People v. Maceda, Aug.

1990

Facts
 In the morning of 11 February 1986, the late ex-Governor of Antique, Evelio Javier, was gunned
down in the plaza of San Jose, Antique.
 Atty. J.T. Barrera filed a motion for admission to bail on behalf of private respondent (accused).
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe filed his opposition thereto, alleging that private
respondent was charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murders
and that the evidence of guilt is strong; hence, he is not entitled to bail as a matter of right.
 Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe filed a motion to discharge accused Oscar Tianzon to
be utilized as a state witness, alleging that there is an absolute necessity for his testimony
against all the accused; that there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offenses except the testimony of said accused, which can be substantially
corroborated in its material points by other evidence
 The prosecution adduced its evidence in support of the motion; however, respondent Judge
deferred the resolution of the motion. Thereupon, the prosecution moved that the presentation
of its evidence in opposition to private respondent's petition for bail be likewise deferred on the
ground that accused Oscar Tianzon is a material witness against private respondent and that his
testimony is necessary for the purpose of determining private respondent's qualification for bail,
i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
 Petitioner filed the instant petition for CERTIORARI, to annul and set aside the orders dated 3, 7
and 8 August 1989, claiming that said orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and
PROHIBITION to enjoin the respondent Judge from hearing private respondent's petition for bail
until he has resolved the motion to discharge accused Oscar Tianzon, and praying that a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order be issued.

Issues
 Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
orders.
 Whether the respondent Judge should be disqualified from further hearing Crim. Cases Nos.
3350-3355

Ruling
 No. The Court finds that respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion, i.e., that he
did not act "arbitrarily", "capriciously" or "despotically" amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders of 3, 7 and 8 August 1989. The Court is aware of
certain reasons why accused Javellana should not be placed in the Provincial Jail. The court was
left with no other choice but to entrust his custody to the Provincial Probation Officer to escort
him to Iloilo City for a medical check-up. It is the perception of the court that there are
movements going ground, by whom is unknown yet to the court, to compel the incarceration of
accused Javellana in the Provincial Jail. The court abhors this situation and the court will not be
intimidated by anyone. It is the perception of this court that even its lawful orders have
somehow been subverted. The court's perception of the circumstances presently obtaining on
the custody and place of detention of Javellana is a hot agenda and of grave importance,
particularly his safety and well being during detention in order that the court can try him on the
charges against him. The Court, however, holds that respondent Judge committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he insisted in continuously hearing
 private respondent's petition for bail and in ordering the arrest and commitment of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. It is well to recall that in the restraining order issued on 31
August 1989, this Court ordered the respondent Judge to cease and desist from continuing the
hearing on private respondent's petition for bail until after he had resolved the motion for
discharge of Oscar Tianzon as state witness. Although the aforesaid motion had already been
denied in the order of 1 September 1989, nevertheless, the prosecution had filed a motion to
reconsider the said order which is still pending resolution. Hence, the said motion has not yet
been resolved with finality. When respondent Judge, therefore, denied the prosecution's motion
for deferment of the scheduled hearings on private respondent's petition for bail and in
proceeding to hear the said motion, by ordering the prosecution to present its evidence —
which precipitated the walk-out of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and his consequent arrest
and commitment to the Provincial Jail — he (respondent judge) was acting in violation of the
restraining order issued by this Court. 
 And now to the question on whether or not respondent Judge should be disqualified from
further hearing Crim. Cases Nos. 3350-3355, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the records. A judge, may in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. In the case at
bar, the reason relied upon for the inhibition or disqualification of respondent Judge, i.e.
manifest partiality to private respondent, is not based on any of the grounds enumerated in the
first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 which per se disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case, but
on the second paragraph thereof. The settled rule is that the judge is left to decide for himself
whether he will desist, for just or valid reasons, from sitting in a case. Respondent Judge has not
as yet decided whether or not he will inhibit himself from further hearing Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355 in the face of the prosecution's motion to disqualify or inhibit him. It would be
premature for the Court at this stage to rule on the matter.
Reyes vs. CA, Feb. 1997

Facts
 In an information filed with the RTC of Bulacan and later assigned to Branch 22 thereof as
Criminal Case No. 9252-M, petitioner Zenaida Reyes was accused of falsifying a deed of sale of
four (4) parcels of land “by feigning and signing the name of Pablo Floro, who could not affix his
signature anymore due to age infirmity, on the said document as seller and causing it to appear
that Floro had participated in the execution of the said document when in fact, as said accused
well knew, said deed of sale was not executed and signed by the said Pablo Floro, nor did he
ever appear before any notary public for the purpose of acknowledging in the deed.
 hearings were scheduled for the presentation of petitioner’s evidence on six different dates, to
wit: (1) February 6, 1989; (2) March 10, 1989; (3) April 12, 1989; (4) May 17, 1989; (5) June 5,
1989, and (6) July 10, 1989. Petitioner was absent thrice, i.e., on February 6 1989, April 12, 1989,
and July 10, 1989. On the first date, petitioner could not come because she was sick and her
counsel so informed the court. She was absent also on June 5, 1989 and July 10, 1989 because
of illness (hypertension and rheumatism). Thus, while petitioner’s absences were explained,
those of her counsel were not.
 The court declared petitioner to have waived the right to present her evidence. Petitioner then
gave a medical certificate which the court noted the said certificate but maintained its previous
order on the ground that the same is not a motion and as counsel was also not in court during
the last hearing to the effect that the presentation of defense evidence is considered waived.
 Petitioner by herself moved for reconsideration. However, it was denied by the court. Hence,
the court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of falsification.

