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G.R. No.

108581 December 8, 1999

LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and
JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and
executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following antecedents:

Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without
her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to
have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and
testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal
from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and
issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of
the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as
intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo
Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective
estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and
other taxes due to the government.1

Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro
prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief
within the extended period
granted.2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was
forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement
the final and executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel
petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When
petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance
of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.

An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory Order dated
January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was
merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even
directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals,
which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.

Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private respondents before the Court of
Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
contends that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was
particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity
of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.

Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and to maintain the status
quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties.3 Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that
petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.

The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter
how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect
nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set
aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the
essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole
world. 4

It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same
attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the
court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of
due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be
brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed.5 Such final order
makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution.6

It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated,7 particularly on three aspects:

n whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and
testament;

n compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;

n the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8

n and the due execution of the last will and testament.9

Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at
the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue
influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a
person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. 11

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically
valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs
of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, 13 the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof
cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that
the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will
no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of
which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other
remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is
satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand
that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become final otherwise
there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium — the very object of which the courts were
constituted was to put an end to controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or
less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 16 The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, 17 which circumstances do not concur herein.

Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed
from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private
respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate
son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings.
Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should
be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some
other court. 18 It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed
according to the laws of intestate succession.

Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In
support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is
entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly when no
project of partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal
wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified
the will. But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be
distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of intestate
distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.

It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is preferred to
intestacy. 20 But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided
by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from
the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo
praesumitur donare. 21 No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both
its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic
validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether the provisions of
the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was
extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the
trial court.

Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he
described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary
dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime
cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will
may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late
spouse's estate.

Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was not married to the late
Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 170609-13 January 30, 2009

BERNIE G. MIAQUE, Petitioner


vs.
HON. VIRGILIO M. PATAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33,
VICENTE C. ARAGONA, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 assailing the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 33
dated August 25, 20052 and September 19, 20053 in Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 captioned People of the
Philippines versus Bernie Miaque, et al.

On January 31, 2000, five Informations for libel4 were filed in the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 26, against petitioner Bernie G.
Miaque and three others.5 In an order dated February 17, 2005,6 these Informations were quashed for lack of jurisdiction
over the offenses charged. Specifically, said Informations failed to allege either that private respondent (therein private
complainant) Vicente Aragona actually held office in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offenses or that the
alleged libelous remarks were printed or first published in Iloilo City.7

On June 22, 2005, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jerry Marañon issued a resolution recommending the filing of
Informations for libel against petitioner and his co-accused. Accordingly, five new Informations for libel docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 were filed against petitioner and his co-accused in the RTC of Iloilo City,
Branch 33, presided by respondent Judge Virgilio M. Patag.

The new Informations were similarly worded as those previously quashed but with these added allegations: (1) Aragona,
Regional State Prosecutor VI of the Department of Justice, held office at the Hall of Justice, Iloilo City or (2) the alleged
libelous remarks were written, printed and published in Iloilo City (on the pertinent dates thereof). Said Informations were
likewise signed and filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Marañon.

In view of the filing of the new Informations, petitioner filed his motions (dated August 8, 2005) not to issue warrants of
arrest and, if already issued, to recall them and remand the Informations to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office for
preliminary investigation.8 In an order dated August 25, 2005, respondent judge denied petitioner’s motions on the ground
that petitioner was beyond the court’s jurisdiction as he was not under the custody of the court.9 Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied in an order dated September 19, 2005. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner challenges the August 25, 2005 and September 19, 2005 orders of respondent judge for being contrary to law
and for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. He contends that the Informations were filed without the
mandatory preliminary investigation. Moreover, the new Informations were filed by one who had no authority to do so
because these were filed by the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office and not the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter supposedly belonged to the latter. Petitioner likewise assails the refusal of respondent judge to
recall the warrants of arrest issued against him.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the People of the Philippines, contends that the quashed
Informations were merely amended to include the allegations that Aragona actually held office in Iloilo City at the time of
the commission of the offenses or that the libelous remarks were printed and first published in Iloilo City. A new
preliminary investigation was therefore unnecessary. On the warrant of arrest, the OSG alleges that the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner in view of the filing of his August 8, 2005 motions. The filing of the motions supposedly
was tantamount to voluntarily submitting to the jurisdiction of the court.

Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is incorrect for it violates the hierarchy of courts.10 A regard for
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts
should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.11 This rule, however, may
be relaxed when pure questions of law12 are raised as in this case.

We grant the petition. The Informations must be quashed.

One of the issues raised in the petition is the authority of the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office to file and sign the new
Informations against petitioner. The offenses charged in each of the new Informations were alleged to have been
committed in Iloilo City but said Informations were filed by the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office.

Sections 9 and 11 of Presidential Decree No. 127513 provide:

SEC. 9. Offices of Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals’ Staffing. -- There shall be in each province and each subprovince;
one provincial fiscal and such number of assistant provincial fiscals as may hereinafter be provided for.

There shall be in each city one city fiscals and such number of assistant city fiscals as may hereinafter be provided.

xxx
SEC. 11. Provincial Fiscals and City Fiscals; Duties and Functions. – The provincial fiscal or the city fiscal shall:

a) xxx

b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal
laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made against the persons accused. xxx (emphasis supplied)

It is undisputed that the alleged acts of libel were committed in Iloilo City. Who then had the authority to file and sign the
new informations against petitioner and his co-accused? The Charter of the City of Iloilo provides:14

[The City Fiscal, now City Prosecutor] shall also have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and
violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and in the Municipal Trial Court of the city, and shall
discharge all the duties in respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals.

The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances, and have
the necessary informations or complaints prepared against the persons accused. xxx15

The authority to sign and file the new Informations is properly lodged with the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office. The Iloilo
Provincial Prosecutor’s Office was clearly bereft of authority to file the new Informations against petitioner. An Information,
when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.16 The court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because there is a defect in the Information. We held in People v. Hon. Garfin:17

It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over
the person of the accused and the subject matter thereof. xxx Questions relating to lack of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceeding. An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.

The foregoing considered, the Informations corresponding to Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-61411 were fatally
defective. The common infirmity in the Informations constituted a jurisdictional defect that could not be cured.18 There was
no point in proceeding under a defective Information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction.19

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33 dated
August 25, 2005 and September 19, 2005 are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. 05-61407 to 05-
61411 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing of new Informations by an authorized officer. The warrants of
arrest issued are likewise QUASHED.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ** CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES**


Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Acting Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

G.R. No. 137187 August 3, 2006

CARMELITA V. LIM and VICARVILLE REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,


vs.
HON. BENJAMIN T. VIANZON in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bataan and VALENTIN GARCIA and CONCEPCION GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Before us is a Petition 1 for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Carmelita V. Lim (Lim)
and Vicarville Realty and Development Corporation (Vicarville), assailing the Orders 2 dated 3 September 1998 and 13
November 1998 issued by public respondent Benjamin T. Vianzon of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan,
Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 6779, entitled "Sps. Valentin and Concepcion Garcia v. Carmelita V. Lim and Vicarville Realty
and Development Corporation." The assailed orders allegedly denied perfunctorily petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss dated 23
June 1998 and Motion for Reconsideration dated 25 September 1998, respectively.

The antecedents follow.

On 21 November 1997, petitioner Lim filed a Complaint Affidavit 3 before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Balanga, Bataan, docketed as I.S. No. 97-984, against Valentin Garcia (Garcia) for Falsification and Perjury. Lim alleged
that Garcia willfully and deliberately asserted a falsehood in an affidavit he had submitted to the Register of Deeds of
Balanga, Bataan. In said affidavit, Garcia allegedly stated falsely that he had lost his owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 107535 after entrusting the same to his agent for purposes of selling the property covered by
the title. 4

On 2 February 1998, Garcia filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor a separate Affidavit/Complaint and
Counter-Affidavit 5 against petitioner Lim, Villamon Fernandez and Corazon Rueda for Falsification of Public Document
and Use of Falsified Document, docketed as I.S. No. 98-095. 6

On 20 February 1998, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bataan consolidated the complaints in I.S. No. 97-984
and I.S. No. 98-095. 7 And on 17 March 1998, the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution 8 recommending the
filing of criminal charges against Garcia and dismissing the charges filed by the latter against petitioner Lim, Fernandez
and Rueda. 9 The dispositive portion of the Joint Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is recommended that an information for Violation of Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code be filed against Valentin Garcia, and the dismissal of the charge of Falsification also against Valentin Garcia.
And accordingly, the counter charges of Valentin Garcia against Carmelita Lim, Corazon Rueda, and Villamon Fernandez
are hereby dismissed.

SO RESOLVED. 10

On 29 April 1998, Garcia and his wife Concepcion Garcia (private respondents) filed a Complaint 11 before RTC of
Balanga, Bataan, Branch 1 for Delivery of The Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title and Damages involving the same
TCT subject of the criminal case. Private respondents principally prayed for the annulment of the alleged Deed of Sale
which petitioners claim to be the basis for their custody of the TCT. 12 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6779. 13

Attached to private respondents’ Complaint is a Certification and Verification 14 Garcia had executed which reads in part:

xxxx

That he is one of the plaintiffs in the foregoing Complaint;

That he has caused the preparation of the said Complaint the allegations of which he has read and found to be true and
correct;

That except for the criminal actions which are pending before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bataan, he has not
heretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;

That if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Honorable Court x x x x 15

Thereafter, Garcia filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor a Petition for Suspension of Criminal Action Based
Upon The Pendency of A Prejudicial Question. 16 Garcia prayed that the criminal action before said office be suspended
pending the resolution of Civil Case No. 6779. This petition was later denied by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on
13 October 1998. 17

On 24 June 1998, the petitioners filed before the RTC of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 1 a Motion to Dismiss raising the
following grounds: a) private respondents violated the rule against forum-shopping in that they failed to state in the
Verification and Certification attached to the Complaint that there is an earlier case filed by petitioners (sic) against them
(sic) not only involving the same issues but also the same set of facts; and b) the claim set forth in private respondents’
Complaint had been extinguished by the previous sale of the property to the petitioners. 18

Public respondent then issued the assailed Order 19 dated 3 September 1998 denying the petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss in
this wise:

Finding the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants and the grounds relied upon to be unmeritorious, the same is
DENIED.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED for the lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 20

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration on 25 September 1998 which public respondent likewise denied in an
Order 21 dated 13 November 1998. A portion of said Order reads as follows:

xxxx

That the court’s order dated September 3, 1998 is a mere interlocutory order and not a final judgment or decision where
there is a need for the court to state clearly the facts and the law relied upon by it;

That as correctly pointed out by the plaintiff’s counsel, for forum shopping to be present, both actions must raise identical
causes of action, subject matter and issues and there can be no forum-shopping in the instant civil case because as a civil
action, it has a different cause of action from a criminal action instituted by the defendants; 22

Meanwhile, on 13 October 1998, an Information was filed by the Provincial Prosecutor against Garcia before the
Municipal Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 1 for Violation of Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code. The case is
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Valentin Garcia," docketed as Criminal Case No. 7266. 23

In their Memorandum 24 dated 29 June 2002, petitioners allege that public respondent gravely abused his discretion when
he denied the motion to dismiss per his Order dated 3 September 1998, without stating therein clearly and distinctly the
reasons therefor. Petitioners also assert that the private respondents violated the rule against forum-shopping for failing to
state that they had previously filed a case involving the same facts, issues and parties and that there is an earlier criminal
case filed by petitioner Lim against respondent Garcia also involving the same issues and facts. Petitioners likewise state
that the claim set forth in private respondents’ Complaint has been extinguished by the previous sale of the property to
them. 25

In their Memorandum 26 dated 30 November 2001, private respondents point out that petitioners failed to attach the
pleadings and documents required by Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They enumerated the
pleadings or documents, copies of which petitioners failed to attach or incorporate, to wit: (a) Motion to Dismiss dated 23
June 1998; (b) Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 13 July 1998; (c) Reply dated 27 July 1998; (d) Rejoinder dated
31 August 1998; (e) Motion for Reconsideration dated 25 September 1998; and (f) Opposition dated 26 October
1998. 27 Citing Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista, 28 private respondents maintain that such failure is fatal to petitioners’ cause. 29

Moreover, private respondents maintain that they are not guilty of forum-shopping because the cause of action of the civil
action they instituted is different from that of a criminal action. 30

We dismiss the petition.

