Art.

8
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.

The decisions referred to are those enunciated by the Supreme Court, which the court of last resort.
Decisions of subordinate or lower courts are only persuasive in nature, and can have no mandatory effect.
However, this rule doesn’t militate against the fact that a conclusion or pronouncement of the Court of Appeals covers a point of
law still undecided in the Philippines may still serve as a Judicial Guide to the inferior courts. In addition, it can even be possible that
such conclusion can be raised to the status of doctrine after it has been subjected to test.

A final judgement “ratio decidendi” should be distinguished from the opinion which states the reasons for such judgement. (Contreras, et al. v
Felix et al)
As according to the 1987 Philippine Constitution “No decision shall be rendered by any courts without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.” “No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused or
denied without stating the legal basis therefor.”
No provision of the Constitution is violated when the Supreme Court denies a petition for review by the issuance of mere resolution.
The “resolutions” are not “decisions” w/n the constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for a review should not be
entertained in view of the provisions of the Rules of Court.

A. Jurisprudence
1. Stare decisis
It came from the latin word “sto” w/c means to be quiet and “decisum” settled things.
It is a latin maxim that conveys the idea of some court to abide to decided cases.
Doctrine that obligates court to look to precedent (past decisions) when making decisions.
Court looks to past similar issues to guide their decisions.
The rule of precedent.
No matter how long a doctrine may be if found to be contrary to law, it must be abandoned.
The principle of stare decisis should not apply when there is a conflict between the precedent and the law.

Additional note:
Stare decisis differ from Res adjudicata. The former related to law; the latter to fact.
Res adjudicate
The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a
subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
 Stare decisis
The principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached
in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.
Cases:
Negros Navigation April of 1980 - Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from
Co. vs CA the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets for his
wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to
attend a family reunion.
April 22, 1980 – Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro,
with the M/T Tacloban City- an oil tanker owned by the Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). Thus, the DON Juan sank.
Private respondents filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation (PNOC/STC).
They are seeking damages for the death of
*Victoria Miranda
* Rosario V. Miranda
*Ramon V. Miranda, Jr.,
*Elfreda de la Victoria
The petitioner, denied that the four relatives of private
respondents boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their
bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further averred that the
Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and competent
crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the
crew of the M/T Tacloban City.
HELD:
In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise th
extraordinary diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers,
trial court and the appellate court relied on the findings of this Cou
Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brough
death of other passengers.
Petitioner criticizes the lower court's reliance on the Mecenas case
that, although this case arose out of the same incident as that invo
Mecenas, the parties are different and trial was conducted separa
Petitioner contends that the decision in this case should be based
allegations and defenses pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, i
on the record of this case.
The contention is without merit. What petitioner contends may be
with respect to the merits of the individual claims against petition
not as to the cause of the sinking of its ship on April 22, 1980 and
liability for such accident, of which there can only be one truth.
Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Court's policy o
maintaining stability in jurisprudence in accordance with the lega
"stare decisis et non quieta movere" (Follow past precedents and
disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case, the same qu
relating to the same event have been put forward by parties simi
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a compete

January 20, 1986- the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co.,
Inc. entered into a compromise agreement whereby petitioner
assumed full responsibility for the payment and satisfaction of all
claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and
releasing the PNOC and the PNOC/STC from any liability to it.
Private respondents did not join the agreement.
RTC - in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering all the defendants to pay
jointly and severally to the plaintiffs damages.
CA- the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court with modification.
ISSUE:
Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the
crew members of petitioner to be grossly negligent in the
performance of their duties, is binding in this case.
The rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the sam
In Woulfe v. Associated Realties Corporation- the Supreme Court o
Jersey held that where substantially similar cases to the pending ca
presented and applicable principles declared in prior decisions, the
was bound by the principle of stare decisis.
State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gill- it was held that under the doctrine of
decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the
proceeding and not bound by the judgment under the res judicat
doctrine.
The Philadelphia court expressed itself in this wise: "Stare decisis s
declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in on
should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substanti
same, even though the parties may be different."
Thus, in J.M. Tuason v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its rulin
other cases involving different parties in sustaining the validity of a
on the principle of "stare decisis et non quieta movere."
Nor is it true that the trial court merely based its decision on the M
case.
The trial court made its own independent findings on the basis of:
a. the testimonies of witnesses such as Senior Third Mate Rog
Vera, who incidentally gave substantially the same testimo
petitioner's behalf before the Board of Marine Inquiry.
The trial court agreed with the conclusions of the then Minister o
Defense finding both vessels to be negligent.
In Mecenas, this Court found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1) a
tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong d
voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in all
ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed to carry. Petition
therefore, clearly liable for damages to the full extent.

