CARMEN LAPUZ-SY Vs EUFEMIO S.

EUFEMIO

FACTS: The deceased, Carmen Lapuz-Sy was married to Eufemio S. Eufemio on September 1934. They
had lived together as husband and wife continuously, however, they were never blessed with an
offspring. During the existence of the said marriage, the spouses acquired several properties.

In 1943, the respondent abandoned the Carmen and the latter discovered that he was cohabiting with a
Chinese woman in 1949.

Consequently, the deceased initiated an action for legal separation before the lower court against the
respondent, praying for the issuance of a decree which would deprive the respondent of his share on
the conjugal partnership profits.

In his answer, the respondent alleged special defenses with several claims involving money and other
properties. He also counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the deceased on
the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with the Chinese woman.

However, during the pendency of the case, Carmen died on a vehicular accident and the counsel
informed the court of the matter. Consequently, the respondent moved to dismiss the proceedings
arguing prescription and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.

The deceased was however substituted by her father, Macario through the motion of the former’s
counsel.

ISSUE: WoN the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the
action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights. YES.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. An action for legal separation is purely personal in
character. Hence, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action
itself.

A review of the resulting changes in the property relations between spouses shows that they are solely
the effect of legal separation, hence, they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to
the decree.

Article 106 (P4) of the Civil Code provides that the offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting
from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse
made in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by the operation of law.

In death supervenes during the pendency of the action, such in the present case, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation, and the expected consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
MARIA MENDOZA Vs JULIA POLICARPIO DELOS SANTOS

FACTS: Properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in the province of Bulacan.
Two of the said parcels of land was in the name of the respondent, Julia Delos Santos, and the third
parcel is also in the name of the respondent however co-owned by Victoria Pantalion, who bought one-
half of the property from the petitioners, Maria Mendoza and her siblings.

Petitioners are grand children of Placido and Dominga Mendoza. The said spouses were blessed with 4
children, namely, Antonio, Vicente, Apolonio, and Exequiel who is married to Leonor. They alleged that
the subject properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that were subject of an oral
partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel.

After Exequiel’s demise, the properties were transmitted to his spouse, Leonor and to their only
daughter, Georgia. When the mother died, her share went to Georgia. In 1992, Georgia died intestate
without an issue.

The petitioners claimed that when Georgia died, the respondent, Julia DS, who is the sister of Leonor,
adjudicated unto herself all the subject properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Georgia.
Hence, the petitioners should have been reserved by the respondent in their behalf and must now
revert back to them, invoking Reserva Troncal (Art. 891 of the Civil Code).

The respondent denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not originate from the
petitioner’s familial line and were not originally owned by the Spouses Placido and Dominga. She alleged
that the subject properties were purchased by Exequiel from some other persons.

The Triacl Court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners and granted their actions for Recovery of
Possession of the subject properties by Reserva Troncal, ordering the respondent to reconvey the same
to them.

On an appeal, The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Trial Court by ruling that
the petitioners failed to establish that Placido and Dominga owned the subject properties, and even
assuming that they previously owned the same, it still cannot be subject to Reserva Troncal as neither
Exequiel predeceased his parents nor did her daughter, Georgia predeceased her.

Hence this present petition by the petitioners arguing that it is sufficient that the subject properties
came from paternal line of Georgia for it to be subject to Reserva Troncal.

ISSUE: WoN the provision on Reserva Troncal as contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code is
applicable in the present case. NO

RULING: The Supreme Court held that DS, who now possess the subject properties, is not the other
ascendant within the purview of Article 891.

Reserva Troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the
third-degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into the into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel’s
as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from who Gregoria inherited the
subject properties.
The law does not go farther than such ascendants, brother or sister in determining the lineal character
of the property.

It was also immaterial for the Court of Appeals to determine whether Exequiel predeceased his parents
or whether Gregoria predeceased him. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is
the ascendant from whom the subject properties originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the
descendant who received the properties from her father, Exequiel by gratuitous title.

Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or
propetisus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. It is gratuitous when the recipient does not
give anything in return. What is clearly established in the present case is that the subject properties
were owned by Exequiel.

Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant. The
respondent, Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant, rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral relative. Not
being Gregoria’s descendant, both petitioners and respondent are therefore her collateral relatives.

In determining the collateral relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to
the relative from whom the computation is made. In case of Julia’s collateral relationship with Gregoria,
ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her mother Leonor, then to the common ancestor, that is Julia
and Leonor’s parent, and then descent to Julia, her aunt. Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative
within the third degree and not her ascendant.

Petitioners cannot be considered as reserves as they are nit relatives within the third degree of Gregoria
from whom the properties came. They are fourth degree relatives being her first cousin.