Case Involves Petition For Prohibition by Jesus Tarrosa, As A "Taxpayer," Questioning The Commission On Appointments

Tarrosa v.
Singson (1994) – CB Gov; list is exclusive
FACTS:
࿿࿿࿿/鑞呔 ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿036 (Eto lang talaga yung facts) In July 2, 1993, Singson was appointed as Governor of the
BSP by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos; his term to be effective on July 6.
࿿࿿࿿/鑞呔 ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿037 Case involves petition for prohibition by Jesus Tarrosa, as a “taxpayer,” questioning the
appointment of Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments
࿿࿿࿿/鑞呔 ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿038 Tarrosa wants Singson not to exercise his functions until his appointment is confirmed by
the COA, and for the Secretary of Budget and Management Salvador Enriquez to not disburse Singson’s salaries and
emoluments
࿿࿿࿿/鑞呔 ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿039 Tarrosa anchors on Sec. 6 of RA 7653, the law which established BSP as the Central
Monetary Authority in the PH. The provision provides:
o Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers and functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised
by the Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board, composed of seven (7)
members appointed by the President of the Philippines for a term of six (6) years.
o The seven (7) members are:
࿿࿿࿿/鑞呔 ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿040 The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of the Monetary Board.
The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable to attend a meeting of the Board, he shall
designate a Deputy Governor to act as his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board shall designate
one of its members as acting Chairman . . ."
࿿࿿࿿/鑞呔 ࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿࿿041 For their defense, Singson and Enriquez claim that Congress exceeded its legislative
powers in requiring COA confirmation of the appointment of the BSP Governor, since such position is not among
the appointments needing confirmation by the COA under the Consti:
o Art. VII, Sec. 16: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
department, agencies, commissions, or boards . . ."
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the appointment of a BSP governor require COA confirmation? – NO
0 Case did not decide on constitutionality of Sec. 6, RA 7653 “in deference to a principle that bars judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question unless the resolution is indispensable for the determination of the case.” (see minor issue why
there’s no need to discuss constitutionality)
1 Nevertheless, case refers to Calderon v. Caralde: Congress cannot by law expand confirmation powers of the COA and
require confirmation of appointment of other gov’t officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Art. VII, Sec. 16
of the Constitution.
(Minor issue; on why SC did not belabor on discussing the constitutionality of RA 7653) Is the action/suit filed proper? – NO
0 The case is a quo warranto proceeding, which seeks the ouster of Singson and that he is unlawfully holding/exercising the
powers of BSP Governor.
1 Such proceeding can only be commenced by the Solicitor General, or by a “person claiming to be entitled to a public
office/position unlawfully held/exercised by another.”
2 In this case, being a “taxpayer,” Tarrosa cannot be the proper party filing for a QW proceeding.
3 Otherwise, it would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, causing incalculable mischief and
hindrance to the efficient.
Concurring opinion, PADILLA, J.
0 Justice Padilla concurs in the decision of dismissing the petition.

1 However, he believes that instead of dismissing the petition based on technical grounds (standing of Tarrosa), the Court
could have just directly applied Calderon v. Carale, to the effect that appointments by the President, which are not among
those requiring COA confirmation, may not, by law, be made subject to the such confirmation.
Pimentel v. Ermita (SUPRA) –ad interim v. acting capacity

Jaigest – PoliRev - 91
Ocampo v. Enriquez (2016) – Marcos burial in LNMB
FACTS:
0 During his campaign for the 2016 Presidential Elections, Duterte publicly announced that he would allow
the burial of former President Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani
o He won.
1 On August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a
Memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya,
regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB
o In compliance to (sic) the verbal order of the President to implement his election campaign promise
to have the remains of former President Marcos interred at the LNMB, kindly undertake all
necessary planning and preparations
o Coordinate closely with the Marcos Family
2 AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto Enriquez issued the following directives to the Philippine Army Commanding
General:
o AFP was to provide services, honors, and other courtesies for the late Former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos as indicated:
0 Vigil
1 Bulger/Drummer
2 Firing Party
3 Military Host/Pallbearers
4 Escort and Transportation
5 Arrival/Departure Honors
5888 His remains lie at Ilocos Norte
23 Interment will take place at the LNMB, Ft. Bonifacio, Taguig City
5888 Provide all necessary military honors accorded for a Presidentå
5889 Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:
5888 Saturnino Ocampo and others in their capacities as human rights advocates or human
rights
violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human
Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).
23 Rene A.V. Saguisag Sr., and his son, as members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his
grandchild.
5888 Representative Edcel Lagman, in his personal capacity, as member of the House of
Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance
(FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims and families of enforced
disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several
others, in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives
of the Philippines.
23 Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, and
several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law
regime of Marcos.
5888 Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, who fought
to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and
taxpayers.
← Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
← Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights
during the martial law regime of Marcos.
← Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, public official and
concerned citizen.
Was the President’s decision to bury Marcos in the LNMB in accordance with the Constitution, the law,
or jurisprudence? – YES.
RE: 1987 Constitution
← Petitioners argue: burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the effect of not just
rewriting history as to the Filipino people's act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning
the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution,
which is a "post-dictatorship charter" and a "human rights constitution."
Jaigest – PoliRev – 1
o Ratification of the 1987 Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism”
o Invoke
← Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27, and 28 of Art. II
← Sec. 17 of Art. VII
← Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV
← Sec. 1 of Art. XI
← Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII
← OSG argues: while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should
not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial
Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
← Provision of Art. II are not self-executing
← Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering that a law should be passed
by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied therein.
o Congress has enacted several laws (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, Ombudsman Act, Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,
Anti-Red Tape Act.)
← To complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has issued various orders,
memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical
standards officials and employees; work flow charts/public transactions; rules and policies
on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and reporting; and client feedback program.
← Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3 (2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is also misplaced.
o Sec. 3 (2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational institutions in teaching the
values of patriotism and nationalism and respect for human rights,
← Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the
recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.
• These provisions contain no direct or indirect prohibitions to Marcos’ interment at the LNMB
← The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the President to "ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed," which is identical to Sec. 1, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, is
likewise not violated by public respondents.
• Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that
the officials and employees of his or her department enforce all laws.
← Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and
proper steps" to carry into execution the law.
← The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is intimately
related to the other executive functions.
← It is best construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power.
← The provision simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the
President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them
RE: R.A. No 289 (An Act Providing For The Construction Of A National Pantheon For Presidents Of The
Philippines, National Heroes And Patriots Of The Country)
← For the perpetuation of their memory and for the inspiration and emulation of this generation and
of generations still unborn, R.A. No. 289 authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the
burial place of the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots.
o Also provided for the creation of a Board on National Pantheon to implement the law.
← Some history:
← On May 12, 1953, President Elpidio R. Quirino approved the site of the National Pantheon at
East Avenue, Quezon City.
← On December 23, 1953, he issued Proclamation No. 431 to formally "withdraw from sale or
settlement and reserve as a site for the construction of the National Pantheon a certain parcel
of land located in Quezon City."
o However, on July 5, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 42 revoking
Proclamation Nos. 422 and 431, both series of 1953, and reserving the parcels of land embraced
therein for national park purposes to be known as Quezon Memorial Park.
← Petitioners argue: Sec. 1 of R.A. No 289 provides for the legal standard by which a person's mortal
remains may be interred at the LNMB, and that AFP Regulations G 161-375 merely implements the law
and should not violate its spirit and intent.
o it is known, both here and abroad, that Marcos' acts and deed — the gross human rights
violations, the massive corruption and plunder of government coffers, and his military record that is
fraught
with myths, factual inconsistencies, and lies — are neither worthy of perpetuation in our memory nor
serve as a source of inspiration and emulation of the present and future generations.
• They maintain that public respondents are not members of the Board on National Pantheon,
which is authorized by the law to cause the burial at the LNMB of the deceased Presidents of the
Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
← SC: petitioners are mistaken
• they miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the LNMB
and the National Pantheon are one and the same
← LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place envisioned in RA No. 289
← The parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was
later on revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that
covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208.
← The National Partheon does not exist.
← To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or the
creation of the Board on National Pantheon.
o This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a
singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national
heroes, and patriots.
← Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, petitioners' allegations must fail.
o To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or
"hero" would be violative of public policy as it will
§ put into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal
remains resting therein, and
§ infringe upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at
the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under existing
laws and regulations.
← Besides, proposed interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains.
o The act in itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero."
p Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal
and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried there the
title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a
"hero."
← Petitioners’ repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors," without showing proof as to
what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative until
the specifics of the interment have been finalized by public respondents.
RE: R.A. No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013)
← Petitioners argue: R.A. No. 10368 modified AFP Regulations G 161-375 by implicitly disqualifying Marcos'
burial at the LNMB
o The legislature, which is a co-equal branch of the government, has statutorily declared his tyranny
as a deposed dictator and has recognized the heroism and sacrifices of the Human Rights
Violations Victims (HRVVs) under his regime.
o The intended act of public respondents damages and makes mockery of the mandatory teaching of
Martial Law atrocities and of the lives and sacrifices of its victims.
o They contend that "reparation" under R.A. No. 10368 is non-judicial in nature but a political action
of the State through the Legislative and Executive branches by providing administrative relief for
the compensation, recognition, and memorialization of human rights victims.
← What is RA 10368?
← In restoring the rights and upholding the dignity of HRVVs, which is part of the right to an effective
remedy, R.A. No. 10368 entitles them to monetary and non-monetary reparation.
Requires the recognition of the violations committed against the HRVVs, regardless of whether
they opt to seek reparation or not.
This is manifested by enshrining their names in the Roll of Human Rights Violations
Victims (Roll) prepared by the Board.
the HRVVs, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 10368 further mandates that:
(1) the database prepared by the Board derived from the processing of claims shall be
turned over to the Commission for archival purposes, and made accessible for the
promotion of human rights to all government agencies and instrumentalities in order to
prevent recurrence of similar abuses, encourage continuing reforms and contribute to
ending impunity;
(2) the lessons learned from Martial Law atrocities and the lives and sacrifices of HRVVs shall
be included in the basic and higher education curricula, as well as in continuing adult
learning, prioritizing those most prone to commit human rights violations; and
(3) the Commission shall publish only those stories of HRVVs who have given prior
informed consent.
SC: This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not
exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law
beyond what it actually contemplates.
o Legislators could have easily inserted a provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the
LNMB as a "reparation" for the HRVVs, but they did not.
o This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there.
The enforcement of the HRVVs' rights under R.A. No. 10368 will surely not be impaired by the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB.
o The assailed act has no causal connection and legal relation to the law.
RE: International Human Rights Laws