Umali vs Judical This Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Council Rules of Court filed directly with this Court by herein petitioner
Rep. Reynaldo V. Umali, current Chair of the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, impugns the present-day
practice of six-month rotational representation of Congress in the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for it unfairly deprives both Houses of
Congress of their full participation in the said body.
As an overview, in Chavez, the constitutionality of the practice of
having two representatives from both houses of Congress with
one vote each in the JBC(Judicial and Bar Council), thus,
increasing its membership from seven to eight, was challenged.
With that, this Court examined the constitutional provision that
states the composition of the JBC, that is, Section 8(1), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies
respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as
damages because in the Mecenas case, the amount of P307,500.0
awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas couple. Under peti
formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43,857.14, while the De
spouses should receive P97,714.28.
Here is where the principle of stare decisis does not apply in view
differences in the personal circumstances of the victims. For that
differentiation would be justified even if private respondents had
the private respondents in the Mecenas case. The doctrine of star
works as a bar only against issues litigated in a previous case. Wh
issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not p
upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous
not stare decisis of the question presently presented. The decision
Mecenas case relates to damages for which petitioner was liable
claimants in that case.
This Court takes another glance at the arguments in Chavez and co
them with the present arguments of the petitioner. A careful peru
(examine in a very careful way), however, reveals that, although th
petitioner questioned the JBC's adoption of the six-month rotatio
representation of Congress leading to the non-counting of his vot
En Banc deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016, the supporting
arguments hereof still boil down to the proper interpretation of S
8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, being mere
rehash(restatement) of the arguments in Chavez, the application
doctrine of stare decisis in this case is inevitable. More so, the pet
failed to present strong and compelling reason not to rule this cas
same way that this Court ruled Chavez.
As stated in the beginning of this ponencia, stare decisis et non qui
movere is a doctrine which means to adhere to precedents and no
unsettle things which are established. This is embodied in Article 8
Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
SECTION 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
In a Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared the said practice of
having two representatives from Congress with one vote each in
the JBC unconstitutional.
This Court, in a Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared the said
practice of having two representatives from Congress with one
vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. This Court enunciated that
the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of the
Congress" in theafore quoted provision is unequivocal and leaves
no room for any other construction or interpretation.
This Court, quoting the keen observation of Retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is also a JBC
Consultant, stated that the ex officio members of the JBC consist of
representatives from the three main branches of government, to
wit: the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court representing the
judiciary, the Secretary of Justice representing the executive, and a
representative of the Congress representing the legislature. It can
be deduced therefrom that the unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution was to treat each ex officio
member as representing one co-equal branch of government
having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees. Now, to allow
the legislature to have more than one representative in the JBC
would negate the principle of equality among these three branches
of the government, which is enshrined in the Constitution.
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and require
in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Sup
Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be fo
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine is based on
principle that once a question of law has been examined and dec
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. The sa
grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of ju
decisions, thus, time and again, the court has held that it is a very
and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to tha
and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially t
A conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that
the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be deci
The rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the sa
The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that t
has ruled that " [a]bandonment thereof must be based only on st
compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictabi
is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and
public's confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncement
diminished."
Here, the facts are exactly the same as in Chavez, where this Court
already settled the issue of interpretation of Section 8(1), Article V
1987 Constitution. Truly, such ruling may not be unanimous, but it
undoubtedly a reflection of the wisdom of the majority of membe
Court on that matter. Chavez cannot simply be regarded as an err
application of the questioned constitutional provision for it mere
The subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in
a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, where this Court reiterated that
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution providing for "a
representative of the Congress" in the JBC is clear and
unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation.
In light of these Decision and Resolution, both Houses of Congress
agreed on a six-month rotational representation in the JBC,
wherein the House of Representatives will represent Congress
from January to June and the Senate from July to December. This
is now the current practice in the JBC. It is by reason of this
arrangement that the votes cast by the petitioner for the
selection of nominees for the vacancies of then retiring Supreme
Court Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Perez) and Arturo Brion
(Brion) were not counted by the JBC during its En Banc
deliberations held last December 2 and 9, 2016. Instead, the
petitioner's votes were simply placed in an envelope and sealed
subject to any further disposition as this Court may direct in a
proper proceeding. This is the root of the present controversy
that prompted the petitioner to file the instant Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus.
In the same vein, the JBC asseverates (affairms) that this Petition
should also be dismissed as the allegations herein are mere
rehash of the arguments and dissents in Chavez, which have
already been exhaustively litigated and settled therein by this
Court, more in particular, the interpretation of Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, hence, barred by the doctrine of
stare decisis. Similarly, there exists no substantial reason or even
supervening event or material change of circumstances that
warrants Chavez's reversal.
the clear mandate of the law, that is, Congress is entitled to only
representative in the JBC in the same way that its co-equal branch
As this Court declared in Chavez, Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1
Constitution is clear, categorical and unambiguous. Thus, it needs
further construction or interpretation. Time and time again, it has
repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in cl
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, only ap
The wordings of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution a
considered as indicative of the final intent of its Framers, that is, fo
Congress as a whole to only have one representative to sit in the JB
Court, therefore, cannot simply make an assumption that the Fram
merely by oversight failed to take into account the bicameral natur
Congress in drafting the same. As further laid down in Chavez, the
were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional repres
in the JBC as it was not in the exercise of its primary function, wh
legislate. Notably, the JBC was created to support the executive p
appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a
contributory non-legislative function. No parallelism can be drawn
the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Cong
legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under A
of the Constitution
This Court cannot succumb to the argument that Congress, being c
of two distinct and separate chambers, cannot represent each othe
JBC. Again, as this Court explained in Chavez, such an argument is
misplaced because in the JBC, any member of Congress, whether
Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empow
represent the entire Congress.
While it is true that Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitut
not explicitly state that the JBC shall be composed of seven memb
however, the same is implied in the enumeration of who will be t
members thereof. And though it is unnecessary for the JBC compo
 be an odd number as no tie-breaker is needed in the preparation
shortlist since judicial nominees are not decided by a "yes" or "no
still, JBC's membership cannot be increased from seven to eight f
be a clear violation of the aforesaid constitutional provision. To a
another member in the JBC, the remedy is not judicial but constitu
amendment.

