51. HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH vs. HON. RENATO C.

CORONA
GR 131457 August 19, 1999
Facts:
 Respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred to SC En Banc. A careful reading
however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, "decided"
referring to cases and "resolved" referring to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis.
(referring each to each)
 The issue presented by the respondents is whether the power of the LGU to reclassify lands is
subject to the approval of the CAR is no longer novel, this having decided in Camarines Sur vs CA
case that the LGU need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use.
 Intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued
certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal farm workers at
the plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property.
Issue:
 Whether or not intervenors may be real parties in interest over the case.
Held:
 Intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farm workers, have no legal or actual and
substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather,
their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land.

52. VICTORINO TORRES v. LEON VENTURA

GR No. 86044 July 2, 1990
Facts:
 In the first case the plaintiffs alleged that Jose B. Henson, in his lifetime, executed in their favor a
chattel mortgage on his drug store at Calle Rosario, known as Farmacia Henson, to secure a loan and
in the second case the plaintiffs alleged that they were the heirs of the late Don Florentino Torres;
and that Jose B. Henson, in his lifetime, executed in favor of Don Florentino Torres a chattel
mortgage on his three drug stores known as Henson's Pharmacy, Farmacia Henson and Botica
Hensonina, to secure a loan.
 In both cases the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant violated the terms of the mortgage and that,
in consequence thereof they became entitled to the possession of the chattels and to foreclose their
mortgages thereon.
 Subsequently, the court issued in each case an order directing the sheriff of the City of Manila to
take immediate possession of said drug stores. The defendant filed practically the same answer to
both complaints. He denied generally and specifically the plaintiffs' allegations, and set up
the following special defenses that the chattel mortgages are null and void for lack of sufficient
particularity in the description of the property mortgaged; and that the chattels which the plaintiffs
sought to recover were not the same property described in the mortgage.
Issue:
 Whether or not the mortgage is valid.
Held:
 Since mortgage is not a prohibited transaction, it follows that it is not tantamount to selling,
disposing of, or conveying the awarded land, which are prohibited transactions. Moreover, the
framers of the law, in not expressly prohibiting mortgage, may have anticipated circumstances in
which the farmer-beneficiary is left with no alternative but to mortgage his land in order to respond
to emergency situations such as sickness in the family
 53. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR v. THE COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 103125 May 17, 1993
Facts:
 The Governor of Camarines Sur filed two (2) separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto and
Efren San Joaquin pursuant to Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 129 authorizing the
Governor to purchase or expropriate properties owned by the San Joaquins for the establishment of
a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial
government employees. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of
inadequacy of the price offered. The motion was denied and a writ of possession was issued in favor
of the province. On appeal with the CA, the San Joaquins asked the appellate court to, among
others, nullify the resolution issued by the Sanggunian. The CA asked the Office of the Solicitor
General to comment to the petition. The Solicitor General stated that the approval of the Office of
the President is not needed but the province must first secure the approval of the DAR of the plan to
expropriate the lands of petitioners. The CA set aside the order of the trial court allowing the
province to take possession and ordered the suspension of the expropriation proceedings until after
the submission of the DAR approval to convert the property.
Issue:
 Whether or not DAR approval is still necessary before an LGU can expropriate agricultural lands for
conversion to non-agricultural use.
Held:
 Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure
the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there
is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the
expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of
Agrarian Reform.

54. FELlX GONZALES & CARMEN GONZALES v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 36213 June 29, 1989
Facts:
 October 1988, Lucia Sison filed a motion to be substituted in lieu of Andres and Leonora as she
inherited the unsold lots of the deceased spouses. The court granted her motion.
 Spouses are owners of parcels of land in Bulacan At the time of the purchased of the spouses,
Maximo Cruz was th tenant who was planting palay thereon. Maximo continued as tenant until he
died and was succeeded by his son Fidel Cruz. After 4 years as tennat, Fidel was succeeded by
Pascual Gonzales, father of Felix Gonzales. In 1954, Pascual ceased to be a tenant because the land
was proposed to be converted into residential subdivision.
 Since 1956, spouses offered to pay rental and acted as agents for the sale of the subdivision lots.
While they are renting, the spouses requsted that they may be allowed to plant palay on the lots
that have not yet been sold. No specific agreement was concluded with regards of harvest, but
spouses delivered part of the yield to Federico Mateo, defendants overseer.
 When spouses defaulted in paying the rentals, the owner demanded for payment of rental or to
vacate. Spouses then filed to elect the leasehold system and pray for a reliquidation of past harvest
embracing the agricultural years. Before summons were served, owners initiated an action against
the spouses for recovery of possession. CFI-Bulacan, favored Gonzales, the owner.
 CA upheld the decision of the court saying that the property ceased to be an agricultural or
farmland, having been converted as residential subdivision.
Issue:
 Whether an agricultural tenancy relationship can be created over land embraced in an approved
residential subdivision.
Held:
 Agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has been converted to residential use.
Agricultural leasehold cannot be established on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation
or farming because of its conversion into a residential subdivision.

55. LOPE MACHETE v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 109093 November 20, 1995
Facts:
 Private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages
before the Regional Trial Court against the petitioners. The complaint alleged that the parties
entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to the private respondent's landholdings in Bohol.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of RTC over the
subject matter.
Issue:
 Whether or not the subject matter of the complaint falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DAR
in the exercise of its quasi- judicial powers.
Held:
 Section 17 of EO 229 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
accordance with law. Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening
the DAR, created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to assume the
powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.

56. NINA M. QUISMUNDO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 95664 September 13, 1991
Facts:
 On February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants of petitioner, filed a complaint with the trial
court praying that their relationship with petitioner be changed from share tenancy to a leasehold
system, pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, their request therefor having
been denied by petitioner.
 On March 2, 1988, private respondents further filed a motion for the issuance of an order
authorizing the supervision by the deputy sheriff of the court of the harvesting and liquidation of the
1987-1988 sugarcane crops, which motion was granted by the trial court in an order dated March 3,
1988.
 On March 16, 1988, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action
since the law that should allegedly govern the relationship of the parties is Act No. 4115, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 271, and not Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. The trial
court denied the motion for lack of merit in an order dated June 2, 1988.
 On June 18, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial order, invoking as an
additional ground the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case under the authority and by
 reason of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically Executive Order No. 229 and
Republic Act No. 6657.
Held:
 Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City has no jurisdiction to try the case at bar
considering that the exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate agrarian cases has already been
vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Issue:
 Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which took effect on June 15,
1988, contains provisions which evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the
Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. The
resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve
agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise
on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not
bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes
and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.

57. MODESTO T. UALAT v. JUDGE JOSE O. RAMOS

AM No. MTJ-91-567 December 6, 1996
Facts:
 Complainants filed an administrative case against respondent Judge Ramos for taking cognizance of
the illegal detainer case filed by their landowner against them. It was shown that the respondent
judge had knowledge of a previously filed DARAB case and the fact that the illegal detainer case falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. Despite the separate affidavits of the complainants
containing allegation of landlord-tenant relationship, the respondent judge took cognizance of the
illegal detainer case.
Issue:
 Whether or not the action of Judge Ramos proper.
Held:
 The Supreme Court in finding the respondent Judge liable for ignorance of the law opined: "As can
be readily seen from the answer filed by complainants Sabio and Ualat in the civil case, they alleged
the existence of an agrarian tenancy relationship between themselves and the landowner.
Additionally, in the proceedings before respondent Judge, complainants were even represented by a
lawyer from the DAR. These matters should have been sufficient to put respondent Judge on notice
that complainants were claiming protection under our agrarian laws. At that point, he ought to have
realized that there existed a genuine issue involving agricultural tenancy among the parties with
respect to the subject property. Knowledge of existing agrarian legislation and prevailing
jurisprudence on the subject, together with an ordinary degree of prudence would have prompted
respondent Judge to refer the case to the DAR for preliminary determination of the real nature of
the parties' relationship, as required by law.

58. REMIGIO ISIDRO v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 105586 December 15, 1993
Facts:
 Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject parcel of land. In 1985, Aniceta
Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio
Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land. The occupancy of a portionof said land was subject
to the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land
 without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent
through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the
land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spente
ffort and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful ldetainer
was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court(MTC) of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija. The trial court dismissed the case because it ruled that it is anagrarian dispute, hence
not cognizable by civil courts. Private respondent appealed to the RTCwhich affirmed in toto the
decision of MTC. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the trial court was reversed.
Issue:
 Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence cannot be cognizable by civil courts.
Held:
 An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under RA 6657 and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee

59. TEOFILA DE LUNA v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 97788 May 11, 1993
Facts:
 Petitioner Teofila de Luna had been in peaceful and continuous possession of four (4) hectares of
land located at Barangay Masinao, Sta. Maria, Laguna. Petitioner and her father, Martin de Luna,
had worked for many years on this and as agricultural tenants thereof.
 After the demise of petitioner’s father, she continued to cultivate the subject parcels of land.
Petitioner’s name appears in the master list of agricultural tenants in the Province of Laguna issued
by the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR") as a full-fledged tenant of landholder Atty. Francisco
Redor.
 On 21 May 1986, petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against her two (2) brothers, private
respondents Casiano and Flaviano de Luna, who allegedly had turned petitioner out of her
possession of the parcels of land through stealth. The complaint for forcible entry was filed with the
MCTC of Mabitac, Sta. Maria, Laguna and there docketed as Civil Case No. 245.
 The complaint was initially dismissed by the MCTC on 30 September 1986 on the basis that the case
fell within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") under Section 2 of Presidential Decree
No. 316 in relation to Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 583. However, after considering an
Omnibus Motion of petitioner, the MCTC set aside its earlier order and instead referred the case to
the DAR.
 After the referral to the DAR and acting upon the certification issued by DAR that the case was
proper for trial in the municipal court, the MCTC proceeded to hear the complaint for ejectment. In
due course, the MCTC rendered a decision requiring private respondents to vacate the premises and
to pay petitioner.
 Dissatisfied, respondent de Luna brothers appealed to the Court of Appeals and raised the issue of
jurisdiction of the MCTC over the dispute.
Issue:
 Whether or not respondents may be deemed as “third persons” under Section 21 of RA 1199
thereby bringing the dispute within the ambit of authority of the RTC as an agrarian court.
Held:
 The 'third party' mentioned in the said sec. 21 of RA 1199 should be construed to mean a person
who is neither landholder nor tenant, but who acts for, openly, secretly, or factually for the
landholder. For instance, a sheriff enforcing an execution sale against the landholder; or a purchaser
or transferee of the land, or a mere dummy of the landowner

60. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 122256 October 30, 1996
Facts:
 Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao
del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A.
No. 6657). Private respondent's certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. It appears, however, that in the Statement of Agricultural
Landholdings ("LISTASAKA") which private respondent had earlier filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower "Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner" was stated . Private
respondent rejected the government's offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same
crops were valued at the higher price. The matter was brought before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, sustained the initial valuation made by the LBP. Private
respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Court.
Private respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC
dismissed its petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latter's Revised Rules
of Procedure, before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition the RTC found that, in
violation of the DARAB's rules of procedure the petition had been filed more than fifteen (15) days
after notice of the decision of the PARAD. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its
motion was denied Private respondent therefore filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, contending that a petition for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 §§56-57 falls
under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was sustained by the Court of
Appeals. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
Issue:
 Whether or not cases involving claims for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657, an appeal from
the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can
resort to the RTC.
Held:
 Any effort to transfer the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the DAR adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 of RA
6657 and therefore would be void.

61. AGAPITO ROM VS. ROXAS & COMPANY, INC.

GR No. 169331 September 5, 2011
Facts:
 On September 30, 1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in Barangay
Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting portions of
the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44664 from the coverage of CARP,
 pursuant to DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994. The application was docketed as
DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98.
 Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only agricultural land
which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as "land devoted to agricultural activity and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." Respondent claimed that
prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, the lands subject of its application were already
re-classified as part of the Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu Municipal
Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, which zoning ordinance was approved by the Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC [now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)]) under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983. Respondent cited DOJ Opinion No. 44
(1990) which provides that lands already classified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial,
industrial or residential use, which ordinance was approved prior to the effectivity of the CARL, no
longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.
 Considering that the application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance
compensation, the DAR, through its Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and Implementation
(CLUPPI-II), directed respondent to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation and/or
waiver of rights of bona fide occupants.
 To comply with the directive, respondent offered payment of disturbance compensation and
attempted to obtain the required waivers from herein petitioners who are the farmer-beneficiaries
of the subject parcels of land as identified by the DAR. However, the parties failed to reach an
agreement as regards the amount of disturbance compensation, hence, respondent filed on
September 28, 2001 a Petition to fix disturbance compensation before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Batangas.
 In its Order of November 6, 2002, the DAR granted the application. From this Order, petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration, Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Second Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration. Said motions, however, were dismissed by the DAR in an Order dated
December 12, 2003.
 Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. In a Decision dated April 29, 2005,
the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari it being an improper remedy. The CA held that
petitioners should have filed a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Even if the certiorari petition is considered as properly filed, the CA ruled that it would still dismiss
the same as there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DAR in issuing the assailed
Orders.
Issue:
 Whether or not the property can be exempted without payment of disturbance compensation.
Held:
 Respondent's application for exemption was not accompanied by proof of disturbance
compensation or by petitioners' waiver/undertaking that they will vacate the subject parcels of land
whenever required. However, this Court finds that respondent has substantially complied with this
requirement found under Section III (B) of DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1990. Records show that upon
being required by CLUPPI-II to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation and/or waiver
of rights of bona fide occupants after an evaluation of its application for exemption revealed that it
was not accompanied by the same,58 respondent exerted efforts to comply with the said
requirement. It offered to pay petitioners their disturbance compensation but they failed to agree
on the price. Petitioners also refused to execute a waiver/ undertaking. Respondent thus filed a
Petition to fix disturbance compensation before the PARAD. To prove these, it submitted to the
DAR a (1) Certification dated September 10, 2001, issued by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., MARO of
 Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that there was failure to reach an amicable settlement on the matter of
disturbance compensation between the parties; and (2) copy of the Petition to fix disturbance
compensation duly received by the PARAD on September 28, 2001.59 To us, these constitute
substantial compliance with the said particular requirement of Section III (B), DAR AO No. 6, Series
of 2002. At any rate, the lack of proof of such payment later proved to be of no consequence since
the assailed November 6, 2002 Order of the DAR was nevertheless made subject to the condition of
payment of disturbance compensation to petitioners. In fact, the Order likewise states that 10 days
from such payment, proof of payment of disturbance compensation must be submitted to the DAR.

62. FRANCISCO SORIANO V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 184282 April 11, 2012
Facts:
 Spouses Soriano were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land located in Hijo,
Maco, Compostela Valley Province. The first parcel had an area of 5.2723 hectares and was covered
by TCT No. (T-8935) T-3120, while the second parcel had an area of 4.0887 hectares and was
covered by TCT No. (T-2906) T-749. In October 1999, the two parcels of land were compulsorily
acquired by the government pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. The LBP made a preliminary
determination of the value of the subject lands. Petitioners, however, disagreed with the valuation
and brought the matter before the DARAB for a summary administrative proceeding to fix the just
compensation.
 On September 30, 2000, the DARAB rendered its decisions affirming the LBP’s preliminary
determination. Notices of the decisions were duly received by counsel for petitioners. But
petitioners belatedly filed a petition before the RTC acting as SAC, for the fixing of just
compensation. Thus, the DAR moved to dismiss the petition arguing that the petition was filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of
Procedure.
 On June 27, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and declared that the DARAB Rules of
Procedure must give way to the laws on prescription of actions as mandated by the Civil Code. The
DAR sought reconsideration of the order, but its motion was denied. Thus, the DAR lodged a petition
for certitorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The CA
granted the petition.
Issue:
 Whether or not an action to fix just compensation for lands placed under R.A. No. 6657 is outside
the purview of the ordinary rules on prescription as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
Held:
 It is clear from §57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs.
Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of
the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to §57 and therefore would be void.

63. CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. RENATO L. MATEO

GR No. 175485 July 27, 2011
Facts:
 In 1988, petitioner purchased from China Bank the land in question which was previously sold by the
mother of Mateo to Rodolfo Pe who in turn constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of
China Bank as security for a loan. China Bank foreclosed the mortgage and consolidated its
ownership of the property after Rodolfo failed to redeem. A TCT was issued in the name of China
Bank. In 1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful detatiner against the respondent’s
 siblings. Respondent counters that CDC acquired the property from China Bank in bad faith because
it had actual knowledge of the possession of the property by the respondent and his siblings.
Issue:
 Whether or not CDC was an innocent purchaser for value.
Held:
 One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the
certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title. He is charged with notice only of
such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. China Bank’s TCT’s was a clean title, that is, it
was free from any lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it purchased the property,
solely upon the face of the certificate of title in the name of China Bank. The respondent’s siblings’
possession did not translate to an adverse claim of ownership. They even characterized their
possession only as that of mere agricultural tenants. Under no law was possession grounded on
tenancy a status that might create a defect or inflict a law in the title of the owner. CDC having paid
the full and fair price of the land, was an innocent purchaser for value. The TCT in the name of CDC
was declared valid and subsisting.

64. RENE ANTONIO V. GREGORIO MANAHAN

GR No. 176091 April 24, 2011
Facts:
 On 16 November 1993, Manahan, the owner of 2 parcel of agricultural land located at San Mateo,
Rizal and Antonio entered into a Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan” (Leasehold Agreement)
whereby the latter undertook to cultivate the subject parcels for an annual rental of 70 cavans of
dried, cleaned and good quality palay, each weighing 44 kilos. The Leasehold Agreement provided,
that the land shall be exclusively planted to rice; that Antonio shall neither expand the 12x12 square
meter portion on which his house stands nor allow others to construct their homes on the lands in
litigation; that the planting and harvest on both parcels shall be simultaneously accomplished by
Antonio; and, that Manahan shall be entitled to a three-day prior notice of the harvests done on the
property. In 1994, 1996 and 1997, Manahan filed complaints before the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) against Antonio, for such violations of the Leasehold Agreement on the ground that
Antonio persisted with the foregoing violations. Manahan filed on16 September 1997 a Complaint
for Ejectment before the Rizal Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD). Antonio,
however, specifically denied the material allegations of the foregoing complaint. On 4 October 1999,
Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision for Manahan based on the following ascertained
violations of the Leasehold Agreement committed by Antonio: (a) failure to pay the stipulated rental
in full from 1993 to 1998; (b) failure to give Manahan prior notification of impending harvests; and
(c)utilization of 3,000 square meters of the property to the planting of kangkong, despite Manahan‘s
objections. As a consequence of the foregoing findings, the PARAD ordered the ejectment of
Antonio from the landholding, payment of the unpaid lease rental and to surrender the subject land.
On appeal, the foregoing decision was initially reversed and set-aside in the 8 January 2004 decision
rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) however, based on
the ocular inspection conducted by the DARAB the motion for reconsideration filed by Manahan
was granted and DARAB issued the 28 December 2004 Resolution reinstated the PARAD‘s 4 October
1999 decision. On 10 February 2005
Antonio filed a petition for review with the CA arguing that the DARAB gravely erred in finding that h
eviolated the leasehold agreement. The CA rendered the herein assailed 31 October 2006 Decision,
dismissing the petition and affirming the DARAB‘s 28 December 2004 Resolution.
Antonio‘s motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied for lack of merit in the CA‘s 4
January 2007 resolution, thus, this petition.
Issue:
 Whether or not ca erred when it applied section 36 (paragraphs 3 and 4) of RA 3844 as
authorized causes for dispossession of petitioner.
Held:
 Fealty to the fact that "R.A. No. 3844 does not operate to take away completely every landowner's
rights to his land" or "authorize the agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive manner in
derogation of the landowner's rights"49 impels us to uphold Antonio's dispossession as ordered by
the PARAD, the DARAB and the CA. "Although the agrarian laws afford the opportunity for the
landless to break away from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others,
a becoming modesty demands that this kindness should at least be reciprocated, in whatever small
way, by those benefited by them.

