Aids in Construction

Six Cases
1. Facts of the case:

ARROYO v. DE A petition was filed by the members of the

House of Representatives challenging the
VENECIA validity of Republic Act 8240. The said Act
amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by the imposition of sin
taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes.

Petitioners charged that there is a violation of

the House Rules which are constitutionally
mandated, thus making such violation
tantamount to violating the Philippine
Constitution.
ARROYO v. DE
Facts of the Case:

VENECIA
The law came from the House of Representatives
which was approved by the Senate with some
amendments. The House and Senate versions of the
bill had disagreeing provisions, so a bicameral
conference committee was formed.

However, as the Chairman pronounced of the approval

of the motion, Rep. Arroyo objected. Despite the
latter’s objection to the motion, the approval of the
committee report had already been declared by the
former.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker

ofthe House of Representatives and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The
bill was then signed into law by then President Fidel V.
Ramos.
ARROYO v. DE Law involved:

VENECIA Republic Act 8240: An Act amending

Sections 138, 140, and 142 of the National
Internal and Revenue Code, as amended,
and for other purposes.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic Act 8240 is null

and void on the ground that it was passed
in violation of the rules of the House.
 Ruling:

ARROYO v. DE No. It cannot be said that Congress committed a grave

VENECIA abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240. What were
alleged to have been violated are merely internal rules
of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law.

The rules of each House of Congress are hardly

permanent in character, thus, they are subject to
revocation, modification, or waiver of the body
adopting them.

Mere failure to conform to such rules does not have the

effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number
of members were able to agree on a particular measure.

.
ARROYO v. DE The Aid of Statutory Construction

VENECIA used in this case is extrinsic aid. The enrolled

bill is regarded as conclusive with respect to
matters that are required by the Constitution
when it isrecorded to the Journal.

As noted, RA No. 8240 is shown in the Journal,

hence, its due enactment has been duly proven.
Extrinsic Aids
 Facts of the case:

2. Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession

COMMISSIONER OF No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and

Natural Resources on December 09, 1957, and
CUSTOMS operates a petroleum refining plant in Limay, Bataan.

v. Under Article 103 of the Republic Act No. 387 which

ESSO STANDARD provides: “During the five years following the granting
of any concession, the concessionaire may import fee
EASTERN, INC. of customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material,
instrument, supplies and accessories.”,

Respondent ESSO imported and was assessed the

special import tax which it paid under protest.
COMMISSIONER OF On February 16, 1962, the Collector of Customs held
that respondent, ESSO, was subject to the payment of
CUSTOMS the special import tax provided in Republic Act. No.

v.
1394, as amended by Republic Act No. 2352, and
dismissed the protests.
ESSO STANDARD On March 11, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of
EASTERN, INC. the Collector of Customs to the Commission of
Customs, who affirmed the decision on March 19,
1965.

Upon review, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the

decision of herein petitioner.

Commissioner of Customs and ordered a refund of the

amount of P.775.62 to respondent ESSO which the
latter had paid under protest.
 Laws involved:

COMMISSIONER OF Republic Act No. 387, the Petroleum Act of 1949

CUSTOMS
v.
ESSO STANDARD
EASTERN, INC.
COMMISSIONER OF Laws involved:

CUSTOMS Republic Act No. 1394, otherwise known as the Special

Import Tax Law
v.
ESSO STANDARD
AN ACT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL IMPORT TAX ON ALL GOODS, ARTICLES OR
PRODUCTS IMPORTED OR BROUGHT INTO THE PHILIPPINES, AND TO REPEAL
REPUBLIC ACTS NUMBERED SIX HUNDRED AND ONE, EIGHT HUNDRED AND

EASTERN, INC. FOURTEEN, EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-ONE, ELEVEN HUNDRED AND
SEVENTY-FIVE, ELEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVEN AND THIRTEEN
HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVE.