Petitioners argue: the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of the HRVVs to "full" and
"effective" reparation, which is provided under
o the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
o the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 2005, and
o the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to
Combat Impunity dated February 8, 2005 by the U.N. Economic and Social Council.
SC: does not agree.
The ICCPR, as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity, call for the enactment
of legislative measures, establishment of national programmes, and provision for administrative
and judicial recourse, in accordance with the country's constitutional processes, that are
necessary to give effect to human rights embodied in treaties, covenants and other international
laws.
The Philippines is more than compliant with its international obligations.
When the Filipinos regained their democratic institutions after the successful People Power Revolution
that culminated on February 25, 1986, the three branches of the government have done their fair
share to respect, protect and fulfill the country's human rights obligations
Contrary to petitioners' postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of
President Duterte, acting through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB.
Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in
varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of Filipinos.
As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and popularization of our history is not the
sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of every freedom-
loving citizen of this country.
Was the President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB done whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily, out
of malice, ill will, or personal bias? – NO.
Petitioners argue: contend that the interment of Marcos at the LNMB will desecrate it as a sacred and
hallowed place and a revered national shrine where the mortal remains of our country's great men and
women are interred for the inspiration and emulation of the present generation and generations to come.
SC: they are wrong
RE: National Shrines

As one of the cultural properties of the Philippines, national historical shrines (or historical shrines) refer to
sites or structures hallowed and revered for their history or association as declared by the NHCP.
Excluded, however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the military memorials and battle monuments
declared as national shrines, which have been under the administration, maintenance and development of
the Philippine Veterans Affiars Office (PVAO) of the DND.
o Among the military shrines are the LNMB
RE: LNMB
Some History:
At the end of World War II, the entire nation was left mourning for the death of thousands of Filipinos.
Several places served as grounds for the war dead, such as the Republic Memorial Cemetery, the
Bataan Memorial Cemetery, and other places throughout the country. The Republic Memorial
Cemetery, in particular, was established in May 1947 as a fitting tribute and final resting place of
Filipino military personnel who died in World War II.
On October 23, 1954, President Ramon D. Magsaysay, Sr. issued E.O. No. 77, which ordered "the remains
of the war dead interred at the Bataan Memorial Cemetery, Bataan Province, and at other places in the
Philippines, be transferred to, and reinterred at, the Republic Memorial Cemetery at Fort Wm Mckinley,
Rizal Province" so as to minimize the expenses for the maintenance and upkeep, and to make the
remains accessible to the widows, parents, children, relatives, and
friends.
On October 27, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 86, which changed the name of
Republic Memorial Cemetery to Libingan ng mga Bayani to symbolize "the cause for which our soldiers
have died" and to "truly express the nation's esteem and reverence for her war dead."
On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423, which reserved for
military purposes, under the administration of the AFP Chief of Staff, the land where LNMB is
located. The LNMB was part of a military reservation site then known as Fort Wm McKinley
(now known as Fort Andres Bonifacio).
On May 28, 1967, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208, which excluded the LNMB from the Fort Bonifacio
military reservation and reserved the LNMB for national shrine purposes under the
administration of the National Shrines Commission (NSC) under the DND.
On September 24, 1972, Marcos, in the exercise of his powers as the AFP Commander-in-Chief, and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated
September 22, 1972, as amended, issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 which reorganized the
Executive Branch of the National Government through the adoption of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan (IRP).
Section 7, Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII thereof abolished the NSC and its functions together
with applicable appropriations, records, equipment, property and such personnel as may
be necessary were transferred to the NHI under the Department of Education (DEC).
The NHI was responsible for promoting and preserving the Philippine cultural heritage by
undertaking, inter alia, studies on Philippine history and national heroes and maintaining
national shrines and monuments.
Pending the organization of the DEC, the functions relative to the administration, maintenance and
development of national shrines were tentatively integrated into the PVAO in July 1973.
On January 26, 1977, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1076. Section 7, Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII
of the IRP was repealed on the grounds that "the administration, maintenance and development of
national shrines consisting of military memorials or battle monuments can be more effectively
accomplished if they are removed from the [DEC] and transferred to the [DND] by reason of the
latter's greater capabilities and resources" and that "the functions of the [DND] are more closely
related and relevant to the charter or significance of said national shrines."
Henceforth, the PVAO — through the Military Shrines Service (MSS), which was created to
perform the functions of the abolished NSC — would administer, maintain and develop
military memorials and battle monuments proclaimed as national shrines.
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued the Administrative Code. The Code retains
PVAO under the supervision and control of the Secretary of National Defense. Among others,
PVAO shall administer, develop and maintain military shrines. With the approval of PVAO
Rationalization Plan on June 29, 2010, pursuant to E.O. No. 366 dated October 4, 2004, MSS was
renamed to Veterans Memorial and Historical Division, under the supervision and control of PVAO,
which is presently tasked with the management and development of military shrines and the
perpetuation of the heroic deeds of our nation's veterans.
Contrary to the dissent, P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB.
Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included in the
national shrines enumerated in the latter.
The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and others which may be
proclaimed in the future as National Shrines" is erroneous because:
As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105.
Following the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, the LNMB is not a site "of the
birth, exile, imprisonment,
detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation."
Is Marcos qualified to be buried in the LNMB? – YES.
A review of the regulations issued by the AFP Chief of Staff as to who may and may not be interred at the
LNMB underscores the nature and purpose of the LNMB as an active military cemetery/grave site.
Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB:
Medal of Valor Awardees;
Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP;
Secretaries of National Defense;
Chiefs of Staff, AFP;
General/Flag Officers of the AFP;
Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and trainees who died in line
of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or
combat related activities;
Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP;
Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas;
Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or
reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of
National Defense; and
Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of
Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.
Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB:
Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and
Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.
The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be sustained for having been issued by the AFP
Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter ego of the
President.
AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that
it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Neither could it be considered ultra vires for purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical, and
capricious standards for qualification for burial at the LNMB.
AFP rules on LNMB was compared to the US Army regulations for Arlington
As a general rule, both recognize and reward the military services or military related activities of the
deceased.
The purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the
people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a
"hero." In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years.
Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a
Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee.
For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, SC may disregard Marcos as a President
and Commander-in-Chief, but SC cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the
other positions he held or the awards he received.
In this sense, SC agrees with the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in his
totality as a person.
While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us.
Our laws give high regard to Marcos as a Medal of Valor awardee and a veteran.
Is Marcos disqualified from being interred in the LNMB? – NO.
Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications stated in
AFP Regulations G 161-375.
o He was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor
dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.
Petitioners, however, protest that a narrow interpretation of the AFP regulations disregards historical context and
the rule on statutory construction.
o They urge the Court to construe statutes not literally but according to their spirit and reason.
Furthermore, according to petitioners, to limit the application of the disqualifying provisions of AFP Regulations G 161-
375 only to soldiers would be unfair (since, unlike Presidents, soldiers have an additional
cause for disqualification) and lead to absurd results (because soldiers who were dishonorably discharged
would be disqualified for acts that are less atrocious than that committed by Marcos).
Petitioners also contend that the AFP regulations would place Marcos in the same class as the other
Philippine Presidents when in fact he is a class of his own, sui generis.
o The other Presidents were never removed by People Power Revolution and were never subject of
laws declaring them to have committed human rights violations.
o Thus, the intended burial would be an act of similarly treating persons who are differently situated.
Despite all these ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final
judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude.
o No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law and that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf."
Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service.
PVAO expressly recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948
Petitioners have not shown that he was dishonorably discharged from military service under AFP
Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for
violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of War.
Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA
Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military service.
The fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only
enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military.
Not being a military person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly be
deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated
by AFP Regulations G 161-375.
Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-constitutional and direct
sovereign act of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere
administrative regulation.
Does the matter of the President’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred in the LNMB pose
a justiciable controversy? – NO.
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.
In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the interment
of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and
military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall
promote national healing and forgiveness.
There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President
Duterte's decision on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.
Do petitioners have locus standi to file these petitions? – NO.
Petitioners, who led their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as
citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal
standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and
personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
Did petitioners violate the exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts? – YES.
Administrative remedies: Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum
and directive before the Secretary of National Defense.
Hierarchy of courts: In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this
case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions
to be led rst with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v. Paño (1967) – Presidential power to reverse decision of heads of executive
positions; what is non-delegable is what the President has to exercise in person
Art. VII, Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
[Focus on the action of the Executive Secretary in this case]

Jose Magallanes was the actual occupant of pastural land & ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., which was
released from a Forest zone & declared agricultural land.
Jose Paño & 19 others filed their own sales applications as actual occupants & farmers but the Director of Lands &
Sec. of Agriculture & Natural Resources ruled in favor of the Corp.
Paño appealed to the President.
The Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reversed a decision of the Director of Lands that had
been affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Petitioner corporation prays that a judgment be rendered declaring:
That the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources has full force
That the decision of the Executive Secretary if contrary to law and of no legal force and effect
May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands
that had been by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources? – YES.
Petitioner’s Argument:
The decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of power.
The Constitution does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be
delegated to the Executive Secretary.
It is the Constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
SC:
It is not correct to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary Acts which the
Constitution does not command that he perform in person, for the President is not expected to perform
in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions.
The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President.
The Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an
undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order.
Petitioner’s Argument:
The Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the other department heads, no higher than anyone of them.
One department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot intrude into
the zone of action allocated to another department secretary.
SC:
Where the Executive Secretary acts “by authority of the President,” his decision is that of the
Unless the action is “disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,” that remains the act of the Chief
Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed (Pozon v. Exec. Sec; Villena v. Secretary of Interior;
Ykalina v. Oricio).
Ang-Angco v. Castillo (1963) – (distinguish President’s power over “acts” and “person” of appointee in
classified service)
FACTS:
October 1956, Pepsi-Cola wrote a letter requesting for a special permit to withdraw 1,188 units of Pepsi-Cola
concentrates from the customhouse. The letters were sent to: (1) the Secretary of Commerce and Industry;
and (2) Secretary of Finance Hernandez.
o Customs did not want to release them because it was imported without any dollar allocation or
remittance of foreign exchange, thus, not covered by any Central Bank (CB) release certificate.
In behalf of Pepsi, Senator Pedro Sabido wrote a letter urging that authority be given to withdraw the
concentrates. These were sent to (1) Sec. Hernandez, and (2) Dr. Andres Castillo (Acting Governor of CB).
o Sec. Hernandez wrote to Castillo stating: "Senator Sabido is taking this to you personally. Unless
we have legal objection, I would like to authorize the withdrawal of the concentrates upon payment
of all charges. Please expedite action."
The Import-Export Committee of the CB submitted to the Monetary Board a memorandum on the petition of the
company and Sabido Law Office for authority to withdraw the concentrates from the customhouse.
o However, the Board failed to take up the matter in its meeting because the transaction did not
involve any dollar allocation of foreign exchange.
Afterwards, Pepsi-Cola then approached Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco. They attempted to secure an
immediate release of the concentrates.
o However, Ang-Angco advised Pepsi to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the No-
Dollar Import Office that had jurisdiction over the case.
o Aquiles Lopez of the No-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter stating that the office had no objection to
the release but that it could not take action because it is not within the office’s jurisdiction.
o Pepsi-Cola showed this letter to Ang-Angco, but he still hesitated to grant the release.
o Instead, Ang-Angco suggested that the letter be amended to remove the ambiguity, but NDIO
refused stating that the letter was neither a permit nor a release.
Collector Ang-Angco, through telephone, read to Sec. Hernandez the letter after which the Secretary verbally
expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate.
o While still in doubt, Ang-Angco finally authorized the release of the concentrates upon payment of
the corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and taxes.
When Commissioner of Customs Manuel Manahan learned of the release of the concentrates, he immediately
ordered their seizure but only a negligible portion remained in the warehouse.
o Manahan filed an administrative complaint against Collector Ang-Angco. He was charged for
committing a grave neglect of duty and observed a conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
customs service.
President Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee to investigate Collector Ang-Angco.
Together with Collector Ang-Angco, Aquiles Lopez was also put under investigation. Lopez was
charged in a separate complaint with serious misconduct in office or conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the State.
Ang-Angco was suspended from the office.
After the investigation, the committee reported to President Magsaysay recommending that a suspension of 15
days, w/o pay, be imposed upon Ang-Angco chargeable against the period of his suspension.
Sec. Hernandez reinstated Ang-Angco to his office, but the decision on the administrative case against him
remained pending.
After 3 years from the termination of the investigation, Exec. Secretary Natalio Castillo found Ang-Angco "guilty
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service", and considering him resigned effective from the
date of notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs.
Upon learning said decision from the newspapers, Ang-Angco wrote a letter to President Carlos P. Garcia.
The letter stated that the action taken by Castillo in removing him from office had the effect of depriving
him of his statutory right to have his case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service
(“Commissioner of CS”), as well as of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals
(“CSBA”), whose decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final, besides the fact that such decision
is in violation of the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers or employees in the civil
service against removal or suspension except for cause in the manner provided by law.
Exec. Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, denied the request for reconsideration.
Collector Ang-Angco sent a memorandum to President Garcia reiterating once more the same grounds on which
he predicated his request reconsideration.
Again Secretary Castillo, by authority of the President, denied the appeal.
Then, Secretary Castillo contended that the President can take direct action and dispose of the administrative
case in question inasmuch as the provisions of law that would seem to vest final authority in subordinate
officers of the executive branch of the government over administrative matters falling under their jurisdiction
cannot divest the President of his power of control nor diminish the same.
o This is by virtue of the President’s power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices.
Hence, Ang-Angco filed this petition to the SC..
ISSUE/HELD
Does the President have the power to take direct action on the case of Collector Ang-Angco even if he
belongs to the classified service in spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959—NO,
President is devoid of such power.
SC held that Exec. Secretary Castillo’s action, without submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service,
is contrary to law and should be set aside.
o The act is still considered valid even with the authority given by the President.
1
Under Sec. 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the Commissioner of Civil Service has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all officers and employees in the classified service.
SC held that the law does not provide for any appeal to the President, nor is the President given the power to
review the decision motu proprio, unlike the provision of the previous Commonwealth Act No. 598.
o However, it must be noted that the removal, separation and suspension of the officers and
employees of the classified service are subject to the saving clause "Except as otherwise provided
by law". The question then may be asked: Is the President empowered by any other law to remove
officers and employees in the classified civil service?
Sec. 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “(b) To remove officials from office conformably
to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, the President of the Philippines may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or
authority under the Government of the Philippines.”
o It shows that the President does not have blanket authority to move any government employee.
o However, his power must still be subject to the law that passed by the legislative body with regard
the procedure, cause and finality of the removal of persons that are subjects of disciplinary action.
Sec. (D) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “Power to appoint and remove. — The
Department Head, the recommendation of the chief of the Bureau or office concerned, shall appoint all
subordinate officers and employees appointment is not expressly vested by law in the President of the
Philippines, and may remove or punish them, except as especially provided otherwise, in accordance the
Civil Service Law.”
o Even for administrative purposes, the President is considered as the Department Head of the Civil
Service Commission. But his power to remove is still subject to the Civil Service Act of 1959.
POWER OF CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENT (IMPT!)
This power of control is general in nature for it does not specificy the manner of its extent and scope.
In the case of Hebron v. Reyes, the SC held that there could be 2 interpretations of the power of control:
(1) The power of an officer to alter/modify/nullify/set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter, or
(2) The power of general supervision over municipal government.
BUT, this does not include the power to remove an officer/employee in the executive department.
Apparently, this “power of control” merely applies to the control over the acts of the subordinate officer
and not over the actor or agent himself of the act.
It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the
performance of his duties.
In administrative law, this is the same meaning given to the word "control”.
Except as otherwise provided by law, (the Commissioner shall) have final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to
the employees.
Thus, the Department Head is given direct control of all bureaus and offices under his department by
virtue of which he may "repeal or modify decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices".
The President's control over the executive department only refers to matters of general policy.
The term "policy" means a settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government,
body, or individual.
It cannot be said that the removal of an inferior officer comes within the meaning of control over
a specific policy of government.
The 1935 Constitution provides for the power of control by the President in Sec. 10(1), Art. 7, and the protection
extended to those who are in the civil service of our government embodied in Sec. 4, Art. 8.
Both seem to be conflicting.
SC reconciled and harmonized these conflicting provisions. In the case of Lacson v. Romero, SC held that “to
hold that civil service officials hold their office at the will of the appointing power subject to removal or forced
transfer at any time, would demoralize and undermine and eventually destroy the whole Civil Service
System and structure.”
The power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and
employees who belong to the executive department.
If the employee does NOT belong to the classified service, the power to remove them is inherent to the
power to appoint them. In other words, the President can validly remove them.
HOWEVER, if the employee belongs to the classified service, the inherent power to remove them
cannot be exercised.
SC held that this is in line with Sec. 10(3), Art. 7 of the Constitution which states that "the Congress may
by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads
of department"
With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided
by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority (i.e. Civil Service Act
of 1959.)
In the case of US v. Perkins, the Court held that “The head of a department has no constitutional prerogative of
appointment to officers independently of legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must be
governed, not only in making appointments but in all that is incident thereto.”
Villaluz v. Zaldivar (1965) – power to remove Presidential appointee in unclassified service
Ruben Villaluz seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office + payment of back salaries. o
He had been nominated as chief of Motor Vehicle Office on May 20, 1958, which was confirmed by
Commission on Appointments.
In a letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the President of the Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces
as Chairman of the Committee on Good Government, the latter informed the former of the findings made by his
Committee concerning alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by Villaluz in the Motor
Vehicles Office.
o malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the government
o failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the same, facilitating thereby the
commission of graft and corruption
o negligence to remedy unsatisfactory accounting
Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo created an investigating committee with the only purpose of investigating the
charges against petitioner and his assistant Aurelio de Leon.
o Villaluz was suspended
After the investigation said committee submitted its report to the President of the Philippines who thereafter issued
Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the removal from office of petitioner.
As a result of petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as acting administrator.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and/or reinstatement but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Is Villaluz under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering that he is an appointee of the
president? – Yes (feelingero).
The Commissioner of Civil Service to investigate and remove presidential appointees

The Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, being a 'presidential appointee, belongs to the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government
as such, he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of
the Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove is inherent in the
power to appoint" as can be implied from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.
Consequently, the Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative
charges filed against said official,
because his authority to pass upon questions of suspension, separation or removal can only be
exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified service – the
administrator does not belong to this.
In this case, the administrative proceedings were commenced upon authority of the Chief Executive.
The administrative proceedings, having been commenced against petitioner, upon the authority of the Chief
Executive who was his immediate administrative head, the same may be commenced by him motu
proprio without previous verified complaint pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941.
Joson v. Torres (1998) – power to discipline local officials
FACTS:
This case involves the validity of the suspension from office of Gov. Joson as Governor of Nueva Ecija.
September 1997, Vice-Governor Tinio and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawaigan (SP) were at the
Provincial Capitol session hall for a session.
o During the meeting, Joson belligerently barged into the Hall.
o Joson angrily kicked the door & chairs and uttered threatening words.
o Joson also came with were several men with firearms.
Tinio and SP claim that Joson used the incident to intimidate them.
This was because Tinio and SP resisted to pass a legislative measure that Joson was pushing for.
The legislative act was to obtain a Php 150M loan from PNB.
They opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated obligation of more
than Php 70M and the provincial treasurer disclosed that they could not afford another loan.
Tinio and SP filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the President charging Joson with grave misconduct and
abuse of authority. They prayed that:
(1) Joson be suspended or removed from office;
(2) Emergency audit of the Provincial treasury; and
(3) Advise PNB to review the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the province.
President Ramos noted that the "the use of force, intimidation or armed followers” by Joson did not equate/justify
the refusal of the SP to approve the proposed loan.
Ramos then instructed the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments Robert Barbers to "take
appropriate preemptive and investigative actions," but NOT to "break the peace."
Barbers went to Nueva Ecija & summoned Joson, Tinio, and the SP to settle the controversy.
Joson promised to maintain peace and order, while Tinio and SP promised to refrain from filing cases
that would affect their peaceful coexistence.
Both parties violated the peace agreement. So the cases against Joson continued.
A lot of petition filing drama occurred (i.e. extension to file answer failure to acquire a counsel to represent him, heavy
workload, Christmas Season, etc.) . So, you can opt to skip the next parts. Procedural lang lahat. MR dito, MTD
dyan. Answer dito. Denial dyan. etc. etc. etc.
PROCEEDINGS IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Usec. Manuel Sanchez (as acting SILG) declared Joson in default.
Tinio and the SP were ordered to present their evidence ex-parte.
However, considering barangay elections were nearing, the complainants will be notified on the date
after the barangay election for them to present their evidence.
The law firm of Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion, representing Joson, filed with the DILG an "Entry of
Appearance with Motion for Time to File Answer Ad Cautelam”
Joson received a copy of the default order. His counsel filed an MR.
Usec. Sanchez granted the MR based on the interest of justice.
He noted the appearance of petitioner's counsel and gave petitioner "for the last time" fifteen (15) days
from receipt to file his answer. (Note: pang ilang last time na ‘to)
Joson still failed to file his answer. He was deemed to have waived his right to present evidence.
Usec. Sanchez reinstated Joson in default and directed Tinio to present their evidence ex-parte.
Joson filed an MTD. MTD was denied.
In the end, Exec. Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing Joson
under preventive suspension for 60 days pending investigation of the charges against him.
Sec. Barbers directed the PNP to assist in the implementation of the preventive suspension and
designated Tinio as Acting Governor until legal incapacity ceases to exist.
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CA
Joson challenged the suspension and the order of default in the Court of Appeals.
Joson filed motion to the CA to lift order of suspension and default order.
Tinio and SPs manifested that they were submitting the case for decision.
Joson contended that:
While He was at his district office in Munoz, he received a phone call from SP member del Mundo.
Del Mundo was enraged at the members of the SP because they refused to tackle the ratification of the
proposed Php 150M loan. So, Joson went to the provincial capitol.
Upon arrival, he went to the Session Hall and asked the members present where Tinio was.
However, he left the Session Hall without waiting a reply.
Joson claimed that there was nothing in his conduct that threatened the SP or caused alarm.
He said he was always accompanied by his official security escorts.
He presented affidavits to support these happenings.
Joson requested that a formal investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to:
(1) The Local Government Code of 1991 and
(2) Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23. o
But his request was denied.
CA dimissed Joson’s Petition.
Exec. Secretary Torres imposed on Joson the penalty of 6 months suspension from office without pay.
ISSUE/HELD
Was the letter-complaint properly filed in the Office of the President?—YES.

Sec. 608 of Chapter 4, Title 2, Book 1 of the LGC enumerates the grounds for which an elective local official may
2
be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office.
An administrative complaint against an elective official must be verified & filed w/ the proper office.
Elective provincial or city official -> with the Office of the President.
Elective municipal official -> with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Barangay official -> before the Sangguniang Panlungsod/Sangguniang Bayan.
In this case, Joson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija.
The administrative complaint was properly filed in the Office of the President.
Were the formal requisites were complied with?—YES.
Joson contends that (1) the complaint was not verified and was not supported by the joint affidavit of the two
witnesses named therein; (2) that complainants realized these defects and inserted the missing documents
while the complaint was still pending with the Office of the President.
To prove this allegations, Joson submitted:
(a) The sworn statement of Solita C. Santos attesting to the fact that after the complaint was filed,
(b) The fact that the verification of the complaint and the joint affidavit of the witnesses do not
indicate the document, page or book number of the notarial register of the notary public.
These do not prove that the verification was inserted after the complaint was filed with the OP.
The lack of verification is a mere formal defect.
The court may order the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may be served.
2
"Sec. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. -- An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office
on any of the following grounds: (a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; (b) Culpable violation of the
Constitution; (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; (d) Commission of
any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor; (e) Abuse of authority; (f)
Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay; (g) Application for, or
acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and (h) such other
grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
1.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court." When
an elective local official commits an act that falls under the grounds for disciplinary action, the administrative complaint
against him must be verified and filed with any of the following: "Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.--
A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows: (a) A complaint against any
elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city shall be filed
before the Office of the President. (b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the
sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and (c) A complaint against
any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose
decision shall be final and executory."
3. Did the Office of the President violate AO No. 23?—YES. (Syllabus topic! Power of control of the President)
Joson contends that:
(1) Office of the President has jurisdiction over the complaint, and
(2) CA erred in applying the alter-ego principle because the power to discipline elective local officials
lies with the President, not with the DILG Secretary.
SC held that jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two
authorities:
(1) Disciplining Authority and
(2) Investigating Authority.
This is explicit from A.O. No. 23, to wit:
"Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly verified, against elective local officials
mentioned in the preceding Section shall be acted upon by the President. The President, who may
act through the Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining Authority."
Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is hereby
designated as the Investigating Authority. He may constitute an Investigating Committee in the
Department of the Interior and Local Government for the purpose.
The Disciplining Authority is the President, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary.
The Disciplining Authority may constitute a Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the SILG.
The SILG is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee.
The SILG is not the exclusive Investigating Authority.
The Disciplining Authority (the President) may designate a Special Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is
derived from his power of general supervision over local governments.
Sec. 4, Art. 10 of the Constitution provides that “The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of
an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties."
If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
The President's power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are
faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law.
Supervision is not incompatible with discipline.
The power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize
the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires. “The constitutional grant to the President of power to
exercise general supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed must be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of the act
or conduct of the petitioner herein.”
Supervision is not a meaningless thing.
It is an active power.
It has its limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render
the power real and effective.
If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon
knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation.
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.
As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution itself to
investigate complaints against local government officials.
AO No. 23 delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may
be constituted by the Disciplining Authority.
This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's claim.
The Disciplining Authority remains with the President.
What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or
the doctrine of qualified political agency. Thus:
"Under this doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business."
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President.
The power of control is provided in Sec. 17, Art. 7 of the Constitution:,
"Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency.
As head of the Executive Department, the President may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
members except when he is required by the Constitution for him to personally act.
The members of Cabinet may act in behalf of the President in certain matters because the He cannot
be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time.
Each head of a department is the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority.
The procedure how the Disciplining and Investigating Authorities should exercise their powers are distinctly set
forth in the Local Government Code and A.O. No. 23. Section 6210 of the Code.
IN THIS CASE, Joson claims that the SILG usurped the power of the President when the SILG required
petitioner to answer the complaint.
Undisputably, the complaint was filed with the OP, but the SILG ordered Joson to answer.
Strictly applying the rules, the OP did NO comply with the provisions of AO No. 23.
The OP should have first required Joson to file his answer.
Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for
further proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is NOT fatal.
The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment
of the case.
The President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance for its further investigation.
The judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence of GADALEJ.
Did the DILG err in declaring him in default for filing a MTD instead of an answer?—NO.
It is true that an MTD is not a pleading prohibited under the LGC of 1991 nor in A.O. No. 23.
Joson was instructed not to file a MTD in order to file answer.
Thrice, he requested for extension of time to file his answer citing as reasons the search for
competent counsel and the demands of his official duties. And thrice, his requests were granted.
Even the order of default was reconsidered and Joson was given additional time to file answer.
After all the requests and 7 months later, he filed a motion to dismiss!
Joson should know that the formal investigation of the case is required by law to be finished w/in 120 days from
the time of formal notice to him.
The extensions petitioner requested consumed 55 days.
Joson filed his answer 9 months after the first notice.
This was more than sufficient time for Joson to comply with the order to file answer.
The speedy disposition of administrative complaints is required by public service.
The efficiency of officials under investigation is impaired when a case hangs over their heads.
Officials deserve to be cleared expeditiously if they are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, so that the
business of government will not be prejudiced.
Did the DILG err in recommending his preventive suspension pending investigation?—NO.
SC held that DILG did not err in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during the
investigation. Preventive suspension is authorized under Sec. 63 of the LGC.
In sum, preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time:
(a) After the issues are joined;
(b) When the evidence of guilt is strong; and
(c) Given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold
office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence.
In this case, Exec. Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension had
been complied with.
Joson's failure to file his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of
his right to file answer and present evidence.
Torres also found that the evidence of Joson's guilt was strong and that his continuance in office during
the pendency of the case could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the evidence against him.
Did the Resolution of the Exec. Secretary finding Joson Guilty and imposing on him a penalty of 6 months
suspension from office without pay was valid?—NO, no due process. It was made w/o formal investigation.
An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused.
These rights are essentially part of procedural due process. The local elective official has the (1) right to
appear and defend himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of
documentary evidence.
Joson’s right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis
of position papers.
SC held that an elective official is directly responsible to the community that elected him.
The official has a definite term of office fixed by law that is of short duration.
Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and shortens this term of office.
When an elective official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the services of the man
they had elected.
Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of the elective official of
their choice.
Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights and the
evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition.
KMU v. Dir.-Gen. of NEDA (2006) – Faithful Execution Clause
ARTICLE VII: Executive Department. SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 420 which directs all government agencies and GOCCs to adopt
a uniform data collection and format for their existing ID system.
o Data to be collected includes: Name, Home Address, Sex, Picture, Signature, Date and Place of
Birth, Marital Status, Name of Parents, Height, Weight, Two index fingers and two thumbmarks, any
prominent distinguishing features like moles and others, TIN
o Common reference number shall form part of the stored ID data, together with at least first five items
in the above enumeration and print of right thumbmark and fingerprint
Dir.-Gen. of NEDA is authorized to streamline and harmonize all government IDs, call on other gov’t agencies
and form technical support groups to provide assistance when necessary, enter into agreements with local
gov’ts, Comelec, other branches of gov’t to ensure gov’t-wide adoption of the system and promulgate rules
and regulations to meet objectives of the EO.
KMU et al. allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because:
It is a usurpation by the President of the legislative power o
It infringes on the citizens right to privacy
ISSUES/HELD:
(Relevant issue) Is EO 420 a usurpation of legislative power? – NO
EO 420 and its subject matter is purely an administrative matter and does not involve exercise of legislative
power. EO 420 is simply an administrative issuance and not an act of legislation.
EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions in the existing law
(GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayor’s Office, LTO, PRC)
EO aims to adopt a uniform data collection and format in order to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability,
insure compatibility and provide convenience to the people served by government entities.
o EO limits the data to 14 specific items (see enumeration in the stated Facts above) and these are
usual data collected by the government.
In making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and making their ID formats uniform
has substantial benefits.
o There will be savings on procurement, compatibility in systems, ease of verification, increased
reliability of data and user-friendliness of a single ID format for government entities.
Under Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution, President therefore can, in the exercise of functions under the law,
adopt a uniform data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability and convenience.
EO 420 applies only to the Executive branch of the government and does not apply to the Judiciary nor to the
Comelec which is authorized by law to issue voter’s ID. This shows that EO 420 does not establish a
national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all
branches of the government.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
There are a number of laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency and
improve public services.
The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format addresses the abovementioned mandate of the
law.
The President, in issuing EO 420, is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed.
The President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws.
What then, requires legislation?
When implementation of an ID system needs special appropriation
When ID card system is compulsory on all branches of the government and all citizens
When ID card system requires collection of personal data not routinely or usually required for such
purpose such that the privacy of citizens is infringed.
EO 420 does not require special appropriation, it affects only the executive departments and agencies which are
already currently issuing ID cards and does not establish a national ID system and (see next issue).
Does EO 420 infringe on the citizen’s right to privacy? – NO
In the years when the GSIS, SSS, LTO etc. have been issuing IDs, there are no complaints yet from citizens that
these ID cards violate their right to privacy.
Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only 14 specific data.
US cases cited in the dissention opinion:
Grisworld v. Connecticut: Declared unconstitutional a state law which prohibited the use and distribution
of contraceptives and allows police entry to bedrooms of married couples. This is
inapplicable to the case at bar.
US Justice Dept v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press: The law authorizes exchange of
information with State and city officials. The Court held that the law exempts release of information
that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and the information demanded
falls under the category of exempt information.
With the exception of 8 specific data shown in the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded under EO
420 are treated as strictly confidential under EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also
personal matters.
Section 7, Art. III of the Constitution grants right of the people to information on matters of public concerns.
Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the people’s right to information on matters of public
concern.
The data treated as strictly confidential under EO No. 420, being private matters and not matters of
public concern and thus, it cannot be released to the public or press.
KMU et al. have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation
by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO narrowly draws the data collection, recording and
exhibition while prescribing comprehensive standards.
Drilon v. Lim (1994) – Power of DOJ Sec. to declare illegal a City Code is more exercise of supervision
(edited A2015 digest)
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.
FACTS:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code reading as
follows:
o Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public
Hearings.—The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the
sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
Four oil companies and a taxpayer appealed Ordinance 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, to
the Secretary of Justice. Pursuant to Section 187 of the LGC, the Secretary declared the said City Code as null
and void for:
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances; and
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
Petition for certiorari with the RTC of Manila
The City of Manila filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Manila which revoked the Secretary’s
resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding that procedural requirements were observed.
More importantly, the RTC Judge Palattao also declared Section 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional because it vested the Secretary of Justice with power of control over local
governments.
The reason being that it violates the policy of local autonomy that is mandated in the Constitution
and Section 17, Article VII which grants the power of supervision over local governments to the
President of the Philippines only.
IMPORTANT: In the decision, the RTC Judge cited the distinction between control and supervision:
Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.
Supervision is the power of the superior officer to see to it that the lower officers perform their functions
in accordance with law.
The Judge concluded that Section 187 of the LGC gave the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision.
Such power of control is only vested with the President. In his view, this violated:
Art. X, Sec 4 (General supervision power of the President over Local Governments
b. Art. X, Sec. 5 (Taxation power of Local Governments) and
c. The policy of local autonomy in general.
Secretary of Justice (SOJ) Drilon argues that Section 187 of the LGC is constitutional and that the Manila Revenue
