Aggravating Circumstances

The aggravating circumstances are based on the higher degree of perversity of the offender manifested at the
time of the commission of the felony; the place, the means, ways or methods employed; his relationship with
the offended party; or other personal circumstance and others.

Kinds of aggravating circumstances:

1. Generic – that which generally applies to all crimes like recidivism.
2. Specific – that which applies to a particular felony like cruelty in crimes against persons.
3. Qualifying – that which changes the nature of the felony, as treachery in murder.
4. Inherent – that which is part of the felony committed, as unlawful entry in robbery with force upon things.
Distinction:
Generic Qualifying

1. Can be offset by an ordinary mitigating. 1. Cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating.

2. Cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the

2. Maybe proved even though not alleged. information. However, it may be proved as a generic
aggravating circumstance.

3. Not offset have the effect of increasing the penalty to the 3. Changes not only the nature but also the name of the
maximum but not beyond that provided by law. offense.
The circumstances specifying an offense or aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved as conclusively as
the act itself, mere suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to establish their presence according to
law. The Supreme Court said that even if the generic aggravating circumstance is not alleged in the
information, the same may be proved even over the objection of the adverse party. (Q10, 1991 Bar)

Specific circumstances:
1. Taking advantage of Official Position.
That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position. (Art. 14, Par. 1)

It is not only necessary that the person committing the crime be a public officer; he must also
use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which such office gives him as a means by which he realizes his
purpose. (People v. Yturriaga, 86 Phil. 534)

If the abuse of the office is an integral element of the felony as in falsification of public document by a public
officer who took advantage of his official position, bribery or malversation, the circumstances is not
considered. This means that this aggravating circumstance is inherent in the crime, since, it cannot be
committed except by public officer. (People v. Teves, 44 Phil 275)

2. That the crime be committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities. (Art. 14, Par. 2)
Public authorities is a person in authority, not an agent of a person in authority, and that the person in
authority should be engaged in the exercise of his public functions, and that he should not be the object of the
crime. It is also essential that the offender knows of the identity of the public authority.
The Chief of Police is a person in authority for he is vested with authority to maintain peace and order and is
duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws. (People v. Rodil, 109 SCRA 308) A Barangay
Chairman is a person in authority. Teachers, professors, supervisors of public and duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities, as well as lawyers are persons in authority only for the purposes of Direct
Assault (Art. 148) and Simple Resistance and Disobedience (Art. 151), but not for the purpose of the
aggravating circumstance in this paragraph. (People v. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601)

If the crime is committed against the public authority, the crime committed is direct assault and this
aggravating circumstance will be considered absorbed. (US v. Rodriguez, 29 Phil. 150)

3. Act be committed with insult to or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank,
age, or sex, or that it be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation.
(Art. 14, Par. 3)
There are four aggravating circumstances in this paragraph, which, if present in the commission of the crime
are considered as one aggravating circumstance only.

There must, however, be proof showing that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the age or
sex of the offended party. (People v. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548) So, these circumstances was not considered when
the accused was drunk at the time of the commission of the offense.

This aggravating circumstance is considered only in crimes against persons, security or honor and not in
crimes against property such as robbery with homicide. (People v. Ang, 62833, Oct. 8, 1985) The mere fact
that the victim was a woman is not itself sufficient to support the contention that there was insult of disrespect
to sex. It is necessary to prove the specific fact or circumstance, other than that the victim is a woman,
showing insult or disregard of sex in order that it may be considered as an aggravating circumstance, such as
compelling a woman to go to the house of the accused against her will. (US v. Quevengco, 2 Phil. 412)

Disregard of respect due to sex and age may be included in treachery. (People v. Limaco, 99 Phil. 35)