On the procedural aspect, we find that petitioners disregarded the doctrine of judicial hierarchy which we enjoin litigants
and lawyers to strictly observe. The Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, as in the case at bar, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction is shared by this Court with the Regional Trial Courts and the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is an
established policy necessary to avoid inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to preclude the further clogging of the Court’s docket. 31

In the instant petition, petitioners failed to show any compelling reason why they filed it before us instead of the Court of
Appeals. For this reason, among others, the petition must fail. We recall our ruling in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, 32 thus:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it
by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with
causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should
generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is
in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and should continue
to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe. 33

Moreover, the instant petition is procedurally flawed as it is not accompanied by copies of relevant pleadings mandated by
the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Said provision reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of
all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided
in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied.)

Specifically, as pointed out by respondents, the instant petition is not accompanied by copies of the Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Reconsideration that petitioners filed with the trial court. These are documents important for the Court’s
appraisal, evaluation and judicious disposition of the case. Failing to fully apprise the Court of the relevant details of the
case, we find this egregious error a sufficient cause for the dismissal of the instant petition. As held in Santiago, Jr. v
Bautista, 34 to wit:

x x x the lower court’s holding that appellant’s failure to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment or order
subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his cause" is
supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by precedents as well. 35

A party who seeks to avail of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari must observe the rules laid down by law, and non-
observance of the said rules may not be brushed aside as mere technicality. 36

In any case, even on the substantive aspect, the petition fails to persuade us. While we agree with petitioners’ lament that
the Order dated 3 September 1998 is defective as it did not state clearly and distinctly the reasons for the denial of
petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, it is noteworthy, however, that public respondent corrected his error in the Order dated 13
November 1998 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. There is no objection to a judge correcting or altogether
altering his case disposition on a motion for reconsideration, it being the purpose of such recourse to provide the court an
opportunity to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed, or, with like effect, to allow the aggrieved party the chance
to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous. A motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari is required
precisely to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-
examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. 37

Parenthetically, assuming that the two orders were erroneous, such error would merely be deemed as an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error
committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be
reviewed or corrected only by appeal. All errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. Petitioners’ rights can be more appropriately addressed in an appeal. 38

Significantly, even if we accord merit to petitioners’ contention that public respondent denied their Motion to Dismiss
perfunctorily, it does not follow that the motion to dismiss should have been granted or that the conclusion should be that
public respondent had acted with grave abuse of discretion.

The Motion to Dismiss, as earlier noted, is predicated on two grounds, namely: breach of the forum-shopping rule and
extinguishment of the cause of action by the previous sale of the property involved to them.

Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the
two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful
would amount to res adjudicata in the other case. 39
What is pivotal in determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants
by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different courts and/or administrative agencies upon the same issues. 40

On this issue, we hold that private respondents were not mandated to disclose the status of the criminal cases. This is so
because, as asserted by private respondents, there is no identity of the causes of action, issues and reliefs prayed for in
the criminal cases and the civil case. The subject matter in I.S. No. 97-984 is whether

criminal actions for Falsification and Perjury should be instituted against Garcia. The principal issue in I.S. No. 98-095 is
similarly whether a criminal complaint for Falsification and Use of A Falsified Document should be filed against Carmelita
Lim, Villamon Fernandez and Corazon Rueda. The principal issue raised in Civil Case No. 6779 is the validity of the
alleged Deed of Sale which petitioners claim to be the basis for their custody of the subject transfer certificate of title.

Anent the contention that private respondents’ complaint has been extinguished by their sale of the property to the
petitioners, this is a matter best threshed out through a full-blown trial.

In sum, the viability of the instant petitions is irreversibly neutered by the procedural deficiencies thereof and the absence
of grave abuse of discretion on public respondent’s part.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 166833 November 30, 2006

FELIXBERTO CUBERO, NERISSA C. NATIVIDAD, JUDY U. LIM, MANUEL R. LAHOZ, SOTERO DIOLA and BELLE
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., and ATTY. ABRAHAM BERMUDEZ, in his capacity as
Registrar of Deeds, Tanauan City, Batangas Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present petition raises the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Individual petitioners Felixberto Cubero, Nerrisa1 C. Natividad, Judy U. Lim, Manuel R. Lahoz and Sotero Diola are the
registered owners of various parcels of land covered by twelve (12) Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).2 The properties
cover a total land area of about 78,178 square meters located in Barangay Suplang, Tanauan, Batangas.

In August 2003, each of the individual petitioners entered into a Joint Venture Development Agreement with co-petitioner
Belle Corporation to develop the properties as part of an agricultural farm lot subdivision project known as "Plantation Hills
at Tagaytay Greenlands Phase I" (the Project) for eventual sale to the public.3

With the development of the Project in full swing in mid-2004, respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.
(Laguna West Cooperative) filed 9 ex-parte petitions4 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan City, for inscription
of an adverse claim, the annotation of which the Registrar of Deeds allegedly failed to carry over to the TCTs of individual
petitioners under the Property Registration Decree5 .

In its petitions before the RTC, respondent Laguna West Cooperative claimed that as early as April 1996 it entered into
separate Joint Venture Agreements (JVAs) with the herein individual petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest Zacarias P.
Narvaez, Filizardo6 N. Contreras, Eladio Contreras, Anacleto P. Narvaez, Victor P. Ortilla, Rafael Maranan, Felipe
Maranan, Elino B. Mangubat, Joaquin N. Olaes and Salvador Alberto;7 and that it registered the JVAs in August 2000 on
the previous owners’ titles by way of an Adverse Claim under Entry No. 199352 and/or 168016.

Laguna West Cooperative added that the petitions were filed to rectify the omission or error and to protect its vested,
subsisting and valid rights under the JVAs.

Accompanying the petitions were Notices of Lis Pendens8 addressed to the Register of Deeds, Tanauan, Batangas.9

Getting wind of the petitions filed by Laguna West Cooperative, petitioners also filed a Complaint10 with the RTC of
Tanauan, for "Annulment of Joint Venture Agreements with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writs of Preliminary
Injunction and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages" against herein respondents Laguna West Cooperative
and Atty. Abraham Bermudez11 in the latter’s capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Tanauan.

In their Complaint, petitioners asserted that the April 1996 JVAs between Laguna West Cooperative and individual
petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest are void ab initio since they were executed within the 10-year prohibitory period under
Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988),12 the titles covering the properties having
emanated from emancipation patents granted in November 1988 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.

Petitioners alleged too in their complaint that the JVAs fall under management contracts prohibited under Republic Act
No. 6657.

Invoking Article 140913 of the Civil Code, petitioners urged the RTC to declare the JVAs inexistent and void for being
contrary to law and public policy.

By Order of September 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint, finding

. . . that [as] the JVAs cover or involve land grants under the Presidential Decree No. 27 and allied agrarian reform laws,
the Department of Agrarian Reform, through its adjudication board (DARAB), has primary jurisdiction to determine the
validity or invalidity thereof.14

For lack of merit, the RTC denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari which raises a pure question of law.

The petition fails.

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action, as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.15 In the determination of jurisdiction, the status or
relationship of the parties, as well as the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy, is also
considered.16

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters, with exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except
those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources.17 Original jurisdiction means jurisdiction to take cognizance of a cause at its inception, try it and pass
judgment upon the law and facts, while exclusive jurisdiction precludes the idea of co-existence and refers to jurisdiction
possessed to the exclusion of others.18

The DARAB has been created to assume the adjudicative powers and functions of the DAR.19 Thus, the DARAB has been
vested with jurisdiction to try and decide all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving
the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).20 Its jurisdiction encompasses cases
involving the "rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation and
use of all agricultural lands" covered by Republic Act No. 6657 and other agrarian laws.21

The RTC amplified its dismissal of petitioners’ complaint in this wise:

There is no question that the instant case does not involve agrarian dispute and that the parties have no tenurial
relationship. The Court dismissed the complaint not because the subject of the questioned JVAs is an agricultural land as
erroneously assumed by the plaintiffs. The complaint was dismissed because it involves controversy or issue in the
implementation of R.A. 6657 – that is – whether or not the agricultural land beneficiaries has reneged its (sic) obligation by
entering in the joint venture agreements and whether the terms thereof are violative of Sections 27 and 73 of the said Act
including the restrictions annotated on the emancipation patents certificates[.]22 (Underscoring supplied)

The finding of the RTC that petitioners’ complaint does not involve an agrarian dispute is a narrow and restrictive view of
the nature of an agrarian dispute. In the recent case of Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative
Development, Inc. v. Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corp.,23 this Court elucidated on the scope of an agrarian
dispute, viz:

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Included in the definition of
agrarian disputes are those arising from other tenurial arrangements beyond the traditional landowner-tenant or lessor-
lessee relationship. Expressly, these arrangements are recognized by Republic Act No. 6657 as essential parts of
agrarian reform. Thus, the DARAB has jurisdiction over disputes arising from the instant Joint Production Agreement
entered into by the present parties.24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In that case, the petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for declaration of nullity of a Joint Production
Agreement.1âwphi1 Upon motion, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal. The petitioner elevated the matter to this Court, contending that there being no tenancy or leasehold
relationship between the parties, the case does not constitute an agrarian dispute cognizable by the DARAB.

In denying the petition in Islanders, this Court held that while the relationship between the parties was not one of tenancy
or agricultural leasehold, the controversy nonetheless fell within the sphere of agrarian disputes, citing, among other
authorities, Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca,25 which held:

All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or
constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it special and original
authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.26

The JVAs subject of the petition for annulment of petitioners precisely involve the development and utilization of the
subject agricultural lands. As successors-in-interest of the beneficiaries of the agricultural lands, individual petitioners
seek to nullify the JVAs. Since the controversy involves the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the
management, cultivation and use of an agricultural land covered by CARP, the case falls squarely within the jurisdictional
ambit of the DAR.27

It bears emphasis that a resolution of the instant case principally entails a determination of the alleged commission of
prohibited acts under Sections 27 and 7328 of Republic Act No. 6645. In cases where allegations of violation or
circumvention of land reform laws have been raised, this Court has declined to address them, it stating that petitioners
must first plead their case with the DARAB.29 There is no reason why this Court should now hold otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO DANTE O. TINGA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995

EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner,


vs.
ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court revives the issue of whether or not the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election
cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction In the split decision of 4 March 1992 in the consolidated cases
of Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on Elections,1 this Court ruled in the negative because of the absence of
any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the constitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to issue such
extraordinary writs. It held that jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must
exist as a matter of law, whether the jurisdiction is original or appellate, and since these two classes of jursdiction are
exclusive of each other, each must expressly conferred by law. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other. This
Court proceeded to state that in the Philippine setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs involves the exercise of
original jurisdiction which has always been expressly conferred either by Constitution or by law. It is never derived by
implication. Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any power to
exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus unlike the case of this Court which is
specifically conferred with such authority in Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that the doctrines laid down
in Pimentel vs. COMELEC2 — that neither the Constitution nor any law has conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC to
issue such writs — still finds application under the 1987 Constitution.

In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, 3 this Court reiterated the Garcia and Uy doctrine.

In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC adhered to the affirmative view of the issue, citing as
authority therefore its own decision of 29 July 1993 in Dictado vs. Cosico and the last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P.
Blg. 697, which reads:

Sec. 50. Definition. —

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions
for certiorari prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.

The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and nullified for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He contends that while the COMELEC's position is inherently
compelling, it deserves scant consideration in view of Garcia and Uy and Veloria and the nature and purpose of B. P. Blg.
697 which was to govern solely the Batasang Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it was a temporary statute
which self-destructed after such election.

The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are uncomplicated and undisputed.

In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for
the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning
candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former.

Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte,
which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.
On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six
votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares the protestant as having won
the mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in
the local election held on May 11, 1992, the protestant having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the
protestee's votes.

Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the private respondent on 1 July 1994.

On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice of appeal and paying
the appellate docket fees.

On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.

On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the private
respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.

On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal. The corresponding writ of
execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration of the order of
execution and the sheriff held in abeyance the implementation of the writ. This motion was denied on 5 August 1994.

The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid other of
the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The petition was docketed as
SPR No. 1-94.

On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition.4 The dispositive portion thereof reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES that is [sic] has exclusive authority to
hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law,
and therefore, assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition for certiorari which is hereby GRANTED. The
Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the Writ of Execution
issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED.

Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position .as Municipality Mayor of
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending resolution of the appeal before this Commission in the case of
Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No. 108-94.

In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, the respondent COMELEC maintains that there
is a special law granting it such jurisdiction, viz., Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not
expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),and that it is not exactly correct that this law self-
destructed after the May 1984 election. It further reasoned out that in the performance of its judicial functions, the
COMELEC, is the most logical body to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election
cases where it has appellate jurisdiction. It ratiocinated as follows:

It is therefore clear that if there is a law which specifically confers jurisdiction to issue the prerogative
Writs, then the Commission has jurisdiction.

Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law.

B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE ELECTION OF
MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE SELECTION OF
SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50 provides:

Sec. 50. Definition.— Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or


affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate, political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with
the Commission.

The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over all pre-proclamation controversies.

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.(Emphasis supplied).

We have debated among ourselves whether Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697, has been repealed. We have
come to the conclusion that it has not been repealed. The repealing provision in the Omnibus Election
Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985), provides:

Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. — Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise known as the
The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election Laws,
decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Code is hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 and
Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang
Pampook of Regions IX and XII. (Emphasis supplied).

B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, in the cited Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in the
Veloria case, the Supreme Court itself said, reiterating previous cases, that implied repeal of statutes is
frowned upon, thus:

Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned upon, so also should the grant of original
jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial body be tabooed. (Garcia/Uy/Veloria
Cases: Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 . . . did not modify or repeal, whether
expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. It is common place Learning
that implied repeal are not favored in Law and are not casually to be assumed. The first
effort of a court must always be to reconcile or adjust the provisions of one statute with
those of another so as to give sensible effect to both provisions (Jalandoni vs. Andaya,
55 SCRA 261 (1974); Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196-197 (1971); National
Power Corporation vs. ARCA, 25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208
(1916); and Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA
377·(1965). Only when there is clear inconsistency and conflict between the provisions of
two (2) statutes, may a court hold that the provisions later in point of time have impliedly
repealed the earlier ones" that (Philippine American Management Co., Inc., vs. Philippine
American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973); and Villegas vs.
Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971) (Larga vs. Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August 3, 1984, 164
SCRA 25).

It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after the Batasang Pambansa
elections of 1984; because of the provisions of Section 1 (Title and Applicability) which provides: "This act
shall be known and cited as "The Law on the 1984 Batasang Pambansa Election." It shall govern the
election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of
sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution.

While that may be true with most of its provisions which were applicable only for the particular election
(like election and campaign periods, voting constituency, etc.) most if not all of the remaining provisions
could be applicable to future elections. It is not lost to the Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also
"for other purposes."

But the important consideration is that the authority granted to the Commission under B.P. Blg. 697 is not
inconsistent with our election laws. It should be mentioned that the provisions of Republic Act No. 6638
which governed the local elections of January 18, 1988, as to the number of councilors in specified cities
(Sec. 3) and the number of Sangguniang members in different provinces and cities (Sec. 4) are still
applicable up to this day. In fact, it became one of the important controlling provision which governed the
May 11, 1992 elections. If provisions of Republic Act No. 6636 which are not inconsistent with the present
election laws did not self-destruct, why should Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697?

Another provision which did not self-destruct is that which provides that "any city or municipal judge, who
includes or excludes any voter without any legal basis in inclusion and exclusion proceedings, shall be
guilty of an election offense," although this provision is found in Section 10 of Executive Order No. 134
supposedly with limited application as the enabling act for the elections for Members of Congress on May
11, 1987 and for other purposes.

Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, jurisdiction to the Commission on Elections because
the Pimentel case said there was none, to fill a void in the law, and avoid an incongruous situation.

A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately but in its relation to the
statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to "harmonized it with the
pre-existing body of laws." Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be
reconciled. . . . (Commissioner of Customs vs. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. L-28329,
August 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 113).

xxx xxx xxx

The statutory construction rule is: "When the Legislature enacts provision, it is
understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter and
that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision
should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in the prior
statutes." (Legaspi vs. Executive Secretary, L-36153, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA
253).

The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial functions to take jurisdiction of
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because it has appellate jurisdiction in election cases
granted by the Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has no more appellate jurisdiction over such
cases And in the case of the Supreme Court, Justice de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in his
dissenting opinion that under the Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in election
cases should properly be limited to decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections, not from
lower courts.

It was of course different under the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388, September 2, 1971) because
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals then had appellate jurisdiction in election case decided by
the lower courts.

In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
have certiorari jurisdiction over election cases from the lower courts because after reiterating the ruling in
the Garcia and Uy cases, the Supreme Court said:

In view of this pronouncement, an original civil action of certiorari, prohibition


or mandamus against a regional trial court in an election contest may be filed only in the
Court of Appeals or in this Court being the only courts given such original jurisdiction
under the Constitution and the Law. (Emphasis supplied).

While these two appellate Courts do have the jurisdiction under the Constitution and the law, it is most
logical for the Commission whenever it performs judicial functions to have the authority to issue these
prerogative writs. . . .

...

In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision laid down in the case of Antonio Dictado vs. Hon.
Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio Tiongco promulgated on July 29, 1993. In this case, the Commission en
banc had occasion to rule on the question of whether or not the Commission has the authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari in election cases.
The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon. Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong, ruled that
there is [a] law which grants the Commission, the exclusive authority to issue special writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in election cases, and there are also Supreme Court decisions, recent in fact,
which declare that the Commission has no such authority precisely because; according to the decisions,
there is no law granting such authority, and without any hint whatsoever of the existence of Sec. 50 of
Batas vs. Pambansa Blg. 697.

As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents were arguing that Sec. 50 of BP Blg. 697 was repealed
by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985). Furthermore, in their answer,
respondents cited Supreme Court decisions where it was declared that, indeed, the Commission has no
jurisdiction to issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not been repealed.

As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess, of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII).

Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a
court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows
that the Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. 5

It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's order of execution pending appeal and
the writ of execution because

[a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed on July 12, 1994 the court a quo had
already lost jurisdiction over the case for as early as July 8, 1994, it had already acknowledged through its
order issued on that date, the perfection of the appeal of petitioner as in fact it ordered the elevation of the
records of the case to this Honorable Commission. 6

Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil action.

In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing is challenged
resolution.

As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment, opposed the petition by invoking the very arguments
adduced by the respondent COMELEC in its challenged the resolution and the dissenting opinion in
the Garcia and Uy cases.

In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the respondent COMELEC postulates that it issued the said
resolution after it had taken cognizance of the appeal interposed by the private respondent from the RTC decision, unlike
in the Garcia and Uy cases, and therefore, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, thus:

it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent powers to employ means necessary to carry into effect
the powers conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court) and verily, there
was no need for any statutory grant for that purpose. Indeed, in annulling the Order of Execution of the
Regional Trial Court, public respondent did not exceed its jurisdiction since its action in this regard was
necessary to preserve the subject of the appeal and to maintain the status quo of the parties pending the
final outcome of its review of the correctness of the appealed decision. 7

It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had jurisdiction over the cases unlike in the instant case
where the trial court had already given due course to the appeal and elevated the records of the case to the COMELEC
which had taken cognizance of the appeal.

This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on its merits.
The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the Solicitor General is unacceptable. It goes
against its theory in the assailed resolution and is not supported by the facts. The challenged resolution involves a case
which the COMELEC docketed as a special relief case (SPR. No. 1-94). Under Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the
special relief cases are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and contempt proceedings. The ordinary appeal
from the RTC decision was, as disclosed in the challenged resolution; docketed as EAC No. 108-94.8 Clearly then, the
COMELEC had recognized and taken cognizance of two cases: one, the ordinary appeal from the RTC decision (EAC No.
108-94), and two, the special civil action for certiorari docketed as SPR No. 1-94. The two cases were not consolidated.
The dissimilarities between them need no further elaboration. Since it issued the challenged resolution under the latter
case, it cannot now be heard to state that it issued it as an incident in the former, the ordinary appeal. This erroneous
contention of the Office of the of the Solicitor General notwithstanding, the position taken by the COMELEC in its
resolution now in question paves the way for a re-examination of this Court's pronouncement in the Garcia and Uy cases.

As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in Veloria, 10 this Court ruled that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory
conferment to it of such jurisdiction.

The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such jurisdiction.
Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that the said law was, per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the election for the
regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter
as provided by the Constitution," and in view of the passage of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular
Batasang Pambansa, 11 this Court is then confronted with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697 became functus
officio after the 14 May 1984 election of members of the regular Batasang Pambansa or the selection thereafter of the
sectoral representatives at the latest, and whether it was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code.

The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697 whose lifetime go beyond the
14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of sectoral representatives. In fact, by the very wording of the last
paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:

Sec. 50. Definition. —

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. (Emphasis supplied).

it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a specific period of time. Taken in the context of the
conspicuous absence of such jurisdiction as ruled in Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, 12 it seems quite obvious that
the grant was intended as a remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationality resulting in a splitting
of jurisdiction pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice De Castro in the said case.

But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The repealing clause of the latter reads as
follows:

Sec. 282. Repealing clause. — Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwise known as The 1978 Election
Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed, except
Presidential Decree No. 1618 .and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members of the
Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII.

The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has been said:

An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are repealed; is in legal
contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some
instances been held to be an express recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is
included and as indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot
be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be
determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely
predicates a repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of
implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than
an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal
to inconsistent acts.13

This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or codification of laws, all
parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the
statute or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14

By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that the Batasang Pambansa had intended
to codify all prior election statutes and to replace them with the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a
reservation that all prior election statutes or parts thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall remain in
force. That sentence

predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on existing and
prior acts of the same subject matter. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and
the rule on strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. For the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws so that, if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the
proper step is to express it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the
statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws.15

This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus Election
Code to determine if the former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter, It found none.

In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and
Veloria cases, We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to review the substance of the challenged
resolution.

That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner's motion for execution
pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private respondent
received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five days 16 from 1 July 1994, or
on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the
appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary
effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on
the last day for any of the parties to appeal,17 or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of
the records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction
over the case. 18 Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of
the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion was filed before
the perfection of the appeal. 19 Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged resolution of 9 February 1995 of the Commission on
Elections in SPR No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita Cumba vs. Manuel M. Relampagos, et al. " is AFFIRMED.

The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February 1995 is hereby LIFTED.

No pronouncemnt as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Romero, Bellosillo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., concurs in the result.

Melo, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.

G.R. No. 170702 June 16, 2006

INGATUN G. ISTARUL, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND PAMARAN T. MATURAN, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolution1 of the First Division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC 1st Division) dated October 21, 2005 granting private respondent’s petition for certiorari and
prohibition, and the Resolution2 of the Commission on Elections En Banc (COMELEC En Banc) dated December 12, 2005
affirming the aforementioned Resolution of the COMELEC 1st Division.

A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the narration of the antecedent facts set forth in the COMELEC 1st Division
Resolution dated October 21, 2005 is undisputed; hence, the pertinent portions thereof are reproduced hereunder:

During the 2004 elections, Maturan [herein private respondent], Istarul [herein petitioner] as well Munap H. Pacio and
Ahmad Atahal ran for the position of mayor of the municipality of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan.

Maturan was eventually proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected mayor of Tipo-Tipo.
Thereafter, private respondent Istarul filed an election protest 3 case docketed Election Case No. 01-04. Pacio, another
losing candidate, also filed his protest case docketed as Election Case No. 26-04. Both cases were assigned to the public
respondent 4 who, for reason of consistency, decided them jointly. The dispositive portion of the joint decision dated
August 10, 2005 is quoted as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court hereby ANNULS the proclamation of protestee dated May 15, 2004,
and DECLARES protestant Ingatun G. Istarul as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan, having
obtained the highest number of votes for the said office in the election held on May 10, 2004."
On the same date, August 10, 2005, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal. The following day, August 11, 2004, private
respondent filed his Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. On August 17, 2005, petitioner filed his Opposition thereto.
After the hearing, specifically on August 22, 2005, public respondent issued its Special Order granting private
respondent’s Motion. He also issued a Writ of Execution on the same day.

On August 23, 2005, the instant petition was filed. On the same day, this Commission (First Division) issued a Temporary
Restraining/Status Quo Ante Order.

After the hearing, both parties filed their respective memoranda. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.5

On October 21, 2005, the COMELEC 1st Division issued a Resolution holding that there are no good reasons to justify the
issuance of the Special Order granting execution pending appeal. The COMELEC 1st Division ruled that Judge Danilo
Bucoy’s failure to establish that public interest would be served; and that a mere statement about the length of time that
the case had been pending in the trial court do not support the issuance of said Order.

The COMELEC 1st Division further noted in its Resolution that Judge Bucoy failed to state in the Joint Decision dated
August 10, 2005 his explanation for crediting certain ballots in favor of either of the parties, thus, violating the principle that
a decision should clearly show the basis for the judge’s rulings. It then concluded that the decision is seriously impaired
and cannot be the source of a valid execution pending appeal.