Issues
 Whether petitioner’s repeated failure to proceed with the trial of the case amount to a waiver
of her right to present evidence.

Ruling
 No. The postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence of a party is a
manner which lies in the discretion of the trial court, but it is a discretion which must be
exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with a view
to doing substantial justice. In the case at bar, hearings were scheduled for the presentation of
petitioner’s evidence on six different dates, to wit: (1) February 6, 1989; (2) March 10, 1989; (3)
April 12, 1989; (4) May 17, 1989; (5) June 5, 1989, and (6) July 10, 1989. Petitioner was absent
thrice, i.e., on February 6 1989, April 12, 1989, and July 10, 1989. On the first date, petitioner
could not come because she was sick and her counsel so informed the court. She was absent
also on June 5, 1989 and July 10, 1989 because of illness (hypertension and rheumatism). Thus,
while petitioner’s absences were explained, those of her counsel were not. Atty. Tenorio simply
disappeared without a trace, despite warning to counsel that her failure to present evidence for
her client on June 5, 1989 would be considered a waiver of the latter’s right to present her
evidence. But counsel failed to heed the warning. Petitioner had to soldier on and, by herself,
had to plead with the court for a chance to present her evidence. Contrary to what the appellate
court thought in affirming petitioner’s conviction, this was not the case of a woman who treated
the criminal proceedings against her with cavalier disdain. Indeed, we do not think that
petitioner’s absences were so many capricious, or egregious as to indubitably indicate an
attempt to stall the proceedings of the criminal case as was the case in People v. Angco and
People v. Dichoso. Petitioner might have tried to delay the filing of her appellant’s brief, but her
effort can be attributed to an understandable desire to be allowed to present her evidence.
Hence, the filing of a motion for new trial. Even in her present petition before this Court
petitioner’s prayer is not that she be exonerated but only that she be given the chance to prove
her innocence by being allowed to present her evidence. Keeping in mind that this case involves
personal liberty, the negligence of counsel was certainly so gross that it should not be allowed
to prejudice petitioner’s constitutional right to be heard. The judicial conscience certainly
cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution just because
the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. Rigid application of
rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice where justice is due to secure to every
individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime with which he or she might
be charged.
Marcos vs. Ruiz, 213 SCRA 177

Facts
 After conducting a preliminary investigation, Asst. Fiscal of Tagbilaran City filed to RTC Bohol 2
information against Marcos for violation of BP 22.
 Marcos appeared during the scheduled arraignment but asked for resetting because his lawyer
has just withdrawn from the case. The court granted his request.
 Later, Marcos was able to settle his obligation with the complainants and the latter executed an
Affidavit of Desistance. Because of that, Asst. City Fiscal filed a Motion to Dismiss the case
because without the testimony of the complainants who withdrew, he cannot successfully
prosecute the case.
 During the arraignment, Marcos pleaded not guilty. When the case was called for hearing,
Marcos and his lawyer already left. The prosecution proceeded in the presentation of its
evidence and rested its case.
 Because Marcos did not attend the trial, the court forfeited his bail bond. Counsel explained that
he was unable to attend the trial because he had attended urgent matter which needed his
personal attention. He also explained that Marcos left in belief that there would no presentation
of evidence since an Affidavit of Desistance was already filed before the court.
 Essentially, the 2nd information was the same as the 1st so the counsel of the accused offered
that reading of information is waived and plea of not guilty be directly entered.

Issue
 Whether the court erred in forfeiting the petitioner’s bail bond for his non-appearance during
trial. Stated otherwise, what are the instances where the presence of the accused during trial is
indispensable? May a counsel enter a plea in behalf of the accused?

Ruling
 The forfeiture of the bail bond was inappropriate. A bail bond may be forfeited only in instances
where the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court of the RoC and, despite
due notice to the bondsmen to produce him before the court on a given date, the accused fails
to appear in person as so required.
 Under the RoC, the accused has to be present: 1. at the arraignment pursuant to par. (b),
Section 1, Rule 116; 2. at the promulgation of judgment, except when conviction is for a light
offense, in which case the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 120, or unless promulgation in absentia is allowed
under 3rd paragraph of said Section; and 3. when the prosecution intends to present witnesses
who will identify the accused.
 Thus, the petitioner's appearance was not required at the subject trial. It is true that he has the
right to be present at every stage of the proceeding (from arraignment to promulgation), but he
can waive his presence. The failure of the accused to appear at the trial despite due notice and
without justification is deemed an express waiver of his right to be present. As such, the trial
may proceed in absentia.
 With regard to the 2nd information, the court made no ruling on the manifestation and offer by
petitioner's counsel that the reading of the information is waived and a plea of not guilty is
entered. The petitioner was neither made to confirm the manifestation nor directed to
personally make the plea. There was no valid arraignment as it is required that the accused
would personally enter his plea.