[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondents clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial,
rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive
owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in
the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages;
P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and
papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and
consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private
respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them
in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision,
petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were
admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not
constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.

Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other
things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the
documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the
injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note
of the following defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed with merit:2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:

xxx xxx xxx

4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there
was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents
Annex A-I to J-7. On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Courts order, respondents
request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be
looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of
the questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use
petitioners admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath.
Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him.
Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands admission and
use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration
that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their
genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no
means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents
and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The
TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the
trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents
and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Puno, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION G.R. No. 160792

FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF

CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES)

CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES)

CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA

LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN

CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA

LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN

HOMOBONO ADAZA, and

ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO,

Petitioners,

Present:

- versus -

GEN. PEDRO CABUAY,

GEN. NARCISO ABAYA,

SEC. ANGELO REYES, and Promulgated:

SEC. ROILO GOLEZ,

Respondents. August 25, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review[1] seeks to nullify the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 17 September
2003 and Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto
Rafael Pulido (petitioners) on behalf of their detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt.
Nicanor Faeldon (PN-Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo
Maestrecampo (PA), and Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) (detainees).

Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay (Gen. Cabuay), Chief of the Intelligence Service of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), who has custody of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded
Gen. Narciso Abaya (Gen. Abaya), Sec. Angelo Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are respectively the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Secretary of National Defense and National Security
Adviser, because they have command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.

Antecedent Facts

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers,
entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale apartment
complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of
Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly
renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several
negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had
earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took
place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood
incident.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The
government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized under Article 134-
A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
03-2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG
Antonio Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.

On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody
the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the
detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.

On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12 August
2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which resolved to:

(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make a RETURN of the writ on
Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case to the Court of
Appeals for RAFFLE among the Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings and decision thereon,
after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court within ten (10) days from promulgation of the
decision.[3]

Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to make a
return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals
on the scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings.

On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return of the
Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals during the
scheduled hearing. After the parties filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court
considered the petition submitted for decision.

On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition. Nonetheless,
the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the
ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing
Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his
commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees right to exercise for two hours a
day.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the
detainees are already charged of coup detat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is
unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the
detainees and petitioners do not even question.

The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail the
legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the appellate court held
that the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the
detainees liberty. The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees right to confer with
their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances.

The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes letter is an abhorrent
violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus
proceedings.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he
made in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two hours
a day. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Cabuay is
hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold the constitutional rights of the
detainees in accordance with the Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04 regarding visiting hours
and the right of the detainees to exercise for two (2) hours a day.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND REVERSING A DECISION

OF THE SUPREME COURT;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE REMEDY
PETITIONERS SEEK; and

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED
JUNIOR OFFICERS DETENTION.[5]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners claim that the Courts 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and the Court remanded
the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus argue that the Courts Order
had already foreclosed any question on the propriety and merits of their petition.

Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows that the Court referred
to the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers detention. Had the Court
ruled for the detainees release, the Court would not have referred the hearing of the petition to the
Court of Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released the detainees had the Court upheld
petitioners cause.

In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in
the hearing of the petition.[6] The respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his
detention.[7] However, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive
matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual
hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus.

For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the
determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention
unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the
case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the
hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court
had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to
address the detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center.
The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person.[8]
The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.[9] If
the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however,
the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus
is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error.[10] Neither can it substitute for an appeal.[11]

Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances where there is deprivation
of a persons constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied
of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints
are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid
has later become arbitrary.[12]
However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will
extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as
to the excess.[13] Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation
of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.[14]

Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the detainees. Neither do
they dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses. What petitioners
bewail is the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as
lawyers from seeing the detainees their clients any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly
curtails the detainees right to counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438 (RA 7438).[15] Petitioners
claim that the regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the
Senate and the Feliciano Commission.

Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to
privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and
Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (Maestrecampo). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the
detainees right against cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees
from having contact with their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and
plywood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the
detainees cells.

Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement.[16] However, the fact
that the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the public.[17] RA 7438,
which specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the
power of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the
detainee and prevent his escape. Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:

Section 4. Penalty Clause. a) x x x

b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of
a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his
immediate family with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual
needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility
over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure
his safety and prevent his escape. (Emphasis supplied)

True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting a detainee client at
any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night. However, the last paragraph of the same Section
4(b) makes the express qualification that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4(b), the detention
officer has the power to undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety
of the detainee and prevent his escape.

