G.R. No. 109992 March 7, 2000
00 harvest proceeds in an Order dated
HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS represented by his
widow ARSENIA GARCIA VDA. DE SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE REYES, in his capacity as
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Malolos,
Bulacan, HON. ERASMO CRUZ, in his capacity as former Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Malolos, Bulacan, DARAB
SHERIFF AMANDO C. DIONISIO, EXEQUIEL GARCIA and/or ADELA
GARCIA and PANTALEON ANTONIO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29709 which
affirmed the two orders of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated April 3, 19922 and November 18,
1992.3
The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel,
Bulacan which was levied on execution by the Municipal Trial Court of
Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989. In accordance with said levy on
execution, the subject land was sold at public auction on September 20,
1990 with Herman Rey Santos, now substituted by his heirs represented
by his widow Arsenia Garcia Vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for
P34,532.50.
Santos registered the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
on October 15, 1990, after private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to
exercise his right of redemption within the reglementary period. As a
result, Ex-Officio Sheriff Carmelita Itapo executed a Final Deed of Sale
dated October 18, 1991 in favor of Santos which was registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan on November 7, 1991.
On April 1, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and
Damages with an application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
docketed as DARAB Case No. 369-BUL '92, praying that petitioner been
joined from preventing private respondent from gathering the mango fruits
lest they "over-mature and become useless."4
The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an
order on April 3, 1992, allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and
directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication
Board.
Subsequently, on April 27, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for
Consignation before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, in an apparent
attempt to redeem his land. This petition was dismissed.
Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992 a motion to
intervene5 with the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and
interests as the party who tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this
season."
On May 7, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint for
Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document, Redemption with
Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos,
the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.6
Thereafter, on July 1, 1992, the Adjudication Board suspended the
hearing on Pantaleon Antonio's motion for intervention pending the
resolution of the ownership issue raised in the above-mentioned
complaint.7
On July 8, 1992, intervenor Pantaleon Antonio filed with the DARAB a
Motion to Withdraw Intervenor's deposited share.8 The motion was
granted and intervenor Pantaleon Antonio was allowed to withdraw
P87,300.00 out of P174,600.
November 18, 1992.9 Corollarily, the DARAB recognized Pantaleon
Antonio as the duly constituted agricultural tenant of the subject land.
As adverted to above, the Court of Appeals affirmed the April 3, 1992
Order of the DARAB ordering the gathering of the mango fruits and
depositing with the Board the proceeds thereof, and the November 18,
1992 Order allowing the withdrawal of intervenor's share in the proceeds
and recognizing him as the duly constituted agricultural tenant.
Hence, the instant petition where petitioner submits that the Court of
Appeals erred:
1. In ruling that the PARAD has jurisdiction over the ancillary matter/s
raised by intervenor in DARAB Case No. 369-BUL '92 despite the fact
that the PARAD itself has admitted involvement of question of ownership
between the original parties and has indefinitely suspended the
principal/main case pending the outcome of the issue of ownership at the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos; and
2. In affirming and/or sustaining the order dated November 18, 1992 of
the PARAD allowing the release of 50% of the proceeds of the sale of the
harvested fruits in favor of intervenor without due process, during the
supposed indefinite suspension, and worse, without requiring said
purported intervenor to post a bond that will answer for damages that may
be sustained by herein petitioners.
Petitioner alleges that since private respondent's ownership of the subject
land is in issue before the lower court, his right to harvest the mango fruits
is still questionable.
We find merit in the petition.
Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB,
provides:
Sec. 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No.
6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844
as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, PD. No. 27 and other agrarian
laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657
(CARP Law), as:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are
contending parties for the ownership of the subject property.
In the case of Morta v. Occidental, et al., 10 this Court held:
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take
hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable
elements to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. de
Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction
of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a)
adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; b)
resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and c)
approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment
of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-
agricultural uses.

Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any

agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy
under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB
has no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken
cognizance of private respondent's petition for injunction in the first place.

Significantly, DARAB admitted that the issue before the Regional Trial
Court was one of ownership.1âwphi1 In fact, the issue of ownership had
been recognized by the DARAB in its assailed order of April 3, 1992 when
it held that:

A careful analysis of the records and attached documents revealed that

the issue involved is question of ownership between the parties, although
the attached Transfer Certificates of Title reflected the name of herein
petitioner.

The next issue to be resolved is whether it was proper for DARAB to take
cognizance of Pantaleon Antonio's motion for intervention considering
that DARAB had no jurisdiction and the issue of ownership is involved.

This Court rules in the negative.

The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be
harvested is an incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. As
such, it is dependent on the main case. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the parties,
necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can
stand. This issue, after all, can be resolved by the trial court, which has
the jurisdiction to order the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing
the proceeds with it, considering that an action has already been filed
before it on the specific issue of ownership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29709 which affirmed the April 3,
1992 and November 18, 1992 orders of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, DARAB is permanently enjoined from hearing the motion
for intervention of Pantaleon Antonio who is ordered to redeposit the
amount of P87,300.00 with the Regional Trial Court. The DARAB is
likewise ordered to transfer the remaining P87,300.00 on deposit with it to
the Regional Trial Court. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162446 March 29, 2010
ROMANITA CONCHA, BENITA COSICO, DOMINGO GARCIA, ROMEO
DE CASTRO, PEDRO CONCHA, CONSTANTINO CONCHA,
ROLANDO NAVARRO, ROSALINDA DE TORRES, CANDIDA DE
TORRES, RODELO COSICO, TEODOLFO CAPUNO, ANTONIO DE
TORRES, MAXIMA CONCHA, GABRIEL CONCHA, IRINEO CONCHA,
AND BRAULIO DE TORRES, Petitioners,
vs.
PAULINO RUBIO, SOFIA RUBIO, AMBROCIA BARLETA, SEGUNDO
CRISOSTOMO, MILAGROS GAYAPA, LASARO CONCHA, AND
LORENSO NAVARRO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Amended Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 73303.
The controversy involves the determination of who between petitioners
Romanita Concha, Benita Cosico, Domingo Garcia, Romeo de Castro,
Pedro Concha, Constantino Concha, Rolando Navarro, Rosalinda de
Torres, Candida de Torres, Rodelo Cosico, Teodolfo Capuno, Antonio de
Torres, Maxima Concha, Gabriel Concha, Irineo Concha, and Braulio de
Torres and respondents Paulino Rubio, Sofia Rubio, Ambrocia Barleta,
Segundo Crisostomo, Milagros Gayapa, Lasaro Concha, and Lorenso
Navarro, are qualified to become beneficiaries over a portion of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-140494, T-140492 and T-
140491, registered in the name of Lilia E. Gala, Luisita E. Gala and
Teresita E. Gala, respectively, with an aggregate area of 33.5006
hectares, more or less.
The facts of the case, as succinctly put by the CA, are as follows:
The subject landholding was placed under the Compulsory Acquisition
Scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the
government. On June 16, 1993, a Notice of Coverage was sent to the
landowners.
In her Affidavit dated August 17, 1993, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of Tiaong, Quezon, named as beneficiaries, viz: IRENEO
CONCHA, BRAULIO DE TORRES, LAZARO CONCHA, SEGUNDINA
CRISTOMO, AMBROSO BARLETA, RAYMUNDO GAYAPA, SOFIA
RUBIO, SOSIMO LOPEZ, SEGUNDA LOPEZ, LORENZO NAVARRO,
INANG RUBIO, GABRIEL CONCHA, ROMANITA CONCHA, BENITA
COSICO, DOMINGO GARCIA, ROMEO DE CASTRO, PEDRO
CONCHA, CONSTANTINO ZITA, ROLANDO NAVARRO, ROSALINDA
DE TORRES, CANDIDA DE TORRES, RODELO COSICO, TEODOLFO
CAPUNO, ANTONIO DE TORRES, and, MAXIMA CONCHA (Annex "A"
of the Complaint, Rollo, pp. 52-53).
On March 24, 1995, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of their
tenancy and their identification as beneficiaries and for disqualification of
the petitioners to become beneficiaries over the subject landholding
docketed as DARAB CASE NO. IV-Qu-1-014-95 (Annex "D", Rollo, pp.
45-51). They alleged that they are the tenants thereof and have not
relinquished their rights over the same, as they returned the monetary
awards given by the landowners (Ibid., p. 4, Rollo, p. 48).
Meanwhile, the registered owners of the subject land entered into a joint
project with 1st A.M. Realty Development Corporation, represented by
Atty. Alejandro Macasaet for its development.
On April 26, 1995, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approved
the landowners’ application for conversion, subject to the following
conditions:
1. The farmer-beneficiary, if any, shall be paid disturbance compensation
pursuant to R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389;
2. The remaining 18.5006 hectares shall be covered by CARP under
compulsory acquisition and the same be distributed to qualified farmer-
beneficiaries.
xxxx
In relation to paragraph 2 thereof, the MARO pursued the coverage of the
remaining 18.5006 has. The petitioners herein were identified as qualified
farmer-beneficiaries where three (3) Certificates of Land Ownership
Awards (CLOA) were issued in their favor (Annexes "C", "C-1. & "C-2").
Respondents, on the other hand, were paid of their disturbance
compensation. They now, however, question the validity and legality of
the institution of the petitioners as beneficiaries over the subject
landholding.
Sometime on January 1996, respondents together with the landowners
filed another case for annulment of CLOAs and prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Restraining Order docketed as DARAB CASE NO. IV-Qu-I-
006-96. This case was consolidated with the earlier DARAB CASE NO.
IV-Qu-I-014-95 and the hearing(s) were jointly held.3
On August 9, 1999, the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD)
rendered a Decision4 dismissing the case, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, it is judged that, this case be, and hereby is, DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.5
The PARAD ruled that respondents had waived their rights as tenants
and as farmer-beneficiaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
program, as evidenced by their Salaysay (for respondent Paulino Rubio)
and their Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay (for the rest of the
respondents).6 In addition, the PARAD ruled that it had no authority to
rule on the selection of farmer-beneficiaries, as the same was a purely
administrative matter under the jurisdiction of the DAR.7
Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal8 of the PARAD Decision.
On November 17, 2000, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) rendered a Decision9 setting aside the PARAD Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated 09
August 1999 is hereby SET ASIDE. Order is given to the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Quezon to cancel the Certificates of Land
Ownership Award issued to Private Defendants-Appellees, and the
MARO of Tiaong, Quezon and PARO for the Province of Quezon to
generate and issue new Certificates of Land Ownership Award in favor of
Plaintiffs-Appellants.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.10
The DARAB ruled that in order for a voluntary surrender by an agricultural
tenant of his landholding to be valid, the same must be done due to
circumstances more advantageous to him and his family − a
consideration, which, the DARAB found, was bereft of any evidence as
shown by the records of the case.11
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration12 of the DARAB
Decision. On September 6, 2002, the DARAB issued a Resolution13
denying their motion.
Petitioners then appealed to the CA.

