6.

B - GAGO Vs MAMUYAC
IMMEDIATE The deceased, Miguel Mamuyac who died on January 1922, executed a last will and
FACTS testament in July 1918.

In 1922, petitioner, Gago move for the probate of the aforesaid last will and testament which
was opposed by the respondents, Mamuyac et al.

After hearing the parties, the Trial Court renders a decision, denying the probate of the said
will on the ground that the deceased, executed another will on April 1919.

Consequently, Gago, presented the 1919 Will before the court for its probate and again, the
same was opposed by the respondents.

RES According to the witnesses of the respondents, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the
CONTENTION testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document and another witness
testified that the original will was actually cancelled by the testator by executing another
one in December 1920.

Narcisa Gago, the daughter of the deceased corroborates the testimony of the other
witnesses, admitting that the will executed in 1919 was found in the possession of her father
during his lifetime and the same was subsequently cancelled.
PET The petitioner contends that the will was not a carbon copy and that the respondent
CONTENTION oppositors are estopped from alleging the facts.
TC/CA The trial court renders a decision denying probate of the 1919 Will of the deceased.
RULING
ISSUE WoN there was a valid revocation of will.

SC RULING Yes. The Supreme Court held that the will was already cancelled in 1920.

The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It
therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills.

The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be
inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found.

Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when
last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same
was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had
ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death.

It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge
or authority of the testator.

In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the proponent clearly to establish not
only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on
the contestant to show that it has been revoked.

In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there
is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes
with the testator.
 8.G - MALOLES Vs DE LOS REYES
IMMEDIATE Dr. Arturo de Santos executed a will during his lifetime. On July 20, 1995, he filed a petition for
FACTS probate of his will in the Regional Trial Court.

He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee
the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate
value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named
executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.

After 10 days, Arturo died.

Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia
de Santos (testator’s sister), he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos.

The private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the designated executrix of the will, filed a motion
for the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61

TC/CA Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the motion filed by the respondent to
RULING Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that since the probate proceeding started in Branch 61, then it
should be the same court which should hear Pacita’s motion. Branch 61 however refused to
consolidate and referred the case back to Branch 65. Branch 65 subsequently consolidated the case
per refusal of Branch 61. Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion for intervention filed by Octavio.

PET Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon
CONTENTION the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. He argues that the proceedings must
continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator,
pursuant to Rule 73, §1 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could
not lawfully act upon private respondent's petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
ISSUE Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court — Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to
proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr. Arturo
de Santos.
RULING No. The Supreme Court held that in cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the
authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature.
In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living
testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.

ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the
allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance
of wills after the testator's death shall govern.

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the
allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or
after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Rule 76, §1 likewise provides:

Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a
will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his will.

The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator has been explained by
the Code Commission thus:

Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the testator or
the formalities adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few cases concerning the
intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the mental
condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue
influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed
by law, the same may be corrected at once. The probate during the testator's life, therefore, will
lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator,
the only questions that may remain for the courts to decide after the testator's death will refer to
the intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even when the
testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under duress or undue
influence, but these are rare cases.

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that
he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be
allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition,
the ordinary probate proceeding after the testator's death would be in order.

In the present case, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was
nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to
Rule 73, §12 of the Rules of Court.
 6.B – MANINANG Vs COURT OF APPEALS
IMMEDIATE Clemencia Aseneta died at the Manila Sanitarium. She left a holographic will – all her real
FACTS properties and personal properties shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad Maninang.

Petitioner Soledad filed a petition for probate of the will of the decedent.

RES The Private respondent, Boy Aseneta who as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of the
CONTENTION decedent. He filed a motion to dismiss the testate case on the ground that the holographic will was
null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and therefore, intestacy
should ensue.

PET In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that in
CONTENTION a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and
resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively
disinherited by the decedent.

TC/CA The lower court dismissed the testate case.

RULING
CA denied petitioner’s certiorari and rule that the trial judge’s order of dismissal was final in nature
and therefore appeal is the proper remedy.

ISSUE WoN the lower court correctly dismissed the testate case
SC RULING No. The Supreme Court held that The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires
it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
... The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of
the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for
the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency
(sic) of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The que0stions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be
raised even after the will has been authenticated ...
As a general rule, in a probate case, only the extrinsic validity of the will should be examined. The
exception is where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, before it is probated.

Whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or
disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance.

Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted
as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in turn, "is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a cause
authorized by law."

The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different. Disinheritance the nullity is
limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.