The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The regulations governing a
detainees confinement must be reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Thus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the governments objective of securing the safety
and preventing the escape of the detainee. The law grants the detention officer the authority to
undertake such reasonable measures or regulations.

Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees right to effective
representation when petitioners visits were limited by the schedule of visiting hours. Petitioners assert
that the violation of the detainees rights entitle them to be released from detention.

Petitioners contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the
detainees indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees release from detention.
The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees right to counsel. The purpose of
the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all
detainees. American cases are instructive on the standards to determine whether regulations on pre-
trial confinement are permissible.

In Bell v. Wolfish,[18] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that regulations must be reasonably
related to maintaining security and must not be excessive in achieving that purpose. Courts will strike
down a restriction that is arbitrary and purposeless.[19] However, Bell v. Wolfish expressly discouraged
courts from skeptically questioning challenged restrictions in detention and prison facilities.[20] The U.S.
Supreme Court commanded the courts to afford administrators wide-ranging deference in
implementing policies to maintain institutional security.[21]

In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make
regulations in detention centers allowable: such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the
detainees safety and prevent his escape. In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers
of the detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and
preventing the escape of all detainees.

While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have
face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of
detainees right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00
p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours
when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard
of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP
officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours.

The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient
time to confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled
visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission,[22] petitioners were given
time to confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.[23] Thus, at no point were
the detainees denied their right to counsel.

Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of
the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive punishment. This argument
fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a
detainees desire to live comfortably.[24] The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into
the detainees desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions into punishment.[25] It is
when the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish.[26] Courts will
also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative
purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose.[27] Jail officials are thus not
required to use the least restrictive security measure.[28] They must only refrain from implementing a
restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it serves.[29]

We quote Bell v. Wolfish:

One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and respondents concede, that the
essential objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees presence at trial. While this interest
undoubtedly justifies the original decision to confine an individual in some manner, we do not accept
respondents argument that the Governments interest in ensuring a detainees presence at trial is the
only objective that may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is lawfully made to confine a
person. If the government could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent
necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally
justified form of detention. The Government also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to
manage the facility in which the individual is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may
require administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly speaking, necessary to ensure
that the detainee shows up at trial. For example, the Government must be able to take steps to
maintain security and order at the institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach
detainees. Restraints that are reasonably related to the institutions interest in maintaining jail security
do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are
restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial. We
need not here attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate governmental interests that may
justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to
ensuring the detainees presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the
individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of
pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.[30]

An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or
disability, and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate.[31] Punishment also requires that
the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of
confinement.[32]

Block v. Rutherford,[33] which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits
as this practice was reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety of innocent individuals will be
jeopardized if they are exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial for serious,
violent offenses and may have prior criminal conviction.[34] Contact visits make it possible for the
detainees to hold visitors and jail staff hostage to effect escapes.[35] Contact visits also leave the jail
vulnerable to visitors smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other contraband.[36] The restriction on contact
visits was imposed even on low-risk detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain
contraband and weapons.[37] The security consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on
contact visits was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees.[38]

Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the
legitimate goal of internal security.[39] This case reaffirmed the hands-off doctrine enunciated in Bell v.
Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction
over prison matters in deference to administrative expertise.[40]

In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their visitors
by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from
their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-
verbal and limited physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact,
it is not even a strict non-contact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the
detainees physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security
concerns.

The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This
measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband
and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and
crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the
fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees.

We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the ISAFP Detention
Center are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each detainee, except for Capt. Nicanor Faeldon and Capt.
Gerardo Gambala, is confined in separate cells, unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The detainees
are treated well and given regular meals. The Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean
and livable compared to the conditions now prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are
congested with detainees. The Court of Appeals found the assailed measures to be reasonable
considering that the ISAFP Detention Center is a high-risk detention facility. Apart from the soldiers, a
suspected New Peoples Army (NPA) member and two suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained in
the ISAFP Detention Center.

We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the
detainees right to privacy when the ISAFP officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters
were not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the ISAFP
Detention Center. Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizens
privacy rights unless authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials
opened the letters.

Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming and outgoing
mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison facility and to avert
coordinated escapes.[41] Even in the absence of statutes specifically allowing prison authorities from
opening and inspecting mail, such practice was upheld based on the principle of civil deaths.[42]
Inmates were deemed to have no right to correspond confidentially with anyone. The only restriction
placed upon prison authorities was that the right of inspection should not be used to delay
unreasonably the communications between the inmate and his lawyer.[43]

Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials received
respect.[44] The confidential correspondences could not be censored.[45] The infringement of such
privileged communication was held to be a violation of the inmates First Amendment rights.[46] A
prisoner has a right to consult with his attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not abrogated by the
legitimate interests of prison authorities in the administration of the institution.[47] Moreover, the risk
is small that attorneys will conspire in plots that threaten prison security.[48]
American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by convicted
inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono[49] recognized that pre-trial
detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of
pre-trial detainees mail addressed to public officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While
incoming mail may be inspected for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial
detainees could not be inspected or read at all.

In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,[50] involving convicted prisoners, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that prison officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to
inmates. However, prison officials could not read such mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme
Court:

The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail from attorneys
to inmates, has been considerably narrowed in the course of this litigation. The prison regulation under
challenge provided that (a)ll incoming and outgoing mail will be read and inspected, and no exception
was made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x

Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates, but contend
that they may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of the prisoners. The
narrow issue thus presented is whether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be
opened by prison authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether such mail must be delivered
unopened if normal detection techniques fail to indicate contraband.

xxx

x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication was from an attorney before
opening it for inspection, a near impossible task of administration would be imposed. We think it
entirely appropriate that the State require any such communications to be specially marked as
originating from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if they are to receive special
treatment. It would also certainly be permissible that prison authorities require that a lawyer desiring to
correspond with a prisoner, first identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the
letters marked privileged are actually from members of the bar. As to the ability to open the mail in the
presence of inmates, this could in no way constitute censorship, since the mail would not be read.
Neither could it chill such communications, since the inmates presence insures that prison officials will
not read the mail. The possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent
attorneys, surely warrants prison officials opening the letters. We disagree with the Court of Appeals
that this should only be done in appropriate circumstances. Since a flexible test, besides being
unworkable, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible constitutional rights
enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding to a rule whereby the inmate is
present when mail from attorneys is inspected, have done all, and perhaps even more, than the
Constitution requires.[51]

In Hudson v. Palmer,[52] the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of
privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners necessarily lose many
protections of the Constitution, thus:

However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear
that imprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights. These constraints
on inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system. The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical
matter, to accommodate a myriad of institutional needs and objectives of prison facilities, chief among
which is internal security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, as
reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to
correction.[53]

The later case of State v. Dunn,[54] citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and
made no distinction as to the detainees limited right to privacy. State v. Dunn noted the considerable
jurisprudence in the United States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a
substantial government interest such as security or discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if complete
censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We
quote State v. Dunn:

[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close
and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and
internal order. We are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoners expectation of privacy always
yield to what must be considered a paramount interest in institutional security. We believe that it is
accepted by our society that [l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of
confinement.
The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted inmate has
been blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally pose an even greater
security risk than convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial
may in many cases be individuals who are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records and
may therefore pose a greater risk of escape than convicted inmates.[55] Valencia v. Wiggins[56] further
held that it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the
purpose of maintaining jail security.

American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees non-privileged mail poses a
genuine threat to jail security.[57] Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an envelope for non-
privileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials.[58] A
pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail.[59] However,
incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can open and
inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents without violating the inmates right to
correspond with his lawyer.[60] The inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and
not to verbal contraband.[61]

Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees letters in
the present case violated the detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a
sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as
the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.

The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and
their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees.

That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights[62] is a
guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or
imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the
limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial
detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.

In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the
constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts balance the guarantees of the
Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators.[63] The deferential review of such
regulations stems from the principle that:

[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would
seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the
intractable problems of prison administration.[64]

The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup
detat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.[65] The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but
visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of
the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject
to the Articles of War.[66]

Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the
NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the
regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better position to know the
security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA
members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should
defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.