The dispositive portion of the Resolution of the COMELEC 1st Division dated October 21, 2005 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Special Order and the Writ of
Execution issued by the public respondent, the Honorable Danilo Bucoy, dated August 22, 2005 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Private Respondent INGATARUN G. ISTARUL is directed to immediately cease and desist from
performing his functions as mayor of the municipality of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan. Petitioner PAMARAN MATURAN is restored
to his position as Mayor of the same municipality and instructed to perform his functions as such until the final
determination of the appeal case he filed.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was referred to the COMELEC En Banc. On December 12, 2005, it
issued a Resolution affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC 1st Division. The COMELEC En Banc reiterated that there
were no good reasons for the issuance of execution pending appeal because a final determination of the true will of the
people would be had only after the resolution of the appeal pending with the COMELEC 1st Division.

Aggrieved by the actions of the COMELEC 1st Division and the En Banc, petitioner then filed the present petition
for certiorari assailing said Tribunal’s Resolutions.

Petitioner prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order which this Court granted in its Resolution dated
January 17, 2006. Thereafter, private respondent filed a motion to lift the temporary restraining order. On February 28,
2006, the Court issued a Resolution dissolving the temporary restraining order because private respondent was able to
prove that, at the time of the filing of the petition, he was the one acting as Mayor of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan.

As grounds for allowance of the petition, it is alleged that:

5.1.1. The Comelec seriously erred in wantonly disregarding the jurisprudential rule on execution pending appeal.

5.1.2. The Comelec seriously erred in ignoring that rule that, as between two presumptive winners, the
proclamation made by the court prevails over that of the board of canvassers.

5.1.3. The Comelec seriously erred in not considering the fact that petitioner never filed a motion for
reconsideration with the trial court.

5.1.4. The assailed Resolution violated the right of the petitioner to procedural due process and the equal
protection clause since it never considered the basic issues raised by petitioner in his pleadings.7
Private respondent, on the other hand, counters that the Joint Decision of Judge Bucoy dated August 10, 2005 is null and
void for failure of the trial court to state particular reasons for rejecting certain ballots and, as such, it should not be
executed pending appeal. He further argues that in this case, the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the trial court
before filing his petition for certiorari with the COMELEC could be dispensed with considering that the need for relief is
extremely urgent.

It should be borne in mind that "unless the COMELEC is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion, its decision
will not be interfered with by this Court."8 In this case, petitioner fails to convince the Court that the COMELEC 1st Division
and En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It is clear from the discussion in the petition that what are assigned as errors of the COMELEC 1st Division and En Banc –
i.e., that the COMELEC erred in wantonly disregarding the jurisprudential rule on execution pending appeal; in ignoring
that rule that, as between two presumptive winners, the proclamation made by the court prevails over that of the board of
canvassers; in not considering the fact that private respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration before the trial
court; and in not considering the issues raised by petitioner in his pleadings - are merely alleged errors of judgment as
they question the wisdom and legal soundness of the COMELEC’s resolutions and not the jurisdiction of said body.
In People v. Court of Appeals,9 the Court expounded on the function of the remedy of certiorari as follows:

As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a
court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not
survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not
the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for
certiorari. x x x 10 (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, since the issues raised in this petition merely question the correctness of the COMELEC’s rulings, petitioner
cannot avail of the writ of certiorari.

Nevertheless, a close examination of the records reveals that petitioner’s allegations are baseless.

There is no showing whatsoever that the COMELEC disregarded the jurisprudential rule on execution pending appeal. On
the contrary, the COMELEC 1st Division and the COMELEC En Banc proceeded on the premise that, indeed, execution
pending appeal may be granted in election cases provided there are good reasons therefore as held in a long line of
cases.11 Unfortunately, in this case, the COMELEC 1st Division and COMELEC En Banc found the "good reasons"
alleged by petitioner and relied on by the trial court to be insufficient to justify the issuance of the special order granting
execution pending appeal.

Petitioner cites as one of the "good reasons" for execution pending appeal, the will of the electorate, based on the finding
of the trial court that he garnered the highest number of votes for the position of mayor of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan during the
May 2004 elections. However, the COMELEC 1st Division, in its Resolution dated October 21, 2005, found the trial court’s
Joint Decision to be "seriously impaired" for its (trial court’s) failure to state any explanation as to its rulings regarding the
crediting of votes in favor of the candidates and the COMELEC concluded that "a decision suffering from grave infirmities
cannot be a source of a valid execution."12

A perusal of the Joint Decision of the trial court, on its face, shows that the COMELEC’s observation that there was a total
lack of explanation for the trial court’s rulings for crediting ballots or votes in favor of the candidates, is correct. Apparently,
the supposed victory of petitioner has not been clearly established. Hence, the COMELEC has a valid basis for not
considering the supposed will of the electorate as a "good reason" to allow execution pending appeal. Having such a
basis for its ruling, the COMELEC cannot be deemed to have gravely abused its discretion.

Verily, there is, as yet, no strong evidence that it is, indeed, the will of the electorate for herein petitioner to occupy the
position of mayor of Tipo-Tipo, Basilan, as said issue is still pending resolution in the appeal filed by private respondent
before the COMELEC.

Moreover, the length of time that the election protest has been pending, thus, leaving petitioner only 21 months as the
remaining portion of the term to serve as mayor, does not constitute "good reason" to justify execution pending appeal.
The case of Fermo v. Comelec,13 which is closely analogous to the present case, is instructive. Therein, the Court stated
thus:
"Shortness of term," alone and by itself cannot justify premature execution. It must be manifest in the decision sought to
be executed that the defeat of the protestee and the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.14 (Emphasis
supplied)

The COMELEC also did not ignore the rule that, as between two presumptive winners, the proclamation made by the trial
court prevails over that of the board of canvassers. However, after finding that the trial court’s ruling regarding which
candidate garnered the highest number of votes is unreliable, the COMELEC applied the ruling in Camlian v.
Comelec,15 where the Court agreed with the COMELEC that:

x x x while it is true that when an election protest is filed the protestee is only considered a presumptive winner until the
protest is resolved, in the same way, when a protestant is adjudged the winner by a court of law but the case is on appeal
with the Commission, such appeal likewise makes the protestant a presumptive winner and, unless meritorious
grounds exist to execute judgment pending appeal, it is illogical to replace a presumptive winner proclaimed by a
board of canvassers, by another presumptive winner so declared by a court. It needs no explanation that when a
protestant is installed as a winner pending appeal, that in itself is already disruptive of the government service.
How much more if the protestee wins the appeal in which case he will have to be reinstalled again to the office
which he was forced to vacate?16 (Emphasis supplied)

With regard to petitioner’s asseveration that the COMELEC did not consider the circumstance that private respondent did
not file a motion for reconsideration of the Special Order before filing the petition for certiorari, the Court finds the same
unmeritorious. Note that the COMELEC 1st Division pointed out that "a decision suffering from grave infirmities cannot be
a source of a valid execution."17 Evidently, the COMELEC found the case to be one of those falling within the exceptions
to the general rule that the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.
Some of the exceptions to this general rule are: (1) when public interest is involved, (2) the matter is one of urgency, and
(3) the order is a patent nullity.18 Since the COMELEC found the Joint Decision of the trial court to be seriously impaired, it
then concluded that the Special Order granting execution pending appeal is invalid or a patent nullity; and that the trial
court was then acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued said Special Order.
Again, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in ruling so.

Petitioner tries to impress upon the Court that the COMELEC acted with bias. He cites the speed with which the
COMELEC 1st Division issued and served the Temporary Restraining Order on the trial court in Basilan. However,
petitioner failed to submit any proof of the alleged irregularity that the bailiff of the COMELEC was already in Basilan in the
morning of August 24, 2005 to serve the TRO, while the order for him to proceed to Basilan was released only at noon of
August 24, 2005.

Petitioner also questions the fact that the Resolution of the COMELEC 1st Division dated October 21, 2005 was
promulgated merely four days after the submission of the parties’ memoranda. This circumstance does not at all show
bias or grave abuse of discretion. Rather, it shows that the COMELEC is upholding its mandate to resolve issues before it
with dispatch.

Lastly, petitioner questions why the COMELEC did not dismiss the petition filed by private respondent despite the fact that
private respondent had allegedly been convicted of nepotism and violation of Section 4 (c ) of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees." Thus, argues
petitioner, private respondent had lost the legal personality to pursue the case against petitioner. Private respondent was,
however, able to present a Joint Order19 of the Office of the Ombudsman dated January 11, 2006 stating that herein
private respondent’s motion for reconsideration is submitted for resolution. This proves that the judgment of the
Ombudsman has not yet become final and executory as private respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the resolution
of the Ombudsman is still pending. Furthermore, this issue is better addressed in the appeal before the COMELEC, as the
only issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion by setting aside the
trial court’s Special Order allowing execution pending appeal.

In sum, petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the COMELEC acted with bias or capricious and whimsical arbitrariness
to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ


Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

(On Leave)
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
G.R. Nos. 178831-32 April 1, 2009

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179120 April 1, 2009

LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,


vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines, and
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179132-33 April 1, 2009

OLIVIA P. PARAS, Petitioner,


vs.
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. ROBERTO
NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives; HON. RHODORA SEVILLA, in
her capacity as Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House of Representatives; THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179240-41 April 1, 2009

RENALD F. VILLANDO, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins

over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her
proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction.

At the core of these contentious consolidated petitions are: (1) the Joint Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007, disqualifying Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) from running
as a congressional candidate for the First District of Negros Oriental; (2) the COMELEC En Banc Resolution2 dated June
29, 2007, affirming her disqualification; and (3) the COMELEC En Banc Resolution3 dated August 16, 2007, resolving that
all pending incidents relating to her qualifications should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).

The facts are uncontroverted. On March 26, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy4 (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for her disqualification were instituted before the COMELEC by concerned
citizens coming from her locality. On April 4, 2007, Napoleon Camero, a registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental,
filed the petition for her disqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenship requirement of a Member of the
House of Representatives. The petition, which was docketed as SPA No. (PES) A07-006,5 alleged that she is not a
natural-born Filipino because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. On April 11, 2007, Renald F.
Villando, also a registered voter of the same locality, filed the second petition on the same ground of citizenship, docketed
as SPA (PES) No. A07-007.6 He claimed that when Limkaichong was born, her parents were still Chinese citizens as the
proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial
defects. Both petitions prayed for the cancellation of Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to strike out her name
from the list of qualified candidates for the Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

In her separate Answers7 to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino since she was born to
a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother, who had reacquired her status as such due to her
husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed after
her father took his Oath of Allegiance on October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate of Naturalization on the
same day. She contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitions outright for lack of cause of action.
Citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,8 she averred that a petition filed before an election, questioning the
qualification of a candidate, should be based on Section 78,9 in relation to Section 7410 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC),11 and not under Sections 6812 and 74 thereof in relation to Section 1,13 Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure14 and Section 5,15 paragraph C (3.a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 7800.16 She also contended that the
petitions were dismissible on the ground that they were in the nature of a collateral attack on her and her father’s
citizenships, in contravention of the well-established rule that attack on one's citizenship may only be made through a
direct action for its nullity.

The COMELEC consolidated the two (2) petitions and re-docketed them as SPA Nos. 07-24717 and 07-248,18 entitled IN
THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG FROM HER CANDIDACY AS FIRST
DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL (herein referred to as the disqualification cases), which
remained pending on May 14, 2007, when the National and Local Elections were conducted.

After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said elections, Limkaichong emerged as the winner with 65,708
votes19 or by a margin of 7,746 votes over another congressional candidate, Olivia Paras20 (Paras), who obtained 57,962.

On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Suspend the
Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the First District of Negros Oriental.21

In a Joint Resolution22 dated May 17, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petitions in the disqualification
cases, disqualified Limkaichong as a candidate for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental, directed the
Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial
Board of Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend her proclamation. In disposing the cases, the COMELEC Second Division made
the following ratiocination:

On the substantial issue of whether respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is disqualified to run for the congressional seat of
the First District of Negros Oriental on the ground that she is not a natural-born Filipino, we hold that she is so disqualified.

Petitioners have successfully discharged their burden of proof and has convincingly shown with pieces of documentary
evidence that Julio Ong Sy, father of herein respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong, failed to acquire Filipino
citizenship in the naturalization proceedings which he underwent for the said purpose.

An examination of the records of Special Case No. 1043 would reveal that the Office of the Solicitor General was
deprived of its participation in all the stages of the proceedings therein, as required under Commonwealth Act No.
473 or the Revised Naturalization Law and Republic Act No. 530, An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization.

xxx
The documents presented by petitioners showed that the OSG was not furnished copies of two material orders of the
trial court in the said proceedings. One was the July 9, 1957 Order granting his petition for naturalization and the other
was the September 21, 1959 Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.

