it is axiomatic
that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. As a consequence,
the failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period as required by the Rules has the
effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the case. So the High Court rules in Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals,
et. al. (205 SCRA 537). And so, it should also be in the case at bar.
Worth noting is that Our Rules of Procedure may be amended, revised or repealed pursuant
to the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII Section 5[5]) providing that rules of procedure of . . .
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. But far
from being disapproved the COMELEC Rules of Procedure received approbation and has
constantly been cited by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions such as in the case
of Pahilan vs. Tabalba (230 SCRA 205, at 211) and Rodillas vs. Commission on Elections (245
SCRA 702, at 704). In the more recent case of Calucag vs. Commission on
Elections promulgated on 19 June 1997 (G.R. No. 123673), the Supreme Court stated that:
Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the
appeal WHICH APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THE
MTC DECISION. . . (page 4-5).
The repeated recognition given by the Supreme Court of this five-day rule within which to file
the required notice of appeal will make questionable the legislative enactment providing for a
ten-day period. 5
Without adopting the foregoing ratiocination of the COMELEC, we nonetheless find the
instant petition devoid of merit.
It is beyond cavil that legislative enactments prevail over rules of procedure promulgated by
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies and that rules of procedure should be consistent with
standing legislative enactments. In relation to the above-quoted Section 9 of Republic Act
6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioner points out that in Flores
vs. Commission on Elections 6, this Court had declared that decisions of the Metropolitan or
Municipal Court in election protest cases involving barangay officials are no longer appealable
to the Regional Trial Court but to the COMELEC pursuant to Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution. 7 Petitioner submits that the dispositive portion in the Flores case only
declared unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 providing for appeal
to the Regional Trial Court but not the ten (10) day period of appeal. The dispositive portion of
the Flores case reads:
1. Declaring Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it provides that
barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be
appealable to the regional trial court.
Petitioner admits that the provisions in Republic Act No. 6679 and for that matter the
Omnibus Election Code providing for appellate jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court had
been declared unconstitutional in the aforecited Flores case. A verbatim comparison of both
provisions reveals that they provide the same remedy, that is, appeal from a decision of the
municipal or metropolitan trial court in barangay election cases to the regional trial court.
Both provisions provide that (1) results of a barangay election may be contested by filing a
sworn petition with the municipal trial court within ten days from proclamation; (2) the MTC
shall decide within thirty days per Republic Act No. 6679 or fifteen days per Omnibus Election
Code; and (3) the decision of the municipal trial court may be appealed to the regional trial
court within ten days from receipt by the aggrieved party, which decision is final and non-
appealable. There is no appreciable basis to make a distinction between the two provisions,
except for their different numbers, to advance that they provide for two different remedies. It
would be superfluous to insist on a categorical declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
appeal provided for in Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the same appeal in Sec. 9,
Republic Act No. 6679 had already been categorically declared unconstitutional. Further, Sec.
252 of the Omnibus Election Code 8 as amended by the new law, Republic Act No.
6679 9, has in effect, been superseded by the latter. While the appellate procedure has been
retained by the amendatory act, Republic Act No. 6679 nonetheless supersedes the verbatim
provision in the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, it was not necessary for Flores to mention
Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, considering that as aforestated, Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 6679 was a mere reenactment of the former law.
Petitioner is of the opinion, though, that the unconstitutionality extended only as to which
court has appellate jurisdiction without affecting the period within which to appeal. According
to petitioner, only the portion providing for the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court in said cases should be deemed unconstitutional. The rest of the provisions, particularly
on the period to appeal, free from the taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and
effect in view of the separability clauses contained in Republic Act 6779 10 and the Omnibus
Election Code. 11
We do not agree.
First, petitioner's argument raises the presumption that the period to appeal can be severed
from the remedy or the appeal itself which is provided in Section 9, Republic Act 6679 and
survive on its own. The presumption cannot be sustained because the period to appeal is an
essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the remedy.
Aptly, the rules on statutory construction prescribe:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced. The presence of a separability clause in statute creates the presumption that the
legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity, of the statute. To justify this
result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could
not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and
valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated
without causing results affecting the main purpose of the act in a manner contrary to the
intention of the legislature. The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no
legal effect or efficacy for any purpose whatsoever, and what remains must express the
legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for
each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole the nullity of
one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or
connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole
and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are
19
unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall
with them. 12
In the instant petition, the exception applies. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6679 and Section
252 of the Omnibus Election Code, without the constitutionally infirm portion on the
appellate jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in barangay election protest cases, does not
remain complete in itself, sensible, capable of being executed and wholly independent of the
portion which was rejected. In other words, with the elimination of the forum, the period
cannot stand on its own. Moreover, when this Court stated that "Section 9 of Rep. Act No.
6679 is declared unconstitutional insofar as it provides that barangay election contests
decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be appealable to the regional trial
court", it meant to preserve the first two sentences on the original jurisdiction of municipal
and metropolitan trial courts to try barangay election protests cases but not, as advanced by
the petitioner, the ten-day period to appeal to the Regional Trial Court. This is the logical and
sound interpretation of subject portion of the Flores case.
Second, what was invalidated by the Flores case was the whole appeal itself and not just the
question of which court to file the petition. If the remedy itself is declared unconstitutional
how could the period to appeal possibly survive? How could the time limit exist if there is
nothing to be done within such time?
Third, we cannot indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the said laws, to
maintain the ten (10) day period to appeal despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of
the appellate jurisdiction of the regional trial court, Republic Act No. 7166 13 amending the
Omnibus Election Code, evinces the intent of our lawmakers to expedite the remedial aspect
of election controversies. The law was approved on November 26, 1991, after the Flores case
which was promulgated on April 20, 1990, and presumably, the legislature in enacting the
same was cognizant of the ruling in Flores. Said law provides the same five (5) day period to
appeal decisions of the trial court in election contests for municipal officers to the COMELEC.
Section 22 thereof reads:
Sec. 22. Election Contests for Municipal Officers. — All election contests involving municipal
offices filed with the Regional Trial Court shall be decided expeditiously. The decision may be
appealed to the Commission within five (5) days from promulgation or receipt of a copy
thereof by the aggrieved party. The Commission shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days
after it is submitted for decision, but not later than six (6) months after the filing of the
appeal, which decision shall be final, unappealable and executory.
There would be no logic nor reason in ruling that a longer period to appeal to the COMELEC
should apply to election contests for barangay officials.
Fourth, since the whole remedy was invalidated, a void was created. Thus, the COMELEC had
to come in and provide for a new appeal in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution.
As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC, Section 6, Article IX-A 14 of the 1987 Constitution
grants and authorizes the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided a uniform five (5) day period for taking an
appeal 15 consistent with the expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would be
absurd and therefore not clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for barangay
election contests. Hence, Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not in
conflict with any existing law. To adopt a contrary view would defeat the laudable objective of
providing a uniform period of appeal and defy the COMELEC's constitutional mandate to enact
rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases.
In view of the Flores case, jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure are controlling in election protests heard by a regional trial court. 16 The Court en
banc has held in Rodillas vs.
COMELEC 17 that "the procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court in a barangay election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure." More recently, in Calucag vs. Commission on Elections 18, the Court en banc had
occasion to state that:
It follows that after the promulgation of Flores, the same arguments propounded therein by
the petitioner may no longer be employed. Article 8 of the Civil Code states that "(j)udicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines." Said pronouncement of the Court, having formed part of the law of
the land, ignorance thereof can no longer be countenanced. Therefore, the COMELEC is the
proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which appeal must be
filed within five days after the promulgation of the MTC's decision. The erroneous filing of the
appeal with the RTC did not toll the running of the prescriptive period. . . . The five-day period
having expired without the aggrieved party filing the appropriate appeal before the COMELEC,
the statutory privilege of petitioner to appeal is deemed waived and the appealed decisions
has become final and executory.
Significantly, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides in part that "[r]ules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court."
Equally devoid of merit is the contention that petitioner was fast tracked because the
COMELEC did not require the parties to file their appeal briefs; that the dismissal was
issued motu proprio without prior notice and hearing; and that dismissal of the appeal defeats
the people's will on procedural points. Suffice it to state that the period for filing an appeal is
by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without
which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed
at all. The right of appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of the law. 19 Further, by virtue
of Section 9 (6), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that "an appeal
may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission for failure
to file a notice of appeal within the prescribed period", the COMELEC is precisely given the
discretion, in a case where the appeal is not filed on time to dismiss the action or proceeding.
The COMELEC, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed orders of the Commission on Elections dated August 3, 1998 and October 14, 1998
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Buena and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 An Act To Amend Republic Act No. 6653 To Postpone The Barangay Elections To March 28,
1989, Prescribing Additional Rules Governing The Conduct Of Barangay Election And For Other
Purposes.
2 Composed of Commissioners Julio F. Desamito and Japal M. Guiani.
3 Rollo, pp. 36-37.
4 Ibid., p. 10.
5 Rollo, p. 38.
6 184 SCRA 484.
20
7 Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) x x x.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualification of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) x x x.
(4) x x x.
(5) x x x.
(6) x x x.
(7) x x x.
(8) x x x.
(9) x x x.
8 Approved on December 3, 1985.
9 Approved on November 4, 1988.
10 Sec. 17. If any part or provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other
parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
11 Sec. 281. Separability clause. — If for any reason any section or provision of this Code, or
any portion thereof, or the application of such section, provision or portion to any person,
group or circumstance is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of this Code or
the application of such section, provision or portion thereof to other persons, groups or
circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.