The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from
petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison
facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the
courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and
prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper
mode to question conditions of confinement.[67] The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is
challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.[68]

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 78545.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

KILUSANG MAYO UNO,

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF

LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG

MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),

JOSELITO V. USTAREZ,

EMILIA P. DAPULANG,

SALVADOR T. CARRANZA,

MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and

ROQUE M. TAN,

Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. No. 167798

THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,

NATIONAL ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,

and THE SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and

MANAGEMENT,

Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

BAYAN MUNA Representatives G.R. No. 167930

SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO

A. CASIO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR, Present:

GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY

Representative LIZA L. MAZA, PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

ANAKPAWIS Representatives PUNO,

RAFAEL V. MARIANO QUISUMBING,

and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, YNARES-SANTIAGO,

Rep. FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, CARPIO,

Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO CORONA,

and RENATO M. REYES, JR. CARPIO-MORALES,

of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ CALLEJO, SR.,

of KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO AZCUNA,

of ACT, FERDINAND GAITE TINGA,

of COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG CHICO-NAZARIO,

of AGHAM, WILFREDO MARBELLA GARCIA, and

of KMP, LANA LINABAN of GABRIELA, VELASCO, Jr., JJ.

AMADO GAT INCIONG,

RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR.,

DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN,

SHARON R. DUREMDES of the

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

IN THE PHILIPPINES, and

BRO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC)

of the ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR

RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE

PHILIPPINES (AMRSP),

Petitioners,

- versus -

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary, ROMULO NERI,

in his capacity as Director-General

of the NATIONAL ECONOMIC and

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA)

and the Administrator of the Promulgated:

NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO),

Respondents. April 19, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is
unconstitutional.
EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads:

REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED

CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND
AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;

WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in government have created unnecessary and
costly redundancies and higher costs to government, while making it inconvenient for individuals to be
holding several identification cards;

WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate the processes and issuance of identification
cards in government to reduce costs and to provide greater convenience for those transacting business
with government;

WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private businesses, enhance the integrity and
reliability of government-issued identification cards in private transactions, and prevent violations of
laws involving false names and identities.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines by

virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:

Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID) system for government. All
government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations, are hereby directed to
adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system to ensure the attainment of the following objectives:

a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public
brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing
the same or related information;

b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing
of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided
under this executive order;

d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and

e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.

Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations
issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order.

Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system The data to be collected and recorded by the
participating agencies shall be limited to the following:

Name

Home Address

Sex

Picture

Signature

Date of Birth

Place of Birth

Marital Status

Names of Parents

Height

Weight

Two index fingers and two thumbmarks

Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others

Tax Identification Number (TIN)

Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency and a common reference
number shall form part of the stored ID data and, together with at least the first five items listed above,
including the print of the right thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as collected and stored, shall
appear on the face or back of the ID card for visual verification purposes.

Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, to

Harmonize All Government Identification Systems. The Director-General, National Economic
Development Authority, is hereby authorized to streamline and harmonize all government ID systems.

Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority. In addition to his organic functions and responsibilities, the Director-General, National
Economic and Development Authority, shall have the following functions and responsibilities:

a. Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this executive order a unified government ID
system containing only such data and features, as indicated in Section 3 above, to validly establish the
identity of the card holder:

b. Enter into agreements with local governments, through their respective leagues of
governors or mayors, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and with other branches or
instrumentalities of the government, for the purpose of ensuring government-wide adoption of and
support to this effort to streamline the ID systems in government;

b. Call on any other government agency or institution, or create subcommittees or technical

working groups, to provide such assistance as may be necessary or required for the effective
performance of its functions; and

d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be necessary in pursuance of the objectives of this
executive order.

Section 6. Safeguards. The Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, and the
pertinent agencies shall adopt such safeguard as may be necessary and adequate to ensure that the
right to privacy of an individual takes precedence over efficient public service delivery. Such safeguards
shall, as a minimum, include the following:

a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity
of a person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to privacy
shall be allowed or tolerated under this order;

c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted;

d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a
personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;

e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and
cryptographic technology; and

f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or
revision of relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification
card shall prescribe.

Section 7. Funding. Such funds as may be recommended by the Department of Budget and Management
shall be provided to carry out the objectives of this executive order.

Section 8. Repealing clause. All executive orders or issuances, or portions thereof, which are inconsistent
with this executive order, are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly.

Section 9. Effectivity. This executive order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Five.

Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification
(ID) systems.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of
legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420
infringes on the citizens right to privacy.[1]

Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on the following grounds:

1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates the decision of this Honorable Court in
Ople v. Torres et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the
Social Security Act of 1997.