65. JUAN GALOPE V. CRESENCIA BUGARIN

GR No. 185669 February 1, 2012
Facts:
 Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. In Barangay Case No. 99-6,
respondent complained that she lent the land to petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that
what she receives in return from petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to recover the land to
farm it on her own. Petitioner countered that respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had
been farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from P4,000 to P6,000 or 15 cavans of
palay per harvest. The case was not settled.
 Represented by Celso Rabang, respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession, ejectment and
payment of rentals before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
docketed as DARAB Case No. 9378.
 The Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled to
security of tenure. On appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that petitioner is
not a de jure tenant. The DARAB found no tenancy relationship between the parties and stressed
that the elements of consent and sharing are not present.
Issue:
 Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties.
Held:
 The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondents act of allowing
the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show her consent to an
unwritten tenancy agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit
provisions of a written contract alone. Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as
the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon
an oral agreement. Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present.
Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant.

66. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FEDERICO SUNTAY

GR No. 188376 December 14, 2011
Facts:
 Respondent Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro with a total
area of 3,682.0285 hectares. In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated
948.1911 hectares of Suntay’s land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.
 Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for
a total valuation of P4,251,141.68.Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for
determination of just compensation in the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) of Region IV, DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00; his petition was
assigned to RARAD Miñas.
 After summary administrative proceeding, RARAD Miñas rendered a decision fixing the total just
compensation for the expropriated portion at P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for
reconsideration, but RARAD Miñas denied its motion. Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial
determination of just compensation in the RTC (Branch 46) in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro as a
Special Agrarian Court, impleading Suntay and RARAD Miñas. The petition essentially prayed that
the total just compensation for the expropriated portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67. Suntay filed
a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that the petition had been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period as required by Section 11, Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of DARAB. After
the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, Land Bank appealed to the CA, which sustained the
dismissal. As a result, Land Bank came to the Court (G.R. No. 157903)
Issue:
 Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank’s petition for the determination of just
compensation.
Held:
 The procedure for the determination of just compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657, as
summarized in Landbank v. Banal, is that initially, the Land Bank is charged with the responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their
84 taking under the voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition arrangement. The DAR, relying
on the Land Bank’s determination of the land valuation and compensation, then makes an offer
through a notice sent to the landowner. If the landowner accepts the offer, the Land Bank shall pay
him the purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders
the certificate of title in favor of the government. In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to
reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the Land Bank and other interested parties
to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the
Decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian
Court for the determination of just compensation. In determining just compensation, the RTC is
required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.

67. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESTATE OF J. AMADO ARANETA

GR No. 161796 February 8, 2012
Facts:
 At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with an area of 1,645 hectares, more or less,
which was originally registered in the name of Alfonso Doronilla under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 7924 of the Rizal Registry. On June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation
1283, carving out a wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in Antipolo, Rizal and reserving
the segregated area for townsite purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be.
 In 1978, the OSG filed with the then CFI of Rizal an expropriation complaint against the Doronilla
property. Meanwhile, on 1979, Doronilla issued a Certification, copy furnished the Agrarian Reform
Office, among other agencies, listing seventy-nine (79) "bona fide planters" he allegedly permitted
to occupy a portion of his land. On 1987 or nine (9) years after it commenced expropriation
proceedings, the OSG moved for and secured the dismissal of the expropriation case. Earlier, or on
March 15, 1983, J. Amado Araneta, now deceased, acquired ownership of the subject Doronilla
property by virtue of court litigation. A little over a week later, he had OCT No.7924 canceled and
secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-70860 in his name
Issue:
 Whether or not the disputed lots are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of1988.
Held:
 Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that CARL shall ‗cover, regardless of tenurial agreement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands.‘ As to what constitutes agricultural
land,‘ it is referred to as ‗land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified
as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.‘ The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands‘ are only those lands which are arable and
suitable agricultural lands‘ and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.‘ "Indeed,
lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands
previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government
agencies other than respondent DAR.

68. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SEVERINO LISTANA

GR No. 168105 July 27, 2011
Facts:
 Private respondent Listana voluntarily offered to sell his land of 246.0561 ha. in Sorsogon to the
government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03 but Listana refused to sell at
that price, so the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in an administrative
proceeding determined the just compensation of the land at P10,956,963.25 and ordered the Land
Bank of the Philippines to pay the same to Listana. A writ of execution was issued by PARAD to that
effect but it was apparently not complied with by LBP so a Motion for Contempt was filed by Listana
with the PARAD against petitioner LBP. PARAD granted the Motion for Contempt and cited for
indirect contempt and ordered the arrest of ALEX A. LORAYES, the Manager of LBP. LBP obtained a
preliminary injunction from the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon enjoining DARAB from enforcing
the arrest order against Lorayes. Listana filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. CA nullified the order of the RTC. Consequently, petitioner LBP filed a petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
 Whether the order for the arrest of petitioner's manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid.
Held:
 Neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the
respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the
DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent?s "Motion for
Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the
arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.

69. LUCIA RODRIGUEZ V. TERESITA V. SALVADOR

 GR No. 171972 June 8, 2011
Facts:
 On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against
petitioners Lucia and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel
of land covered by Original Certificate of Title issued by virtue of Free Patent in the name of the
Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador and that petitioners acquired possession
of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest, and that despite several
verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land. Petitioners
interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband,
Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and permission of respondent‘s predecessors-in-
interest, siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would
devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings.
Since there is a tenancy relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case
and not the MTC. On September 10, 2003, the MTC promulgated a Decision finding the existence of
an agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties, and thereby, dismissing the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Argao, Cebu. On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision remanding the case to the MTC for
preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship exists between the parties.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that the purpose of a preliminary hearing was served
by the parties‘ submission of their respective position papers and other supporting evidence. On
June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed the MTC Decision dated
September 10, 2003. Respondent sought for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, respondent filed
a Petition for review with the CA. On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of
respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties because petitioners
failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-in- interest consented to the tenancy
relationship. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that petitioners-defendants are not tenants of the subject land.
Held:
 Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case. Agricultural tenancy exists when
all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. As
correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking. Self-serving statements, however, will
not suffice to prove consent of the landowner; independent evidence is necessary. Aside from
consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest. Mere occupation or cultivation of an
agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural tenant. It is incumbent upon a
person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of
agricultural tenancy. In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove consent and sharing of harvest
between the parties. The MTC has jurisdiction over the 90 instant case. No error can therefore be
attributed to the CA in reversing and setting aside the dismissal of respondent‘s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the remand of the case to the MTC for the determination of the amount of
damages due respondent is proper. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 24,
 2005 Decision and the February 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA are AFFIRMED.
This case is ordered REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu, to determine the
amount of damages suffered by respondent by reason of the refusal and failure of petitioners to
turn over the possession of the subject land, with utmost dispatch consistent with the above
disquisition.

70. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 132767 January 18, 2000
Facts:
 PVB owned 4 parcels of land in Tagum, Davao, and these lands were taken by the DAR for
distribution to landless farmers pursuant to CARP. Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made
by LBP and DARAB, PVB filed a petition for a determination of just compensation for the properties.
The petition was dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period.
 CA affirmed this decision. CA added that the jurisdiction over the land valuation is lodged in the
DARAB. PVB filed for reconsideration but was denied too.
Issue:
 Whether or not the jurisdiction over the fixing of just compensation is under DARAB.
Held:
 There is nothing contradictory between the "agrarian reform matters" under the jurisdiction of DAR
and the "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform" [which includes just
compensation] under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The first is an administrative proceeding while the
second is judicial.

71. GERARDO RUPA SR, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 80129 January 25, 2000
Facts:
 Petitioner Gerardo Rupa Sr. filed an action for redemption with damages against Magin Salipot
claiming that he had been a tenant of a parcel of coconut land formerly owned by Vicente Lim and
Patrocinia Yu Lim for more than twenty (20) years now, sharing the harvests on a 50%-50% basis.
Also, that he is the overseer over four parcels of coconut land owned by the Lim spouses. However,
without any prior written notice, the land tenanted by the petitioner was sold to Magin Salipot for
P5,000.00 in January 1981. Petitioner averred that he only learned of the sale on February 16, 1981,
and that he sought assistance with the local office of Agrarian Reform for the redemption of the
questioned property and even deposited the amount of P5,000.00 with the trial court.
 However, the Regional Trial Court of Masbate rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the
ground that Rupa was not a tenant of the subject property and thus, not entitled to a right of
redemption over the same. On appeal, the Court of Appeals finds, in substance, that there is no
clear and convincing evidence to show that plaintiff was a share tenant of the spouses Lim and that
Rupa is bound by his admission in Criminal Case No. 532-U, entitled People of the Philippines. vs.
Mariano Luzong filed six months after the instant case wherein he admitted that he was the
overseer and administrator of the five parcels of land owned by the Lim spouses. Thus, negating his
claim of tenancy. The CA therefore affirmed on appeal the decision of the lower court. Hence, this
petition seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
Issue:
 Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the land.
Held:
 A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with
the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce
with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Briefly stated, for
this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2. The
subject is agricultural land; 3. There is consent; 4. The purpose is agricultural production; 5. There is
personal cultivation; and 6. There is sharing of harvests. In the case at bar, the fact that RUPA has
been planting coconut seedlings and minor crops in the vacant portions of the subject land as well
as cleaning and gathering coconuts to process them into copra is borne out by the records.