Code really did not follow the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the
LGC.
Procedural: The petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Circular 1-88 which requires the SolGen to
submit a certified true copy of the assailed decision. But on MR, the certified true copy was attached and the
petition was reinstated in light of the important issues that were raised.
ISSUE/ HELD:
Was the RTC correct in ruling that Sec. 187 is unconstitutional insofar as it empowers the SOJ to review tax
ordinances and to annul them? NO.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary to review the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted,
to revoke it on either or both grounds.
o When he alters, modifies, or sets aside an ordinance, he is not permitted to substitute his own judgment
for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code but he did not replace it with his own version of
what the Code should be.
Therefore, the act of the Secretary was one of supervision and not control.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in
his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do
it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that
the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them.
If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform
to the prescribed rules.
He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less
than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.
The RTC decision cited the case of Taule v. Santos which held that the Secretary of Local Governments does not
have jurisdiction over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay because such power belonged to the
COMELEC by constitutional provision. The case has no application here because the issue was about
jurisdiction and not of supervision or control.
3
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act which allowed the Secretary of
Finance (SOF) to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.
(SOF) Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an
examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it
would smack of control rather than mere supervision.
(Vs SOJ) Here, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187.
All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the
right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.
He has no discretion on this matter.
In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the
inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in its enactment.
These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
Sec. 2 - A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise:
Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one
hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust,
excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national economy policy, and when the said Secretary
exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days
within which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal
with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be
considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local legislative body may notvreimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds
for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.
National Artist for Literature Almario et al v. Executive Secretary (2013)
FACTS:
This case revolves around the controversy surrounding the 2009 Order of National Artists.
4
The Order goes way back and in 1992, RA 7356 (Law Creating the National Commission for Culture and Arts)
established the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).
o The NCCA is, among others, to “extend recognition of artistic achievement through awards, grants, and
services to artists and cultural groups which contribute significantly to the Filipino’s cultural legacy;
o In connection with this mandate, the NCCA is vested with the power to advise the President on
matters pertaining to culture and arts, including the creation of a special decoration/award, for
persons who have significantly contributed to the development and promotion of PH culture
and arts. (RA 7356, Sec. 12)
The CCP Board of trustees and the NCCA teamed up to jointly administer the National Artists Award.
They adopted the revised guidelines for deliberation in the choice of National Artists in 2007.
Among the important guidelines include:
Ensuring that awards are implemented in a successful and impartial manner;
Formation of a National Artist Award Secretariat to form a special research group who shall verify info
submitted on nominees;
That there will be two deliberations on nominations – first deliberation panel (Council of Experts) shall be
intradisciplinary (so panelists shall be grouped according to their respective fields of expertise to
shortlist their nominees) and then second deliberation panel shall be composed of different set
of experts and may include members from varying backgrounds.
List of awardees after these deliberations shall be submitted to the President of the Philippines for
confirmation, proclamation and referral.
IMPT: NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and staff are
automatically disqualified.
1996: NCCA and CCP created a National Artist Award Secretariat, and added another layer to the selection
process to involve and allow participation of more members of the arts and culture sector.
It was only actually in 2003, through EO 236 were National Artists Award was renamed the Order of National
th
Artists and raised to the level of a Cultural Order, 4 in precedence among the orders and
decorations that comprise the honors of the PH.
Recognizes that the National Artist recognition is conferred “upon recommendation of the CCP and the
NCCA”
Created a “Committee on Honors” to assist the President in evaluating nominations for recipients of
The IRR of EO 236 also ensures that the nominations received from the various awards meet two tests: that
there has not been abuse of discretion in making the nomination and that the nominee is in good
standing.
EO 435 (2005) clarified that the NCCA and the CCP “shall advise the President on the conferment of the
Order of National Artists.
2009 Controversy:
From 87 nominees from the first deliberation panel, a shortlist of 32 names was compiled; and then
down to 13 names after the second deliberation.
May 6, 2009: FINAL LIST of 4 names was agreed upon:
Name Field/Category Number of Votes
Manuel Conde Film and Broadcast Arts 26
Ramon Santos Music 19
Lazaro Francisco Literature 15
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz Visual Arts 15
1972; Marcos’s Proclamation No. 1001, upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the CCP, created the category of
Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and
letters. Amorsolo was declared as the first National Artist;
Proclamation No. 1144: created a National Artists Awards Committee that would administer the conferment of the category
of National Artist; Committee composed of the BoT of the CCP; tasked to “draft the rules to guide tis deliberations in the choice of
National Artist.
CCP Chairperson Labrador and CCP Pres and Art Director Jardin sent a letter to the President as
recommending the four people above.
Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various sectors strongly
endorsing Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Manosa and Jose Moreno.
Committee on Honors submitted a memo to PGMA recommending the conferment of the Order on the
four recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on Guidote-Alvarez et al.
SO: PGMA issued Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist; and
Proclamation Nos 1824-29 declaring Francisco, Alcuaz, and Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Manosa, and Moreno as National Artists. (So si Ramon Santos lang hindi naging awardee)
Hence the petition by different groups (National Artists, cultural workers and academics, and the Concerned
Artists of the PH), questioning the Proclamations on the conferment of the awards, which disregarded the
rigorous screening and selection process.
According to them, the President’s discretion to name National Artists is not absolute but LIMITED;
That conferment of award to Guidote-Alvarez was illegal because she was then the Executive director of
the NCCA and presidential adviser on culture and arts (so she’s DQd)
Did President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo confer the National Artist awards with grave abuse of discretion
– YES!
The NCCA and CCP’s powers with respect to the conferment of the Order of National Artists are clear. They
“recommend” or “advise.”
o These are synonymous.
o They mean to “give an opinion or counsel, recommend a plan or course of action, to give notice.”
o That it is discretionary or optional with the person addressed whether he will act on such advice
or not. (merely persuasive, not binding upon party [so President] to whom it is made])
o So, President may or may not adopt recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP Boards
HOWEVER: the President’s discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the
CCP Boards meaningless.
Discretion is “not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is rined in to keep it from
straying.”
5
As such, the President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. IMPT: Section 17, Art. VII of
the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the President.
o Faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate
grant of power.
o Underscores rule of law; President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them
o What laws are then the bounds of the President’s discretion? Remember all the Proclamations and the
law (RA 7356) providing the mandate and duties of the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees?
o Further, remember the guidelines that the bodies jointly administered?
o Although a mere administrative regulation, the court has held that when adopted pursuant to law, it
has the force and effect of law, binding upon executive and administrative agencies,
including the President as chief executor of laws, until set aside.
o These guidelines include the general guidelines, the provisions on the Awards Committee, Committee
on Honors, and more importantly, the prohibition of NCCA and Board members and consultants
and NCCA and CCP officers from being nominated.
o With these, Guidote-Alvarez is then disqualified, because she was then the Executive Director of the
NCCA.
o At the same time, the Court holds that the discretion of the President is confined to the names
submitted to him/her by the NCCA and CCP Boards; that he/she could not have considered
conferment of the Awards on any person not considered and recommended by the NCCA and
CCP Boards.
This is the “proper import” of EO 435 (2005) when it clarified that the NCCA and CCP “shall
advise the President on the conferment of the Order of National Aritsts.”
As such, PGMA could not have properly considered Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Manosa and
Moreno as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and CCP Boards.
Considering them disregards both the stringent selection and meticulous screening process and
the respective mandates of the NCCA and CCP under relevant laws.
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed
Court rendered Proclamations declaring Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Manosa, and Moreno as National Artists
INVALID.
Lansang v. Garcia (1971) – habeas corpus reviewable by SC
Art. VII, Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty -eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty- four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
FACTS
This case involves the Plaza Miranda bombing incident on August 21, 1971 where in the middle of the public
meeting conducted by the Liberal Party, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where the candidates of
LP for the 1971 general elections were.
o 8 persons were killed and many more sustained serious injuries which could have been fatal had it not
been for the timely medical assistance.
On August 23, 1971, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889, in response to the lawless elements, which
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained as well as others who
may be thereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion.
Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were then filed by persons who were arrested without warrant and then
detained upon the authority of said proclamation.
o These petitions assailed the validity of the proclamation and of their detention.
o Respondents filed their returns stating that the continued detention is justified pursuant to the
proclamation, that there is a state of insurrection or rebellion, and that the public safety and
security required the suspension of the privilege.
On August 30, 1971, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending the previous proclamation. It was
further amended on September 18, 1971, this time lifting the suspension in some of the provinces and cities.
Was the proclamation formally valid? — Moot and Academic.
Petitioners question the formal validity of the original proclamation that it did not comply with the pertinent
6 7
constitutional provisions, namely Par. 14, Sec. 1, Art. III and par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. VII of the Constitution.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for
such suspension shall exist.
They maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual invasion, insurrection or
rebellion or imminent danger thereof. Consequently, the proclamation was invalid.
This contention was predicated on its first whereas clause stating, “lawless elements had entered into a
conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together with the avowed purpose of
actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion.”
The actuality so alleged refers to the existence of a conspiracy and the intent to rise in arms (not of an
uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or insurrection).
The Court held that regardless of the merit of the said contention, it has been rendered moot and academic by
Proclamation No. 889-A which reads now: “lawless elements had entered into a conspiracy and have in fact
joined and banded their forces together with the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking, waging
and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion...”
In other words, apart from adverting to the existence of actual conspiracy and of the intent to rise in
arms to overthrow the government, Proclamation No. 889A asserts that the lawless elements "are
actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion" to accomplish their purpose.
Proclamation No. 889A has superseded the original proclamation and that the flaws attributed thereto are purely
formal in nature.
Are the findings of the Executive as to the basis for suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus are conclusive upon the Court? — No.
Pursuant to the Constitution, two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the
privilege of the writ:
there must be invasion, insurrection, or rebellion OR imminent danger thereof; AND
public safety must require the suspension of the privilege.
The Court held that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the
constitutional sufficiency thereof.
o Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus under specified conditions.
o What goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is
supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere
allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is
vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect is constitutionally supreme.
o The function of the Court is merely to check (not supplant) the Executive or to ascertain merely whether
he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction. It is neither to exercise the power vested
in him nor to determine the wisdom of his act.
Petitioners contend that public safety did not require the suspension of the privilege based on the following
grounds:
o That there is no rebellion;
o That prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government has been functioning
normally;
o That no untoward incident has actually taken place after August 21, 1971;
o That the President’s alleged apprehension is non-existent and unjustified; and
o That the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize the public safety.
The Court, however, stated that the existence of rebellion is obvious.
The alleged absence of untoward incident after August 21 is attributable to the logical effect of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ – to compel those connected with the rebellion or insurrection
to go into hiding.
Records also show that the President had received intelligence information that there was a July-August
plan involving a wave of assassinations, kidnappings, terrorism and mass destruction of property and
an extraordinary occurrence would signal the beginning of said event.
Moreover, the serious condition of peace and order situation in Mindanao and the expansion of CPP
activities from Central Luzon to other parts of the country required the armed forces to be spread
over the country.
The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection,
or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus,
or place the Philippines or any part of thereof under martial law.
Based on such data, the Court held that the Executive did not act arbitrarily or gravely abused its
discretion when the President concluded that public safety and national security required the
suspension of the privilege of the writ.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and that,
accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional;
Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039 and L-34265, insofar as
petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala, Rogelio Arienda, Vicentellao, Juan Carandang, Nemesio E.
Prudente, Gerardo Tomas, Reynaldo Rimando, Filomeno M. de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro and Antolin
Oreta, Jr. are concerned;
The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary
examination and/or investigation of the charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein
petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and
Teresito Sison, and to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist
against them, or, otherwise, to order their release; and
Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the completion of the aforementioned
preliminary examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of the proper orders or resolution in
connection therewith, the parties may by motion seek in these proceedings the proper relief.
Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
David v. Arroyo (Supra)
Ampatuan v. DILG (Supra)
Lagman v. Medialdea (Supra)
Diego v. People (2015) – Pardoning Power: discretionary and beyond control of the court
Art. VII, Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
FACTS:
Grace San Diego:

Accountant of Obando Fisherman’s Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (Cooperative) from Jan. 1993-
March 11, 1987
In charge of accounting all business transactions and performed functions of cashier, teller,
granted loans, did check discounting and trading.
Recorded and reported cash in bank transactions and summarized them, entrusted with
pre-signed checks and authorized to fill in the details therein.
Acted as cashier when Teresita Gonzales was on maternity leave from November 18, 1996 to January
6, 1997; acted as teller when Flordeliza Ocampo was on her honeymoon (naks!) from January 13-
30, 1997.
On both occasions, she had complete access to the cash vaults and filing cabinets of the
cooperative where the documents are kept.
Stopped reporting for work on March 12, 1997.
Narciso Correa, the GM of the cooperative asked Dimapelis (bookkeeper) to prepare bank book balance on the
cash transactions during the day on order to establish the accountability of San Diego by comparing the
cash position she prepared against the balances of the bank.
Savings account passbooks and bank statements were missing.
After reconciliation of cash position, discrepancies were discovered in the report of San Diego.
Cash balance based on San Diego’s report: 9, 590, 455.17
Cash balance based on audited figure: 3,712,442.80
Criminal charges were then filed against San Diego for qualified theft.
RTC found San Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
CA denied her MR.
San Diego mainly alleges that there is failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUES/HELD:
Are there sufficient evidence to prove San Diego’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt? – YES
The CA did not err when it ruled that the proof adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to prove petitioner's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
o The prosecution presented the testimony of its expert witness, Alfonso Piscasio, the cooperative's
independent auditor since 1992.
o He stated that his audit was based on standard and generally accepted auditing procedures.
o The audit report, duly offered and presented in the trial, was supported by certifications by several
depository banks of the cooperative indicating its balance on its account. Records are bereft of any
showing that the audit report made by the independent auditor is erroneous and unsupported by
documents and bank statements.
San Diego's own expert witness, Criselda Sarmiento Oplas, failed to dispute the audit report presented. She
admitted to focusing her review on bank reconciliation made by Piscasio.
The circumstances and records created an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the San Diego, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
San Diego insists that the proof adduced plausibly indicates commission of estafa and not qualified theft.
She argued that if the thing is not taken away, but received and then appropriated or converted without
the consent of the owner, the crime committed is estafa.
The Court is not persuaded by her argument since it was established during trial that San Diego never received
the sum of money in trust, or on commission or for administration.
One of the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence is that the money, goods or other personal
property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same.
When the thing is received by the offender from the offended party in trust or in commission or for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession
of the thing received.
Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing transferred
and this he may set up even against the owner.
To reiterate, it was established in the trial that petitioner never received the sum of money in trust, or on
commission or for administration.
(Relevant) Can RTC impose a penalty which precludes pardon? – NO
RTC decision:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing findings, the Court hereby finds accused GRACE SAN DIEGO y
TRINIDAD guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT as defined and
penalized under Article 310, in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code, and
accordingly, sentences her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty years without pardon
before the lapse of 40 years and with the accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the
Revised Penal Code, and to indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., in
the amount of Php6,01 6,084.26.
The Court stated that there is a need to modify the penalty imposed by the lower court and affirmed by the CA.
The proper penalty imposable is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but it was incorrect for the RTC to sentence
the accused to the penalty of reclusion perpetua for forty (40) years without pardon because that would be a
limitation on the part of the power of the Chief Executive. The exercise of the pardoning power is
discretionary in the President and may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the court,
save only when it contravenes the limitations set forth by the Constitution.
Llamas v. Orbos (1991) – Clemency on administrative
penalties (edited A2015 digest)
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
FACTS:
Rodolfo D. Llamas is the incumbent Vice-Governor of the Province of Tarlac and, on March 1, 1991 he assumed, by
virtue of a decision of the Office of the President, the governorship.
Mariano Ocampo III is the incumbent Governor of the Province of Tarlac and was suspended from office for a period
of 90 days.
Oscar Orbos was the Executive Secretary at the time of the filing of this petition and is being impleaded herein in
that official capacity for having issued, by authority of the President, the assailed Resolution granting executive
clemency to respondent governor.
Sometime in 1989, Llamas filed a verified complaint against Ocampo before the then Department of Local
Government (DLG, for short), charging him with alleged violation of Section 203(2) (f) 203(2) (p), and 208(w), of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and other appropriate laws,
among them, the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The complaint before the DLG was subsequently tried, where both Llamas and Ocampo presented their respective
evidence.
o Llamas maintains Ocampo, as Provincial Governor of Tarlac, entered into and executed a Loan
Agreement with Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc., a non-stock and non-profit organization headed by
the governor himself as chairman and controlled by his brother-in-law as executive director, trustee, and
secretary.
o That the said Loan Agreement was never authorized and approved by the Provincial Board.
o That the said Agreement is wholly one-sided in favor of the Foundation and grossly inimical to the
interest of the Provincial Government because it did not provide for interest or for any type security and
it did not provide for suretyship and comptrollership or audit to control the safe disbursement of said
loan.
o That a total amount of P20,000,000.00 was disbursed to the aforesaid Foundation.
On the other hand, it is the contention of Ocampo that "the funds were intended to generate livelihood project among
the residents of Tarlac and the use of the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc. was authorized by law and considered
the best alternative as a matter of judgment."
o That he resigned from the said Foundation in order to forestall any suspicion that he would influence it. o
That it is not true that the Loan Agreement did not provide for continuing audit by the Provincial
Government because the Memorandum of Agreement provides otherwise.
o That the Provincial Government and him did not and profit thereby because it provided sufficient
safeguards for repayment.
After trial, the Secretary of the then Department of Local Government found Ocampo guilty of graft and corruption.
Parenthetically, be it noted that the Resolution imposed not a preventive suspension but a penalty of
suspension.
Ocampo moved for a reconsideration of the DLG decision but the same was denied. He appealed the DLG
decision to the Office of the President.
Later Executive Secretary Orbos issued a Resolution dismissing Ocampo’s appeal and affirming the DLG decision.
Subsequently, on March 1, 1991, to the effect that the decision of the Office of the President in administrative
suspension of local officials shall be immediately executory without prejudice to appeal to appropriate courts,
Llamas, took his oath of office as acting governor.
Under the administrative suspension order, Llamas had up to May 31, 1991 as acting governor. On the same date of
Llamas’ oath, Ocampo moved for a reconsideration of the Executive Secretary's Resolution, to which Llamas
filed an opposition.
To the surprise of Llamas, however, Ocampo issued an "administrative order" in which the latter signified his intention
to continue exercising his functions as governor in the belief that "the pendency of my Motion for
Reconsideration precludes the coming into finality as executory the DLG decision."
Without ruling on Ocampo’s Motion for Reconsideration, Exec. Sec. Orbos issued a Resolution including therein
certifications of Ocampo’s constituents saying that the loan program was a success and thereby giving
Ocampo an executive clemency in the sense that his ninety-day suspension is hereby reduced to the
period already served. In the same letter, Orbos pointed out that Ocampo manifests already serving more than
sixty (60) days of the ninety-day suspension. (Orbos was clearly referring to BP No. 337 on preventive
suspension which says that prevention suspension shall not exceed 60 days. But this is wrong since, the
penalty meted to Ocampo was suspension.)
By virtue of such Resolution, Ocampo reassumed the governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification
made to the Llamas.
Llamas posits that the issuance by Orbos of the May 15, 1991 Resolution was "whimsical, capricious and despotic,
and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting lack of jurisdiction," basically on the ground that executive
clemency could be granted by the President only in criminal cases as there is nothing in the statute books
or even in the Constitution which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases.
o He further contends that since Ocampo refused to recognize his suspension (having reassumed the
governorship in gross defiance of the suspension order), executive clemency cannot apply to him; that
his rights to due process were violated because the grant of executive clemency was so sudden that he
was not even notified thereof; and that despite a finding by Ocampo of impropriety in the loan
transaction entered into by Ocampo, the former failed to justify the reduction of the penalty of
suspension on the latter.
o Llamas further alleges that the executive clemency granted by Exec. Sec. Orbos was "the product of a
hocus-pocus strategy" because there was allegedly no real petition for the grant of executive clemency
filed by Ocampo.
[There is a lengthy discussion of Llamas’ petition which includes the preventive suspension under BP blg.
337 and the events which marked his assumption of office as governor including among others his oath of
office as acting governor, Ocampo’s announcement to the Media that Llamas was to perform his functions,
Ocampo’s acceptance of his suspension in the front cover of Manila bulletin, meeting with then President
Aquino and Rep. Conjuangco who asked him to discharge his duties as acting governor. ]
(cited in dissenting opinion) The decision of suspension was rendered after a finding by the Secretary of Interior
and Local Government that Ocampo had committed and which was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the Provincial Government of Tarlac.
o Thus, such suspension entirely distinct and separate from preventive suspension imposed on local
elective officials prior the final determination of the complaint filed against them, which is limited to only
sixty (60) days under the Local Government Code.
o A preventive suspension may be imposed after issues have been joined and before the
termination of the case when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had committed the
act complained of and the evidence of culpability is strong or when the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safe and integrity of the records and
other evidence.
In contrast, the administrative sanction of suspension imposed after the case has been heard is subject to the
limitation that it must not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent nor bar the respondent from an
elective public office for as long as he meets the qualifications required by law.
In the case, the limitation of sixty (60) days does not apply.
Ocampo had already served 81 days out of the 90-day suspension when the executive clemency was extended. With
only nine (9) days left unserved of the suspension imposed, the reason behind the grant of such executive
clemency to private respondent appears dubious, if not entirely whimsical.
ISSUE/ HELD:
Was the grant of executive clemency and the reason therefore, political questions beyond judicial review? –
No. The grant of executive clemency, in this case, is not beyond judicial review.
On executive clemency: the issue concerns the validity of the discretionary powers and so the courts can
exercise the power of judicial review.
Ocampo avers that since under the Constitution, discretionary authority is granted to the President on the exercise of
executive clemency, the same constitutes a political question which is beyond judicial review.
Court said, no. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers
are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns
the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the
Constitution, the courts will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review.
And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it
constitute interference with the functions of the President.
Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco: (excerpt)
Where discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those
powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts concern themselves only with the
question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.
As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the
political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by
considerations of public or political policy.
A question is political, and not judicial, means that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in
their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or
particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.
But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the
restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the
executive or the Legislature.
The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to "the end that
the government may be one of laws and not men" — words which Webster said were the greatest
contained in any written constitutional document.
Besides, under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been conferred an "expanded jurisdiction" to review
the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted
within the bounds of the Constitution (See Art. VIII, Sec. 1, Constitution). "Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court
is to merely check whether or not the govermental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of
its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view".
In the case at bar, the nature of the question for determination is not purely political.
Does the President have the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases? YES. The
Constitution does not distinguish between the criminal and administrative cases.
a. The Constitution does not distinguish.
Llamas's main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases, based on
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution (refer to emphasis supplied in the codal).
According to the Llamas, the qualifying phrase "after conviction by final judgment" applies solely to criminal cases.
Applying the doctrine "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," the Court rejects Llamas’ argument.
In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so the court must not distinguish.
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President,
with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised
only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment
cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
In the same vein, the court does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant
executive clemency in administrative cases.
The President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases; with
much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.
b. The DLG decision amounted to a final conviction which entitled Ocampo to an executive clemency.
Also, Llamas, describes in his very own words, Ocampo as one who has been "convicted in an administrative case".
Thus, Llamas concedes that the word "conviction" may be used either in a criminal case or in an administrative case.
And since Ocampo has withdrawn his Motion for Reconsideration for the grant of executive clemency, the DLG
decision became final which thereby allowed him to be given such grant.
c. The president merely exercised his power of supervision and control.
Of equal importance are the following provisions of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, Section I, Book III of which provides:
SECTION 1. Power of Control. — The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. SECTION 38. Definition of
Administrative Relationships. — Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the
special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as
follows:
Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain
the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials
or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly
provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies the word "control" shall
encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. ... (emphasis supplied)
The disciplinary authority to investigate, suspend, and remove provincial or city officials devolves at the first instance
on the Department of Interior and Local Government (Secs. 61 and 65, B.P. Blg. 337) and ultimately on the
President (Sec. 66). Implicit in this authority, however, is the "supervision and control" power of the
President to reduce, if circumstances so warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify the suspension or
removal order, even "in the sense" of granting executive clemency. "Control," within the meaning of the
Constitution, is the power to substitute one's own judgment for that of a subordinate.
Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the
President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her.
The President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may
substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially where the basis therefor would be to
serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant "executive
clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public
official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the
alleged executive clemency was granted, after adducing reasons that subserve the public interest. — "the
relative success of . . . livelihood loan program."
d. Other basis for the executive clemency in admin cases:
Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In meritorious cases, ..., the President may commute or remove administrative
penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees, in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and
conditions as he may impose in the interest of the service." During the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, a subject of deliberations was the proposed amendment to Art. VII, Sec. 19 which reads as follows:
"However, the power to grant executive clemency for violation of corrupt practices laws may be limited by
legislation." The Constitutional Commission, however, voted to remove the amendment, since it was in
derogation of the powers of the President.
As Mr. Natividad stated:
I am also against this provision which will again chip more powers from the President. In case of other
criminals convicted in our society we extend probation to them while in this case, they have already been
convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can offer mercy to them is through this executive clemency
extended to them by the President. If we still close this avenue to them, they would be prejudiced even
worse than the murderers and the more vicious killers in our society ....
The proposal was primarily intended to prevent the President from protecting his cronies. Manifestly, however, the
Commission preferred to trust in the discretion of Presidents and refrained from putting additional limitations on
his clemency powers.
It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the President's executive clemency
powers may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the Constitution, that is, "no
pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall be
granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC" (Article IX, C, Section 5,
Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty
administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the
Constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the process
exempts him from punishment therefor.
On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support
a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the
technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will therefore be unjust and unfair for
those found guilty administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency
cannot be extended to them, even in the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the
public.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
On the jurisdiction of the Court: What happened in this case was that President Aquino saw fit to amend the
decision rendered by the Secretary of Local Government on September 21, 1990, by reducing 90-day suspension
imposed on Gov. Ocampo. The President had the authority to do this, and she could exercise it through Executive
Secretary. His act, not having been "reprobated disauthorized" by her, is presumed to be the act of the Preside
herself. The Court is not concerned with the wisdom of that act, on its legality. I believe the act is legal but
reserve judgment on its wisdom.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is my opinion that the constitutional grant of power to the President to accord executive clemency, does
not extend to administrative sanctions imposed, in an administrative proceeding.
The power exists as an instrument or means for correcting these infirmities and also for mitigating whatever
harshness might be generated by a too strict an application of the law. This principle applies to all criminal
offenses committed against the state.
It is plainly evident that the intention of the Constitution is to empower and enable the President to afford relief from
enforcement of the criminal law which imposes penalty and which appears unduly harsh. However, the
President's pardoning power cannot be used to release or destroy the civil rights or remedies of private
individuals, or to relieve against private obligations, civil penalties and forfeitures, or an order or judgment in a
civil action or proceeding, or an administrative proceeding.
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution, it is clear that the
intention of the framers of the fundamental law was to extend to the President the power to grant pardons,
reprieves, or commutations in cases involving criminal offenses, which include violations of the Anti-Graft Law.
There is no indication at all that such power to grant executive clemency by the President may be extended to
administrative sanctions imposed in an administrative proceeding.
Cristobal v. Labrador (1940) – absolute pardon; restoration of full political and civil rights
This case seeks to reverse the decision of CFI-Rizal in sustaining the right of Teofilo Santos to remain in the list of
registered voters in precinct No. 11 in Malabon, Rizal.
CFI Rizal found Teofilo Santos guilty of estafa and sentenced him to six months of arresto mayor and to return to
Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo the swindled amounts, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
o On appeal, SC confirmed the judgment of conviction.
He was confined in the provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal from March 14 - August 18, 1932 and paid the corresponding
costs
Santos, despite the conviction, continued to be a registered voter in Malabon, Rizal and was the municipal president
between 1934 - 1937
Commonwealth Act 357 (Election Code) was passed by the National Assembly in 1938. Section 94 (b) disqualified
Santos from voting for having been “declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property”
In 1939, Santos applied to the President for an absolute pardon. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice,
the president granted the petition
o Restored his “full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or
employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature
and involving no money or property responsibility”
Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of Santos’ name in the list of eligible voters in Precinct 11 of Malabon, Rizal
on the grounds of Section 94, paragraph (b) of the Election Code
o CFI denied the petition and sustained the right of Teofilo Santos to remain in the list of registered voters
in Precinct 11 Malabon, Rizal based on the pardon extended to him by the President
Did the pardon extended by the President to Santos restore to him his full political rights? – Yes.
Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides: "(6) The President shall have the power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in
cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and 'with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper
to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly."
Two limitations on exercise of granting absolute pardon
Power is to be exercised after convictions
Such power does not extend to cases of impeachment
Pardoning power is subject to limitations placed by the Constitution but cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the convictions.
When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction
While the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that “he will be eligible for appointment
only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility,” it is
absolute insofar as it “restores the respondent to full civil and political rights”
The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does
not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of the
pardoning power of the Chief Executive which is not contemplated in the Constitution. Restoring of political rights
would then be left solely to legislative action
Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC and Estrada (2015) – Erap’s absolute pardon
FACTS:
2007, Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder.
Penalty imposed: reclusion perpetua and the accessory penalty of civil interdiction.
However, PGMA extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to President Estrada.
Estrada “received and accepted” the same by affixing his signature on the pardon letter.
2009, Estrada filed his certificate of candidacy for presidency.
Several complaints were filed in the COMELEC to oppose his candidacy.
COMELEC dismissed the complaints on the grounds that:
The Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting president; and
The pardon granted to Estrada by PGMA restored the his right to vote/be voted for a public office.
COMELEC en banc also dismissed the MR.
nd
2010 elections were held but Estrada was only able to garner the 2 highest number of votes.
2012, Estrada filed his CoC for Mayor of Manila City.
Rosas -Vidal filed for disqualification case against Estrada.
She contended that Estrada was disqualified to run for office because of his plunder conviction by
8 9
She relied on Sec. 40 of the LGC, in relation to Sec. 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
nd
COMELEC 2 Div. dismissed the petition for lack of merit. MR was also denied.
Hence, this petition to the SC.
While this case was pending in the SC, Estrada won the election and was proclaimed the mayor of Manila.
Alfredo Lim, his opponent, intervened in the case. Lim contended that Estrada was disqualified to run
for and hold public office as the pardon granted to him failed to expressly remit his perpetual
disqualification.
He also contended that since Estrada was disqualified to run, his votes should be declared stray and
Lim should be declared the winner.
Risos- Vidal raised Art. 36 and 41 of the RPC:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold publicoffice, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence.
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their accessory penalties.– The penalties of
reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or
during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
By these provisions, a pardon restoring civil/political rights without specifying what civil/political rights
are restored, shall not work to restore the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage.”
Basically, she contends that a general pardon does not carry with it the automatic restoration of civil and
political rights.
She cites the concurring opinions of Justices Padilla and Feliciano in Monsanto v. Factoran Jr. stating
that "the restoration of the right to hold public office to one who has lost such right by reason
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
Those with dual citizenship;
Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same
right after the effectivity of this Code; and
The insane or feeble minded.
9
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
of conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no matter
how intensely arguable, but must be stated in express, explicit, positive and specific language."
OSG and Estrada contended that:
The subsequent grant of pardon effectively restored his right to run for any public office.
The restoration of his right to run for any public office is the exception to the prohibition under Sec. 40 of
the LGC and Sec. 12 of the OEC.
As to the requirements in the RPC (the express restoration/remission of a particular right to be stated in
the pardon), they assert that “a rigid interpretation of the RPC provisions would be
stretching too much the clear and plain meaning of the provisions."
Taking into consideration the Whereas Clause of the pardon granted to Estrada, they support the
position that it "is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon and cannot therefore serve to
restrict its effectivity."
ISSUE/HELD
Did COMELEC commit GADALEJ in ruling that Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as
a result of the pardon granted to him by PGMA?—NO.
SC held that Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office.
o The wording of the pardon to Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
o It is not affected by the RPC provisions, when in fact, the pardon conforms with the said provisions.
The petition for disqualification by Risos-Vidal against Estrada was anchored on Sec. 40 of the LGC and Sec. 12
of the OEC.
o She claimed that Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective office despite the
fact that Estrada was granted pardon that includes a statement expressing "he is hereby restored
to his civil and political rights."
o She insisted that it could be inferred that PGMA did not deliberately intend to restore Estrada’s rights
of suffrage and to hold public office, or to otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification.
o SC held that this was untenable. The text of the pardon was clear.
Sec. 19, Art. 7 and Sec. 5, Art.9-C of the Constitution provides that the President possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency.
o Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
o Sec. 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules,
and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission.
These constitutional provisions provides that the only instances where the President may NOT extend pardon
are in the cases of:
o (1) Impeachment cases;
o (2) Cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and
o (3) Cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC.
o Hence, the President’s pardoning power cannot be limited by legislative action by the Congress.
o This principle was reiterated in the cases of Cristobal v. Labrador, Pelobello v. Palatino, and
Monsanto v. Factoran.
With regard the RPC provisions, SC held that these cannot serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive power and
prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes.
o SC cannot uphold Risos-Vidal’s interpretation of said RPC provisions.
o A rigid reading of the provisions is unwarranted, especially if it will defeat or unduly restrict the power
of the President to grant executive clemency.
o SC held that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum.
o SC held that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that Estrada "is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights" complies with the requirement of express restoration.
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the RPC provisions must be followed by the President. He reasons out
that these provisions do not abridge the President’s power to extend clemency.
o However, the majority disagrees with the statement that Congress may dictate how the President
may exercise his power of executive clemency.
o Such being power given by the Constitution cannot be interfered with by Congress.
SC held that the right to seek public elective office is recognized by law as falling under the whole gamut of civil
and political rights. Both law and jurisprudence maintains that the right to seek public elective office is
unequivocally considered as a political right.
Risos-Vidal relied on the separate opinions in the case of Monsanto v. Factoran to justify her argument that an
absolute pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public office has been restored, and that the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification has been remitted.
o SC held this to be incorrect. Although the opinions of the dissenting Justices are to be respected,
they do not form part of the controlling doctrine nor to be considered part of the law of the land
o A careful reading of the majority opinion in Monsanto, penned by CJ Fernan, reveals that a stringent
and overly nuanced application of the RPC provisions will require the President to use a statutorily
prescribed language in giving executive clemency, even if the intent of the President can be
deduced from the text or words used in the pardon.
o Furthermore, SC held that the pardon of Estrada is consistent with the RPC provisions.
SC held that the disqualification of Estrada under Sec. 40 of the LGC in relation to Sec. 12 of the OEC was
removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
o SC held that the subsequent absolute pardon granted to Estrada effectively restored his right to
seek public elective office.
o Sec. 12 of the OEC allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, to run for and hold any public
office, whether local or national position.
o The principle was upheld in Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, where the SC acknowledged the said
provision as one of the legal remedies that may be availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local
election filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the
date of proclamation.
rd
SC held that the 3 preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
The provision states "whereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office.”
SC held that this neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that
This is true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored.
Jurisprudence tells us that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory
clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute because they are not part of the operative
language of the statute.
In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and
therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfillment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the
pardon.
Justice Leonen dissents on the point of the coverage of the pardon: whether the pardon granted to Estrada was
so expansive as to have restored all his political rights, inclusive of the rights of suffrage and to hold public
office.
Justice Leonen is of the view that the pardon in question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite
the statement that Estrada is "hereby restored to his civil and political rights.”
This statement restored to Estrada all his civil and political rights except the rights denied to him by the
unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification made up of, among others, the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office.
However, SC held that the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," is
crystal clear – the pardon granted to Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only
unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term
"political rights" adverted to has a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
SC HELD that the COMELEC did not commit GADALEJ in dismissing the petitions for disqualifications against
Estrada

Case Involves Petition For Prohibition by Jesus Tarrosa, As A "Taxpayer," Questioning The Commission On Appointments

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Case Involves Petition For Prohibition by Jesus Tarrosa, As A "Taxpayer," Questioning The Commission On Appointments

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Tarrosa v.

Singson (1994) – CB Gov; list is exclusive

Does the appointment of a BSP governor require COA confirmation? – NO

0 Justice Padilla concurs in the decision of dismissing the petition.

Pimentel v. Ermita (SUPRA) –ad interim v. acting capacity

RE: International Human Rights Laws

RE: National Shrines

Is Marcos qualified to be buried in the LNMB? – YES.

Is Marcos disqualified from being interred in the LNMB? – NO.

[Focus on the action of the Executive Secretary in this case]

The Commissioner of Civil Service to investigate and remove presidential appointees

Was the letter-complaint properly filed in the Office of the President?—YES.

Does EO 420 infringe on the citizen’s right to privacy? – NO

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:

Ampatuan v. DILG (Supra)

Lagman v. Medialdea (Supra)

Grace San Diego:

(Relevant) Can RTC impose a penalty which precludes pardon? – NO

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