The title indicates unmistakably that it is repealing six

prior statutes. As will be seen later, all these laws dealt
with the imposition of a special excise tax on foreign
exchange or other form of levy on importation of
goods into the country.
 Issue:

COMMISSIONER OF Whether or not the exemption enjoyed by ESSO Inc. from

customs duties granted by Republic Act No. 387 (the Petroleum

CUSTOMS Act of 1949), should embrace or include the special import tax
imposed by Special Tax Law.

v. Ruling:
ESSO STANDARD Republic Act No. 1394 repealed and revoked six earlier statutes
EASTERN, INC. which had something to do with the imposition of special levies
and/or exemption of certain importations from the burden of
the special import taxes or levies.

R.A. No. 387, the Petroleum Act, had been spared by Congress,
although this latter law had granted more concessions and
tax-exemption privileges than any of the statutes that were
amended, repealed or revoked by R.A. No. 1394. The Congress
saw fit to preserve the privileges granted under the Petroleum
Law of 1949 in order to keep the door open to the exploitation
and development of the petroleum resources of the country with
such incentives given under that law.
COMMISSIONER OF Aid of Construction

CUSTOMS Extrinsic aid, the history of the enactment of the

statute and purpose of the legislature in employing a
v. clause or provision in the law, has been used to

ESSO STANDARD determine the true intent of the lawmaking body.

EASTERN, INC. R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of 1949, was
intended to encourage the exploitation, exploration of
petroleum resources of the country by giving it the
necessary incentive
Extrinsic Aid
3. Facts of the Case:

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR

A certification election where Union, National
UNIONS (PAFLU),
v. Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU), obtained
BUREAU OF 429 votes as against 414 votes from the Union,
LABOR RELATIONS, HON. CARMELO C. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU).
NORIEL, NAT’L FED. OF FREE LABOR UNIONS
(NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
CO., INC.,(PBM Under the Rules and Regulations implementing the
present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes is
sufficient for the certification of the victorious labor
union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS (PAFLU),
v.
BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS, HON. CARMELO C.
NORIEL, NAT’L FED. OF FREE LABOR UNIONS
(NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
CO., INC.,(PBM)
Facts of the Case:
However, the certification of the winning Union was
suspended. The losing union PAFLU claimed that
there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Hon.
Carmelo C. Noriel. The spoiled ballots should have
been counted in determining the valid votes cast under
the Rules for Certification Elections, Rule II, invoking
Allied Workers Assoc. of the Ph vs Court of Industrial
Relations.
Director of Labor Relations Noriel asserted that
Industrial Peace Act under RA 875 was controlling in
the case of Allied Workers Association vs Court of
Industrial Relations, no longer relevant and
controlling in the case at hand.
 Laws involved:

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR

Rule 6 of the Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code
UNIONS (PAFLU),
v. of the Philippines, Section 8, subsection (f)
BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS, HON. CARMELO C. "The union which obtained majority of the valid votes cast by eligible
NORIEL, NAT’L FED. OF FREE LABOR UNIONS voters shall be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all
(NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS the workers in the appropriate unit. However, in order to have a valid
CO., INC.,(PBM) election, at least fifty-one percent of all eligible voters in the
appropriate bargaining unit shall have cast their votes."

Article 256 of the Labor Code Rules for Certification

Elections, Rule II, sec. 2[j]:

"However, spoiled ballots, i.e., those which are defaced, torn or

marked should be counted in determining the majority since they are
nevertheless votes cast by those who are qualified to do so.”

Issue: Whether or not the governing rule shall be the

Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code
or that of RA 875 for the certification election
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS (PAFLU),
v.
BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS, HON. CARMELO C.
NORIEL, NAT’L FED. OF FREE LABOR UNIONS
(NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
CO., INC.,(PBM)
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the prevailing rule is the Rules
and Regulations implementing the Labor Code. RA 875 had
been superseded by the present Labor Code and therefore, the
certification election is governed by the present Labor Code and
theRules issued thereunder.
According to the Supreme Court, “the principle of
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive
officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is
entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the
construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded
in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to
support it.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS (PAFLU),
v.
BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS, et. Al. HON. CARMELO C.
NORIEL, NAT’L FED. OF FREE LABOR UNIONS
(NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS
CO., INC.,(PBM)
Aid of Construction
Extrinsic aid, Contemporary Construction was used as
an invaluable aid. It’s placed upon statutes at the time
of, or after, their enactment to enforce the law and
resolve ambiguous provisions of law.
In the case at bar, the Rules and Regulations
implementing the Labor Code was the contemporary
or practical construction aimed to enforce the law.
The Supreme Court ruled that the construction of the
authorities tasked to implement the laws in question
should be given the controlling opinion since the
executive and administrative officers were generally
the first officials to interpret the law in preparation for
the statutes’ enforcement.
 Facts of the Case:

