ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSION
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which
shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional
Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the
practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which, in any
way, may be affected by the functions of his office,
nor shall he be financially interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Section. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be fixed by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure.
Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall
appoint their officials and employees in accordance
with law.
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released.
Section 6. Each Commission en banc may
promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices. Such
rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights.
ARUELO V. CA
Facts:
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent
therein only five days from receipt of summons
within which to file his answer to the petition (Part
VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had
lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According
to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions
for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule
13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure;
hence, the filing of said pleadings did not suspend the
running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a
new five-day period to file his answer.
Issue:
whether the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian
to file his pleading beyond the five-day period
prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Held:
No. Petitioner filed the election protest
with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are
governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings
before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by
Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought
before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I
provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI,
shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought
before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to
election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable
by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.
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 It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that
motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not
allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases
pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC
cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain
pleadings in the regular courts. The power to
promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme
Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
SEC 7. Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by
a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of
its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.
CUA V. COMELEC
FACTS:
The COMELEC First Division rendered a 2:7
decision on August 10, 1987 favoring Cua as winner
in the lone Congressional scat of Quirino but his
proclamation was suspended due to lack of
unanimous vote required by the procedural rules in
Comelec Resolution No.1669 regarding transaction
of official business of a Division.
Pursuant to said rule, private respondent Puzon filed
a motion for reconsideration with the Comelec en
banc. On October 28, 1987, three members voted to
sustain the First Decision, with 2 dissenting and one
abstaining (one died earlier). But respondent insists
that no valid decision was reached by the COMELEC
en banc because only three votes were reached in
favor of Cua and theses did not constitute a majority
of the body.
ISSUE: Is the Cua‘s contention correct?
HELD:
Yes. The 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division
was valid decision under Art.IX-A Sec.7 of the
Constitution.
Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm
the First division constituted a majority of the five
members who deliberated and voted thereon en bane.
Their decision is also valid under the aforesaid
Constitutional provision.
ESTRELLA V. COMELEC
Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a
mayoralty race in May 14, 2001 elections. His
opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional
Trial Court (RTC) an election protest which
consequently annulled Salvador‘s proclamation and
declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and
eventually issued writ of execution. While Salvador
filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second
Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of
Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante
Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion
voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another
Commissioner to substitute him. The Second
Division, with the new judge, affirmed
with modifications the RTC decision and
declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor. Salvador
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
elevated to the COMELEC En Banc, in which this
time, Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of
Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC
En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he may
not participate in the Division deliberations, he will
vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC
En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
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ISSUE:
Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited
himself in Division deliberations may participate in
its En Banc deliberation.
HELD:
The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003
issued by the COMELEC En Banc is nullified.
Commissioner Lantion‘s voluntary
piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced.
Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a
Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with
reservation. To allow him to participate in the
En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited
himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory
justification, not only judicially unethical
but legally improper and absurd. Since
Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote
in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving
three (3) members concurring therewith, the
necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the
members of the COMELEC was not attained. The
order thus failed to comply with the number of votes
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or
order.
ACENA V. CSC
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution
of the Civil Service Commission which set aside the
order of the Merit Systems Protection Board
declaring the herein petitioner as the legitimate
Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological
Colleges. Acena was assigned as Admin. Officer by
then President of Rizal Technological Colleges and
was subsequently promoted as Associate Professor
on temporary status pending his compliance to obtain
a Master’s Degree while assuming the position of
Acting Admin Officer at the same time. The Board
of Trustees designated Ricardo Salvador as Acting
Admin Officer and pursuant to the same, the new
College President Dr. Estolas revoked the
designation of the petitioner as acting Admin Officer.
Petitioner sent a letter to the CSC stating his desire to
keep his appointment as Admin Officer instead of
Associate Professor. Thus the latter’s appointment
was withdrawn. He also filed a complaint for
injunction of damages to Dr. Estolas assailing the
validity of his dismissal from his position as violation
of security of tenure. He filed another complaint for
illegal termination against Dr. Estolas before the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The CSC
