FISCAL AUTONOMY
206 of the LGC requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of
1. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY V. CA
DOCTRINE: Under Sec. 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code, which governs the legal relation and status of government units,
agencies and offices within the entire government machinery, MIAA is a government
instrumentality and not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Under Sec.
133(o) of the LGC, MIAA as a government instrumentality is not a taxable person
because it is not subject to "[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind" by local governments.
The only exception is when MIAA leases its real property to a "taxable person" as
provided in Sec. 234(a) of the LGC, in which case the specific real property leased
becomes subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings
leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of
Parañaque.
FACTS:
- Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City under EO No. 903
- As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land,
improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex
- MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land
- The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to
MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically
approved by the Pres. of the Philippines
- the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No.
061 stating that the LGC of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax
granted to MIAA under Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter
- MIAA negotiated with Resp. City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax
imposed by the City and MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due
- MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of
Parañaque
- the City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and
warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings
- The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the
Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax
delinquency
- MIAA sought clarification
- OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying OGCC Opinion No. 061 --> Sec.
exemption
- OGCC opined that Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is
exempt from real estate tax
- MIAA filed with the CA an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with
prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order which sought
to restrain the city of parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against,
and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings
- CA dismissed  MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day reglementary period
- the City of Parañaque posted notices of auction sale
- A day before the public auction, MIAA filed before this Court an Urgent Ex-
Parte and Reiteratory Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order to restrain the city from auctioning the airport lands and buildings
- this Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) effective immediately
ISSUE: WON the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real
estate tax under existing laws
RULING: Yes. MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax
imposed by local governments
- MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an
instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local
taxation
- the real properties of MIAA are owned by the PH and thus exempt from real
estate tax
- There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled corporation is not
exempt from real estate tax BUT MIAA is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation
- Sec. 2(13) of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a government-owned or
controlled corporation as any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly
or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case
of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital
stock: x x x
- A GOCC must be "organized as a stock or non-stock corporation." 
MIAA is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation nor is it a stock
 corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares  MIAA
has no stockholders or voting shares
· Under its Charter, MIAA does not have capital stock that is divided
into shares
· MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members
- A non-stock corporation must have members and even if we assume that the
Government is considered as the sole member of MIAA, this will not make
MIAA a non-stock corporation  Non-stock corporations cannot distribute
any part of their income to their members
- Sec. 88 of the Corporation Code provides that non-stock corporations are
"organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural,
recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes,
like trade, industry, agriculture and like chambers." MIAA is not organized for
any of these purposes
- MIAA is a public utility and is organized to operate an international and
domestic airport for public use
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform
efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
- When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not become a corporation.
· Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising
not only governmental but also corporate powers.
- A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government
Units. – Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of
the following:
xxxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies
and instrumentalities and local government units.
- Sec. 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the
national government, which historically merely delegated to local governments
the power to tax
- While the 1987 PC now includes taxation as one of the powers of local
governments, local governments may only exercise such power "subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide."
- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government
instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local governments
- Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against
taxation
- This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national
government instrumentalities
- a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption
- However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national government
instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in
favor of the national government instrumentality
Thus, Sec. 133 of the LGC states that "unless otherwise provided" in the Code, local
governments cannot tax national government instrumentalities.
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc
Culloch v. Maryland) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the
very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.
The conclusion of the majority is that under Sec. 133(o), MIAA as a government
instrumentality is beyond the reach of local taxation because it is not subject to taxes, fees
or charges of any kind. Moreover, the taxation of national instrumentalities and agencies
by LGUs should be strictly construed against the LGUs.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed
Resolutions of the CA of 5 October 2001 and 27 September 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
66878. We DECLARE the Airport Lands and Buildings of the Manila International
Airport Authority EXEMPT from the real estate tax imposed by the City of Parañaque.
We declare VOID all the real estate tax assessments, including the final notices of real
estate tax delinquencies, issued by the City of Parañaque on the Airport Lands and
Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority, except for the portions that the
Manila International Airport Authority has leased to private parties. We also declare
VOID the assailed auction sale, and all its effects, of the Airport Lands and Buildings of
the Manila International Airport Authority. No costs. SO ORDERED.
2. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU V. PEZA
 - These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-Lapu
and the Province of Bataan separately filed against the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA).
- In G.R. No. 184203, the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City) assails the CA’ decision
dated January 11, 2008 and resolution dated August 6, 2008, dismissing the
City’s appeal for being the wrong mode of appeal. The City appealed the RTC,
Branch 111, Pasay City’s decision finding the PEZA exempt from payment of
real property taxes.
- In G.R. No. 187583, the Province of Bataan (the Province) assails the CA’
decision4dated August 27, 2008 and resolution5 dated April 16, 2009, granting
the PEZA’s petition for certiorari. The CA ruled that the RTC, Branch 115,
Pasay City gravely abused its discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real
property taxes to the Province of Bataan.
Facts common to both cases:
- Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Pres.ial Decree No. 66 in 1972, declaring as
government policy the establishment of export processing zones in strategic
locations in the Philippines. To carry such policy, the Export Processing Zone
Authority was created. The said decree declared that EPZA will be a non-profit
entity, and was also declared to be exempt from taxes.
Facts of G.R. No. 184203
- On March 25, 1998, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer,
demanded from the PEZA PHP 32,912,350.08 in real property taxes for the
period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan
Economic Zone. The City pointed out that no provision in the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995 specifically exempted the PEZA from payment of
real property taxes, unlike Sec. 21 of Pres.ial Decree No. 66 that explicitly
provided for EPZA’s exemption. Since no legal provision explicitly exempted
the PEZA from payment of real property taxes, the City argued that it can tax
the PEZA.
- On September 11, 2002, the PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief25 with
the RTC of Pasay City, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from
payment of real property taxes. Pursuant to Rule 63, Sec. 3 of Rules of Court,
the Office of the Solicitor General filed a comment31 on the PEZA’s petition
for declaratory relief. It agreed that the PEZA is exempt from payment of real
property taxes, citing Sec.s 24 and 51 of the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995. Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the National Government, the
trial court ruled that the City had no authority to tax the PEZA under Sec.s
133(o) and 234(a) of the LGC of 1991. In the resolution32 dated June 14, 2006,
the trial court granted the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief and declared it
exempt from payment of real property taxes.
- Issue 1: WON exhaustion of administrative remedies is needed?
- The proper remedy of a taxpayer depends on the stage in which the local
government unit is enforcing its authority to collect real property taxes. For the
guidance of the members of the bench and the bar, we reiterate the taxpayer’s
remedies against the erroneous or illegal assessment of real property taxes.
GR: Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the LGC is necessary in cases
of erroneous assessments where the correctness of the amount assessed is
assailed.
- Once an assessment has already been issued by the assessor, the proper remedy
of a taxpayer depends on whether the assessment was erroneous or illegal.
- An erroneous assessment “presupposes that the taxpayer is subject to the tax
but is disputing the correctness of the amount assessed.” With an erroneous
assessment, the taxpayer claims that the local assessor erred in determining any
of the items for computing the real property tax, i.e., the value of the real
property or the portion thereof subject to tax and the proper assessment levels.
In case of an erroneous assessment, the taxpayer must exhaust the
administrative remedies provided under the LGC before resorting to judicial
action.nRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
- In case of an illegal assessment where the assessment was issued without
authority, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not necessary and the
taxpayer may directly resort to judicial action. The taxpayer shall file a complaint
for injunction before the RTC to enjoin the local government unit from
collecting real property taxes.
- In case the local government unit has issued a notice of delinquency, the
taxpayer may file a complaint for injunction to enjoin the impending sale of the
real property at public auction. In case the local government unit has already
sold the property at public auction, the taxpayer must first deposit with the court
the amount for which the real property was sold, together with interest of 2%
per month from the date of sale to the time of the institution of action. The
taxpayer may then file a complaint to assail the validity of the public auction.
The decisions of the RTC in these cases shall be appealable before the Court of
 Tax the ground that the venue was improperly laid. Neither did the City raise
this objection in its answer.
3. MCIAA V. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU
- Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by
Congress on July 31, 1990 under RA No. 6958 to “undertake the economical,
efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan
International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu
City x x x and such other airports as may be established in the Province of
Cebu.”
- Upon its creation, Pet. enjoyed exemption from realty taxes under Sec. 14 of RA
No. 6958.
- In September 11, 1996, however, this Court rendered a decision in MCIAA v.
Marcos declaring that upon the effectivity of RA No. 7160 (The LGC of 1991),
Pet. was no longer exempt from real estate taxes. Resp. City issued to Pet. a
Statement of Real Estate Tax assessing the lots comprising the Mactan
International Airport in the amount of P162,058,959.52.
- Pet. complained that there were discrepancies in said Statement of Real Estate
Tax as follows:
o The statement included lots and buildings not found in the inventory
of Pet.’s real properties;
o Some of the lots were covered by two separate tax declarations which
resulted in double assessment;
o There were double entries pertaining to the same lots; and
o The statement included lots utilized exclusively for governmental
purposes.
- Resp. City amended its billing and sent a new Statement of Real Estate Tax to
Pet. in the amount of P151,376,134.66. Pet. averred that this amount covered
real estate taxes on the lots utilized solely and exclusively for public or
governmental purposes such as the airfield, runway and taxiway, and the lots on
which they are situated.
- Pet. paid Resp. City the amount of P4M monthly, which was later increased to
six million pesos P6M monthly. As of December 2003, Pet. had paid Resp.
City a total of P275,728,313.36.
- The Sec. of the DOJ issued Opinion No. 50, Series of 1998 which states that
o “The query is resolved in the affirmative. The properties used for
airport purposes (i.e. airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which
the runway and taxiway are situated) are owned by the PH. it is our
considered opinion that the properties used for airport purposes, such
as the airfield, runway and taxiway and the lots on which the runway
and taxiway are located, are owned by the State or by the PH and are
merely held in trust by the MCIAA, notwithstanding that certificates
of titles thereto may have been issued in the name of the MCIAA.”
- Based on the above DOJ Opinion, the Dept. of Finance issued a 2nd
Indorsement to the City Treasurer of Lapu-Lapu which reads that:
o “This Dept. (DOF) interposes no objection to the request of Mactan
Cebu International Airport Authority for exemption from payment of
real property tax on the property used for airport purposes” mentioned
above.
- The City Assessor, therefore, is hereby instructed to transfer the assessment of
the subject airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which the runway and
taxiway are situated, from the “Taxable Roll” to the “Exempt Roll” of real
properties.”
- Resp. City Treasurer Elena T. Pacaldo sent Pet. a Statement of Real Property
Tax Balances up to the year 2002 reflecting the amount of P246,395,477.20. Pet.
claimed that the statement again included the lots utilized solely and exclusively
for public purpose such as the airfield, runway, and taxiway and the lots on
which these are built. Resp. Pacaldo then issued Notices of Levy on 18 sets of
real properties of Pet..
- Pet. filed a petition for prohibition with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction. Branch 53 of RTC Lapu-Lapu City then issued a 72-hour
TRO. The petition for prohibition sought to enjoin Resp. City from issuing a
warrant of levy against Pet.’s properties and from selling them at public auction
for delinquency in realty tax obligations.
- The RTC issued an Order denying the motion for extension of the TRO. Thus,
on December 10, 2003, Resp. City auctioned 27 of Pet.’s properties. As there
was no interested bidder who participated in the auction sale, Resp. City
forfeited and purchased said properties. The corresponding Certificates of Sale
of Delinquent Property were issued to Resp. City.
- Pet. claimed before the RTC that it had discovered that Resp. City did not pass
any ordinance authorizing the collection of real property tax, a tax for the special
education fund (SEF), and a penalty interest for its nonpayment. Pet. argued
that without the corresponding tax ordinances, Resp. City could not impose and
collect real property tax, an additional tax for the SEF, and penalty interest from
Pet..
- RTC: granted Pet.’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction. However,
upon motion of Resp., the RTC lifted the writ of preliminary injunction ruling
that the Resp. City, in the course of the hearing of its motion, presented to this
Court a certified copy of its Ordinance No. 44 (Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the
City of Lapu-Lapu), Sec. 25 whereof authorized the collection of a rate of one
and one-half (1 ½) [per centum] from owners, executors or administrators of
any real estate lying within the jurisdiction of the City of Lapu-Lapu, based on
the assessed value as shown in the latest revision.
- Pets. filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA promulgated the questioned
Decision on October 8, 2007, holding that Pet. is a government-owned or
controlled corporation and its properties are subject to realty tax. CA reasoned
that under the LGC , enacted pursuant to the Constitutional mandate of local
autonomy, all natural and juridical persons, including GOCCs, instrumentalities
and agencies, are no longer exempt from local taxes even if previously granted
an exemption.
- Pet. filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the questioned Decision
covering only the portion of said decision declaring that Pet. is a GOCC and,
therefore, not exempt from the realty tax and special education fund imposed
by Resp. City. Pet. cited Manila International Airport Authority v. CA (the 2006
MIAA case) involving the City of Parañaque and the Manila International
Airport Authority. Pet. claimed that it had been described by this Court as a
government instrumentality, and that it followed “as a logical consequence that
Pet. is exempt from the taxing powers of Resp. City of Lapu-Lapu.The CA
denied Pet.’s motion for partial reconsideration in the questioned Resolution.
- From the 1996 MCIAA ruling, it is acknowledged that, under Sec. 133 of the
LGC, instrumentalities were generally exempt from all forms of local
government taxation, unless otherwise provided in the Code. On the other hand,
Sec. 232“otherwise provided” insofar as it allowed local government units to
levy an ad valorem real property tax, irrespective of who owned the property.
At the same time, the imposition of real property taxes under Sec. 232 is, in turn,
qualified by the phrase “not hereinafter specifically exempted.” The exemptions
from real property taxes are enumerated in Sec. 234 of the Code which
specifically states that only real properties owned by the PH or any of its political
subdivisions are exempted from the payment of the tax. Clearly,
instrumentalities or GOCCs do not fall within the exceptions under Sec. 234 of
the LGC.
- The CA nevertheless held that even if it is clear that Resp. City has the power
to impose real property taxes over Pet., “it is also evident and categorical that,
under RA No. 6958, the properties of Pet. MCIAA may not be conveyed or
transferred to any person or entity except to the national government.
- The MCIAA case remains the controlling law on the matter as the same is the
established precedent; not the MIAA case but the MCIAA case since the former,
as keenly pointed out by the Resp. City of Lapu-Lapu, has not yet attained
finality as there is still yet a pending motion for reconsideration filed with the
Supreme Court in the aforesaid case.
Issue: WON PET. IS A GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY EXEMPT
FROM PAYING REAL PROPERTY TAXES
Held: YES, The Pet. is an instrumentality of the government; thus, its properties
actually, solely and exclusively used for public purposes, consisting of the airport
terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which they are
situated, are not subject to real property tax and Resp. City is not justified in
collecting taxes from Pet. over said properties.
- The CA (Cebu City) erred in declaring that the 1996 MCIAA case still controls
and that Pet. is a GOCC. The 2006 MIAA case governs. In 2006, the Court en
banc decided a case that in effect reversed the 1996 Mactan ruling. The 2006
MIAA case had, since the promulgation of the questioned Decision and
Resolution, reached finality and had in fact been either affirmed or cited in
numerous cases by the Court. The decision became final and executory on
November 3, 2006. Furthermore, the 2006 MIAA case was decided by the Court
en banc while the 1996 MCIAA case was decided by a Division. Hence, the 1996
MCIAA case should be read in light of the subsequent and unequivocal ruling
in the 2006 MIAA case
- In the 2006 MIAA case, the SC held that MIAA’s airport lands and buildings
are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments; that it is not a
GOCC but an instrumentality of the national government, with its real
properties being owned by the PH, and these are exempt from real estate tax.
- Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they
do not become stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition
before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a government-owned or
controlled corporation.Examples are the Mactan International Airport
Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, the University of the Philippines and
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. All these government instrumentalities exercise
corporate powers but they are not organized as stock or non-stock corporations
as required by Sec. 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
 Code. These government instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called in which case, only those portions of Pet.’s properties which are leased to taxable
government corporate entities persons like private parties are subject to real property tax by the City of Lapu-
- In the 2006 MIAA case, the issue before the Court was “whether the Airport Lapu.
Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing - We hereby adopt and apply to Pet. MCIAA the findings and conclusions of the
laws.” When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, Court in the 2006 MIAA case, and we quote:
the instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government - To summarize,
instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a o MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation
government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate under Sec. 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, Administrative Code because it is not organized as a stock or
police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA non-stock corporation.
exercises“all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as o Neither is MIAA a government-owned or controlled corporation
these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this EO under Sec. 16, Article XII of the 1987 PC because MIAA is not
- The Court in the 2006 MIAA case went on to discuss the limitation on the taxing required to meet the test of economic viability.
power of the local governments as against the national government or its o MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
instrumentality. When local governments invoke the power to tax on national powers and performing essential public services pursuant to Sec.
government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code.
governments. There is no point in national and local governments taxing each As a government instrumentality, MIAA is not subject to any
other, unless a sound and compelling policy requires such transfer of public kind of tax by local governments under Sec. 133(o) of the LGC.
funds from one government pocket to another. o The exception to the exemption in Sec. 234(a) does not apply to
- There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government MIAA because MIAA is not a taxable entity under the LGC. Such
instrumentalities for rendering essential public services to inhabitants of local exception applies only if the beneficial use of real property
governments. The only exception is when the legislature clearly intended to tax owned by PH is given to a taxable entity.
government instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public services for - Finally, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted
sound and compelling policy considerations. to public use and thus are properties of public dominion. Properties of
- The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are public dominion are owned by the State or PH.
used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The
fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does
not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for
public use. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject 4. PIMENTEL, JR. V. OCHOA
to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any
Doctrine: Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public
matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the LGC itself weighs
dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services
against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in
will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances,
the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where
foreclosures and auction sale.
it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned
- Like in MIAA, the airport lands and buildings of MCIAA are properties of
public dominion because they are intended for public use. As properties of
- The Pets. assail the validity of certain provisions of RA 10147 or the GAA
public dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the PH, and are
(General Appropriations Act) which allotted and increased to P21 Billion, the
outside the commerce of man. This, unless Pet. leases its real property to a
budget for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program spearheaded by DSWD.
taxable person, the specific property leased becomes subject to real property tax;
 - Herein Pets. seek to enjoin Resp.s from implementing the said program on the
ground that it amounts to a recentralization of government functions that have There is decentralization of Decentralization of power, on the other
already been devolved from the national government to the LGUs. Since the administration when the central hand, involves an abdication of political
manner of implementation was primarily through a national agency lie DSWD government delegates administrative power in the [sic] favor of local
instead of the LGUs to which the responsibility and functions of delivering powers to political subdivisions in governments [sic] units declared to be
social welfare and health care services devolved pursuant to Sect. 17 of RA 7160 order to broaden the base of autonomous. In that case, the
in relation to Article 10. government power and in the autonomous government is free to chart
- Pets. also assert that instead of allocating the entire 21M budget to the LGUs, it process to make local governments its own destiny and shape its future with
is the DSWD has full control over the identification of beneficiaries and the more responsive and accountable minimum intervention from central
manner by which services are to be delivered or the conditions to be complied and ensure their fullest development authorities. According to a
with. as self-reliant communities and make Constitutional author, decentralization
them more effective partners in the of power amounts to self-immolation,
Issue: W/ N the 21 budget allocation of CCT (conditional cash transfer) violates Local pursuit of national development and since in that event, the autonomous
Autonomy of the LGUs? (No.) social progress. government becomes accountable not to
the central authorities but to its
Held: Every law has in its favor the presumption of Constitutionality, and to justify its At the same time, it relieves the constituency
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the PC, not a doubtful and central government of the burden of
argumentative one.23 Pets. have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity managing local affairs and enables it
of the provisions under the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an to concentrate on national concerns.
intervention program formulated by the national government itself but implemented in
partnership with the local government units to achieve the common national goal
development and social progress can by no means be an encroachment upon the
autonomy of local governments. The Pres. exercises general
supervision over them, but only to
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not ensure that local affairs are
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous administered according to law. He
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political has no control over their acts in the
subdivisions xxx. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and sense that he can substitute their
policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national judgments with his own.
goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the Pres. and Congress.

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.

5. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DENR

DECENTRALIZATION OF DECENTRALIZATION OF
ADMIN. POWER
Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO. On April 29, 1998, MGB-RO
denied Golden Falcon’s application for FTAA on for failure to secure the required area
clearances from the Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the
DENR-RO. Golden Falcon appealed the denial with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-
Central Office (MGB-CO).
On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO, MCCS filed
with the PENRO of Bulacan their applications for quarry permit covering the same
area subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA application. MGB-CO finally denied Golden
Falcon’s appeal on July 16, 2004.
AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration permit
covering the same subject area on September 13, 2004. Confusion of rights resulted from
the overlapping applications of AMTC and the persons applying for quarry permits – the
contention was the date the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open to other
permit applications from other parties
On October 19, 2004, upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog, DENR-MGB
Director Ramos stated that the denial of Golden Falcon’s application became final on
August 11, 2004, or fifteen days after Golden Falcon received the order of denial of its
application. Hence, the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open to permit
applications only on that date.
Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion on the issue,
stating that the subject area became open for new applications on the date of the
first denial on April 29, 1998 (MGB-RO’s order of denial), as MGB-CO’s order of
denial on July 16, 2004 was a mere reaffirmation of the MGB-RO’s April 29 order; hence,
the reckoning period should be April 29.
Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsed the applications for
quarry permit, now apparently converted to applications for small-scale mining
permit, to the Governor of Bulacan. PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Governor
the approval of said applications. Eventually, the Governor issued the small-scale mining
permits. AMTC appealed to the DENR Sec..
The DENR Sec. decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and cancelled the governor’s
issuance of small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos that
the area was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-
CO denial). Hence, the applications for quarry permit filed on February 10, 2004 were
null as these were filed when the area was still closed to mining location. On the other
hand, AMTC filed its application when the area was already open to other mining
applicants, hence, its application was valid. The small-scale mining permits were also
issued in violation of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the Governor
pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never proclaimed to be under the
small-scale mining program.
The Pet. League of the Provinces of the Philippines filed this petition saying that that this
is not an action of one province alone, but the collective action of all provinces through
the League, as a favorable ruling will not only benefit one province, but all provinces and
all local governments.
ISSUES
1. Whether DENR’s act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts to
executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all
provinces, as the DENR Sec. substituted the judgment of the Provincial Governor
of Bulacan. - NO
2. WON Sec. 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC and Sec. 24 of the Small-Scale Mining Act,
which confer upon DENR and the DENR Sec. the power of control are
unConstitutional, as the PC states that the Pres. (and Exec Depts) has the power of
supervision only, not control over acts of LGUs. - NO
HELD
No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Sec. was rendered in accordance
with the power of review granted to the DENR Sec. in the resolution of disputes, which
is provided for in Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Sec. 22 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The decision of the DENR Sec., declaring that the Application for
Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling
the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from
the power of review granted to the DENR Sec. under R.A. No. 7076 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The DENR Sec.'s power to review and decide the issue on the validity of
the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as
recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the
determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending
parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and
the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.
The DENR Sec. exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts
or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Sec. can
neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing
Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as
it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
2. No. In this case, Resp. DENR Sec. has the authority to nullify the Small-
Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR
Sec. has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale
Mining Program is subject to control by Resp. DENR. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 2, Article
XII of the PC provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."
Under said provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural
resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made
subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the LGC, while the
People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the People’s Small-Scale Mining
Program is to be implemented by the DENR Sec. in coordination with other concerned
local government agencies. The Court has clarified that the Constitutional guarantee
of local autonomy in the PC Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of
local government units or the decentralization of government authority. It does
not make local governments sovereign within the State.
The LGC did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law
to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and
review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying
out the State's Constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization of the country's natural resources.
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the
time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This presumption is rooted
in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the 3 coordinate Dept.s of
the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This Court, however, may
declare a law, or portions thereof, unConstitutional where a Pet. has shown a clear and
unequivocal breach of the PC, leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.
1Local government units shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of
the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);
(b) On the second year, thirty-five percent (35%); and
In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by Pet. to challenge the Constitutionality of Sec. 17
(b)(3)(iii) of the LGC of 1991 and Sec. 24 of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the Constitutionality
of the said provisions of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
6. MANDANAS V. OCHOA
- The Pets. hereby challenge the manner in which the just share in the national
taxes of the local government units (LGUs) has been computed.
- This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing
the manner the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for FY 2012 computed the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the LGUs. Certain collections of NIRTs
by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) — specifically: excise taxes, value added taxes
(VATs) and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs) — have not been included in the
base amounts for the computation of the IRA.
ISSUE: WON Sec. 284 of the LGC1 is unConstitutional for being repugnant to Sec.
6, Article X of the 1987 PC.2
HELD: Sec. 284 of the LGC deviates from the plain language of Sec. 6 of Article X of
the 1987 PC
- While Sec. 6 mentions national taxes as the source of the just share of the
LGUs, Sec. 284 ordains that the share of the LGUs be taken from national
internal revenue taxes instead.
o The phrase “national internal revenue taxes” 3 engrafted in Sec. 284 is
undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes written in
Sec. 6. As such, Congress has actually departed from the letter of the
1987 PC stating that national taxes should be the base from which the
just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible.
- Congress can validly exclude taxes that will constitute the base amount for the
computation of the IRA only if a Constitutional provision allows such exclusion.
o Although it has the primary discretion to determine and fix the just
share of the LGUs in the national taxes, Congress cannot disobey the
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).
2Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
3\
 express mandate of the PC for the just share of the LGUs to be derived
from the national taxes.
o The intent of the framers in respect of Sec. 6 is really that the base for
reckoning the just share of the LGUs should include all national
taxes.
- The 1987 PC is unequivocal in ordering that the just share of the LGUs in the
national taxes shall be automatically released to them. With Congress having
established the just share through the LGC, it seems to be beyond debate that
the inclusion of the just share of the LGUs in the annual GAAs is unnecessary,
if not superfluous.
o Hence, the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall be
released to them without need of yearly appropriation.
o The term automatic connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and
perfunctory; LGUs are not required to perform any act or thing in
order to receive their just share in the national taxes.
o To operationalize the automatic release without need of appropriation,
Sec. 286 of the LGC clearly provides that the automatic release of the
just share directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
treasurer, as the case may be, shall be "without need of any further
action.”
o As compared to the provisions of the 1987 PC on Judiciary,
Constitutional Commisions, Ombudsman, and the Commission on
Human rights which shares to aspects: The first relates to the grant of
fiscal autonomy, and the second concerns the automatic release of
funds. The common denominator of the provisions is that the
automatic release of the appropriated amounts is predicated on the
approval of the annual appropriations of the offices or agencies
concerned.
7. REPUBLIC V. PALAWAN
- The PH, through the Dept. of Energy, entered into Service Contract No. 38
with Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, as
Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of petroleum operations in the area known
as the “Camago-Malampaya” located offshore northwest of Palawan.
Exploration of the area led to the drilling of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas
reservoir about 80 kilometers from the main island of Palawan and 30kms from
the platform.
- The Service contract provided for a 60-40 share ratio where the 60% will go to
the Government and 40 to the province of Palawan.
o Administrative Order No. 381
 Pres. Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
381 which, in part, stated that the Province of Palawan was
expected to receive about US$2.1 Billion from the estimated
US 8.l Billion total government share from the Camago
Malampaya natural gas project for the 20-year contract
period.
 DoE Sec. Francisco L. Viray wrote Palawan Governor
Salvador P. Socrates, requesting for the deferment of
payment of 50% of Palawan's share in the project for the first
seven years of operations, estimated at US$222.89 Million,
which it would use to pay for the National Power
Corporation's Take-or-Pay Quantity (TOPQ) obligations
under the latter's Gas Sale and Purchase Agreements with
SPEX/OXY.
Palawan’s Claim
- The Provincial Government of Palawan asserted its claim over forty percent
(40%) of the National Government's share in the proceeds of the project.
- It argued that since the reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction, it is
entitled to said share under Sec. 290 of the LGC. The National Government
disputed the claim, arguing that since the gas fields were approximately 80 kms
from Palawan's coastline, they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
province and is within the national territory of the Philippines.
- Negotiations took place between the National Government and the Provincial
Government of Palawan but proved to be unsuccessful. After their demand to
pay was unheeded, the province of Palawan decided to institute legal action.
Civil Case No. 3779
- The Provincial Government of Palawan filed a petition for declaratory relief
before the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa against the affected Dept.
Secretaries.
o It sought Judicial determination of its rights under A.O. No. 381
(1998), R.A. No. 7611 or the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for
Palawan Act, Sec. 290 of R.A. No. 716024 or the LGC of 1991 (LGC),
 and Provincial Ordinance No. 47425 (series of 2000). It asked the RTC
to declare that the Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoir is part of
the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan and that the
Provincial Government of Palawan was entitled to receive 40% of the
National Government's share in the proceeds of the Camago-
Malampaya natural gas project.
- Commenting on the petition, PH maintained that Palawan was not entitled to
the 40% share because the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is outside its territorial
jurisdiction.· It postulated that Palawan's territorial jurisdiction is limited to its
land area and to the municipal waters within 15 km from its coastline. It denied
being estopped by the acts of government officials who earlier acknowledged
Palawan's share in the proceeds of the project.
- E.O. No. 683
o On December 1, 2017, Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O.
No. 683 which authorized the release of funds to the implementing
agencies pursuant to a Provisional Implementation Agreement that
allowed 50% of the disputed 40% of the Net Government Share in the
proceeds of the Service Contract No. 38 to be utilized for the
immediate and effective implementation of development projects for
the people of Palawan.
ISSUE: W.N. Palawan may claim 40% of the share. [NO]
HELD:
LGU’s share in national wealth
- Under Sec. 25, Article II of the 1987 PC, "(t)he State shall ensure the autonomy
of local governments."
- In furtherance of this State policy, the 1987 PC conferred on LGUs the power
to create its own sources of revenue and the right to share not only in the
national taxes, but also in the proceeds of the utilization of national wealth in
their respective areas.
Territorial jurisdiction refers to territorial boundaries as defined in
the LGU's charter
- The LGC does not define the term "territorial jurisdiction." Provisions therein,
however, indicate that territorial jurisdiction refers to the LGU's territorial
boundaries.
- Under the LGC, a "province" is composed of cluster of municipalities, or
municipalities and component cities. A "municipality," in tum, is described as a
group of barangays, while a "city" is referred to as consisting of more urbanized
and developed barangays.
- In the creation of municipalities, cities and barangays, the LGC uniformly
requires that the territorial jurisdiction of these government units be "properly
identified by metes and bounds" The intention, therefore, is to consider an
LGU's territorial jurisdiction as pertaining to a physical location or area as
identified by its boundaries. This is also clear from other provisions of the LGC,
particularly Sec.s 292 and 294, on the allocation of LGUs' shares from the
utilization of national wealth, which speak of the location of the natural
resources.
- That "territorial jurisdiction" refers to the LGU's territorial boundaries is a
construction reflective of the discussion of the framers of the 1987 PC who
referred to the local government as the "locality" that is "hosting" the national
resources and a "place where God chose to locate His bounty. " It is also
consistent with the language ultimately used by the Constitutional Commission
when they referred to the national wealth as those found within (the LGU's)
respective areas.
- In enacting charters of LGUs, Congress .is called upon to properly identify their
territorial jurisdiction by metes and bounds. Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC stressed
the need to demarcate the territorial boundaries of LGUs with certitude because
they define the limits of the local governments' territorial jurisdiction.
Area as delimited by law and not exercise of jurisdiction as basis of the LGU’s equitable share
- The Court cannot subscribe to the argument posited by the Province of Palawan that
the national wealth, the proceeds from which the State is mandated to share with the
LGUs, shall be wherever the local government exercises any degree of jurisdiction.
- An LGU's territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily co-extensive with its exercise or
assertion of powers.
- To hold otherwise may result in condoning acts that are clearly ultra
vires. It may lead to, in the words of PH, LGU s "rush[ing] to exercise
its powers and functions in areas rich in natural resources (even if
outside its boundaries) with the intention of seeking a share in the
proceeds of its exploration" a situation that "would sow conflict not
 only among the local government units and the national government
but worse, between and among local government units.
- There is likewise merit in PH's assertion that Palawan's interpretation
of what constitutes an LGU's territorial jurisdiction may produce
absurd consequences. Indeed, there are natural resources, such as
forests and mountains, which can be found within the LGU's territorial
boundaries, but are, strictly speaking, under national jurisdiction,
specifically that of the Dept. of Environment and Natural Resources.
- To equate territorial jurisdiction to areas where the LGU exercises jurisdiction means
that these natural resources will have to be excluded from the sharing scheme
although they are geographically within the LGU's territorial limits. The
consequential incongruity of this scenario finds no support either in the language or
in the context of the equitable sharing provisions of the 1987 PC and the LGC.
- The Provincial Government of Palawan argues that its territorial jurisdiction extends to
the Camago-Malampaya reservoir considering that its local police maintains peace and
order in the area; crimes committed within the waters surrounding the province have been
prosecuted and tried in the courts of Palawan; and the provincial government enforces
environmental laws over the same area
- The Court notes, however, that the province's claims of maintaining peace and order in
the Camago-Malampaya area and of enforcing environmental laws therein have not been
substantiated by credible proof. The province likewise failed to adduce evidence of the
crimes supposedly committed in the same area or their prosecution in Palawan's courts
- The province cites illegal fishing, poaching and illegal entry as the cases tried before the
courts of Palawan. As conceded by the parties, however, the subject gas reservoir is
situated, not in the marine waters, but in the continental shelf. The Province of Palawan
has not established that it has, in fact, exercised jurisdiction over this submerged land area
- The LGU's authority to adopt and implement measures to protect the environment does
not determine the extent of its territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the LGU's statutory
obligation to maintain ecological balance is but part of the nation's collective effort to
preserve its environment as a whole.
- The extent to which local legislation or enforcement protects the environment will not
define the LGU's territory. In fine, an LGU cannot claim territorial jurisdiction over an
area simply because its government has exercised a certain degree of authority over it.
Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but by the law that creates
it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical
boundaries as fixed in its charter.
- No law clearly granting the Province of Palawan territorial jurisdiction over the Camago Malampaya
Reservoir
- PH has enumerated the laws defining the territory of Palawan. As defined in its
organic law, the Province of Palawan is comprised of merely islands. The continental
shelf, where the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is located, was clearly not included in
its territory. Under Palawan’s charter, therefore, the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is
not located within its territorial boundaries.
LOCAL AUTONOMY
1. BATANGAS CATV V. CA
- On July 28, 1986, Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution no. 210, granting
Batangas CATV a permit to consult, install and operate a Community Antenna
Television (CATV) system in Batangas. Sec. 8 of the provision provides that
Batangas CATV is authorized to charged its subscribers the maximum rates
specified, provided that any increase of rates shall be subject to approval of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.
- On November 1993, Batangas CATV increased its subscriber rates from P88 to
P180/month. As a result, the Batangas City Mayor wrote them a letter
threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures approval from Sangguniang
Panlungsod.
- Batangas CATV filed with RTC a petition for injunction, alleging that
Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators because under EO 205, the NTC has the sole
authority to regulate the CATV operation in PH.
- RTC → ruled in favor of Batangas CATV; the sole agency of the government
which can regulate CATV operation is the NTC, and that the LGUs cannot
exercise regulatory power over it without appropriate legislation.
- CA → reversed; although the CATV system is granted by NTC pursuant to EO
205, this does not preclude the Sangguniang Panlungsod from regulating the
operation of the CATV in their locality under the powers vested upon it by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 337 [LGC of 1983], Sec. 177[1].
o Resolution No. 210 authorized the grantee to impose charges which
cannot be increased except upon approval of Sangguniang Bayan. It
further provided that in case of violation by grantee of terms and
conditions, the city shall have right to withdraw. Thus, appellee’s action
of increasing service rates breached Resolution no. 210 which gives the
right to withdraw the permit.
 - Batangas CATV’s argument: While RA 7160 [LGC of 1991] extends to the
LGUs the general power to perform any act that will benefit their constituents,
nonetheless, it does not authorize them to regulate the CATV operation.