National Police Commission Sec. 39, RA 6975 "An Act Establishing the Philippine National
Police Under a Reorganized DILG provides for a uniform
v. retirement system for PNP members, the compulsory retirement

Hon. Judge Salvador de

age fifty-six (56). Petitioner sent notices of retirement to private
respondents of the now defunct Philippine Constabulary, aged
Guzman, Jr. et. Al. 56 and above.

Respondents filed a complaint, a declaratory relief before the

RTC stating that the age of retirement (56) set by Section 39 of
RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are also covered
by Sec. 89.

Respondent Judge issued a restraining order followed by a writ

of injunction upon posting of a P100,000.00 bond by private
respondent.

The respondent judge ruled that the term "INP" in Section 89 of

the PNP Law includes all members of the present PNP,
irrespective of the original status of the present members of the
PNP before it was created.

And that Section 39 thereof shall become operative after the

lapse of the four-year transition period.
 Laws involved:
National Police Commission
Sec. 39, RA 6975 Compulsory Retirement
v.
Hon. Judge Salvador de Compulsory retirement, for officer and non-officer, shall be upon the

Guzman, Jr. et. Al.

attainment of age fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in case of anyofficer
with the rank of chief superintendent, director or deputy director
general, the Commission may allow his retention in the service for an
unextendible period of one (1) year.

Sec. 89 thereof which provides:

National Police Commission Issue: Whether or not the term INP is synonymous with
the PC and thus should included in the application of
v. Section 39 of RA 6975.
Hon. Judge Salvador de
Guzman, Jr. et. Al. Ruling: SC ruled that the use of the term INP is not
synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the
statute could have just made a uniform reference to the
members of the whole Philippine National Police (PNP)
for retirement purposes and not just the INP.

The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it

cannot be construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89
includes the members of the PC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued on

January 8, 1992 is hereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of respondent judge
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
National Police Commission Aid of Construction

v. The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section
89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police force is clear. The
Hon. Judge Salvador de distinction is relevant for the purpose of the statute, which is to enable

Guzman, Jr. et. Al.

the local police force to plan for their retirement which would be earlier
than usual / because of the new law. Section 89 is merely transitory,
remedial in nature, and loses its force and effect once the four-year
transitory period has elapsed. Finally, it applies not only to some but to
all local police officers.

Why should the retirement age of PC officers be increased during the

transitory period to the exclusion of other PC officers who would retire
at age 56 after such period? Such absurdity was never contemplated by
the law and would defeat its purpose of providing a uniform retirement
age for PNP members.
5. Casco Chemical Co., engaged in manufacturing synthetic
resin glues in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and
Casco Chemical Co. hardwood, bought foreign exchange to import urea and
v. formaldehyde, the main raw materials in the production of
the said glues.
Pedro Gimenez
They paid P33,765.42 in 1949 and P6345.72 in 1960. Prior
thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and
second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the
Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959,
declaring that the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee.

The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in

audit and approve the said refund on the ground that the
exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the
provision of section 2 of RA 2609.
Casco Chemical Co. Laws involved:

v. Section 2 of RA 2609, the Foreign Exchange Margin

Pedro Gimenez Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines, fixing a
uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions.

- "The margin established by the Monetary Board

pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall
not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for
the importation of the

following:

"XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of

plywood and hardboard when imported by andfor the
exclusive use of end-users."
Casco Chemical Co. Issue:

v. Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by

Pedro Gimenez law from the payment of the margin fee.