On September 9, 2003, the CA issued a Decision14 ruling in favor of
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The 17 November 2000 Decision of the DARAB is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The titles over the subject land issued in favor of herein
petitioners are upheld.
SO ORDERED.15
Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
On February 27, 2004, the CA issued an Amended Decision16 granting
respondents’ motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED and the DARAB Decision dated November 17, 2000 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.17
The salient portions of the Amended Decision are hereunder reproduced
to wit:
A more than cursory reading of the arguments in support of their Motion
for Reconsideration prompted Us to reconsider Our Decision for the
following reasons:
1. Why would respondents choose to remain tenants on the 15-hectare
retained area when they can be beneficiaries of the 18-hectare remaining
portion of the subject agricultural land? In other words, why would they
choose to be leaseholders when they can be landowners?
2. If indeed they chose to remain in the 15-hectare retained area, the
same was eventually developed into a residential subdivision under the
Conversion Order issued by the DAR. Obviously, there can be no
agricultural tenant over a residential land. And
3. It is indubitable that respondents are recognized tenants on the subject
land and they had returned the disturbance compensation for the 15-
hectare retained area and instead, opted to be beneficiaries over the
CARP covered 18-hectare portion. Respondents should therefore be
given the priority in the selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries under
Section 22 of RA 6657.18
Hence, herein petition, with petitioners raising a sole assignment of error,
to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) IS CLOTHED WITH
JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE INVOLVING THE
IDENTIFICATION AND SELECTION OF QUALIFIED FARMER-
BENEFICIARIES OF A LAND COVERED BY THE COMPREHENSIVE
AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP).19
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioners argue that the DARAB is not clothed with the power or
authority to resolve the issue involving the identification and selection of
qualified farmer-beneficiaries since the same is an Agrarian Law
Implementation case, thus, an administrative function falling within the
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary.20
Petitioners’ argument is well taken.
In Lercana v. Jalandoni,21 this Court was categorical in ruling that the
identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving
strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.22
In addition, in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,23
this Court had an occasion to discuss the jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary in the selection of farmer-beneficiaries, to wit:
x x x Suffice it to say that under Section 15 of R.A. No. 6657, the
identification of beneficiaries is a matter involving strictly the
administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter which is exclusively
vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, through its authorized offices.
Section 15 reads:
SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. — The DAR in coordination
with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in
this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farm workers
who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential
beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide
the following data:
(a) names and members of their immediate farm household;
(b) owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of
tenurial relationship;
(c) location and area of the land they work;
(d) crops planted; and
(e) their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.
A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the
barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or other public
buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection by the
public at all reasonable hours.
Meanwhile, Administrative Order No. 10 (Rules and Procedures
Governing the Registration of Beneficiaries), Series of 1989, provides:
SUBJECT: I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Committee (BARC), as organized pursuant to RA 6657, shall
register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farm workers who are
qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This Administrative Order provides
the Implementing Rules and Procedures for the said registration.
xxxx
B. Specific
1. Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the CARP.24
Even a perusal of the DARAB Revised Rules shows that matters strictly
involving the administrative implementation of the CARP and other
agrarian laws and regulations, are the exclusive prerogative of, and
cognizable by, the Secretary of the DAR. Rule II of the said Rules read:
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. – The Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No.
6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844
as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the
following:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws;
b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination and payment
of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance
compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning
the functions of the Land Bank;
c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions of
DAR officials other than the Secretary, lease contracts or deeds of sale or
their amendments under the administration and disposition of the DAR
and LBP;
d) Cases arising from, or connected with membership or representation in
compact farms, farmers’ cooperatives and other registered farmers’
associations or organizations, related to land covered by the CARP and
other agrarian laws;
e) Cases involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-
emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the
CARP or other agrarian laws;
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT),
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Patent
(EP) and the administrative correction thereof;
g) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred
to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
Provided, however, that matters involving strictly the administrative
implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations,
shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of
the DAR.25
The administrative function of the DAR is manifest in Administrative Order
No. 06-00,26 which provides for the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law
Implementation Cases. Under said Rules of Procedure, the DAR
Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over identification, qualification or
disqualification of potential farmer-beneficiaries. Section 2 of the said
Rules specifically provides, inter alia, that:
SECTION 2. Cases Covered. - These Rules shall govern cases falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall include
the following:
(a) Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), including protests or
oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage;
(b) Identification, qualification or disqualification of potential farmer-
beneficiaries;
(c) Subdivision surveys of lands under CARP;
(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs)
and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance, recall or
cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land
Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet registered with the Register of
Deeds;
(e) Exercise of the right of retention by landowner; x x x27
Based on the foregoing, the conclusion is certain that the DARAB had no
jurisdiction to identify who between the parties should be recognized as
the beneficiaries of the land in dispute, as it was a purely administrative
function of the DAR. The PARAD was, thus, correct when it declared that
it had no jurisdiction to resolve the dispute, to wit:
As earlier stated no other agency of government is empowered or
authorized by law in the selection and designation of farmer beneficiaries
except the DAR being purely an administrative function. The Adjudication
Board is not clothed with power and authority to rule on the selection of
farmer beneficiaries. To do so would be an ultra vires act of said Board,
being administrative in character.28
It behooves this Court to ask why the DARAB granted affirmative relief to
respondents, when clearly the PARAD decision subject of appeal was
categorical about its lack of jurisdiction. A reading of the DARAB
Decision, however, shows that no discussion of the Board’s jurisdiction
was made. The failure of the DARAB to look into the jurisdictional issue
may, however, be attributed to the fact that petitioners did not raise said
issue before the DARAB. Nevertheless, this Court is of the opinion that
the same should not be an excuse for, nor should it warrant, the DARAB’s
action, especially since a plain reading of the PARAD Decision, as earlier
stated, shows that it categorically discussed the body’s lack of jurisdiction.
The same holds true for the CA Decision, which did not tackle the
jurisdictional impediment hounding the petition notwithstanding that
petitioners raised said issue in their petition.
While this Court in Torres v. Ventura29 ruled that it was hard to believe
that a tenant, who had been tilling the land in question for a long time,
would suddenly lose interest in it and decide to leave it for good and at a
time when he knew that full ownership over the same was soon going to
be in his hands,30 this Court believes that the same consideration should
not apply to the case at bar.
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Department of Education, Culture
and Sports,31 this Court held that the administrative prerogative of DAR
to identify and select agrarian reform beneficiaries holds sway upon the
courts:
In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential
CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November 23,
1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject
properties under CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP
beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative
implementation of the CARP, it behooves the courts to exercise great
caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is
grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. x x x
32
Thus, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer’s (MARO) decision not to
include respondents as farmer-beneficiaries must be accorded respect in
the absence of abuse of discretion. It bears stressing that it is the MARO
or the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who, together with the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, screens and selects the possible
agrarian beneficiaries.33 If there are farmers who claim they have priority
over those who have been identified by the MARO as beneficiaries of the
land, said farmers can file a protest with the MARO or the PARO who is
currently processing the Land Distribution Folder.34 Afterwards, the
proper recourse of any individual who seeks to contest the selection of
beneficiaries is to avail himself of the administrative remedies under the
DAR and not under the DARAB, which is bereft of jurisdiction over this
matter.
In any case, it appears to this Court that the decision of the MARO was
arrived at after due consideration of the circumstances of the case. On
this note, this Court takes notice of the Affidavit35 of the MARO
explaining her reason for excluding respondents as farmer-beneficiaries.
The pertinent portions of the Affidavit are hereunder reproduced, thus:
xxxx

