St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. vs. Macondray & Co.

, Inc

Payment or Performance

Winthrop Products, Inc. of New York – Shipper

SS ‘Tai Ping’ – owned and operated by Wilhelm Wilhemsen
Winthrop Stearns, Inc. Manila – Consignee
Barber Steamship Lines, Inc. – agent of Wilhelm Wilhelmsen
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company – Insurer
Manila Port Service – arrastre contractor
Macondray & Co., Inc. – carrier

FACTS:
 Winthrop Products, Inc. of New York shipped aboard the SS ‘Tai Ping’, 218 cartons and drums of drugs and
medicine which were consigned to Winthrop Stearns, Inc. Manila Philippines
 Barber Steamship Lines, Inc. issued a Bill of Lading in the name of Winthrop Products, Inc. as shipper, with
arrival notice in Manila to consignee Wintrhop Stearns, Inc. Manila
 The shipment was insured by the shipper against loos and/or damage with St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company
 SS Tai Ping arrived at the Port of Manila and discharged the shipment into the custody of Manila Port Service
 The shipment was discharged complete and in good order with the exception of 1 drum and serveral cartons
which were in bad order condition
 The consignee filed a claim in the amount of P1,109.47 representing the C.I.F value of the damaged drum
and cartons of medine with the carrier and Manila Port Service
 Both the carrier and Manila Port Service refused to pay such claim
 The consignee then filed its claim with the insurer. On the basis of such claim, the insurance company paid to
the consignee the insured value of the lost and damaged goods, including other expenses in connection
therewith in the total amount of $1,134.46
 As subrogee of the rights of the shipper and/or cosignee, the insurer instituted with the CFI an action against the
defendants for the recovery of the amount of $1,134.46
 Contention of defendant Manila Port Service:
o The whole cargo was delivered to the consignee in the same condition in which it was received from the
carrying vessel
o Their liability is limited to the invoice value of the goods, but in no case more than P500 per package
pursuant to their Management Contract
 Contention of defendants Macondray & Co., Inc, Barber Steamship Lines, Inc. and Wilhelm Wilhelmsen:
o The carrier’s liability for the shipment ceased upon discharge thereof from the ship’s tackle
o If any damage was sustained by the shipment while it was under the control of the vessel, such damage
was caused by insufficinecy of packaging, force majeure and/or perils of the sea
 Lower Court Ruling:
o Defendants Macondray & Co, Barber Steamship Lines Inc and Wilhel Wilhelmsen to pay plaintiff, jointly
and severally P300
o Defendant Manila Port Service to pay plaintiff P809.67
o (Total P1109.67)
 Contention of St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.:
o As subrogee of the consignee, it should be entitled to recover from defendants the amount of $1,134.46
which it actually paid to the consignee and which represents the value of the lost and damaged shipment
as well as other legitimate expenses
 Contention of Defendants:
o Their liabilty is limited to the C.I.F. value of the goods, pursuant to contract of sea carriage embodied in
the bill of lading
o That the consignee’s claim against the carrier and arrastre operators was only for the sum of P1,109.67

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not, in case of loss or damage, the liability of the carrier to the consignee is limited to the C.I.F value
of the goods which were lost or damaged.
2. Whether the insurer who has paid the claim in dollars to the consignee should be reimbursed in its peso equivalent
on the date of discharge of the cargo or on the date of the decision?

HELD:
1. YES
 The liabilities of the dendants with respect to the lost or damaged shipments are expressly limited
to the C.I.F. value of the goodsas per contract of sea carriage emobodied in the bill of lading
 It reads:
o “The limitation of liability xxx shall inure not only to the benefit of the carrier xxx but also to the
benefit of any independent contractor performing services xxx”
 The shipper and consignee are, therefore, bound by such stipulations
 It is for this reason that the consignee filed its claim against the defendant on the basis of the C.I.F. value
of the lost or dagmaged goods in the aggregate amount of P1,109.67