Moreover, from a perusal of the same page 171 of the OSG logbook, we have determined that the OSG did not receive
a notice for the hearing conducted by the trial court on July 9, 1959, prior to its issuance of the September 12, 1959
Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, this was fatal to the naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy,
and prevented the same from gaining finality. The leading case in the matter is Republic v. Hon. Gabriel V. Valero, 136
SCRA 617 (May 31, 1985), wherein the Supreme Court declared:

And as though that was not enough, the hearing prior to the oathtaking of respondent Tan was conducted without the
required notice to the Solicitor General. It is true, as it appeared later, that Fiscal Veluz, Jr. was authorized by the Solicitor
General to represent the Government in the hearing of the application for naturalization. That authority, however, does not
extend to Fiscal [Veluz’s] right to appear for the State in the hearing preparatory to the oathtaking. Private respondent Tan
was therefore under legal obligation to serve copy of his motion to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen upon the Solicitor General which was not done.

Respondent argues that upon his taking of the Oath of Allegiance, Julio Ong Sy became a Filipino citizen for all intents
and purposes, with all the rights appurtenant thereto.

This argument does not hold water, as was held by the Supreme Court in the same case of Republic v. Valero, supra:

That private respondent Tan had already taken his oath of allegiance does not in any way legalize the proceedings
relative thereto which is pregnant with legal infirmities. Compounding these irregularities is the fact that Tan was allowed
to take his oath even before the expiration of the thirty (30)-day period within which an appeal may be made thus making
the said oath not only highly improper but also illegal.

In the same case, the Supreme Court added:

To sustain the same would be to sanction a monstrosity known as citizenship by estoppel. The grant of naturalization
under such circumstances is illegal and cancellation thereof may be had at any time. Neither estoppel nor res judicata
may be set up as a bar from instituting the necessary proceedings to nullify the certificate of naturalization so issued.

Another glaring defect in the said proceedings was the fact that Julio Ong Sy took his Oath of Allegiance on October
21, 1959, which was exactly thirty (30) days after his declaration as a naturalized Filipino.

Even granting that the OSG was notified of the September 21, 1959 Order, this was still one day short of the reglementary
period required under Sections 11 and 12 of C.A. No. 473, above-cited.

The thirty-day reglementary period is so required under the law so that the OSG could make known his objections and to
appeal from the order of the trial court declaring the petitioner a naturalized Filipino citizen. This is also the reason why a
copy of the petitioner’s motion to take his oath of allegiance has to be furnished to the OSG.

The respondent insists that naturalization proceedings are in rem and are binding on the whole world.

She would have been correct had all the necessary parties to the case been informed of the same. The OSG, being the
counsel for the government, has to participate in all the proceedings so that it could be bound by what has transpired
therein. Lacking the participation of this indispensable party to the same, the proceedings are null and void and, hence, no
rights could arise therefrom.

From all the foregoing, therefore, it could be seen that Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Filipino citizenship through the
naturalization proceedings in Special Case No. 1043. Thus, he was only able to transmit to his offspring, Chinese
citizenship.

Respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong being the daughter of Julio Ong Sy, and having been born on November 9, 1959,
under the 1935 Philippine Constitution, is a Chinese national, and is disqualified to run as First District Representative
of Negros Oriental.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED from her
candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directed to strike out the name
JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for the said position, and the concerned Board of
Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG as winning
candidate, if any, until this decision has become final.

SO ORDERED.23

The PBOC received the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division on the evening of May 17, 2007, and
accordingly suspended the proclamation of Limkaichong.24

The following day, or on May 18, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 806225 adopting the policy-
guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which
shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.

On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC a Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of May
17, 2007 and Urgent Motion to Lift the Order Suspending Proclamation.26

On May 22, 2007, Limkaichong filed another motion for the lifting of the directive suspending her proclamation, insisting
that she should be proclaimed as the winner in the congressional race pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8062.27 On
same date, Villando, one of the petitioners in the disqualification cases, filed an Urgent Manifestation Clarifying
COMELEC Resolution No. 8062 with Motion,28 praying that the COMELEC should not lift the suspension of
Limkaichong’s proclamation.

On May 25, 2007, the PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, reconvened and proclaimed
Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First District of Negros Oriental.29

Thereafter, or on May 30, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Nullify and/or Annul the Proclamation of
Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong as First District Representative of Negros Oriental in relation to the May 17, 2007 Joint
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division,30 stating, among others, that Limkaichong's proclamation violated the
earlier order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending her proclamation. The petition, docketed as SPC No. 07-211,
was dismissed by the COMELEC First Division,31 ratiocinating that the disqualification cases were not yet final when
Limkaichong was proclaimed. Accordingly, her proclamation which was valid or legal, effectively divested the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction over the cases. The COMELEC First Division explained its ruling in this wise:

The Commission has made its intention in issuing Resolution No. 8062 very clear in that there shall be no suspension
of proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases involving, among others, issues of
citizenship. As the disqualification cases involving Limkaichong were still pending reconsideration by the en banc, the
underlying policy which gave rise to the issuance of the Resolution: to respect the will of the Filipino electorate, applies to
the suspension of proclamation of the winning congressional candidate for the First District of Negros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

Dissatisfied, Paras moved for the reconsideration of the above Resolution.32

Meanwhile, in a Resolution33 dated June 29, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc, in an equally divided vote of 3:3, denied
Limkaichong’s motion for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in the disqualification
cases. The pertinent portions of the Resolution denying her motion reads:

Anent the issue of jurisdiction, We rule that the Commission has jurisdiction to rule on Respondent Limkaichong’s Motion
for Reconsideration notwithstanding her proclamation as it is only this Commission, and not the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which has jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a
division or en banc. As stated by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Codilla v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605,
December 10, 2002, respondent herself seasonably challenged the validity of the resolution of the Second Division in her
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the issue of respondent’s disqualification was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Comelec En Banc to resolve, and HRET cannot assume jurisdiction on the matter, to wit:

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec En Banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the
matter.

In Puzon v. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-
elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House
of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very
COMELEC pronouncements themselves." This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions
of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

Finally, in disposing the Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by
intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be proclaimed as the winning candidate for First District Representative,
suffice it to say that in the same case of Codilla v. De Venecia, supra, the Supreme Court held, thus:

More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains
the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every
election, the people’s choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect.
When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election
for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place. In Domino v. COMELEC, this Court ruled, viz.:

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a constituency,
the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume
that the second placer would have received that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the
voters. He could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.

xxx

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath
of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and does not entitle the candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice
and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his
rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the
importance and meaning of democracy and the people’s right to elect officials of their choice.

All told, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of this Commission (Second Division) in its Joint
Resolution promulgated on May 17, 2007.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is
hereby DENIED.

The Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by Intervenor Olivia P.
Paras praying that she be proclaimed as the winning candidate for the First District Representative of Negros Oriental is
hereby denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.34

On July 3, 2007, Limkaichong filed in the disqualification cases against her a Manifestation and Motion for Clarification
and/or To Declare the Petitions as Dismissed in Accordance with Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.35 She contended that, with her proclamation, her having taken her oath of office and her assumption of the
position, the COMELEC was divested of jurisdiction to hear the disqualification cases. She further contended that,
following Section 6,36 Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the disqualification cases would have to be reheard,
and if on rehearing, no decision would be reached, the action or proceedings should be dismissed, because the
COMELEC En Banc was equally divided in opinion when it resolved her motion for reconsideration.
On an even date, Paras wrote the House of Representatives informing it of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated
June 29, 2007 upholding the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007, which disqualified
Limkaichong as a congressional candidate.37

In the interim, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Jose de Venecia, Jr. (De Venecia) allowed Limkaichong to
officially assume the office as a Member of the House of Representatives on July 23, 2007, as shown in the Journal of the
House of Representatives.38

Despite Limkaichong’s repeated pleas for the resolution of her manifestation and motion for clarification,39 the COMELEC
did not resolve the same. Hence, on August 1, 2007, she filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari40 under Rule 65, in
relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32 praying for the annulment of
the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and the June 29, 2007 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc in the disqualification cases for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. She averred that since she was already proclaimed on May 25, 2007 as Representative of the First District
of Negros Oriental, had assumed office on June 30, 2007, and had started to perform her duties and functions as such,
the COMELEC had lost its jurisdiction and it is now the HRET which has jurisdiction over any issue involving her
qualifications for the said office.

On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc ruled on Limkaichong’s manifestation and motion for clarification,41 with the
following disquisition:

In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of office on June 30, 2007, this
Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Limkaichong should now be
determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the above-quoted provision of the
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, that all pending incidents relating
to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of the House of Representatives should now be determined by
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)

On August 24, 2007, Louis Biraogo (Biraogo), as a citizen and a taxpayer, filed with the Court a Petition for Prohibition
and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 42 under Section 2, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R. No. 179120, seeking to enjoin and permanently prohibit: (a) De Venecia
from allowing Limkaichong to sit in the House of Representatives and participate in all its official activities; and (b)
Limkaichong from holding office as its Member.43

Meanwhile, on August 28, 2007, Paras has instituted before the Court a Petition for Quo Warranto, Prohibition and
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction44 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R. Nos. 179132-33, seeking, among
others, the ouster of Limkaichong from the House of Representatives on account of her disqualification and for the holding
of special elections to fill the vacancy created by such.45

On even date, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution46 denying Villando's motion to suspend the
proclamation of Limkaichong, which denial was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution47 dated February 1,
2008.

On September 5, 2008, Villando also filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction with Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order48 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 179240-41, contending, among others, that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
August 16, 2007 Resolution49 because it still acted on Limchaikong’s manifestation and motion for clarification,
notwithstanding that the same was not set for hearing and considering that its June 29, 2007 Resolution had already
become final and executory.

As the four (4) petitions are interrelated, the Court resolved to consolidate them in its Resolutions dated September 4 and
11, 2007.

The Court heard the parties in oral argument on August 26, 2008, during which the following issues were tackled:
1. Whether the proclamation of Limkaichong by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Negros Oriental is valid;

2. Whether said proclamation divested the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
Limkaichong's citizenship;

3. Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal shall assume jurisdiction, in lieu of the COMELEC,
over the issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;

4. Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that Limkaichong is
disqualified from running as a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground that she is not a natural-
born citizen;

5. Whether the COMELEC disqualification of Limkaichong is final and executory; and,

6. Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibit Limkaichong from
assuming her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives.

On same day, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file within twenty (20) days their respective memoranda,
after which the petitions shall be deemed submitted for resolution, with or without the memoranda.

Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for the qualification of a Member of the House of
Representatives, thus:

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

When Limkaichong filed her COC, she stated therein that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. It was not true, according
to the petitioners in the disqualification cases, because her father remained a Chinese citizen at the time of her birth. The
COMELEC Second Division has sided with Camero and Villando, and disqualified Limkaichong to run as a congressional
candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental for having failed to comply with the citizenship requirement. Accordingly,
her proclamation was ordered suspended notwithstanding that she obtained the highest number of votes during the
elections. Nonetheless, she was proclaimed by the PBOC pursuant to the policy guidelines of COMELEC En
Banc Resolution No. 8062, and she has since assumed her position and performed her functions as a Member of the
House of Representatives.

Whether Limkaichong’s proclamation was valid.

The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17,
2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as
for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration
effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution.50 Since the execution of the May 17, 2007
Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the
execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.

In G.R. Nos. 179132-33, Paras, however, maintained that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen who was disqualified to run
as a congressional candidate by way of a final judgment of the COMELEC. With that, her proclamation was questionable
and the same was done in open defiance of the Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division.
She also stressed that Limkaichong's proclamation was procedurally defective, it appearing that one of the PBOC
members was not present on May 25, 2007, and that it took place in a restaurant and not at the provincial capitol. Finally,
she argued that Limkaichong’s proclamation was void in accordance with the Court's pronouncement in the case of
Codilla v. De Venecia.51
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment on the petition of Paras, expressing its support for the position
taken by the latter.

A perusal of the arguments advanced by Paras and the OSG does not sway the Court to rule against the validity of
Limkaichong’s proclamation. No less than the COMELEC First Division has sustained the validity of her proclamation
when it dismissed, by way of a Resolution dated June 29, 2007, the petition filed by Paras to nullify the proclamation. Not
only that. The COMELEC First Division has also adopted Limkaichong’s argument that following her valid proclamation,
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the disqualification cases has ceased and that the same should be threshed out in the
proper proceedings filed before the HRET. Notably, the dismissal of Paras’ petition was affirmed by the COMELEC in its
Omnibus Order dated January 28, 2008.

