G.R. No.

91552-55 March 10, 1994

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO MANUNGAS, JR. y GO @

"PERCY", accused-appellant.

Facts of the case:

In 1987, accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. recruited Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo Ramirez, Leonardo
Estanoco and Crisanto Collado to work as janitors in Saudi-Arabia. In connection with this, Fernando
required the applicants the several amounts for medical, placement and other fees. The applicants failed
to be deployed to Saudi however, and upon verification with POEA, they found out that Fernando was not
a licensed recruiter. Complainants filed complaints of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale
against Fernando. Fernando maintained that he was not illegally recruiting because he was connected with
a duly licensed recruitment agency, and that only because the job openings was subsequently awarded to
another recruitment agency that the applicants he recruited were not able to leave for Saudi.

Issue: Whether or not Fernando was guilty of Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale, given the circumstances.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Fernando, despite of his being connected with a licensed recruitment
agency, was still guilty of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, because he performed the acts of
recruitment as defined in Article 13 of the Labor Code, by himself. He was the one who recruited the
applicants, and he was the one who required of them the fees he collected himself. Illegal recruitment was
also qualified because he recruited more than three persons.

G.R. No. 179907 February 12, 2009

ARLENE N. LAPASARAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Arlene N.
Lapasaran, assails the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 28, 2007 and its Resolution2 dated September
12, 2007, in CA-G.R. CR No. 29898.

The facts of the case follow:

In September 2001, private complainant Menardo Villarin (Menardo) and his sister Vilma Villarin (Vilma)
met petitioner Arlene N. Lapasaran, who worked at Silver Jet Travel Tours Agency (Silver Jet) at SIMCAS
Building, Makati. For a fee of ₱85,000.00, petitioner undertook the processing of the papers necessary for
the deployment (under a tourist visa) and employment of Menardo in South Korea. Petitioner informed
Menardo that he would be employed as "factory worker," which was, subsequently, changed to "bakery
worker."3 Thereafter, Menardo paid the said fee in installments, the first in September 2001 in the amount
of ₱10,000.00, which was received by a certain Pastor Paulino Cajucom;4 the second installment was
₱35,000.00; while the third and last payment was ₱40,000.00; the last two installments were delivered to
the petitioner.5

After two postponements in his flight schedule, Menardo finally left for South Korea on November 25, 2001.
Unfortunately, he was incarcerated by South Korean immigration authorities and was immediately
deported to the Philippines because the travel documents issued to him by the petitioner were fake.6 He
immediately contacted petitioner and informed her of what happened. Thereupon, petitioner promised to
send him back to South Korea, but the promise was never fulfilled. Consequently, Menardo and his sister
Vilma demanded the return of the money they paid, but petitioner refused and even said, "Magkorte na
lang tayo."7 It was later found out that petitioner was no longer connected with Silver Jet.

Hence, the separate charges for illegal recruitment and estafa against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila. Raffled to Branch 34, the cases were docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-215331 for
Illegal Recruitment and Criminal Case No. 03-215332 for Estafa.8 When arraigned, she pleaded not guilty
to both charges.

In her defense, petitioner testified that she owned a travel agency named A&B Travel and Tours General
Services, engaged in the business of visa assistance and ticketing. She averred that it was Vilma who
solicited her assistance to secure a tourist visa for Menardo. She admitted transacting with the Villarins,
but committed only to securing a tourist visa and a two-way airplane ticket for Menardo, for which she
received ₱70,000.00 as payment. She denied having recruited Menardo Villarin; she likewise denied having
promised him employment in South Korea.9

On February 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal recruitment and estafa.10

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Decision with a modification in the penalty imposed
in Criminal Case No. 03-215332 for estafa.11

Petitioner now comes before this Court on the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA ARE APPLICABLE IN THESE
CASES.12

We deny the petition.

Both the trial and appellate courts found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and
convincing. We are, therefore, inclined to respect such finding. The best arbiter of the issue of the credibility
of the witnesses and their testimonies is the trial court. When the inquiry is on that issue, appellate courts
will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter was in a better position
to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.1avvphi1 Its finding thereon will not be disturbed, unless it plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, may affect the result of the case. We
find no cogent reason to disturb the trial court’s conclusion, as affirmed by the CA.13

In the first case, petitioner was charged with illegal recruitment, defined and penalized by the Labor Code
as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042.14 Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown that
petitioner gave the complainant the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send the
complainant abroad for work, such that the latter was convinced to part with his money in order to be
employed.15 To be engaged in the practice of recruitment and placement, it is plain that there must, at
least, be a promise or an offer of employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or
abroad.16 Petitioner’s misrepresentations concerning her purported power and authority to recruit for
overseas employment, and the collection from Menardo of various amounts, clearly indicate acts
constitutive of illegal recruitment.

Petitioner’s claim that she did not represent herself as a licensed recruiter, but that she merely tried to help
the complainants secure a tourist visa could not make her less guilty of illegal recruitment, it being enough
that she gave the impression of having had the authority to recruit workers for deployment abroad.17

As provided in Section 7(a)18 of R.A. No. 8042, the CA correctly affirmed the imposition of the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, and the payment of a fine of
₱200,000.00, in Criminal Case No. 03-215331.

In the second case, petitioner was charged with violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) which punishes estafa committed as follows:

By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of the crime are: (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit; and (b) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party.19
Here, it has been sufficiently proven that petitioner represented herself to Menardo as capable of sending
him to South Korea for employment, even if she did not have the authority or license for the purpose.
Undoubtedly, it was this misrepresentation that induced Menardo to part with his hard-earned money in
exchange for what he thought was a promising future abroad. The act of petitioner clearly constitutes estafa
under the above-quoted provision.20

It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be convicted of both illegal recruitment and estafa.
The reason, therefore, is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is
malum in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second,
such an intent is imperative.21

Lastly, the CA correctly modified the penalty imposed by the RTC for the crime of estafa in Criminal Case
No. 03-215332.