Pursuant to E.O. No. 205, only the NTC has the authority to regulate the CATV
operation, including the fixing of subscriber rates.
- Resp.’s argument: CA did not commit error. Resolution no. 210 was enacted
pursuant to Sec. 177 (c) and (d) of BP 337 which authorizes LGUs to regulate
businesses. The term businesses necessarily includes the CATV industry. Second,
Resolution No. 210 is in the nature of a contract between Pet. and Resp.s, it
being a grant to the former of a franchise to operate a CATV system. To hold
that E.O. No. 205 amended its terms would violate the Constitutional
prohibition against impairment of contracts.
ISSUE: WON a LGU may regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators within its territorial jurisdiction? NO.
HELD: On June 11, 1978, Marcos issued PD 1512 establishing a monopoly of the CATV
industry by granting Sining Makulay an exclusive franchise to operate the system. It
terminated all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system
previously granted by local governments or by any instrumentality or agency of the
national government and prescribed subscriber rates to be charged by Sining Makulay to
its customers.
- On July 21, 1979, Marcos issued LOI 894vesting upon the Chairman of the
Board of Communications direct supervision over the operations of Sining
Makulay. Thereafter, he issued EO 546, integrating the Board of
Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau to form the
NTC which has for its functions:
o Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of
communications utilities and services, radio communications systems,
wire or wireless telephone or telegraph systems, radio and television
broadcasting system and other similar public utilities;
o Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular
operators of public service communications; and determine and
prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such public
utility facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates are
established by international bodies or associations of which the
Philippines is a participating member or by bodies recognized by the
Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates
- The exclusive franchise of Sining Makulay was cut because of the 1986
Revolution. During Aquino’s administration, she issued EO 205, opening the
CATV industry to all citizens of the Philippines. It mandated the NTC to grant
Certificates of Authority to CATV operators and to issue the necessary
implementing rules and regulations.
- On September 9, 1997, Ramos issued EO 436which restated the NTC’s
regulatory powers, thus:
- SEC. 2. The regulation and supervision of the cable television industry in the
Philippines shall remain vested solely with the National Telecommunications
Commission(NTC).
- SEC. 3. Only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives,
granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the Commission
may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable
television service within a service area.
- In light of the above laws and EO 436, NTC exercises regulatory power over
CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
- It must be emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the regulatory
power shall be vested solely in the NTC, it pertains to the regulatory power over
those matters which are peculiarly within the NTC’s competence, such as, the:
(1) determination of rates, (2) issuance of certificates of authority, (3)
establishment of areas of operation, (4) examination and assessment of the legal,
technical and financial qualifications of applicant operators, (5)granting of
permits for the use of frequencies, (6) regulation of ownership and operation,
(7)adjudication of issues arising from its functions, and (8) other similar matters.
- There is no dispute that Sangguniang Panlungsod, like other local legislative bodies,
has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the
general welfare clause of B.P. Blg. 337 and under RA 7160 based on Sec.
16[2]and Sec. 458[3]. As such, the general welfare clause is the delegation in
statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs.
- Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the
general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the
indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to
reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the use
of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of
large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV
operators.
- While LGU’s power over general welfare clause is recognized, Resolution no.
210 cannot be sustained as it violates the mandate of existing laws and State’s
 deregulation policy over CATV industry. The apparent defect in Resolution No.
210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No. 436 insofar as it permits
Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the
power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators.
- Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it
to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by
a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the
subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may
be rendered invalid.Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature
has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding
throughout the State.
- Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV
operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance
or approve a resolution in violation of the said law. An ordinance in conflict
with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held
to be invalid. LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV
operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
- On the assumption of a conflict between E.O. No. 205 and R.A. No. 7160, the
proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both
by harmonizing them if possible. Thus, the NTC, under E.O. No. 205, has
exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting CATV operation, including
specifically the fixing of subscriber rates, but nothing herein precludes LGUs
from exercising its general power, under R.A. No. 7160, to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of their constituents.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Resolution no. 210 also violated the State’s deregulation policy [Deregulation is the
reduction of government regulation of business to permit free markets and competition].
Resp.s argue that EO 205 violates Constitutional prohibition against impairment of
contracts as Resolution 210 is a grant of franchise. There is no law authorizing LGUs to
grant franchises to operate CATV system. Whatever authority LGUs had before, the same
had been withdrawn by Marcos in PD no. 1512.Now, Sec. 3 of EO 426 provides that
only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a
Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and
maintain a cable television system or render cable television service within a service
area.Thus, in the absence of Constitutional authorization, municipalities have no power
to grant franchises.
2. DISOMANGCOP V. DATUMANONG
- Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction(Petition) are the Constitutionality and validity of R.A. 8999: “An Act
Establishing An Engineering District in the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur
and Appropriating Funds Therefor,” and Dept. of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) Dept. Order No. 119 (D.O. 119)on the subject, “Creation of Marawi
Sub­District Engineering Office.”
- Sec.s 1 and 15, Article X of the PC mandate the creation of autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. Sec. 15 specifically provides that
“[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
PC and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the PH.”
- Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, R.A. 6734: “An Act Providing for An
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,” was enacted and signed
into law on 1 August 1989. This called for the plebiscite. Only four (4) provinces
voted for the creation of an autonomous region, namely: Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
- In accordance with R.A. 6734, then Pres. Corazon C. Aquino issued on 12
October 1990, E.O. 426: “Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the Dept.
of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under
the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes.”
- ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. Pres. Cory Aquino flew
to Cotabato, the seat of the Regional Government, for the inauguration. Nearly
9 years later, on 20 May 1999, then Dept. of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) Sec. Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119on the creation of Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Officewhich shall have jurisdiction over all national
infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and
the province of Lanao del Sur.
- Almost 2 years later, on 17 January 2001, then Pres. Joseph E. Estradaapproved
and signed into law R.A. 8999: “An Act Establishing an Engineering District in the
1stDistrict of the Province of Lanao Del Surand Appropriating Funds Therefor.”
- Congresslater passed R.A. 9054: “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose RA No. 6734,
 entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended.”
It, likewise, contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the retained areas of governance of the National Government.
- R.A. No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite on Aug. 14, 2001. Basilan and City of
Marawi voted to join ARMM. R.A. 6734 & R.A. 9054are collectively referred to
as the ARMM Organic Acts.
- Pets. Arsadi M. Disomangcop (Disomangcop) and Ramir M. Dimalotang
(Dimalotang) addressed a petition to then DPWH Sec. Simeon A. Datumanong,
seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A. 8999.
No action, however, was taken on the petition.
- Pets. Disomangcop & Dimalotang filed the instant petition in their capacity as
Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively for the
1stEngineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur, seeking:
o (1) to annul and set aside D.O. 119;
o (2) to prohibit Resp. DPWH Sec. from implementing D.O. 119 and
R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public works projects intended for
Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District Engineering
Office and other administrative regions of DPWH; and
o (3) to compel the Sec. of the Dept. of Budget and Management (DBM)
to release all funds for public works projects intended for Marawi City
and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only; and to compel Resp.
DPWH Sec. to let the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur implement all public works projects within its
jurisdictional area.
- They alleged that D.O. 119 was issued with GAD and it violates the
Constitutional autonomy of the ARMM, as the D.O. has tasked the Marawi
Sub-District Engineering Officewith functions that have already been devolved
to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
- Resp.s, through the OSG, defended that the power of autonomous regions did
not diminish the legislative power of Congress; and that petitoners have no legal
standing.
ISSUE: WON R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are UNCONSTITUTIONAL
HELD: YES
[Jurisdiction] It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the creation of and appropriation of funds to the
First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A. 8999 will affect the
powers, functions and responsibilities of the Pets. and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two
offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that Pets. are in
imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and jobs. Their material and substantial
interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999.
Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the validity of
the enactments subject of the instant case.
[R.A. No. 8999] While the ARMM Organic Acts are classified as statutes, they are more
than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the
provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this
case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
Also, R.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R.A. 9054. R.A. 9054 is anchored on the
1987 PC. It advances the Constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the
ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one of which is its
jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however, ventures to
reestablish the National Government's jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in Lanao
del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter law's
objective.
[Regional Autonomy under R.A. 6734 & R.A. 9054] National laws are subject to the
PC one of whose state policies is to ensure the autonomy of autonomous regions, as
provided in Sec. 25, Article II of the 1987 PC.The idea behind the Constitutional
provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with
distinctive cultures and traditions. These cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to
flourish.
However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a
sovereignty distinct from that of PH, as it can be installed only "within the framework of
this PC and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the PH."
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government
unit vis---> -vis the central government. It refers to the granting of basic internal
government powers to the people of a particular area or region with least control and
supervision from the central government
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization. Decentralization is a decision
by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or
functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It is typically a delegated power,
wherein a larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local
governments. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units
that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right against
the central government.
Decentralization comes in two forms:
- Deconcentrationis administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of functions
or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the national office to the
regional and local offices. It is also referred to decentralization of administration.
- Devolutionconnotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the
central government to local government units. This is a more liberal form of
decentralization since there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities.
It aims to grant greater autonomy to local government units in cognizance of
their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their
administrative and technical capabilities. It is also referred to decentralization of
power.
E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM to the
Autonomous Regional Government (ARG) as provided in Sec.s 1 and 2 of E.O. 426.
More importantly, Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the
administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds for public works to the
ARG, as shown in Sec. 20, Art. VI, RA 9054.
[D.O. 119]D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has
jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative
of the provisions of E.O. 426. The EO was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734—which initiated
the creation of the Constitutionally-mandated autonomous regionand which defined the
basic structure of the autonomous government. E.O. 426 sought to implement the
transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the
Autonomous Regional Government.
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry
of Public Works and Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control
and supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional
Government. The latter statute specifically applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. Thus, E.O.
124 should give way to E.O. 426.
[GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION] Resp.s committed GAD for implementing RA
8999 despite being repealed, and for maintaining the DPWH Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office pursuant to D.O. 119 which has been rendered functus officio by the
ARMM Organic Acts.
WHEREFORE, considering that RA No. 9054 repealed RA No. 8999 and rendered
DPWH Dept. Order No. 119 functus officio, the petition insofar as it seeks the writs of
certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Accordingly, let a writ of prohibition ISSUE
commanding Resp.s to desist from implementing R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119, and
maintaining the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and the First
Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur comprising the City of Marawi and
the municipalities within the First District of Lanao del Sur. However, the petition insofar
as it seeks a writ of mandamus against Resp.s is DENIED (because funds cannot be released
without a Regional Assembly Public Works Act).
LOCAL AUTONOMY AND DECISION-MAKING
1. PROVINCE OF RIZAL V. EXEC. SEC.
- The case is a petition filed the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo,
and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
CA, denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the legality and Constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 635.
- At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts
of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the Pres.
[Pres. Ramos], through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and
similar waste disposal applications.
- The Pets. opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump
site under the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their
constituents. Moreso, the dump site is to be constructed in theWatershed
reservation.
- Through the concerted efforts of the officials and residents of the Province of
Rizal and Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during
the term of Pres. Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened.
- A TRO was then filed. Here, the Pets. did not raise the question that the project
was not consulted and approved by the appropriate Sanggunian but the court
took it into consideration since a mere MoA does not guarantee the dump site’s
permanent closure.

ISSUE: WON consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and Municipality
of San Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project
HELD:
- Yes, contrary to the averment of the Resp.s, Proclamation No. 635, which was
passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the LGC, which was
approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.
- Sec. 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to
require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultation with appropriate local government units, non-
governmental and people's organization, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdiction."
- Likewise Sec. 27 requires prior consultations before a program
shall be implemented by government authorities and the prior
approval of the Sanggunian is obtained."
- Corollarily as held in Lina , Jr. v. Paño, Sec. 2 (c), requiring
consultations with the appropriate local government units,
should apply to national government projects affecting the
environmental or ecological balance of the particular community
implementing the project.
Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining
order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared
before the CA that they had conducted the required consultations.
- However, the ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore when at the
height of the protest rally and barricade made by the residents of Pets. to stop
dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of
4 3.
1. Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural
resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such
other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of
ecological imbalance; [Sec. 447 (1)(vi)]
2. Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of the
municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land
within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting
integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in
populous centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said
fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Sec. 447 (2)(vi-ix)]
Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA
that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.
- Moreover, Sec. 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the
municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things,
“enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec. 16 of th(e) Code.”
These include (see footnote)4
- Briefly stated, under the LGC, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented:
1. prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
2. prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
- Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s
implementation is illegal.
2. BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. V. PROVINCE OF AKLAN
FACTS: Boracay Island (Boracay), a tropical paradise located in the Western Visayas
region of the Philippines and one of the countrys most popular tourist destinations, was
declared a tourist zone and marine reserve in 1973 under Pres.ial Proclamation No. 1801.
The island comprises the barangays of Manoc-manoc, Balabag, and Yapak, all within the
municipality of Malay, in the province of Aklan.
More than a decade ago, Resp. Province built the Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger
Terminal at Barangay Caticlan to be the main gateway to Boracay.It also built the
corresponding Cagban Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal to be the receiving end for
Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services
and facilities as provided for under Sec. 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and
facilities, …providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of
communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest
development projects ….and, subject to existing laws, establishing and providing for the
maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the
inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the construction, maintenance,
repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of
the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate
ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said water supply and within one hundred
(100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in
connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption, use or wastage of water.”[Sec.
447 (5)(i) & (vii)]
tourists in Boracay. Resp. Province operates both ports to provide structural facilities
suited for locals, tourists and guests and to provide safety and security measures.
Governor Marquez sent a letter to Resp. PRA on March 12, 2009 expressing the interest
of Resp. Province to reclaim about 2.64 hectares of land along the foreshores of Barangay
Caticlan, Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan, pursuant to Resolution No. 13, s.
2008 issued by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan.
Sometime in April 2009, Resp. Province entered into an agreement with the Financial
Advisor/Consultant that won in the bidding process held a month before, to conduct the
necessary feasibility study of the proposed project for the Renovation/Rehabilitation of
the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Building and Jetty Port, Enhancement and Recovery of
Old Caticlan Coastline, and Reclamation of a Portion of Foreshore for Commercial
Purposes (the Marina Project), in Malay, Aklan.
Subsequently, on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Resp. Province issued
Resolution No. 2009110, which authorized Governor Marquez to file an application to
reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan with Resp. PRA.
Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay expressed its strong
opposition to the intended foreshore lease application, through Resolution No. 044,
approved on July 22, 2009, manifesting therein that Resp. Provinces foreshore lease
application was for business enterprise purposes for its benefit, at the expense of the local
government of Malay, which by statutory provisions was the rightful entity to develop,
utilize and reap benefits from the natural resources found within its jurisdiction.
In August 2009, a Preliminary Geohazard Assessmentfor the enhancement/expansion of
the existing Caticlan Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal through beach zone restoration
and Protective Marina Developments in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan was completed.
Thereafter, Governor Marquez submitted an Environmental Performance Report and
Monitoring Program (EPRMP) to DENR-EMB RVI, which he had attached to his letter
dated September 19, 2009, as an initial step for securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC). The letter reads in part:
With the project expected to start its construction implementation next month, the
province hereby assures your good office that it will give preferential attention to and
shall comply with whatever comments that you may have on this EPRMP.
Within the same month of October 2009, Resp. Province deliberated on the possible
expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40)
hectares.
Resp. PRA approved the reclamation project on April 20, 2010 in its Resolution No.
4094and authorized its General Manager/Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to enter into a
MOA with Resp. Province for the implementation of the reclamation project.
On April 27, 2010, DENR-EMB RVI issued to Resp. Province ECC-R6-1003-096-7100
(the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64
hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port.
On May 17, 2010, Resp. Province entered into a MOA with Resp. PRA.
In Resolution No. 046, Series of 2010, adopted on June 23, 2010, the Malay Municipality
reiterated its strong opposition to Resp. Provinces project and denied its request for
afavorableendorsement of the Marina Project.
The Malay Municipality subsequently issued Resolution No. 016, Series of 2010, adopted
on August 3, 2010, to request Resp. PRA not to grant reclamation permit and notice to
proceed to the Marina Project of the Resp. Provincial Government of Aklan located at
Caticlan, Malay, Aklan.
In a letter dated October 12, 2010, Pet. informed Resp. PRA of its opposition to the
reclamation project.
Pet. likewise transmitted its Resolution No. 001, Series of 2010, registering its opposition
to the reclamation project to Resp. Province, Resp. PRA, Resp. DENR-EMB, the
National Economic Development Authority Region VI, the Malay Municipality, and
other concerned entities.
Pet. alleges that despite the Malay Municipalitys denial of Resp. Provinces request for
afavorableendorsement, as well as the strong opposition manifested both by Barangay
Caticlan and Pet. as an NGO, Resp. Province still continued with the implementation of
the Reclamation Project.
On June 1, 2011, Pet. filed the instant Petition for Environmental Protection
Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus. On June 7, 2011, this Court issued
a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the Resp.s to file
their respective comments to the petition.
After receiving a copy of the TEPO on June 9, 2011, Resp. Province immediately issued
an order to the Provincial Engineering Office and the concerned contractor to cease and
desist from conducting any construction activities until further orders from this Court.
ISSUES:
[1] WON the petition should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic;
[2] WON the petition is premature because Pet. failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing this case;
[3] WON Resp. Province failed to perform a full EIA as required by laws and regulations
based on the scope and classification of the project;
[4] WON Resp. Province complied with all the requirements under the pertinent laws and
regulations; and
[5] WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project
HELD: A close reading of the two LGUs respective resolutions would reveal that they
are not sufficient to render the petition moot and academic, as there are explicit
conditions imposed that must be complied with by Resp. Province. In Resolution No.
003, series of 2012, of the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan it is stated that any vertical
structures to be constructed shall be subject for barangay endorsement. Clearly, what the
barangay endorsed was the reclamation only, and not the entire project that includes the
construction of a commercial building and wellness center, and other tourism-related
facilities.Pets. objections, as may be recalled, pertain not only to the reclamation per se,
but also to the building to be constructed and the entire projects perceived ill effects to
the surrounding environment.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Malay obviously imposed explicit conditions for Resp.