In addition, the validity of Limkaichong's proclamation is in accordance with COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 8062.
The disqualification cases filed against her remained pending as a result of her timely motion for reconsideration. Villando
(in G.R. Nos. 179240-41), however, maintained that Resolution No. 8062 is invalid; hence, it could not be used as basis
to validate Limkaichong's proclamation. He argued that it must be published since it is a "policy-guideline" in the exercise
of the COMELEC’s rule-making power. As such, it cannot supersede the Joint Resolution of the Second Division which
was rendered pursuant to the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial power.

His argument is specious. Resolution No. 8062 is not only a policy- guideline. It is also an administrative interpretation of
the two (2) provisions of the 1987 Constitution, namely: (i) Section 17,52 Article VI (ii); Section 2(2),53 Article IX-C; Section
654 of R.A. 6646; and Sections 24155 and 243,56 Article XX of the OEC. As such, it does not have to comply with the due
process requirement. The term "administrative" connotes or pertains to "administration, especially management, as by
managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things." It does
not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon.57 This
is to be distinguished from "quasi-judicial function," a term which applies, among others, to the action or discretion of
public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature.58

Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the COMELEC’s constitutionally mandated power to promulgate its own rules of
procedure relative to the conduct of the elections.59 In adopting such policy-guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and
Local Elections, the COMELEC had in mind the objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the interest
of justice and fair play. Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the
elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their
proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Whereas,
in this case, the COMELEC Second Division having failed to act on the disqualification cases against Limkaichong until
after the conduct of the elections, with her obtaining the highest number of votes from the electorate, her proclamation
was properly effected by the PBOC pursuant to Resolution No. 8062.

The Court has held in the case of Planas v. COMELEC,60 that at the time of the proclamation of Defensor, the respondent
therein who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not
yet final. As such, his proclamation was valid or legal, as he had at that point in time remained qualified. Limkaichong’s
situation is no different from that of Defensor, the former having been disqualified by a Division Resolution on the basis of
her not being a natural-born Filipino citizen. When she was proclaimed by the PBOC, she was the winner during the
elections for obtaining the highest number of votes, and at that time, the Division Resolution disqualifying her has not yet
became final as a result of the motion for reconsideration.

II

Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC, should assume jurisdiction
over the disqualification cases.

In her petition (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), Limkaichong argued that her proclamation on May 25, 2007 by the PBOC divested
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over all issues relating to her qualifications, and that jurisdiction now lies with the HRET.

Biraogo, on the other hand, believed otherwise. He argued (in G.R. No. 179120) that the issue concerning Limkaichong’s
disqualification is still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc to resolve because when Limkaichong
was proclaimed on May 25, 2007, the matter was still pending resolution before the COMELEC En Banc.
We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.61 It
follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the
House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 25062 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral
Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.63

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Corollary thereto is Rule 14 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, as amended, which states:

RULE 14. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.lavvphil.zw+

The COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution dated August 16, 2007, had given paramount consideration to the two (2)
aforementioned provisions when it stated that:

In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of office on June 30, 2007, this
Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Limkaichong should now be
determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the above-quoted provision of the
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, that all pending incidents relating
to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of the House of Representatives should now be determined by
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Worth citing also is the ratiocination of the COMELEC First Division when it dismissed the petition of Paras seeking the
nullity of Limkaichong's proclamation, thus:

The present situation is similar not to the factual circumstances of Codilla, which Paras invokes, but rather to that
in Planas which adheres to the general rule giving jurisdiction to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. As at
the time of Limkaichong's proclamation, her disqualification was not yet final, her proclamation was valid or legal. This
Commission no longer has jurisdiction over the case. This, notwithstanding the Second Division's directive suspending
Limkaichong's proclamation.

The Commission has made its intention in issuing Resolution No. 8062 very clear in that there shall be no suspension of
proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases, involving, among others, issues of citizenship. As
the disqualification cases involving Limkaichong were still pending reconsideration by the En Banc, the underlying policy
which gave rise to the issuance of the resolution: to respect the will of the Filipino electorate, applies to the suspension of
proclamation of the winning Congressional candidate for the First District of Negros Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that Limkaichong’s proclamation
was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity
does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.64 The Court has shed light on this in the case of Vinzons-Chato,65 to the effect
that:

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a
Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already
lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing
of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the
sound judgment and discretion of the HRET. Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and
void does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:

x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office
and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is
self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard
to the people's mandate.

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against respondent Unico would be to usurp
the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.

In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming jurisdiction over all
matters essential to a member’s qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.

The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives, to wit:

Rule 16. Election protest. -- A verified petition contesting the election of any Member of the House of Representatives
shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within
ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant while
the adverse party shall be known as the protestee.

xxx

Rule 17. Quo Warranto. -- A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a Member of the House of
Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any voter
within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner
while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.

xxx

Rule 19. Periods Non-Extendible. -- The ten-day period mentioned in Rules 16 and 17 is jurisdictional and cannot be
extended.

Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may
assail one’s eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or
a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections,66 we
ruled that where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of
petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.

The PBOC proclaimed Limkaichong as the winner on May 25, 2007. Thus, petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33,
and 179240-41) should have filed either an election protest or petition for quo warranto within ten days from May 25,
2007. But they did not. In fact, to date, no petition of protest or petition for quo warranto has been filed with the HRET.
Verily, the ten-day prescriptive period for initiating a contest against Limkaichong has long expired.

However, the said ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification cases
based on citizenship. Under the 1987 Constitution, Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born
citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who
assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period
notwithstanding.

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,67 the Court held that:

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken.
The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office as governor
because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If,
say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his
nationality, would she have the right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may not longer
be made within ten days from her proclamation? x x x

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing
exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this
case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack
of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
alone, abjuring and renouncing all fealty to any other state.

However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section 18 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued: - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the
Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the
naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization certificate,
return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided,
That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his native country or the country of his
former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as prima facie evidence of his
intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or private high
schools recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the Philippines, where
Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, through the fault of their
parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy
of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of
Interior [now Office of the President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the
constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment
of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,68 where the Court of First Instance judge motu proprio and not in the proper
denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who had already taken their
oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted with
certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into
and rule upon such infirmities must
be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the
naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his
representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers,
presumably after previous investigation in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question
the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly
not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.

III

Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly disqualified Limkaichong on the
ground that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In resolving the disqualification cases, the COMELEC Second Division relied on the entries in the docket book of the
OSG,69 the only remaining record of the naturalization proceedings,70 and ruled on the basis thereof that the naturalization
proceedings of Julio Ong Sy, Limkaichong’s father, in Special Case No. 1043, were null and void. The COMELEC Second
Division adopted Villando and Camero’s arguments that the OSG was deprived of its participation in the said case for it
was not furnished copies of the following: (a) the July 9, 1957 Order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) granting the
petition for naturalization; and (b) the September 21, 1959 Order of the CFI declaring Julio Ong Sy a Filipino citizen. Thus,
when the latter took his oath of allegiance on October 21, 1959, it was exactly 30 days after his declaration as a
naturalized Filipino, or one day short of the reglementary period required under Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473. Such defects were fatal to the naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy and prevented the same from gaining
finality. The COMELEC Second Division concluded that since Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Philippine citizenship through
the said naturalization proceedings, it follows that Limkaichong remains a Chinese national and is disqualified to run as
candidate and be elected as a Member of the House of Representatives.

We cannot resolve the matter of Limkaichong’s citizenship as the same should have been challenged in appropriate
proceedings as earlier stated.

IV

Whether the COMELEC's disqualification of Limkaichong is final and executory.

In resolving this issue, pertinent is the provision of Section 13(b), Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure:

Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. – x x x

(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and
executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

In his Memorandum dated June 27, 2008, Biraogo stated that the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in the
disqualification cases became final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation and that the same was not
restrained by this Court pursuant to Section 13(b), Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He averred that
since Limkaichong received a copy of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated June 29, 2007 on July 3, 2007, she had
until July 8, 2007 within which to obtain a restraining order from the Court to prevent the same from becoming final and
executory. However, she did not do anything to that effect. Biraogo also averred that Limkaichong is guilty of forum
shopping; hence, her petition must be dismissed by the Court.

Instead of asking the Court for what Biraogo opined as a restraining order, Limkaichong filed with this Court, on August 1,
2007, her petition for certiorari assailing the said COMELEC En Banc Resolution pursuant to Section 2,71 Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, postulating that she had thirty (30) days from July 4, 2007 within which
to file the petition, or until August 3, 2007. She cited Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which prescribes the
power of this Court to review decisions of the COMELEC,72 thus:

SEC. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.

In his Comment on the petition, Villando prayed for the outright dismissal of Limkaichong’s petition as (a) it was filed
beyond the reglementary period; (b) Limkaichong engaged in prohibited forum shopping; and (c) Limkaichong admitted
that the issues raised have become moot and academic. He also sought to declare Limkaichong in contempt of court for
forum shopping.

The COMELEC, through the OSG, also filed its Comment, praying for the denial of Limkaichong's petition and its
dismissal for being moot, contending that: (a) the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated August 16, 2007 has rendered
the instant petition moot and academic; and (b) Limkaichong knowingly and intentionally engaged in forum shopping. The
OSG argued that, without waiting for the resolution of her Motion for Clarification and two (2) successive motions to
resolve said motions which are pending before the COMELEC En Banc, Limkaichong filed the present petition to question
the Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, which issues were pending before the
COMELEC En Banc. Her act of seeking relief from this Court while there were several other incidents pending before the
COMELEC, the final resolution in either one of which will amount to res judicata in the other, clearly showed forum
shopping on her part.

In her Reply to the above Comments, Limkaichong countered that she did not engage in forum shopping, for had she
waited for the COMELEC to rule on her manifestation and other motions, it would have resulted in the expiration of the
reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari before the Court.

The May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying Limkaichong and suspending her
proclamation cannot yet be implemented considering that she timely filed a motion for reconsideration. Thus, pursuant to
Section 13(c), Rule 18 and Section 2 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Joint Resolution has not yet
attained finality for it to be implemented.

Notably, the seeming impropriety of the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated June 29, 2007 has since been
remedied by the promulgation of its Resolution dated August 16, 2007, recognizing that it no longer has jurisdiction over
the disqualification cases following the valid proclamation of Limkaichong and her assumption of office as a Member of
the House of Representatives.

Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibit Limkaichong from assuming
her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives.

Biraogo's contention was that De Venecia73 should be stopped from entering Limkaichong's name in the Roll of Members
of the House of Representatives because he has no power to allow an alien to sit and continue to sit therein as it would
amount to an unlawful exercise of his legal authority. Moreover, Biraogo opposes Limkaichong’s assumption of office in
the House of Representatives since she is not qualified to sit therein, being a Chinese citizen and, thus, disqualified by
virtue of a final and executory judgment of the COMELEC En Banc. He relied on the COMELEC En Banc Resolution
dated June 29, 2007, which affirmed the COMELEC Second Division Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying
Limkaichong from holding public office. He contended that the said Resolution dated June 29, 2007 is already final and
executory; hence, it should be respected pursuant to the principle of res judicata.

De Venecia, on the other hand, argued that he should not be faulted for honoring the proclamation of Limkaichong,
because it had the hallmarks of regularity, and he had no power to exclude any Member of the House of Representatives
motu proprio. In their Comment on the petition, respondents De Venecia, et al., contended that the enrollment of a
Member in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives and his/her recognition as such becomes the ministerial
duty of the Secretary General and the House of Representatives upon presentation by such Member of a valid
Certificate of Proclamation and Oath of Office.

Respondent Nograles, as De Venecia's, substitute, filed a Memorandum dated July 16, 2008 stating that under the
circumstances, the House of Representatives, and its officials, are without recourse except to honor the validity of the
proclamation of Limkaichong until the same is

canceled, revoked or nullified, and to continue to recognize her as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Negros Oriental until it is ordered by this Court, as it was in Codilla, to recognize somebody else. He went on to state that
after assumption by the Member-elect, or having acquired a presumptively valid title to the office, the House of
Representatives cannot, motu proprio, cancel, revoke, withdraw any recognition given to a sitting Member or to "remove"
his name from its roll, as such would amount to a removal of such Member from his office without due process of law.
Verily, it is only after a determination by the appropriate tribunal (as in this case, the HRET), pursuant to a final and
executory order, that the Member does not have a right to the office (i.e., not being a duly elected Member), that the
House of Representatives is directed to exclude the said Member.

Their contentions are meritorious. The unseating of a Member of the House of Representatives should be exercised with
great caution and after the proper proceedings for the ouster has been validly completed. For to arbitrarily unseat
someone, who obtained the highest number of votes in the elections, and during the pendency of the proceedings
determining one’s qualification or disqualification, would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides.74

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. Nos. 178831-32 is GRANTED and the Joint Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. All the
other petitions (G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, 179240-41) are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Original Signed
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

On leave
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES


Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION<


Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated that: IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division is upheld."