Dwelling includes dependencies, staircase, and enclosures under the house. A place of “sanctuary worthy of
respect.” (People v. Parazo, May 14, 1997) A combination house and store is not a dwelling. (People v. Magnaue,
3510, May 30, 1951) For dwelling to be appreciated, it is not necessary that the victim is the owner of the
dwelling. It is enough that she has the right to be in the dwelling and not only as an incidental circumstance.
(People v. Sto. Tomas, 138 SCRA 206) It is aggravating where the place is, even for a brief moment, a home to
the offended party though he is not the owner thereof, provided that he did not provoke the commission of the
crime and the dwelling is not that of the offender also. (People v. Badilla, 185 SCRA 554)
Dwelling is an aggravating circumstance even if one does not enter the house of the victim. Such as when the
assailant from the outside shoots the victim inside his house. (People v. Bautista, 440, Nov. 29, 1947)
This circumstance is not considered where provocation was given by the offended party or where both
parties reside in the same dwelling. In case of a boarding house, each room of a boarder is considered a
separate dwelling. (People v. Daniel, 75 OG 4834)

Dwelling is aggravating if adultery is committed in the conjugal dwelling because the respect due the conjugal
house is violated (US v. Ibanez, 33 Phil. 611) if the paramour is not residing in the conjugal dwelling.

4. Acts be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness. (Art. 14, Par. 4)
The requisites are:
a. The offended party had trusted the offender.
b. The offender abused such trust.
c. That such abuse of confidence facilitated the commission of the crime.
If the accused raped a girl who was entrusted to his care by the parents, there is betrayal of confidence reposed
upon him by the parents but not an abuse of the confidence of the offended party (People v. Crumb, 46 OG
6162) since the confidence between the parties must be personal. But if the offender was the servant of the
family and sometimes took care of the child, whom she later killed, there is present grave abuse of confidence.
(People v. Caliso, 58 Phil. 283)

5. Crime be committed in the (1) Palace of the Chief Executive, or (2) in his presence, or (3) where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in (4) a place dedicated to religious worship. (Art.
14, Par. 5)
In crime committed in the presence of the President, it is not necessary that the latter be exercising his
functions. With respect to the first, third, and fourth, the crime must have been committed with full
consciousness of the place; in other words, the offender must have intended to commit the crime at the place,
knowing fully well that the place deserves respect.

This circumstance is present when the accused stabbed the victim in the office of the Chief of Police who was
investigating a fist fight between them. (People v. De Ananias, 96 Phil. 979)

6. Nighttime, Uninhabited Place or Band.

That the crime be committed at night time, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever such
circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense. Whenever more than 3 armed malefactors shall
have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.
(Art. 14, Par. 6)

Nocturnity comprises the period of the day between sunset and the beginning of dawn. But for nighttime to
be appreciated, it is not absolutely necessary that the offender purposely sought nighttime to commit the
crime; it is enough that it facilitated the commission of the crime or his escape or prevented identification.
(People v. Cristobal, 91 SCRA 71) Where nocturnity is so interlocked with the circumstance of treachery
as to become part of the latter, nocturnity cannot be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance.
(People v. Pardo, 79 Phil. 566) If the commission of the crime was commenced at day time and it was
consummated at nighttime, such is not aggravated. (US v. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4) Chance meeting between the
accused and the victim negates nighttime as an aggravating circumstances. (People v. Aquino, 124 SCRA 835)
(Q9, 1994 Bar; Q3, 1997 Bar)
Uninhabited place (Despoblado) is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the
crime, but whether or not in the place where the crime was committed there was a reasonable possibility of
the victim receiving some help. (People v. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87) Provided that solitude was purposely sought or
taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the felony. (People v. Coderes, 104 SCRA 255)
Band consists of at least four armed malefactors organized with the intention of carrying out any unlawful
design. They should have acted together in the commission of the crime. If one has no direct participation in
the commission of the crime, like a principal by inducement there is no band. (Gamara v. Valero, 51 SCRA
322) In a band, conspiracy is presumed, it need not be proved.
Band is inherent in brigandage but not in simple robbery committed by band. It is not considered in the crime
of rape. (People v. Corpus, 43 OG 2249) Band and abuse of superior strength have the same essence which is
the utilization of the combined strength of the assailants to overpower the victim and consummate the killing.
(People v. Medrano, 31871, December 14, 1981)

7. Crime committed on the Occasion of Calamity.

That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic, or other
calamity or misfortune. (Art. 14, Par. 7)

This is aggravating because the offender “who in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the
afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them.” (US v. Rodriguez, 19
Phil. 150)
The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune but it does not come within the meaning of “other
calamity or misfortune.” (People v. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1037)

8. Aid of Armed Men who insure or afford impunity.

That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. (Art. 14,
Par. 8)

It should be borne in mind, that the armed men should not participate in the execution of the
felony. Otherwise, they become co-principals. Casual presence is not aggravating if the offender did not avail
himself of any of their aid nor did he knowingly count upon their assistance in the commission of the crime. (US
v. Abaigar, 2 Phil. 417) If used as a means to insure its execution in the killing of a person, such is absorbed in
treachery.

9. Recidivism (Art. 14, Par. 9)

Recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by
final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code. Recidivism involves at least two
conviction, and hence, it is a form of plurality of crimes like reiteration, habitual delinquency and quasi-
recidivism. The first conviction must be by final judgment and must take place prior to the second conviction.
(People v. Baldera, 86 Phil. 189) The number of years intervening between the convictions is
immaterial. Recidivism is likewise considered even if the offender has been given absolute pardon for the first
conviction, since pardon merely extinguishes the penalty (US v. Sotelo, 28 Phil. 147) but not in the case of
amnesty as such extinguishes all the effects in law of the crime committed. (US v. Francisco, 10 Phil. 185)
Habitual delinquent is a person who within a period of ten (10) years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crime of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification, has
been found guilty of any said crimes a third time or oftener. (Art. 62, Par. 5)
Distinction:
Recidivism Habitual Delinquency

1. Applies to all offenses embraced in the same title of the 1. Applicable only to robbery, theft, estafa, falsification,
Code. serious and less serious injuries.

2. Need not be alleged in the complaint or information. 2. Must be alleged or charged.

3. If not offset, merely raises the imposition of the

3. Carries with it an additional penalty.
prescribed penalty to its maximum period.

4. Between each conviction there should not be a lapse of

4. Intervening period between convictions is immaterial.
time of more than 10 years.
May the offender be a recidivist and a habitual delinquent at the same time? Yes, if the offender was convicted
for the third time of theft within the conditions prescribed by law, the first and second convictions referring to
robbery and estafa, recidivism will be aggravating in the imposition of the principal penalty for the crime of
theft. At the same time, by reason of such recidivism, he is also a habitual delinquent, and is sentenced to the
additional penalty provided by law, although in the imposition of the said additional penalty, recidivism is no
longer considered as an aggravating circumstance as it is inherent in this form of habitual delinquency. (People
v. Manalo, 8586, May 25, 1956) May the offender be a habitual delinquent without being a recidivist? Yes, if
the three convictions refer to the specific felonies not embraced in the same title of the Code like robbery,
falsification and serious physical injuries.

Quasi-recidivism arises when the offender shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final
judgment, before beginning to serve the sentence, or while serving the same, he shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, besides being penalized as a habitual
delinquent, if applicable. (Art. 160) This is not a separate crime by itself.
It is necessary to allege recidivism in the information and to attach thereto certified copies of the previous
sentence rendered against the accused to be presented during the trial. (People v. Martinada, 194 SCRA 36)
(Q18, 1993 Bar)

10. Reiteracion or Habituality.

That the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
penalty or for 2 or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. (Art. 14, Par. 10)

In reiteracion (habituality), it is essential that the offender must have been previously punished, i.e., he must
have served, partially or totally, the penalty imposed upon him; that the penalty for the crime for which he
was previously punished, must be equal or greater than the penalty for the crime for which he is on trial, or
that he had previously been punished for 2 or more offenses the penalty for which is lighter than
the penalty prescribed for the offenses for which he is on trial. Reiteracion is discretionary on the court. In
reiteracion, the offenses are not embraced in the same title of the Code.
To be appreciated, it is necessary to present as evidence certified copies of the sentence rendered against the
accused, except when the accused pleads guilty to an information alleging reiteracion. (People v. Monterey,
Sept. 3, 1996)

11. Crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise. (Art. 14, Par. 11)
It is not enough that the one committed the crime received a gift or a reward; it is essential that such price
or reward or promise must have been the prime consideration in the commission of the crime. Thus, if the
money was given, without any previous promise, after the commission of the crime as an expression of
sympathy, this circumstance cannot be present. (US v. Flores, 28 Phil. 29) The offender who induced others to
commit the crime for a price, promise or reward is a principal by inducement. (People v. Otero, 51 Phil. 201)

12. Crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or intentional
damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin.
(Art. 14, Par. 12)
It is essential that any of the means mentioned must have been used by such offender in the commission
of the crime. Thus, if the building is burned as a means to kill the occupant, the crime will be murder, not
murder with arson. (People v. Villarega, 54 OG 3482) This is the only aggravating circumstance that could be a
crime in itself. Such that if a hand grenade was thrown into a house and as a result of the explosion, the house
was damaged but no one was injured, the crime committed is the crime involving destruction. (People v.
Comporedondo, 47 OG 779)

13. That the act be committed with evident premeditation. (Art. 14, Par. 13)
The 3 requisites of evident premeditation are:
a. The time when the accused determined to commit the crime.

b. An act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination.

c. A sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his acts. (Q3, 1997 Bar)

In order that premeditation may be considered either as an aggravating circumstance or as a qualifying

circumstance, it must be evident, that is, the intention to kill must be manifest and it must have been planned
in the mind of the offender and carefully meditated. Conspiracy does not necessarily
imply evident premeditation although premeditation can co-exist with price or reward. (US v. Nabor, 7 Phil.
267) This circumstance is inherent in the crime of robbery, especially committed by several persons, since
there must be an agreement and the persons have to meditate and reflect on the manner of carrying out the
crime and they have to act immediately in order to succeed. (People Carillo, supra) But it may be considered in
robbery with homicide (People v. Valeriano, 1259, Sept. 19, 1955), if there is evident premeditation to kill
besides stealing.

Mere threats to kill without evidence of sufficient time for meditation and reflection do not constitute evident
premeditation. (People v. Apao Moro, 6771,May 18, 1957) An attack made in the heat of anger negates evident
premeditation. (People v. Amin, 39046, June 30, 1975)

14. Craft, fraud, or disguise is employed. (Art. 14, Par. 14)

These are intellectual means in the commission of a crime and are separate aggravating circumstances.

By the employment of craft and fraud, the offender resorts more to intellectual rather than material means in
order to attain his objective. Craft is cunning or intellectual trickery or chicanery resorted to by the accused to
carry out his evil design. (People v. Zea, 130 SCRA 77) There is craft when the accused assumed a position of
authority to gain entrance in a house to enable him to be alone with the offended party to commit acts of
lasciviousness upon her. (People v. Timbol, 47 OG 1859) Also, this circumstance is aggravating where the
offenders pretended to be bona fide passengers of a jeepney in order not to arouse suspicion, but once inside
the jeepney, they robbed the passengers and the driver. (People v. Lee, 66848, Dec. 20, 1991) If the craft is
used to insure the commission of the crime without risk to the accused, it is absorbed by treachery. (People v.
Malig, 46 OG Sup. 11, 255)
Fraud which constitutes deceit and manifested by insidious words or machination is illustrated in the case of
the step-father of the offended party, who taking advantage of the absence of the her mother, took the young
girl away and told her she was to be taken to the house of her godmother but instead she was taken to another
house where she was raped. (People v. De Leon, 50 Phil. 539)
The term disguise refers to anything that the offender may use to prevent recognition. If in spite of the
disguise, the offender was recognized, such cannot be aggravating. (People v. Sonsona, 8966, May 25, 1955)
15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense. (Art. 14, Par.
15)
There must be a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, and to appreciate it, it is
necessary to evaluate the physical conditions of the protagonists and the arms employed by each side. (People
v. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285) There must be deliberate intent to take advantage of the same. (People v. Bello, 10
SCRA 298) Mere numerical superiority does not necessarily involve superiority in strength. It is necessary to
prove, besides, that attackers “cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from superiority in strength.
(People v. Elizaga, 47 OG 38)