Article 315 of the RPC fixes the penalty for Estafa, viz.:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.lawphil.net

As the amount involved is ₱75,000.00 which exceeds ₱22,000.00, the penalty should be imposed in its
maximum period which is six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years
adding one year for every additional ₱10,000.00, provided the total penalty does not exceed 20 years.
Hence, since the amount of the fraud exceeds ₱22,000.00 by ₱53,000.00, then a total of five (5) years should
be added to the above-stated maximum period.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that
which could be properly imposed under the RPC as discussed above. On the other hand, the minimum term
of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by the Code, which is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods ranging from
six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 03-215332, the CA correctly imposed the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, eight (8) months
and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 28, 2007 and its Resolution dated September 12, 2007, in CA-G.R. CR No. 29898, are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Espanol, Jr., 533 SCRA 424 , September 14, 2007

Labor Law; Labor Code, Judgment; Appeals; A judgment debtor who acquiesces of and voluntarily complies
with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.

Same; Same; Illegal Recruitment; Definition of Recruitment and Placement; The conduct of preparatory
interviews is a recruitment activity.—Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement
as: any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad whether
for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the basis
of this definition—and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to portray—the conduct of preparatory
interviews is a recruitment activity.

Same; Same; Same; It is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment, that renders
the recruitment activity of LCL unlawful.—The fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment during the
interviews is of no moment. From the language of Article 13(b), the act of recruitment may be “for profit
or not.” Notably, it is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of payment, that renders the
recruitment activity of LCL unlawful.

Same; Appeals; Due Process; The essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity afforded a party
to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of its defense; What is vital is not the opportunity to
cross-examine an adverse witness, but an opportunity to be heard.—The claim of denial of due process on
the part of C.F. Sharp must also be rejected. The essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity
afforded a party to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of its defense. What is vital is not the
opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness, but an opportunity to be heard. In this case, C.F. Sharp
was given ample opportunity to be heard, to adduce evidence in support of its version of the material
occurrences, and to controvert Rizal’s allegation and the Inspection Report. It submitted its position paper
with supporting affidavits and documents, and additionally pleaded its causes on appeal before the
Secretary of Labor. Under the circumstances, a claim of denial of due process on C.F. Sharp’s part is
completely unavailing.

Same; Same; Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the labor officials’ findings rest.—C.F. Sharp would have us re-evaluate the factual
veracity and probative value of the evidence submitted in the proceedings a quo. C.F. Sharp may well be
reminded that it is not our function to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the evidence adduced by the
parties. Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. Judicial review of labor cases does
not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officials’ findings rest.
Hence, where the factual findings of the labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by, the
CA, the same are accorded respect and finality, and are binding upon this Court. It is only when the findings
of the labor agencies and the appellate court are in conflict that this Court will review the records to
determine which findings should be upheld as being more in conformity with the evidentiary facts. Where
the CA affirms the labor agencies on review and there is no showing whatsoever that said findings are
patently erroneous, this Court is bound by the said findings. [C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Espanol,
Jr., 533 SCRA 424(2007)]

G.R. No. 113161, August 29, 1995

People of the Phil., plaintiff-appellee vs Loma Goce, et. al., accused-appellant

Ponente: Regalado

Facts:

On January 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate nd in large scale,
punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the labor code as amended by PD 2018, filed against Dan and Loma
Goce and Nelly Agustin in the RTC of Manila, alleging that in or about during the period comprised between
May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive in the City of Manila, the accused conspired and represent
themsleves to have the capacity to recruit Filipino workers for employment abroad.

January 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the 3 accused bot none of them was arrested. Hence,
on February 1989, the RTC prdered the case archived but issued a standing warrant os arrest against the
accused.

Thereafter, knowing the whereabouts of the accused, Rogelio Salado requested for a copy of the warrant
of arrest and eventually Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the Paranaque Police. Agustin's counsel filed a
motion to revive the case and requested to set a hearing for purpose of due process and for accused to
immediately have her day in court. On the arraignment, Agustin pleaded not guilty and the trial went on
with four complainants testified for the prosecution and reciepts of the processing fees they paid.

Agustin for the defense asserted that Goce couple were licensed recruiters but denied her participation in
the recruitment and denied knowledge of the receipts as well.

On November 1993, trial court rendered judgment finding that Agustin as a principal in the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale with sentence of life imprisonment and pay P100,000.00.

Issues:

Agustin appealed witht the follwing arguments: (1) her act of introducing the complainants to the couple
does not fall within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13 in relation to Article
34 of the labor code; (2) there is no proof of conspiracy and (3) there is no proof that appellant
offered/promised overseas employment to the complainants.
Ruling:

The testimonial evidence shows that Agustin indeed further committted acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment because, the complainants had a previous interview with Agustin (as employee of the Goce
couple) about fees and papers to submit that may constitute as referral. Agustin collected the payments of
the complainants as well as their passports, trainning fees, medical tests and other expenses.On the issue
of proof, the court held that the receipts exhibited by the claimants are clear enough to prove the payments
and transaction made.

PEOPLE v. BULU CHOWDURY

G.R. No. 129577-80. February 15, 2000

Facts : Bulu Chowdury was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale by recruiting Estrella
B. Calleja, Melvin C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis for employment in Korea. Evidence shows that accused –
appellant interviewed private complainant in 1994 at Craftrade’s office, and required them to submit
requirements such as passport, NBI clearance, ID pictures, medical certificate and birth certificate.
Chowdury also required them to pay placements fee for a certain amount. At that time, he was an
interviewer of Craftrade which was operating under temporary authority given by POEA pending the
renewal of license. He was charged based on the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as employee
of Craftrade and he is not in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. The complainants
also averred that during their applications for employment for abroad, the license of Craftrade was already
expired.

For his defense Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His
primary duty was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the
instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency's President and General Manager,
and Mr. UtkalChowdury, the agency's Managing Director.