2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no power to issue EO 420.
Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that
purpose.

3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy

(i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the owners consent.

(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any violation of its
provisions.

(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420.

4. Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO 420, the Executive Order was issued
without public hearing.

5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of laws and results in the
discriminatory treatment of and penalizes those without ID.[2]

Issues
Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that EO 420 is a usurpation of
legislative power by the President. Second, petitioners claim that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right
to privacy.

Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the ripeness of the petitions. Even assuming
that petitioners are bereft of legal standing, the Court considers the issues raised under the
circumstances of paramount public concern or of transcendental significance to the people. The
petitions also present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination because all government
entities currently issuing identification cards are mandated to implement EO 420, which petitioners
claim is patently unconstitutional. Hence, the Court takes cognizance of the petitions.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are without merit.

On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power

Section 2 of EO 420 provides, Coverage. All government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this
executive order. EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions
under existing laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420.
Examples of these government entities are the GSIS,[3] SSS,[4] Philhealth,[5] Mayors Office,[6] LTO,[7]
PRC,[8] and similar government entities.

Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system. Thus,
all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt
a uniform data collection and format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the
uniform data collection and format, namely:

a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the
public brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database
containing the same or related information;

b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and
those availing of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided
under this executive order;

d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and

e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.

In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve
efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by
government entities.

Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14
specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth;
(7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index
fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14)
Tax Identification Number.

These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal identification by government
entities, and even by the private sector. Any one who applies for or renews a drivers license provides to
the LTO all these 14 specific data.

At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data from applicants for
identification purposes. EO 420 will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID
databases of the government entities. Government entities cannot collect or record data, for
identification purposes, other than the 14 specific data.

Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data for their ID systems, either
expressly or impliedly by the nature of the functions of these government entities. Under their existing
ID systems, some government entities collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows. At
present, the data collected and recorded by government entities are disparate, and the IDs they issue
are dissimilar.

In the case of the Supreme Court,[9] the IDs that the Court issues to all its employees, including the
Justices, contain 15 specific data, namely: (1) Name; (2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number; (5)
ID Number; (6) Height; (7) Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color of Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11) Right
Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number; (14) Name and Address of Person
to be Notified in Case of Emergency; and (15) Signature. If we consider that the picture in the ID can
generally also show the sex of the employee, the Courts ID actually contains 16 data.

In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only the first five items listed in
Section 3, plus the fingerprint, agency number and the common reference number, or only eight specific
data. Thus, at present, the Supreme Courts ID contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for
government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained in the Supreme Court ID is also far
more financially sensitive, specifically the Tax Identification Number.

Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and making their ID formats
uniform, will admittedly achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are savings in terms of
procurement of equipment and supplies, compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of
verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of a single ID format for all
government entities.

There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the collection and recording of their
data to the 14 specific items in Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that these government
entities can individually adopt the ID format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly
within the authority of the heads or governing boards of the government entities that are already
authorized under existing laws to issue IDs.

A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the
heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their
systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to
their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID
format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and
optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of
legislative power.

Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under
the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus
and offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.

Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in
the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format
to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents
constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.

Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does
not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not
apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID
cards.[10] This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is
needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.

The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are
several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve
public services.[11] The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the
President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has
not usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents
constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the
President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the
President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO
420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the
implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply
an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.

The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does
not require legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public
schools also routinely issue ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards
to their members. The purpose of all these ID cards is simply to insure the proper identification of a
person as an employee, student, or member of a club. These ID cards, although imposed as a condition
for exercising a privilege, are voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an employee, student
or member of a club.

What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the
implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing
appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of
government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens
whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection
and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that
the citizens right to privacy is infringed.

In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card
systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is
not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a
very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the
confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the
data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.

EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID
card. EO 420 applies only to government entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and
issuing ID cards as part of their governmental functions. Every government entity that presently issues
an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own name. The only difference is that the ID card will
contain only the five data specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number,
and the common reference number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure integrity and
reliability of identification.

This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive department should
undertake cost savings, achieve efficiency in operations, insure compatibility of equipment and systems,
and provide user-friendly service to the public. The collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are
day-to-day functions of many government entities under existing laws. Even the Supreme Court has its
own ID system for employees of the Court and all first and second level courts. The Court is even trying
to unify its ID system with those of the appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan
and Court of Tax Appeals.