In sum, this Court will not overthrow Chavez for it is in accord wit
constitutional mandate of giving Congress "a representative" in t
the same manner, the adoption of the rotational scheme will not in
deprive Congress of its full participation in the JBC for such an arra
is also in line with that constitutional mandate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiora

Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Additional notes:

Casus omissus- an omitted case

Locus standi or legal standing- the right to bring an action, to be heard in court, or to address the Court on a matter before it. Therefore, a party
will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate:

(1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.

The Judicial and Bar Council's (JBC) primary task is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary and the Office of the Ombudsman for the
President's perusal. The council aims to enhance the quality of the search, screening, and selection process, as well as insulate the process from
undue influence of any kind.

En Banc French for "on the bench." The term is used when all judges of a particular court hear a case.
 2. Law of the case

Case Facts: Held

Fulgencio v National Labor Relations
Commissions
On different dates in 1992, the private It is well established that when a right or fact has
respondent served the petitioners with been judicially tried and determined by a court of
uniformly worded notices of termination of
employment. As a result, the petitioners
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
joined other employees in filing three unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the
separate cases of illegal dismissal against the parties and those in privity with them. The dictum
private respondent. therein laid down became the law of the case and
what was once irrevocably established as the
On January 22, 1993, the Labor Arbiter
controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be
rendered judgment dismissing the complaints
binding between the same parties as long as the
for lack of merit.On appeal, the National Labor
facts on which the decision was predicated,
Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the
continue to be the facts of the case before the
labor arbiters findings and ruled as follows:
court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability
of that dictum can no longer be relitigated anew
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby
since said issue had already been resolved and
SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering
finally laid to rest in that aforementioned case
respondent to:
(Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 306 [1986]), if not by the
principle of res judicata, but at least by
1. Immediately reinstate complainants to their
conclusiveness of judgment (Vda. de Sta. Romana v.
former positions without loss of seniority
PCIB 118 SCRA 335 [1982]).
rights and privileges; and

2. Pay them full backwages from the time they

were dismissed up to the time they are
actually reinstated.

After the Labor Arbiter denied the motion for

reconsideration, the private respondent filed
petition.

Section 3, Rule 46 as amended by the

Supreme Court in Bar Matter No. 803 which
took effect on September 1, 1998 provides
 that "In actions filed under Rule 65, the
petition shall further indicate the material
dates showing when notice of the judgment
or final order or resolution subject thereof
was received, when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and when
notice of the denial thereof was received."

We note that the petitioners have failed to

include in their petition the required
explanation on why personal service upon the
respondents was not resorted to pursuant to
Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. Strict compliance
with this rule is mandated. (Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. v. Hon. Helen Bautista-
Ricafort, Et Al., G.R. No. 132007, August 5,
1998).

Additional notes:

We take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general
rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception.

A prima facie case is a legal scenario where the prosecution of a case presented enough evidence to convict the defendant. It is a situation
where the facts and proofs shown to the court have enough merit for a trial to be commenced.

Obiter dictum
A judge's incidental expression of opinion, not essential to the decision and not establishing precedent.
Something that was said in a judgment that is not essential to the decision and which is not binding precedent.
Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana
Realty and Development
Corporation
Petitioner Ayala Corporation (hereinafter referred to
as Ayala) was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located in Makati City with an area of 840 square
meters, more or less and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 233435 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal.
On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy
married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa
Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and
the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and
Deed Restrictions. Among the Special Conditions of
Sale were:
a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit
the building plans to the vendor before September 30,
1976 for the latter’s approval
b) the construction of the building shall start on
or before March 30, 1977 and completed before 1979.
Before such completion, neither the deed of sale shall
be registered nor the title released even if the
purchase price shall have been fully paid.
c) there shall be no resale of the property
Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng, in April 1989, were able to
sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and
Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
Rosa-Diana) with Ayala’s approval.
For Ayala to release the Certificate of Title of the
subject property, Rosa-Diana executed an Undertaking
promising to abide by said special conditions of sale
We see no reason then, how the law of the
case or stare decisis can be held to be
applicable in the case at bench. If at all, the
pronouncement made by the Court of
Appeals that petitioner Ayala is barred from
enforcing the deed of restrictions can only
be considered as obiter dicta.
The additional pronouncement of the Court
of Appeals that Ayala is estopped from
enforcing the deed of restrictions even as it
recognized that this said issue is being tried
before the trial court was not necessary to
dispose of the issue as to the propriety of
the annotation of the lis pendens. A dictum
is an opinion of a judge which does not
embody the resolution or determination of
the court, and made without argument, or
full consideration of the point, not the
proffered deliberate opinion of the judge
himself. It is not necessarily limited to issues
essential to the decision but may also
include expressions of opinion which are not
necessary to support the decision reached
by the court. Mere dicta are not binding
under the doctrine of stare decisis.
While the Court of Appeals did not err in
ruling that the present petition is not barred
by C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled "Ayala
Corporation v. Ray Burton Development
Inc." under the doctrine of res judicata,
neither, however, can the latter case be cited
as precedential under the doctrine of stare
executed between Ayala and the original vendees.
Upon the submission of the Undertaking, together with
the building plans for a condominium project, known as
"The Peak", Ayala released title to the lot, thereby
enabling Rosa-Diana to register the deed of sale in its
favor and obtain Certificate of Title No. 165720 in its
name.
Thereafter, Rosa-Diana submitted to the building
official of Makati another set of building plans for "The
Peak" which were substantially different from those
that it earlier submitted to Ayala for approval. While
the building plans which Rosa-Diana submitted to Ayala
for approval.
During the construction of Rosa-Diana’s condominium
project, Ayala filed an action with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order
against Rosa-Diana Realty seeking to compel the latter
to comply with the contractual obligations under the
deed of restrictions annotated on its title as well as
with the building plans it submitted to the latter. In the
alternative, Ayala prayed for rescission of the sale of
the subject lot to Rosa-Diana Realty.
decisis. It must be pointed out that at the
time the assailed decision was rendered,
C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 was on appeal with
this Court. Significantly, in the decision We
have rendered in Ayala Corporation v. Ray
Burton Development Corporation 12 which
became final and executory on July 5, 1999
we have clearly stated that "An examination
of the decision in the said Rosa-Diana case
reveals that the sole issue raised before the
appellate court was the propriety of the lis
pendens annotation. However, the appellate
court went beyond the sole issue and made
factual findings bereft of any basis in the
record to inappropriately rule that AYALA is
in estopped and has waived its right to
enforce the subject restrictions.

The lower court denied Ayala’s prayer for injunctive

relief, thus enabling Rosa-Diana to complete the
construction of the building.

The Land Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the

ruling of the Register of Deeds saying that an action for
specific performance or rescission may be classified as
a proceeding of any kind in court directly affecting title

Dee v. Harvest All Investment
Limited
to the land or the use or occupation thereof for which
a notice of lis pendens may be held proper.
Harvest All Investment Limited et al. are acting as a
member of Alliance's Board of Directors.
Its Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is held every
June 15. However, in a Special Board of Directors
Meeting held at three (3) o'clock in the afternoon of
May 29, 2015, the Board of Directors, over Hedy S.C.
Yap Chua's objections, passed a Board Resolution
indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015 ASM pending
complete subscription to its Stock Rights Offering (SRO)
consisting of shares with total value of ₱l Billion which
was earlier approved in a Board Resolution passed on
February 17, 2015.
This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file the instant
Complaint (with Application for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction). In
said complaint, Harvest All, et al. principally claimed
that the subscription to the new shares through the
SRO cannot be made a condition precedent to the
exercise by the current stockholders of their right to
vote in the 2015 ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived
of their full voting rights proportionate to their existing
shareholdings.
The Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et
al. with filing fees amounting to ₱8,860.00 which they
paid accordingly. Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed an
Amended Complaint: (a) deleting its prayer to declare
null and void the Board Resolution dated February 17,
2015 approving the SRO; and (b) instead, prayed that
the passages in Lu that "an intra-corporate
controversy always involves a property in
litigation" and that "there can be no case of
intra-corporate controversy where the value
of the subject matter cannot be estimated"
are clearly non-determinative of the
antecedents involved in that case and,
hence, cannot be controlling jurisprudence
to bind our courts when it adjudicates
similar cases upon the principle of stare
decisis. As it is evident, these passages
in Lu only constitute an opinion delivered by
the Court as a "by the way" in relation to a
hypothetical scenario (i.e., if the complaint
was filed during the effectivity of A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC, which it was not) different from
the actual case before it.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, the
Court had the opportunity to define an obiter
dictum and discuss its legal effects as
follows:
An obiter dictum is a remark made, or
opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision
upon a cause by the way, that is, incidentally
or collaterally, and not directly upon the
question before him, or upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of
the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. It does
not embody the resolution or determination
 the Alliance Board be enjoined from implementing and of the court, and is made without argument,
carrying out the SRO prior to and as a condition for the or full consideration of the point. It lacks the
holding of the 2015 ASM. force of an adjudication, being a mere
expression of an opinion with no binding
The RTC Ruling force for purposes of res judicata."
The RTC dismissed the instant complaint for lack of
jurisdiction due to Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay the
correct filing fees.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision the CA reversed the RTC's order of
dismissal and, accordingly, reinstated the case and
remanded the same to the court a quo for further
proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees.
Also citing Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, and Lu, the CA held that the
prevailing rule is that all intra-corporate controversies
always involve a property in litigation. Consequently, it
agreed with the RTC's finding that the basis for the
computation of filing fees should have been the ₱l
Billion value of the SRO and, thus, Harvest All, et
al. should have paid filing fees in the amount of more
or less ₱20 Million and not just ₱5,860.00. However, in
the absence of contrary evidence, the CA held that
Harvest All, et al. were not in bad faith and had no
intention of defrauding the government, as they merely
relied in the assessment of the Clerk of Court. Thus, in
the interest of substantial justice, the CA ordered the
reinstatement of Harvest All, et al.' s complaint and the
remand of the same to the RTC for further proceedings,
provided that they pay the correct filing fees.

Additional Note:
 Obiter Dictum

An encumbrance (also spelled incumbrance) is any right or interest that exists in someone other than the owner of an estate and that restricts
or impairs the transfer of the estate or lowers its value.

Lis pendens the term may refer to any pending lawsuit. (2) A written notice that a lawsuit has been filed concerning real estate, involving either
the title to the property or a claimed ownership interest in it. The notice is usually filed in the county land records office.