In November 1995, Bulu Chowdury and Josephine Ong were charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.

The trial Court found Chowdury guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of the
crime charged.

Held: No. The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:

(1) The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code;

(2) He did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;
and (3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) 804219 states who shall be held liable for the offense,
thus: “The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories.
In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be
liable.”

An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal,
together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal
recruitment. The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his
active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the
direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally
liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer.

In this case, Chowdury merely performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and managing
director. The prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant is conscious and has an active
participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Moreover, accused-appellant was not
aware of Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and the prosecution failed to prove that he
actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. The obligation to register its personnel with the
POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. A mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the
legal requirements for its operation. The accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of
Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly authorized by
his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his job
description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirements for deployment
but he never received money from them. Chowdury did not knowingly and intentionally participated in the
commission of illegal recruitment being merely performing his task and unaware of illegality of
recruitment.

ALTERNATIVE RULING:

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) states who shall be held liable for the offense, thus:
"The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In
case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business
shall be liable."
As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable for illegal
recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. An employee of a company or corporation
engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his if it is shown that he
actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. It has been held that the existence of the
corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally
causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can act, only by and through
its human agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The employee or agent of a corporation
engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be
prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he consciously
contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight his contribution may be. The law of
agency, as applied in civil cases, has no application in criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment
when he participates in the commission of a crime upon the ground that he simply acted as an agent of any
party. The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active
participation in its commission. Where it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction
of his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for
an act done for and in behalf of his employer.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NOGRA, G.R. 170834, AUGUST 29, 2008

The facts, as established by the prosecution, are aptly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), as follows:

Appellant held office at Loran International Overseas Recruitment Co., (Loran) in Concepcion Grande, Naga
City (p. 4, TSN, October 19, 1998). A nameplate on his table prominently displayed his name and position
as operations manager (p. 11, TSN, November 17, 1998; p. 4, TSN, January 12, 1999; p. 21, TSN, November
19, 1998). The license of Loran also indicated appellant as the operations manager (p. 5, TSN, February 10,
1999). The POEA files also reflect his position as operations manager of Loran (Exhibit L to L-4, pp. 5-9,
TSN, November 19, 1998).

Sometime in December 1996, Renato Alden went to Loran to apply for a job as hotel worker for Saipan. He
was interviewed by appellant, who required Alden to submit an NBI clearance and medical certificate and
to pay the placement fee. Alden paid the amount of P31,000.00. The additional amount of P4,000.00 was
to be paid prior to his departure to Saipan (pp. 5-6, TSN, November 17, 1998). Appellant promised Alden
that he would leave within a period of three to four months. After one year of waiting Alden was not able
to leave. Alden filed a complaint with the NBI when he was not able to recover the amount and could no
longer talk with appellant (p. 6, TSN, November 17, 1998).

On April 18, 1997, Teofila Lualhati applied for employment as hotel worker for Saipan with Loran (pp. 1-
3, 10, TSN, November 19, 1998). Appellant required her to submit an NBI clearance and medical certificate
and to pay the processing fee in the amount of P35,000.00 so she could leave immediately. She paid the
amount of P35,000.00 to Loran's secretary in the presence of appellant. She was promised that within 120
days or 4 months she would be able to leave (pp. 11-13, TSN, November 19, 1998). Despite repeated follow-
ups, Lualhati was unable to work in Saipan. She demanded the refund of the processing fee. When the
amount was not returned to her, she filed a complaint with the NBI (pp. 14-15, TSN, November 19, 1998).

Sometime in April 1998, Filipina Mendoza went to Loran to apply for employment as hotel worker (p. 4,
TSN, July 12, 1999). She paid the amount of P35,000.00 as placement fee. When she was not able to work
abroad, she went to Loran and sought the return of P35,000.00 from appellant (p. 7, TSN, January 21, 1999).

Sometime in October 1997, Kerwin Donacao went to Loran to apply for employment as purchaser in Saipan
(p. 4, TSN, February 10, 1999). He was required to submit NBI clearance, police clearance, previous
employment certificate and his passport. He paid the placement fee of P35,000.00 (pp.4-5, TSN, February
10, 1999). After paying the amount, he was told to wait for two to three months. When he was not able to
leave for Saipan, he demanded the return of the placement fee, which was not refunded (pp. 6-7, TSN,
February 10, 1999).

During the first week of November 1997, Annelyn Sarmiento and her husband, Oliver Sarmiento, applied
for overseas employment. For the application of Oliver Sarmiento, they submitted his medical certificate
and certification of previous employment. They were also made to pay the amount of P27,000.00 as
processing fee. Oliver Sarmiento was promised that within 1 month, he would be able to leave. Initially,
Oliver Sarmiento was told that allegedly his visa was yet to be obtained. When he was not able to leave and
what he paid was not refunded, he filed a complaint with the NBI (pp. 4-6, TSN, April 23, 1999).

Sometime in May 1997, Fe Zaballa applied for overseas employment in Saipan with Loran (p. 4, TSN, May
21, 1999). She was required to submit her medical certificate, original copy of her birth certificate, NBI
clearance and police clearance. She was also required to pay the amount of P35,000.00 as placement fee.
When she could not be deployed, she sought to recover the amount she paid, which was not returned (pp.
7-8, TSN, May 2, 1999).
On March 26, 2003, the RTC rendered Judgment7 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged.

On April 10, 2003, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.9 The RTC ordered the transmittal of the entire records
of the case to this Court.

Conformably to the ruling in People v. Mateo,10 the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review.

On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision12 affirming the decision of the RTC. The CA held that being
an employee is not a valid defense since employees who have knowledge and active participation in the
recruitment activities may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment activities, based upon this Court's
ruling in People v. Chowdury13 and People v. Corpuz;14 that appellant had knowledge of and active
participation in the recruitment activities since all the prosecution witnesses pinpointed appellant as the
one whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas and he was the one who
told them about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit; that the mere fact
that appellant was not issued special authority to recruit does not exculpate him from any liability but
rather strongly suggests his guilt; that appellant's invocation of non-flight cannot be weighed in his favor
since there is no established rule that non-flight is, in every instance, an indication of innocence.