opined that Acena is still the Admin Officer since his
appointment as Asso. Prof. was withdrawn. Dr.
Estolas filed petition for review to the Office of the
President. The Presidential Staff Director referred
the complaint back to the CSC. In the dispositive
portion of its resolution, the CSC finds the action of
Dr. Estolas valid and set aside the previous opinion
made by the CSC and the order of the MSPB. The
petitioner files a petition for certiorari against the
CSC decision on jurisdictional issue.
ISSUE: WON the CSC acted in grave abuse of
discretion.
RULING: The court held that respondent Estolas
filed a petition for review beyond the prescriptive
period of 15 days where the decision of the MSPB
can be made appealable with the CSC. Beyond this
reglementary period, the decision of the MSPB
renders to be final and executory. The petition was
also filed at the wrong forum (to the office of the
Pres.) The court finds the CSC to have an excess of
jurisdiction of entertaining the petition and made a
reversible error of setting aside the MSPB order
which has long become final and executory. The
court granted the petition of the petitioner while
setting aside the decision of the CSC.
VITAL-GOZON V. CA
FACTS:
President Aquino reorganized the various offices of
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the Ministry of Health. Dr. de la Fuente was demoted
but the CSC declared the transfer from Chief of
Clinics to Medical Specialists II as illegal.
Three months elapsed without any word from Dr.
Vital-Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or any
indication whatever that the CSC Resolution would
be obeyed. Dr. de la Fuente, apprehensive that the
funds to cover the salaries and allowances otherwise
due him would revert to the General Fund, asked the
CSC to enforce its judgment. He was however "told
to file in court a petition for mandamus because of
the belief that the Commission had no coercive
powers — unlike a court — to enforce its final
decisions/resolutions.
Respondent court denied it on the ground that the
"petitions (for mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is
the Court the forum for . . . (said) claim of damages."
De la Fuente sought reconsideration, contending that
the Appellate Court had competence to award
damages in a mandamus action. He argued that while
such a claim for damages might not have been proper
in a mandamus proceeding in the Appellate Court
"before the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because the
CA had authority to issue such writs only 'in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction,'" the situation was changed
by said BP 129 in virtue of which three levels of
courts — the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial
Court, and the Court of Appeals — were conferred
concurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs,
and the CA was given power to conduct hearings and
receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To require
him to separately litigate the matter of damages he
continued, would lead to that multiplicity of suits
which is abhorred by the law.
On the other hand, in an attempt to nullify the adverse
dispositions of the Court of Appeals — and obtain
"the ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing
respondent de la Fuente's claim for damages" — the
Solicitor General's Office had instituted the special
civil action of certiorari at bar. It contends that the
CA is not legally competent to take cognizance of
and decide the question of damages in a mandamus
suit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus
against a public officer, to take cognizance of the
matter of damages sought to be recovered from the
defendant officer.
2. Whether or not the Solicitor General may represent
the defendant public officer in the mandamus suit, in
so far as the claim for damages is concerned.
HELD:
1. No. The Solicitor General's Office correctly
identifies Section 9, B.P. 129 as the legal provision
specifying the original and appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals. The section pertinently
declares that the "Intermediate Appellate Court (now
the Court of Appeals) shall exercise . .," among
others: Original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction .
Section 19, governing the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases,
contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral
and exemplary damages," and indeed does not use
the word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that
said courts have power to try and decide claims for
moral, exemplary and other classes of damages
accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases
falling within their specified jurisdiction.
2. No. As laid down in the Urbano and Co cases:
(T)he Office of the Solicitor General is not
authorized to represent a public official at any stage
of a criminal case.
This observation should apply as well to a public
official who is haled to court on a civil suit for
damages arising from a felony allegedly committed
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by him (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Any
pecuniary liability he may be held to account for on
the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account.
The State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the
Office of the Solicitor General likewise has no
authority to represent him in such a civil suit for
damages.
It being quite evident that Dr. Vital- Gozon is not
here charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for
damages arising from a crime, there is no legal
obstacle to her being represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
FILIPINAS ENGINERRING V. FERRER
FACTS:
COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the
manufacture and supply of voting booths. However,
the losing bidder, petitioner in the instant case,
Filipinas Engineering filed an Injunction suit against
COMELEC and Acme. The lower court denied the
writ prayed for.
Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over
the case which the court granted. Filipinas' motion
for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this appeal for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the
COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising
from its invitation to bid; and
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a
cause of action under the premises against the
COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin
them from complying with their contract.
RULING:
It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review
on certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and
enforcement of election laws.
The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in
favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions but merely as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of
elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a "final order" reviewable
by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-
judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by
the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and
exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie
from such order. Any question arising from said
order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action
before the trial courts.
What is contemplated by the term "final orders,
rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable
by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by
law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by
the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers
REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.
1-95 May 16, 1995
(REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1-91)
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL
MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL
MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of
Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders of the Court
of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies.
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1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission,
Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board,
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration,
Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions
Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic
Energy Commission, Board of Investments, and
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.
2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not
apply to judgments or final orders issued under the
Labor Code of the Philippines.
3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these
rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the
period and in the manner herein provided, whether
the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law.
4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the
date of its last publication, if publication is required
by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration
filed in accordance with the governing law of the
court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper
motion and the payment of the full a mount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional
period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file
the petition for review. No further extension shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.
5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken
by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7)
legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof
of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and
on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the
petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be
indicated as such by the petitioner.
Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner
shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and
deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption
from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and
the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of
Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the
grounds relied upon. If the Court of Appeals denies
the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and
other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the denial.
6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition
for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties
to the case, without impleading the courts or agencies
either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a
concise statement of the facts and issues involved
and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original
or certified true copy of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from, together with
certified true copies of such material portions of the
record as are referred to therein and other supporting
papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates
showing that it was filed within the reglementary
period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as required in
Revised Circular No. 28-91.
7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
REQUIREMENTS. — The failure of the petitioner to
comply with the foregoing requirements regarding
the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the
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deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and
the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds
for the dismissal thereof.
8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of
Appeals may require the respondent to file a
comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss,
within ten (10) days from notice. The Court,
however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same
to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly
for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.
9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment
shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in
seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly
legible certified true copies of such material portions
of the record referred to therein together with other
supporting papers. It shall point out insufficiencies or
inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and
issues, and state the reasons why the petition should
be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be
served on the petitioner, and proof of such service
shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.
10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the
comment or such other pleadings or documents as
may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals
or upon the expiration of period for the filing thereof,
and on the bases of the petition or the record the
Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the court or
agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or
law that would warrant reversal or modification of
the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought
to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition;
otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of
fact of the court or agency concerned, when
supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding
on the Court of Appeals.
11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen
(15) days from notice that the petition has been given
due course, the Court of Appeals may re-quire the
court or agency concerned to transmit the original or
a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the
proceeding under review. The record to be
transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all
parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may
require or permit subsequent correction of or
addition to the record.
12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not
stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals
shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may
deem just.
13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the
petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals
may set the case for oral argument or require the
parties to submit memoranda within a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be
deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the
last pleading or memorandum required by these rules
or by the Court itself.
14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions
for certiorari against the Civil Service Commission
and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed
and pending in the Supreme Court prior to the
effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular
shall be treated as petitions for review hereunder and
shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate disposition. Petitions
for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which
may be filed after the effectivity hereof and up to
June 30, 1995 shall likewise be considered as
petitions for review and shall be referred to the Court
of Appeals for the same purpose.
In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal
contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date of receipt
by the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus
transferred or referred to it shall be considered as the
date of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and
the Court of Appeals may require the filing of
amended or supplemental pleadings and the
submission of such further documents or records as
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it may deem necessary in view of and consequent to
the change in the mode of appellate review.

15. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Rules 43 and 44 of

the Rules of Court are hereby repealed and
superseded by this Circular.

16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be

published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995.

May 16, 1995.