Negative opposite doctrine - WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS AN END TO WHAT IS IMPLIED is

known as negative-opposite doctrine or argumentum a contrario.

Chung Fook v White

Chung Fook is a native born citizen of the US. His wife, an alien Chinese woman ineligible for
naturalization was refused admission to the US and detained at the immigration station, on the
ground that she was an alien, afflicted with a dangerous contagious disease. Although Chung Fook
did not question their ground on her being an alien or her disease, he contended that she is still
entitled to admission under the proviso found in section 22 of the Immigration Act of February 5,
1917. The provision read

'That if the person sending for wife or minor child is naturalized, a wife to whom
married or a minor child born subsequent to such husband or father's naturalization
shall be admitted without detention for treatment in hospital.”

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. The measure of the exemption is
plainly stated and, in terms, extends to the wife of a naturalized citizen only.

The exemption from detention was meant to relate only to a wife who by marriage had
acquired her husband's citizenship, and not to one who, notwithstanding she was married
to a citizen, remained an alien.

Expressio Unius Rule - This auxiliary rule is used in CONSTRUCTION of statutes granting
powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights, and imposing penalties
and forfeitures, as well as those statutes which are strictly construed. It is only a tool and
not a mandatory rule used for ascertaining the legislative intent. The rule must also yield to
legislative intent.

Escribano v Avila

Escribano was charged by Congressman Pendatun for libel after claiming that
Congressman Pendatun was “the worst animal that ever lived in this province” in a live
radio broadcast. Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the offense but Judge Avila ruled in his orders that he had the power to
conduct the investigation.

Petitioner invokes the provisions of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which were
inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, which do not empower the Court of First Instance to
conduct a preliminary investigation of written defamations.

Amendment of Art. 360, never intended to take away the jurisdiction of the CFI to conduct
a preliminary investigation in libel cases. The amendment merely sought to strip the
ordinary municipal court of its power to hold a preliminary investigation of written
defamations. The fact that the Court of First Instance is not mentioned in Article 360 as a
tribunal that may conduct the preliminary investigation of libel cases would seem to
suggest that it cannot conduct such preliminary investigation, following th e
maxim expressio unius.

Where a statute directs the performance of a certain acts by a particular person or class of
persons, it implies that it shall not be done otherwise or by a different person or class of
persons.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos

This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for
violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money
for the renovation of their chapel without a permit from the DSWD . The decree provides as
follows:

Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or

receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first
secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and
Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan.

In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious purpose” is
not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not
include, it excludes.

The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words “charitable” and “religious”
separately and independently of each other. In P.D. 1564, it merely stated “charitable or
public welfare purposes” which means that it was not the intention of the framers of the
law to include solicitations for religious purposes. The world “religious purpose” is not
interchangeable with the expression “charitable purpose”.

Limitations of Rule

Gomez v Ventura

San Pablo Manufacturing Corp v Commissioner of Internal Revenue

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the

business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It
was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue miller’s tax and
manufacturer’s sales tax for SPMC’s sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc.
(UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as
manufactured products. SPMC was not liable for the 3% miller’s tax. It maintains that the
crude oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an ingredient
of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to miller’s tax pursuant to Section 168 of the
1987 Tax Code.

Petition denied.

The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code wa s clear. The
tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-
products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient.

Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be
construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.

Casus Omissus

People v Manantan

Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code.
However, Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers
enumerated in the said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that
a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54.

Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised
Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or
treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any
candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise
than exercising the right to vote." He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted
revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.

It was ruled that justice of peace was included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were
expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of
judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In
Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader
term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges. A "justice of the peace" is a judge.

Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer
or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or
rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any
candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer."
The rule of casus omissus does not apply where it is shown that the legislature did not
intend to exclude the person, thing or object from enumeration.

Doctrine of Last Antecedent - Qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated not those which are distantly or
remotely located.

Florentino v Philippine National Bank

Florentino et al are indebted to the respondent bank in the amount of P6,800 plus interest.
The said loan is secured by a mortgage of real properties. Petitioner Florentino is a holder
of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33.
On December 27, 1953, petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with
their backpay certificate but PNB refused to accept petitioner’s offer to pay the said
indebtedness with the latter’s backpay certificate.

Appellee is ordered to accept the backpay certificate. Section 2 of RA 304 reads as:

“…obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory Act for
which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or to any of its
branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or control by the
Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same
for such settlement.”

SC held that the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, “any citizen of
the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines.” It should be noted that there is a comma before the words “or to any citizen,
etc.,” which separates said phrase from the preceding ones. Hence, “who may be willing to
accept the same for settlement” applies only to the last antecedent.

Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia – relative words refer to
the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires

Rule: use of a comma to separate an antecedent from the rest exerts a dominant influence
in the application of the doctrine of last antecedent

Reddendo singular singulis – the maxim means referring each to each; referring each
phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is,
the words should be taken distributively.