People vs Purisima (1978)

Summary Cases:

 People vs. Purisima 86 SCRA 542

Subject : Right of the accused to be to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him; Repeal by implica tion not favored; Element s of the offense punished under Par 3, Presidential
Decree No. 9; Statutory construction: the intent of the law prevails over the strict adherence to the letter
of the law; Resort to Preamble or Whereas clause in order to discover legislative intent; The result or
effects of the presidential decre e must be within its reason or intent; It is presumed that undesirabl e
consequences are never intended by a legislative measure; Penal statutes are to be construed strictly
against the state and liberally in favor of an accused; The Informations are fatally defective; Remedy
against order of court sustaining a motion to quash the Information;

Facts:

These twenty -six (26) conso lidat ed Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Phili ppine s are
directed against three Courts of First Instance, presided by Hon. Purisima, Hon. Maceren, and Hon. Polo.

Before these courts were filed Informations charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of
deadly weapo n" in violatio n of Paragra ph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 9 issued by (then) President
Marcos, to wit:

"3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as 'fan
knife,' 'spear,' 'dagger,' 'bolo,' 'balisong,' 'barong,' 'kris,' or club, except where such articles are
bein g used as nece ssar y tools or impl emen ts to earn a live liho od and whil e bein g used in
connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

The weapons described in the different Informations consisted of (a) a carving knife with a blade of 6-1/2
inches and a wooden handle, (b) an ice pick with an overall length of about 8 1/2 inches, and (c) a
socya tan. In the Informatio ns, the accus ed was charg ed of carryi ng the said items “outside of his
residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessa ry to earn his livelihood nor
being used in connection therewith.”

However, on a motion to quash filed by the various accused, the three Judges repsectively issued an
Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on the common ground that the Information did not
allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state
one essential element of the crime, i.e., “that the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed,
pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion,
insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder .”

In the present petition assailing the said Orders, the main argument advanced by the government is that
a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive
activities, that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.

Held:

Right of the accused to be to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of
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the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia, state the
designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare
his defense accordingly.

2. To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned in the charge.
In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these
cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is
the subject of another penal statute (Section 26 of Act No. 1780) and a Manila city ordinance (Ordinance

No. 3820).

3. Thus, what arises is a situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police
officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the penal statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree.
That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts
constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy
pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action

Repeal by implication not favored

4. The cour t does not agre e with petiti oner that the abov e-me ntio ned penal statute and the city
ordinance are deemed repealed by Presidentia l Decree No. 9 . PD No. 9 par (3) does not contain any
repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. This principle holds true with
greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state
and liber ally in favor of the accuse d. In fact, Articl e 7 of the New Civil Cod e provides that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse,
or custom or practice to the contrary.

Elements of the offense punished under Par 3, Presidential Decree No. 9

5. The offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act
of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

6. It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of
the scope of the penal statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of
carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What
makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree (PD No. 9) is the motivation behind it.
Without that motivation, the act f alls within the purview of the city ordinance or the penal statute when
the circumstances so warrant.

Statutory construction: the intent of the law prevails over the strict adherence to the letter of the
law

7. That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise
from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the
true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be
construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.

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8. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, a presidential decree in these cases, the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislati ve intent is the
controlling factor , for in the word s of thi s Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo , per Mr. Justi ce Claudio
Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.”

9. The court resorted to ceratin aids to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3):

(a) the preamble or "whereas" clauses which enumera te the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein

(b) the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.

Resort to Preamble or Whereas clause in order to discover legislative intent

10. The events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. are spelled out in the "Whereas"
clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to
Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, and public disorder mentioned in
Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly
weapons.

11. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or "whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

12. While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself
ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which
otherwise does not exist.

13. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in
the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus,
an apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions.
[see Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. The City of Cebu]

The result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent

14. The acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no
relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. It follows that it is only that act of
carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted
desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.

15. Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the
statute should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose.
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quash.

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