Issue: WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS A MERE
EMPLOYEE OF THE RECRUITMENT AGENCY DESPITE HIS DESIGNATION AS ITS OPERATIONS MANAGER.

HELD:
The defense of being a mere employee is not a shield against his conviction for large scale illegal
recruitment. In People v. Gasacao and People v. Sagayaga, the Court reiterated the ruling in People v. Cabais,
People v. Chowdury and People v. Corpuz that an employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal
recruitment may be held liable as principal by direct participation, together with its employer, if it is shown
that he actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JULIA REGALADO ESTRADA, Accused-Appellant.

he three (3) private complainants, Noel Sevillena (Sevillena), Albert Cortez (Cortez), and Janice A. Antonio
(Antonio), testified for the prosecution. Mildred Versoza, Labor and Employment Officer at the Philippine
Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA), was also offered as a witness for the prosecution, but
her testimony was dispensed with in view of the defense's admission of the genuineness and due execution
of the POEA Certification8 stating that Estrada was not included in the list of employees submitted by ABCA
International Corporation (ABCA) for acknowledgment.9 Their respective testimonies sought to establish
that Estrada, without the necessary license or authority from the POEA, recruited them for overseas
employment for a fee, as follows:
Private complainants separately met Estrada on various dates from February to April 2009.10 Sevillena was
encouraged by his father to seek the help of Estrada as he knew her to be recruiting for overseas work;11
Cortez met Estrada through his aunt who also knew Estrada to be a recruiter for overseas work;12 and
Jacinto came to know Estrada after she chanced upon a tarpaulin advertisement for overseas work on
which Estrada's number and address were posted.13
During their respective meetings, Estrada represented herself as having power and authority to deploy
persons abroad for overseas employment.14 Cortez recalled that in their initial meeting, Estrada told him
that she works for Worldview International Corporation (Worldview), a private recruitment agency for
overseas employment. She later told him, however, that she changed agency because Worldview's license
had expired.15
After their respective meetings, Estrada offered private complainants various jobs in Dubai. In particular,
Sevillena was offered a job as a baker after he refused the initial job offer in Saudi Arabia;16 Cortez was
offered a job as a waiter;17 and Antonio was offered a job as a cashier after she refused the first job offer as
a saleslady.18
The private complainants transacted only with Estrada to whom they submitted all the documents
necessary for their overseas placement and to whom they paid processing, placement, and other fees.19
Specifically, Sevillena paid P8,000.00 as processing fee and P17,000.00 as placement fee;20 Cortez similarly
paid P8,000.00 as processing fee and P17,000.00 as placement fee;21 Antonio paid P10,000.00 as
processing fee and P15,000.00 as placement fee.22 In addition to the fees they paid to Estrada, private
complainants alleged incurring other amounts relative to their overseas placement. Cortez and Antonio
paid the said fees personally to Estrada at her house in Canlubang, Laguna;23 while Sevillena paid the said
fees personally to Estrada at his godmother's house in Calamba City.24 Estrada did not issue a single receipt
for the said fees.25
Estrada also required the private complainants to submit themselves to medical examination at the Holy
Angel Medical Clinic (HAMC) in Manila. Again, the private complainants paid the fees for said medical
examination personally to Estrada: Sevillena and Cortez each paid P4,000.00;26 while Antonio paid
P3,500.00.27 As in the processing and placement fees, no receipt was issued for the medical examination
fees.28
Estrada further required private complainants, with the exception of Antonio, to undergo the Pre-
Departure Orientation Seminar (PDOS).29 However, even after undergoing PDOS, payment of the fees
required, and submission of the documentary requirements, Estrada still failed to deploy them abroad.
Estrada repeatedly promised them that their plane tickets were still being processed. Estrada, however,
failed to deliver on her promised deployment of the private complainants; thus, they were prompted to file
criminal cases against Estrada.30
Evidence for the Defense
The defense presented Estrada herself. The defense also presented as witness Emilia G. Cosmo-an (Cosmo-
an), president of ABCA International Corporation (ABCA), another recruitment agency for deployment
abroad. In the course of Cosmo-an's testimony, however, the defense moved to declare her as a hostile
witness, but the trial court did not act on the said motion.31 Their respective testimonies are as follows:
Estrada came to know the private complainants when they separately went to her house and asked her
help for them to work abroad.32 Estrada insisted that she merely mentioned ABCA and Worldview to the
private complainants because she knew their respective owners.33 She explained that prior to her meeting
with the private complainants, she worked as a secretary at a military hospital in Riyadh; that the owner
of Worldview, Madam Juico, was her friend; that she also knew the owner of ABCA because the owner's
daughter was her former co-worker at the Riyadh hospital; and that the complainants went first to
Worldview where they got her number.34
Estrada denied that her mobile number was posted on a tarpaulin advertisement for work abroad. She
alleged that what was posted on the tarpaulin is the number of Worldview, and that the owner of
Worldview merely gave Antonio her number.35 She admitted that Antonio indeed went to her house but
averred that the latter merely asked if she knew the owner of Worldview, to which she answered in the
affirmative as Worldview is the agency which handles her documents every time she departs abroad for
work. Antonio then left and went to Worldview.36 Thereafter, Antonio's husband informed her that Antonio
and her friends had already submitted their applications to ABCA.37
With respect to Sevillena and Cortez, Estrada averred that the two went to her house, together with their
aunt,38 to ask if she could deploy workers abroad to which she answered in the negative. While in her house,
Sevillena and Cortez met Antonio. The three went to ABCA together.39
Estrada learned later from Sevillena and Cortez's aunt, as well as from the owner of ABCA, that the two had
already submitted their requirements to ABCA.40 She also learned that despite completing all the
requirements, the two failed to depart because, according to Cortez, they did not sign the contract because
of the low salary offered.41 Subsequently, Sevillena and Cortez went to her house to ask for the return of
the money they paid to ABCA. She insisted that she did not receive any money from the private
complainants and that she did not recruit them for overseas work.42
On her part, Cosmo-an testified that she did not really know Estrada having talked to her only once. She
recalled that she met Estrada at the parking lot of her office sometime in March 2010. Estrada followed her
and asked help for her relatives who were looking for work abroad, to which she responded that she may
be able to help if there was a job order.43 Estrada returned to ABCA's office later but they were not able to
talk.44
Cosmo-an also denied that her agency received money from the private complainants and claimed that her
agency never required applicants to pay placement and other fees.45 She insisted that Estrada was not and
has never been connected with ABCA in any capacity.46 In fact, after she heard unpleasant rumors about
Estrada, she placed a newspaper ad/notice on 27 April 2010 that Estrada was not and had never been
connected with ABCA.47 Cosmo-an further denied knowing any of the private complainants

The RTC Ruling

In its decision, the RTC found Estrada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment
in large scale and three (3) counts of estafa under Article 315(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court was convinced that the prosecution was able to establish Estrada's guilt by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It noted that the certification from the POEA confirmed that Estrada had never been
licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. This fact, coupled with her pretenses
that she had the ability or influence to recruit private complainants for work in Dubai clearly made her
liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.

The CA Ruling
In its appealed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The appellate court ruled that private
complainants' categorical and unequivocal avowal that Estrada promised and assured them of work in
Dubai, and their positive identification of Estrada as the person who recruited and demanded payment
from them naturally prevails over her defense of denial. As such, the trial court aptly ruled that the
prosecution evidence convincingly demonstrated the presence of the elements of illegal recruitment in
large scale.
The appellate court further opined that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged with
and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under R.A. No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code; and
estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC.

THE ISSUE
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED IN FINDING ESTRADA GUILTY OF ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE AND THREE (3) COUNTS OF ESTAFA DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S
FAILURE TO PROVE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THESE CRIMES BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.

THE COURT'S RULING

Elements constituting illegal recruitment in large scale sufficiently established

Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority as contemplated under Article 13(f) of the Labor Code, shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers, and including referring, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not.
Further, to sustain a conviction for illegal recruitment under R.A. No. 8042 in relation to the Labor Code,
the prosecution must establish two (2) elements: first, the offender has no valid license or authority
required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and second,
the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined in
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Section 6 of R.A. No.
8042.52 Further, in case the illegal recruitment was committed in large scale, a third element must be
established, that is, the offender commits the illegal recruitment activities against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.53
The Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to establish the essential elements of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale.
First, it is not disputed that Estrada is not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas placement.
During the trial, the defense admitted the POEA Certification which stated that Estrada is not included
among the list of employees submitted by ABCA for POEA acknowledgment. Therefore, Estrada is not
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. This fact was not denied by Estrada in her defense
anchored only on the allegation that she did not recruit the private complainants but merely mentioned
ABCA and Worldview to them.
Second, the prosecution was able to establish that Estrada unlawfully engaged in activities which refer to
recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042.
Specifically, the prosecution was able to sufficiently demonstrate that Estrada promised and recruited
private complainants for employment abroad for a fee.
This is amply supported by the testimonies of the private complainants who categorically testified that
Estrada promised them employment and placement in Dubai as baker, waiter, and cashier. More
particularly, the private complainants positively identified Estrada as the person with whom they
transacted relative to their alleged deployment to Dubai; the person who instructed them to complete the
documents necessary for their deployment and to undergo medical examination; the person to whom they
submitted these documents; and the person to whom they directly paid the processing, placement, medical
examination, and other fees.
It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses'
credibility, especially when the CA affirmed such findings, are entitled to great weight and respect by this
Court.54 Further, in the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by
improper motives, the trial court's assessment with respect to their credibility shall not be interfered with
by this Court.55 Thus, between the positive identification and categorical testimony by the private
complainants and Estrada's unsubstantiated and uncorroborated denial, the Court finds the former more
credible.
Finally, it is clear that Estrada committed illegal recruitment activities against the three (3) private
complainants. Thus, the trial and appellate courts properly convicted Estrada of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale.
PEOPLE VS OCHOA

Facts:

The private complainants were recruited by the accused for deployment to Taiwan and Saudi Arabia in
exchange for fees of various amounts. The accused stated under oath that she was employed by AXIL
International Services as a recruiter. AXIL had a temporary license to recruit Filipino workers for overseas
employment. She admitted recruiting private complainants and receiving from them different amounts as
placement fees and medical fees.

Issue:

W/N the accused committed illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa

Held:

Yes. It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants
the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that
the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. All eight private complainants
herein consistently declared that Ochoa offered and promised them employment overseas. Ochoa required
private complainants to submit their bio-data, birth certificates, and passports, which private complainants
did. Private complainants also gave various amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees
as evidenced by the receipts Ochoa issued to Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin. Despite private complainants’
compliance with all the requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave for work abroad. Private
complainants pleaded that Ochoa return their hard-earned money, but Ochoa failed to do so.

More importantly, Ochoa could still be convicted of illegal recruitment even if we disregard the POEA
certification, for regardless of whether or not Ochoa was a licensee or holder of authority, she could still
have committed illegal recruitment. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any person,
whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal
recruitment for certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Among such acts, under
Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the [f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault. Ochoa committed illegal recruitment
as described in the said provision by receiving placement and medical fees from private complainants,
evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and failing to reimburse the private complainants the amounts
they had paid when they were not able to leave for Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, through no fault of their own.

Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that is, committed against three or more
persons individually or as a group. Here, there are eight private complainants who convincingly testified
on Ochoas acts of illegal recruitment.

The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person. Both elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303.Ochoas
deceit was evident in her false representation to private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin that she
possessed the authority and capability to send said private complainants to Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for
employment as early as one to two weeks from completion of the requirements, among which were the
payment of placement fees and submission of a medical examination report. Ochoa promised that there
were already existing job vacancies overseas for private complainants, even quoting the corresponding
salaries. Ochoa carried on the deceit by receiving application documents from the private complainants,
accompanying them to the clinic for medical examination, and/or making them go to the offices of certain
recruitment/placement agencies to which Ochoa had actually no connection at all. Clearly deceived by
Ochoas words and actions, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were persuaded to hand over
their money to Ochoa to pay for their placement and medical fees. Sadly, private complainants Gubat, Cesar,
and Aquino were never able to leave for work abroad, nor recover their money.

//……………………………….//

In the second week of February 1998, Ochoa was introduced to Robert Gubat, a licensed electrical engineer
and a resident of Pulang Lupa, Las Pis, through a certain Nila, Gubats neighbor, who had a pending
application for work abroad with Ochoa. Ochoa talked to Gubat on the telephone, and during their
conversation, Ochoa told Gubat that one of her applicants was already leaving for Taiwan. Per Ochoas
instruction, Gubat met with Francisco Pascual, who accompanied him to Ochoas house in San Bartolome,
Novaliches, Quezon City, and personally introduced Gubat to Ochoa. Gubat submitted his rumto Ochoa,
which Ochoa would bring to Axil International Agency where Ochoa was working as a recruiter. Right after
browsing through Gubats rum Ochoa informed Gubat that as an engineer, Gubat was qualified to work as
a factory supervisor and could leave for Taiwan in two weeks or in March 1998. Ochoa also told Gubat that
the total application expenses would amount to ₱100,000.00, and the downpayment was ₱50,000.00.
Gubat was able to actually pay Ochoa ₱18,800.00 as reservation fee at the agency; processing fee for Gubats
papers at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Malacanang, and Embassy of Taiwan; and medical
examination fee. Ochoa, however, only issued to Gubat three receipts, dated March 3, March 31, and April
6, all in the year 1998, in the amount of P5,000.00 each or a total of P15,000.00. Gubat started to worry
when he was not able to leave for abroad as Ochoa promised and when she failed to show up at their
arranged meetings. When Gubat was finally able to talk to Ochoa, Ochoa again promised him that he would
be leaving for abroad soon. Despite Ochoa's renewed promise, Gubat was still not able to leave the country.
Gubat then demanded that Ochoa return his documents and money. When Ochoa failed to comply with his
demand, Gubat filed a report against Ochoa at Barangay (Brgy.) San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City.
On May 21, 1998, he met the other private complainants who had similar complaints against Ochoa. When
nothing came out of the confrontation with Ochoa at Brgy. San Bartolome, Gubat and the other private
complainants filed a joint complaint against Ochoa before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Ochoa was also accused of illegal recruitment of other individuals.

Cory C. Aquino of the POEA authenticated the Certification dated June 3, 1998, issued by Hermogenes C.
Mateo (Mateo), Director, Licensing Branch of the POEA, that Ochoa, in her personal capacity, is neither
licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Cory identified Director
Mateos signature on the Certification, being familiar with the same. The Certification was issued after a
check of the POEA records pursuant to a request for certification from the NBI. Cory, however, admitted
that she did not participate in the preparation of the Certification, as the NBIs request for certification was
through a counter transaction, and another person was in charge of verification of counter transactions.

On April 17, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa.

Ochoa filed a Notice of Appealin which she stated her intention to appeal the RTC judgment of conviction
and prayed that the records of her case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals.

The Special Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decisiondated June 17, 2002
affirming the appealed RTC decision dated April 17, 2000. Ochoa filed a Motion for Reconsideration,which
the People opposed for being bereft of merit.

In its Resolutiondated August 6, 2003, the Court of Appeals declared that it had no jurisdiction over Ochoas
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ochoa was guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale?

HELD:

LABOR LAW

Ochoa was charged with violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042. Said provision broadens the
concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Codeand provides stiffer penalties, especially for those that
constitute economic sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate.

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment as follows:

SEC. 6.Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-
licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:Provided, That any such non-licensee or
non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons
shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person,
whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place
without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the
distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the
latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.All eight private complainants
herein consistently declared that Ochoa offered and promised them employment overseas. Ochoa required
private complainants to submit their bio-data, birth certificates, and passports, which private complainants
did. Private complainants also gave various amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees
as evidenced by the receipts Ochoa issued to Gubat, Cesar,and Agustin.Despite private complainants
compliance with all the requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave for work abroad. Private
complainants pleaded that Ochoa return their hard-earned money, but Ochoa failed to do so.

Ochoa contends that Exhibit "A," the POEA certification which states that Ochoa, in her personal capacity,
is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment was already rejected by the
RTC during the hearings on bail for being hearsay, and should not have been admitted by the RTC after the
trial on the merits of the criminal cases. Inadmissible evidence during bail hearings do not become
admissible evidence after formal offer. Without the POEA certification, the prosecution had no proof that
Ochoa is unlicensed to recruit and, thus, she should be acquitted.
Ochoa's contention is without merit.

REMEDIAL LAW

We refer to the following ruling in Fullero v. People,wherein we rejected a similar argument raised by
petitioner therein against a certification issued by an officer of the Professional Regulation Commission:

Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended that the prosecution's documentary evidence, consisting
of Exhibits "A," "C," "F," "G," "H," "I," "J," "K," "L," "M," "N," "O," "P," "Q" and "R" and their sub-markings, are
inadmissible in evidence based on the following reasons:

(1) Exhibit "A," which is the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, confirming that petitioner's
name does not appear in the registry books of licensed civil engineers, was not properly identified during
the trial. The proper person to identify the certification should have been the signatory therein which was
PRC Director II Jose A. Arriola, or in his absence, a person who actually witnessed the execution of the
certification. Prosecution witness Atayza, who was not present when the certification was executed, had
identified the certification during the trial. Thus, the contents of the certification are mere hearsay.