Abuse of superior strength is inherent in parricide when the husband killed his wife, as generally the husband
is physically stronger than the wife. (People v. Galapia, supra) Also, it is inherent in rape or is absorbed in the
element of force. (People v. Saylan, 130 SCRA 159)

Intoxication a victim with intention to kill him is characterized by means employed to weaken the defense.
(People v. Ducusin, 53 Phil. 280)

16. Treachery
That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. (Art. 14, Par. 16)
In parricide, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance as well as in homicide, if it is not alleged in the
information.
Even a frontal attack may be considered as such if it was sudden and unexpected so that the victim had no
chance to defend himself or evade the blow. However, suddenness of the attack itself does not
indicate treachery. It must be sought as a means to insure the execution of the crime and to insure the
attacker from the defense forthcoming from the offended party. (People v. Bongo, 26909, Feb. 22,
1974) Treachery must exist at the commencement of the execution of the felony. (US v. Balagtas, 19 Phil.
164) Thus, if the attack begun without treachery but the same continued, and consummated with treachery, it
will not be considered. (Q6, 1995 Bar; Q6, 1993 Bar)

Treachery absorbs nighttime, abuse of superior strength, uninhabited place, by band, aid of armed men, as
well as means to weaken the defense. When treachery rests upon a separate fact, nighttime is not absorbed
by treachery. Treachery may co-exist with evident premeditation, as when the accused quarreled with the
deceased, threatened to kill him and on the following day did so, when he surreptitiously entered the house of
the deceased and without warning, fired at the deceased who was shot unaware. (People v. Mutya, 11255, Sept.
30, 1959) Treachery is inherent in murder by poisoning. (People v. Caliso, 58 Phil. 283) (Q10, 1991 Bar)

Any sudden and unexpected attack from behind is clearly treacherous. However, an attack from behind or
shooting at a fleeing victim is not necessarily treacherous unless it appears that the method of attack was
adopted by the accused deliberately with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without any risk to
the assailant from any defense that the party assaulted may make. (People v. Canete, 44 Phil. 478) A shot in the
back of the victim’s head is not conclusive proof of treachery; the manner of aggression or how the act which
resulted in the death of the victim had began and developed, must be proved. (People v. Ablao, 183 SCRA 658)

But where the persons killed are children of tender years, being 1 year old, 6 years old and 12 years old, the
killing is murder even if the manner of the attack was not shown. (People v. Ganohon, 74670, April 30, 1991)

In sum, the following requisites must concur for treachery to be present:

a. The culprit employed means, methods or forms of execution which directly and specially tend to insure the
offender’s safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party.

b. That such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously shown. (People v.
Clemente, 21 SCRA 261) (Q3, 1997 Bar)

17. That the means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy (shame or disgrace)
to the natural effects of the act.(Art. 14, Par. 17)
It is, as the saying goes, adding insult to injury; for instance, raping a married woman in the presence of her
husband who was helpless to render any assistance, much less to defend her as he was bound. Ignominy
to be appreciated must be inflicted on the victim while he is still alive. Thus, there is no ignominy when the
accused sliced and took the flesh from the thighs, legs and shoulder of the victim after killing her with a knife.
(People v. Balondo, 27401, Oct. 31, 1969) There is ignominy where the accused in committing the rape used
not only the missionary position, but also, the dog position as dogs do, i.e., entry from behind.

Ignominy produces moral suffering, while cruelty produces physical suffering.

18. Crime be committed after an unlawful entry. (Art. 14, Par. 18)
There is unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way not intended for the purpose. Entering through
the window is unlawful entry. The unlawful entrance must be made for the purpose of committing a crime like
rape or murder. But it is inherent in the crime of trespass to dwelling (US v. Barberan, 17 Phil. 509) and in
robbery with force upon things although it may be considered in robbery with violence or intimidation against
persons. (Q3, 1997 Bar)
Unlawful entry to be aggravating must be for the purpose of entrance and not for the purpose of escape. It must
be alleged in the information to qualify the crime to robbery; otherwise, the crime will be theft. (People v. Sunga,
43 Phil. 205)

19. As a means to the commission of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken.(Art. 14, Par. 19)
This means is for the purpose of committing a crime. It is inherent in robbery with force upon things.

20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under 15 years of age or by means of motor vehicles,
motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means. (Art. 14, Par. 20, as amended by RA 5438)
There are two distinct aggravating circumstances. The first shows the greater perversity of the offender in
taking advantage of the youthfulness of those persons for criminal purposes. The second is intended to meet
the problem created by modern criminal in resorting to faster means of conveyance to commit the crime. The
use of motor vehicles facilitates the commission of the crime. If the vehicle is used to facilitate only the escape
of the offender it is not aggravating. A scooter and a motorcycle are included under “similar means.”

21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other
wrong not necessary for its commission. (Art. 14, Par. 21)
It is essential that the offender inflicted the wounds not necessary for the crime but for the purpose of making
the victim suffer more. For cruelty to exist, there must be proof that the acts were perpetrated while the
victim was still alive. This circumstance is distinguished from that of ignominy in that cruelty refers
to physical suffering, whereas, ignominy is circumscribed to moral suffering. Gagging of the mouth of a 3-year
old child with stockings, dumping him with head downward into a box, and covering the box with sacks and
other boxes, causing slow suffocation, and as a result the child died, constitutes cruelty. (People v. Lara, 113
SCRA 316) Also, in the crime of rape, where the offender tied the victim to a bed and burnt her face with a
lighted cigarette while raping her. (People v. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316) (Q8, 1994 Bar)
The fact that 13 stabs wounds were inflicted upon the victim does not constitute cruelty, absent proof that such
wounds were inflicted sadistically in a way that made the victim agonize before the fatal blow which snuffed
out his life was delivered. (People v. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 19)

22. Under influence of dangerous drugs. (RA 6425, as amended)

When a crime is committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous drugs, such state shall be
considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of a crime and the application of the
penalty provided in the Revised Penal Code. (People v. Belgar, 92155, March 11, 1991)

23. Syndicate or Organized Crime Group.

This is a special aggravating circumstance, contemplates of a group purposely formed or organized to engage
in criminal activities for gain, not merely the commission of a particular crime by two or more persons who
confederated and mutually helped one another in its commission. The existence of a conspiracy does not
necessarily imply or carry with it this aggravating circumstance. (People v. Alberca, June 26, 1996)

Alternative Circumstances
Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or
mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions attending its commission.
Specific circumstances:
1. Relationship
It shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. (Art. 15)

Relationship of stepfather or stepmother and stepson or stepdaughter is included by analogy as similar to

ascendant or descendant. (People v. Bersabal, 48 Phil. 439) But relationship between uncle and niece is not
included. (US v. Incierto, 15 Phil. 358)
Relationship is mitigating in crimes against property. But in theft, estafa and malicious mischief, relationship
is exempting.