Injunctive relief a court-ordered act or prohibition against an act or condition which has been requested, and sometimes granted, in a petition
to the court for an injunction. Such an act is the use of judicial (court) authority to handle a problem and is not a judgment for money. Whether
the relief will be granted is usually argued by both sides in a hearing rather than in a full-scale trial, although sometimes it is part of a lawsuit
for damages and/or contract performance.

1. Ratio decidendi (plural rationes decidendi) is a Latin phrase meaning “the reason for the decision.” Ratio decidendi refers to the legal,
moral, political and social principles on which a court’s decision rests. It is the rationale for reaching the decision of a case. It is binding
on lower courts through the principle of Stare decisis. Ratio decidendi is a helpful tool for a lawyer.

Ratio is a ruling on a point of law and the decision on a point of law depends on facts of a case. Culling out ratio from a judgment is difficult. A
thorough reading of an entire judgment is required to identify a ratio. Ration decidendi can be determined or identified in the following ways:

 By distinguishing material facts from unimportant facts.

 By discovering the precedents applied to identify the court’s approach.
 By restricting analysis to the majority opinions.
 By reading out subsequent decisions and considering it at several levels.

Art. 9
No judge or court shall decline to render judgement by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficient of the laws.
1. Dura lex sed lex
“The law is harsh but that is the law”
The first duty of the judge is to apply the law without fear or favor, to follow its mandate, not to temper with it.
What the law grants the court cannot deny.
 If some laws are unwise and detrimental, proper representations may be made to Congress.
People vs Veneracion
That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together with one alias "LANDO" and other persons whose
true names, identifies and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, with treachery, taking
advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity, and
ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by
taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a warehouse,
covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head
with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y
LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the
latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said
ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY, a.k.a. "LANDO" and others, caused
her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death
immediately thereafter.
The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided over by
respondent Judge.
Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday
who was already dead, (allegedly shot by police escorts
after attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1
D. Vidad on August 12, 1994), pleaded "Not Guilty."
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after
weighing the evidence of the prosecution
and the defendant at trial found the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Rape with Homicide.
The law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime for which
respondent judge found the accused guilty
was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by
its provisions.
We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings
in imposing the death sentence because of
his religious convictions. While this Court
sympathizes with his predicament, it is its
bounden duty to emphasize that a court of
law is no place for a protracted debate on
the morality or propriety of the sentence,
where the law itself provides for the
sentence of death as a penalty in specific
and well-defined instances. The discomfort
faced by those forced by law to impose the
death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a
matter upon which judges have no choice.
Courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
efficacy or morality of laws. In People
vs. Limaco we held that:
Today there are quite a number of people
who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or
ineffective. However, as long as that penalty
remains in the statute books, and as long as
our criminal law provides for its imposition
in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law
regardless of their private opinions. It is a
well settled rule that the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. The only function of the
judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not
in disharmony with the Constitution, to
apply them. And for the guidance of the
members of the judiciary we feel it
incumbent upon us to state that while they
as citizens or as judges may regard a certain
law as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and
may recommend to the authority or
department concerned, its amendment,
modification, or repeal, still, as long as said
law is in force, they must apply it and give it
effect as decreed by the law-making body.
Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that
after an adjudication of guilt, the judge
should impose "the proper penalty and civil
liability provided for by the law on the
accused."This is not a case of a magistrate
ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a
judge, fully aware of the appropriate
provisions of the law, refuses to impose a
penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing,
respondent judge acted without or in excess
of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of jurisdiction
in imposing the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the
penalty of Death.
 2. Effects of the silence of the law, & Obscurity or insufficient of law

A judge must give a decision, whether he knows what law to apply or not. Thus, even if a judge does not know the rules of
cockfighting, he must still decide the case. (Chua v. Bernas).

Under the old civil code – When there is no law exactly applicable to the point in controversy, the custom of the place shall be applied, and in
default, the general principles of law. (Art 6. Par. 2 old civil code).

IF THE LAW BE SILENT, OBSCURE OR INSUFFICIENT, WHAT SHOULD THE JUDGE APPLY IN DECIDING A CASE?

NOTE: The judge may apply any rule he desires as long as the rule chosen is in harmony with general interest, order morals, and public policy.
Rules may be the ff:

1. Customs that are not contrary to law, public order, & public policy. (Art. 11, Civil Code)
2. Decisions of foreign and local courts on similar cases.
3. Opinions of highly qualified writers and professors.
4. Rules of statutory construction.
5. laid down in analogous instances. (Cerrano v tan chuco, 38 Phil. 392).