12 Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990, pp. 27-28, quoting Lidasan vs. Commission
on Elections, 21 SCRA 496.
13 An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and For Other Purposes (November 26, 1991).
14 Sec. 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules however shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights.
15 Rule 22 — Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest Cases
Sec. 3. Notice of Appeal. — Within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision of the
court, the aggrieved party may file with said court a notice of appeal, and serve a copy thereof
upon the attorney of record of the adverse party.
Rule 27 — Pre-Proclamation Controversies
Sec. 10. Appeals from Rulings of Board of Canvassers. — (a) A party aggrieved by a ruling of
the Board of Canvassers shall, within forty-eight hours from receipt of a copy of the ruling of
the Board of Canvassers, file with the Board a written and verified Notice of Appeal; and
within an inextendible period of five (5) days, he shall file his appeal to the Commission.
Rule 35 — Election Contests Before Courts of General Jurisdiction
Sec. 21. Appeal. — From any decision rendered by the court the aggrieved party may appeal
to the Commission on Elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision.
Rule 36 — Quo Warranto Case Before Courts of General Jurisdiction
Sec. 14. Appeal. — From any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal
to the Commission on Elections, within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision.
Rule 37 — Review of Decisions of the Commission
Sec. 3. Decisions Final After Five Days. — Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to
deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance
candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become
final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation, unless restrained
by the Supreme Court.
16 Abeja vs. Tañada, 236 SCRA 60 (1994).
17 245 SCRA 702 (1995).
18 274 SCRA 405 (1997), emphasis supplied.
19 Laza vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 654.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to
be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445,
447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731,
733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165,
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826,
1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239,
241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-
303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397,
405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602,
609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-
940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-
21
1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-
1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593,
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94,
95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on
the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition.
The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and
directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this
mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section
3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified
time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a
public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show
any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs.
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus
would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of
that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to
apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e.,
469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is
a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a
proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a
special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule
to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the
particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable
and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for
the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the
United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government
to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law
of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be
difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered
his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette
is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-
for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when
it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity
of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the
issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date
of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents
or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time
to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
22
for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of
laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept
abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and
for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies
the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no
means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the
Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas
de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in
the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself
makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be
published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the
law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official
Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official
and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have
not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.
The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to
wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found
to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite
clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect
to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested,
of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in
the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not
been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it
is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by
the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled
that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding
is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their
comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
23
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication
required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is
an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not
follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a
statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of
any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a
pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential
act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no
such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what
is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is,
to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute
or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus:
"The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but
such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is
not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in
the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg
to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed
be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown
and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to
subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for
me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential
decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of
their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no
legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be
open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to
hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or
executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto
character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on
the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the
challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official
Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is
subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself
only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical
force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and
effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to
yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in
this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed
that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be
punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in
earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a
law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and
the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary
rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law
are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself:
the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days]
after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify
the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's
indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally
fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
24
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not
mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the
decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but
such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is
not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any
statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity
date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may
provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode
of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official
Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as
have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the
said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity
of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law,
especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot
nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to
when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that
role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication
in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written
opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly
impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential
issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would
arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any
legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication
required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is
an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not
follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a
statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of
any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a
pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential
act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no
such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what
is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is,
to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute
or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus:
"The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but
such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is
not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in
the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg
to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the
government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed
be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown
and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to
subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for
me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential
decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of
25
their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no
legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be
open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to
hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or
executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto
character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on
the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the
challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official
Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is
subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself
only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical
force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and
effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette
would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to
yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in
this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme.
Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and
ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed
that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be
punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in
earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a
law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and
the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary
rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law
are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that
"Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws
which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their
effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic
constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself:
the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days]
after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify
the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's
indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally
fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of
effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not
mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the
decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of
due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but
such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is
not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any
statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity
date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two
things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may
provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode
of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official
Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to
Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in
relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as
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have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be
published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the
said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity
of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law,
especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot
nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to
when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that
role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws
become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication
in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection Article 7,
Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR
1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A
2 Ibid, closing paragraph.
3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).
4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).
5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.
6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
Teehankee, J.:
1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.
2 Notes in brackets supplied.
3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.
Plana, J.:
* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publication of
all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex rel.
White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public
nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Footnotes
1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be
recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law.
2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs.
City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec,
95 SCRA 392.
3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486;
Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs.
Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.
5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110
Phil. 150.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.
8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
9 93 Phil.. 68,.
10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of
the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the
respective dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed
therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-
publication of other presidential issuances.
11 129 SCRA 174.
Fernando, CJ.:

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