2. On the date of the discharge of the cargo

 The plaintiff, as insurer, after paying the claim of the insured for damages under the insurance, is
subrogated merely to the rights of the assured
 As subrogee, it can recover only the amount that is recoverable by the latter
 Since the right of the assured is limited or restricted by the provisions in the bill of lading, as suit by
the insurer as subrogee necessarily is subject to like limitations and restrictions

Ronquillo vs. CA
Joint and Solidary Obligation

FACTS:
 Ronquillo was one of the four defendants of the Civil case filed by Antonio So (private respondent) for
collection of money amounting to 117M
 The amount sought to be collected represented the value of the checks issued by defendants in payment
for foodstuffs delivered to and received by them
 They entered into a compromise agreement. In said agreement both parties agree that failure of either
party to comply with the terms and conditions stipulated, the innocent party will be entitled to an
execution of the decision based on the compromise agreement and the defaulting party agrees and hold
themselves to reimburse the innocent party for attys fees and other fees because of failure of the other
two defendants to pay their obligation, private respondent filed for the issuance of writ of execution
 A writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction for the claim against the properties of the defendants
including petitioner, single and jointly liable
 The decision of RTC based on the compromise agreement provides that “defendants individually and
agree to pay” within a periods of six months from January 1980 or before June 30, 1980

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ronquillo is solidarily liable with the other defendants in the civil case.

RULING:
YES. The term individually has the same meaning as collectively, separately, distinctively, respectively
or severally. An agreement to be individually liable undoubtedly creates a several obligation and a several
obligation is one which binds himself to perform the whole obligation
 LEUNG BEN VS. P. J. O’BRIEN, JAMES A. OSTRAND and GEO. R. HARVEY

FACTS:
 On December 12, 1917, an action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by P.J. O’Brien
to recover of Leung Ben the sum of P15,000, all alleged to have been lost by the plaintiff to the defendant
in a series of gambling, banking, and percentage games conducted during the two or three months prior
to the institution of the suit.
 The plaintiff asked for an attachment against the property of the defendant, on the ground that the latter
was about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors.
 THIS ATTACHMENT WAS ISSUED.
 The provision of law under which this attachment was issued requires that there should be a cause of
action arising upon contract, express or implied.
 The contention of the petitioner is that the statutory action to recover money lost at gaming is not such an
action as is contemplated in this provision, and he insists that the original complaint shows on its face that
the remedy of attachment is not available in aid thereof; that the Court of First Instance acted in excess of
its jurisdiction in granting the writ of attachment; that the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy by appeal or otherwise; and that consequently the writ of certiorari supplies the appropriate
remedy for this relief.

ISSUE:
1. Supposing that the Court of First Instance has granted an attachment for which there is no statutory
authority; can this court entertain the present petition and grant the desired relief?

2. Whether or not the statutory obligation to restore money won at gaming is an obligation arising from
contract, express or implied?

RULING:
1. YES. Under section 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction by
the writ of certiorari over the proceedings of Courts of First Instance, "wherever said courts have exceeded
their jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy." In the same section, it is further
declared that the proceedings in the Supreme Court in such cases shall be as prescribed for Courts of First
Instance in sections 217-221, inclusive, of said Code. This has the effect of incorporating into the practice
of the Supreme Court, so far as applicable, the provisions contained in those sections to the same extent
as if they had been reproduced verbatim immediately after section 514.

2. YES. In permitting the recovery money lost at play, Act No. 1757 has introduced modifications in the
application of Articles 1798, 1801, and 1305 of the Civil Code.

The first two of these articles relate to gambling contracts, while article 1305 treats of the nullity of
contracts proceeding from a vicious or illicit consideration. Taking all these provisions together, it must
be apparent that the obligation to return money lost at play has a decided affinity to contractual obligation;
and the Court believes that it could, without violence to the doctrines of the civil law, be held that such
obligations is an innominate quasi-contract.

It is however, unnecessary to place the decision on this ground. In the opinion of the Court, the cause of
action stated in the complaint in the court below is based on a contract, express or implied, and is therefore
of such nature that the court had authority to issue the writ of attachment. The application for the writ of
certiorari must therefore be denied and the proceedings dismissed.