Thus, it has been said that were the law governing particular matter is silent on a question at issue, the provisions of another law governing
another matter may be applied where the underlying principle or reason is the same “Ubi cadem ratio ibi eadem disposito”

Courts cannot legislate – The legislator recognizes that, the court in the language of Justice Holmes, “do and must legislate” to fill the gaps in the
law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings is finite and therefore cannot envisage (envision) all possible cases to which the law
may apply.
Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.

The judges are confined from molar to molecular motions.

a. General principles of the natural moral law, human law and equity.
b. Respect for human dignity and personality.

3. Judicial Aids
a. Does Art. 9 apply to criminal cases?
 Yes, an offense is not a crime unless prohibited and punished by the law.
(“Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege” -There is no penalty in the absence of law)
Nevertheless, if somebody is accused of a non-existent crime, the judge must DISMISS the case.
An equivalent to a judicial acquittal.

4. Customs
rule of human action or it is a conduct established by repeated acts, and practiced as a rule of a society thru the implicit approval
of the lawmakers, and which is therefore generally obligatory and legally binding.
A usage or practice of the people, which, by common adoption and acquiescence. and by long and unvarying habit, has become
compulsory, and has acquired the force of a law with respect to the place.

DISTINCTION OF “LAW” FROM “CUSTOMS”

Ordinary law
Written, consciously made and enacted by Congress.
It is cognizance by local laws.
Custom
Is unwritten, spontaneous, and as a source of right.

KINDS OF CUSTOM

A general custom is that of a country; a “custom of the place” is one that transpires.
NOTE: A general custom it is in conflict with the local yields to the latter. However, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a general custom is
presumed to be also the “custom of the place.”

Custom Propter legem - in accordance with the law. ; Custom Contra legem – unnecessary to apply because it only repeats the law. Thus, it is
wrong to apply the second. ; Custom extra legem – may constitute(establish or creat) the sources of supplementary law, in default of specific
legislation on the matter.

REQUISITES BEFORE THE COURTS CAN CONSIDER CUSTOMS:

1. Custom must prove as a fact, accdg. to the rules of evidence; otherwise, custom cannot be considered as a source of right.
2. Custom must not be contrary to the law.
Igorot custom which is contrary to law is not applicable or be invoked.
3. There must be a number of repeated acts, wherein the repeated acts must have been uniformly performed.
 4. There must be a juridical intention (convictio juris seu necessitates) to make a rule of social conduct.- There must be a conviction in the
community that it is the proper way of acting, and that, therefore, a person who disregards the custom in fact also disregards the law.
5. There must be sufficient lapse of time- not require by custom, but it gives evidence of the fact that indeed it exists and is being duly
observed.

Art. 10
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

Ursua vs. CA Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as
Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned he reasserts his innocence.
in Kidapawan, Cotabato.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the
May 9,1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the
requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have
to conduct an investigation on a complaint for brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of
bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of
unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which
officials of the Department of Environment and petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then
Natural Resources. that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There
is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending
August 1, 1989 - Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for to use that name as his second name in addition to his real
petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by
Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not
the complaint against petitioner. He then asked his even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even
client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the
of the Ombudsman because his law firm's Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of
messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
personal matters. Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint
was part of public records hence open to inspection and
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the
security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. “ Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be
Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a
proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of mind and the statute should be construed with reference
Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
copy of the complaint, receipt of which he literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.”
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was
greeted by Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the
same officeWhen Loida learned that the person who
introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually
petitioner Cesario Ursua, Loida reported the matter
to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that
petitioner be accordingly charged.
December 18, 1990- petitioner without leave of
court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the
failure of the prosecution to prove that his
supposed alias was different from his registered
name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause.
Petitioner argued that no document from the local
civil registry was presented to show the registered
name of accused which according to him was a
condition sine qua non for the validity of his
conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found
him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085.

May 31, 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the

conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by
imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as
minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine
of P5,000.00.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic
events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was
registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That
persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of
this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority
for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set
forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his
pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no
person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

1. Legislative intent
a. In case of doubt
the judge should presume that “the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail”
“the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life”
-Judicial conclusions inconsistent with the spirit of a law must be avoided.

In the case of Feria v Commission on Election – No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless much less inutile. “We must therefore
as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. If a statute would be construed the most dominant in that process is the
purpose of the Act.”