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception.
A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told,
or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of
the truth of what he has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.

The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the exceptions is the entries
in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. In other words, official entries are
admissible in evidence regardless of whether the officer or person who made them was presented and
testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Other
recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The necessity consists in the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to innumerable
transactions in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper public business. The trustworthiness
consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty by a public officer.

Exhibit "A," or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was signed by Arriola, Director II of the
PRC, Manila. Although Arriola was not presented in court or did not testify during the trial to verify the said
certification, such certification is considered as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is
therefore presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not present any plausible proof to rebut its
truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in evidence.

In the case at bar, the POEA certification was signed by Dir. Mateo of the POEA Licensing Branch. Although
Dir. Mateo himself did not testify before the RTC, the prosecution still presented Cory, Dir. Mateos
subordinate at the POEA Licensing Branch, to verify Dir. Mateos signature.

Also worth re-stating is the justification provided by the Court of Appeals for the admissibility of the POEA
certification, viz:

The certificate is admissible. It is true that the trial court, during the bail hearings, rejected the certification
for being hearsay because at that stage of the proceedings, nobody testified yet on the document. However,
as the trial progressed, an officer of the POEA, specifically in its licensing branch, had testified on the
document. It does not follow, then, as appellant would want this court to assume, that evidence rejected
during bail hearings could not be admissible during the formal offer of evidence.

This court admits that Ms. Cory Aquino was not the signatory of the document. Nevertheless, she could
testify on the veracity of the document because she is one of the officers of the licensing branch of the POEA.
Being so, she could testify whether a certain person holds a license or not. It bears stressing that Ms. Aquino
is familiar with the signature of Mr. Mateo because the latter is her superior. Moreover, as testified to by
Ms. Aquino, that as a policy in her office, before a certification is made, the office checks first whether the
name of the person requested to be verified is a reported personnel of any licensed agency by checking
their index and computer files.

As found in the offices records, appellant, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment. It bears stressing, too, that this is not a case where a certification
is rendered inadmissible because the one who prepared it was not presented during the trial. To reiterate,
an officer of the licensing branch of the POEA, in the person of Ms. Aquino, testified on the document. Hence,
its execution could be properly determined and the veracity of the statements stated therein could be
ascertained.

LABOR LAW

More importantly, Ochoa could still be convicted of illegal recruitment even if we disregard the POEA
certification, for regardless of whether or not Ochoa was a licensee or holder of authority, she could still
have committed illegal recruitment. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any person,
whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal
recruitment for certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Among such acts, under
Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the "[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault." Ochoa committed illegal recruitment
as described in the said provision by receiving placement and medical fees from private complainants,
evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and failing to reimburse the private complainants the amounts
they had paid when they were not able to leave for Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, through no fault of their own.

Ochoa further argues in her defense that she should not be found personally and criminally liable for illegal
recruitment because she was a mere employee of AXIL and that she had turned over the money she
received from private complainants to AXIL.

We are not convinced. Ochoa's claim was not supported by any corroborating evidence. The POEA
verification dated September 23, 1998, also signed by Dir. Mateo, and presented by Ochoa during trial,
pertains only to the status of AXIL as a placement agency with a "limited temporary authority" which had
already expired. Said verification did not show whether or not Ochoa was employed by AXIL. Strangely, for
an alleged employee of AXIL, Ochoa was not able to present the most basic evidence of employment, such
as appointment papers, identification card (ID), and/or payslips. The receipts presented by some of the
private complainants were issued and signed by Ochoa herself, and did not contain any indication that
Ochoa issued and signed the same on behalf of AXIL. Also, Ochoa was not able to present any proof that
private complainants money were actually turned over to or received by AXIL.

There is no reason for us to disturb the weight and credence accorded by the RTC to the evidence of the
prosecution, over that of the defense. As is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater weight is given to the
positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than the accuseds denial and
explanation concerning the commission of the crime.Likewise, factual findings of the trial courts, including
their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court,
particularly when the Court of Appeals affirmed such findings. After all, the trial court is in the best position
to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses. The absence of any showing that the
trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result
of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts determination
according credibility to the prosecution evidence. Moreover, in the absence of any evidence that the
prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.

Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that is, committed against three or more
persons individually or as a group. Here, there are eight private complainants who convincingly testified
on Ochoas acts of illegal recruitment.

LABOR LAW

In view of the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution, we uphold the verdict of the RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Ochoa is guilty of illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage.

Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less
thanP500,000.00 nor more thanP1,000.000.00 shall be imposed when the illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage. Thus:

Sec. 7. Penalties.

(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage as defined herein.

Since the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine ofP1,000,000.00 imposed on Ochoa by the RTC, and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are in accord with the law, we similarly sustain the same.

CRIMINAL LAW

We affirm as well the conviction of Ochoa for estafa committed against three private complainants in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. The very same evidence proving Ochoas criminal
liability for illegal recruitment also established her criminal liability for estafa.

It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic
Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. We explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut That:

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of
the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent
of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the
accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for
offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that
ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.

Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:

Art. 315.Swindling(estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person.Both elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. Ochoa's
deceit was evident in her false representation to private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin that she
possessed the authority and capability to send said private complainants to Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for
employment as early as one to two weeks from completion of the requirements, among which were the
payment of placement fees and submission of a medical examination report. Ochoa promised that there
were already existing job vacancies overseas for private complainants, even quoting the corresponding
salaries. Ochoa carried on the deceit by receiving application documents from the private complainants,
accompanying them to the clinic for medical examination, and/or making them go to the offices of certain
recruitment/placement agencies to which Ochoa had actually no connection at all. Clearly deceived by
Ochoas words and actions, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were persuaded to hand over
their money to Ochoa to pay for their placement and medical fees. Sadly, private complainants Gubat, Cesar,
and Aquino were never able to leave for work abroad, nor recover their money.