In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:

"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a determination as regards her
qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively
pass upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to due
process and for unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise required by the constitution."1 (as originally
underscored)

The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:

"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who
has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of Marinduque."2

Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus: petitioner is a duly proclaimed
winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her
qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The crucial question is
whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013. Without the
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be no
valid and effective assumption of office.

We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:

"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18
May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and
residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any
pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x As the
point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis of her due proclamation, the
instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we here repeat that the proclamation which
petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.
1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc has
already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First Division
that CANCELLED petitioner's certificate of candidacy.

2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of petitioner's certificate o
candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been
removed, there was not even any attempt to remove it.

3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation may be removed. Rule 18,
Section 13 (b) provides:

"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En Bane shall become final
and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."

Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a restraining order that will
remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days
the Supreme Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen.
Petitioner did not move to have it happen.

It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being proclaimed. Petitioner
lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not
be proclaimed because there was a final finding against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed a restraining order
from the Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to her became
executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative. She would have to base her
recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of
candidacy and that a restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable
injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before
and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to
her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law into her hands" and secure a
proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane decision that was final on 14 May 2013 and final
and executory five days thereafter.

4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule 18 in the provision that the
COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL AND EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation
unless restrained by the Supreme Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained, moves from
promulgation into becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section 5 of Rule 18 it is stated:

Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a division shall be made on
a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by
registered mail or by telegram.

5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very date of its promulgation on 14
May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us that she in fact received a copy of the decision on 16 May
20 13.4 On that date, she had absolutely no reason why she would disregard the available legal way to remove
the restraint on her proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a proclamation two days thereafter. The
utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane decision and of the Rule stating that her proclamation at that point
MUST be on permission by the Supreme Court is even indicative of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.

6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted proclamation as the very reason to
support her argument that she could no longer be reached by the jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the
HRET that has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of her qualifications for office.

7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which she directs, as well as in her
objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with her procured proclamation that petitioner nullifies the
COMELEC's decision, by Division and then En Banc and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the COMELEC
decision. In other words, petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all administrative and judicial actions thereon,
past and present. And by her proclamation, she claims as acquired the congressional seat that she sought to be a
candidate for. As already shown, the reasons that lead to the impermissibility of the objective are clear. She
cannot sit as Member of the House of Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with
knowledge of the existing legal impediment.
8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction
over her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a
written constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the
House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such
membership.5 Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is
the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC,
was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14
May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed the
proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of Marinduque.
The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained when no restraining order was
obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days from 14 May 2013.

9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the COMELEC First Division
ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by
that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court
regarding the decision of the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was indispensably needed, not
to legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation with the Supreme Court decision as
basis.

10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil action for a writ of Certiorari
through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed by set rules and principles.

a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was
a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard summarily. The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by
the COMELEC Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the Commission may
designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive
evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the proceedings are authorized to
be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their
position paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; x x x and that
this provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing and reception of evidence are delegated by
the Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x x.

b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.6

It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise of the COMELEC summary
jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the Supreme Court's authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling
that is brought before it, that defines the way petitioner's submission before the Court should be adjudicated. Thus further
explained, the disposition of 25 June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered
evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of
the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She
likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity
to question and present controverting evidence.

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed in
order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission. In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel
certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her
case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First
Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not
avail herself of the opportunity given her.

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right
to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times
more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process
in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the
chance to be he rd on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)

As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First Division,
discoursed as follows:

"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office the law requires that she
must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the
proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is
petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident
or naturalized citizen of the USA.

Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however,
establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30 2012
petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to
prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely
misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had
availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and
hold any elective public office in the Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent
submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is
that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is
a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner
submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225
to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US
passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not
apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September
2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to
comply with rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed
said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot
claim that she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated
only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012.1âwphi1
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, to this effect:
This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath
of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper
proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the
records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that was not
previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of questions -Did petitioner execute an
oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at the earliest
opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since she
took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed
to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this Court, as it was never
raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise
known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002
(Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner s
oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No.
9225.

These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s citizenship. Petitioner, however,
failed to clear such doubt.7

11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the
petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s
certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines
who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the
proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on
more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the
COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In
that sense, the HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so
only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such membership. The
HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive,
and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been
terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the
Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the
representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET
proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the
terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that
representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in
representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.

12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be attributed, as the dissent
does so, to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25 June 2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise by
the HRET of its constitutional duty. Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition was done to pave the
way for the unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The petitioner can very well invoke the
authority of the HRET, but not as a sitting member of the House of Representatives.8

The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was contained in a letter to the
members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was internal to the Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts
approval to have the explanation published as it is now appended to this Resolution.

The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well be in order to remind
petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties, but continues until the case is
terminated.9 When petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court exercised
such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the petition
by petitioner.

More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly has legal consequences.
Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition, negative and nullify the Court's Resolution and its
legal effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests. Obviously, she cannot,
as she designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.

WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed. Entry of Judgment is
ordered.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

See Separate Concurring Opinion


MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion (NO PART)


ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See: Dissent.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

No Part No part
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave) See Concurring opinion


MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join J. Carpio in his Dissent No part


MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See dissenting opinion


MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO


Chief Justice
Footnotes

* On official leave.

1
Rollo, p. 325.

2
Id. at 9.

3
"The concept of 'final' judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or 'executory' as of right
[final and executory]), is definite and settled. A 'final' judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the
basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of
res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court
except to await the parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once
it becomes 'final' or, to use the established and more distinctive term, 'final and executory. ' See Investments Inc v
Court o Appeals 231 Phil. 302, 307 (1987).

Thus, when the COMELEC En Bane rendered its Resolution dated 14 May 2013, such was a final
judgment the issue of petitioner's eligibility was already definitively disposed of and there was no longer
any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for office, and the COMELEC's task of ruling on the
propriety of the cancellation of petitioner's COC has ended. This final judgment, by operation of Sec. 3,
Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, became final and executory on 19 May 2013, or five days
from its promulgation, as it was not RJ restrained by the Supreme Court. See rollo pp. 163-165.

4
Rollo p. 5.

Parenthetically, the surrounding facts of the case show that the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC), as well
as the parties, already had notice of the COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated 14 May 2013 before petitioner was
proclaimed. As alleged in the Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration, and which was not disputed by
petitioner, the COMELEC En Bane found that On May 15 2013, the Villa PBOC was already in receipt of the May
14 2013 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner thereby affirming the March 27, 2013
Resolution of the First Division that cancelled petitioner's COC. The receipt was acknowledged by Rossini M.
Ocsadin of the PBOC on May 15,2013. On May 16,2013, Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, petitioner's counsel of record,
received a copy of the same resolution. On May 18 2013, the PBOC under ARED Ignacio is already aware of the
May 14,2013 Resolution of the Commission En Bane which is already on file with the PBOC. Furthermore, PBOC
members Provincial Prosecutor Bimbo Mercado and Magdalena Lim knew of the 14 May 2013 Resolution since
they are the original members of the Villa PBOC. However, while counsel for petitioner, Atty. Aureus, already
received a copy of said resolution on May 16, 2013, the counsel for petitioner, Atty. Ferdinand Rivera (who is an
UNA lawyer), who appeared before the Ignacio PBOC on May 18,2013, misrepresented to said PBOC that
[petitioner] has not received a copy of the said May 14 2013 Resolution of this Commission. This has mislead the
Ignacio PBOC in deciding to proclaim petitioner believing that petitioner is not yet bound by the said resolution.
See rollo pp. 392-393.

5
In the case at bar, as the PBOC and the parties all had notice of the COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated 14
May 2013, the PBOC should have, at the very least, suspended petitioner's proclamation. Although COMELEC
Resolution No. 9648 or the General Instructions for the Board of Canvassers on the Consolidation/Canvass and
Transmission of Votes in Connection with the 3 May 2013 National and Local Elections authorizes the PBOC to
proclaim a winning candidate if there is a pending disqualification or petition to cancel COC and no order of
suspension was issued by the COMELEC, the cancellation of petitioner's COC, as ordered in the COMELEC En
Banc Resolution dated 14 May 2013, is of greater significance and import than an order of suspension of
proclamation. The PBOC should have taken the COMELEC En Bane s cue. To now countenance this precipitate
act of the PBOC is to allow it to render nugatory a decision of its superior. Besides, on 18 May 2013, there was no
longer any pending case as the COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated 14 May 2013 is already a final judgment.

6
Beluso v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456.
In De Ia Cruz v COMELEC and Pacete the Court ruled that the COMELEC being a specialized agency
tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and
decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. (G.R. No. 192221, 13
November 2012, 685 SCRA 347, 359).

In Mastura v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not
be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial
evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the
COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC -created and explicitly
made independent by the Constitution itself -on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The
COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rut of evidence. (G R. No. 124 521, 29 January 1998,
285 SCRA 493, 499).

7
Rollo, pp. 181-184.

8
Petitioner before the HRET, can manifest what she desires in this Motion for Reconsideration concerning the
existence of Identification Certificate No. 05-05424 issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 13 October 2005,
ostensibly recognizing her as a citizen of the Philippines as per (pursuant) to the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. 9225) in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, S. of 24 and Memorandum Circular
No. AFF-2004-01 per order of this no. CRR No. 05-10/03-5455 AFF No. 05-4961 signed by Commissioner ALIPIO
F. FERNANDEZ dated October 6 2005. Petitioner belatedly submitted this manifestation in her Motion for
Reconsideration for the stated reason that her records with the Bureau of Immigration has been missing.
Fortunately, her Index Card on file at the Fingerprint Section was found and it became the basis, together with
Petitioner's copy of the certificate which she just unearthed lately, for the issuance of a certified true copy of her
Identification Certificate No. 05-05424." See rollo, pp. 364 and 311.

9
Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez G.R. No. 172700,23 July 2010, 625 SCRA 299, 307.

G.R. No. 190734 March 26, 2010

BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA, Petitioner,


vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), dated September 10, 2009, and its Resolution dated November 12, 2009, be
declared null and void ab initio.

The narration of facts in the HRET Decision is not disputed by the parties. Pertinent portions thereof are reproduced
hereunder:

On 12 June 2007, protestant Bai Sandra S.A. Sema, a congressional candidate of the Lakas-CMD who obtained 87,237
votes or 18,345-vote difference from protestee Dilangalen, who obtained 105,582 votes, filed an election protest against
the latter. Allegedly, it was on 1 June 2007, when the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Shariff Kabunsuan proclaimed
protestee Didagen P. Dilangalen as Representative of the Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City (as no
certified true copy of the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidate for Member of the
House of Representatives was attached to the protest).

Protestant Sema is protesting a total of 195 precincts of the Municipality of Datu Odin Sinsuat of the Lone District of
Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, based on the following grounds:

1. The various Boards of Election Inspectors (BEI), in connivance with the protestee, deliberately and wrongfully
read, appreciated, and/or tabulated the votes appearing in the ballots that were lawfully and validly cast in favor of
the protestant as votes cast for the protestee;

2. Ballots containing valid votes cast for the protestant were misappreciated and considered as marked ballots
and declared null and void;

3. Ballots prepared by persons other than the voters themselves, and fake or unofficial ballots wherein the name
of the protestee was written, were illegally read and counted in favor of the protestee;

4. Ballots wherein no name of any candidate for Member of the House of Representatives was written in the blank
space for the said position were illegally read and counted in favor of the protestee;

5. Valid votes entered in the ballots in favor of the protestant were considered stray;

6. Groups of ballots wherein the protestee was voted as Representative but which were evidently prepared by one
(1) person were purposely considered as valid ballots and counted in favor of the protestee;

7. Individual ballots wherein the protestee was voted as Representative but which were evidently prepared by two
(2) or more persons were purposely considered as valid ballots and counted in favor of the protestee;

8. Ballots wherein the protestee was voted as Representative but were void because stickers were posted unto
them, and/or because of other patent or pattern markings appearing on them, were unlawfully read and counted in
favor of the protestee;

9. The protestee and his supporters illegally switched the ballots and election returns to manipulate the results;

10. The election returns purportedly coming from these precincts that were used in the canvassing by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers bear badges of fraud or irregularity, such as the uniform appearance and pattern
of writing of taras, showing that they are manufactured and prepared in an environment that allowed the people
who prepared them the luxury of time, convenience and comfort;1avvphi1

11. The election returns purportedly coming from these precincts that were used in the canvassing are spurious
as they did not contain the thumbmarks and/or the signatures of the members of the BEI;

12. The election returns purportedly coming from these precincts that were used in the canvassing by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers were spurious as they were thumbmarked and/or signed by persons who were
not members of the BEI on record;

13. The election returns purportedly coming from these precincts that were used in the canvassing by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers appear to have been tampered with to increase the votes for the protestee
recorded therein, as shown by the additional taras in the row for the protestee that are in handwriting different
from the other taras;

14. The total number of votes for the position of Member of the House of Representatives in the election returns
purportedly coming from these precincts that were used in the canvassing by the Provincial Board of Canvassers
exceeded the total number of registered voters in these precincts;

15. The total number of votes for the position of Member of the House of Representatives in the election returns
purportedly coming from these precincts that were used in the canvassing by the Provincial Board of Canvassers
exceeded the total number of voters who actually voted;
16. The protestee engaged in pervasive vote-buying in order to induce the people voting in these precincts to vote
for him;

17. The protestee engaged in the so-called negative vote-buying to induce people who would have voted for
protestant not to cast their votes anymore;

18. The protestee employed and deployed "flying voters" to unlawfully increase the votes cast in his favor;

19. The protestee employed armed men to terrorize and intimidate voters and compel them to vote for him;

20. The protestee, employing armed men to terrorize and intimidate the protestant's supporters, prevented them
from casting their votes in these precincts; and

21. The protestee, employing armed men to terrorize and intimidate the members of the BEI in these precincts,
coerced the said election inspectors to manipulate the counting and tallying of the votes for the position of the
Member of the House of Representatives by padding the tallied votes cast for the protestee and/or reducing the
tallied votes for the protestant.