It is considered as an aggravating circumstance in crimes against persons if the offended party is of a higher
level than the offender, or when the offender and the offended party are relatives of the same level. (People v.
Mercado, 51 Phil. 99) As a rule, relationship is mitigating if the offended party is of a lower level than that of
the offender or even exempting if committed by a parent in excessive chastisement.

In crimes against chastity, relationship is aggravating whether the offender is of a higher or lower degree than
that of the offended party. It is due to the nature of the crime. (People v. Porras, 58 Phil. 578)

2. Intoxication
As a general rule, intoxication is a mitigating circumstance. It must be shown that at the time of the commission
of the criminal act, the accused has taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks to blur his reason and deprive him
of certain degree of control. (People v. Boduso, 450, Sept. 30, 1974) Intoxication to be mitigating must be proved
to the satisfaction of the Court. (People v, Noble, 77 Phil. 93) It is aggravating only in two cases:

a. Where intoxication is habitual.

b. When it is intentional, that is, it is subsequent to the plan of the commission of a felony.

For intoxication to be habitual, it is not necessary that the offender should be drunk 7 days a week. It is enough
that the offender has acquired the habit of getting drunk, or drinking to excess. If one who had plotted to kill
the victim, had drunk wine in order to embolden him in carrying out with his evil plan, drunkenness is not
mitigating. (People v. Hernandez, 3391, May 23, 1952)

3. Degree of instruction or education of offender.

As a rule, lack of instruction or a low degree of intelligence is considered as a mitigating circumstance in all
crimes except in offenses against chastity and property. And also, in the crime of murder, for a man as a
rational being, has always been forbidden to kill. (People v. Tabian, 126 SCRA 571) It
should be borne in mind that this circumstance is not dependent on the matter of schooling; it depends
more on the alertness of the mind, the ability to observe and grasp the significance of happenings around
him. If one is unable to write but is highly and exceptionally intelligent or mentally alert that he easily realizes
the significance of his act, there is no mitigating circumstance. (People v. Gorospe, 105 Phil. 184)

High degree of instruction is aggravating if the offender availed himself or took advantage of it in committing a
crime as in the case of a lawyer who commits falsification or a doctor who kills his victim by means of poison.

PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE

The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals
The following are considered principals:

a. Those who take direct part in the execution of the act.

They are those who, participating in the criminal design, personally take part in the execution of the
felony by acts tending to the same end. As a general rule, all those who participated in a felony are liable as
principal when a conspiracy between or among them is established. (People v. Nierra, 96 SCRA 335)

b. Those who directly force or induce others to commit the offense.

Generally, the induction is done by means of promises or reward or price, sometimes, by the utterance of
words. It is necessary that the person uttering the encouraging words must have such a moral influence over
the person induced that the words of the other would practically amount to a command; and the words
uttered must have been the moving factor that made the actor commit the offense, and that the words
uttered were used to procure the commission of the offense.
There is a principal by induction or by inducement only if it is shown that the crime was actually committed by
another who was induced. (People v. Ong Chiat Lay, 60 Phil. 788)

Regarding the induction, it is essential that (1) it be made directly with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime, and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the said commission by the
one induced. (People v. De la Cruz, 97 SCRA 385)

c. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. (Art. 17)
These are persons who, without personally participating in the execution of the felony, nevertheless cooperate
with the principals by direct participation by performing another act. The act performed by him must
be absolutely essential or indispensable to the extent that without the act performed by him, the crime could
not have been committed. It is only when the evidence fails to show the existence of conspiracy when the
act of the alleged principals by cooperation must be indispensable. An example of which is the act of
lending the boat for the purpose of robbing a person who lived in an islet separated from the mainland by a
wide and deep river and accessible only by a water craft. The lender becomes principal by indispensable
cooperation. Also, the act of initialing the check is indispensable to the act of defraudation of the depositor as
without it the check would not be cashed. (US v. Lim Buanco, 14 Phil. 484)
But any cooperation, even done with knowledge of the criminal intent of the accused, if not indispensable to
the commission of the crime, will make one liable as an accomplice. So, if the accused knowingly aided the
killers by casting stones at the victim (People v. Tatlonghari, 27 SCRA 726) or the act of giving the victim a fist
blow after he was stabbed by the other accused (People v. Vistido, 79 SCRA 719) the liability will be that of an
accomplice.