CRIMINAL LAW

The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation. According to Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if
the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be.

It was established by evidence that in Criminal Case No. 98-77301, Gubat was defrauded by Ochoa in the
amount of P15,000.00; in Criminal Case No. 77-98302, Cesar paid Ochoa the sum of P17,000.00; and in
Criminal Case No. 77-98303, Agustin handed over to Ochoa a total of P28,000.00.

The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, when the amount of the
fraud is over P12,000.00 but not exceeding P22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum (i.e., from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years). If the amount of fraud exceeds P22,000.00,
the aforementioned penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, or anywhere within prision correccional minimum and
medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).Consequently, the minimum terms in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302 were correctly fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals at 2 years, 11 months, and 11 days of prision correccional. While the minimum term in Criminal
Case No. 98-77303 was increased by the Court of Appeals to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional,
it is still within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Section 315 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The maximum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law shall be that which, in view of attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code. To compute the
minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty for estafa when the amount of fraud
exceeds P12,000.00, the time included in prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum shall
be divided into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this computation, the
minimum period for prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is from 4 years, 2 months,
and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days; the medium period is from 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to
6 years, 8 months, and 20 days; and the maximum period is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years.
Any incremental penalty (i.e., 1 year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.) shall thus be added to
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court, provided that the
total penalty does not exceed 20 years.

In Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302, the amounts of fraud were more than P12,00.00 but not
exceeding P22,000.00, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum
term shall be taken from the medium period of the penalty prescribed (i.e., 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days
to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days). Thus, the maximum terms of 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days actually
imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302
are proper.

As for determining the maximum term in Criminal Case No. 98-77303, we take into consideration that the
amount of fraud was P28,000.00. Since the amount of fraud exceeded P22,000.00, the maximum term shall
be taken from the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8
years; but since the amount of fraud exceeded P22,000.00 by only P6,000.00 (less than P10,000.00), no
incremental penalty shall be imposed. Considering that the maximum term of 8 years fixed by the Court of
Appeals in Criminal Case No. 98-77303 is within the maximum period of the proscribed penalty, we see no
reason for disturbing the same.

DENIED
RODOLFO VS PEOPLE

//……………………………//

“Promises or offers for a fee employment” is sufficient to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.

Petitioner Rosa C. Rodolfo approached private complainants Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus individually
and invited them to apply for overseas employment in Dubai. Rodolfo, being their neighbor, Ferre and
Corpus agreed and went to the former’s office. The office bore the business name ―Bayside Manpower
Export Specialist‖. In that office, Ferre gave P1,000.00 as processing fee and another P4,000.00. Likewise,
Corpus gave Rodolfo P7,000.00. Rodolfo then told Ferre and Corpus that they were scheduled to leave for
Dubai. However, private complainants and all the other applicants were not able to depart on the
scheduled date as their employer allegedly did not arrive. Thus, their departure was rescheduled, but the
result was the same. Suspecting that they were being hoodwinked, Ferre and Corpus demanded of Rodolfo
to return their money. Except for the refund of P1,000.00 to Ferre, Rodolfo was not able to return Ferre’s
and Corpus’ money. Ferre, Corpus and three others then filed a case for illegal recruitment in large scale
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Rodolfo.

The RTC rendered judgement against Rodolfo but in imposing the penalty, the RTC took note of the fact
that while the information reflected the commission of illegal recruitment in large scale, only the complaint
of two (Ferre and Corpus) of the five complainants was proven. Rodolfo appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA dismissed the petition but modified the penalty imposed by the trial court. The CA also
dismissed Rodolfo’s Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodolfo is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale

HELD:
The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which must concur, are: (1) that the offender has no
valid license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and
(2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement under
Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. If another
element is present that the accused commits the act against three or more persons, individually or as a
group, it becomes an illegal recruitment in a large scale.

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines ―recruitment and placement‖ as ―[a]ny act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.‖

That the first element is present in the case at bar, there is no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior Overseas
Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, testified that the records of
the POEA do not show that Rodolfo is authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. A
Certification to that effect was in fact issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Division of
POEA.

The second element is doubtless also present. The act of referral, which is included in recruitment, is ―the
act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected
applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau.‖ Rodolfo’s admission that
she brought private complainants to the agency whose owner she knows and her acceptance of fees
including those for processing betrays her guilt.

Rodolfo issued provisional receipts indicating that the amounts she received from the private complainants
were turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does not free her from liability. For the act
of recruitment may be ―for profit or not.‖ It is sufficient that the accused ―promises or offers for a fee
employment‖ to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. Parenthetically, why Rodolfo accepted the
payment of fees from the private complainants when, in light of her claim that she merely brought them to
the agency, she could have advised them to directly pay the same to the agency, she proferred no
explanation.

On Rodolfo’s reliance on Señoron, true, the Court held that issuance of receipts for placement fees does not
make a case for illegal recruitment. But it went on to state that it is ―rather the undertaking
of recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority‖ that makes a case for
illegal recruitment.

LAPASARAN VS PEOPLE (INCOMPLETE DIGEST)

PEOPLE VS VALENCIANO

12. DARVIN VS CA
Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed
from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to
recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of this
promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for US Visa and air fare.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.

Held:

Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:

...b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not: Provided, that any reason person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a
fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:

a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of the Labor
Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
under Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be shown:
(1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the said person
does not have a license or authority to do so.

In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to private
respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private
respondent work abroad. What is established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-
appellant P150,000.

By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more,
can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is
nothing to show that appellant engaged in recruitment activities.

At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that appellant
probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of
evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the People’s evidence fail to indubitably prove the
accused’s authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the Court’s duty, and the accused’s
right, to proclaim his innocence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonably doubt. The accused is ordered immediately
released from her confinement.
PEOPLE VS BRIONES (NO DIGEST)

ployment.