Petitioner maintains that the term "urea

formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be
construed as "urea and formaldehyde" (italic ours) and
that respondents herein, the Auditor

General and the Auditor of the Central Bank have

erred in holding otherwise.
5. Ruling:

Casco Chemical Co. No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee.
v. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which

Pedro Gimenez is distinct from urea and formaldehyde.

The petitioner’s contends that the bill approved in

Congress contained the conjunction “and” between the
terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of “urea
formaldehyde” and not the latter.

But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and

the intent of the House of Representatives in passing
the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing
of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
5. Aid in construction

Casco Chemical Co. Extrinsic, Presumption against Absurdity

v.
Statutes must receive a sensible construction such as
Pedro Gimenez will give effect to the legislative intention so as to avoid
an unjust or absurd conclusion.
 Facts of the Case

6.
Employees of ARIS requested for a grievance conference. The
management ignored their complaints to their hazardous working
conditions. Due to inaction to their pleas, they went to the

ARIS (Phil.) Inc. management's office to protest. The management issued a

memorandum to require each one to explain why they should not be

v.
terminated from the service for their conduct.

NLRC
Despite their explanation, the workers were dismissed for violation of
company rules and regulations. They then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner ARIS Inc. and Mr. Bayan with the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter in its decision ordered the reinstatement of the

private respondents. The petitioner appealed and filed an Opposition
to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on
execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases
pending at the

In their Reply, the private respondents argued that R.A. No. 6715 is not
sought to be given retroactive effect since the decision to be executed
pursuant to it was rendered after the effectivity of the Act. The said law
took effect on March 21, 1989, while the decision was rendered on June
22, 1989.
 Laws involved:

Section 12 of RA 6715

ARIS (Phil.) Inc.

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee,
in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending
appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and

v.
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer,
merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement provided therein.

NLRC Section 2, NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals provides:

Order of Reinstatement and Effect of Bond. — In so far as the reinstatement aspect is

concerned, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee
shall immediately be executory even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted
back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
separation, or, at the option of / the employer, merely be reinstated in the payroll. The posting
of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.

Section 17, NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals provides:

Transitory provision. — Appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of
these Interim Rules must conform to the requirements as herein set forth or as may be directed
by the Commission.
 Issue: Whether Section 12 of RA 6715 is violative of the
Constitutional guaranty of due process?

Ruling: Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to

ARIS (Phil.) Inc.

appeal. The appeal may be availed of by the losing party or a
party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the execution
may be applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency
v. of the appeal.

NLRC The Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal and
the grant thereof is left to the discretion of the court upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order.

The validity of the questioned law is a valid exercise of the police

power of the State on the theory that the preservation of the lives
of the citizens is a basic duty of the State that is more vital than
the preservation of corporate profits.

Also, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC can validly be given
retroactive effect. They are procedural or remedial in character,
promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article 218
(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Settled is the rule
that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect. There are no
vested rights in rules of procedure.
 Aid in construction

Extrinsic, Presumption against Unconstitutionality

ARIS (Phil.) Inc.

Further, laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A law shall not be

v. declared invalid unless the conflict with the constitution is clear

beyond reasonable doubt.

NLRC It is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible
constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the
other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred.
 Facts of the Case

Employees of ARIS requested for a grievance conference. The

management ignored their complaints to their hazardous working
conditions. Due to inaction to their pleas, they went to the

ARIS (Phil.) Inc. management's office to protest. The management issued a

memorandum to require each one to explain why they should not be

v.
terminated from the service for their conduct.

NLRC
Despite their explanation, the workers were dismissed for violation of
company rules and regulations. They then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner ARIS Inc. and Mr. Bayan with the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter in its decision ordered the reinstatement of the

private respondents. The petitioner appealed and filed an Opposition
to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on
execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases
pending at the

In their Reply, the private respondents argued that R.A. No. 6715 is not
sought to be given retroactive effect since the decision to be executed
pursuant to it was rendered after the effectivity of the Act. The said law
took effect on March 21, 1989, while the decision was rendered on June
22, 1989.