On July 19, 2007, protestee filed an Answer with Counter-Protest, counter-protesting 198 clustered/merged precincts in
Sultan Kudarat and 50 precincts in Sultan Mastura on the following grounds:

(i) The duly appointed watchers of herein protestant [Dilangalen] were not allowed by the protestee [Sema] and
her supporters to enter the hereunder enumerated protested precincts and to [obersve] the casting of votes as
well as the counting of votes by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI's);

(ii) The ballots in most of the protested precincts were written by only one or two persons indicating that no actual
voting took place.

(iii) Flying voters were employed by the protestee and her supporters.

(iv) Protestee engaged in massive vote-buying during the campaign period and even during the election day.

(v) Registered voters in the protested municipalities, who are active supporters of herein protestant, were
prevented by the protestee and her supporters, through violence and intimidation, from casting their votes.

(vi) In connivance with herein protestee, the members of the BEI's in most of the protested precincts merely filled
up the Election Returns giving protestee a wide margin over herein protestant.

(vii) During the canvassing before the Municipal Board of Canvassers, the votes allegedly obtained by the
protestee were padded by the members of the board of canvassers in favor of the protestee.

(viii) Obviously manufactured election returns, prepared by the protestee and her supporters were used during the
canvassing by the Municipal Board of Canvassers in the protested Municipalities.

From September 16-29, 2008, the Tribunal conducted revision of ballots in all the contested precincts. During the revision
of ballots, it was discovered that only one (1) out of the 248 ballot boxes of the counter-protested precincts contained
ballots. The other 247 counter-protested ballots were totally empty or did not contain ballots and election documents. The
results of revision of ballots in the 195 protested precincts and one (1) counter-protested precinct are shown in the Table
below.

Protestant Sema Protestee Dilangalen


Votes per election returns 2,238 33,707
Votes per physical count 2,794 32,603

On November 27, 2008, protestant filed her Formal Offer of Exhibits x x x.


xxxx

On January 22, 2009, protestee filed his Comment (on the Formal Offer of Exhibits of the Protestant) x x x.

xxxx

On May 13, 2009, protestee filed his Formal Offer of Evidence x x x.

xxxx

On May 20, 2009, protestant filed her Comment/Objections (Re: Protestee's Formal Offer of Evidence), x x x.

xxxx

The Tribunal received the memoranda of the parties on June 25, 2009.

Protestant seeks a resolution of her protest by way of appreciation of ballots, asserting that the spurious ballots containing
votes for protestee be rejected and be themselves considered as proof that the will of the people was thwarted by election
fraud in the protested 195 precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat.

On the other hand, protestee belied protestant's allegation of fraud invoking the presumptions stipulated by the parties
and his reliance in the stipulated testimony of then Acting Municipal Treasurer of Datu Odin Sinsuat, Aladin D. Abdullah,
vice Municipal Treasurer Datu Eden Ala, who inhibited himself being a relative of a local candidate, that in such capacity
she distributed to the different Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs) in the municipality of Datu Odin Sinsuat the same
official ballots, election returns and other election documents which she received from the COMELEC. To protestee, the
votes for him were cast by the voters themselves in official ballots validly read for him, and the entries in the objected
ballots were not written by the voters themselves.

In contrast to her position in respect to the votes in Datu Odin Sinsuat, as regards the counter-protested precincts in
Sultan Kudarat and Sultan Mastura, where protestant was shown to have attained higher number of votes than protestee
based on available official results, but when the ballot boxes of 247 out of 248 precincts were opened during revision, they
yielded no ballots and other election documents, protestant asserts that determination of votes of the parties should be
based on sources other than the missing ballots.1

The tribunal summarized the issues as follows:

I. Whether or not there were election irregularities, anomalies or errors committed during the May 14, 2007
elections which will nullify the votes counted and canvassed for each party, or stated differently, whether the
irregularities uncovered during revision and appreciation, among others, were committed during or after the
elections.

II. Who is the real winner in the May 14, 2007 congressional elections for the Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City after a revision and appreciation of the ballots?2

On September 10, 2009, the HRET issued the assailed Decision. The HRET found that majority of the ballots in the 195
protested precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat were rejected as fake or spurious ballots since they did not contain security
features described by Commissioner Resurreccion Borra of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). It was also
pointed out that "Reports on Revision Results, duly signed by both parties' revisors, showed that during the revision, all
the ballot boxes in the 195 protested precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat had no self-locking metal seals x x x, [t]hus, it cannot
be conclusively stated, that the ballot boxes at the time that they were opened for revision purposes were in the same
condition as they were when closed by the Chairman and Members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) after the
completion of the canvassing proceedings." On the other hand, only one (1) out of the 248 ballot boxes of the counter-
protested precincts contained ballots. Nevertheless, the HRET ruled that petitioner failed to prove by convincing evidence
that the election itself, conducted on May 14, 2007, was tainted by fraud and irregularities that frustrated the will of the
electorate. The HRET concluded that the ballots and/or ballot boxes must have been tampered with after the elections
and the counting and canvassing of votes. Thus, the HRET relied on the election returns and other election documents
to arrive at the number of votes validly cast for petitioner and respondent Dilangalen.

The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:


WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DISMISSES the instant election protest; AFFIRMS the proclamation of protestee Didagen P.
Dilangalen; and DECLARES him to be the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City.

Pursuant to Rule 96 of the 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, as soon as this Decision
becomes final and executory, let notice hereof be sent to the President of the Philippines, the House of Representatives
through the Speaker and the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated November 12, 2009.

Hence, this petition, where it is alleged that:

A.

THE RESPONDENT HRET COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT SUCCESSFULLY PROVEN BY CONVINCING EVIDENCE
THAT THE CONTESTED ELECTION WAS ATTENDED BY FRAUDS AND IRREGULARITIES WHEN THE PETITIONER
PRESENTED OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF FRAUD EXEMPLIFIED BY THE DISCOVERY DURING REVISION OF
THE NUMEROUS SPURIOUS BALLOTS FOR RESPONDENT DILANGALEN INSIDE THE BALLOT BOXES.

B.

THE RESPONDENT HRET GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN A MANNER AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE SPURIOUS BALLOTS CONTAINING VOTES FOR RESPONDENT
DILANGALEN THAT WERE FOUND INSIDE THE BALLOT BOXES DURING REVISION PROCEEDINGS WERE
INTRODUCED INTO SAID BALLOT BOXES AFTER, AND NOT DURING THE ELECTIONS, WHEN SUCH DEDUCTION
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY OF RESPONDENT DILANGALEN'S EVIDENCE, THEREBY DEVIATING FROM THE
BASIC RULE THAT WHEN WHAT IS INVOLVED IS THE CORRECTNESS OF THE NUMBER OF VOTES OF EACH
CANDIDATE, THE BEST AND MOST CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE ARE THE BALLOTS THEMSELVES.

C.

THE RESPONDENT HRET COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT DEDUCTING FROM THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTES CREDITED TO RESPONDENT
DILANGALEN THE FRAUDULENT BALLOTS IN HIS NAME THAT WERE DISCOVERED DURING THE REVISION
PROCEEDINGS.

D.

THE RESPONDENT HRET GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN A MANNER AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING THE PROCLAMATION OF RESPONDENT DILANGALEN WHEN THE NUMBER OF
VALID VOTES WHICH REMAINED AFTER DEDUCTING THE SPURIOUS BALLOTS COUNTED FOR HIM WAS LESS
THAN THE NUMBER OF VOTES LEGALLY OBTAINED BY HEREIN PETITIONER.4

The above allegations boil down to the issue of whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction by relying on election returns and other election documents, instead of the ballots themselves, in
determining who actually won in the May 14, 2007 congressional elections for the Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts and its jurisdiction to review decisions and
orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal.
Absent such grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or
jurisdiction.5 Grave abuse of discretion has been described in Juan v. Commission on Elections,6 as follows:
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would amount to lack of
jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law. The office of a petition for certiorari is not to correct simple errors of
judgment; any resort to the said petition under x x x Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the
resolution of jurisdictional issues. Thus, it is imperative for the petitioner to show caprice and arbitrariness on the
part of the COMELEC [or, in this case, the tribunal] whose exercise of discretion is being assailed.7

There is no cavil of doubt as to the factual findings regarding the fake ballots in the 195 precincts in Datu Odin Sinsuat, or
the lost ballots for the 247 ballots boxes from the counter-protested precincts. What petitioner questions is the Tribunal's
reliance on election returns and/or tally sheets and other election documents to arrive at the number of votes for each of
the parties. However, jurisprudence has established that such action of the HRET was well within its discretion and
jurisdiction.

Indeed, the general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes for each candidate, the
best and most conclusive evidence is the ballots themselves. However, this rule applies only if the ballots are available
and their integrity has been preserved from the day of elections until revision. When the ballots are unavailable or
cannot be produced, then recourse can be made to untampered and unaltered election returns or other election
documents as evidence.8

Petitioner admits in her petition that elections were actually held in Datu Odin Sinsuat. Both parties agreed with the
HRET's findings of fact that majority of the ballots in the 195 protested precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat were fake or
spurious ballots, and all the ballot boxes in the 195 protested precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat had no self-locking metal
seals. Neither do they dispute that only one (1) out of the 248 ballot boxes of the counter-protested precincts contained
ballots. The parties have not presented any evidence that there were any incidents of ballot snatching or switching on May
14, 2007- the day of the election itself. On the contrary, the only evidence on record, i.e., the affidavits of the Chief of
Police of Sultan Kudarat, Philip M. Liwan (Exhibit "1"); the Station Commander at Sultan Mastura, John R. Calinga (Exhibit
"3"), and the Election Officer of Datu Odin Sinsuat, Raufden A. Mangelen (Exhibit "4"), all attest to the fact that there were
no such incidents of switching nor were there reports of violence or irregularities during the casting, counting and
canvassing of votes. Thus, as concluded by the HRET, when said ballot boxes were opened for revision purposes, they
could not be said to be in the same condition as they were when closed by the Chairman and Members of the BEI after
the completion of the canvassing proceedings.

In Rosal v. Commission on Elections,9 the Court ruled, thus:

x x x where a ballot box is found in such a condition as would raise a reasonable suspicion that unauthorized persons
could have gained unlawful access to its contents, no evidentiary value can be given to the ballots in it and the
official count reflected in the election return must be upheld as the better and more reliable account of how and
for whom the electorate voted.10

Significantly, nothing on record shows that the election returns, tally sheets and other election documents that the HRET
had on hand had been tampered or altered. Since it is undisputed that there are hardly any valid or authentic ballots upon
which the HRET could base its determination of the number of votes cast for each of the parties, the HRET merely acted
in accordance with settled jurisprudence when it resorted to untampered and/or unaltered election returns and other
election documents as evidence of such votes.

In sum, there is no showing whatsoever that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, dated September 10, 2009 and November 12, 2009, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
On Official Leave
REYNATO S. PUNO*
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO** RENATO C. CORONA


Acting Chief Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ


Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA


Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

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