Province to comply with on pain of revocation of its endorsement of the project,
including the need to conduct a comprehensive study on the environmental impact of the
reclamation project, which is the heart of the petition before us. Therefore, the contents
of the two resolutions submitted by Resp. Province do not support its conclusion that
the subsequent favorable endorsement of the LGUs had already addressed all the issues
raised and rendered the instant petition moot and academic.
We do not agree with Resp.s appreciation of the applicability of the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies in this case. We are reminded of our ruling in Pagara v. CA,
which summarized our earlier decisions on the procedural requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, to wit:
The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is
not applicable: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction; or (3) where the Resp. is a Dept. Sec., whose acts as an alter ego of the Pres.
bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or
(4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, when there is no due process observed, or where the protestant has no
other recourse.
Although Pet. was not a party to the proceedings where the decision to issue an ECC was
rendered, it stands to be aggrieved by the decision, because it claims that the reclamation
of land on the Caticlan side would unavoidably adversely affect the Boracay side, where
Pets. members own establishments engaged in the tourism trade. As noted earlier, Pet.
contends that the declared objective of the reclamation project is to exploit Boracays
tourism trade because the project is intended to enhance support services thereto;
however, this objective would not be achieved since the white-sand beaches for which
Boracay is famous might be negatively affected by the project. Pets. conclusion is that
Resp. Province, aided and abetted by Resp.s PRA and DENR-EMB RVI, ignored the
spirit and letter of our environmental laws, and should thus be compelled to perform their
duties under said laws.
***
The new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a
relief for Pet. under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that
may be availed of to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law and
which provides for the issuance of a TEPO as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance
of the writ itself. The Rationale of the said Rules explains the writ in this wise:
Environmental law highlights the shift in the focal-point from the initiation of regulation
by Congress to the implementation of regulatory programs by the appropriate
government agencies.
Thus, a government agencys inaction, if any, has serious implications on the future of
environmental law enforcement. Private individuals, to the extent that they seek to change
the scope of the regulatory process, will have to rely on such agencies to take the initial
incentives, which may require a judicial component. Accordingly, questions regarding the
propriety of an agencys action or inaction will need to be analyzed.
This point is emphasized in the availability of the remedy of the writ of mandamus, which
allows for the enforcement of the conduct of the tasks to which the writ pertains: the
performance of a legal duty.
The writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment
in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts
decision and, in order to do this, the court may compel the submission of compliance
reports from the Resp. government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor
compliance with its decision.
Pet. had 3 options where to file this case under the rule: the RTC exercising jurisdiction
over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred, the CA, or this
Court.
Pet. had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to
determine the questions of unique national and local importance raised here that pertain
to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus it was justified in coming to this
Court.
3) Being the administrator of the EIS System, Resp. DENR-EMB RVIs submissions bear
great weight in this case.However, the following are the issues that put in question the
wisdom of Resp. DENR-EMB RVI in issuing the ECC:
[1] Its approval of Resp. Provinces classification of the project as a mere expansion of the
existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new project;
[2] Its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project;
[3] The lack of prior public consultations and approval of local government agencies; and
[4] The lack of comprehensive studies regarding the impact of the reclamation project to
the environment.
As may be gleaned from the breakdown of the 2.64 hectares as described by Resp.
Province above, a significant portion of the reclaimed area would be devoted to the
construction of a commercial building, and the area to be utilized for the expansion of
the jetty port consists of a mere 3,000 square meters (sq. m). To be true to its definition,
the EIA report submitted by Resp. Province should at the very least predict the impact
that the construction of the new buildings on the reclaimed land would have on the
surrounding environment. These new constructions and their environmental effects were
not covered by the old studies that Resp. Province previously submitted for the
construction of the original jetty port in 1999, and which it re-submitted in its application
for ECC in this alleged expansion, instead of conducting updated and more
comprehensive studies.
Any impact on the Boracay side cannot be totally ignored, as Caticlan and Boracay are
separated only by a narrow strait. This becomes more imperative because of the
significant contributions of Boracays white-sand beach to the countrys tourism trade,
which requires Resp. Province to proceed with utmost caution in implementing projects
within its vicinity.
***
The LGC establishes the duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of
ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior public consultation and approval of
local government units for the projects described therein.
In the case before us, the national agency involved is Resp. PRA. Even if the project
proponent is the local government of Aklan, it is Resp. PRA which authorized the
reclamation, being the exclusive agency of the government to undertake reclamation
nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for Resp. Province to go through Resp. PRA and to
execute a MOA, wherein Resp. PRAs authority to reclaim was delegated to Resp.
Province. Resp. DENR-EMB RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also a national
government institution which is tasked with the issuance of the ECC that is a prerequisite
to projects covered by environmental laws such as the one at bar.
This project can be classified as a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities, and is covered by the requirements found in the
LGC provisions.
Under the LGC, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national project that
affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: prior consultationwith the affected local communities, and prior approval
of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory
requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.

Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and prior approval are required by law
to have been conducted and secured by the Resp. Province. Accordingly, the information
dissemination conducted months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient
to comply with this requirement under the LGC. Had they been conducted properly, the
prior public consultation should have considered the ecological or environmental
concerns of the stakeholders and studied measures alternative to the project, to avoid or
minimize adverse environmental impact or damage. In fact, Resp. Province once tried to
obtain the favorable endorsement of the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, but this was denied
by the latter.
Moreover, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides:
5.3. ublic Hearing / Consultation Requirements
For projects under Category A-1, the conduct of public hearing as part of the EIS review
is mandatory unless otherwise determined by EMB. For all other undertakings, a public
hearing is not mandatory unless specifically required by EMB.
Proponents should initiate public consultations early in order to ensure that
environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into consideration in the EIA
study and the formulation of the management plan. All public consultations and public
hearings conducted during the EIA process are to be documented. The public
hearing/consultation Process reportshall be validated by the EMB/EMB RD and shall
constitute part of the records of the EIA process.
In essence, the above-quoted rule shows that in cases requiring public consultations, the
same should be initiated early so that concerns of stakeholders could be taken into
consideration in the EIA study. In this case, Resp. Province had already filed its ECC
application before it met with the local government units of Malay and Caticlan.
The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent
endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan on
February 13, 2012, and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay onFebruary
28, 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of Resp.
Province. As we have established above, the respective resolutions issued by the LGUs
concerned did not render this petition moot and academic.
It is clear that both Pet. and Resp. Province are interested in the promotion of tourism in
Boracay and the protection of the environment, lest they kill the proverbial hen that lays
the golden egg. At the beginning of this decision, we mentioned that there are common
goals of national significance that are very apparent from both the Pets. and the Resp.s
respective pleadings and memoranda.
As shown by the above provisions of our laws and rules, the speedy and smooth
resolution of these issues would benefit all the parties. Thus, Resp. Provinces cooperation
with Resp. DENR-EMB RVI in the Court-mandated review of the proper classification
and environmental impact of the reclamation project is of utmost importance.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The TEPO issued by this Court is hereby converted into a writ of continuing mandamus
specifically as follows:
1. Resp. Dept. of Environment and Natural Resources-Environmental Management
Bureau Regional Office VI shall revisit and review the following matters:
a. its classification of the reclamation project as a single instead of a co-located project;
b. its approval of Resp. Provinces classification of the project as a mere expansion of the
existing jetty port in Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a new project; and
c. the impact of the reclamation project to the environment based on new, updated, and
comprehensive studies, which should forthwith be ordered by Resp. DENR-EMB RVI.
2. Resp. Province of Aklan shall perform the following:
a. fully cooperate with Resp. DENR-EMB RVI in its review of the reclamation project
proposal and submit to the latter the appropriate report and study; and
b. secure approvals from local government units and hold proper consultations with non-
governmental organizations and other stakeholders and sectors concerned as required by
Sec. 27 in relation to Sec. 26 of the LGC.
Resp. Philippine Reclamation Authority shall closely monitor the submission by Resp.
Province of the requirements to be issued by Resp. DENR-EMB RVI in connection to
the environmental concerns raised by Pet., and shall coordinate with Resp. Province in
modifying the MOA, if necessary, based on the findings of Resp. DENR-EMB RVI.
The Pet. Boracay Foundation, Inc. and the Resp.s The Province of Aklan, represented by
Governor Carlito S. Marquez, The Philippine Reclamation Authority, and The DENR-
EMB (Region VI) are mandated to submit their respective reports to this Court regarding
their compliance with the requirements set forth in this Decision no later than 3 (3)
months from the date of promulgation of this Decision.
In the meantime, the Resp.s, their concerned contractor/s, and/or their agents,
representatives or persons acting in their place or stead, shall immediately cease and desist
from continuing the implementation of the project covered by ECC-R6-1003-096-7100
until further orders from this Court. For this purpose, the Resp.s shall report within five
(5) days to this Court the status of the project as of their receipt of this Decision, copy
furnished the Pet..
3. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. LIM
FACTS
· On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by
oil companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell) and Dept. of Energy for the
creation of a Master Plan to address and minimize the potential risks and
hazards posed by the proximity of communities, business and offices to
Pandacan oil terminals without affecting security and reliability of supply
and distribution of petroleum products.
· On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted Ordinance
No. 8027 which reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its
adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial I.
· Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification
were given six (6) months from the date of effectivity to stop the operation
of their businesses. It was later extended until 30 April 2003.
· On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the
Supreme Court (SC) to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
· Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the RTC of Manila an
action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction.
The same was issued in favor of Chevron and Shell. Petron, on the other
hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August 2004.
· On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119
entitled “An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use
Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration,
Enforcement and Amendment thereto”. This designates Pandacan oil
depot area as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone.
· On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and directed
Mayor Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that
the objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack
on the Pandacan Terminals.
· The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on the 7 March
2007 Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027 is
Constitutional and that it was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No.
8119 as there is no irreconcilable conflict between them.
· SC later on denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.
· On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor
Lim), the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under
Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No.
8187 appended to the list a Medium and a Heavy Industrial Zone where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly allowed.
· Pets. Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Their
contentions are as follows:
- It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not
promote the general welfare of the people
- It is violative of Sec. 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 PC as well
as health and environment related municipal laws and
international conventions and treaties, such as: Clean Air Act;
Environment Code; Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil
Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of
the Child
- The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8119 when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance
No. 8027
· On the other hand, the Resp.s Mayor Lim, et.al. and the intervenors oil
companies contend that:
- The Pets. have no legal standing to sue whether as citizens,
taxpayers or legislators. They further failed to show that they have
suffered any injury or threat of injury as a result of the act
complained of
- The petition should be dismissed outright for failure to properly
apply the related provisions of the PC, the Rules of Court, and/or
 the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the
appropriate remedy available
- The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the
SC only exercises appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
Constitutionality or validity of an ordinance under Sec. 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 PC
- It is the function of the SP to enact zoning ordinance without
prior referral to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and
Appeals; thus, it may repeal all or part of zoning ordinance sought
to be modified
- There is a valid exercise of police power
· On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which essentially
amended the assailed Ordinance to exclude the area where petroleum
refineries and oil depots are located from the Industrial Zone. The same
was vetoed by Mayor Lim.
ISSUES
1. WON there are violations of environmental laws
2. WON the principle of hierarchy of courts is violated
3. WON the Pets. have legal standing to sue
4. WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unConstitutional in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals
RULING
1. None. The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is
embodied in Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states that the Rules shall
govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil actions before the
MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs, and the RTCs involving the
enforcement or violations of environmental and other related laws, rules
and regulations such as but not limited to: R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances
and Hazardous Waste Act; R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act; Provisions in
C.A. No. 141; and other existing laws that relate to the conservation,
development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment
and natural resources.
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there
are allegations of violations of environmental laws in the petitions, these only
serve as collateral attacks that would support the other position of the Pets. –
the protection of the right to life, security and safety.
2. No. The SC held that it is true that the petitions should have been filed
with the RTC, it having concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over a special
civil action for prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief.
However, the petitions at bar are of transcendental importance
warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed. (Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 464 Phil. 375)
3. Yes. The SC referred to their Decision dated 7 March 2007 which ruled
that the Pets. in that case have a legal right to seek the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8027 because the subject of the petition concerns a public
right, and they, as residents of Manila, have a direct interest in the
implementation of the ordinances of the city.
No different are herein Pets. who seek to prohibit the enforcement of
the assailed ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that concerns
a public right.
In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the
people is indisputably a right of utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the
Pets., as residents of Manila, have the required personal interest to seek relief to
protect such right.
4. Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance
relative to the continued stay of the oil depots, the SC followed the same
line of reasoning used in its 7 March 2007 decision, to wit:
“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of
promoting a sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and
general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled
to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
 devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in
the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on
Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City
of Manila which recommended the approval of the
ordinance:
(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of
highly flammable and highly volatile products
which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum
gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel
oil among others;
(2) The depot is open to attack through land, water and
air;
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and near
Malacañang Palace; and
(4) In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot,
the fire could spread to the neighboring
communities.
The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a
particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist
target. As long as there is such a target in their midst, the residents of
Manila are not safe. It therefore becomes necessary to remove these
terminals to dissipate the threat.”
The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The
Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been
lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade the Court that
the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk
by the presence of the oil depots, the SC holds that the Ordinance No. 8187 in
relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unConstitutional.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one
point or another, no matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some, the
SC cannot allow the right to life be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event.
Statistics and theories of probability have no place in situations where the very
life of not just an individual but of residents of big neighbourhoods is at stake.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
1. Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unConstitutional and invalid with respect
to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
2. The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to cease and desist
from enforcing Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the relocation and
transfer of the oil terminals out of the Pandacan area
3. The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45)
days, submit to the RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated comprehensive plan
and relocation schedule, which relocation shall be completed not later than
six (6) months from the date the required document is submitted.
4. MOSQUEDA V. PILIPINO BANANA
DOCTRINES:
1) A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the
local government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the PC or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not
be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be
unreasonable.
2) A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police
powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of
the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first
requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the PC; the second, to the Due
Process Clause of the PC.
3) Tests when police power is invoked as the rationale for the valid passage
of an ordinance: The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation
 test or rational basis test) demands that the classification reasonably relate to the
legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies in cases involving economics
or social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class. The strict
scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with
the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of
a suspect class. The Government carries the burden to prove that the classification
is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted an ordinance imposing a ban against
aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City.
Pursuant to the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced 3
months thereafter. The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc.
(PBGEA) filed a petition in the RTC to challenge the Constitutionality of the ordinance,
alleging that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power and
violated the equal protection clause. The RTC declared that the ordinance is valid and
Constitutional saying that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power under the
General Welfare Clause of the LGC and that the ordinance was consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause. On appeal, however, the CA reversed the judgment of the RTC.
ISSUE: Is the prohibition against aerial spraying a lawfully permissible method that the
local government unit of Davao City may adopt to prevent the purported effects of aerial
drift? (No.)
HELD: To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a
two-pronged test: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate
powers of the local government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the
conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the PC and the statutes, as well as
with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
I. Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application within
3 months can readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected plantations and
the corresponding resources required therefor. To recall, even the RTC recognized the
impracticality of attaining a full-shift to other modes of spraying within 3 months in view
of the costly financial and civil works required for the conversion.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will
consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography and
geographical features of the plantations. As such, the conversion could not be completed
within the short timeframe of 3 months, requiring the Resp.s and other affected
individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the 3-month period under
pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would
definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
(As to the buffer zones: The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose
of minimizing the effects of aerial spraying within and near the plantations. Although Sec.
3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees within the identified buffer
zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as confiscatory requiring
payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if the
taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of
the land. The Resp.s cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their
landholdings because they can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to
be identified as the buffer zones.)
II. Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The ordinance violated the equal protection clause. The imposition of the ban is too
broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to be aerially applied
and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. Such imposition becomes
unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relation to the purported inconvenience,
discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the ordinance seeks to address.
The burden will now become more onerous to various entities, including those with no
connection whatsoever to the intended purpose of the ordinance.
We must emphasize that our ruling herein does not seek to deprive the LGUs their right
to regulate activities within their jurisdiction. They are empowered under Sec. 16 of the
LGC to promote the general welfare of the people through regulatory, not prohibitive,
ordinances that conform with the policy directions of the National Government.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 failed to pass this test as it contravenes the specific regulatory
policy on aerial spraying in banana plantations on a nationwide scale of the National
Government, through the FPA.
Finally, the unConstitutionality of the ban renders nugatory Ordinance No. 0309-07 in its
entirety. Consequently, any discussion on the lack of the separability clause becomes
entirely irrelevant.
5. CITY OF BATANGAS V. PILIPINAS SHELL
● Batangas City is an LGU constituting a political body corporate, endowed with
powers pertaining to a municipal corporation. The Sangguniang Panlungsod is
the legislative body of Batangas City.
● Resp. PSPC owns and operates a refinery situated in Tabangao, Batangas City
(Tabangao Refinery).
● Shell Philippines Exploration, B.V. (SPEX), a foreign corporation licensed to
do business in the Philippines, was tasked to explore and develop possible
petroleum sources in North Western Palawan
○ This exploration led to the discovery of an abundant source of natural
gas in the Malampaya field off the shores of Palawan.
○ The Malampaya Project required the construction of a 504-kilometer
offshore pipeline for the transport of natural gas from Malampaya field
to Batangas, for treatment in PSPC's Tabangao Refinery.
● May 28, 2001: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas City enacted an
Ordinance which requiring heavy industries operating along the portions of
Batangas Bay to construct desalination plants for the use of seawater as coolant
for their industrial facilities.
○ This ordinance was approved by the mayor in June 2001.
○ Among the facilities affected by the ordinance was PSPC's Tabangao
Refinery.
● May 23, 2006: PSPC filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity praying that the
Ordinance be declared null and void.
○ PSPC averred that the Ordinance constitutes an invalid exercise of
police power as it failed to meet the substantive requirements for
validity.
■ PSPC argued that the Ordinance contravenes jurisdiction of
the NWRB to regulate and control the Philippines' water
resources.
○ PSPC alleged that the Ordinance unduly singles out heavy industries,
and holds them solely accountable for the loss of water and destruction
of aquifers without basis, resulting in the deprivation of their property
rights without due process of law
○ PSPC also assailed the non-publication of the Ordinance in a
newspaper of general circulation, and the lack of public hearings or
consultations on the matter.
