165.
People of the Philippines V Wong Chuen Ming
GR No. 112801-11
Facts:
 Appellants together with several others, were
charged with unlawfully transporting into the
country Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
"shabu." informations were filed against all of the
accused individually, setting forth similar allegations.
 After passing through and obtaining clearance from
immigration officers at the NAIA, the tour group
went to the baggage claim area to retrieve their
respective checked-in baggage. While checking their
baggage the inspection officer became suspicious
and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter.
Inside the box was a plastic bag containing white
crystalline substance.
 When appellant’s were apprehended, they were
asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and
after having identified them, they were again made
to sign on the plastic bags containing white
crystalline substance inside the boxes bearing their
signatures.
Issue:
 Whether or not the court erred in not excluding the
inadmissible evidence obtained in violation of
appellant’s Miranda rights.
Held:
 Yes
 The Court holds that the signatures of accused on the
boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing
"shabu," are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study
of the records reveals that accused were never
informed of their fundamental rights during the
entire time that they were under investigation.
Specifically, Accused were not informed of their
Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain
silent and to counsel and any statement they might
make could be used against them, when they were
made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen
Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on
the plastic bags when they were already taken in
custody at Camp Crame. By affixing their signatures
on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic
bags, Accused in.effect made a tacit admission of the
crime charged for mere possession of "shabu" is
punished by law. These signatures of accused are
tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial
confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of
Rights (Section 12 [1][3], Article III, 1987
Constitution). They are, therefore, inadmissible as
evidence for any admission wrung from the accused
in violation of their constitutional rights is
inadmissible against them.
166. People of the Philippines V Armando De Lara
GR No. 94953 September 5, 1994
Facts:
 A surveillance team was conducted based on the
information that there was a rampant selling of
illegal drugs in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora
Streets at Sta. Ana, Manila.
 A buy-bust operation was conducted thereafter
where accused-appellant was apprehended. During
the investigation, appellant was apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the
assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked to
give a written statement, he refused to do so
pending arrival of his lawyer.
Issue:
 Whether or not the evidence obtained against
accused-appellant is inadmissible.
Held:
 Yes.
 The Court finds to be meritorious appellant’s claim
that he was not assisted by counsel during the
custodial investigation, specifically when he was
forced to sign the photocopy of the marked twenty-
peso bill (Exh. "E"), Receipt of Property Seized (Exh.
"F"), and the Booking and Information Sheet (Exh.
"H"). The said documents are inadmissible in
evidence for the reason that there was no showing
that appellant was then assisted by counsel nor his
waiver thereto put into writing (Constitution, Art. III,
Sec. 3 [2]). Be that as it may, the rejection of said
evidence would not affect the conviction of appellant
in view of the abundance of other evidence
establishing his guilt.
167. People of the Philippines V Ernesto Luvendino
GR No. 69971 July 3, 1992
Facts:
 Accused-appellant was convicted for rape with
murder. When he was apprehended by the police
authorities he confessed to them of what transpired
on the night they committed the crime.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting and
giving credence to the evidence of re-enactment and
admission of guilt, both of which were uncounseled
Held:
 No.
 The Court finds that the statements in People v
Burgos are not intended to establish a rigid and
automatic rule that the subsequent presence of and
assistance by counsel of the accused prior to and
during the subscribing under oath of an extrajudicial
confession and an accompanying waiver of right to
counsel, cannot have any legal effect at all. For one
thing, under the factual circumstances of People v.
Burgos — where the trial court believed the
statements of the accused that he had been
"exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence
and third degree measures" and where the
investigating officer was not presented as a witness
by the prosecution — the above statements were
clearly appropriate. In the case at bar, Police Sgt.
Galang who had interrogated Luvendino at the police
station was, as already pointed out, presented as a
witness by the prosecution and had testified in
extenso, that Luvendino had been informed by him
(Police Sgt. Galang) of his constitutional rights, that
Luvendino had waived his rights voluntarily and
intelligently, being convinced that he did not need the
assistance of a lawyer and could, by himself, clarify
what had taken place. Moreover, Luvendino in the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal in Pasig, had initially
been assisted by a Citizens Legal Aid Office (CLAO)
lawyer. But he at that time nonetheless declined to
swear to Exhibit "L" and later, together with his
mother, insisted that he be allowed to retain a lawyer
of their own choice, which request was honored.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the trial
court in the instant case did not accord any credence
to Luvendino’s claim that he had been physically
beaten up by the police officers at the Taguig police
station. In the afternoon of the same day, Luvendino
had every opportunity in the presence of his mother
and his own chosen counsel, Atty. Eustacio Flores, to
denounce to the Provincial Fiscal at the latter’s office
any maltreatment that the police officers might have
 earlier in the day administered to him, to abjure the
extrajudicial confession or the waiver of his right to
counsel there incorporated as non-voluntary or non-
intelligent and to refuse to sign once more under
oath his "Salaysay." He did not do so; Atty. Flores did
not do so either then and there or when he testified
as a defense witness. Their failure to do so deprives
his contention before this Court of any real force.
Luvendino may be deemed to have in effect ratified,
before the Fiscal and with the aid of counsel, the
extrajudicial confession and waiver of the right to
counsel which he had earlier signed without the
presence of counsel in the police station.
168. People of the Philippines V Carlito Linsangan
GR No. 88589 April 16, 1991
Facts:
 Accused-appellant was apprehended after a buy-bust
operation was conducted. The officer frisked
Linsangan and retrieved the marked ten-peso bills
(Exhs. A-1 and A-2) tucked in his waist. He asked the
appellant to sign his name on the two P10 bills.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court erred in not holding
that when the policemen required him to initial the
P10-bills, they violated his constitutional right to
counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate
himself while under custodial investigation.
Held:
 No.
 The appellant was not denied due process during the
custodial investigation. Although he was not assisted
by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the
police found tucked in his waist, his right against self-
incrimination was not violated for his possession of
the marked bills did not constitute a crime; the
subject of the prosecution was his act of selling
marijuana cigarettes (People v. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47;
People v. Macuto, 176 SCRA 762; Mejia v. Pamaran,
160 SCRA 457). His conviction was not based on the
presence of his initials on the P10 bills, but on the fact
that the trial court believed the testimony of the
policemen that they arrested him while he was
actually engaged in selling marijuana cigarettes to a
member of the arresting party. The trial court gave
more credence to their categorical declarations than
to the appellant’s denials (People v. Tan, 145 SCRA
614). That is as it should be for as law enforcers, they
are presumed to have performed their official duties
in a regular manner (People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA
521; People v. Ale, 145 SCRA 50). Their task of
apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug
trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural
technicalities to make it doubly so.
169. Juan Ponce Enrile V Jaime Salazar
GR No. 92163 June 5, 1990
Facts:
 Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement of the National Bureau
of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued
by Hon. Jaime Salazar. The warrant was issued on the
information signed and earlier that day filed by a
panel of prosecutors charging Senator Enrile with the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the
period of the failed coup attempt. Senator Enrile was
taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters,
without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The
following morning, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal where he was given over to the custody of
the Superintendent of the Northern Police District
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his
constitutional rights in being denied his right to bail.
Held:
 Yes.
 Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right
to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and
of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as
charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be
accepted as a correct proposition.
170. Jose Comendador V Renato De Villa
GR No. 93177 August 2, 1991
Facts:
 Petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in a failed coup de’tat.
 Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail which was
subsequently denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon
filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial
Court which granted his liberty.
Issue:
 Whether or not Section 13, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution covers personnel from the Armed
Forces.
Held:
 No.
 The Court find that the right to bail invoked by the
private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available
in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was
suggested in Arula, where we observed that the right
to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military where the right to bail does not exist.
171. Alicia Baylon V Deodoro Sison
AM No. 92-7-360-0 April 6, 1995
Facts:
 Respondent Judge Deodoro J. Sison stands charged
with the now familiar malfeasance of granting bail in
a non-bailable offense of double murder without
benefit of notice and hearing. Specifically, it is
averred that the prosecution was not given notice of
at least three days before the scheduled hearing on
the petition for bail, in violation of the mandate
under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court and,
worse, with two non-working days between the filing
and the hearing of the petition. It is likewise
contended that during the controverted hearing, the
prosecution, which was not even duly represented,
was not given the opportunity to prove that the
evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.
Issue:
 Whether or not respondent judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion in granting the petition for bail.
Held:
 Yes.
 The Court rejects the tenuous proposition that time
was of the essence, since the ambient circumstances
obtaining prior to the grant of bail could not but,
have cautioned respondent judge to be more
circumspect in entertaining and resolving the
petition therefore. First, the accused were charged
 with double murder, each of which is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death, hence bail is not a
matter of right. Second, no bail was recommended in
the information which was filed on the bases of the
sworn statements of several eyewitnesses to the
incident, thus constituting clear and strong evidence
of the guilt of all the accused. Third, at the time of
the application for bail, there was still pending a
reinvestigation of the case being conducted by the
Office of the City Prosecutor. It must be noted that
the reinvestigation was at the instance of the
accused themselves, hence any resultant delay
caused by the conduct thereof is naturally and
logically attributable to them. And, finally, the
guileful setting of the hearing of the petition for bail
on December 23, 1991, when the same was filed only
on December 21, 1991 which was a Saturday, readily
casts doubt on the good faith in and the regularity of
the procedure adopted by the defense. The
prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to
present evidence because by the very nature of
deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such
evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is
strong. On the basis of the foregoing considerations
alone, and even without the further elaboration
correctly advanced by complainant in representation
of her office, we find no cogent reason whatsoever
to justify respondent’s alacrity in ordering the
immediate release of the accused despite their
somewhat extended confinement and, much less,
could respondent’s pretensions validly support a
grant of bail. –judges MUST always first conduct
hearings before granting the motion to bail to
determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong.
172. Reymualdo Buzon V Tirso Velasco
AM No. RTJ-94-1209 February 13, 1994
Facts:
 Petitioner charged respondent judge with gross
ignorance of the law and alleged illegal acts and/or
irregularity in granting bail to the accused in a
murder case amounting to gross partiality.
Issue:
 Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting bail to an accused
with the crime of murder.
 Yes
 The Court emphasized the extreme necessity of
conducting hearings in applications for bail,
especially in capital offenses. It is a rule of long
standing that bail is not a matter of right in cases
involving capital offenses or where the offense for
which the accused stands charged is punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong. It is true that the weight of the evidence
adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. However, such discretion may be exercised
only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree
of guilt of the accused for the purpose of determining
whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty. At the hearing, the court should assure that
the prosecution is afforded the opportunity to adduce
evidence relevant to the factual issue, with the
applicant the having the right of cross-examination
and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. In the
case at bench, however, no formal hearing was
conducted by respondent judge. He could not have
assessed the weight of the evidence against accused
before granting the latter’s application for bail.
173. Inocencio Basco V Leo Rapatalo
AM No. RTJ-96-1335 March 5, 1997
Facts:
 In a sworn letter-complaint, complainant Inocencio
Basco charged respondent Judge with gross
ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of
law for granting bail to an accused in a murder
without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.
Issue:
 Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting bail without hearing.
Held:
 Yes.
 In the application for bail of a person charged with a
capital offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
must actually be conducted to determine whether or
not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. Since the determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated
to conduct a hearing even in cases where the
prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave
the application for bail to the discretion of the court.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition
for bail is required, as can be gleaned from the
abovecited case, is for the court to take into
consideration the guidelines set forth in Section 6,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of
bail. This Court, in a number of cases held that even if
the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition
to an application for bail of an accused, the court
may still require that it answer questions in order to
ascertain not only the strength of the state’s evidence
but also the adequacy of the amount of bail. After
hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail
must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should
then formulate his own conclusion, as to whether
the evidence so presented is strong enough as to
indicate the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the
order granting or denying the application for bail
may be invalidated because the summary of
evidence for the prosecution which contains the
judge’s evaluation of the evidence may be
considered as an aspect of procedural due process
for both the prosecution and the defense.
174. Jose Obosa V Court of Appeals
GR No. 114350 January 16, 1997
Facts:
 The lower court promulgated its decision convicting
petitioner on two counts of homicide not murder
which was initially charged. Accused Obosa
manifested his intention to appeal and asked the
Court to allow him to post bail for his provisional
liberty. Immediately, the lower court granted
accused Obosa’s motion and fixed bail.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner is entitled for bail.
Held:
 No.
 The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to
an appellant who, though convicted of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisomnent, was nevertheless originally charged
with capital offense. Such appellant can hardly be
unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of
things, there is a substantial likelihood of his
 conviction and the corresponding penalty being
affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not insignificant
possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of
instead being found guilty of the capital offense
originally charged. In such an instance, the appellant
cannot but be sorely tempted to flee. In Quemuel v.
CA, Et Al., the Supreme Court held that the appeal in
a criminal case opens the whole case for review and
this includes the penalty, which may be increased.
Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is submitted for
review, even factual questions may once more be
weighed and evaluated. That being the situation, the
possibility of conviction upon the original charge is
ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had
previously demonstrated that evidence of the
accused’s guilt is strong, as it had done so in this
case, such determination subsists even on appeal,
despite conviction for a lesser offense, since such
determination is for the purpose of resolving
whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any
bearing on whether petitioner will ultimately be
acquitted or convicted of the charge.
175. People of the Philippines V Procoro Donato
GR No. 79269 June 5, 1991
Facts:
 Private respondent was charged for the crime of
rebellion. Respondent judge granted his petition to
bail. Petitioner in the support of their claim that
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting the bail argues that private
respondent is stopped from invoking his right to bail,
having expressly waived it in another case when he
agreed to remain in legal custody and face trial
before the court having custody of his person.
Issue:
 Whether or not the right to bail may be waived.
Held:
 Yes.
 It is competent for a person to waive a right
guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to
action which would be invalid if taken against his will.
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional
rights such as, for example, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; the right to
counsel and to remain silent; and the right to be
heard. Even the 1987 Constitution expressly
recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of
Rights. Section 12(1) of Article III thereof on the right
to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice
states: These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel. This provision
merely particularizes the form and manner of the
waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests that the
other rights may be waived in some other form or
manner provided such waiver will not offend Article
6 of the Civil Code. The Court hereby rules that the
right to bail is another of the Constitutional rights
which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to
the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
176. Aurora Mejia V Manuel Pamaran
GR Nos. L-56741-42 April 15, 1988
Facts:
 Petitioner is charged before the Sandiganbayan for
anti-graft and corrupt practices. Petitioner argued
that only one stage of appeal is available to the
petitioner under PD No. 1606 (creation of
Sandiganbayan) which effectively deprives her of the
intermediate recourse to the Court of Appeals and
that in said appeal to this Court only issues of law
may be raised and worse still the appeal has become
a matter of discretion rather than a matter of right
Issue:
 Whether or not the procedure provided for by the
Sandiganbayan are ex post facto and hence all
proceedings taken against petitioner are void being
in violation of the Constitution.
Held:
 No.
 This court has had frequent occasion to consider the
requirements of due process of law as applied to
criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may
be said that if an accused has been heard in a court
of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law, and only punished
after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him,
with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment
awarded within the authority of a constitutional law,
then he has had due process of law.
177. Francisco Tatad V Sandigandbayan
GR Nos. L-72335-39 March 21, 1988
Facts:
 A formal complaint was filed before the Legal Panel,
Presidential Security Command, charging petitioner
for violation of anti-graft and corrupt practices.
However, no action was taken on said report. Five
years later, the same complaint was filed before the
Tanodbayan against petitioner in which the
Tanodbayan referred the case to the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding
investigation.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner was deprived the right to
a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him.
Held:
 Yes.
 The Court finds the long delay in the termination of
the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in
the instant case to be violative of the constitutional
right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing
the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by
the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.
Not only under the broad umbrella of the due
process clause, but under the constitutionally
guarantee of speedy disposition of cases as
embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in
the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate
delay is violative of the petitioner’s constitutional
rights.
178. People of the Philippines V Roberto Ostia
GR No. 131804 February 26, 2003
Facts:
 Appellant was accused for the crime of rape with
homicide. When arraigned, Roberto, with the
assistance of his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of
not guilty to the charge of rape with homicide.
 During the trial, Roberto, through counsel, moved
that he be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty
to rape with homicide and to enter a plea of guilty to
murder. The father of the victim, and the public
prosecutor agreed to Roberto’s pleading guilty to
 murder. Roberto, per Certificate of Re-arraignment,
was re-arraigned for the lesser offense of murder
and pleaded guilty thereto.
Issue:
 Whether or not the court failed to comply with its
mandatory duties when appellant pleaded guilty.
Held:
 Yes.
 When an accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital
offense, the trial court is mandated to do the
following: (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea and the accused’s full
comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2)
require the prosecution to present evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (3) ask the accused if he desires to
present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so
if he desires. The procedure in said rule is mandatory
and a judge who fails to observe with fealty the said
rule commits grave abuse of discretion. This Court
had cautioned trial judges to proceed with
meticulous care whenever the imposable penalty for
the crime charged is death.
 The Court is convinced that the trial court failed to
comply with its duties under Section 3, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court. It bears stressing that accused-
appellant did not even know how to read and write.
In fact, he merely affixed his thumbmark on the
Waiver of Right to a Preliminary Investigation. The
trial court failed to explain to accused-appellant (a)
the nature of murder and the elements thereof; (b)
that killing a four-year old girl, constituted treachery,
a qualifying circumstance; accused being unlettered
could not be presumed to understand the requisites
of treachery, a highly technical legal term; (c) the
nature and effect of a qualifying aggravating
circumstance in the killing and its effect on the
penalty that may be imposed on him; (d) what
heinous crimes are and the meaning and import of
indivisible penalties; e) the specific circumstances
which may be considered by the court in the
imposition of reclusion perpetua or death penalty; (f)
whether his plea of guilty after the prosecution had
commenced presenting its evidence may still be
considered by the trial court as a mitigating
circumstance; (g) the nature of civil liabilities that he
may be ordered to pay and the amounts thereof. The
trial court even failed to probe into the reasons for
accused-appellant’s change of plea from not guilty of
rape with homicide to guilty of murder and for his
failure to adduce evidence during the reinvestigation
of the case despite having been granted the right to
do so by the trial court. The trial court did not even
bother inquiring from accused-appellant whether he
sought the advice of his counsel before pleading
guilty to murder and whether he wanted to adduce
evidence in his behalf to prove any mitigating
circumstances in the commission of the crime to
warrant the imposition of the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
179. Patricio Dumlao V Commission on Elections
GR No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
Facts:
 Petitioner Igot and Salapantan question the
constitutionality of BP Blg 51 which disqualifies any
person who has committed any act of disloyalty to
the State, including acts amounting to subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall
to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by
this Act, or to participate in any partisan political
activity.
Issue:
 Whether or not BP Blg. 51 is unconstitutional.
Held:
 Yes
 Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article
IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not
synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso
contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running
from public office on the ground alone, that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In
ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of
acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges
have been filed for such acts, as both of them would
be ineligible to run for public office. A person
disqualified to run for public office on the ground
that charges have been filed against him is virtually
placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto,
which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term
of the sentence.
180. People of the Philippines V Alfredo Alcantara
GR No. 91283 January 17, 1995
Facts:
 Appellant was arrested for being a suspect in a crime
of robbery with homicide. A few days later he was
brought to the hospital and presented to the
surviving victim where the latter pointed at him as
one of the culprits.
 From the hospital, appellant was brought to the
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group headquarters at
Camp Crame. Allegedly, without being apprised of his
rights nor provided with counsel, he was
interrogated, urged and tortured to confess his guilt.
Issue:
 Whether or not the conviction of herein accused-
appellant was valid.
Held:
 No.
 A thorough reading of the records of the case shows
that the people’s evidence fails to meet the quantum
required to overcome the constitutional presumption
of innocence. Thus, regardless of the weakness of
appellant’s defense of denial and uncorroborated
alibi, he is entitled to an acquittal.
 The Court does not agree with the trial court that
appellant was positively identified as the perpetrator
of the crime at bench. Indeed, in his direct testimony,
he failed to identify the appellant in open court, and
actually pointed to another person as the suspect.
181. Generoso Corpuz V People of the Philippines
GR No. 74259 February 14, 1991
Facts:
 When petitioner’s designation as acting supervising
cashier in the provincial treasury was terminated, a
transfer of accountability was effected between
petitioner and his successor. The certificate of
turnover revealed a shortage which led to his
conviction for the crime of malversation of public
funds. He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the
 charge because the shortage imputed to him was
malversed by other persons.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner’s conviction was valid.
Held:
 Yes.
 The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is
applicable only where the evidence of the parties is
evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in
favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise
here. The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome by the
petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution
and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the
accused must yield to the positive finding that he
malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of
the public whose confidence he has breached. His
conviction must be affirmed.
182. Crispino Flores V Jesus Ruiz
GR No. L-35707 May 31, 1979
Facts:
 For refusing to vacate a land levied against
petitioner, he was cited in contempt by the trial
court. Petitioner, however, contends that his
constitutional right was violated since was not duly
notified of the contempt charge, nor was he properly
arraigned since he was not assisted by counsel during
the hearing.
 Both respondent judge and private respondent
denies the claim of petitioner, of having been denied
due process since accordingly, he was willing to go
into trial in the case even in the absence of his
lawyer.
Issue:
 Whether or not the right to counsel may be waived.
Held:
 No.
 The right of the accused to counsel in criminal
proceedings has never been considered subject to
waiver. The practice has always been for the trial
court to provide the accused with a counsel de oficio,
if he has no counsel of his own choice, or cannot
afford one. This is because the right to be heard
would be of little avail if it does not include the right
to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of the
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because
he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence and this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It
is for this reason that his right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time
to procure an attorney of his own.
183. People of the Philippines V Frisco Holgado
GR No. L-2809 March 22, 1950
Facts:
 For kidnapping and detaining one Artemia Fabreag in
the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours
thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty. Appellant was charged with illegal
detention.
 During trial, it was alleged that appellant stated that
he had no counsel and was going to plead guilty for
the crime allegedly upon the instruction of on Mr.
Ocampo. However, according to the fiscal, he has
investigated this case and found out that this
Ocampo has nothing to do with this case and found
no evidence against this Ocampo.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court correctly convicted the
appellant when he pleaded guilty unaided by
counsel.
Held:
 No.
 One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by
our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there
can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be
heard would be of little avail if it does not include the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence.
 The record discloses that said court did not inform
the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it
ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court
failed to inquire whether or not the accused was to
employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to
procure one or to assign an attorney de oficio. It
must be added, in the instant case, that the accused
who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with
the qualification that he was instructed by one Mr.
Ocampo. The trial court failed to inquire as to the
true import of this qualification.
184. People of the Philippines V Mario Serzo, Jr.
GR No. 118435 June 20, 1997
Facts:
 During arraignment for the crime of murder,
appellant appeared without counsel. Consequently,
the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio for the
arraignment only. Appellant, however, moved that
the arraignment be reset and that he be given time
to engage a counsel of his own choice, which the trial
court granted.
 During the trial, hearings were postponed in several
instances since appellant appeared before the court
without counsel. The court was forced to appoint a
counsel de oficio but appellant insists that he is still
looking for a counsel de parte.
Issue:
 Whether or not appellant was denied his right to
counsel.
Held:
 No.
 The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by
our Constitution, our laws and our Rules of
Court. During custodial investigation, arraignment,
trial and even on appeal, the accused is given
the option to be represented by a counsel of his
choice. But when he neglects or refuses to exercise
this option during arraignment and trial, the court
shall appoint one for him. While the right to be
represented by counsel is absolute, the option of the
accused to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such
 option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible
dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice
the equally important rights of the state and the
offended party to speedy and adequate justice.
185. People of the Philippines V Zosimo Crisologo
GR No. 74145 June 17, 1987
Facts:
 On arraignment was set for the crime of robbery
with homicide. The accused was allegedly informed
of the charge against him through sign language by
Special Policeman Muñoz. Mr. Muñoz subsequently
entered a plea of guilty on behalf of the accused.
Upon objection of counsel, however, this plea was
disregarded and arraignment was rescheduled until
such time as the Court could avail of the services of
an expert in the sign language from the school of the
deaf and dumb.
 Apparently no sign language expert or representative
ever arrived. Without the services of an expert in
sign language ever being utilized at any stage of the
proceedings, the accused was found guilty.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court failed to safeguard the
appellant’s right to due process of the law.
Held:
 Yes.
 The absence of an interpreter in sign language who
could have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the
full facts of the offense with which he was charged
and who could also have communicated the
appellant’s own version of the circumstances which
led to his implication in the crime, deprived the
accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself. Even the appellant’s
final plea of not guilty cannot excuse these
inherently unjust circumstances.
 The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign
language and of any other means, whether in writing
or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges
against him denied the accused his fundamental right
to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of
the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of
the accused was determined was not safeguarded.
The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him in the proceedings where his life and
liberty were at stake.
186. Lauro Soriano V Sandiganbayan
GR No. L-65952 July 31, 1984
Facts:
 Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a
complaint lodged with the City Fiscal. The case was
assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was
then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the
investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00
from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan
reported the demand to the National Bureau of
Investigation which set up an entrapment. The
entrapment succeeded and an information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan for violation of RA 3019.
 The evidence for the prosecution, however, clearly
and undoubtedly support, if at all, the offense of
Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and
is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in
the offense charged, which is for violation of RA
3019. The petitioner claims that he cannot be
convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code
because to do so would be violative of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner was denied of his right to
be informed.
Held:
 No.
 A reading of the information which has been
reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery
so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the
right to be informed.
187. People of the Philippines V Genaro Gines
GR No. 83463 May 27, 1991
Facts:
 Private complainant filed a complaint for libel which
was set to be heard in the court of herein
respondent judge. Due to several circumstances,
mostly on the part of the private complainant’s
medical issues, the case was dismissed for lack of
interest.
Issue:
 Whether or not the right of the accused to a speedy
trial had been violated to entitle them to the
dismissal of the case.
Held:
 No.
 The Court finds that said right has not been violated
in the case at bar and thus holds that the dismissal of
the case is premature and erroneous. The right of an
accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the
Constitution but the same shall not be utilized to
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
indicting criminals. It secures rights to a defendant
but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.
The Court is convinced that private complainant’s
absences at the hearings of the case were in good
faith and that he had justifiable and meritorious
reasons. Said absences are evidently not capricious,
oppressive, nor vexatious to the two accused who
had waived their appearance at the trial of the case.
It should be remembered that the right to a speedy
trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays and
postponements arising from illness, medical
attention, body operations, as in the instant case
where it was satisfactorily proven that private
complainant had to undergo eye operations,
hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad. The
subject case for libel was dismissed some eight and a
half months after the information was filed. This
period is not such an extended, prolonged or lengthy
duration as to cause capricious and vexatious delay.
For, speedy trial means one that can be had as soon
after indictment is filed as the prosecution can with
reasonable diligence prepare for trial.
188. Jaime Dacanay V People of the Philippines
GR No. 101302 January 25, 1995
Facts:
 A criminal complaint for economic sabotage through
smuggling, with regard to the importation of raw
sugar by the National Sugar Trading Corp, was filed
with the Tanodbayan against the principal officers of
the said corporation including petitioner.
 Petitioner filed a motion for immediate and separate
trial invoking his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Respondent People of the Philippines, however,
 opposed the said motion on the ground that a
separate trial for petitioner would entail a lengthy
and repetitious proceeding. Petitioner’s motion was
denied.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a separate
trial.
Held:
 Yes.
 A separate trial is in consonance with the right of an
accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed to him by the
1987 Constitution, more specifically under Section
14(2) of Article III thereof. As defined in the case of
Flores v. People, a speedy trial is one conducted
according to the law of criminal procedure and the
rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays. The primordial purpose of this
constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an
accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an
indefinite period of time. Likewise, it is intended to
prevent delays in the administration of justice by
requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with
reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
prosecutions.
 It has been eight years since the information against
petitioner was filed, but the case against him has yet
to be tried. The long delay has clearly prejudiced
petitioner, who is now more than seventy-three
years of age.
189. People of the Philippines V Alberto Opida
GR No. L-46272 June 13, 1986
Facts:
 Appellant was convicted for the crime of murder as
conspirator. The basis of their conviction by the trial
court was the testimony of two prosecution
witnesses, neither of whom positively said that the
accused were at the scene of the crime, their
extrajudicial confessions, which were secured
without the assistance of counsel, and corroboration
of the alleged conspiracy under the theory of
interlocking confessions.
 During the trial, it was noted of how the way the trial
judge conducted his interrogation of the two accused
and their lone witness. Reading the transcript, one
gathers the impression that the judge had allied
himself with the prosecution to discredit at the
outset the credibility of the witnesses for the
defense. Even the Defense counsel could hardly put
in a word edgewise because the judge kept
interrupting to ask his own questions. The questions
were not clarificatory but adversary; and when they
were not adversary, they were irrelevant, and
sometimes also cruel.
Issue:
 Whether or not appellant’s constitutional rights have
been violated.
Held:
 Yes.
 Time and again this Court has declared that due
process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement, the
Court has added that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to
give added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than
this, as a minimum guaranty of due process. This
guaranty was not observed in this case.
 The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in
fact all too eager to convict the accused, who had
manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at the
conclusion of the trial, "You want me to dictate the
decision now?” he was betraying a pre-judgment
long before made and obviously waiting only to be
formalized. The scales of justice must hang equal
and, in fact, should even be tipped in favor of the
accused because of the constitutional presumption of
innocence. Needless to stress, this right is available
to every accused, whatever his present circumstance
and no matter how dark and repellent his past.
Despite their sinister connotations in our society,
tattoos are at best dubious adornments only and
surely not under our laws indicia of criminality. Of
bad taste perhaps, but not of crime. In any event,
convictions are based not on the mere appearance of
the accused but on his actual commission of crime,
to be ascertained with the pure objectivity of the
true judge who must uphold the law for all without
favor or malice and always with justice.
190. Rolito Go V Court of Appeals
GR No. 106087 April 7, 1993
Facts:
 After conducting an investigation of the shooting
incident, the police identified petitioner as the prime
suspect in the commission of the crime. Petitioner,
accompanied by two lawyers, presented himself
before the Police Station. He was arrested and
booked for the shooting. The police filed a complaint
for frustrated homicide with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
 Counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an
omnibus motion praying for petitioner’s immediate
release and for a preliminary investigation. The case
was raffled to the sala of respondent judge who
approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and
ordered his release. However, respondent judge later
motu proprio issued an Order which recalled order
granting bail; directed petitioner to surrender within
48 hours from notice; cancelled the order granting
leave for the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation; treated petitioner’s
omnibus motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation as a petition for bail.
 Petitioner later filed with respondent Judge a Motion
for Recusation praying that the latter inhibit himself
from hearing the case which respondent judge
denied.
Issue:
 Whether or not respondent judge’s acts demonstrate
partiality to the prosecution in denying his petition.
Held:
 No.
 The rule on the disqualification of judges is a
mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due
process. It is now beyond dispute that due process
cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of
objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair and being just.
Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the
decision arrived at would be the application of the
law to the facts as found by a judge who does not
play favorites.
 The cold neutrality of an impartial judge, although
required primarily for the benefit of the litigants, is
also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary
and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the
 people’s faith in the institutions they have erected
when they adopted our Constitution. The notion that
justice must satisfy the appearance of justice is an
imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the
conduct of public business, including trials, upon the
courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the
proper dispensation of justice
 While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by
petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons for
the voluntary inhibition of the judge under Rule 137,
sec. 1, par. 2, the established rule is that mere
suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There
should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the
charge. Bare allegations of partiality and
prejudgment will not suffice. Bias and prejudice
cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a
judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to person and do
equal right to the poor and the rich.
 When taken in the light of petitioner’s repeated
attempts to have the proceedings in the murder case
suspended and his lawyers’ transparent maneuvers
for the needless protraction of the case, the Motion
for Recusation can only be viewed as another dilatory
move and the present Motion for Reconsideration a
further ploy to stall hearings.
191. People of the Philippines V Cesar Lacbanes
GR No. 88684 March 20, 1997
Facts:
 Accused-appellant was charged and convicted for
violation of the dangerous drugs act when he was
arrested on a buy-bust operation.
 In his appeal, accused-appellant questions the
court’s conviction on the ground that the
prosecution failed to present the confidential-
informant turned poseur-buyer to know the
witnesses against him and meet them in court.
Issue:
 Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to
present the witness poseur-buyer violated the
appellant’s constitutional right.
Held:
 No.
 There was no need to present the poseur-buyer as
PFC Rosales witnessed the whole transaction where
the marked money was exchanged for three sticks of
marijuana cigarettes. The settled rule is that the
testimony of a lone prosecution witness, as long as it
is positive and clear and not arising from an improper
motive to impute a serious offense to the accused,
deserves full credit. This Court has ruled in several
cases that non-presentation of the informer, where
his testimony would be merely corroborative or
cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's case.
192. People of the Philippines V Joselito Agbulos
GR No. 73875 May 18, 1993
Facts:
 Accused-appellant was charged with forcible
abduction with rape. Agbulos was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Later, the hearing was set and the
accused was notified at his home address.
 Due to appellant’s failure to appear before the court,
he was convicted for the crime and a warrant of
arrest was issued against him.
Issue:
 Whether or not trial may proceed even in the
absence of the accused.
Held:
 Yes.
 The trial in absentia was perfectly valid, having been
held in accordance with Article IV, Section 19, of the
1973 Constitution, then in force, which has been
reproduced verbatim in Article III, Section 14(2) of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
 The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition
of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be
indefinitely deferred, and many times completely
abandoned, because of the defendant’s escape. Now
the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his
continued prosecution and possibly eventual
conviction provided only that: a) he has been
arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial;
and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
193. Elias Carredo V People of the Philippines
GR No. 77542 March 19, 1992
Facts:
 Petitioner was charged with malicious mischief. He
deposited a cash bond for his provisional liberty.
Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty
and thereafter he filed a written waiver of
appearance.
 At the hearing, the prosecution moved for the recall
of its principal witness for the purpose of identifying
the accused-petitioner who was not then present.
Hence, the hearing was re-scheduled and a subpoena
was issued to petitioner who failed to appear. The
defense counsel justified petitioner’s absence in that
the latter’s presence can no longer be required as he
already filed a written waiver of appearance.
Nevertheless, the municipal judge issued an order,
ordering the arrest of petitioner, the confiscation of
the cash bond, and at the same time ordering the
bondsman, who is the petitioner himself, to show
cause why no judgment should be rendered against
him.
Issue:
 Whether or not an accused who, after arraignment,
waives his further appearance during the trial, can be
ordered arrested by the court for non-appearance
upon summons to appear for purposes of
identification.
Held:
 Yes.
 It is important to state that the provision of the
Constitution authorizing the trial in absentia of the
accused in case of his non-appearance after
arraignment despite due notice simply means that he
thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses face
to face among others. An express waiver of
appearance after arraignment, as in this case, is of
the same effect. However, such waiver of
appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that
the prosecution is thereby deprived of its right to
require the presence of the accused for purposes of
identification by their witness which is vital for the
conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a right of
the accused does not mean a release of the accused
from his obligation under the bond to appear in court
whenever so required. The accused may waive his
right but not his duty or obligation to the court.
 194. People of the Philippines V Omar Mapalao
GR No. 92415 May 14, 1991
Facts:
 Accused-appellants, together with two others were
charged and convicted with robbery with homicide
after their victims have positively identified them.
 While on appeal, one of their co-accused was able to
escape detention during arraignment and trial and
still had not been apprehended. Accordingly, the
court struck down his appeal and trial in absencia
proceeded and thereafter the judgment and
conviction was promulgated. Nevertheless, through
counsel, he appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court erred in striking down
the appeal of the accused.
Held:
 Yes.
 In this case, appellant Magumnang remained at large
even as his appeal was pending. Hence, by analogy
his appeal must be dismissed. The reason for this
rule is because once an accused escapes from prison
or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court and unless he
surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court
he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief
from the court.
 Thus when as in this case he escaped from
confinement during the trial on the merits and after
his arraignment, and so the trial in absentia
proceeded and the judgment against him was
promulgated in accordance with Section 14(2) Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, nonetheless, as he
remained at large, he should not be afforded the
right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily
submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is
otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment against him. While at large as
above stated he cannot seek relief from the Court as
he is deemed to have waived the same and he has no
standing in court.
195. Sedfrey Ordonez V Director of Prisons
GR No. 115576 August 4, 1994
Facts:
 Two detainees from the period of martial law wrote
to the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) complaining that their continued detention
violated their rights under International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. The UNHCR communicated
their request through the Department of Foreign
Affairs which in turn forwarded said request to the
CHR requesting the release of the detainees. A
petition for habeas corpus then ensued.
 At the hearing, Chairman Ordonez argues for the
prisoners and pleaded for their immediate release in
view of the failure of the Department of Justice to
file charges against them. He stressed that their
continued detention despite the nullification of their
convictions was a clear violation of their human
rights.
Issue:
 Whether or not the failure to file charges against
herein detainees entitles them for immediate
release.
Held:
 Yes.
 There is absolutely no question that the prisoners’
plea should be heeded. The government has failed to
show that their continued detention is supported by a
valid conviction or by the pendency of charges
against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever.
If no information can be filed against them because
the records have been lost, it is not the prisoners who
should be made to suffer. In the eyes of the law,
Paquinto and Cabangunay are not guilty or appear to
be guilty of any crime for which they may be validly
held. Hence, they are entitled to be set free.
196. Juan Dizon V Vicente Eduardo
GR No. L-59118 March 3, 1988
Facts:
 These plea is filed on behalf of the two petitioners
who had been arrested with others during the
martial law period by the military, detained in the
military camp, and then claimed by the military to
have been released after nine days. But they were
not released to their parents, who had been visiting
them, nor to any other responsible person — and
were never seen or heard from by anyone since then.
Issue:
 Whether or not the release of a detained person
renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and
academic.
Held:
 No.
 Respondents make such a plea in line with their
return that they had released the desaparecidos
after nine days. But their return begs the question.
The cited general rule postulates that the release of
the detainees is an established fact and not in
dispute, and that they do not continue to be missing
persons or desaparecidos. Where, however, there
are grounds for grave doubts about the alleged
release of the detainees, which we share,
particularly, where the standard and prescribed
procedure in effecting the release has not been
followed, then the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence the alleged release is shifted to
the respondents. Release is an affirmative defense
and "each party must prove his own affirmative
allegations," 13 just as the burden of proof of self-
defense in a killing rests on the accused. Moreover,
evidence of release lies particularly within
respondents’ power.
197. Rolando Angeles V Director of Prison
GR No. 117568 January 4, 1995
Facts:
 Petitioner was charged with, and convicted of selling
and delivering shabu. He now files a petition for
habeas corpus invoking RA7659 which reduces the
penalties prescribed under the original Dangerous
drug act and the court ruling in People v Simon
confirming the retroactive application of the
amendatory law.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner is entitled for the writ of
habeas corpus.
Held:
 No.
 petition for habeas corpus cannot be granted.
Petitioner, it appears, has only served the minimum
of his sentence; however, he may, if qualified, be
released on parole pursuant to Section 5 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
 While the instant petition for habeas corpus should
be DISMISSED for its prematurity, the Court,
 nonetheless, expresses its concern over the plight of
persons convicted for drug-related offenses prior to
the enactment and effectivity of Republic Act No.
7659 who, like herein petitioner, could be entitled to
parole for having served their minimum sentences,
or who, indeed, may be due for release from
confinement after having served their maximum
sentences conformably with the applicable penalties
newly prescribed by Republic Act No. 7659 and our
decision, construing this law, in the Simon case.
Aware of the need to have this matter attended to
with great dispatch, the Court sees it fit to take the
opportunity, by way of extraordinary measures, to
pronounce thusly: All courts of competent
jurisdiction may entertain petitions for habeas
corpus to consider the release of prisoners convicted
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act who have
served the maximum of the applicable penalties
newly prescribed by Republic Act No. 7659. In this
regard, the formalities required for petitions
for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally, and
such petitions, although deficient in form (e.g. in
letter-petition forms), may be entertained so long as
they are sufficient in substance. In the negative, the
courts to which the petitions are filed may refer the
matter to the Commission on Human Rights or to the
Public Attorney’s Office for possible assistance to the
prisoners concerned.
198. In re: Petition for habeas corpus of Wilfredo
Torres
GR No. 122338 December 29, 1995
Facts:
 Torres was convicted of two counts of estafa. The
maximum sentence would expire on November 2,
2000. A conditional pardon was granted to Torres by
the President of the Philippines on condition that
petitioner would not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines. Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement.
 The Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to
recommend to the President the cancellation of the
conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres
had been charged with twenty counts of estafa
before, and convicted of sedition. The President
cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. Then the
Minister of Justice an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner
was accordingly arrested and confined to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.
Issue:
 Whether or not Torres may invoke the writ of habeas
corpus.
Held:
 No.
 Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a
person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal
or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration
of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not
for the grant of conditional pardon which had been
revoked because of a breach thereof, the
determination of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he
would have served his final sentence for his first
conviction until November 2, 2000.
199. Lisandro Abadia V Court of Appeals
GR No. 105597 September 23, 1994
Facts:
 Private respondent was arrested in connection with a
coup attempt. He was detained for nine months
without charges. A petition for habeas corpus was
filed by the private respondent which was, however,
dismissed on the ground that pre-trial investigation
was already ongoing before a Pre-Trial and
Investigative (PTI) Panel of the Judge Advocate
General’s Office.
 Three months after these charges were filed; the
Panel found no evidence of direct participation by
the private respondent in the coup. Said panel
nonetheless recommended that respondent be
charged with violation of Article 136 of the Revised
Penal Code (Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit
Rebellion or Insurrection) and the 96th Article of War
in relation to the 94th Article of War. Consequently,
all existing charges against respondent were
dismissed and a new charge for violation of Article of
War No. 96 for having allegedly been involved in a
series of conferences with other military officers for
the purpose of overthrowing the government was
filed with the General Court Martial (GCM) No. 8.
 Respondent filed a second petition for habeas
corpus before the Court of Appeals where he assailed
his continued detention in spite of the dismissal of all
charges against him amounted to illegal restraint of
liberty. The Court of Appeals 12th division granted his
petition.
Issue:
 Whether or not respondent court may not impose a
time frame for the Chief of Staff to act on the
respondent’s case where the law itself provides
none.
Held:
 No.
 The absence of rules and regulations mandating a
reasonable period within which the appropriate
appellate military authority should act in a case
subject to mandatory review is no excuse for denial
of a substantive right. The Bill of Rights provisions of
the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to
expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect
citizens from procedural machinations which tend to
nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III
of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy
disposition of cases to cases "before all judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." This
protection extends to all citizens, including those in
the military and covers the periods before, during and
after the trial, affording broader protection than
Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a
speedy trial.
200. Roger Chavez V Court of Appeals
GR No. L-29169 August 19, 1968
Facts:
 Petitioner was convicted for qualified theft. He now
invokes the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court that he
is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from
imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial
which resulted in his conviction, he was denied his
constitutional right not to be compelled to testify
against himself, since the court allowed the fiscal to
make him as a witness for the prosecution.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing
petitioner to be a witness for the prosecution.
Held:
 Yes
 The privilege against self-incrimination is based on
the constitutional injunction that: "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," fully
echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court where,
in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be
entitled to be exempt from being a witness against
himself..
201. Arsenio Pascual V Board of Medical Examiners
GR No. L-25018 May 26, 1969
Facts:
 It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel
for respondent-appellant announced that he would
present as his first witness herein petitioner-
appellee, who was the respondent in such
malpractice charge.
Issue:
 Whether or not the right to self-incrimination be
availed of in an administrative hearing.
Held:
 Yes.
 Where petitioner was the respondent in the
malpractice charge filed against him with the Board
of Medical Examiners, the said Board cannot compel
him to take the witness stand as a witness for the
complainants. The principle against self-incrimination
is equally applicable to a proceeding that could
possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice
the medical profession.
 The constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination is not limited to that of allowing a
witness to object to questions the answers to which
could lead to a penal liability being subsequently
incurred. The constitutional guarantee protects as
well the right to silence.
 Why the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination protects as well the right to silence
should be thus is not difficult to discern. The
constitutional guarantee, along with other rights
granted an accused, stands for a belief that while
crime should not go unpunished and that the truth
must be revealed, such desirable objectives should
not be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the
human personality. More and more in line with the
democratic creed, the deference accorded an
individual even those suspected of the most heinous  The accused was not compelled to make any
crimes is given due weight. admissions or answer any questions, and the mere
fact that an object found on his person was
202. Rizal Alih V Delfin Castro examined; seems no more to infringe the rule
GR No. L-69401 June 23, 1987 invoked, than would the introduction in evidence of
Facts: stolen property taken from the person of a thief.
 Petitioners were apprehended during a military raid  The prohibition contained in section 5 of the
in search of loose firearm, ammunition and other Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to
explosives. Several firearms were confiscated after be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition
the raid. against legal process to extract from the defendant’s
 The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
mandamus with preliminary injunction and The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine
restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of
articles seized from them, to prevent these from prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose
being used as evidence against them, and to of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations
challenge their finger-printing, photographing and implicating them in the commission of a crime.
paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-
incrimination. 204. Emeteria Villaflor V Ricardo Summers
Issue: GR No. 16444 September 8, 1920
 Whether or not petitioners’ right to self- Facts:
incrimination was violated. 
Held: Issue:
 No. 
 The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to Held:
testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it 
in Holt v. United States, 18 The prohibition of
compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material.
203. United States V Tan Teng
GR No.7081 September 7, 1912
Facts:
 Defendant was charged with the crime of rape. The
evidence used against him was the testimony of the
offended party which was suffering from a venereal
disease allegedly acquired from defendant, and the
result of the examination made by the Bureau of
Science which held positive results that defendant
was in fact suffering from gonorrhea.
Issue:
 Whether or not to admit such evidence was to
compel the defendant to testify against himself.
Held:
 No.