72. RAYMUNDO T. MAGDALUYO v. ATTY. ENRIQUE L. NACE

GR No. 3808 February 2, 2000
Facts:
 This is a case of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct of a lawyer’s professional
responsibility. Complainant alleged that he is the registered owner of parcels of land situated in
Antipolo, Rizal. In 1991, he conducted dialogues with squatters — among them respondent — living
on said land and offered to relocate them to another portion of the land. The squatters refused and
they filed a complaint against complainant before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (PARAB) claiming that they are tenants and thus could not be forcibly ejected.
 This is a case of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct of a lawyer’s professional
responsibility. Complainant alleged that he is the registered owner of parcels of land situated in
Antipolo, Rizal. In 1991, he conducted dialogues with squatters — among them respondent — living
on said land and offered to relocate them to another portion of the land. The squatters refused and
they filed a complaint against complainant before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (PARAB) claiming that they are tenants and thus could not be forcibly ejected.
Issue:
 Whether the respondent committed a falsehood and of forum-shopping violating his professional
responsibility as a lawyer.
Held:
 Respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility against engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.2 He was, indeed, less than sincere in asserting
two conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all probability, he knew not to be his. What
made matters worse was his participation in bringing such claims to court, knowing them to be
contradictory and therefore cannot both be true, though both could be totally false. In this he is
guilty of consenting to if not actual commission of a falsehood before a court, again in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

73. EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D. DAEZ v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 133507 February 17, 2000
Facts:
 Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy. Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan being cultivated by the herein respondents. DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina denied the
application for exemption upon finding that the subject land is covered under LOI 474, the
petitioner's total properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law. The Secretary of
DAR, Benjamin T. Leong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all affirmed the said Order
 and disregarded an Affidavit executed by the respondents stating that they are not the tenants of
the land. Their findings were that the Affidavit was merely issued under duress. In the meantime,
Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to the respondents.
 Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland under R.A. No. 6657.
DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed her to retain the subject riceland but
denied the application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to prove actual
tillage or direct management thereof. This order was set aside by the DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao
but reinstated on appeal by the Office of the President. The Court of Appeals again reversed this
Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the previous Decision of DAR Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao. Hence, this Appeal.
Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject landholdings, despite
the fact that a previous decision denying the petition for exemption had long become final and
executor.
Held:
 It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and
the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the
subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application
filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865 hectare riceland, even after her appeal
for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory. The right
of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature.
It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the
landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to
perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is land which is
not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the government from the
inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a
pointless process. The issuance of EPs and CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the
landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of
1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the
landowner's retained area.

74. BAYANI BAUTISTA v. PATRICIA ARANETA

GR No. 135829 February 22, 2000
Facts:
 In essence, the plaintiff averred that he had been the lawful tenant of a three (3) hectare parcel of
land owned by Gregorio Araneta II since 1978. In April 1991, a group of armed security guards,
allegedly, were sent by herein defendant Patricia Araneta, successor of Gregorio Araneta II and
warned plaintiff to vacate and to stop cultivating the subject landholding. Plaintiff prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendant from the continued employment
of threats and harassments against his person, for the issuance of a permanent preliminary
injunction during the pendency of the case, for the maintenance of status quo and for the
recognition of his right as tenant of the land. Defendant to summarize, denied all the allegations of
the plaintiff and stated that the property belonged to Consuelo A. de Cuesta Auxilum Christianorum
Foundation Incorporated and leased to defendant for the development of a bio-dynamic farm and
ultimately for the establishment of a training center for bio-dynamic agriculture in the Philippines
and humid tropics in Asia. The land also does not fall under CARL because it has more than 18%
slope. During an ocular inspection, defendant learned of the presence of the plaintiff. The former
invited the latter to join the project but he declined and agreed to leave the premises. However, the
 plaintiff changed his mind and refused to leave. Efforts at conciliation did not push through and
instead a Complaint for Peaceful Possession with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by the plaintiff. The PARAD ruled in favor of the
plaintiff (petitioner) and declared him as a bonafide tenant. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the said
Decision. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB. Hence, this Appeal.
Petitioner contends that in 1978, he entered into an oral tenancy agreement with Gregorio Araneta
II whom he has known and believed as the owner of the land. And that he regularly delivered to
Gregorio forty (40) cavans from the harvest through Lino Tocio. Petitioner likewise relies on the
certification (ARPT and MARO) that he is a tenant on the landholding.
Issue:
 Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the subject landholding.
Held:
 The Appeal lacks merit. "His reliance on the certifications issued in his favor is misplaced because
they do not prove that the landowner made him his tenant. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed,
they only show that petitioner is in possession of the land. The certifications do not disclose how
and why he became a tenant." In sum, respondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged
agricultural leasehold agreement between petitioner and Gregorio. In the 1961 case of Lastimoza vs.
Blanco, we ruled that "tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and
lawful landholder who is either the 'owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land' (sec.
5 [b], Rep. Act No. 1199), and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the
land subject of the tenancy. . . . To rule otherwise, would be to pave the way for fraudulent
collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder." Lastly, we
cannot sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the
DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of petitioner in
holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we held that
certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are
merely provisional and not conclusive on the courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these
findings especially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence.

75. HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY v. THE COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 109992 March 7, 2000
Facts:
 The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on execution by the
Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989 and subsequently sold at public
auction on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos now substituted by his heirs and
represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50. Private
respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the reglementary
period. On April 1, 1992, respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) docketed as DARAB Case No. 369-BUL '92 praying that petitioner be enjoined from
preventing private respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become
useless". The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an Order allowing the
gathering of the mango fruits and directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the
Adjudication Board. Then on April 27, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Consignation
before the RTC of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to redeem his land. The petition was dismissed.
Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992, a Motion to intervene with the DARAB
claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests as the party who tended and had the mango
trees bear fruits this season". On May 7, 1992 private respondent filed a complaint for
 Annulment/Cancellation of Saleand Document, Redemption with Damages and Preliminary Writ of
Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan. The DARAB suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio's motion for intervention
pending the resolution of the ownership issue. On July 8, 1992, intervenor this time filed with the
DARAB, a motion to withdraw intervenor's deposited share. The Motion was granted and
intervenor was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of the P174,650.00 harvests proceeds with
intervenor Antonio being recognized as the duly constituted tenant of the land. The Court of
Appeals affirmed these orders of the DARAB. Hence, the instant petition for review on Certiorari.
Issue:
 Whether or not the PARAD/DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters even when the
question of ownership is pending resolution with the Regional Trial Courts.
Held:
 For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the
parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to
establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.

76. GAVINO CORPUZ v. Spouses GERONIMO GROSPE

GR No. 135297 June 8, 2000
Facts:
 Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) who, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27,
was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017
and 012) with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and
formerly owned by a certain Florentino Chioco. On January 20, 1982, petitioner mortgaged the
subject land in favor of Virginia de Leon to pay for his wife's hospitalization. Upon the expiration of
the contract, petitioner again mortgaged the property to herein respondent Hilaria Grospe [wife of
Geronimo Grospe] for a period of four years (from December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to
guarantee a loan of P32,500.00. The parties even executed a "Kasunduan sa Pagpapahiram ng
Lupang Sakahan" which allowed the respondents to use and/or cultivate the land during the
duration of the mortgage. Petitioner instituted an action for recovery of possession with the DARAB
in Cabanatuan City against the respondents averring that the latter entered the disputed land by
force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991 and destroyed the palay planted on the land.
Respondents in their answer claimed that the petitioner himself allowed them to take over the
possession and cultivation of the property until the latter has paid his loan. However, instead of
paying his loan, petitioner had allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights" over the
landholding in consideration in the amount of P54,394.00. Petitioner denied waiving his rights and
claimed that he and his children's signatures appearing on the waiver were forgeries.
 The PARAD ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang
Nayon ng Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija which in turn, had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27
recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses who were the "most
qualified farmer(s)-beneficiaries". The DARAB affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Likewise, petitioners ‘appeal and
subsequent reconsideration thereof were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
 Whether or not the waiver executed by the petitioner null and void for being contrary to agrarian
laws.
Held:
 The court have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a
Certificate of Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or
through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal
system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus, negating the government's
program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil.

77. JAIME P. CORPIN v. AMOR S. VIVAR

GR No. 137350 June 19, 2000
Facts:
 Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan covered
by TCT No. T-299732 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Private respondent Amor S. Vivar is
in possession of said parcel of land. Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against the private
respondent with the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan. For failure to timely file his Answer
with Motion to Dismiss the court deemed the case submitted for judgment and rendered a decision
ordering private respondent to vacate the land in dispute. Private respondent appealed the case to
the Regional Trial Court and submitted documents to support his claim that he is a tenant of the
petitioner's lot. The Regional Trial Court in turn, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the said Decision with the Court of Appeals.
The latter upheld the Regional Trial Court's finding and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in ruling that there was a landlord-tenant relationship
between the parties.
Held:
 In the case of Bayog vs. Natino which the appellate court cited, we held that the metropolitan circuit
trial court, which dismissed defendant's Answer for having been filed out of time and decided the
case based on the allegations in the complaint, should not have disregarded defendant's Answer
and should have heard and received the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it
had jurisdiction over the case. What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the
following: (1) Pagtitibay dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel Torres, Chairman of the BARC of
Tabang; (2) Affidavit of Dr. Teodoro Placido dated April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Ambrosio T. Mendoza dated April 22, 1996; and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay of private respondent
dated April 22, 1996. Considering the foregoing, it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing
whereby both parties may present evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal trial
court's jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court's finding that there exists a
landlordtenant relationship between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the
documents attached by private respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court only on
appeal and were not previously presented to the municipal trial court, must be set aside due to
insufficiency of evidence.

78. KSMP, INC. vs. DARAB

GR No. 139051 June 26, 2000
Facts:
 The case stemmed from the Order dated May 27, 1975 by then DAR Secretary Conrado Estrella
granting the request for conversion of 1,837.30 hectares of agricultural land situated in Nasugbu,
Batangas into residential, commercial, industrial and other urban purposes. In essence, the Order
stated that the subject land is not economically suited for agricultural cultivation and that if there
are any tenant-tillers, disturbance compensation should be paid to them in accordance with law.
Fifteen (15) occupants assisted by the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) claiming to be tenants of a
forty-four (44) hectare portion filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. But prior to
such, former President Ferdinand B. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 on November 27, 1975
declaring the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate, Cavite and Nasugbu, Batangas as tourist
zones more suitable for residential, commercial, industrial and urban uses. In December 1989,
apparently unaware of the conversion orders and presidential proclamation, then DAR Secretary
Miriam Defensor-Santiago issued Notices of Acquisition dated December 14-27, 1989. Private
respondents, Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, filed their objections to these Santiago notices. Thereafter,
on January 22, 1991, Secretary Benjamin T. Leong who succeeded Secretary Santiago ruled on the
validity of the questioned Order issued on May 27, 1975 and denied the Motion for Reconsideration
holding that pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, Maragondon, Ternate and Nasugbu are declared as
tourist zones. On May 14, 1991, the private respondents filed a Petition with the DARAB docketed as
DARAB Case No. 0335 for the purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders which in effect
suggested the manner of invalidating the Santiago Notices as it was contrary to the Leong Order of
January 22, 1991. Petitioner KSMP filed a complaint-inintervention on the aforementioned case.
This was dismissed by the DAR. Subsequently, KSMP filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals docketed as G.R. No. 47813 imputing grave abuse of discretion on the DARAB. The CA
dismissed the same. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
 Whether or not the petitioner has the right to intervene and is a proper party-in-interest in the
subject controversy.
Held:
 The Supreme Court find no error with the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause is lost considering
that the Conversion Orders have long become final and executory. There was, therefore, no more
case to which it could intervene. The complaint-in-intervention was, therefore, correctly dismissed
pursuant to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner's insistence that there was no final
disposition yet of the conversion case, as in fact, DARAB Case No. 0335 was initiated by the private
respondents is untenable. A perusal of the records reveal that DARAB Case No. 0335 was filed by the
private respondents for the purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders particularly the fixing
of the final disturbance compensation to the legitimate farmer-occupants. The complaint-in-
intervention, however, puts in issue petitioner's alleged tenancy relationship and security of tenure
which the DARAB does not have any jurisdiction. Furthermore, petitioner, a juridical entity, has no
personality to file the instant petition to intervene in the case as the real parties-in-interest are the
members thereof who were not even recognized as the rightful tenants occupying the subject land.
As observed by the DAR, "members of petitioner are merely holding on to expectancy that they will
become the beneficiaries assuming that the land is still capable." The fact, however, remains that
the land in question has already been excluded from the purview of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) by the Estrella and Leong Orders which had long become final and executory.

79. REYNALDO BEJASA AND ERLINDA BEJAS v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 108941 July 6, 2000
Facts:
 On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-infact,
having power of administration over the disputed land. On October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered
into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a term of one year.
On December 30, 1984, the Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of an
"aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with aterm of one year. After the aryenduhan
expired, despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and
did not give any consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or share harvest. On February 15,
1988, the Bejasas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint for
confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery of damages against Isabel Candelaria and
Jaime Dinglasan, and the trial court ruled i favour of the Bejasas. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
 Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship between the owner and the Bejasas.
Held:
 The elements of the tenancy relationship are: (1) There are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject is agricultural land; (3) there is sharing of harvests. Candelaria and the Bejasas, between
them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as land owner never gave her consent. Even
assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy
agreement, there is no proof that they did.

80. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP

GR No. 152640 June 15, 2006
Facts:
 The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) seeks the nullification of the Order of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals granting PHILCOMSAT's application for the exemption of its 700
hectare land being subject to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. The controversy
involves a parcel of land owned situated within the area which had been declared a security zone
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848.
 A Notice of coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by petitioner DAR informing the former that the land
in question shall be place under CARP compulsory acquisition scheme PHILCOMSAT sought an
exemption of the subject property from CARP coverage insisting that the land will be utilize for the
expansion of its operations. Respondent's application was rejected by the Sec. Garilao citing the
reason among others that the term "security zone" is not embraced within the definition of lands
used for national defense under Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657.
Issue:
 Whether or not the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a security zone
under P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. no. 1848, can be subjected to CARP
Held:
 The SC agree with the CA when it stated that the subject property is clearly within the scope of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law had it not been decreed by P.D. No. 1845 that it is a security
zone. The very purpose by which P.D. 1845 was passed declaring the area within a radius of three
kilometers surrounding the satellite earth station in Baras, Rizal a security zone is to protect and
insure the safety and interrupted operation of the modern media of international communications
in the said property, as indicated in the whereas clause of said law. Thus, to subject said security
zone to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government would negate the very
purpose by which P.D. 1845, as revised by P.D. 1848 was decreed. These laws have never been
repealed. P.D. 1848 is also specific in that occupation of the area, either by the owners or their bona
 fide tenants, require a prior written permission or authority from the Ministry of the National
Defense, now Department of National Defense. It is therefore the Department of National Defense
which will determine [x x x] who can occupy the subject property, and not the Department of the
Agrarian Reform.

81. ISLANDERS CARP-FARMERS BENEFICIARIES MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. v. LAPANDAY

AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
GR No. 159089 May 3, 2006
Facts:
 On March 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint Production Agreement for Islanders
Carp-Farmer Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. with Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation. Almost three years after, petitioner, represented by its alleged chairman
Manuel K. Asta filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus, Damages, with
prayer for Preliminary Injunction against respondent. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended
complaint with leave of court alleging that the persons, who executed the contract, were not
authorized by it. Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has primary, exclusive and original jurisdiction.
 On August 21, 1996, respondent then filed a case at the DARAB for Breach of Contract, Specific
Performance, Injunction with Restraining Order, Damages and Attorney's fees. The DARAB decided
the case in favor of respondent declaring the Joint Production Agreement as valid and binding. The
RTC then issued its decision of October 18, 1999 dismissing the case. Finding the relationship
between the parties to be agricultural leasehold, the CA held that the issue fell squarely within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. Hence, the appellate court rules that the RTC had correctly dismissed the
Complaint filed by petitioner. Petitioner contends that, there being no tenancy or leasehold
relationship between the parties this case does not constitute an agrarian dispute that falls within
the DARAB's jurisdiction.
Issue:
 Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the controversy.
Held:
 The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is vested with the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform. Through Executive Order 129-A the President of the Philippines created the DARAB
and authorized it to assume the powers and function of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases.

82. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE BERNARDO V. SALUDANES
GR No. 146581 December 13, 2005
Facts:
 The instant case stemmed from twenty – one (21) petitions for just compensation filed on April 6,
1999 by several landowners with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), herein petitioner and the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) was impleaded as respondents. The petitions involve several tracts of land
forming part of a banana plantation operated by the AMS Group of Companies, one of herein
respondents. Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the landowners
offered to sell these parcels of land to the government.
 The Special Agrarian Court consolidated the cases and named a panel of Commissioners to receive
and evaluate evidence on the amount of compensation to be paid to the landowners. After trial, the
 Special Agrarian Court admitted and approved the Appraisal Report of the Commissioners. On
February 7, 2000, the said court rendered its joint Decision fixing, as it has judiciously determined,
the just compensation for the landholdings and the improvements of all the herein petitioners in all
these above – captioned docketed agrarian cases.
 Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Special Agrarian Court. The
LBP filed with the same court a Notice of Appeal. A few days after, the DAR also filed its Notice of
Appeal. Both notices of appeal was denied by the SAC.
Issue:
 Whether or not the untimely filing of the petition for certiorari is exempted from the operation of
Section 4, Rule 65 by reasons of justice and equity.
Held:
 Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides; SEC. 4. When and
where petition filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the sixty day period shall be counted notice of the denial of
said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the act or omission of
a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer, or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, if it involves the acts
or omissions of a quasi – judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed in and recognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

83. HEIRS OF JULIAN DELA CRUZ AND LEONORA TALARO v. HEIRS OF ALBERTO CRUZ
GR No. 162890 November 22, 2005
Facts:
 Sometime in 1950, the DAR allocated a portion of the property in favor of Julian Dela Cruz, herein
petitioner, who was a tenant thereon. Such portion was identified as Lot No. 778 with an area of
3.362 hectares, subsequently, In September 1960, the Republic of the Philippines sold the said to
Julian Dela Cruz by virtue of an Agreement to Sell.
 On September 27, 1960, the DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. AS-5323 in his favor as
the qualified tenant of the landholding. Julian bound and obliged himself to pay the amortizations
over the land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the property and made payments to the
government for a period of almost 20 years. He died in 1979 and was survived by his wife, Leonora
Talaro-dela Cruz and their 10 children, including Mario and Maximino dela Cruz.
 In May 1980, Leonora dela Cruz executed a private document, with the consent of her children, sold
the land in favor of Alberto, who took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over a period
of 10 years without any protest from Leonora and her children. He then filed an application to
purchase the property with the DAR.
 On June 27, 1991, the DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA No. 51750 over the property in favor
of Alberto Cruz, and the certificate was registered with the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
 On August 15, 1991, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. CLOA- 0-
3035 over the landholding in favor of Alberto Cruz. The title contained an annotation prohibiting the
beneficiary from selling or transferring the landholding within a period of 10 years from issuance,
except to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).
 On October 10, 1996, Leonora and her 10 children filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the following: the order of the PARO, CLOA No.
51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 issued in favor of Alberto Cruz.
 On November 16, 1990, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order approving
the recommendation of the MARO. He directed the cancellation of Julian’s CLT and declared that
whatever rights Julian had over the landholding and payments made in favor of the government
under the Agreement to sell were forfeited.
 After due proceedings, the PARAD granted the petition in a Decision dated July 9, 1997. It declared
that the petitioners were the rightful allocates of the property, and directed the MARO to cancel
CLOA No. 51750 and TCT No. CLOA -0-3035 and issue another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto
was ordered to vacate the property. The PARAD also directed the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija
to cancel the said title and issue a new one over the landholding in favor of the petitioners.
 Alberto appealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD on June 19,
2000. The DARAB ruled that the rights of the petitioners as farmers-beneficiaries could not be
transferred or waived except through hereditary succession or to the government, conformably with
agrarian reform laws and that the private document Leonora executed may be assailed by her
children 109 by Julian, who were not privies thereto. The DARAB also ruled that in executing the
private document, Leonora failed to comply with DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8
 In a Decision dated March 31, 2003, the CA granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the
petition of the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz in the PARAD for lack of jurisdiction. The CA declared that
there was no tenancy relationship between respondent Alberto and the said heirs; hence, the
DARAB had no jurisdiction over the petition. It declared that the issue before the DARAB was the
rightful ownership over the landholding.
Issue:
 Whether or not the DAR adjudication board has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
 The Court agrees with the petitioner’s contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have
jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants
to whom CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction
and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian reform
laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction
of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARABs
lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.

84. CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) V. THE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM
GR No. 183409 June 18, 2009
Facts:
 Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella organization of some 3,500 private
corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships and individuals directly or indirectly involved in
land and housing development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and
supply, and services in the various related fields of engineering, architecture, community planning
and development financing.
 The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is the duly appointive head of the DAR
whose administrative issuances are the subject of this petition. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform
issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, and then subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the
 Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on
the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses, amending and updating the previous
rules on land use conversion.
 On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e.,
DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion, which further
amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent
therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural
to nonagricultural uses or to another agricultural use, thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform amended certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-
07, particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.
 To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which
temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.
 Petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation of Section 65] of
Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to
nonagricultural uses or to other agricultural uses, such as the conversion of agricultural lands or
areas that have been reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988. According to
petitioner, there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law
that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or
reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority. Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slowdown of housing projects, which, in
turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the
substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.
Issue:
 Whether the DAR Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion by
issuing and enforcing DAR AO # 01-02, as amended which regulate reclassified lands as some
provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.
Held:
 The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were
done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative functions and not of judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. In issuing the aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
never made any adjudication of rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for
he never exercised any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and
administrative functions.

85. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. DELIA T. SUTTON

GR No. 162070 October 19, 2005
Facts:
 Respondents inherited a land in Masbate which has been exclusively devoted to cow and calf
breeding, the respondents made a voluntary offer to sell their land to DAR to avail of certain
 incentives under the law. When CARP took effect, it included to its coverage farms used for raising
livestock, poultry and swine.
 Since, SC en banc declared lands devoted to poultry and livestock not included in the definition of
agricultural land in Luz Farms Case, respondents filed with DAR a formal request to withdraw their
offer to sell saying that their land is exempted from the coverage of CARL.
 Since, SC en banc declared lands devoted to poultry and livestock not included in the definition of
agricultural land in Luz Farms Case, respondents filed with DAR a formal request to withdraw their
offer to sell saying that their land is exempted from the coverage of CARL.
 In 1995, DAR partially granted the application of the respondents for exemption applying the
retention limits (1hectare:1head of animal) with such, some portion of respondent's land were
exempted, some portion were segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. Respondents
moved for reconsideration saying that the entire portion of the land must be exempted because it
was solely devoted to cattle-raising, their motion was denied.
 They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing the constitutionality of CARL
and pushing their application for exemption. The President affirmed the order of DAR. On appeal,
CA declared the DAR Administrative Order (retention limits) null and void, favoring the respondents.
Issue:
 Whether or not DAR A.O prescribing a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to
livestock raising constitutional.
Held:
 The Court finds that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought
to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,
swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and
poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or
agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming.
It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is
in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage,
waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive
warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and
digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks,
pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.

86. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. ROBERTO J. CUENCA

GR No. 154112 September 23, 2004
Facts:
 Private respondent Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in La Carlota City and
devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane. The MARO of La Carlota City issued and sent a
NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the landholding under the compulsory
coverage of R.A. 6657. The NOTICE OF COVERAGE also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) will determine the value of the subject land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405. Private
respondent Cuenca filed with the RTC for Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of
Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405. Cuenca alleged that the implementation of CARP in his
landholding is no longer with authority of law considering that, if at all, the implementation should
have commenced and should have been completed between June 1988 to June 1992; that Executive
Order No. 405 amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional
 considering that then President Corazon Aquino no longer had law-making powers; that the NOTICE
OF COVERAGE is a gross violation of PD 399.
 Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab
initio. The respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist
from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of
the value of the subject land. The DAR thereafter filed before the CA a petition for certiorari
assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
 Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was
mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) had jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had the
power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.
Issue:
 Whether or not the complaint filed by the private respondent is an agrarian reform and within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court.
Held:
 Yes. A careful perusal of respondents Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs
prayed for refer -- not to the pure question of law spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality of EO
405 -- but to the annulment of the DARs Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of the
allegations is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following
averments. The main subject matter raised by private respondent before the trial court was not the
issue of compensation. Note that no amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the
DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to invoke the courts function of determining just compensation.
To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage constitutes the first necessary step towards the
acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates to the
implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR
could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly
constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.

87. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

GR No. 140847 September 23, 2005
Facts:
 Petitioner Hospicio de San Jose de Barili ("Hospicio") is a charitable organization created as a body
corporate in 1925 by Act No. 3239. The law was enacted in order to formally accept the offer made
by Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui to establish a home for the care and support, free of charge, of
indigent invalids and incapacitated and helpless persons.
 The Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) Region VII issued an order ordaining
that two parcels of land owned by the Hospicio be placed under Operation Land Transfer in favor of
twenty-two (22) tillers thereof as beneficiaries. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, a land reform law,
was cited as legal basis for the order. The Hospicio filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
order with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary, citing the aforementioned Section 4
of Act No. 3239. It argued that Act No. 3239 is a special law, which could not have been repealed by
P.D. No. 27, a general law, or by the latter's general repealing clause.
 The DAR Secretary rejected the motion for reconsideration in an Order held that P.D. No. 27 was a
special law, as it applied only to particular individuals in the State, specifically the tenants of rice and
corn lands. Moreover, P.D. No. 27, which covered all rice and corn lands, provides no exemptions
 based on the manner of acquisition of the land by the landowner. The Order of the 91 | P a g e DAR
Secretary was assailed in a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals which the latter, the
Court of Appeals and hereby, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DAR Secretary's issuance. It
sustained the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) position that Section 4 of Act No.
3239 was expressly repealed not only by P.D. No. 27, but also by Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, both laws being explicit in mandating
the distribution of agricultural lands to qualified beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals further noted
that the subject lands did not fall among the exemptions provided under Section 10 of Rep. Act No.
6657. The appellate court brought into play the aims of land reform, affirming as it did "the need to
distribute and create an economic equilibrium among the inhabitants of this land, most especially
those with less privilege in life, our peasant farmer.
 Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeals' Decision, petitioner filed Petition for Review.
Issue:
 Whether or not provision in Section 4 of Act No. 3239 prohibiting the sale of the properties donated
to the charitable organization that was incorporated by the same law bars the implementation of
agrarian reform laws as regards said properties.
Held:
 Under Section 4 of the CARL, place under coverage are all public and private agricultural lands
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, subject to the exempted lands listed
in Section 10 thereof. We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither P.D. No. 27 nor the CARL
exempts the lands of the Hospicio or other charitable institutions from the coverage of agrarian
reform. Ultimately, the result arrived at in the assailed issuances should be affirmed. Nonetheless,
both the DAR Secretary and the appellate court failed to appreciate what to this Court is indeed the
decisive legal dimension of the case.  Agrarian reform is justified under the State's inherent power
of eminent domain that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon
payment of just compensation to the owner. It has even been characterized as beyond the
traditional exercise of eminent domain, but a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

88. JOSE LUIS ROS v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

GR No. 132477 August 31, 2005
Facts:
 The case stems from a denial of the application for conversion before the Regional Office of Dar
Region 7 disallowing the application for conversion filed by petitioners, owners/ developers of
several parcels of land located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. The application was based on Municipal
Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Mun. Council of Balamban, Cebu which reclassified such lands as
industrial lands. Said ordinance was approved by the Provincial Board of Cebu on April 3, 1995.
Because of such disapproval, petitioners filed with the RTC of Toledo City a complaint for Injunction
with application of TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction ruling that it is DAR which has jurisdiction citing section 20 of the Local Government
Code.
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the same and the Court of
Appeals ordered the Public respondent to file their comments on the petition. Two sets of
comments from Public respondents, one from DAR provincial Office and another form the office of
the solicitor general, were submitted, to which petitioners filed their consolidated reply. Petitioners
claim that local grants have the power to reclassify portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the
conditions set forth in Section 20 of the Local Government Code that if agricultural lands sought to
be reclassified by the local government is one which has already been brought under the coverage
 of the CARL and/or which has been distributed to ARBs, then such reclassification must be
confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its authority under Section 65 of the CARL, in order for the
reclassification to become effective, that if the land sought to be classified is not covered by CARL
and not distributed to ARBs, then no confirmation from DAR is necessary.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to issue a writ of injunction
against the DAR.
Held:
 The petition lacks merit. The authority of DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered
by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local
Government Code. The code explicitly provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of RA no 6657. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially
been lodged with an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform case,
jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform, more specifically, in the DARAB.

89. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD

GR No. 127198 May 16, 2005
Facts:
 This is a Petition for Review dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner
Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per
square meter as just compensation for the States acquisition of private respondents properties
under the land reform program.
 On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of
just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by
the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents
the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as corespondents
the registered tenants of the land.
Issue:
 Whether or not the just compensation that was provided was proper.
Held:
 Landbank’s contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October
21, 1972, the time of effectively of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of
the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In
office of the President, Malacanang Manila vs CA, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did
not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just
compensation. In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents
for their property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway,
market value, assessors’ value and the volume and value of its produce. This court is convinced that
the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in
accordance with, and guided by RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence. Wherefore, the petition is
DENIED, Costs against petitioner.

90. PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 142359 May 25, 2004
Facts:
 Petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
49363,which set aside and reversed the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board(DARAB) and reinstated the decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(PARAD) of Trece Martirez City, which, in turn, ordered the dismissal of the complaint for
Maintenance for Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction of petitioner Pasong Bayabas Farmers
Association, Inc. (PBFAI).
Issue:
 Whether or not the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL).
Held:
 The contention of the petitioners has no merit. Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, agricultural
lands refer to lands devoted to agriculture as conferred in the said law and not classified as
industrial land. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable or suitable lands that do not
include commercial, industrial and residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides that it covers
all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised
or that can be raised thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. In executing the
said deeds, the members of the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the
property. Hence, they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same. DAR has
jurisdiction over all controversies involving the implementation of agrarian reform program.

91. VICENTE ADRIANO V. ALICE TANCO

GR No. 168164 July 5, 2010
Facts:
 A Complaint was filed by Vicente before the regional office of DARAB in Region III averring that he is
a tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation of a land owned by respondent and has been
performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of the mango
trees which were then divided equally between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to
improve and establish his home within the premises. However, respondents denied having
instituted any tenant on their property. They stressed that Vicente is not a tenant but only a mere
regular farm worker of the respondent for the specific purpose of spraying the mango trees. The
decision of PARAD was rendered in favor of Vicente which was then affirmed by the DARAB.
Respondents filed a Petition for Review to the CA contending, among others, that Vicente was hired
as a caretaker and, therefore, the nature of their relationship is that of an employer-employee
relationship; and, there is no proof that the parties share in the harvest. Furthermore, respondents
insisted that the agreed engagement of services of Vicente for the specific purpose of spraying the
mango trees was made upon the intercession of the MARO, who emphasized that the same would
not ripen into tenancy relationship. CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents. Hence, the
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed and
set aside the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Issue:
 Whether or not the findings of the PARAD and the DARAB that Vicente is a bona fide tenant is
supported by substantial evidence.
Held:
 Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they
agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the
landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on
 and cultivating the land. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations
that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure.[24] For tenancy relationship
to exist, the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4)
the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there
is sharing of the harvests between the parties.[25] All the requisites must concur in order to
establish the existence of tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is
fatal.[26] The SC affirm the findings of the CA that the essential requisites of consent and sharing are
lacking.

92. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION

BOARD
GR No. 175200 May 4, 2010
Facts:
 Respondent Mateo Villaruz, Sr. (Villaruz) was asked to work as a tenant of an Estate’s sevenhectare
rice field in order to prevent the land from falling into the hands of squatters. It had a house
constructed on the lot for Villaruz and engaged his daughter and son-in-law to serve as co-tenants.
As it later turned out, the Estate mortgaged Lot 916 to a bank, resulting in its foreclosure when the
loan could not be paid. Petitioner National Housing Authority (NHA) bought the lot. Later that year,
the Department of Public Works and Highways constructed roads and bridges that passed through a
portion of the lot. As a result, some plants and crops had to be cut down, prompting respondent
Villaruz to demand payment of their value. When the demand was not heeded, respondent Villaruz
filed an action for damages and disturbance compensation against petitioner NHA and the Estate
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) who as well dismissed the same. Later on, respondent Villaruz
filed a complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) seeking recognition as
tenant beneficiary of the lot he tenanted and praying that his possession of its three-hectare portion
be maintained. After hearing, the PARAD ruled in Villaruz’s favor with respect to such portion
provided he paid 25% of his net harvest to petitioner NHA until a fixed rental could be set. But he
could not be declared owner of the lot since it had ceased to be private agricultural land, having
been bought by the government. Petitioner NHA then appealed the PARAD decision to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which affirmed the same. Undaunted,
the NHA appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered a decision, affirming the questioned
decisions of the PARAD and the DARAB. Hence, the present petition for review.
Issue:
 Whether or not all lands acquired by the National Housing Authority (NHA) for its resettlement and
housing efforts is beyond the scope of agrarian laws.
Held:
 This Court ruled that P.D. 1472 exempts from land reform those lands that petitioner NHA acquired
for its housing and resettlement programs whether it acquired those lands when the law took effect
or afterwards. The language of the exemption is clear: the exemption covers "lands or property
acquired x x x or to be acquired" by NHA. Its Section 1 does not make any distinction whether the
land petitioner NHA acquired is tenanted or not. When the law does not distinguish, no distinction
should be made. In addition, Section 1 of P.D. 1472 provides that petitioner NHA shall not be liable
for disturbance compensation. Since only tenants working on agricultural lands can claim
disturbance compensation, the exemption assumes that NHA may have to acquire such kinds of land
for its housing program. If the exemption from payment of disturbance compensation applied only
to untenanted lands, then such exemption would be meaningless or a superfluity.
93. HEIRS OF LORENZO AND CARMEN VIDAD AND AGVID CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. V. LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 166461 April 30, 2010
Facts:
 A parcel of land was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657
or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Of the entire area, the government only
acquired 490.3436 hectares. LBP who has the primary responsibility to determine the valuation and
compensation for all lands LBP computed the initial value of the land at P2,961,333.03 for 490.3436
hectares. The owners rejected the valuation and filed Petition for Review to Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) who dismissed said petition. As second petition for review
asking for re-evaluation was filed to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who issued
to LBP and Order re-compute the value of the land. LBP revalued the land atP4,158,947.13 for
402.3835 hectares andP1,467,776.34 for 43.8540 hectares. Still, such was rejected by the
petitioners. Case was then instituted before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of
Tuguegarao (RARAD) for the purpose of determining the just compensation for their land. In a
decision dated 29 March 2000, the RARAD fixed the just compensation for the land at
P32,965,408.46. Petitioners manifested their acceptance thereof. LBP moved for reconsideration
but was denied by RARAD. Thus, filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the
RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Petitioners moved to dismiss LBPs petition on the
ground of res judicata. SAC rendered a decision, based on LBPs evidence alone, fixing the just
compensation at P5,626,724.47 for the 446.2375 hectares of the land. Petitioners filed an appeal to
the CA questioning the authority of the SAC to give due course to the petition of LBP, claiming that
the RARAD has concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC over just compensation but was denied.
Issue:
 Whether or not SAC can assume jurisdiction over the petition for determination of just
compensation filed by respondent after the RARAD had rendered its decision of 29 March 2000 and
a writ of execution is issued.
Held:
 The procedure for the determination of just compensation under RA 6657, commences with LBP
determining the value of the lands under the land reform program. Using LBPs valuation, the DAR
makes an offer to the landowner through a notice sent to the landowner, pursuant to Section 16(a)
of RA 6657. In case the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR adjudicator conducts a summary
administrative proceeding to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner,
the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A
party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC
designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final determination of just compensation. Contrary to
petitioners argument, the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do not exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the
SAC in just compensation cases. The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature

94. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

GR No. 173085 January 29, 2011
Facts:
 In late 2003 respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), a government
corporation, filed several expropriation actions before the various branches of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City, for acquisition of lands needed for the construction of the Subic-Clark-
Tarlac Expressway Project. Ten of these cases were raffled to Branch 58 of the court 1 and it is these
that are the concern of the present petition.
 The defendants in Branch 58 cases were respondents Armando Simbillo, Christian Marcelo, Rolando
David, Ricardo Bucud, Pablo Santos, Agrifina Enriquez, Conrado Espeleta, Catgerube Castro, Carlito
Mercado, and Alfredo Suarez. They were the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they
acquired as beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform program. Another defendant was
Land Bank of the Philippines, the mortgagee of the lands by virtue of the loans it extended for their
acquisition. The lands in these cases were located in Porac and Floridablanca, Pampanga.
 On learning of the expropriation cases before Branch 58, petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB)
filed motions to intervene in all the cases with attached complaints-in-intervention, a remedy that it
adopted in similar cases with the other branches. PVB alleged that the covered properties actually
belonged to Belmonte Agro-Industrial Development Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in
1976. PVB had since foreclosed on the mortgages and bought the same at public auction in 1982.
Unfortunately, the bank had been unable to consolidate ownership in its name.
 But, in its order of August 18, 2004, Branch 58 denied PVB's motion for intervention on the ground
that the intervention amounts to a third-party complaint that is not allowed in expropriation cases
and that the intervention would delay the proceedings in the cases before it.
 PVB filed its motion for reconsideration but Branch 58 denied the same, prompting the bank to file a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). On January 26, 2006 the CA rendered a
decision, dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It also denied in a resolution dated June 2, 2006 5
PVB's motion for reconsideration.
 Meanwhile, on April 3, 2006 Branch 58 issued separate decisions in all 10 cases before it, granting
the expropriation of the subject properties. The court noted the uncertainty as to the ownership of
such properties but took no action to grant BCDA's prayer in its complaint that it determine the
question of ownership of the same pursuant to Section 9, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Issue:
 Whether or not the CA erred in holding that PVB was not entitled to intervene in the expropriation
cases before Branch 58 of the Angeles City RTC.
Held:
 The Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 26,
2006 and its resolution dated June 2, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP 88144. PVB's point regarding the authority
of the court in expropriation cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting claims over the ownership of
the lands involved in such cases is valid. But such rule obviously cannot apply to PVB for the
following reason,(1) At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases, its conflict with
the farmer beneficiaries who held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs emanating from such titles were already
pending before Angeles City RTC Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court. Branch 58 had no
authority to preempt Branch 62 of its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were already
pending before it.

95. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP.

GR No. 178895 January 10, 2011
Facts:
 On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga issued a Notice of
Coverage to petitioner with regards to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently
placed under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).
 On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), Davao
Oriental, and an Application for Exemption of the lots covered by TCT No. T-12637 and T-12639 from
CARP coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of
 land are exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares
are used for grazing and habitat of petitioner's 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of
goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL). That the presence of livestock have already existed in the area prior to the Supreme Court
decision on LUZ FARMS vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. We were surprised however, why the
management of the corporation did not apply for Commercial Farm Deferment (CFD) before, when
the two years reglamentary period which the landowner was given the chance to file their
application pursuant to R.A. 6657, implementing Administrative Order No. 16, Series of 1989.
 However, with regards to what venture comes first, coconut or livestocks, majority of the
farmworkers including the overseer affirmed that the coconut trees and livestocks were
simultaneously and all of these were inherited by his (applicant) parent. In addition, the financial
statement showed 80% of its annual income is derived from the livestocks and only 20% from the
coconut industry.
 On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T-12635 covering Lots 1454-A & 1296 was cancelled and a new one
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under RP T-16356. On February 7, 1994,
petitioner through its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letter-affidavit addressed to the
respondentSecretary requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on
the ground that they needed the additional area for its livestock business.
 The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated March 5, 1997
denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly
shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its
application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area. The
application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved.
 In the assailed Decision dated 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC
Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels of land (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos. T-12637 and
T- 12639) located in Barrio Don Enrique Lopez (the "Lopez lands") from coverage of the CARL.
However, it upheld the Decisions of the Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the
application for exemption with respect to Lots 1454-A and 1296 (previously under TCT No. T-12635)
in Barrio Limot (the "Limot lands"). These lots were already covered by a new title under the name
of the Republic of the Philippines (RP T-16356).
 The DAR and SNLABC separately sought a partial reconsideration of the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, but their motions for reconsideration were subsequently denied in the Court of
Appeals Resolution dated 08 June 2007.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Lopez and Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABC's
livestock business.
Held:
 The Petitions of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp.
are dismissed, and the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the DAR Regional Director are hereby
affirmed. On the other hand, the Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for
livestock and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL, while, the Limot lands of SNLABC
are not actually and directly being used for livestock and should thus be covered by the CARL. In
contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber
and are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage.

96. ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., vs. DAMBA-NFSW

GR No. 149548 December 14, 2010
Facts:
 Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27,
1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the
President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15,
1988. Before the law’s effectivity, on May 6, 1988, Roxas & Co. filed with respondent DAR a
voluntary offer to sell (VOS) Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance
with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 Roxas & Co., through its President, sent a letter to the Secretary of
DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,Batangas
allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural.
 As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential
Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE
IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURISTZONE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for conversion of its three
haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520
which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its
pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates
of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three Haciendas including CLOA
No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No.
167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for exemption from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR
Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994 which states that all lands already classified as
commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion
clearance from the DAR.
Issue:
 Whether or not PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism
zone to non-agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.’s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP
coverage.
Held:
 PP 1520 did not automatically convert the agricultural lands in the three municipalities including
Nasugbu to non-agricultural lands. Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three
municipalities as each constituting a tourism zone, reclassified all lands therein to tourism and,
therefore, converted their use to non-agricultural purposes. The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520
identified only "certain areas in the sector comprising the three Municipalities that have potential
tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific
geographic areas" to achieve its purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential tourism areas are. In the above-cited case of Roxas
& Co. v. CA, the Court made it clear that the "power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad
and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law lies with the Department of 124 Agrarian Reform, not with this Court." The
DAR, an administrative body of special competence, denied, by Order, the application for CARP
exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did not automatically reclassify all the lands in the
affected municipalities from their original uses. A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential
tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone clearly does not
allocate, reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes.
Neither does said proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall already
 be used for purposes other than agricultural.Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a
reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands,
or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic and sweeping exemption from
CARP in the name of tourism development. The same would also undermine the land use
reclassification powers vested in local government units in conjunction with pertinent agencies of
government. There being no reclassification, it is clear that said proclamations/issuances, assuming
took effect before June 15, 1988,could not supply a basis for exemption of the entirety of the lands
embraced therein from CARP coveraged. To reiterate, PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential
tourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism zones. It did not
reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use. A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of conversion
before one is permitted to use it for other purposes.

97. JOSE MENDOZA v. NARCISO GERMINO

GR No. 165676 November 22, 2010
Facts:
 On June 27, 1988, the petitioner and Aurora C. Mendoza (plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for
forcible entry.
 The plaintiffs claimed that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in
Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34267.
Sometime in 1988, respondent Narciso unlawfully entered the subject property by means of
strategy and stealth, and without their knowledge or consent. Despite the plaintiffs repeated
demands, respondent Narciso refused to vacate the subject property.
 On August 9, 1988, respondent Narciso filed his answer, claiming, among others, that his brother,
respondent Benigno Germino, was the plaintiffs agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter
in the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household.
 After several postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent
Narciso. Without conducting a hearing, and despite respondent Narcisos objection, the MTC issued
an order on October 27, 1995, remanding the case to the DARAB, Cabanatuan City for further
proceedings. On December 14, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), impleading respondent Benigno as additional defendant.
 The PARAD found that the respondents were mere usurpers of the subject property, PARAD ordered
the respondents to vacate the subject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as actual
damages.
 Not satisfied, the respondents filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB, arguing that the case should
have been dismissed because the MTCs referral to the DARAB was void with the enactment of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which repealed the rule on referral under Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 316.
 The DARAB held that it acquired jurisdiction because of the amended complaint that sufficiently
alleged an agrarian dispute, not the MTCs referral of the case. Thus, it affirmed the PARAD decision.
The CA found that the MTC erred in transferring the case to the DARAB since the material
allegations of the complaint and the relief sought show a case for forcible entry, not an agrarian
dispute. It noted that the subsequent filing of the amended complaint did not confer jurisdiction
upon the DARAB. Thus, the CA set aside the DARAB decision and remanded the case to the MTC for
further proceedings.
Issue:
 Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
 Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in his
answer, this did not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. It continued to
have the authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of
the ejectment suit on its merits. After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set
up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. In the present case, instead of
conducting a preliminary conference, the MTC immediately referred the case to the DARAB. This
was contrary to the rules. Besides, Section 2 of P.D. No. 316, which required the referral of a land
dispute case to the Department of Agrarian Reform for the preliminary determination of the
existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship, has indeed been repealed by Section 76 of R.A. No.
6657 in 1988. The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision.
While we lament the lapse of time this forcible entry case has been pending resolution, we are not
in a position to resolve the dispute between the parties since the evidence required in courts is
different from that of administrative agencies.

98. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

GR No. 159674 June 30, 2006
Facts:
 Hacienda Maria Inc. herein private respondent requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings
be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefore, HMI
allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be
covered under Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted
and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and Emancipation Patents (EPs) covering
the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons. In December 1997,
HMI filed with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential
Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not
devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid
therefore. RARAD rendered a decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners
because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established
tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which affirmed
the RARAD Decision. On appeal to the CA, the same was dismissed. Petitioners contended that the
EPs became indefeasible after the expiration of one year from their registration.
Issue:
 Whether or not Emancipation Patents (EPs) have become indefeasible one year after their issuance.
Held:
 After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding
certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential
Decree No. 27, the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection
accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent.
Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it
be decreed to another person.
 99. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM
GR No. 78742 July 14, 1989
Facts:
 The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned
by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O.
No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
 The petitioners questioned P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. They contended that President
Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid
also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention
limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other
requisites of a valid appropriation.
 In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same
may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. In considering
the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of
their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated
because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of
agricultural lands.
Issue:
 Whether or not the argument that EO No. 228, now EO No. 229, should be invalidated because it did
not provide for retention limits is tenable.
Held:
 The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the
Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the
law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares: Retention Limits.
— Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any
public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable
family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as
determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case
shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to
each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15)
years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That
landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep
the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

100. PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., vs. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL

GR No. 79310 July 14, 1989
Facts:
 The case at bar is one of the consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988" The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill
 District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization
composed of 1,400 plantermembers. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No.
131 and E.O. No. 229. The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President.
Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was
convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that,
even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No.
131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on
just compensation, due process, and equal protection. Furthermore, they contend that taking must
be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with
money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
Issue:
 Whether or not it is correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP.
Held:
 Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the
CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the
decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made
by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified
in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.