2. Accomplices
Those persons, who, not being principals, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts. (Art. 18)
The acts performed while material must not be indispensable. Thus, where the accused is proven to have
merely assisted in guarding the detained persons to prevent their escape, the accused should be held as an
accomplice only since the act performed by him was not indispensable. However, if the person takes part
in the conspiracy, he can never be an accomplice.

An accomplice has knowledge of the criminal design of the principal and all that he does is to concur with the
latter in his purpose, by cooperating in the execution of the crime by previous or simultaneous acts, for the
purpose of supplying material or moral aid to the principal in an efficacious way. (People v. Tanzo, 44 Phil. 18)

It is also necessary that any wound inflicted by the accomplice must not be the cause of death; if the wound is
mortal, the offender would be a principal by direct participation. (People v. Aplegido, 76 Phil. 571)

Accomplices are also known as accessories before the fact. Any doubt as to the participation of an individual
in the commission of the crime, is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility. (People v. Abiog, 15310, Oct.
31, 1961)
Supposing, while A is choking B, C suddenly appears and stabs B mortally. If A continues choking B after the
mortal wound is inflicted, A will be an accomplice. His act is a concurrence in the criminal design of C to kill B.
(People v. Tamayo, supra) If, however, he does not do any act after B is stabbed, A has no liability in the killing
of B by C. The liability of A and C will then be individual. If there is conspiracy between A and C to kill B, both
will be collectively liable as principals for the death of B.
A person who assaults a victim already fatally wounded by another is only regarded as an accomplice, unless
there was anterior conspiracy. (People v. Cagalingan, 188 SCRA 313)

3. Accessories
Those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein,
either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
a. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
Buying a gold watch from another, knowing that it was stolen property, the accessory assists the thief to
profit by the effects of the crime. The accessory should materially benefit from the act. Riding in a stolen
vehicle is “not profiting” since it does not improve his economic position. Profiting is not synonymous to intent
to gain as an element of theft. (People v. Morales, 71 OG 529)

b. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof,
in order to prevent its discovery.
In the crime of homicide, the body of the crime or the corpus delicti is the fact of the killing, that is, a specific
offense in fact committed by someone. (People v. Marquez, 43 OG No. 5) A person who place in one of the hands
of the deceased after he was killed to show that he was armed and it was necessary to kill him for having offered
resistance to the authorities, is an accessory. (People v. Saladino, 3634, May 30, 1961) This is similar to
concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery.
c. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder,
or an attempt at the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. (Art.
19)
If the one assisted is the accomplice, there is no accessory. The public officer is an accessory irrespective of the
crime committed by the principal provided it is not a light felony. On the other hand, in case of private person,
the author of the crime must be guilty of treason, parricide, murder or attempt against the life of the President
or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Thus, if a private person assists another who has been
guilty of robbery, he cannot be an accessory.

An accessory does not participate in the criminal design nor cooperate in the commission of the crime. (People
v. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600) If the principal is acquitted because the facts alleged to have been committed are not
proved or do not constitute a crime, the accessory is not liable. (US v. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194) But if the principal
is acquitted because of an exempting circumstance, the accessory may be held liable as the crime has been
committed. As long as the crime has been committed, even if the principal has not been arrested and convicted,
the accessory may be held liable. (People v. Billon, 48 OG 1391)

The following are criminally liable for light felonies:

1. Principals
2. Accomplices
The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect
to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the exception where the accessory profits or assists in
the principal to profit from the effects of the crime. (Art. 20)

The reason therefor is that if the accessory himself profited or assisted to profit from the effects of the crime
the motivating power was not his relationship with the principal but his love for money.