● In response, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod maintained that
they have the power to enact the Assailed Ordinance pursuant to the general
welfare clause under the LGC.
○ According to them, the rationale of the Assailed Ordinance is to stop
PSPC and other industries similarly situated from relying "too much"
on ground water as coolants for their machineries, and alternatively
promote the use of seawater for such purpose.
○ Further, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod alleged that
the Ordinance had in fact been published in Dyaryo Veritas, a
newspaper of general circulation in the area, and that joint public
hearings on the matter had in fact been conducted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan, where PSPC was duly
represented.
● RTC rendered a Decision declaring the ordinance invalid for want of necessity
and for not conducting prior public hearing, and for violating the due process
clause of the PC. The RTC also held that the Sangguniang Panlungsod
encroached upon the authority of the NWRB.
● On appeal, the CA dismissed the appeal filed by the City for lack of merit. The
CA further held that the police power of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is
subordinate to the Constitutional limitations that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good. Hence, the instant recourse to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which declared the Ordinance invalid.
HELD: The Ordinance is INVALID for being ultra vires, for being contrary to existing
law, and for lack of evidence showing the existence of factual basis for its enactment.
● Time and again, the Court has ruled that in order for an ordinance to be valid,
the ordinance
○ must not contravene the PC or any statute;
○ must not be unfair or oppressive;
○ must not be partial or discriminatory;
○ must not prohibit, but may regulate trade;
○ must be general and consistent with public policy; and
○ must not be unreasonable
● Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the State, it is
incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the will of their principal, the
 State. Necessarily, therefore, ordinances enacted pursuant to the general welfare
clause may not subvert the State's will by contradicting national statutes
SUMMARY. An amendment to the requisites to convert a municipality to a city was
○ There is no doubt that the Ordinance contravenes the provisions of
made by the Congress through RA 9009. This law increased the requirement from P20M
the Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control
to P100M. Congress approved of the Cityhood Laws which converted several
and regulate the use of ground water which, by virtue of the provisions
municipalities into cities without conforming to the P100M requirement. The SC ruled
of the Water Code, pertains solely to the NWRB.
that the Cityhood Laws are unConstitutional for bypassing the LGC which is the main
○ By enacting the Ordinance, Batangas City acted in excess of the powers
law that must be followed in terms of creating cities.
granted to it as an LGU, rendering the Assailed Ordinance ultra vires.
○ It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in DOCTRINE. The PC requires Congress to stipulate in the LGC all the criteria necessary
status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress
with a state law of general character and statewide application is cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in
the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of
power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law
or repugnant to the general policy of the state.
● In any case, it bears emphasizing that the measure of the substantive validity of
1. Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities during the
an ordinance is the underlying factual basis for which it was enacted. Hence,
11th Congress but did not act on 24 other municipalities.
without factual basis, an ordinance will necessarily fail the substantive test for
validity.
2. It enacted RA 9009 during the 12th Congress, which took effect on June 30, 2001.
○ To prohibit an act or to compel something to be done, there must be
a shown reason for the same. The purpose must also be cogent to the
3. RA 9009 amended Sec. 450, LGC by increasing the annual income requirement of
means adopted by the law to attain it. In this case, as seen in the
a municipality into a city from P20M to P100M to restrain the rush of the conversion.
"whereas clause," the purpose of the ordinance is to protect the
environment and prevent ecological imbalance, especially the drying 4. According to Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, municipalities simply want to secure a larger
up of the aquifers of Batangas City share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
○ It would have been acceptable had there been a specific study or
findings that the local government conducted (sic) and not just its 5. The HoR of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 which sought
reliance on the complaints of some constituents who merely made its exemption of the P100M requirement for the 24 municipalities not approved during
conclusion that the drying up of wells or its salination was due to the the 11th session, without the approval of the Senate.
"heavy industries" use of groundwater.
6. The HoR during the 13th Congress re-adopted Joint Resolution No.29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate, where it was not approved.
CREATION AND ALTERATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
1. LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC 7. 16 Municipalities filed their bills containing a common provision on the exemption
of the P100M requirement.

8. HoR and Senate approved the Cityhood Bills which subsequently turned into the
Cityhood Law.
 9. Pets. filed the present complaint, to declare the Cityhood Laws unConstitutional for
violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the PC and the equal protection clause, and raised their
concern on the matter that the share of existing cities will be reduced.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON the Cityhood Laws are valid – NO
The PC is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the LGC and not in any other law. There is only one LGC.18 The PC
requires Congress to stipulate in the LGC all the criteria necessary for the creation of a
city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the LGC govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law,
not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the PC is to
insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform,
non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC. Any derogation or deviation from
the criteria prescribed in the LGC violates Sec. 10, Article X of the PC.
RA 9009 amended Sec. 450 of the LGC to increase the income requirement from P20
million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence,
from that moment the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must
satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Sec. 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA
9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.
DECISION.
Petition granted. Pets. won. Cityhood Law was named unConstitutional.
- With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and
NOTES.
RA 9009 An Act Amending Sec. 450 Of RA No. 7160, Otherwise Known As The LGC
- Pets. Navarro, Bernal and Medina (former political leaders of Surigao del Norte), filed
Of 1991, By Increasing The Average Annual Income Requirement For A Municipality
Or Cluster Of Barangays To Be Converted Into A Component City
Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it
has an average annual income, as certified by the Dept. of Finance, of at least Twenty
million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if
it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
2. NAVARRO V. ERMITA
- Oct. 2, 2006: The PH Pres. approved into law R.A. No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Island). Dec. 3, 2006: COMELEC conducted the mandatory
plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Gov’t
Code (LGC). Plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.
the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), The Pres. appointed the interim set of
provincial officials. Thereafter, Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials.
before this Court a Pet. for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the
Constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355 -> DISMISSED. They filed another petition for
certiorari are taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte for the same
reason, alleging that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would
perpetuate an illegal act of Congres, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del
 Norte a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenu Allocation (IRA), and
rich resources.
- Further, they alleged that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12
square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Sec. 10,
Article X of the PC and of Sec. 461 of the LGC.
- Court GRANTED the petition: declared R.A. No. 9355 UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the creation of a
province under the LGC. Consequently, the proclamation of Dinagat & declaration of its
officials were declared NULL & VOID.
- The decision also declared Art. 9(2) of the Rules & Regulations Implementing the LGC
(LGC-IRR) as NULL & VOID, for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC,
inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.”
- PH, represented by the OSG, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Decision. However, the Court in Resolution dated May 12, 2010
DENIED.
- The movant-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution. They
alleged that the COMELEC issued Reso. No. 8790 which provides that:
- If the Decision is reversed, the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of
Surigao del Norte remain as two (2) separate provinces;
- If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative
District, Surigao del Norte.
- If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District
of Surigao del Norte.
- As the elected officials of Surigao del Norte, their positions will be affected by the
nullification of the election results in the event that the Resolution is not reversed.
- If the Resolution is not reversed, Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part
of the 1st Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be
conducted.
- The Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment stating that the decision had become
final & executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, this urgent motion to recall entry of judgment
as filed by movant-intervenors.
- The movants-intervenors raised 3 (3) main arguments to challenge the above Resolution,
namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Sec. 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended
province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of
the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is
applicable in the instant case.
ISSUE: WON Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991
stating, “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands,” is VALID – YES.
HELD
- The central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are
economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to
their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and
land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. Economic viability is the
primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a
province. This is the clear intent of LGC framers.
- The requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a city, and a province as
provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR.
o For a Barangay: Sec. 386, LGC and Art. 14, LGC-IRR.
o For a Municipality: Sec. 442, LGC and Art. 13, LGC-IRR
o For a City: Sec. 450, LGC and Art. 11, LGC-IRR
o For a Province: Sec. 461, LGC and Art. 9, LGC-IRR.
- The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
province sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
- When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it
is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Sec. 442 and Sec.
450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the
requisites for the creation of a province under Sec. 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
- Thus, it is logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed
in Sec. 442 (for municipalities) and Sec. 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but
was inadvertently omitted in Sec. 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to
 correct the congressional oversight in Sec. 461 of the LGC—and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
- To make the province comply with the minimum land are criterion of 2,000 square
kilometers even if it consists of several islands, it would be more difficult and
burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because
the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous
land mass. It also defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as
enshrined in the PC.
- Pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into
that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it
enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat. Further, the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both
Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show
the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land
area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one
or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by
necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
3. UMALI V. COMELEC
● The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution no. 183-2011,
requesting the Pres. to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from the
component city of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC).
● Aceding to the request, the Pres. issued Pres.ial Proclamation Series of 2012,
proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to ratification in a plebiscite
by qualified voters as provided in Sec. 453 of LGC.
● COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued Minute Resolution no. 12-0797,
stating that for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City
from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of
Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite. It based this resolution on
Sec. 453 of the LGC, citing jurisprudence whereby only the residents of the city
proposed to be converted were allowed to vote in the plebiscite.
● The Governor of Nueva Ecija (Umali) filed a verified MR, arguing that the proposed
conversion will necessarily and directly affect the province of Nueva Ecija.
◦ Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10,
Art. X of the PC, arguing that while the conversion in question does not
involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit
of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the LGU directly
affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their
rights and responsibilities.
◦ phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then
be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected
by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be
upgraded -->all registered voters are qualified
● Private Resp. City Mayor of Cabanatuan (Vergara) opposed on the ground that Sec.
10, Art. X does not apply to conversions.
◦ a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched,allows only the
qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite
● COMELEC --> ruled in favor of Vergara
● Vergara maintained that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a
component city into an HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the
conversion will only be the city itself. In this instance, no political unit will be created,
merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU and no boundaries
altered.
◦ The conversion would merely reinforce the powers already exercised by
the city thus participation of the voters of the province in the plebiscite
won’t be necessary.
● COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9543, which adopted a calendar of
activities and periods of prohibited acts in connection with the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC.
● Dr. Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief which was raffled to
RTC, praying that Minute Resolution 12-0797 be declared unConstitutional & that
TC declare all qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be included in the
plebiscite
● COMELEC suspended preparations, but plebiscite was rescheduled. Thereafter, J.V.
Bautista filed a case for mandamus, contending that since the TRO issued by the
RTC has already expired, the duty of the public Resp. to hold the plebiscite has
become mandatory and ministerial
● After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public Resp. issued Resolution No. 1353
scheduling the plebiscite to January 25, 2014. However, a TRO was issued by this
Court on January 15, 2014 in G.R. No. 203974 to suspend the conduct of the
plebiscite for Cabanatuan City’s conversion.
ISSUE: WoN qualified voters of Nueva Ecija should be included in the plebiscite not
only those in Cabanatuan City? YES.
HELD: While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the
PC we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is
substantial alteration of boundaries. The phrase “substantial alteration of boundaries"
involves and necessarily entails a change in the geographical configuration of a local
government unit or units. However, the phrase "boundaries" should not be limited to the
mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political
boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between political
subdivisions, where the LGU’s exercise of corporate power ends and that of the other
begins”
The alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow Cabanatuan City’s conversion in
the same way that creations, divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take place
without entailing the alteration. Thus, conversion to an HUC is substantial alternation of
boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.
Thus, Vergara’s interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs afoul of Sec. 10, Art. X of the
PC which explicitly requires that all residents in the "political units directly affected"
should be made to vote.
The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directlyaffected by Cabanatuan City’s
conversion
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite,
what should primarily be determined is WON the unit or units that desire to participate
will be "directly affected" by the change.
In Tan v COMELEC, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of the
new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered
and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite. It can
be seen that the Constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained
"the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected"
whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of
the boundaries.
A. Impact on Economic Rights
In the case of Miranda, the changes that will result in the downgrading of an LGU from
an independent component city to a component city cannot be categorized as
insubstantial, thereby necessitating the conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification. Often
raised is that Cabanatuan City’s conversion into an HUC and its severance from Nueva
Ecija will result in the reduction of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province
based on Sec. 285 of the LGC.
Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction of its share in IRA once Cabanatuan City
attains autonomy. In view of the economic impact of Cabanatuan City’s conversion, Pet.
Umali’s contention, that its effect on the province is not only direct but also adverse,
deserves merit. His claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes imposed in
Cabanatuan City is well-founded based on Sec. 151.
To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs. 452(a) and 461(a) of
the LGC is in order. A component city’s conversion into an HUC and its resultant
autonomy from the province is a threat to the latter’s economic viability. The ensuing
reduction in income upon separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on the
province’s operations as there would be less funding to finance infrastructure projects
and to defray overhead costs.
B. Impact on Political Rights
Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of Nueva Ecija and those
of its residents will also be affected by Cabanatuan’s conversion into an HUC. Notably,
the administrative supervision of the province over the city will effectively be revoked
upon conversion. Secs. 4 and 12, Art. X of the PC read:
Sec. 4. The Pres. of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities
and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be
independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose
charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for
elective provincial officials.
Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to Cabanatuan City if
it is converted into an HUC. This includes the right to be outside the general supervision
of the province and be under the direct supervision of the Pres.. An HUC is not subject
to provincial oversight because the complex and varied problems in an HUC due to a
bigger population and greater economic activity require greater autonomy. Likewise, the
registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for and be voted upon as
provincial officials.In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the
province of Nueva Ecija, the city will be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the
province.

The entire province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Thus, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija
should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.
NOTES [rules]:
Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 PC (invoked in Tan). No province, city, municipality or barrio
may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC, and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Sec. 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.
(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office, and within the latest
annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (₱50,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as highly
urbanized cities.
Sec. 461. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Dept.
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
SUPERVISION OVER, AND DISCIPLINE OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
1. MIRANDA V. SB
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City,
Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998
for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently, Vice Mayor
Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman alleging that
Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of authority or official functions for
insisting to perform the functions of a mayor despite the preventive suspension order by
the Ombudsman.
Mayor Miranda asserted that reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in good
faith. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he received a memorandum
from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to reassume the position.
Notably, Mayor Miranda’s counter-affidavit also stated that he left the mayoralty post
after coercion by the Philippine National Police. He also contends that under Sec. 63 (b)
of the LGC, local elective officials could not be preventively suspended for a period
beyond 60 days.
On 28 Nov 2001, the prosecution filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to suspend
Miranda based on Sec. 13 of RA 3019. Miranda opposed the motion on the ground that
the offense of usurpation of authority or official functions under Art. 177 of RPC is not
embraced by the former provision which only contemplates offenses which involve fraud
upon public funds or property.
Issue: WON Sandiganbayan committed GAD when it preventively suspended him for
90 days.
Held: NO.
First, Sec. 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.—Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act
or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as
a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled
to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been
separated from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be
liable to restitute the same to the Government.
Sec. 13 covers 2 types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the government;
and (2) any offense involving public funds or property. Contrary to the submission of the
Miranda, nothing in R.A. No. 3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit Sec. 13 only to
acts involving fraud on public funds or property. The phrase is clear and categorical.
Second, Sandiganbayan did not committed GAD when it ruled that Miranda’s act fell
within the catch-all provision “x x x or for any offense involving fraud upon
government.” Fraud is defined as “an instances of an act of trickery or deceit especially
when involving misrepresentation: act of deluding”. Thus, the subject phrase means “any
instance or act of trickery or deceit against the government”. It is not restrictively
equivalent to malversation of funds which is covered by the 2 nd type of offense.
The dissent opines that fraud upon government is not necessarily an essential element of
the crime of usurpation of authority. However, the majority decision affirmed the
Sandiganbayan’s decision which state that Miranda committed fraud when he:
· Indirectly dealt with the city’s funds as persons he appointed will be given
their respective salaries, benefits and other monetary consideration which will
be paid wholly or mainly out of the city’s funds;
· Performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor, i.e.[,] approval of
vouchers, and payment of other expenses which is subject to proof, he indirectly
dealt with the funds of the city; and
· Performed functions as Mayor which caused chaos/confusion albeit
temporary as employees would not know whom to follow.
Third, Court does not believe that he was in good faith as his own affidavit states that he
refused to leave his position despite the memo of Sanchez and left only a few days after
receipt thereof due to the coercion of the PNP. This contradicts his position that he
immediately complied with the memo. Moreover, they should have assailed the validity
of suspension instead of taking the law into their own hands.
Fourth, it should be stressed that Pet. was suspended by the Sandiganbayan. Under Sec. 13 of
R.A. No. 3019, this suspension is mandatory if the information is sufficient. the Pet. has
by his acts acquiesced to the validity and sufficiency of the Amended Information as he
did not file a motion to quash the Info or a motion for bill of particulars before
pleading.[1]
Assuming that the objection to the sufficiency of the Info was timely raised, Miranda was
still NOT deprived of his Constitutional right to be appraised of the nature & cause of
accusation, as argued by the dissenting opinion. The test is whether the crime is described
in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable
certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d’etre of the rule is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. Applying such, it cannot be said that the Amended
Information failed to properly apprise the Pet. of the charge against him. The information
charged the Pet. with assuming the duties and performing acts pertaining to the office of
Mayor willfully, unlawfully and knowingly under the pretense of official position.
Moreover, it states some of the specific acts which constitute usurpation of official
functions.
Fifth, the issue before this Court is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse
of discretion in suspending the Pet. for 90 days. The validity of the Ombudsman’s order
of preventive suspension of the Pet. for 6 months is not the one assailed in the case at
bar.
Sec. 63[2] of the LGC was only meant as a cap in the discretionary power of the Pres.,
governor and mayor to impose excessively long preventive suspensions. The
Ombudsman is not mentioned in the said provision was not meant to be governed
thereby. The Pres., governor and mayor are political personages. As such, the possibility
of extraneous factors influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not
remote. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not subject to political pressure given
the independence of the office which is protected by no less than the PC.
The difference between suspensions by the Ombudsman and the Pres., governor and
mayor under the LGC are clear. The two provisions govern differently.
- In order to justify the preventive suspension by the Ombudsman, (1) the
evidence of guilt should be strong, and (2) that any of the following
circumstances are present: (a) the charge against the officer or employee should
involve dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) that the charges should warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the Resp.'s continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed
against him.
- On the other hand, the LGC requirements for suspension (at any time after the
issues are joined), are that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the Resp.
has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is
strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office
of the Resp. could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.
Citing Garcia v. Mojica: “Resp.s may be correct in pointing out the reason for the shorter
period of preventive suspension imposable under the LGC. Political color could taint the
exercise of the power to suspend local officials by the mayor, governor, or Pres.’s office.
In contrast the Ombudsman, considering the Constitutional origin of his Office, always
ought to be insulated from the vagaries of politics, as Resp.s would have us believe. x x x
It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month preventive suspension under the
Ombudsman Law is “much too repugnant” to the 60­day period that may be imposed
under the LGC. But per J. Vitug, “the two provisions govern differently.”
There is no reason to reverse this ruling. The Court’s above ruling is in accord with the
intent of the law. It bears emphasis that Senator Pimentel explained during the Senate
deliberations that the purpose of Sec. 63 of the Code is to prevent the abuse of the power of
preventive suspension by members of the executive branch,
Verily, Sec. 63 of the LGC does not govern preventive suspensions imposed by the
Ombudsman, which is a Constitutionally created office and independent from the
Executive branch of government. The Ombudsman’s power of preventive suspension is
governed by RA No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), particularly Sec. 24.
In addition to the differences between the 6-month limit for the Ombudsman and the
60-day limit for the executive officials is that the PC has endowed the Ombudsman with
unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political pressure. Among these statutory
protections are fiscal autonomy, fixed term of office and classification as an impeachable
officer.
2. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAM NORTE V. GONZALES
Doctrine: no vested right to public office, nor is public service a property right.
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines
Norte by then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a
permanent capacity. An administrative case was filed against her for gross
insubordination, this was later on captioned as Administrative Case No. 001. After
Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found her guilty
of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel that she be held
administratively liable. On September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc
Investigation Committees recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.
On appeal, the CSCmodified Governor Pimentels decision finding Gonzales guilty of
insubordination and suspending her for six months. This decision was appealed by
Governor Pimentel, which the CSC denied.
The CSC then issued Resolution No. 002245,which directed Gonzales reinstatement.
Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000,
but terminated her services the next day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a letter to
the CSC reporting his compliance with its order, and Gonzales subsequent dismissal as a
confidential employee.
The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008,which again directed Gonzales
reinstatement as provincial administrator. It clarified that while the Local Government
Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA 7160) made the provincial administrator position
coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to prejudice
officials who were already issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the
new laws effectivity. According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a vested right to her
permanent appointment as provincial administrator and is entitled to continue holding
this office despite its subsequent classification as a coterminous position.
Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines Nortes
incumbent governor, refused to reinstate her. The CSC responded with Resolution No.
061988,which ordered Gonzales reinstatement to the provincial administrator position,
or to an equivalent position. Thus, the petitioner, through Governor Typoco, filed a
petition for review before the CA, seeking to nullify the CSCs Resolution No. 030008 and
Resolution No. 061988.
The CA supported the CSCs ruling. Petitioner sought for reconsideration but the same
was denied. Hence, this petition before the SC. In its present petition for review on
certiorari, the petitioner argues that the provincial administrator position has been
converted into a highly confidential, coterminous position by RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales
no longer enjoyed security of tenure to the position she held prior to RA 7160s enactment.
ISSUE: WON Gonzales should be reinstated as the provincial administrator or to an
equivalent position
HELD: No. CA decision reversed
Political Law- Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a
primarily confidential, non-career position
Congress reclassification of the provincial administrator position in RA 7160 is a valid
exercise of legislative power that does not violate Gonzales security of tenure.
Having established that Congress has changed the nature of the provincial administrator
position to a primarily confidential employee, the next question to address would be its
impact on Gonzales security of tenure. According to the petitioner, Gonzales lost her
security of tenure when the provincial administrator position became a primarily
confidential position. Gonzales, on the other hand, retorted that the conversion of the
position should not be retroactively applied to her, as she is a permanent appointee.
Both the CA and the CSC ruled in favor of the latter, and gave premium to Gonzales
original permanent appointment under the old LGC. They posit that Gonzales acquired
a vested legal right over her position from the moment she assumed her duties as
provincial administrator. Thus, she cannot be removed from office except for cause and
after due hearing; otherwise such removal would amount to a violation of her security of
tenure.
The arguments presented by the parties and ruled upon by the CA reflect a conceptual
entanglement between the nature of the position and an employees right to hold a
position. These two concepts are different. The nature of a position may change by law
according to the dictates of Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is
a right that enjoys Constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may itself change according
to the nature of the position.
In the current case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the provincial
administrator position but significantly modified many of its aspects. It is now a primarily
confidential position under the non-career service tranche of the civil service. This change
could not have been aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she was not the only provincial
administrator incumbent at the time RA 7160 was enacted. Rather, this change was part
of the reform measures that RA 7160 introduced to further empower local governments
and decentralize the delivery of public service.
Thus, Gonzales permanent appointment as provincial administrator prior to the
enactment of RA 7160 is immaterial to her removal as provincial administrator. For
purposes of determining whether Gonzales termination violated her right to security of
tenure, the nature of the position she occupied at the time of her removal should be
considered, and not merely the nature of her appointment at the time she entered
government service.
In echoing the CSC and the CAs conclusion, the dissenting opinion posits the view that
security of tenure protects the permanent appointment of a public officer, despite
subsequent changes in the nature of his position.
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall
not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process.
It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of
the office held. In other words, the CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled
that the petitioner violated Gonzales right to security of tenure when she was removed
without sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation had since then been
changed.
In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated
under the law prevailing at the time of the termination of her service; i.e., she was then
already occupying a position that was primarily confidential and had to be dismissed
because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the appointing authority. Thus,
Gonzales termination for lack of confidence was lawful. Thus, Gonzales termination for
lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as provincial
administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable position. This conclusion,
however, is without prejudice to Gonzales entitlement to retirement benefits, leave
credits, and future employment in government service.
PETITION GRANTED.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
1. LA CARLOTA V. ROJO
- On March 17, 2004, Atty. Rex Rojo resigned as member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental.
- The next day, he was appointed as Sangguniang Panlungsod Sec. by then-Vice-Mayor
Rex Jalandoon. The day after that, Vice-Mayor Jalandoon submitted Rojo’s position
papers to the Civil Service Commission Negros Occidental Field Office (CSCFO)
for attestation.
- CSCFO: Considered the appointment permanently recalled.
- Basis: The Chairman of the Personnel Selection Board and the Human Resource
Management Officer did not sign the certifications, the latter relative to the
completeness of the documents and to the publication requirement.
- Vice-Mayor Jalandoon appealed to the CSC Regional Office.
- Argument: The Human Resource Management Officer refused to affix his signature
on Rojo’s appointment documents but nonetheless transmitted them to the CSCFO.
Such transmittal should be construed that the appointment was complete and regular
and that it complied with the requirements of a valid appointment.
- The City of La Carlota (represented by the newly-elected mayor Jeffrey Ferrer) and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod (represented by the newly-elected vice-mayor Demie
Honrado) intervened.
Arguments
- Jalandoon is not the real party in interest in the appeal; rather, it is Atty. Rojo, who,
by his inaction, should be considered to have waived his right to appeal.
o The appointment was made during the election
ban (March 26 to May 9, 2004).
o The resignation of Rojo as member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod is ineffective, having
not complied with the provision on quorum
under Sec. 82(d) of R.A. No. 7160.
CSC Regional Office: Reversed the CSCFO.
Basis:
1. Jurisprudence provides that the disapproval of an appointment affects
the discretionary authority of the appointing authority; hence, he alone may
appeal the disapproval of an appointment.
2. The appointment was made on March 18, 2004, which was outside the
election ban period.
3. Atty. Rojo’s resignation from the Sangguniang Panlungsod was valid.
It was tendered with the majority of the council members in attendance (7 out
of the 13 councilors were present). Since the appointment of Rojo sufficiently
complied with the publication requirement, deliberation by the Personnel
Selection Board, certification that it was issued in accordance with the
limitations provided for under Sec. 325 of R.A. 7160, and that
appropriations/funds are available for said position, the regional office
approved the appointment.
• Mayor Ferrer and Vice-Mayor Honrado appealed to the CSC, and
subsequently to the CA.
o Argument: Vice-Mayor Jalandoon, as presiding officer of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the resignation, should not be counted
in determining WON a quorum exists. Excluding him, there were only 6 out of
the 12 members who were present. Since the required majority of 7 was not
reached to constitute a quorum, then no business, including the acceptance of
Atty. Rojo’s resignation, could have validly been transacted on that day.
CSC: Affirmed the CSC Regional Office.
CA: Affirmed the CSC Regional Office.
ISSUE: WON there was a quorum when Atty. Rojo had resigned as member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod?
HELD: Yes, there was a quorum.
1. LGC, Sec. 457: The sangguniang panlungsod xxx shall be composed of the city
vice-mayor as presiding officer xxx.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “composed of” as “formed of” or “consisting of.” The
vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is therefore a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
2. Senate deliberations on the LGC also show the intent to treat the vice-mayor as
a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In these deliberations, Senator Gonzales
observed that the provincial governor, the city mayor, the municipal mayor, and the
punong barangay are no longer members of their respective sanggunian. The Supreme
Court holds that, in the same way, the vice-governor, the city vice-mayor, and the
municipal vice-mayor, as presiding officers of their respective sanggunian, are members
thereof.
3. Zamora v. Gov. Caballero (2004): The entire membership must be taken into
account in computing the quorum of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. xxx Legislation,
which is the principal function and duty of the sanggunian, requires the participation of
all its members so that they may not only represent the interests of their respective
constituents but also help in the making of decisions by voting upon every question put
upon the body. The acts of only a part of the sanggunian done outside the parameters of
the legal provisions aforementioned are legally infirm, highly questionable, and are, more
importantly, null and void.
DILG Opinion No. 46, s. 2007 (which conformed to Zamora v. Gov. Caballero): The
vice-mayor is included in the determination of a quorum in the sanggunian.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied; CSC Regional Office decision affirmed.

Notes:
- J. del Castillo, in his dissenting opinion, cited Perez v. Hon. Dela Cruz, wherein
it was held that a city vice-mayor who serves as presiding officer of the local legislative
board cannot be considered a member thereof. This case, however, was decided even
before the enactment of the old LGC in 1983. Therefore, this case, compared to the more
recent case of Zamora v. Gov. Caballero, is inapplicable to the present case.
2. VICENCIO V. VILLAR
- The City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon presided by
Hon. Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and approved City Ordinance
No. 15-2003 entitled “An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice-
Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into Contract for
Consultancy Services for Consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to
Function in their Respective Areas of Concern”
- Arnold Vicencio was elected City-Vice Mayor of Malabon in 2004. By virtue of
this office, he also became the Presiding Officer of the SPM and at the same
time, the head of the Sanggunian Secretariat.
- Vicencio, representing the CIty Government of Malabon City, entered into
Contracts for Consultancy Services.
- After the signing of their respective contracts, the 3 consultants rendered
consultancy services to the SPM. Thereafter, the 3 consultants were
correspondingly paid for their services pursuant to the contracts therefor.
- However, an Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) was issued disallowing
the amount for being an improper disbursement.
- Aggrieved by the disallowance, Vicencio appealed it the Adjudication and
Settlement Board of the COA, which subsequently denied it.
ISSUE: WON COA committed serious errors or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it affirmed ASB’s decision relative to the
disallowance of disbursement concerning the services rendered by hired consultants for
the SPM
ALT: WON the mayor was allowed to enter into such contracts
5 (1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlungsod and sign all warrants drawn on the city treasury
for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlungsod;
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of the sangguniang
panlungsod, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in this Code;
(3) Assume the office of the city mayor for the unexpired term of the latter in the event of permanent vacancy
as provided for in Sec. 44, Book I of this Code;
HELD: NO, under the LGC, the ff are the powers and duties of a city Vice Mayor: (See
Sec. 456. LCG)5
- Under this provision, there no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-
mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that
provided for the city mayor.
- Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the
city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it.
- Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter
into contracts for consultancy services.
- As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-
Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a "continuing authority"
for any person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into
subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.
- Ordinance No. 15-2003 is clear and precise and leaves no room for
interpretation.
- It only authorized the then City Vice-Mayor to enter into consultancy
contracts in the specific areas of concern.
- Further, the appropriations for this particular item were limited to the
savings for the period June to December 2003. This was an additional
limitation to the power granted to Vice-Mayor Yambao to contract on
behalf of the city. The fact that any later consultancy contract would
necessarily require further appropriations from the city council
strengthens the contention that the power granted under Ordinance
No. 15-2003 was limited in scope.
- Hence, Pet. was without authority to enter into the 2005
Consultancy Contracts.
- Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
- Thus, the ordinance should be applied according to its express terms,
and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to
an injustice.
(4) Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the city mayor in cases of temporary vacancy
as provided for in Sec. 46, Book I of this Code; andcralawlibrary
(5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance.
 - In the instant case, there is no reason to depart from this rule,
since the subject ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or
unjust.
- Sec. 103 of P.O. 1445 declares that expenditures of government funds or uses
of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal
liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.
- The public official's personal liability arises only if the expenditure of
government funds was made in violation of law.
- In this case, Pet.'s act of entering into a contract on behalf of the local
government unit without the requisite authority therefor was in
violation of the LGC.
- While Pet. may have relied on the opinion of the City Legal Officer,
such reliance only serves to buttress his good faith. It does not,
however, exculpate him from his personal liability under P.D. 1445.
- In sum, the COA's assailed Decision was made in faithful compliance with its
mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it
by the PC.
- The COA was merely fulfilling its mandate in observing the policy that
government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved; and
that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such
funds and property should be prevented.
- Thus, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to the COA.
TERM LIMITS AND RECALL
1. LACEDA V. LIMENA
Pet. Roberto Laceda, Sr., and private Resp. Randy L. Limena were candidates for Punong
Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, West District, Sorsogon City, during the October 29,
2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On October 23, 2007, Limena filed
a petition for disqualification and/or declaration as an ineligible candidate5 against Laceda
before the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had already served as Punong Barangay
for Brgy. Panlayaan for 3 consecutive terms since 1994, and was thus prohibited from
running for the fourth time under Sec. 2 of RA No. 9164 which provides:
SEC. 2. Term of Office. - The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan
officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be 3 (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3 (3) consecutive terms in the same
position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994
barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected.
Limena likewise attached the following certification from the Dept. of the Interior and
Local Government:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that per records in this office HON. ROBERTO LACEDA, SR.,
incumbent Punong Barangay of Panlayaan, West District, Sorsogon City. 'was elected as
Punong Barangay during the May 9, 1994, May 12, 1997 and July 15, 2002 Barangay
Elections. He resigned from office on March 20, 1995 to run as Municipal Councilor.
Hence, he is covered by the 3-term rule of paragraph 2, Sec. 2 of RA 9164 which provides
that: "No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3 (3) consecutive terms in
the same position: Provided, however, that the term of office shall be reckoned from the
1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office [for] any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official was elected."
xxx
In his Answer, Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for 3
consecutive terms. However, he asserted that when he was elected for his first two terms,
Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that when he served his third term, the Municipality
of Sorsogon had already been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to form a new
political unit, the City of Sorsogon, pursuant to RA No. 8806. Thus, he argued that his
third term was actually just his first in the new political unit and that he was accordingly
entitled to run for two more terms.
Laceda likewise argued that assuming he had already served 3 consecutive terms, Rep. Act
No. 9164 which imposes the 3-term limit, cannot be made to apply to him as it would
violate his vested right to office. He alleged that when he was elected in 1994 the
prohibition did not exist. Had he known that there will be a law preventing him to run
for the fourth time, he would not have run for office in 1994 as he was looking forward
to the election in 2007.
On January 15, 2008, the COMELEC declared Laceda disqualified and cancelled his CoC.
Laceda moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC in a
Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved, Laceda filed a petition for certiorari before this
Court.
On June 10, 2008, this Court dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently show that
any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC in rendering the assailed
Resolutions of January 15, 2008 and May 7, 2008. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
Laceda insists that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its
decision on the requisites enunciated in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections for the
application of the 3-term prohibition in Sec. 43 of the LGC. Laceda argues that said case
is inapplicable since it involved the position of municipal mayor while the instant case
concerned the position of Punong Barangay. He likewise insists that he served his third
term in a new political unit and therefore he should not be deemed already to have served
a third term as Punong Barangay for purposes of applying the 3-term limit.
Issue: WON COMELEC not commit any abuse of discretion when it declared him
disqualified and cancelled his CoC.
Ruling:
Laceda insists that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its
decision on the requisites enunciated in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections12 for the
application of the 3-term prohibition in Sec. 4313 of the LGC.14 Laceda argues that said
case is inapplicable since it involved the position of municipal mayor while the instant
case concerned the position of Punong Barangay. He likewise insists that he served his
third term in a new political unit and therefore he should not be deemed already to have
served a third term as Punong Barangay for purposes of applying the 3-term limit.
For reasons hereafter discussed, the motion for reconsideration cannot prosper.
Sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, like Sec. 43 of the LGC from which it was taken, is primarily
intended to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office,
and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for
the same office after a term of nine years. This Court has held that for the prohibition to
apply, two requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for 3
consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he or she has fully
served 3 consecutive terms.
In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of Sorsogon
and Bacon were merged and converted into a city thereby abolishing the former and
creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said that for the purpose of
applying the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay
of Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City, is the
same as before the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are the
same. They are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay
for 3 consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held power and authority as their Punong
Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda's term.
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections, which involved a similar question, this Court held
that where a person has been elected for 3 consecutive terms as a municipal mayor and
prior to the end or termination of such 3-year term the municipality has been converted
by law into a city, without the city charter interrupting his term until the end of the 3-year
term, the prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the fourth time as city
mayor thereof, there being no break in the continuity of the terms.
Thus, conformably with the democratic intent of Rep. Act No. 9164 and this Court's
ruling in Latasa v. Commission on Elections, we hold that the prohibition in Sec. 2 of
said statute applies to Laceda. The COMELEC did not err nor commit any abuse of
discretion when it declared him disqualified and cancelled his CoC.
2. RIVERAL III V. COMELEC
- May 2004: Marino Morales ran as a candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga.
- January 10, 2004: Atty. Rivera and Normandick De Guzman filed a petition to cancel
the COC of Morales on the ground that he was elected and had served 3 previous
consecutive terms as Mayor of Mabalacat which is a violation of Sec. 8, Article X of
the PC and Sec. 43(b) of the LGC.
- Morales admitted his election as mayor of Mabalacat for 3 terms but the second term
was only as a “caretaker of the office” because he was not validly elected it being
pronounced as void and that he was suspended by the Ombudsman for an anti-graft
case.
- May 6, 2004: COMELEC rendered a resolution disqualifying Morales to run for the
position of mayor and his COC was then canceled.
- March 14, 2005: His motion for reconsideration was granted.
- After the proclamation of Morales as the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat, Anthony
Dee, who was also a candidate for Mayor, filed with the RTC a petition for quo
warranto against Morales alleging that he is now ineligible to run for the fourth time
for having served as mayor for 3 consecutive terms. Same answers were raised by
Morales.
- November 22, 2004: RTC dismissed the petition of Dee on the ground that Morales
did not serve the 3-term limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat,
but Dee in the May 1998 elections.
- Dee appealed to the COMELEC but was dismissed.
- The motion for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE/S: WON Morales has already served for 3 consecutive terms. – YES.
HELD:
For the 3-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur,to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for 3 (3) consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served 3 (3) consecutive terms.
Here, Resp. Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed
the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by Pet. Dee
ousting him (Resp.) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance
does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Sec. 8, Article X of the PC can not be more clear and explicit –
The term of the office of elected local officials x x x, shall be 3 years and no such official
shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. x x x
Upon the other hand, Sec. 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the LGC) clearly provides:
No local official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. x x
x
Resp. Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat
continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007,
he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.
The framers of the PC, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards
against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms.
Having found Resp. Morales ineligible, his CoC dated December 30, 2003 should be
cancelled.
As a consequence of Pet.’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Sec. 44 of the
LGC, to wit:
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and
Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor,
the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x
x
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591 is GRANTED. Resp. Morales’ CoC
dated December 30, 2003 is cancelled. In view of the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor
in Mabalacat, Pampanga, the vice-mayor elect of the said municipality in the May 10, 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections is hereby declared mayor and shall serve as
such for the remaining duration of the term July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. The petition in
G.R. No. 170577 is DISMISSED for being moot.
3. DIZON V. COMELEC
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the
COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the
ground that the latter was elected and had fully served 3 previous consecutive terms in
violation of Sec. 43 of the LGC. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995,
1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his CoC
on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor
of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He
averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Anthony
D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections. Thus, he was not
elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should be reckoned from
2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took
judicial notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was
held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001
(notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then proclamation
of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the 3--term limit
under Sec. 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004
elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run
again for the same position in 2007 elections.
Issues:
1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004--2007 term (although he was ousted
from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term
2. WON the 2007--2010 term of Morales is his 5th term
Held:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during
his fourth term. We cancelled his CoC dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation
disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for
Morales were considered stray votes.
Both Article X, Sec. 8 of the PC and Sec. 43(b) of the LGC state that the term of office
of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be 3 years, and no such official
shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the
disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms
in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served 3 consecutive terms.
In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four
consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We disqualified
Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the 3-term limit.
Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001
term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales’ service with respect
to the 1998-2001 term because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4 July
2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with
respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective
immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The
vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may
seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold
office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term)
2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO. Morales
occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:
1995-1998
1998-2001
2001-2004
2004-2007.
However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the
2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full
term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of
the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted as a term for
purposes of computing the 3-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June
2007 served as a gap for purposes of the 3-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007
to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the 3-term limit
rule
MONTEBON v COMELEC 2008
Facts:
1. Montebon, Ondoy, and Potencioso were candidates for Municipal Mayor of Tuburan,
Cebu in the May 2007 elections.
2. Pets. and other candidates for Municipal Mayor filed a Petition for Disqualification
against Potencioso alleging that the latter had been elected and had served 3 consecutive
terms as Municipal Mayor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is
proscribed from running in the 2007 elections, as it would be his 4th term.
3. Potencioso admitted he was elected for 3 consecutive terms but claimed that the service
of his 2nd term was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice-mayor of
Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice-Mayor Mendoza. He therefore is not disqualified
to run, the interruption not being voluntary.
4. Pet.: It is a voluntary renunciation therefor enot considered an interruption.
5. COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc both ruled in favor of
Potencioso. It was an involuntary interruption, therefore not disqualified.
Important provisions:
1. Sec.8, Article X, 1987 PC:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law shall be 3 years and no such officials shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
2. LGC
Sec. 43. Term of Office
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
Pet.: Voluntary renunciation therefore not considered interruption.
Resp.: Involuntary therefore an interruption.
Issue: WON Potencioso’s succession as Vice-Mayor can be considered a voluntary
renunciation of office which cannot be considered an interruption therefore making him
disqualified to run in the 2007 elections?
Held: No.
SC:
1. Lonzanida vs. COMELEC: 2 conditions must concur to be disqualified:
i. Official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same local
government post.
ii. He has fully served 3 consecutive terms.
2. Borja Jr. vs. COMELEC: Term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for the
disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected 3 consecutive
times; he must also have served 3 consecutive terms in the same position.
3. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Under Sec. 44 LGC, if a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest-ranking Sanggunian
Member shall become Vice Mayor. There is no way could it be considered voluntary
renunciation. The legal successor is not given any option under the law to accept or not.
4. SC quoting COMELEC ruling: Succession by law to a vacated government
office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a
public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes
said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty
and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is therefore more
compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.
5. BOLOS, JR. V. COMELEC
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be 3 years, and no such official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
1. For 3 consecutive terms, Pet. was elected to the position of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in 1994, 1997 and 2002.
2. In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking,
Pet. ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as
Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He served the
full term of the Sangguniang Bayan position, which was until June 30, 2007.
3. Thereafter, Pet. filed his CoC for Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol
in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
4. Resp. Rey Angeles Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and candidate for
the same office, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Pet. as
candidate on the ground that he had already served the 3-term limit. Hence, Pet. is no
longer allowed to run for the same position.
5. Cinconiegue contended that Pet.’s relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay
in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal
decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections.
He added that Pet. knew that if he won and assumed the position, there would be a
voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.
6. In his Answer, Pet. admitted that he was elected as Punong Barangay of Barangay
Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the last 3 consecutive elections of 1994, 1997 and 2002. By reason
of his assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member, his remaining term of office as
Punong Barangay, which would have ended in 2007, was left unserved. He argued that his
election and assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member was by operation of law;
hence, it must be considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last
term of service.
7. In 2008, COMELEC First Div. disqualified Bolos, stating that his assumption of
office as Municipal Councilor in 2004 was a voluntary renunciation of the Office of
Punong Barangay.
ISSUES & RATIO.
WON Bolos’ assumption of office as Municipal Councilor was a voluntary renunciation of the office of
the Punong Barangay—YES
The 3-term limit for elective local officials is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the PC,
which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be 3 years, and no such official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
Socrates v. Commission on Elections8 held that the rule on the 3-term limit, embodied
in the PC and the LGC, has two parts:
x x x The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining
the 3-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that
involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service
and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to
form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After 3 consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for
a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third consecutive term. 9
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections,10 the Court stated that the second part of the
rule on the 3-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the PC to bar any attempt
to circumvent the 3-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term. The Court
held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that
the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same government
post; and (2) that he has fully served 3 consecutive terms.11
In this case, it is undisputed that Pet. was elected as Punong Barangay for 3 consecutive
terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification.
What is to be determined is whether Pet. is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his
position as Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as Sangguniang
Bayan member and assumed said office.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was voluntary renunciation by Pet. of
his position as Punong Barangay.
As conceded even by him, Resp. (Pet. herein) had already completed two consecutive
terms of office when he ran for a third term in the Barangay Elections of 2002. When he
filed his CoC for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan of Dauis, Bohol, in the May 10, 2004
[elections], he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of
his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post
as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely that
Resp. had filed his CoC for the Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the
municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after being elected and proclaimed,
return to his former position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor would
entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it.
Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary..
Petition DENIED.
6. ALDOVINO, JR. V. COMELEC
1. Resp. Asilo was an elected council for Lucena City for 3 consecutive terms (1998-
2001, 2001-2004, 2004-2007)
2. During his 2004-2007 term of the office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended
him for 90 days in relation to a criminal case he then faced
3. SC subsequently lifted such suspension, thus he resumed performing the functions
of his office and finished his term.
4. In 2007, Asilo filed his CoC for the same position.
5. Pets. sought to deny due court Asilo’s CoC or to cancel it on the ground that he had
been elected and served for 3 terms. Hence, violating the 3 term limit rule.
6. COMELEC 2nddivision: favor Asilo.
a. It reasoned out that the 3-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to
render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension
the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
b. Preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the
suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full
term, thus the term should not be counted for the purpose of the 3 term
limit rule
Issue: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his
term of office for purposes of the 3 term limit rule?
Held:
Preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of an elective public official, has
been mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on Elections. Doctrinally,
however, Borja is not a controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but
with the application of the 3-term rule on the term that an elective official acquired by
succession
3 term limit rule
a. In relation to the PC provision Article X Sec. 8
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
Sec 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the PC provision.
As worded, the Constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits
an elective officials stay in office to no more than 3 consecutive terms. This is the first
branch of the rule embodied in Sec. 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a
term as a period of time 3 years during which an official has title to office and can serve.
As mentioned in the case of Appari vs. CA, term in a legal sense means a fixed and definite
period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office
The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative no such
official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. The limitation refers to the term
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office.
Basically, it is the voluntary renunciation of the office that is not considered as an
interruption.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect continuity of
service for a full term for purposes of the 3-term limit rule.
The word renunciation carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is
to give up, abandon, decline, or resign. renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of
the Constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the term, i.e.,
the loss of title to office. It is a loss of title to office by conscious choice
Based on the Constitutional deliberations, the framers intent apparently was to close all gaps
that an elective official may seize to defeat the 3-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary
renunciation has been rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the 3-term limit rule
This examination of the wording of the Constitutional provision and of the circumstances
surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to make term limitation a
high priority Constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which
cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal Constitutional worth.
We view preventive suspension vis--vis term limitation with this firm mindset.
b. Interruption
The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the 3-term limit rule is one
that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have
involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective
interruption to occur.
This has to be the case if the thrust of Sec. 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be
faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than
3 consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example and standard of what
does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term.
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a
term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break
from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from
exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right
to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The
latter occurs during an office holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot
exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term failure to serve
cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve,
then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Sec. 8, Article X both by structure
and substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in office to 3
consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary
renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read in the
context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise
of the powers of the elective position. The voluntary renunciation it speaks of refers only to
the elective officials voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It
does not speak of the temporary cessation of the exercise of power or authority that may
occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of them
c. In relation to the nature of preventive suspension
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled
conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the
individual office holder.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective
officials service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive
suspension involves protection of the service and of the people being served, and
prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term
limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has served his 3 terms
in office without any break. Preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render
service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there
has been a break in the term.
d. Preventive suspension and intent of 3 term limit rule
Strict adherence to the intent of the 3-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office
beyond 3 terms. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a
permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
e. Preventive suspension and voluntary renunciation
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a
voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he
may have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him.
From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness
that voluntary renunciation embodies
Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary
Cabusao
renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of
service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, 2nd Naga City, Pili, Ocampo, Libmanan, Minalabac,
different and non-comparable Camaligan, Canaman, Pamplona, Pasacao, San
Magarao, Bombon, Fernando, Gainza, Milaor
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render Calabanga, Gainza,
service, is disallowed by the PC as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not Milaor
allowed as a mode of circumventing the 3-term limit rule.
3rd Caramoan, Garchitorena, Naga City, Pili, Ocampo,
Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion, Camaligan, Canaman,
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon, Magarao, Bombon,
and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the 3-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, Tinambac, Siruma Calabanga
however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term.
Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary 4th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Caramoan, Garchitorena,
renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua Goa, Lagonoy,
Presentacion, Sangay, San
time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed
Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac,
soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing Siruma
preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention
more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the PC expressly disallows as an 5th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Bato,
interruption. Buhi, Bula, Nabua
● Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District
f. Conclusion to form the present Third District.
● In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members
Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive
of the Sanggunian, Third District and served until 2013.
suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials term.
● In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member
of the Sanggunian, Third District.
7. NAVAL V. COMELEC ● Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of
Camarines Sur for 3 consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian,
● From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served irrespective of the district he had been elected from.
as a member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. ● Naval alleges that the First, Second and Third Legislative Districts of
● October 12, 2009: RA 9716 was enacted, reapportioning the legislative districts Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of new sets
in Camarines Sur in the following manner: of municipalities. With the separation of Gainza and Milaor from the
other eight towns which used to... comprise the Second District, the
District Pre- RA 9716 Post-RA 9716 voters from the Third Legislative District are no longer the same ones
as those who had elected him to office in the 2004 and 2007 elections.

1st Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, San
Fernando, Del Gallego,
Ragay, Lupi, Sipocot,
Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi, ISSUE: WON the reapportionment of the districts led to the refreshing of Naval’s 3-term
Sipocot, Cabusao
limit as member of the Sangguinan.
HELD:
 ● Reapportionment is "the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the Constitutional requirement
of equality of representation."
● R.A. No. 9716 indicates the intent of the lawmakers to create a single new
Second District from the merger of the towns from the old First District with
Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 9716
used the word "rename."
○ Although the qualifier "without a change in its composition" was not
found in Sec. 3(c), unlike in Sec.s 3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive is
the clear intent to create a sole new district in that of the Second, while
merely renaming the rest.
● Thus, a complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion other
than that the lawmakers intended the old Second District to be merely renamed
as the current Third District.
○ While Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are
elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which
elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one which
brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.
● Therefore, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for
by Naval.
● Further, sustaining Naval's arguments would... practically allow him to hold the
same office for 15 years. These are the circumstances the PC explicitly intends
to avert.
● Certainly, the Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public,
the real sovereign, so to speak. However, let all the candidates for public office
be reminded that as citizens, we have a commitment to be bound by our PC and
laws. Side by side our privileges as citizens are restrictions too.
8. ARATEA V. COMELEC
- Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were
candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 elections.
- Lonzanida filed his COC on Dec 1 2009, and on Dec 8, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo
(Rodolfo) filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida or cancel his COC under Sec. 78
of the Omnibus Election Code on the ground that Lonzanida was elected and had
served as mayor for 4 consecutive terms prior to the term for the May 2012 elections.
- Rodolfo asserted that there were false material representation in Lonzanida’s COC
when he certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election.
- Sec. 8, Article X of the 1987 PC and Sec. 43(b) of the LGC both prohibit a local
elective official from being elected and serving for more than 3 consecutive terms
for the same position.
- COMELEC 2nd Div: cancelled Lonzanida’s COC. An M/R was filed before the
COMELEC En Banc and the same remained pending during the May 2010
elections, where Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of votes for
Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
- Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before RTC Judge Viray and wrote
the DILG for an opinion on whether as Vice Mayor, he was legallu required to
assime the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification.
- DILG Legal Opinion No. 111, S. 2010 stated that Lonzanida was dq-ed to hold
office by reason of his criminal conviction thus leaving the Office of the Mayor
permanently vacant. Aratea could therefore assume said office in an acting capacity
without prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution on the M/R.
- Aratea again wrote DILG to allow him to take his oath of office as Mayor of San
Antonio, where DILG Sec. Jesse Robredo allowed him to do the same as permanent
Municipal Mayor, without prejudice to the outcome of the pending cases with
COMELEC.
- COMELEC En Banc: issued a resolution dq-ing Lonzanida based on two grounds,
first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than 3
consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted
by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code.
- [AUG 25 2010] Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Attached Petitionin Intervention.15 She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the
COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the
cancellation of his CoC and the striking out of his name from the list of official
candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010
elections.
- [JAN 26 2011] Aratea, in a Comment asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed
the winning candidate because Antipolo only received the 2 nd highest number of
votes.
- COMELEC En Banc: issued an Order. The Resolution was pertaining to how
to fill the vacancy resulting from the disqualification. (CHECK NOTES)
ISSUES & RATIO.
a. WON Antipolo or Aratea is the rightful occupant of the
Office of the Mayor – ANTIPOLO.
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged “second placer,” should be proclaimed Mayor
because Lonzanida’s CoC was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a
candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the
only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor.
b. WON the disqualification of Lonzanida is valid under Sec. 68 –
NO

A petition for disqualification under Sec. 68 clearly refers to “the commission of
prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country.”
All the offenses mentioned in Sec. 68 refer to election offenses under the
Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is
absolutely nothing in the language of Sec. 68 that would justify including violation
of the 3term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification
under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under
Sec. 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia, this Court ruled:
[T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are
criminal and not administrative in nature. x x x
Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the 3term limit rule, or his conviction by
final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal
Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition under Sec. 68.
c. WON there was false material representation in violation of
Sec. 78 - YES
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Sec. 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which
means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the
statement that Sec. 74 requires him to state under oath in his CoC. As this Court
held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer to
“qualifications or eligibility.” One who suffers from perpetual special
disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from
perpetual special disqualification files a CoC stating under oath that “he is eligible to
run for (public) office,” as expressly required under Sec. 74, then he clearly
makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Sec.
78.
d. WON the 3-Term Limit Rule is a ground for
Ineligibility – YES (Latasa, Rivera, & Ong)
Sec. 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he
seeks election. Thus, Sec. 74 states that “the CoC shall state that the person
filing x x x is eligible for said office.” The 3term limit rule, enacted to prevent
the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorate’s freedom of
choice, is found both in the PC and the law. After being elected and serving for 3
consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the
same office in next regular election32 because he is ineligible. One who has an
ineligibility to run for elective public office is not “eligible for [the] office.” As used
in Sec. 74, the word “eligible”33 means having the right to run for elective public
office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for
the public office.
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections, Pet. Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality
of Digos was converted into the City of Digos during Latasa’s third term. Latasa
filed his CoC for city mayor for the 2001 elections. Romeo Sunga, Latasa’s
opponent, filed before the COMELEC a “petition to deny due course, cancel CoC
and/or disqualification” under Sec. 78 on the ground that Latasa falsely represented
in his CoC that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa argued that he
did not make any false representation. In his CoC, Latasa inserted a footnote after
the phrase “I am eligible” and indicated “Having served 3 (3) term[s] as municipal
mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor.” The COMELEC First
Division cancelled Latasa’s CoC for violation of the 3term limit rule but not for false
material representation. This Court affirmed the COMELEC En Banc’s denial of
Latasa’s motion for reconsideration.
We cancelled Marino Morales’ CoC in Rivera III v. Commission on Elections
(Rivera). We held that Morales exceeded the maximum 3term limit, having been
elected and served as Mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms (1995 to 1998,
1998 to 2001, 2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We declared him ineligible as a
candidate for the same position for the 2007 to 2010 term. Although we did not
explicitly rule that Morales’ violation of the 3term limit rule constituted false material
representation, we nonetheless granted the petition to cancel Morales’ CoC under
Sec. 78. We also affirmed the cancellation of Francis Ong’s CoC in Ong v. Alegre,
where the “petition to disqualify, deny due course and cancel” Ong’s CoC under Sec.
78 was predicated on the violation of the 3term limit rule.
1. When possession of a Disqualifying Condition is NOT a
ground for P/for Disqualification – Loong, Fermin, and
Munder
It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in
the grounds for eligibility and ineligibility visavis qualifications and disqualifications.
For example, a candidate may represent that he is a resident of a particular Philippine
locality when he is actually a permanent resident of another country. In cases of such
overlap, the Pet. should not be constrained in his choice of remedy when the Omnibus
Election Code explicitly makes available multiple remedies. Sec. 78 allows the filing of
a petition to deny due course or to cancel a CoC before the election, while Sec. 253
allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the election. Despite the overlap of
the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification using grounds
enumerated in Sec. 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a CoC under
Sec. 78.
The distinction between a petition under Sec. 68 and a petition under Sec. 78 was
discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections with respect to the applicable
prescriptive period. Resp. Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under Sec. 78 to
disqualify Pet. Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional ViceGovernor of the
Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to his age.
The petition was filed 16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25
day period from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that
Ututalum’s petition was one based on false representation under Sec. 78, and not for
disqualification under Sec. 68. Hence, the 25day prescriptive period provided in Sec.
78 should be strictly applied.
In Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the issue of a candidate’s possession of
the required oneyear residency requirement was raised in a petition for
disqualification under Sec. 68 instead of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
CoC under Sec.
78. Despite the question of the oneyear residency being a proper ground under Sec.
78, Dilangalen, the Pet. before the COMELEC in Fermin, relied on Sec. 5(C)(1) and
5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 43 and filed the petition under Sec.
68. In Fermin, we ruled that “a COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary
legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from
those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds.” 44
A petition for disqualification can only be premised on a ground specified in Sec. 12
or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Sec. 40 of the LGCThus, a petition
questioning a candidate’s possession of the required oneyear residency requirement,
as distinguished from permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country,
should be filed under Sec. 78, and a petition under Sec. 68 is the wrong remedy.
In Munder v. Commission on Elections, 45 Pet. Alfais Munder filed a CoC for Mayor of
Bubong, Lanao del Sur on 26 November 2009. Resp. Atty. Tago Sarip filed a petition
for Munder’s disqualification on 13 April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder
misrepresented that he was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he
was eligible to register as a voter in 2003 even though he was not yet 18 years of age
at the time of the voter’s registration. Moreover, Munder’s CoC was not
accomplished in full as he failed to indicate his precinct and did not affix his
thumbmark. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Sarip’s petition and
declared that his grounds are not grounds for disqualification under Sec. 68 but for
denial or cancellation of Munder’s CoC under Sec. 78. Sarip’s petition was filed out
of time as he had only 25 days after the filing of Munder’s CoC, or until 21 December
2009, within which to file his petition.
The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the
COMELEC Second Division, the COMELEC En Banc did not rule on the propriety
of Sarip’s remedy but focused on the question of whether Munder was a registered
voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court reinstated the COMELEC Second
Division’s resolution. This Court ruled that the ground raised in the petition, lack of
registration as voter in the locality where he was running as a candidate, is
inappropriate for a petition for disqualification. We further declared that with our
ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected the claim that lack of substantive
qualifications of a candidate is a ground for a petition for disqualification under Sec.
68. The only substantive qualification the absence of which is a ground for a petition
under Sec. 68 is the candidate’s permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign
country.
6. WON COMELEC has a legal duty to enforce perpetual special
disqualification
– YES
Even without a petition under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC
is under a legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The
final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification
of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running
forpublic office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The
final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to
other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
WON the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification
to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the PC
the COMELEC is duty bound to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election.” The disqualification of a convict to run for elective
public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent
court, is part of the enforcement and administration of “all the laws” relating to the
conduct of elections.
What is the effect of a void COC –A cancelled CoC void ab initio cannot give rise to
a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
Ergo, since Resp. Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio,
Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
9. TALAGA V. COMELEC
· Ramon Talaga and Philip M. Castillo respectively filed their certificates of candidacy
(CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City for May 10, 2010 elections. Ramon, the
candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD, declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the
office he was seeking to be elected to.
· Castillo filed with COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition
to Deny Due Course to or Cancel CoC of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having
Already Served 3 Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena.
· Ramon countered that Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office
during his second and third term and that 3-term limit did not apply to him as an
involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service.
· In Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections , SC held that preventive suspension,
being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the
3- term limit rule. Ramon filed COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve
taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino.
· COMELEC First Division issued Resolution disqualifying Ramon.
· Ramon filed Verified Motion for Reconsideration on April 19 but he filed Ex-parte
Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration on May 4. On
the same day, Barbara Ruby filed her won COC for Mayor in substitution of Ramon
attaching Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-
CMD.
· COMELEC en banc declared Comelec First Division’s resolution final and executory.
· On election day, name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes were
counted in favor of Barbara Ruby and was credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s
39,615 votes.
· Castillo filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the
suspension of Barbara Ruby's proclamation.
· COMELEC en Banc gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC and CONA included
her in certified list of candidate. CBOC proclaimed her as newly elected mayor.
· Castillo filed Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with COMELEC as Ruby
cannot be considered a candidate as COMELEC en Banc approved her substitution 3
days after election hence votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.
· Roderick Alcala, duly-elected Vice Mayor, sought to intervene alleging that he should
assume the post Mayor as Ruby’s substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly
lost the elections.
· COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s petition-in-
intervention holding that no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon as
candidate for mayor of Lucena City, the counting of the votes of Ramon in favor of Ruby
is proper. The proclamation of Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order.
· Comelec en banc reversed and held that (a) Resolution of 1st division did not attain
finality for being issued without a hearing as a mere incident of the COMELEC's
ministerial duty to receive the COCs of substitute candidates; (b) it was based on the
wrong facts; and (c) Ramon's disqualification was resolved with finality only on May 5,
2010, the COMELEC En Banc concluded that Barbara Ruby could not have properly
substituted Ramon but had simply become an additional candidate who had filed her
COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed to the position
pursuant to Sec. 44 of the LGC.
ISSUES:
1. WON Barbara Ruby’s substitution was valid
2. Who among the contending parties should assume the position
HELD:
 Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any
person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race.
One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no
valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It
should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly
substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much
the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.
 Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he
was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted.
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a
finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material
representation that is false. The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public
office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a
mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is
patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character
of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of
any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is
elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election
laws.
To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the 3-term limit) is enforced both by
the Constitution and statutory law. The objective of imposing the 3-term limit rule was
"to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office."
To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely
precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth
consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing
the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run.
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with
Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to render his
CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELEC’s declaration
of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute.
Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to a
permanent vacancy in the office
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when
the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in
the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after
the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law
governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment
before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted.
Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. On the other hand,
the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position
of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute
due to Ramon’s ineligibility.
A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such
vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the
LGC, to wit:
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
and Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor,
the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor.
10. ABUNDO B. COMELEC
- Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the
2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidateand accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor.
- In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers
initiallyproclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed
the functions of the office of mayor.
- Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually
declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way forhis
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on
June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
- May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When
Abundo filed his CoC for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres
lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, thecorresponding
petition, predicated on the 3-consecutive term limit rule.
ISSUE: WON Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has
consecutively served for 3 terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining
one year and one month of the second term as a result of an election protest
HELD: The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s 3 successive,
continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was
initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to
which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice
of the electorate.
The 3-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Sec. 8,
Article X of the 1987 PC, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected. (Emphasis supplied.) and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of RA No. (RA) 7160,
or the LGC (LGC)
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the PC as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length
of time shall NOT, in determining service for 3 consecutive terms, be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the observation that
the law "does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption
of service that does not affect ‘continuity of service for a full term’ for purposes of the 3-
term limit rule."
As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections, 33 the principle behind the 3-term
limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the PC prohibits is a consecutive
fourth term term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his third
consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term,34albeit he is allowed to
seek a fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have sought his
fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after
his or her third term.
An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately
following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected."
This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to
skirt the 3-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a
voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be
brought about by certain events or causes.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the 3-term limit rule has engendered a host of
disputes resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who were
elected and served for 3 terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by
what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their
opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary interruption is claimed to
result from any of these events or causes: succession or assumption of office by operation
of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an
election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election
- 6since the petition was primarily based on his alleged violation of the 3-term limit rule, the same
should have been filed as a petition to deny due course to or cancel CoC under Rule 23 of
COMELEC Resolution 9523, in relation to Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the ground
cited affected a candidate's eligibility;
contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the
official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.
11. ALBANIA V. COMELEC
- May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections: Resp. Edgardo A. Tallado and Jesus O.
Typoco were both candidates for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte.
- After the counting and canvassing of votes, Typoco was proclaimed as the
winner.
- Tallado questioned Typoco's proclamation by filing with the COMELEC,
a petition for correction of a manifest error.
- The Petition was decided in Tallado's favor on March 5, 2010 and the latter
assumed the position of Governor of Camarines Norte from March 22,
2010 to June 30, 2010, the end of the 2007-2010 term.
- Tallado ran again in the 2010 and 2013 National and Local Elections where he won
and served as Governor of Camarines Norte, respectively.
- On October 16, 201 , Tallado filed his CoC as Governor of Camarines Norte in the
May 9, 2016 National and Local elections.
- On November 13, 2015, Albania, a registered voter of Poblacion Sta. Elena,
Camarines Norte, filed a petition for Resp.'s disqualification from running as
Governor based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 on two grounds:
- He violated the 3 term limit rule under Sec. 43, LGC; and
- Tallado's suspension from office for one year without pay, together with its
accessory penalties, after he was found guilty of oppression and grave abuse
of authority in the Ombudsman's Order dated October 2, 2015.
- Tallado argued that
- On procedural matters6
- On the substantive issues, he denied violating the 3-term limit rule
as he did not fully serve 3 consecutive terms since he only served as
Governor for the 2007 elections from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010.
- On April 22, 2016, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for being
filed out of time.
- It ruled that a violation of the 3-term limit rule and suspension from office
as a result of an administrative case are not grounds for disqualification of
a candidate under the law.
- that based on Sec. 23, the petition should had been filed on November 10, 2015, but the petition
was filed only on November 13, 2015, hence, the same had already prescribed and must be
dismissed.
- His suspension from office is also not a ground for a petition for disqualification.
- Pet. filed a MR with the COMELEC En Banc, which dismissed the same in a
Resolution dated August 24, 2016. The COMELEC En Banc echoed the Division's
findings that the grounds relied upon by Pet. are not proper for a petition for
disqualification but one for denial of due course to or cancellation of Tallado's COC,
which was filed out of time.
- It then continued to rule on the merits finding that Resp. did not serve the full
2007-2010 term as Governor of Camarines Norte, thus, cannot be considered
as one term for purposes of counting the 3-term threshold.
ISSUE: WON Resp. Tallado violated the 3 term limit rule under LGC
HELD: NO.
- The SC held that 2 conditions must concur for the application of the
disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the 3-term limit rule, which
are:
1. That the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms
in the same local government post, and
2. That he has fully served 3 consecutive terms.
- Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections
- As worded, the Constitutional provision fixes the term of a local
elective office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more
than 3 consecutive terms.
- Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time - 3
years - during which an official has title to office and can serve.
- Appari v. CA,
- The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of
time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office.
- According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which
an office may be held.
- Upon expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to
holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso
facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent
method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration
of the terms for which he was elected or appointed.
- Gaminde v. Commission on Audit
- Term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office
as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another.
- In this case, while Resp. ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007
elections, he did not win as such.
- It was only after he filed a petition for correction of manifest error that he was
proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor.
- He assumed the post and served the unexpired term of his opponent from
March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010.
- Consequently, he did not hold the office for the full term of 3 years to
which he was supposedly entitled to.
- Thus, such period of time that Resp. served as Governor did not constitute a
complete and full service of his term. The period when he was out of office
involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his service as Governor.
- As he had not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and had not been elected for 3
consecutive terms as Governor, there was no violation of the 3-term limit rule
when he ran again in the 2016 elections.
12. GOH V. BAYRON
DOCTRINE: Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the conduct
of recall elections in the 2014 GAA, we see no reason why the COMELEC is unable to
perform its Constitutional mandate to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of x x x recall."
FACTS:
1. Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition against Mayor Bayron
due to loss of trust and confidence brought about by "gross violation of
pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross
violation of pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related gross
inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and
emotional immaturity as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City."
2. COMELEC: promulgated Resolution No. 9864 which found the recall
petition sufficient in form and substance, but suspended the funding of any
and all recall elections until the resolution of the funding issue
3. Mayor Bayron filed with the COMELEC an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for Clarification which prayed for the dismissal of the
recall petition for lack of merit
4. Goh opposed with Motion to Lift Suspension which prayed for the
COMELEC's denial of Mayor Bayron's Omnibus Motion, as well as to
direct COMELEC's authorized representative to immediately carry out the
 publication of the recall petition against Mayor Bayron, the verification
process, and the recall election of Mayor Bayron
5. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9882:
a. The power of recall for loss of confidence is exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit to which the local
elective official subject to such recall belongs
b. The exercise of this power is subject to the following limitations
provided for by law: (a) any elective local official may be the
subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for
loss of confidence; and (b) [n]o recall shall take place within one
(1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one
(1) year immediately preceding a regular election
c. The conduct of recall is one of several Constitutional mandates
of the Commission. Unfortunately, it cannot now proceed with
the conduct of recall elections as it does not have an appropriation
or legal authority to commit public funds for the purpose.
ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 9864 is valid insofar as the same directed the suspension
of further action on the instant Recall Petition and WON in the ANNULMENT AND
REVERSAL of Resolution No. 9882, on the ground that in their issuance, the Resp.
Commission committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction
RULING: Yes. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution
Nos. 9864 and 9882.
· The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the
COMELEC to perform its Constitutional mandate of conducting recall
elections
· There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC
to conduct recall elections for 2014
· Despite Resolution No. 9882's statement about the alleged failure of the
2014 GAA to provide for a line item appropriation for the conduct of recall
elections, we hold that the 2014 GAA actually expressly provides for a line
item appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections.
· COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has "a
line item for the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall
votes and plebiscites.'
· This admission of the COMELEC is a correct interpretation of this specific
budgetary appropriation --> To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a
specific amount and a specific purpose but the purpose may be specific
even if it is broken down into different related sub-categories of the same
nature
· Resolution No. 9882 proposed alternative sources for funding recall
elections
· There is no clash between the COMELEC and Congress. We reiterate that
the 2014 GAA provides a line item appropriation for the COMELEC's
conduct of recall elections.
· Since the COMELEC now admits that it does not have sufficient funds
from its current line item appropriation for the "Conduct and supervision
of x x x recall votes xx x" to conduct an actual recall election, then there is
therefore an actual deficiency in its operating funds for the current year.
· The COMELEC, in Resolution No. 9882, admitted the existence of a line
item appropriation for the "Conduct and supervision of x x x recall votes x
x x":
· A careful review of the Commission's budget under the 2014 GAA reveals
that it does not have any appropriation or line item budget (line item) to
serve as a contingency fund for the conduct of recall elections.
· contrary to the COMELEC's assertion, the appropriations for personnel
ser-Vices and maintenance and other operating expenses falling under
"Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and
plebiscites" constitute a line item which can be augmented from the
COMELEC's savings to fund the conduct of recall elections in 2014
· The conduct of recall elections requires only operating expenses, not capital
outlays. The COMELEC's existing personnel in Puerto Princesa are the
same personnel who will evaluate the sufficiency of the recall petitions. and
conduct the recall elections
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
1. SEMA V. COMELEC
1. In 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Sec. 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao.
2. MMA Act 201 provided that the eight municipalities shall be separated from
the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent
province (Shariff Kabunsuan).
3. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its
second legislative district.
4. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not
part of the Province of Maguindanao.
5. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite
6. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under
MMA Act 201.
7. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 dated March 6, 2007
"maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in
the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.”
8. However, in preparation for the May 2007 elections, COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201
9. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, amending Resolution No. 07-0407
by renaming the first legislative district as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”
10. Sema, who was a candidate in the May 2007 elections for Representative of
“Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City,” prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, treating Cotabato City as part of the
legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, and the exclusion from
canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office.
11. Sema claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped
Congress’ power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
12. COMELEC contended that
(1) Sema’s prayer for the writ of prohibition became moot with the
proclamation of Resp. Didagen P. Dilangalen as representative of the
legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
13. Respodent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
Constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff
Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely
renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district.
14. Resp. Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion
Maguindanao’s first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component
unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with
Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum
population requirement under Sec. 5 (3), Article VI of the PC for the creation
of a legislative district within a city.
Issues:
(1) Whether Sec. 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is Constitutional; -
NO
(2) Whether the comelec resolution is Constitutional. - YES
Held:
1. No. Sec. 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Sec. 5 of
Article VI and Sec. 20 of Article X of the PC, as well as Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the PC.
Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities
necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise
under Sec. 5, Article VI of the PC and Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the PC.
Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office
like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of
the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided
in Sec. 20, Article X of the PC.
MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
2. Yes. COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative
district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely
complies with Sec. 5 of Article VI and Sec. 20 of Article X of the PC, as well as Sec. 1 of
the Ordinance appended to the PC.

2. KIDA V. SENATE