That, in said Affidavit, I certified that the Plaintiff-Appellants (Paulino
Rubio et al.) were included in the list of beneficiaries of the subject
landholding, but they refused to sign in the prescribed CA forms of the
DAR to facilitate the documentation, instead executed two (2)
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated Oct. 5, 1993 x x x;
That, I have done my best to convince the said Plaintiff-Appellants to
cooperate in the documentation under Compulsory Acquisition of the
subject landholdings, but with violent reaction, they said, they already
received disturbance compensation from the landowners in CASH and
lots x x x;
That, the said lots with a total area of 1.5 hectares should be part of 18.5
hectares to be covered by CARP, as mentioned in the ORDER issued by
DAR Undersecretary JOSE C. MEDINA, JR., dated April 26, 1995, but
Mr. Paulino Rubio (Plaintiff-Appellant) requested 1.5 hectares were
already given to them (Plaintiff-Appellants) by the landowners, Teresita
Gala as part of their disturbance compensation and should be processed
through VLT which the undersigned MARO agreed; x x x.
That, it is not true, they (Plaintiff-Appellants) returned the money given by
the landowners, in fact, they used it in building their houses in the lot
given to them;
That, the said lot was already transferred to Sps. Paulino Rubio and
Isabel B. Rubio through private transaction without DAR Clearance as
evidence by the herein-attached Xerox copies of TCT No. T- 360494 and
Tax Declaration No. 39-013-0778;
xxxx
That, after the said Plaintiff-Appellants build their houses in 1993 in the
above-mentioned lots, and after the above-mentioned "SINUMPAANG
SALAYSAY" were executed, they already abandoned the landholding in
question, reason why the MARO, BARC and partner NGO KAMMPIL- Mr.
Pastor Castillo to screen additional beneficiaries from the regular farm
workers of the subject landholdings- such as magtatabas, mag-iipon,
magkakariton who lived in adjacent barangays; x x x.36
The foregoing declaration of the MARO strengthens the earlier Decision
of the PARAD which ruled that the waivers executed by respondents were
valid and binding, thus:
The text and substance of the affidavit of Paulino Rubio, quoted as
follows:
1) Na sinasabi nina IRENEO CONCHA AT BRAULIO DE TORRES sa
kanilang sinumpaang salaysay may petsa Agosto 17, 1993 na ako raw ay
CARP beneficiary sa lupang sakop ng Titulo No. T-140491, T-140492 at
T- 140494 na ako ang kanilang tinutukoy na Inang Rubio pagkat ang
palayaw sa akin ay Inong;
2) Na ang naulit na salaysay ay kasinungalingan at maaaring sila ay
managot sa Batas dahil sa salaysay na iyan at ako naman ay walang
ginawang application bilang beneficiary sa mga lupang naulit;
3) Na itong si Braulio de Torres ay tumanggap na rin ng disturbance
compensation buhat sa may-ari ng lupa noong Hunio 7, 1993 at ito
namang si Ireneo Concha kailan man ay walang naging karapatan ano
man sa lupa sapagkat ang nagtrabajo sa lupa ay ang kaniyang kapatid na
si Gabriel Concha na tumanggap din ng disturbance compensation;
4) Na hindi rin naman mga beneficiaries itong sina Maxima Concha na
kapatid ni Gabriel at ang kanyang asawa na si Teodulfo Capuno at si
Romanita Concha na asawa ni Ireneo; hindi rin beneficiaries itong asawa
ni Braulio na si Candida de Torres and at ang kanilang anak na si Antonio
de Torres at manugang na si Rosalinda de Torres;
5) Yaong mga binayaran ng disturbance compensation ay kusang-loob
nilang inalis ang kanilang mga bahay sa loob ng niogan at ang lahat nang
binanggit ko sa itaas ay pawang wala ng mga bahay sa niogan maliban
kay Braulio de Torres na ayaw umalis;
6) Na hindi rin beneficiaries itong mga dayuhan na sina Nenita at Rodelo
Cosico at si Constantino Zita;
7) Kung ako man ay gagawing beneficiary sa lupa pagdating ng
panahong ito ay aking tatalikuran pagka’t wala namang pakikinabangin sa
niogan na matatanda na ang puno ng niog na dapat ng putulin sapagka’t
maliliit ang bunga.37
Noted that affiant Paulino Rubio, admitted that he never applied as farmer
beneficiary (Paragraph 2- Affidavit). That in case he (Paulino) will be
listed as farmer beneficiary, he will reject it for the land is no longer
productive as the coconut existing thereon are already old and it is ready
to be cut and are no longer bearing fruits (Paragraph 7- Affidavit).
Abundantly shown that the rest of the co-plaintiffs in their Joint
"Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay" (Annex "2") stated, textually
quoted:
1) Na sinasabi nina IRENEO CONCHA at BRAULIO DE TORRES sa
kanilang sinumpaang salaysay may petsa Agosto 17, 1993 na kami raw
ay mga CARP beneficiaries sa lupang sakop ng Titulo No. T-140491, T-
140492 at T-140494;
2) Na ang naulit nilang salaysay ay hindi totoo sapagka’t wala naman
kaming ginawang pagaaply bilang beneficiary sa naulit na mga lupa at
kung inilista man kami ang pagkakalista ay hindi namin alam;
3) Na kami ay binigyan ng disturbance compensation at binigyan ng mga
lote na may-ari ng lupa bago iyon ipinagbili upang gawing social housing
project at kami naman ay lubos na nasiyahan sa ginawa sa amin ng may-
ari ng lupa;
4) Na ayaw na naming magtrabaho sa lupa na ito ay niogan na ang mga
puno ay laos na may mga 100 taon na ang edad at ang mga bunga ay
labis ang liliit at hindi naman kami napayag na gawain kaming mga
beneficiaries sa lupa, kaya nga lumagda na rin kami noong Hunio 7, 1993
sa pagsasauli sa lupa sa may-ari;
5) At kung nagkaroon man kami ng karapatan bilang mga CARP
beneficiaries sa naulit na lupa ay ito ay aming tinatalikuran na ngayon sa
aming pagkakalagda sa kasulatang ito.38
Joint affiants-co-plaintiffs clearly stated that they never applied as farmer
beneficiaries in the subject land, and if ever their names were listed in the
"DAR List" of farmer beneficiaries, it was not with their consent and
knowledge (Paragraph 2- Affidavit). Further, affiants stated that they were
paid "disturbance compensation" by the landowner and additionally given
"homelots" by said landowner (Paragraph 3- Affidavit). That they are no
longer interested to be listed and designated farmer beneficiaries for they
can no longer make use, nor benefit from the land, as the existing
coconuts are already 100 years old, and that by virtue of this joint
"Salaysay", they surrendered voluntarily their respective landholdings to
the landowner (Paragraph 4-Affidavit). That in case they will be listed and
designated as CARP beneficiaries, they will reject such offer or renounce
or waive the same.39
In addition, the PARAD observed that respondents were motivated by
greed when they chose to repudiate their sworn statements, thus:
After an assiduous study and re-examination of the evidence on hand, the
Adjudicator found DAR to have legal and valid reasons in the exclusion of
plaintiffs as farmer-beneficiaries based on their sworn statement which
waived and renounced their rights as tenants and farmer- beneficiaries of
the program. This was based on the fact that plaintiffs were awarded
individual "homelots" and paid disturbance compensation by the overstepped its legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy
landowner. It is observed clearly by the Adjudicator that plaintiffs took a between petitioners and respondents in deciding who should be declared
bold stance to deny or repudiate their sworn statement simply to enable the farmer-beneficiaries over the land in dispute. The CA thus erred in
them to be allocated farm land together with the defendants herein. The affirming the decision of the DARAB, which was rendered in excess of
Board found that plaintiffs were motivated by greed which will cause jurisdiction.
undue prejudice to the rights of the defendants herein. Plaintiffs wanted a
lion’s share of the land by claiming for more areas covered by the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
program, apart from what they received from the landowner, a homelot February 27, 2004 Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
and disturbance compensation. This postulate cannot be countenanced SP No. 73303 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The September 9,
by this Board, otherwise plaintiffs will enrich themselves at the expense of 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals is REINSTATED.
the defendants.40
SO ORDERED.
While respondents allege that they are the true tenants of the
landholdings in dispute, petitioners beg to differ, claiming that they,
together with respondents, are the tenants of the land and that the latter
have relinquished their rights.41 This Court cannot address such
allegation, as the same is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. In
any case, it must be stressed that a tenant of a parcel of land, which is
later declared to be under the coverage of CARP, is not automatically
chosen; nor does he have absolute entitlement to be identified as the
farmer-beneficiary thereof as can be gleaned from Section 18 of Republic
Act No. 6657, which provides for an order of priority of qualified farmer
beneficiaries, thus:

Sec. 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. — The lands covered by CARP shall be

distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same
barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same
municipality in the following order of priority;

(a) agriculture lessees and share tenants.

(b) regular farm workers;

(c) seasonal farm workers;

(d) other farm workers;

(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;

(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and

(g) others directly working on the land.

The finding of the MARO declaring petitioners as beneficiaries of the land

in dispute must, therefore, be accorded respect. It should also be equally
binding on the DARAB for the simple reason that the latter has no
appellate jurisdiction over the former: The DARAB cannot review, much
less reverse, the administrative findings of DAR.42 Instead, the DARAB
would do well to defer to DAR’s expertise when it comes to the
identification and selection of beneficiaries, as it did in Lercana where this
Court noted with approval that, in the dispositive portion of its decision,
left to the concerned DAR Offices the determination of who were or
should be agrarian reform beneficiaries. In fact, this course of action
available to the DARAB is now embodied in Rule II of its 2003 Rules of
Procedure, thus:

Section 5. Referral to Office of the Secretary (OSEC). − In the event that

a case filed before the Adjudicator shall necessitate the determination of a
prejudicial issue involving an agrarian law implementation case, the
Adjudicator shall suspend the case and, for purposes of expediency, refer
the same to the Office of the Secretary or his authorized representative in
the locality x x x.

While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies − such

as the DARAB − which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction
is confined to specific matters, are accorded not only respect but even
finality by the courts. Care should be taken so that administrative actions
are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set by the
enabling law for each agency.43 In the case at bar, the DARAB has
G.R. No. 180471 March 26, 2010
ALANGILAN REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by ALBERTO ROMULO,
as Executive Secretary, and ARTHUR P. AUTEA, as Deputy
Secretary; and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by Alangilan Realty & Development Corporation (petitioner),
challenging the August 28, 2007 Decision1 and the November 12, 2007
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76525.
Petitioner is the owner/developer of a 17.4892-hectare land in Barangays
Alangilan and Patay in Batangas City (Alangilan landholding). On August
7, 1996, petitioner filed an Application and/or Petition for
Exclusion/Exemption from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) Coverage3 of the Alangilan landholding with the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). It averred that, in 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City
classified the subject landholding as reserved for residential under a
zoning ordinance (1982 Ordinance), which was approved by the Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission. It further alleged that, on May 17,
1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City approved the City
Zoning Map and Batangas Comprehensive Zoning and Land Use
Ordinance (1994 Ordinance), reclassifying the landholding as residential-
1. Petitioner thus claimed exemption of its landholding from the coverage
of the CARP. In support of its application, petitioner submitted a
certification4 dated October 31, 1995 of Zoning Administrator Delia O.
Malaluan.
On May 6, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao issued an Order5
denying petitioner’s application for exemption. The DAR Secretary noted
that, as of February 15, 1993, the Alangilan landholding remained
agricultural, reserved for residential. It was classified as residential-1 only
on December 12, 1994 under Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No.
709, series of 1994. Clearly, the subject landholding was still agricultural
at the time of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657, or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), on June 15, 1988. The
qualifying phrase reserved for residential means that the property is still
classified as agricultural, and is covered by the CARP.
The DAR Secretary disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein application for exemption
involving seventeen (17) parcels of land with an aggregate area of
23.9258 hectares located [in] Calicanto, Alangilan and Patay, Batangas
City is hereby GRANTED insofar as the 4.9123 hectares [of] Calicanto
landholdings are concerned and DENIED with respect to the 17.4892
Alangilan properties, subject to the payment of disturbance compensation
to qualified tenants, if any there be.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order, arguing that the
Alangilan landholding was already reserved for residential use as early as
October 6, 1982. Invoking this Court’s ruling in Natalia Realty, Inc. v.
Department of Agrarian Reform,7 petitioner insisted that the subject
landholding was outside the coverage of the CARP. Petitioner also
submitted a Supplemental to Motion for Reconsideration,8 arguing that
the landholding had already been reclassified as reserved for residential
and had been earmarked for residential use even before the effectivity of
the CARL. Accordingly, its non-development into a subdivision did not
remove the landholding’s zoning classification as reserved for residential.
On July 8, 1997, petitioner submitted an Addendum to Supplemental to
Motion for Reconsideration,9 attaching another certification stating that
the Alangilan landholding was zoned as reserved for residential in 1982,
and became residential-1 in 1994. In a 2nd Addendum to Supplemental to
Motion for Reconsideration,10 petitioner submitted another certification
whereby the zoning administrator withdrew her first certification and
clarified that the phrase agricultural, reserved for residential spoke of two
classifications, namely, agricultural (coded brown in the map) and
reserved for residential (coded brown with diagonal lines), stating further
that the Alangilan landholding was reserved for residential.
However, the DAR Secretary was not at all persuaded, and denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on December 21, 1998, viz.:
After a careful review and evaluation of the case, this Office finds no
cogent reason to reverse its Order, dated 6 May 1997.
Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994 provides that "lands that are
classified as commercial, industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no
longer need any conversion clearance"; as such, they are exempt from
the coverage of R.A. [No.] 6657.
The phrase "Reserved for Residential" is not a zoning classification
contemplated in the aforestated A.O. as to exempt a particular land from
the coverage of R.A. 6657. Moreso in this case, because the phrase was
attached to the word "Agricultural"; in fact, we can say that it merely
qualified the term "Agricultural." We believe that the correct interpretation
of the zoning should be that the land is agricultural, but it may be
classified and used for residential purposes in some future time, precisely,
because it has been reserved for residential use. This interpretation is
supported by the fact that the zoning of the land became Residential only
in 1994, per Ordinance No. 3, series of 1994, which established a
Comprehensive Zoning Regulation and Land Use for Batangas City. To
reiterate, the Sanggunian Members of Batangas City would have
expressly, unequivocably, and unqualifiedly zoned the area as
"residential" if they had intended it to be zoned as such in 1982. They
never did until the issuance of Ordinance No. 3 in 1994.
It is also important to note, that the legend used in the Zoning Map of
Batangas City approved by HSRC (now HLURB) per Resolution No. 92,
dated 6 October 1982, indicated a certain kind of arrangement which put
in sequential order those that were similarly zoned, but with different
qualifications and/or characteristics. Thus, "residential-1," "residential-2,"
and "residential-3" were placed on top of the list one after the other, while
"Agricultural, reserved for residential" and mining agricultural were put at
the bottom, but also enumerated one after the other. If the subject
properties were classified more of residential than agricultural, it should
have been placed in the legend right after "residential-3", and the color
that should have been used was not brown but a shade of white with
diagonal lines to reflect its dominant residential character.
Even the Applicant was aware that the classification of the area was
agricultural. In his letter to the MARO of Batangas City, dated 24 October
1995, the Applicant categorically admitted that the Alangilan Landholding
was classified as agricultural. The said letter stated as follows:
At present, the subject properties are classified as agricultural. However,
Barangay Alangilan where these properties are located have been
declared by an ordinance of the Municipal Council of Batangas City as
commercial, industrial and/or residential.
As to what ordinance the Applicant was referring to was not specified.
However, it seems obvious that he was referring to the 1994
Comprehensive Zoning Regulations and Land Use for Batangas City
(Ordinance No. 3, series of 1994). The previous zoning ordinance, i.e. the
Batangas City Zoning Ordinance approved under HSRC Resolution No.
R-92, series of 1982, dated 6 October 1982, classified the said
landholding as "Agricultural, Reserved for Residential." It was Ordinance
No. 3, series of 1994 that explicitly classified the area as "Residential-1."
This Office, therefore, is convinced that the zoning classification of the
Alangilan Landholding prior to 15 June 1988 was Agricultural, although
with the qualification that it had been reserved for residential use. The
ocular inspection conducted in 1996 by the representatives of the MARO,
PARO and RARO confirmed that the Alangilan Landholding was still used
for agricultural purposes. The area was planted with mangoes and
coconuts.
We could not give credence to the 3rd Certification, dated 9 December
1997, of Zoning Administrator Delia Malaluan-Licarte, because it does not
conform to the Batangas City Zoning Ordinance and Map approved under
HSRC Resolution No. R-92, series of 1982, dated 6 October 1982. In the
first place, what is asked from Zoning Administrators is merely to state the
kind of classification/zoning where a certain area falls as provided in the
approved Zoning Ordinance. In the case at bar, the Zoning Administrator
went beyond her authority. In effect, she reclassified the area from
"Agricultural, Reserved for Residential" to "Reserved for Residential" by
claiming that there were actually two zones provided by the Sanggunian
Members. It was actually a modification of the zoning ordinance which, to
us, is clearly unwarranted.
Moreover, even assuming the Zoning Administrator is correct, the
classification "Reserved for Residential" is not within the contemplation of
A.O. No. 6, series of 1994. The said A.O. talks about lands that were
classified as residential before 15 June 1988. Alangilan Landholding was
merely reserved for Residential. It connotes something in the future,
which is, that the land may be classified as residential in some future
time. It was identified as an expansion area, nothing else. The fact
remains that in 1982, the landholding was still Agricultural, and this fact is
not changed by the re-interpretation made by Zoning Administrator Delia
Malaluan-Licarte.11
On appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the decision of the
DAR Secretary:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the appealed Order dated 21 December 1998 of the
Department of Agrarian Reform [is] AFFIRMED in toto.
Parties are required to INFORM this Office, within five (5) days from
notice, of the dates of their receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.12
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the motion also suffered the
same fate, as the OP denied it on March 20, 2003.13
Petitioner went up to the CA via a petition for review on certiorari,
assailing the OP decision. On August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed the
petition. The CA noted the report of MARO, Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office (PARO), and Regional Agrarian Reform Office (RARO) that the
Alangilan landholding was devoted to agricultural activities prior to the
effectivity of the CARP on June 15, 1988 and even thereafter. Likewise,
there was no showing that it was classified as commercial, industrial, or
residential in town plans and zoning ordinances of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board. Accordingly, the Alangilan property did not cease
to be agricultural. The 1994 Ordinance classifying the property as
residential-1 did not convert or reclassify the Alangilan landholding as
residential because there was no proof that a conversion clearance from
the DAR was obtained. Thus, despite its reclassification in 1994 by the
City Government of Batangas, the Alangilan landholding remained under
CARP coverage. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA
denied it on November 12, 2007.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner, arguing that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER’S ALANGILAN LANDHOLDING IS SUBJECT TO THE
COVERAGE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE PROPERTY HAS BEEN CONVERTED
TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USES BY THE ZONING ORDINANCE OF
THE CITY OF BATANGAS PRIOR TO THE LAW.14
Petitioner insists on exemption of the Alangilan landholding from CARP
coverage. It argues that the subject landholding had already been
converted into non-agricultural use long before the advent of the CARP.
The passage of the 1982 Ordinance, classifying the property as reserved
for residential, it asserts, effectively transformed the land into non-
agricultural use, and thus, outside the ambit of the CARL. It cites Natalia,
wherein it was ruled that lands intended for residential use are outside the
coverage of the CARL.
Indeed, lands devoted to non-agricultural activity are outside the coverage
of CARL. These include lands previously converted into non-agricultural
uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988. Unfortunately,
petitioner failed to convince us that the Alangilan landholding ceased to
be agricultural at the time of the effectivity of the CARL.
It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as
agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as
residential-1 in 1994. However, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the term
reserved for residential does not change the nature of the land from
agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary,
the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use. It
does not denote that the property has already been reclassified as
residential, because the phrase reserved for residential is not a land
classification category.
Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject
landholding was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994,
reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding
had already been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner
claims, then there would have been no necessity for the passage of the
1994 Ordinance.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in our ruling in Natalia. The case is not on all
fours with the instant case. In Natalia, the entire property was converted
into residential use in 1979 and was developed into a low-cost housing
subdivision in 1982. Thus, the property was no longer devoted to
agricultural use at the time of the effectivity of the CARL.
In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the subject
landholding had already been converted into residential use prior to June
15, 1988. We also note that the subject landholding was still being utilized
for agricultural activities at the time of the filing of the application for
exemption. The ocular inspection, jointly conducted by the MARO, PARO
and RARO, disclosed that the landholding was planted with mangoes and
coconuts.15
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Oroville Development
Corporation,16 we held:
[i]n order to be exempt from CARP coverage, the subject property must
have been classified as industrial/residential before June 15, 1988. In this
case, the DAR's examination of the zoning ordinances and certifications
pertaining to the subject property, as well as its field investigation,
disclosed that the same remains to be agricultural. The Zoning
Certifications to the effect that the land is within the city's potential growth
area for urban expansion are inconsequential as they do not reflect the
present classification of the land but merely its intended land use.
Not having been converted into, or classified as, residential before June
15, 1988, the Alangilan landholding is, therefore, covered by the CARP.
The subsequent reclassification of the landholding as residential-1 in
1994 cannot place the property outside the ambit of the CARP, because
there is no showing that the DAR Secretary approved the reclassification.

In a last-ditch effort to secure a favorable decision, petitioner assails the

authority of the DAR Secretary to determine the classification of lands. It
asserts that the power to classify lands is essentially a legislative function
that exclusively lies with the legislative authorities, and thus, when the
Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City declared the Alangilan landholding
as residential in its 1994 Ordinance, its determination was conclusive and
cannot be overruled by the DAR Secretary.

The argument is specious.

The exclusive jurisdiction to classify and identify landholdings for

coverage under the CARP is reposed in the DAR Secretary. The matter of
CARP coverage, like the instant case for application for exemption, is
strictly part of the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter
well within the competence of the DAR Secretary.17 As we explained in
Leonardo Tarona, et al. v. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division), et
al.:181avvphi1

The power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP coverage

lies with the DAR Secretary pursuant to Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657.
Verily, it is explicitly provided under Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB
Revised Rules that matters involving strictly the administrative
implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations,
shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of
the DAR.

Finally, it is well settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are

generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if such findings
are supported by substantial evidence. The factual findings of the DAR
Secretary, who, by reason of his official position, has acquired expertise
in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect and, without
justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified, or reversed.19 In this
case, petitioner utterly failed to show justifiable reason to warrant the
reversal of the decision of the DAR Secretary, as affirmed by the OP and
the CA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76525 are
AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180384 March 26, 2010
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CORAZON M. VILLEGAS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 180891
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF CATALINO V. NOEL and PROCULA P. SY, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated cases1 are about the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial
Court (RTC), acting as a Special Agrarian Court, over just compensation
cases involving agricultural lands located outside its regular territorial
jurisdiction but within the province where it is designated as agrarian court
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) filed cases for
determination of just compensation against respondent Corazon M.
Villegas in Civil Case 2007-14174 and respondent heirs of Catalino V.
Noel and Procula P. Sy in Civil Case 2007-14193 before the RTC of
Dumaguete City, Branch 32, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court for the
province of Negros Oriental. Respondent Villegas’ property was in
Hibaiyo, Guihulngan City, Negros Oriental, while respondent heirs’ land
was in Nangca, Bayawan City, Negros Oriental. These lands happened to
be outside the regular territorial jurisdiction of RTC Branch 32 of
Dumaguete City.
On September 13, 2007 RTC, Branch 32 dismissed Civil Case 2007-
14174 for lack of jurisdiction.2 It ruled that, although it had been
designated Special Agrarian Court for Negros Oriental, the designation
did not expand its territorial jurisdiction to hear agrarian cases under the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan City where
respondent Villegas’ property can be found.
On November 16, 2007 RTC, Branch 32 also dismissed Civil Case 2007-
14193 for lack of jurisdiction. It pointed out that RTC, Branch 63 of
Bayawan City had jurisdiction over the case since respondent heirs’
property was within the latter court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioner Land Bank moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the
two cases but RTC, Branch 32 denied both motions.3 Aggrieved, Land
Bank directly filed this petitions for certiorari4 before this Court, raising a
purely question of law.
Sole Question Presented
The sole question presented in these cases is whether or not an RTC,
acting as Special Agrarian Court, has jurisdiction over just compensation
cases involving agricultural lands located outside its regular jurisdiction
but within the province where it is designated as an agrarian court under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998.
The Court’s Ruling
The RTC, Branch 32 based its order on Deputy Court Administrator
(DCA) Zenaida Elepaño’s opinion that single sala courts have jurisdiction
over agrarian cases involving lands located within its territorial jurisdiction.
An RTC branch acting as a special agrarian court, she claimed, did not
have expanded territorial jurisdiction. DCA Elepaño said:
x x x [B]eing a single sala court, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64,
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, has jurisdiction over all cases, including
agrarian cases, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court emanating from
the geographical areas within its territorial jurisdiction.
Further, the jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Courts over agrarian
cases is co-extensive with its territorial jurisdiction. Administrative Order
No. 80 dated July 18, 1989, as amended by Administrative Order No.
80A-90 dated February 23, 1990, did not expand the territorial jurisdiction
of the courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts.5
Respondent Villegas6 adopts DCA Elepaño’s view. Villegas points out
that the designation of RTC, Branch 32 as a Special Agrarian Court did
not expand its territorial jurisdiction. Although it has been designated
Special Agrarian Court for the Province of Negros Oriental, its jurisdiction
as an RTC did not cover the whole province.
Respondent Villegas adds that, in hearing just compensation cases, RTC,
Branch 64 in Guihulngan City should be no different from the situation of
other single sala courts that concurrently hear drugs and family-related
cases even as the Supreme Court has designated family and drugs
courts in Dumaguete City within the same province. Further, Guihulngan
City is more than 100 kilometers from Dumaguete City where RTC,
Branch 32 sits. For practical considerations, RTC, Branch 64 of
Guihulngan City should hear and decide the case.
For their part, on June 19, 2009 respondent heirs of Noel informed7 the
Court that petitioner Land Bank had already paid them for their land.
Consequently, they have no further interest in the outcome of the case. It
is not clear, however, if the trial court had already approved a
settlement.1avvphi1
"Jurisdiction" is the court’s authority to hear and determine a case. The
court’s jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by law.8 In this case, the law that confers jurisdiction on Special
Agrarian Courts designated by the Supreme Court in every province is
Republic Act (R.A.) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988. Sections 56 and 57 are the relevant provisions:
SEC. 56. Special Agrarian Court. - The Supreme Court shall designate at
least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each
province to act as a Special Agrarian Court.
The Supreme Court may designate more branches to constitute such
additional Special Agrarian Courts as may be necessary to cope with the
number of agrarian cases in each province. In the designation, the
Supreme Court shall give preference to the Regional Trial Courts which
have been assigned to handle agrarian cases or whose presiding judges
were former judges of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges assigned to said courts shall
exercise said special jurisdiction in addition to the regular jurisdiction of
their respective courts.
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their
special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for
decision.
The law is clear. A branch of an RTC designated as a Special Agrarian
Court for a province has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation in that province. In
Republic v. Court of Appeals,9 the Supreme Court ruled that Special
Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over two
categories of cases: (1) all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and (2) the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under R.A. 6657.

By "special" jurisdiction, Special Agrarian Courts exercise power in

addition to or over and above the ordinary jurisdiction of the RTC, such as
taking cognizance of suits involving agricultural lands located outside their
regular territorial jurisdiction, so long as they are within the province
where they sit as Special Agrarian Courts.

R.A. 6657 requires the designation by the Supreme Court before an RTC
Branch can function as a Special Agrarian Court. The Supreme Court has
not designated the single sala courts of RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan
City and RTC, Branch 63 of Bayawan City as Special Agrarian Courts.
Consequently, they cannot hear just compensation cases just because
the lands subject of such cases happen to be within their territorial
jurisdiction.

Since RTC, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City is the designated Special

Agrarian Court for the province of Negros Oriental, it has jurisdiction over
all cases for determination of just compensation involving agricultural
lands within that province, regardless of whether or not those properties
are outside its regular territorial jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions, SETS ASIDE the orders
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City dated
September 13, 2007 and October 30, 2007 in Civil Case 2007-14174,
entitled Land Bank of the Philippines v. Corazon Villegas, and its orders
dated November 16, 2007 and December 14, 2007 in Civil Case 2007-
14193, entitled Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Catalino V. Noel
and Procula P. Sy, which orders dismissed the cases before it for lack of
jurisdiction. Further, the Court DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch
32 of Dumaguete City to immediately hear and decide the two cases
unless a compromise agreement has in the meantime been approved in
the latter case.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.
(CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein
petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc.
(CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as
amended by DAR AO No. 05-07,1 and DAR Memorandum No. 88,2 for
having been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some
provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and
unconstitutional.
Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
is the umbrella organization of some 3,500 private corporations,
partnerships, single proprietorships and individuals directly or indirectly
involved in land and housing development, building and infrastructure
construction, materials production and supply, and services in the various
related fields of engineering, architecture, community planning and
development financing. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform is named
respondent as he is the duly appointive head of the DAR whose
administrative issuances are the subject of this petition.
The Antecedent Facts
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO
No. 07-97,3 entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses," which
consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use
conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all
untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local
Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
issued DAR AO No. 01-99,4 entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on
the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses," amending
and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its coverage
includes the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted
to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-
agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of
agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of
which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural
use other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to
residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or
after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 66575 on 15 June 1988 pursuant
to Section 206 of Republic Act No. 71607 and other pertinent laws and
regulations, and are to be converted to such uses.
On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another
Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002
Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended
DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances
inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to
another agricultural use.
Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended
certain provisions8 of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-
07, particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and
calamities.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real
estate development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued
Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the
processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.
By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of
housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage,
unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice
not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole
nation.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner posits the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS
THAT HAVE BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL,
INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-AGRICULTURAL USES.
II.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION AND GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY
ISSUING AND ENFORCING [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED]
WHICH SEEK TO REGULATE RECLASSIFIED LANDS.
III.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE
LOCAL AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
IV.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE[S] OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
V.
WHETHER MEMORANDUM NO. 88 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWER.9
The subject of the submission that the DAR Secretary gravely abused his
discretion is AO No. 01-02, as amended, which states:
Section 3. Applicability of Rules. – These guidelines shall apply to all
applications for conversion, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to
another agricultural use, such as:
xxxx
3.4 Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified
by the LGU or by way of a Presidential Proclamation, to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the
effectivity of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988, x x x. [Emphasis supplied].
Petitioner holds that under Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No.
8435,10 the term agricultural lands refers to "lands devoted to or suitable
for the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,
raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm
products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by a person whether
natural or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land." When the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, however, issued DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, he included in
the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June
1988." In effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988
are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of conversion,
redistribution, or otherwise. In so doing, petitioner avows that the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction as he has no
authority to expand or enlarge the legal signification of the term
agricultural lands through DAR AO No. 01-02. Being a mere
administrative issuance, it must conform to the statute it seeks to
implement, i.e., Republic Act No. 6657, or to the Constitution, otherwise,
its validity or constitutionality may be questioned.
In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, was made in violation of Section 6511 of Republic Act No.
6657 because it covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to
non-agricultural uses or to other agricultural uses, such as the conversion
of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGUs or
by way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.
According to petitioner, there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No.
6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the
jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified
lands be submitted to its conversion authority. Thus, in issuing and
enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Petitioner further asseverates that Section 2.19,12 Article I of DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, making reclassification of agricultural lands
subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion,
violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not provided
therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion
procedures or requirements, or that the DAR’s approval or clearance
must be secured to effect reclassification. The said Section 2.19 of DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional mandate
on local autonomy under Section 25,13 Article II and Section 2,14 Article
X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Petitioner similarly avers that the promulgation and enforcement of DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, constitute deprivation of liberty and property
without due process of law. There is deprivation of liberty and property
without due process of law because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, lands that are not within DAR’s jurisdiction are unjustly,
arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on
pain of administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is
discrimination and violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased
in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society.
As its final argument, petitioner avows that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is
not a valid exercise of police power for it is the prerogative of the
legislature and that it is unconstitutional because it suspended the land
use conversion without any basis.
The Court’s Ruling
This petition must be dismissed.
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum.15 In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,16 citing People v.
Cuaresma,17 this Court made the following pronouncements:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive.
It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of
Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established
policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court’s docket.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon
the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which
in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as
the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.19
This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such
as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the
availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction.20
Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the
following cases: (a) Chavez v. Romulo,21 on citizens’ right to bear arms;
(b) Government of [the] United States of America v. Hon. Purganan,22 on
bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections v. Judge
Quijano-Padilla,23 on government contract involving modernization and
computerization of voters’ registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v.
Hon. Sec. Zamora,24 on status and existence of a public office; and (e)
Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona,25 on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of
the Office of the President which modified the approval of the conversion
to agro-industrial area.26
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set
forth special and important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court
and why this Court should give due course to this petition in the first
instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set forth in Heirs of Bertuldo
Hinog v. Melicor.27 The present petition should have been initially filed in
the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy
of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this
petition.
Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for
Certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a
Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this Court has only appellate,
not original, jurisdiction.28 Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(Emphasis supplied.)
With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not
have original jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only
questions of law are involved.
Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial
hierarchy, this Petition is still dismissible.
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court
within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing
such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.29
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1)
the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.30
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means
that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer,
is not authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding,
because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general
power in respect of it are wanting.31 Without jurisdiction means lack or
want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or
causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular
matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.32 Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.33
In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the above-
mentioned requisites for the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform in issuing the assailed
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, as well as Memorandum No. 88 did so
in accordance with his mandate to implement the land use conversion
provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the process, he neither acted in
any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. A Petition for
Certiorari is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit on this matter,
viz.:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment must be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer.1avvphi1
A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where
it has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of
the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the
other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of
public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature."34
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights
are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a
tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine
the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.35
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The
issuance and enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the
questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88
were done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative
functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing the
aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
never made any adjudication of rights of the parties. As such, it can never
be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for
he never exercised any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his
quasi-legislative and administrative functions.
Furthermore, as this Court has previously discussed, the instant petition
in essence seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or
illegality of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and
Memorandum No. 88. Thus, the adequate and proper remedy for the
petitioner therefor is to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which this
Court has only appellate and not original jurisdiction. It is beyond the
province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances
unconstitutional and illegal because certiorari is confined only to the
determination of the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke
certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative issuances
unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the
writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right,
"never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion."36
At any rate, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the
instant petition should still be dismissed.
Executive Order No. 129-A37 vested upon the DAR the responsibility of
implementing the CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the
successful implementation of the CARP, Section 5(c) of the said
executive order authorized the DAR to establish and promulgate
operational policies, rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian
reform implementation. Section 4(k) thereof authorized the DAR to
approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses. Similarly, Section 5(l) of the
same executive order has given the DAR the exclusive authority to
approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by
law. Section 7 of the aforesaid executive order clearly provides that "the
authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the [DAR]
and the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform x x x."

Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15
June 1988" have been included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so
doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of
his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-
A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform
implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands
for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural
lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the
category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to
non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands
in the context of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No.
6657.
More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which
Opinion has been recognized in many cases decided by this Court,
clarified that after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June
1988 the DAR has been given the authority to approve land
conversion.38 Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority to
include in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15
June 1988" for purposes of land use conversion.
In the same vein, the authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to
include "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of
agricultural lands finds basis in jurisprudence. In Ros v. Department of
Agrarian Reform,39 this Court has enunciated that after the passage of
Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go
through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the
DAR. However, agricultural lands, which are already reclassified before
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 which is 15 June 1988, are
exempted from conversion.40 It bears stressing that the said date of
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 served as the cut-off period for
automatic reclassifications or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer
require any DAR conversion clearance or authority.41 It necessarily
follows that any reclassification made thereafter can be the subject of
DAR’s conversion authority. Having recognized the DAR’s conversion
authority over lands reclassified after 15 June 1988, it can no longer be
argued that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was wrongfully given the
authority and power to include "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988"
in the definition of agricultural lands. Such inclusion does not unduly
expand or enlarge the definition of agricultural lands; instead, it made
clear what are the lands that can be the subject of DAR’s conversion
authority, thus, serving the very purpose of the land use conversion
provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was
made in violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers
even those non-awarded lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or by
way of Presidential Proclamations on or after 15 June 1988 is specious.
As explained in Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, it is
true that the DAR’s express power over land use conversion provided for
under Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is limited to cases in which
agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality
has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value
for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. To suggest, however,
that these are the only instances that the DAR can require conversion
clearances would open a loophole in Republic Act No. 6657 which every
landowner may use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform
program. It should logically follow, therefore, from the said department’s
express duty and function to execute and enforce the said statute that any
reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial or industrial
property, on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June
1988 should first be cleared by the DAR.42
This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals43 that reclassification of
lands does not suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from each
other. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of
agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR while
reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the
requirements and procedures for land use conversion. In view thereof, a
mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a
landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of
conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other
purposes.44
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and
conversion that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses must still undergo the
process of conversion before they can be used for the purpose to which
they are intended.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR’s conversion
authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No.
6657 on 15 June 1988.45 The said date served as the cut-off period for
automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer
require any DAR conversion clearance or authority.46 Thereafter,
reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to DAR’s
conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the
agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the
current use of reclassified agricultural lands.
It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done
by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations because either way
they must still undergo conversion process. It bears stressing that the act
of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies
how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does
not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for
other purposes. As explained in DAR Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series
of 1994, cited in the 2009 case of Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-
NFSW and the Department of Agrarian Reform,47 reclassification of
lands denotes their allocation into some specific use and providing for the
manner of their utilization and disposition or the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan.
For reclassified agricultural lands, therefore, to be used for the purpose to
which they are intended there is still a need to change the current use
thereof through the process of conversion. The authority to do so is
vested in the DAR, which is mandated to preserve and maintain
agricultural lands with increased productivity. Thus, notwithstanding the
reclassification of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses, they must
still undergo conversion before they can be used for other purposes.
Even reclassification of agricultural lands by way of Presidential
Proclamations to non-agricultural uses, such as school sites, needs
conversion clearance from the DAR. We reiterate that reclassification is
different from conversion. Reclassification alone will not suffice and does
not automatically allow the landowner to change its use. It must still
undergo conversion process before the landowner can use such
agricultural lands for such purpose.48 Reclassification of agricultural
lands is one thing, conversion is another. Agricultural lands that are
reclassified to non-agricultural uses do not ipso facto allow the landowner
thereof to use the same for such purpose. Stated differently, despite
having reclassified into school sites, the landowner of such reclassified
agricultural lands must apply for conversion before the DAR in order to
use the same for the said purpose.
Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or
by way of Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988
must undergo the process of conversion, despite having undergone approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No.
reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for other purposes. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has been validly recognized by said Section
20 of Republic Act No. 7160 by explicitly providing therein that, "nothing in
It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner
agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657."
purpose, i.e., public school, etc., because in such a case, conversion is
no longer necessary. As held in Republic v. Estonilo,49 only a positive act DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, does not also violate the due process
of the President is needed to segregate or reserve a piece of land of the clause, as well as the equal protection clause of the Constitution. In
public domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation of public providing administrative and criminal penalties in the said administrative
agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect converted the same order, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform simply implements the provisions
to such use without undergoing any conversion process and that they of Sections 73 and 74 of Republic Act No. 6657, thus:
must be actually, directly and exclusively used for such public purpose for
which they have been reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated from Sec. 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. – The following are prohibited:
the reservations and transferred to the DAR for distribution to qualified
beneficiaries under the CARP.50 More so, public agricultural lands xxxx
already reserved for public use or purpose no longer form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for (c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-
agriculture.51 Hence, they are outside the coverage of the CARP and it agricultural use with intent to avoid the application of this Act to his
logically follows that they are also beyond the conversion authority of the landholdings and to disposes his tenant farmers of the land tilled by them;
DAR.
xxxx
Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of (f) The sale, transfer or conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) including lands any other usufructuary right over the land he acquired by virtue of being a
not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non- beneficiary, in order to circumvent the provisions of this Act.
agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2) issuing and enforcing xxxx
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, subjecting to DAR’s jurisdiction for
conversion lands which had already been reclassified as residential, Sec. 74. Penalties. ─ Any person who knowingly or willfully violates the
commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses on or after 15
provisions of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than
June 1988.
one (1) month to not more than three (3) years or a fine of not less than
one thousand pesos (₱1,000.00) and not more than fifteen thousand
Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the
pesos (₱15,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.
reclassification of agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the
requirements of land use conversion procedure or that DAR’s approval or
If the offender is a corporation or association, the officer responsible
clearance must be secured to effect reclassification, did not violate the
therefor shall be criminally liable.
autonomy of the LGUs.
And Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435, which specifically provides:
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 states that:
Sec. 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. – x
SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. – (a) A city or municipality may,
x x.
through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public
hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural
Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be
lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the
penalized with imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years, or a fine
following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and
equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the government's
sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of
investment cost, or both, at the discretion of the court, and an accessory
Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater
penalty of forfeiture of the land and any improvement thereon.
economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as
determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such
In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after
reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total
determining, in an administrative proceedings, that violation of this law
agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
has been committed:
xxxx
a. Consolation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion;
and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided,
further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries
b. Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent
pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A.
conversion applications that they may file with the DAR.
No. 6657), otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law," shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion
Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the administrative and criminal
of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said
penalties provided for under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, are
Act.
imposed upon the illegal or premature conversion of lands within DAR’s
jurisdiction, i.e., "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
xxxx
industrial or for other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1998."
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or
The petitioner’s argument that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is
modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
unconstitutional, as it suspends the land use conversion without any
basis, stands on hollow ground.
The aforequoted provisions of law show that the power of the LGUs to
reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute. The authority of the DAR to
It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the
instruction of the President in order to address the unabated conversion
of prime agricultural lands for real estate development because of the
worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such measure was
made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in which
rice cultivation and production may be carried into. The issuance of said
Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of the
public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is

DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168959 March 25, 2010
NAPOLEON MAGNO, Petitioner,
vs.
GONZALO FRANCISCO and REGINA VDA. DE
LAZARO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
Napoleon Magno (petitioner) filed this Petition for Review1 to reverse the
Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision2 dated 4 July 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
84467. In the assailed decision, the CA set aside the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board’s (DARAB) Decision dated 8 January
2004 and reinstated the Decision dated 22 December 1993 of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Cabanatuan City. The
PARAD dismissed petitioner’s action for collection of lease rentals and
ejectment against Gonzalo Francisco and Regina Vda. De Lazaro
(respondents).
The Facts
Petitioner is the owner of a 5.3 hectare lot (lot) which is a portion of an
agricultural land identified as Lot No. 593 situated in Brgy. San Fernando,
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. Petitioner’s lot is part of the 13 parcels of land
registered in the name of petitioner’s mother, Maria Candelaria Salud
Talens (Talens). Talens’ landholding totals 61 hectares, more or less.
Petitioner acquired the lot through a Deed of Sale executed by Talens on
28 July 1972,3 but the sale was only registered on 3 September 1986.4 At
the time of the sale, Gonzalo Francisco and Manuel Lazaro tenanted the
land and their separate areas of tillage were 2.8 and 2.5 hectares,
respectively.5
Petitioner entered into a written contract of agricultural leasehold with
Manuel Lazaro on 5 October 19726 and with Gonzalo Francisco on 7
August 1980.7 In the leasehold contract, Manuel Lazaro was obliged to
pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular season, and 20 cavans
during dayatan cropping season. Gonzalo Francisco, on the other hand,
was required to pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular season
and 25 cavans during the cropping season.8
Gonzalo Francisco and Manuel Lazaro (who was succeeded by his
surviving spouse Regina Vda. De Lazaro upon his death) complied with
the conditions of the agricultural leasehold until the regular season of April
1991 when they stopped paying rentals despite petitioner’s repeated
demands.9 Respondents believed that they have fully paid the price of the
lot under the Barangay Committee on Land Production’s (BCLP)
valuation.10
On 10 January 1990, Gonzalo Francisco was issued Emancipation Patent
(EP) No. 416156 covering an area of 27,284 square meters. On the same
date, Manuel Lazaro was also issued EP No. 41615711 covering an area
of 25,803 square meters.12
On 19 May 1993, petitioner filed with PARAD of Cabanatuan City a
complaint for ejectment and collection of lease rentals against
respondents. At the time of filing of the complaint, respondent Francisco
and respondent Lazaro were already in arrears of 155 cavans and 145
cavans, respectively.13
Respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint invoking the following
arguments:
1. The leasehold contracts are without force and effect since
the lot was under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.14 The sale
executed by Talens was merely designed to exclude the land
from OLT coverage.
2. Since the lot value, as determined and approved by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), has been paid, the
collection of lease rentals is now moot.
3. Respondents are now considered owners-cultivators of their
respective landholdings and cannot be ejected.15
On 22 December 1993, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City dismissed the
case for lack of merit.16
On appeal, the DARAB rendered a Decision dated 8 January 2004, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision
appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a NEW DECISION is hereby
rendered:
1. Finding and declaring the Deed of Absolute sale binding
upon respondents Gonzalo Francisco and Regina vda. De
Lazaro;
2. Maintaining the agricultural leasehold relationship between
landowner-petitioner Napoleon Magno and respondents-
lessees Gonzalo Francisco and Regina vda. De Lazaro;
accordingly, declaring the Contracts of Agricultural Leasehold
respectively entered into by and between the said parties still
subsisting and in full force and effect;
3. Ordering respondents Gonzalo Francisco and Regina vda.
De Lazaro to pay severally their lease rentals in arrears
covering the period from the regular season of (April) 1991 up
to and until the final restoration or proper reinstatement of the
lease contracts in question.
SO ORDERED.17
Respondents filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the DARAB’s
decision. On 4 July 2005, the CA rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision dated January 8, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the decision of the PARAD-Cabanatuan City dated December 22,
1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.18
Aggrieved by the CA’s decision reinstating the decision of the PARAD of
Cabanatuan City, petitioner elevated the case before this Court.
Ruling of the PARAD of Cabanatuan City
The PARAD stated that on 10 January 1990, EPs were issued to
respondents. Then, in the conferences held on 8 March and 9 August
1990, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Rogelio C. Palomo
found out that the lot is covered by the OLT program and the DAR-Central
Office had not received any petition for OLT exemption. The PARAD
noted that in the final land valuation conference, a thorough computation
of the paid lease rentals was conducted. The PARAD believed that
respondents are no longer liable to pay the lease rentals because
respondents are now considered owners of their respective landholdings.
The PARAD stated that from 1990, respondents have fully paid the
amount of the lot as evidenced by the land valuation under the BCLP
scheme prepared by DAR officials.19
The PARAD relied on the 2nd Indorsement submitted by PARAD
Benjamin M. Yambao (PARAD Yambao) that the lot is covered by OLT
and that the farmer-beneficiaries including respondents have fully paid for
the lot. The 2nd Indorsement reads:
Respectfully returned to Mr. Enrique S. Valenzuela, PARO, NEPARO,
Cabanatuan City, the herein Claim Folder thru BCLP of Ms. Candelaria S.
Talens covered by TCT No. 7390 containing an area of 26 hectares, more
or less, situated at San Fernando, Norte, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija which this
Office after an appraisal of the documents attached and as per his
comments therein, the landholding in question appears to have been
subjected to an Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27; that a BCLP
has already been prepared and approved by the authorities concerned,
and that as per findings, the subject landholding has already been FULLY
PAID by the farmer-beneficiaries. Let it be emphasized that the
landholding in question was covered by P.D. No. 27 and not pursuant to
RA No. 6657, for which reason any valuation to be made in the
landholding in question should be within the memorandum circular
implementing P.D. 27 and not under memorandum circular implementing
RA No. 6657. Besides, as per his findings thereto, the land in question is
now fully paid. By that the valuation process is a fait accompli. With that, it
is now the honest opinion of the undersigned that any action to be taken
thereto is within the administrative prerogative of that office there-being
no formal complaint nor protest filed before this office, pursuant to
DARAB Procedures this Office could not take possible action thereof
unless and under a formal complaint of protest is lodge before this office,
either the landowner or by the farmer-beneficiaries.20
The PARAD took note of the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Talens, where she conveyed her land to different persons including
petitioner for ₱1 and other valuable considerations, was suspicious in
nature. The PARAD reasoned that the sale was consummated on 28 July
1972 but the registration occurred in 1986. The PARAD believed that the
sale made by Talens was a device to circumvent PD 27 in order to
exclude her land from OLT coverage. The PARAD noted that when the
claim folder was prepared, processed and approved by the BCLP, Talens
was still declared the landowner of 26 hectares including petitioner’s lot.
The PARAD explained that petitioner also failed to file a formal complaint
or protest on the land valuation prepared by DAR officials before the
proper forum. Since petitioner is estopped from claiming that respondents
are still his tenants, respondents are not liable to pay lease rentals to
petitioner.21
Ruling of the DARAB
The DARAB found a different state of facts. The DARAB re-examined the
pleadings filed and evidence submitted by the parties and found that
petitioner, together with his siblings, wrote then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (MAR) Minister Conrado F. Estrella (Minister Estrella) for
exemption of their properties from OLT coverage by way of a letter-
protest dated 19 May 1974. Minister Estrella acted with dispatch and gave
the following instruction to then District Officer Gene Bernardo, which
reads:
D/O Gene Bernardo,
Please look into this petition and get the facts. Verify and make your
report and recommendation.
Sgd. CFE
5/26/7422
The DARAB stated that petitioner wrote another letter dated 25 December
1975 to Minister Estrella seeking to exercise his right of retention. The
DARAB ruled that these letters belie the PARAD’s finding that petitioner is
estopped from claiming that respondents are still his tenants.23
The DARAB stated that in 1974, Minister Estrella issued MAR
Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1974 declaring that transfers of
ownership of lands covered by PD 27 executed by landowners after 21
October 1972 shall all be considered acts committed to circumvent PD
27. This memorandum circular was further amended by an undated
Memorandum which provides:
With respect to transfers of ownership of lands covered by P.D. 27, you
shall be guided by the following:
Transfers of ownership of lands covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title
duly executed prior to October 21, 1972 but not registered with the
Register of Deeds concerned before said date in accordance with the
Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) shall not be considered a valid
transfer of ownership insofar as the tenants-farmers are concerned and
therefore the lands shall be placed under Operation Land Transfer.
Transfers of ownership of unregistered lands x x x executed prior to
October 21, 1972, whether registered or not, with the Register of Deeds
concerned, pursuant to Act No. 3344 may be considered a valid
transfer/conveyance as between the parties subject to the verification of
the due execution of the conveyance/transfer in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.1avvphi1
In order that the foregoing transfers of ownership mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs maybe binding upon the tenant, such tenant should
have knowledge of the transaction prior to October 21, 1972, have
recognized the persons of the new owners and have been paying rental
to such new owners." (Emphasis in the original)24
The DARAB ruled that respondents as petitioner’s tenants had knowledge
of the Deed of Sale executed on 28 July 1972 and had recognized
petitioner as the new owner and paid rentals to him. Since all the
requirements have been met and satisfied, the sale between petitioner
and Talens is binding upon respondents. The DARAB ruled that
respondents are still tenant-lessees of petitioner and shall be entitled to
security of tenure and obligated to comply with their duty to pay the lease
rentals in accordance with the terms and conditions of their leasehold
contract.25
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA stated that the EPs are public documents and are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. The EPs are presumably issued in
the regular performance of an official duty. The CA ruled that petitioner
has not presented any evidence showing that the issuance of the EPs
was tainted with defects and irregularities; hence, they are entitled to full
faith and credit.26
The CA, quoting the 2nd Indorsement issued by PARAD Yambao, held
that the matter of OLT coverage of petitioner’s lot has been settled. The
CA also upheld the PARAD’s ruling that respondents have fully paid the
value of the lot.27
The CA ruled that the factual findings and conclusion of the PARAD of
Cabanatuan City are supported with substantial evidence as opposed to
the DARAB’s findings of fact.28
Issue
Petitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration: Whether
unregistered EPs issued to agricultural lessees which appear to be
irregular on their face can defeat the landowner’s rights to agricultural
leasehold rentals.29
Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA committed grave error because the
evidence on record is bereft of any showing that certificates of land
transfer (CLTs) have been issued to respondents and that the EPs have
been registered with the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija.30 Petitioner
points out that the CA disregarded a significant fact that the land valuation
came after the issuance of the EPs; hence, the issuance of the EPs was
tainted with irregularity because it was violative of Section 2 of PD
266. 31 Petitioner claims that his retention rights and rights to land rentals
from respondents cannot be defeated by patently fraudulent EPs.
Petitioner also alleges that MARO Palomo had no authority in fact or law
to determine the just compensation. Assuming that MARO Palomo had
the authority, petitioner cannot be bound by the determination of just
compensation because petitioner was not present and could not have
signified his agreement during the land valuation conferences. 32 xxx
Manuel
Respondents claim that in appeals in agrarian cases, the findings of fact Lazaro
of the PARAD, as affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive especially
if they are based on substantial evidence.33 Gonzalo
Francisco
Respondents allege that in the Order dated 10 October 2002, this case
was forwarded to DAR Secretary. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the proceeding in this case is
hereby suspend (sic) until the submission of the result of the
administrative determination of the coverage of the subject landholding in
dispute to this Board. Let the entire records of the above-entitled case be
forwarded to the office of the DAR Secretary to effect such determination
as stated above.
Respondents argue that the DAR has not yet submitted the result of the
administrative determination of the lot in dispute to the DARAB.
Respondents contend that the DARAB’s decision dated 8 January 2004
was issued without jurisdiction.34
Findings of Fact
It is well-settled that this Court is not a trier of facts. The factual findings of
the CA are regarded as final, binding and conclusive upon this Court,
especially when supported by substantial evidence. However, there are
recognized exceptions35 to this rule, such as when the factual findings of
the CA are contrary to those of the quasi-judicial agency. In this case, the
factual findings of the CA and the DARAB are conflicting; thus, we are
compelled to look at the factual milieu of this case and review the
records.36 The CA had also overlooked certain relevant facts undisputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
Petitioner claims that upon the proclamation of PD 27 on 21 October
1972, Talens no longer owned the land consisting of 61 hectares.
Therefore, petitioner together with his siblings filed their Petitions for
Exemption with respect to their landholdings.37
In a letter dated 19 May 1974, petitioner together with his siblings
requested Minister Estrella to certify that Talens’ 61-hectare land, which
was sold to her ten children, is exempt from the OLT coverage.38
In another letter dated 26 December 1975, petitioner informed Minister
Estrella that he would like to exercise his retention right of five hectares
on the lot he owned.39
A document entitled "Date Notice Send" presented as Exhibit "1" by the
respondents and signed by MARO Palomo stated that conferences 40 for
land valuation were held but petitioner failed to appear. MARO Palomo
stated that the lot was subjected to BCLP valuation and after a thorough
computation, respondents together with other farmer-beneficiaries were
declared as having fully paid for their areas of cultivation. MARO Palomo
recommended the approval of the BCLP claim folders and the issuance of
the EPs to the farmer-beneficiaries.41
A document entitled "Lease Rentals Paid" presented as Exhibit "1-
A,"42 reveals:
Name of Area Approved AGP in Total land value Lease rentals
FBs Cultivated paid
cavans Pesos cavans Pesos cavans Pesos
2.5803 130 11,375.00 335 29,350.90 990 82,774.
50
2.8597 130 11,375.00 371 32,529.08 1,005 87,730.
70
On 18 December 1991, PARAD Yambao issued a 2nd Indorsement
stating that Talens’ land is covered by OLT and the farmer-beneficiaries
have fully paid the land such that the valuation process is only a fait
accompli.43
On 2 January 1992, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Enrique
S. Valenzuela issued a 3rd Indorsement stating that a formal complaint or
protest should be filed first by the landowner or the farmer-beneficiaries
before the DARAB can take possible action.44
On 22 September 1994, PARO Rogelio M. Chaves issued a certification
stating that Manuel Lazaro and Gonzalo Francisco both paid the sum of
₱82,774.50 and ₱87,730.70 as lease rentals from 1973 to 1990
representing full payment of the land value owned and registered in the
name of Talens with an area of 2.5803 and 2.7284 hectares,
respectively.45
In a letter dated 1 April 1997, Atty. Teodoro C. Linsangan, Register of
Deeds III wrote to Mr. Emmanuel N. Paralisan, CARP46 Program Director
of the Land Registration Authority. The Register of Deeds acknowledged
receipt of the EPs issued to Gonzalo Francisco and his associates.
However, the Register of Deeds stated that they cannot effect registration
because there is a pending case filed by PARO Chaves at the Regional
Trial Court of Gapan: In Re: Cad. Case No. 081 – for reconstitution of
mutilated TCT No. 7390 (Mother Title), where the EPs were taken. 47
In an Order dated 10 October 2002, the DARAB suspended the case
proceedings until the submission of the result of the administrative
determination of the coverage of the subject lot in dispute. The DARAB
ordered the entire records to be forwarded to the office of the DAR
Secretary to effect such determination of OLT coverage.48
On 8 January 2004, the DARAB rendered a decision declaring the Deed
of Absolute Sale between petitioner and Talens as binding upon the
respondents. The DARAB also declared that the agricultural leasehold
relationship between petitioner and respondents still subsists. The
DARAB ordered respondents to pay the lease rentals from April 1991 until
the proper reinstatement of the lease contracts.
OLT Coverage
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Abdulwahid,49 the Court, quoting
Centeno v. Centeno,50 held:
[T]he DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program. The DARAB has primary, original and appellate
jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under RA No. 6657, E.O.
Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389,
P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations."
Agrarian dispute as defined in Section 3(d) of Republic Act (RA) No.
665751 refers "to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases.
The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters
involving the administrative implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and
other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative
orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable
by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his
issuances, to wit:
3.1 Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage
under the agrarian reform program and the initial issuance of
CLOAs and EPs, including protests or oppositions thereto and
petitions for lifting of such coverage;
3.2 Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion,
qualification, or disqualification of potential/actual farmer-
beneficiaries;
3.3 Subdivision surveys of land under CARP;
3.4 Recall, or cancellation of provisional lease rentals,
Certificates of Land Transfers (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary
Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance, recall, or
cancellation of EPs or CLOAs not yet registered with the
Register of Deeds;
3.5 Exercise of the right of retention by the landowner;
3.6 Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10
of RA 6657;
3.7 Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice
(DOJ) Opinion No. 44 (1990);
3.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for
livestock, swine, and poultry raising;
3.9 Cases of exemption/exclusion of fish pond and prawn farms
from the coverage of CARP pursuant to RA 7881;
3.10 Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject of
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA)
found unsuitable for agricultural purposes;
3.11 Application for conversion of agricultural land to
residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural
uses and purposes including protests or oppositions thereto;
3.12 Determination of the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries
to homelots;
3.13 Disposition of excess area of the tenant’s/farmer-
beneficiary’s landholdings;
3.14 Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;
3.15 Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by DAR
and its predecessors; or
3.16 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns
referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR. (Boldfacing supplied)
It is undisputed that petitioner and respondents have an established
tenancy relationship, such that the complaint for collection of back rentals
and ejectment is classified as an agrarian dispute and under the
jurisdiction of the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. However, in view
of the conflicting claims where petitioner asserted ownership over the lot
and respondents emphasized that the lot is subject to OLT coverage,
there is a need to ascertain if the lot is under the agrarian reform program.
Since the classification and identification of landholdings for coverage
under the agrarian reform program are Agrarian Law Implementation
cases, the DAR Secretary should first resolve this issue. In Sta. Ana v.
Carpo,52 we held:
Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and
respondents in this case. An action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of
lease rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage
by the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. But issues with respect to
the retention rights of the respondents as landowners and the
exclusion/exemption of the subject land from the coverage of agrarian
reform are issues not cognizable by the PARAD and the DARAB, but by
the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned, the same are Agrarian
Law Implementation (ALI) Cases. (Boldfacing supplied)
Therefore, the PARAD of Cabanatuan City had no authority to render a
decision declaring the lot under OLT coverage. In fact, when the case
was appealed, the DARAB acknowledged that it had no jurisdiction on the
OLT coverage. In an Order dated 10 October 2002, the DARAB
suspended the case proceedings until the submission of the result of the
administrative determination of the lot and thus submitted the entire
records to the DAR Secretary. Respondents themselves admitted in their
Memorandum that the DAR has not submitted the result of its
administrative determination of the lot to the DARAB. It is therefore
essential that the DAR Secretary should first resolve the issue on the lot’s
inclusion or exclusion from OLT coverage before a final determination of
this case can be had.

Proof necessary for the resolution of the issues on OLT coverage and
petitioner’s right of retention should be introduced in the proper forum.
The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve these
issues being the agency lodged with such authority since it has the
necessary expertise on the matter.53

We sustain the DARAB’s ruling declaring the Contracts of Agricultural

Leasehold entered into by petitioner and respondents still subsisting and
in full force and effect. We modify the DARAB’s ruling ordering
respondents to pay severally their lease rentals in arrears covering the
period from the regular season of April 1991 until the final determination
on the OLT coverage of the lot.

Wherefore, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84467. We
REINSTATE with MODIFICATION the Decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board dated 8 January 2004 in DARAB
Case No. 2404 (Reg. Case No. 2332 "NE"93) without prejudice to the
rights of the parties to seek recourse from the Office of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary on the issues they have raised.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-9855 April 29, 1957
MELCHOR MANIEGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
RICARDO L. CASTELO, in his capacity as Provincial Sheriff for the
Province of Nueva Ecija, respondent-appellee.
Feliciano R. Bautista for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor
Troadio T. Quiazon Jr., for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, denying a writ of mandamus to compel the Provincial Sheriff to
deliver to the petitioning landlord the 25 per cent of the tenant's share of
the crop, that section 19 of Republic Act 1199 declares exempt from liens
or attachment.
The case was submitted to the court below on the following stipulation of
facts:
1. That, on March 11, 1954, judgment was rendered in Civil Case No.
175, entitled MELCHOR MANIEGO vs. DANIEL JAIME, by the Justice of
the Peace Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, a copy of said decision is
herewith attached as Annex "A" hereof;
2. That, 145 cavans and 11 kilos of palay belonging to Daniel Jaime was
raised in his landholding as tenant of petitioner was levied upon by the
respondent pursuant to a Writ of Execution issued in Civil Case No. 175;
3. That, after due notice and publication required by law, the respondent,
thru Deputy of Provincial Sheriff F. G. Manahan sold at public auction the
145 cavans 11 kilos of palay belonging to Daniel Jaime, a copy of the
notice and publication of the sale is herewith attached as Annex "B"
hereof;
4. That, petitioner was the highest bidder in the auction sale who bid
P835.80 for the 145 cavans and 11 kilos of palay as shown by a
certificate issued by Deputy Provincial sheriff F. G. Manahan herewith
attached as Annex "C" hereof;
5. That, the petitioner has paid the kilometrage fee and percentage of
collection as shown in official Receipt No. 6289136 herewith attached as
Annex "D" based on the amount of his bid;
6. That, on February 10, 1955, the petitioner went to the office of the
Provincial Sheriff and verbally demanded the delivery of the receipt to him
of the 145 cavans and 11 kilos of palay which he purchased in the auction
sale and the indorsement in his favor of the receipts of deposits herewith
attached as Annex "E" hereof, so petitioner could withdraw the palay from
the NG SU Rice Mill where the palay are deposited;
7. That, Provincial Deputy Sheriff F. G. Manahan prepared the
indorsement appearing on the back of Annexes "E" but the respondent
refused to sign the said indorsement and likewise refused to deliver to
petitioner the receipt of 145 cavans and 11 kilos of palay by the latter in
the auction sale;
8. That, the respondent was willing to deliver the palay after deducting
therefrom 25 per cent thereof which respondent claims as exempt from
execution under Republic Act No. 1199, Section 19, which fact he knew
only immediately after the auction sale upon arrival in his office;
9. That, on February 18, 1955, the respondent received an order dated
February 16, 1955, of the Justice of the Peace Court of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija commanding the respondent to release 25 per cent of the 145
cavans and 11 kilos sold to the petitioner in the auction sale but not yet
delivered to petitioner in favor of Daniel Jaime; a copy of said order
bearing the date of receipt by the Office of the Provincial Sheriff is hereto
attached as Annex "F" hereof;
10. That, the parties agree to submit this case for decision by the Court
based on the foregoing stipulation of facts.
11. That, the parties will submit their memorandum simultaneously within
15 days from today, after which this case is deemed submitted for
decision. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-16).
Section 19, of Republic Act 1199 (new Rice Tenancy Act), is to the effect
that —
SEC. 19. Exemption from Lien and/or Attachment. — Twenty-five per
centum of the tenant's share of the produce of the land in share tenancy,
or of the entire produce in leasehold tenancy, one work animal and one of
each kind of farm implement belonging to the tenant, provided that the
value of such work animal and implements do not exceed five hundred
pesos, shall be exempt from lien and attachment.
The court below held that the tenant having claimed the exemption thus
provided, the Sheriff was not compellable by mandamus to deliver the
exempt portion; that the fact that the tenant laid claim to the exemption
after the Sheriff's sale had been held did not constitute a waiver of the
exemption because the same could not under any circumstance, be
waived or relinquished. Hence, the petition was dismissed.
From that judgment the petitioner has appealed to this Court, and argues
that, in the absence of statutory restriction, the tenant's exemption must
be regarded as a personal right that is waived if not interposed in due
time.
We can not assent to this view. As pointed out in the appealed decision,
the 25 per cent exemption
is a reservation which the law specifically sets aside for the exclusive
benefit of the tenant and upon which he can readily depend to meet his
immediate needs and those of his family.
Being designed to provide sustenance for the tenant and his family from
one harvest to the next, a waiver of the exemption could amount to a
waiver of the tenant's right to live. Any such renunciation would therefore
be against public policy, and hence null and void even without specific
statutory provision. The case comes under the rule of Art. 6 of the new
Civil Code, providing as follows:
ART. 6. Rights may he waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.
We have had, heretofore, occasion to point out the remedial character of
the tenancy acts, and the need of construing their provisions to carry out
the legislative policy.
The Tenancy Act is a remedial legislation intended to better the lot of the
sharecropper by giving him a more equitable participation in the produce
of the land which he cultivate. Being a remedial statute it should be
construed so as to further its purpose in accordance with the general
intent of the lawmaker. Adopting the construction placed upon it by
petitioner would open the door to evasions and render the law useless.
(Sibulo vs. Altar, 83 Phil., 513, 46 Off. Gaz, 5502).
The Sheriff's levy on the exempt portion being illegal, the sale thereof was
likewise unlawful and unenforceable. The Petitioner could not plead
ignorance of the inclusion of the exempted portion in the levy and sale, he
being the landlord on whose land the palay was harvested.
We find no reversible error in the judgement appealed from. Wherefore,
the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.