There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary. The same
is true for government entities under the Executive department. If government entities under the
Executive department decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to
achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any
legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative power.

On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy

All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards
in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that
the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been no
complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and recording of personal
identification data.
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to
EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis
to complain against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID
system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight
specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require less data
collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420.

Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent of data
to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and
record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can
show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme Courts ID
shows.

Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing safeguards on
the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy.
Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted:

a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing
the identity of a person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;

b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to
privacy be allowed or tolerated under this order;

c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted;

d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential
and a personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;

e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and
cryptographic technology;

f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any
correction or revision of relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the
identification card shall prescribe.
On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be
collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420
further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the
prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. Some
one hundred countries have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such as Spain,
France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not have
national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic
Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social or other public services.[12] Even with EO
420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems
but allow only sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other specific purposes.

Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform
effectively and efficiently their mandated functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system,
GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising from false
names and identities. The integrity of the LTOs licensing system will suffer in the absence of a reliable ID
system.

The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the right to privacy, namely, Griswold v.
Connecticut,[13] U.S. Justice Department v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,[14] and
Whalen v. Roe.[15] The last two decisions actually support the validity of EO 420, while the first is
inapplicable to the present case.

In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the use and
distribution of contraceptives because enforcement of the law would allow the police entry into the
bedrooms of married couples. Declared the U.S. Supreme Court: Would we allow the police to search
the sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very
idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. Because the facts and
the issue involved in Griswold are materially different from the present case, Griswold has no persuasive
bearing on the present case.

In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect and store information on
individuals from public records nationwide but whether the State could withhold such information from
the press. The premise of the issue in U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect and store in a
central database information on citizens gathered from public records across the country. In fact, the
law authorized the Department of Justice to collect and preserve fingerprints and other criminal
identification records nationwide. The law also authorized the Department of Justice to exchange such
information with officials of States, cities and other institutions. The Department of Justice treated such
information as confidential. A CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee demanded the
criminal records of four members of a family pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the Freedom of Information Act expressly exempts release of information that
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and the information demanded falls
under that category of exempt information.

With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded
under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only
strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside
the coverage of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as
strictly confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data
cannot be released to the public or the press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not
collide with EO 420 but actually supports the validity EO 420.

Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection for control over
information. In Whalen, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York law that required
doctors to furnish the government reports identifying patients who received prescription drugs that
have a potential for abuse. The government maintained a central computerized database containing the
names and addresses of the patients, as well as the identity of the prescribing doctors. The law was
assailed because the database allegedly infringed the right to privacy of individuals who want to keep
their personal matters confidential. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared:

Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies,

and to public health agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the
disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to
representatives of the State having responsibility for the health of the community does not
automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy. (Emphasis supplied)

Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen, the 14
specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are far less sensitive
and far less personal. In fact, the 14 specific data required under EO 420 are routine data for ID systems,
unlike the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of patients taking prescription drugs.
Whalen, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the constitutionality of EO 420 as non-
violative of the right to privacy.
Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reiterated Whalen. In Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth,[16] the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law that required doctors
performing abortions to fill up forms, maintain records for seven years, and allow the inspection of such
records by public health officials. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that recordkeeping and reporting
requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly
respect a patients confidentiality and privacy are permissible.

Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,[17] the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld a law that required doctors performing an abortion to file a report to the government that
included the doctors name, the womans age, the number of prior pregnancies and abortions that the
woman had, the medical complications from the abortion, the weight of the fetus, and the marital
status of the woman. In case of state-funded institutions, the law made such information publicly
available. In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: The collection of information with respect to actual
patients is a vital element of medical research, and so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no
purpose other than to make abortion more difficult.

Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld in
Whalen, Danforth and Casey as not violative of the right to privacy, the disclosure requirements under
EO 420 are far benign and cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO 420 requires
disclosure of 14 personal data that are routine for ID purposes, data that cannot possibly embarrass or
humiliate anyone.

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such
violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection,
recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres[18] is not authority
to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance,
broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter
required legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his
concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, The voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation,
and it is only on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court.

EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant
to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any
power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance
in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System,[19] a
national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID
card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance
system where none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card
systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and
user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents
constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under
the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice