Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648

An emotional response to the state of accounting

education: developing accounting students’
emotional intelligence
Ken McPhail∗
Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Glasgow,
65-71 Southpark Avenue, Glasgow G12 8LE, UK

Received 15 December 2002; accepted 30 January 2003

Abstract

This paper attempts to do three things. Firstly, in the light of growing concern over the expanding
managerialism and rationalism within society in general and accounting education in particular, the
paper presents a theoretical reappraisal of the extent to which conventional perspectives on rational-
ism and managerialism might be misconstrued. In particular, the paper address a question that relates
to the role of emotion within business decision making: ‘while we might feel uneasy about basing
accounting and business decisions purely on reason, surely this is more acceptable than basing them
on feelings or emotions?’ Behind this rhetorical question lies the common assumption that emotional
responses to business issues are at best unhelpful. The first section of the paper explores this mis-
conceived notion of the distinction between reason and emotion which, it is argued, has emerged
primarily from the work of Max Weber and presents an alternative perspective on the primacy of
emotion in all rational decision making. Secondly, drawing on Gardner’s work on multiple intelli-
gences, the paper suggests that the conventional misconception of the relationship between emotion
and reason has resulted in the complete failure within accounting education to address the area of
student’s emotional intelligence. Finally, it is contended that despite the spread of managerialism,
accounting education remains a dialectical process and the paper concludes with a report on a spe-
cific attempt to critically resist the managerialist rhetoric through developing accounting student’s
emotional skills.
© 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Education; Emotional intelligence; Accounting

∗ Tel.: +44-141-330-5572.
E-mail address: k.mcphail@accfin.gla.ac.uk (K. McPhail).

1045-2354/$ – see front matter © 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S1045-2354(03)00050-9
630 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648

1. Introduction

Within the critical accounting literature there is growing interest in emotion. The intro-
duction of poetry into some academic journals, aspects of the environmentalist literature
(Hines, 1991), the burgeoning feminist literature, and in particular its critique of Haber-
mas (Broadbent, 1998), along with emotional approaches to accounting and business ethics
(McPhail, 1999, 2001) are just a few examples of where the literature has taken an emotional
turn. It would seem that at least some of this interest in emotion represents a reaction against
the perceived increasing rationalisation in most spheres of public and private life. This paper
attempts to contribute to this literature by critically analysing conventional conceptions of
both reason and emotion. The paper address a question that relates to the position of emo-
tion within business decision making in general: ‘while we might be concerned about the
spread of rationalism, would not it be dangerous to encourage accountants to make decisions
based on feelings or emotions.’ Behind this rhetorical question lies the now common sense
assumption that emotional responses to business issues are distorting and that one should
therefore not allow one’s feelings to cloud one’s judgements. This paper however attempts
to show that this view of emotion, although widely accepted, is nevertheless misconceived.
The paper argues that the conventional dichotomy between reason and emotion cannot be
sustained under close analysis and that contrary to the prevailing view, emotions are central
in all rational decision making processes. The paper draws on this analysis to suggest that a
developed emotional intelligence is crucial for critically engaging with the world. As such
one of the key objectives of the paper is to introduce emotion as a legitimate field of concern
into the critical accounting education literature in the same way that organisational theo-
rists have attempted to introduce emotion as a legitimate aspect of organisational studies
(Ashforth and Kreiner, 2002; Goffman, 1956; Fineman, 1993).
Historically the study of emotion has generally tended to be concerned with its negative
aspects. A classic example of this is, Gustav Le Bon’s ‘The Crowd’ (1895, in Barbalet,
2001). In this work, Le Bon shows the dangerous consequences of allowing emotion to
determine action. The reason why emotion is conventionally construed as both distorting
and dangerous is because of the way in which it is thought to contribute towards irrational
behaviour. While there may be some areas where emotion is sanctioned and perhaps even
encourage, like sport and familial relationships (Heller, 1979), the negative attitude towards
emotion has been particularly strong within the domain of business and even stronger within
the field of accounting. The accountant’s commitment to objectivity and representational
faithfulness would seem to allow little scope for emotion. Indeed, the prevailing view within
the literature has traditionally been that both professional and corporate organisations are
sites of instrumental rationality (Barbalet, 2001; Bolton, 2000; Hanoch, 2002). While the
literature has begun to question this representation (see, for example, Gambling, 1977) as
yet it contains very little analysis of the relationship between reason and emotion within
accounting. There is however a paradox here because at the same time as we might feel
uneasy about condoning or even encouraging individuals to make decisions based on emo-
tions or feelings there is also a certain amount of uneasiness at the increasing spread of
managerialism into domains that previously were considered to be beyond its scope.
This paper critically analyses these conventional conceptions of reason and emotion
within accounting and it is split into three sections. Section one provides an introduction to
 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648 631

emotion and critically analyses the conventional opposition between reason and emotion,
specifically within the accounting and business arena. Section two draws on the emerging
field of Social and Emotional Learning as a way of introducing the notion that there may
be different categories of intelligence. This section also presents some of the characteristics
that might form the bases of an emotional intelligence. The final section of the paper reports
on an accounting and business ethics course that attempted to develop accounting student’s
emotional competencies.

2. The confused dichotomy between reason and emotion

This section critically analyses the conventional distinction between reason and emotion.
It is primarily concerned with the generic term emotion rather than specific emotions like
shame or fear.
The analysis that follows is based on a specific view of emotion. Firstly, the paper dis-
tinguishes emotions (such as fear) from moods (for example, boredom) and emotional
disorders (such as depression) (Hanoch, 2002b). Secondly, it is assumed that emotions can
be classified as either positive or negative depending on specific circumstances (Hanoch,
2002b). Thirdly, it is presumed that emotions are, in the main, structurally determined.
However, the paper also assumes that emotion operates in a dialectical way. Sometimes
certain social structures or circumstances will engender specific emotions while on other
occasions certain emotions may be identified as contributing towards certain social circum-
stances (Fox and Spector, 2002). Finally, the paper assumes that that there is often a certain
amount of conscious human agency involved in being emotional (Gabriel, 1995; Thompson
and Ackroyd, 1995). Sometimes individuals will manage to control their emotions while at
other times their behaviour will be directly influenced by their emotions (Barbalet, 2001;
Bolton, 2000; Hochschild, 1979).
It may also be helpful to clarify the sense in which the term rationality is employed
within the paper. Although the paper is primarily concerned with practical or instrumental
rationality, in the sense of relating specifically to how an individual determines how they
should act, some of the arguments could be extended to the arena of theoretical rationality,
or the domain of one’s beliefs.
Based on these assumptions, this section explores three different perspectives on the
relationship between reason and emotion. Firstly, from the conventional view that emotion
and reason are antithetical. Secondly, from the position that emotion might be seen to support
reason and finally from the perspective that to reason is actually to experience a certain kind
of emotion.

2.1. Emotion and reason as antithetical

Although emotion played a significant role in Bentham’s original conceptualisation of

utility; and Smith’s ruminations on the Market (1984) economists have traditionally ignored
this aspect of their works and instead focused on the cognitive characteristics of economic
decision making (Hanoch, 2002). Much of the traditional organisational literature has simi-
larly viewed capitalist entities from a rational-cognitive perspective (Ashkanasy et al., 2002;
632 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648

Hanoch, 2002; Simon, 1976). This perspective implies firstly that emotion and reason are
two distinct modalities (Bolton, 2000; Hanoch, 2002) and secondly that emotion is diamet-
rically opposed to reason. Finally, this position views emotion as inferior to reason. Emotion
is conventionally construed as something that is inappropriate and perhaps even dangerous
within an economic context because of the way it is assumed to contribute towards irrational
behaviour (Hanoch, 2002b). This is the view that prevails within accounting and business
education and practice.
Historically both the distinction between reason and emotion and the view that emotions
are to be suppressed, can be attributed in a large extent to the work of Max Weber (Barbalet,
2001). In fact some have contended that Weber has contributed significantly to the prevail-
ing, ‘sociology without emotion.’ Aligned to this absolute distinction between reason and
emotion is Weber’s contention regarding the increased rationalisation and the associated
spread of managerialism. According to Weber, the pervasiveness of reason can be attributed
to and continues to support rational, bureaucratic organisation (Barbalet, 2001). It is also
quite evident from Weber’s work that not only does he see the role of emotion declining
in developed bureaucratic systems but that he sees this demise as essentially a good thing.
He views emotion as a potential hindrance to social and economic development. Barbalet
(2001) encapsulates this view when he says, ‘Weber suggests that emotions are sponta-
neous and impulsive forces which distract a person from their purposes. The implication
is that emotion will create disorder in human affairs whereas rationality will bring order
to an individual’s behaviour.’ Perhaps surprisingly Rousseau (in Barbalet, 2001) seems to
reflect a similar attitude when he says that, ‘the passage from the state of nature to civil
society produces a very remarkable change in man . . . he is forced to consult his reason
before listening to his inclinations.’ More recently, the exploration within the accounting
literature of Habermas’ attempts to salvage a role for reason in an increasingly irrational,
postmodern world, perhaps indicates an affinity with Rousseau’s sentiments (see Laughlin,
1987).
The traditional view of the distinction between reason and emotion seems to be the
prevailing perspective within much of the critical accounting literature (Broadbent, 1998;
McPhail, 1999). As a consequence little critical attention has been paid to the relationship
between emotion, social structures, and the exercise of power. However, of greater concern
here is the fact that this dichotomy and negative representation of emotion has contributed
towards the exclusion of any consideration of emotion from the praxis of critical accounting
education.
This conventional view of the relationship between reason and emotion has however been
challenged within the organisational studies (Etzioni, 1988; Hochschild, 1983); economic
psychology (Hanoch, 2002) and leadership literatures (Bolton, 2000; Peters and Austin,
1985). Hochschild’s (1983) seminal work on the role of emotion within organisations, and
in particular her concept of emotional labour, represents a challenge to the conventional
dichotomy between reason and emotion. Hochschild contended that an increasing propor-
tion of the labour requirement, particularly within service industries comes in the form
of emotion labour, that is the requirement to produce certain emotions as well as expand-
ing physical and mental energy in ones job (Bolton, 2000; Fineman, 1993; Hochschild,
1983; Zapf, 2002). Hanoch (2002, see also Kaufman, 1999) has also introduced an emo-
tional dimension into Simons (1947, 1955) concept of bounded rationality. The following
 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648 633

perspective explored in this section draws on these literatures to present an alternative view
of the relationship between reason and emotion.

2.2. Emotion as the facilitator of reason

The developments within the organisational studies and decision theory literatures chal-
lenge some of the main assumptions underlying the prevailing conception of the relationship
between reason and emotion. This literature suggests that the role of emotion within con-
temporary capitalist organisations does not come at the expense of rationality, but rather
operates in its service. It is not that emotion is diametrically opposed to reason but rather
emotion and reason are seen to be interconnected (Ashkanasy et al., 2002; Bolton, 2000;
Damasio, 1994; Hanoch, 2002). Hochschild’s (1983) work in particular would suggest that
far from being antithetical, emotional labour is an increasingly important production factor
in the service industries.
Developments within the economic psychology literature however suggest an even more
elemental and interconnected relationship between reason and emotion. While the emerging
organisational literature would still view both modalities as being distinct, new decision
making theory suggests that emotion enables reason to function (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Damasio,
1994; Elster, 1999; Hanoch, 2002; Picard, 1997). It is suggested that emotion helps reason
to function in three different ways. Firstly, emotion can be seen to help individuals establish
which problems they should solve and in which order they should address them. Secondly,
according to De Sousa (1990), emotion helps an individual identify the elements that reason
must take into account when a decision is being made. And finally, at a more fundamental
level, emotion can be seen to help establish appropriate goals for reason to work towards
(Hume, 1740). Simon (1983), for example, contends that ‘reason cannot select our final
goals, nor can it mediate for us in conflicts over what final gaol to pursue—we have to settle
these issues in some other way.’
Hanoch’s (2002a; see also Isen and Means, 1983) work, which is supported by clinical
psychology,1 suggests that without the help of our emotions it would be impossible to
make any decisions at all. Hanoch’s (2002) study of the relationship between emotion and
bounded rationality suggests that emotion works with reason in two distinct ways. Firstly,
our emotions help us to restrict the range of possibilities to be evaluated. And secondly
they focus our attention on particular aspects of the information that should be taken into
account when decisions are being made. Hanoch (2002a, see also Etzioni, 1988) suggests
that emotion plays a significant role in assigning levels of importance to specific variables
that might be incorporated into our decision making. Much of this emerging research has
endeavoured to challenge the traditional conception that emotions have a disrupting and
distorting impact on reason. Hanoch (2002a) summarises his argument as follows,
emotions function as an information processing mechanism with their own internal logic
working in conjunction with rational calculation. By restricting the range of options
considered (reducing the load on short and long term memory), by focusing on certain

1 Damasio (1994) for example found that individuals who had suffered damage to their frontal lobes were

incapable of making decisions even though they had not lost their ability to reason.
634 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648

variables (certain stimuli receive higher ranking order), and by initiating and terminating
the evaluation process (working as a satisfying mechanism), emotions supplement the
insufficiencies of reason.2
Barbalet (2001) drawing on Kemper’s (1991) argument that, ‘structural relations of cir-
cumstances [are] sufficient to elicit particular emotions,’ concludes that it is emotion that
bridges the lacuna between social structure and social action.
From this perspective, it seems inevitable that both accounting students and practitioners
will routinely use emotions when they are engaged in making accounting and business
decisions. However, there can be little doubt that accounting education in general provides
students with little help in using or engaging with these emotions, in exploring how they
are employed, which factors they privilege or the social, political and ethical consequences
of employing particular emotions within particular decision making situations.

2.3. Emotion as the basis of reason

There is however a third and more radical perspective on the relationship between reason
and emotion. This view assumes that reason, more than simply being facilitated by emotion
can actually be viewed as a particular kind of emotional state itself.
In his (1897) exposition of the ‘Sentiment of Rationality,’ James contends that within
its everyday context, practical rationality is predominately recognised as a feeling of ratio-
nality (Barbalet, 2001). Barbalet (2001) suggests that James initially defined this feeling in
negative terms as ‘the absence of any feeling of irrationality.’ James (1897) elaborates that
it is a, ‘feeling of the sufficiency of the moment of its absoluteness—the absence of all need
to explain it, account for it or justify it.’ Others have termed this feeling an, ‘emotion of
security,’ (Rivera, 1977, in Barbalet, 2001). Barbalet (2001) contends that within an every-
day context this security is predicated primarily upon the relationship between an action or
event and its consequence. Barbalet (2001) explains that James, ‘locates the sentiment of
rationality in the affective or emotional displacement of uncertainty concerning the future.’
Langer (1989), March (1971, in Hanoch, 2002) and Schumpeter (1934), although they seem
to take a similar position to James all suggest that it is intuition, rather than feelings of se-
curity that play an important role in decision making. Indeed they suggest that it should be
given a more positive role in decision making. Schumpeter (1934), for example, contends
that, ‘everything depends on intuition, the capacity for seeing things in a way that proves
to be true even though it cannot be established at the moment.’
From this more radical perspective all accounting and business problems could be con-
strued as being resolved based on arriving at a particular emotional state. However, while
accounting education generally provides students with help in exploring the analytical and
perhaps even critical elements of business decision making it fails to develop the kind of
emotional competencies that would enable students to engage in a more emotional way with
these problems. Yet, while James’ perspective is helpful for contributing to our understand-
ing of some aspects of practical rationality, there is a danger that the conflation of reason
and emotion could be taken too far. There is scope in accounting education for both the

2 This does not of course mean that every decision has an emotional element.
 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648 635

rational exploration of the emotional side of practical rationality within accounting practice
as well as emotionally exploring the emotion of this rationality.
From this third perspective it becomes quite clear that the exclusion of emotion from
accounting education and business decision-making is quite literally impossible. What this
third perspective also means off course is that the spread of managerialism within accounting
academia should not be construed only in terms of a Weberian expansion of rationality but
also as the spread of a particular kind of emotion. An emotional commitment that is based
to some extent on social structures yet also contributes to them.
The artificial distinction between reason and emotion has tended to deflect attention away
from the study of the role of emotion in the function of societies. The conventional view may
also have contributed towards misconceptions about the predominance of rationality and the
potential for emotion within critical theory. The view of some critical theorists (Adorno, for
example) that emotion or art or irrationalism might be something that is opposite to reason
is perhaps also seen to be misplaced. (Simmel, 1971, in Barbalet, 2001), for example,
contends that the predominance of the emotion of rationality is linked to the structure and
rhythms of the market economy. The feeling of rationality progressively displacing other
emotions as a motivating force for action. The implications of an emotional approach to
both reason and to accounting education may be particularly relevant given the growing
interest in Habermas’s rational ideal speech situation and empathy models of ethics like
John Rawls’ ‘original position.’ If reason is based on emotion then what does it mean for
the possibility of an ideal speech situation ever existing, at least in the terms described by
Habermas. Also, alternatively, if we are to take empathy ethics at all seriously then do they
need to be proceduralised? One way of doing this might be through the kind of social and
emotional learning described below. This paper contends that there is a critical role for
emotion in critical theory and particularly critical accounting education and the following
section elaborates on this contention.

3. Social and emotional learning

The conventional dichotomy between reason and emotion and particularly the negative
connotations of emotion within the field of accounting and business has resulted in very
little consideration of emotion either as a subject for investigation or as an educational goal.
This situation prevails not only because emotion is perceived in such negative terms but also
because our concepts of educational maturation, at least within accounting, remain fixated
upon cognitive development (Kohlberg, 1969, 1972) and analytical skills (Bloom, 1956).
The idea that other domains of intelligence exist and that we may want to try to develop
them within an accounting degree are rarely if ever discussed (although see McPhail, 2001,
1999).3
Building on the re-theorisation of the relationship between reason and emotion outlined
above, this section draws on an emerging literature on social and emotional learning (SEL)
(Cohen, 1999) to argue firstly that emotional intelligence is a discrete category of intelli-
gence that can be educated in the same way as rational or analytical intelligence (Goleman,

3 I should emphasise that I am, of course not talking about transferable skills.
636 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648

1995) and secondly, that the development of specifiable emotional competencies can and
should be incorporated into accounting and business education. While much of the work on
emotional intelligence has been depoliticised through the management development litera-
ture (Goleman, 1995; Peters and Austin, 1985), this section is based on the premise that the
concept could have more radical potential when incorporated into the critical accounting
literature.
While at one level all education is social and emotional in character (McIntosh and Style,
1999), SEL is particularly concerned with the process through which specific kinds of
competencies are developed. While there is a growing body of literature on SEL (Cohen,
1999), the field of enquiry into emotional intelligence is still embryonic. As yet there is no
generally accepted definition of the concept or agreement as to what the term incorporates
(Ashkanasy et al., 2002; Davis et al., 1998). However, Ashkanasy et al. (2002, see also
Mayer and Salovey, 1993, 1995, 1997) do provide a reasonable working definition. They
contend that emotional intelligence is the, ‘ability to read emotions in one’s self and in
others, and to be able to use this information to guide decision-making.’ Bass (1998) terms
the first aspect, emotional self awareness.
Theoretically, SEL begins with Gardener’s (1983) work on multiple forms of intelligence.
Gardner contended that the emotional sphere was just as legitimate an educational domain
as any other. This argument commences with a fairly widely accepted definition of intelli-
gence as the ability to ascertain conceptual relationships between cognitive objects within
a particular domain and between cognitive objects and the domain as a whole (Mayer et al.,
2001). It is also generally accepted that this ability is facilitated by an, ‘input function,’
and psychologists commonly differentiate between various kinds of intelligence based on
these inputs. For example, verbal intelligence is distinguished by linguistic inputs. From
this basis, it is contended that there is a sufficiently discrete set of learned relationships
and set of inputs (feelings) to warrant the discussion of a separate domain of emotional
intelligence (Mayer et al., 2001). Developing Gardner’s work, Cohen (1999) explains that
while it is helpful to separate these domains for discussion and analysis, in practice they
are inter-connected. He says, ‘when I have a (mathematics or linguistic) problem, how do
I feel and how do I draw on these feelings to go about solving the problem?’
Since Gardner, SEL theorists have been investigating the kinds of emotional competencies
that might be construed as being characteristics of an emotional intelligence. While there
is considerable debate as to the nature and range of these competencies, there appears to be
some consensus that they are based in the emotional awareness both of the individual’s self
and of others (Cohen, 1999). In particular, they are viewed as being related to the individual’s
ability to recognise their own feelings and appreciate the feelings of others (Cohen, 1999).
Anna Freud explains this capacity as follows, ‘just as the children’s ability to recognise
phonemes is the basic building block of reading letters and words, I believe that being
able to recognise their own experience—self-reflective ability- and the ability to recognise
others experiences are the basic building blocks of social and emotional competencies.’
Social and emotional intelligence is thus seen to provide the bases for regulating the social
and emotional spheres of the individuals life, and solving social and emotional problems
(Cohen, 1999).
Some researchers have restricted emotional intelligence to specific skills like perception,
understanding and emotional management (Ashkanasy et al., 2000; Mayer and Salovey,
 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648 637

Fig. 1.

1995). Others, however, interpret the concept more broadly as incorporating empathy, de-
cision making and collegiality (Goleman, 1995). Developing work by the Northeast Foun-
dation for Children, Elliot (1997) identifies five key emotional competencies: co-operation,
assertion, responsibility, empathy and self control. These are similar to Goleman’s (1995)
five, ‘core facets of emotional literacy’: self awareness; the ability to handle emotions;
self motivation; empathetic capacities and social skills. Although each taxonomy differs in
composition, empathy appears to be a key competence that appears in most lists. However,
many aspects of these initial attempts to struggle with the meaning of emotional intelligence
miss the critical potential of the concept. McIntosh and Style (1999) begin to address this
potential when they suggest that a key element in SEL is the exploration of the power rela-
tions that influence the way these competencies emerge and operate within different social
and economic contexts. In short, they contend that SEL involves exploring the political
nature of the emotions.
Proponents of SEL argue that social and emotional learning requires the same status cur-
rently given to mathematics and English. Indeed one of the key areas where a consensus has
emerged is that whatever the skills and competencies that constitute emotional intelligence,
they can be accessed, explored and engendered through education4 (Ashkanasy et al., 2000).
However, at present the literature appears to contain a broad mixture of different types of
emotional intelligence and it is unclear whether and how these different forms of intelli-
gence may fit into some broader structure of emotional development. Fig. 1 represents an
attempt to clarify what might be involved in the various stages of emotional development.

4 I am of course using the term education here to refer to the whole democratic, liberal tradition of education.

This is important, as some forms of emotional education and labour are undoubtedly exploitative (Conger, 1990;
Hochschild, 1983; Weierter, 1997; Zapf, 2002). SEL in no way involves manipulating the emotions or emotional
week points of others.
638 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648

The most eliminatory stage of emotional intelligence may involve emotional awareness.
This initial stage involves the ability to identify that one is feeling a particular emotion: for
example that I am happy or ashamed; resentful or in love. This first stage may also include
and involve the ability to recognise (in the sence of naming) the emotions of others. To
appreciate that your mother or father is angry, or sad. This initial stage probably relates quite
specifically to cognitive capabilities. The second stage relates to the ability to identify which
emotions are appropriate for specific situations. There is probably a strong socio-cultural
element to this level of learned behaviour. The literature on emotional labour highlights that
the display of specific emotions in particular circumstances is often a required part of one’s
job (Hochschild, 1983). This may also be experienced as part of a professional identity. As a
service industry, the accountant has to be civil to clients yet at the same time one would also
imagine that certain emotions are also expected inside their own organisations. It would
seem probable that professional education contributes towards the development of these
emotional expectations (Rafaeli and Sutton, 1987; Zapf, 2002). However, this emotional
labour represents a relatively low level of intelligence in terms of social and emotional
learning. The third stage: Emotional empathy involves the ability to enter into the feelings of
others. This primary competence is a stage beyond identifying an individuals emotional state
and selecting the appropriate response. The literature suggests that imagination could play
a significant role in progressing individuals towards higher levels of emotional intelligence
(Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, see also Earl, 1983, 1984; Hanoch, 2002a). The final stage: emotionality
relates to a more basic emotional self awareness that is used consciously to guide decision
making and may be thought of in terms of Schumpeter’s notion of intuition. Of course,
it would also be possible to envisage this domain of intelligence coalescing with other
domains of intelligence.
This section has attempted to introduce emotional intelligence as a discrete category of
intelligence that can be educated in the same way as verbal or rational intelligence (Cohen,
1999; Goleman, 1995). It has also attempted to identify what social and emotional compe-
tencies might look like and how they could be conceived in terms of levels of development.
However, one question remains to be addressed: what would social and emotional education
look like within the context of an accounting degree. This question will be addressed in the
final section of the paper.

4. Developing an emotional approach to accounting education

Section one presented an interpretation of reason and emotion which although not new
is, I would contend, new to accounting. Section two started to explore some of the im-
plications of this interpretation for accounting. If emotion does play a significant role in
social structures and if it plays a fundamental role in all decisions, whether accounting
or other wise, then perhaps it deserves more attention than it has been afforded to date
in the critical and accounting literature. Section two has attempted to develop a legiti-
mate case for emotional intelligence and has outlined specific emotional competencies that
SEL would conventionally try to promote. This final section of the paper presents an ex-
ample of an attempt to proceduralise SEL within accounting. In particular, this section
delineates an accounting and business ethics course developed at the University of Glasgow
 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648 639

Fig. 2.

specifically designed to engage students with accounting and business ethics at an emotional
level.
The course Accounting and Business Ethics was developed at the University of Glasgow
two years ago. It is an optional module and can be taken by students on any accounting
degree program in the third or fourth year of study. The aims of the course were to develop
students’ ethical awareness; their emotional skills and their abilities to identify, engage
with and analyse ethical issues (see McPhail, 2001, 2002). The course was based on the
premise that a large part of the process of identifying and grappling with ethical issues
is based on what Petersen (1998) calls ‘Tacit Ethics,’ a concept similar to Schumpeter’s
(1934) ‘intuition’ (see also Langer, 1989; March, 1971, in Hanoch, 2002a). Petersen defines
tacit ethics as unarticulable feelings and emotions that often act as semiconscious guides in
ethical decision making (see Fig. 2).
At the core of SEL is the belief that emotional development is related to the capacity
of an individual to learn from their emotional and social experiences (Cohen, 1999). The
literature also suggests that imagination could play a significant role in this learning pro-
cess (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, see also Earl, 1983, 1984; Hanoch, 2002a). This section discusses
three events that were organised as part of the Accounting and Business Ethics course and
which were designed to provide students with emotionally disruptive and engaging expe-
riences. The first event was a case study of the thalidomide drug which was conducted
by Simone Baker, herself severely affected by the drug. The second was a case study of
the Maxwell pension fraud. This seminar was conducted by Ivy Needham, a 77-year-old
Yorkshire woman who was the leading activist in the pensioners campaign for the reinstate-
ment of their pension funds. The final event was a trip to Barlinnie prison in Glasgow. This
section describes these three events in some detail and discusses the student’s responses
to them.
640 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648

5. Thalidomide

The first event was a case study of the thalidomide drug.

It is estimated that approximately 10,000 babies across the world were affected by the
thalidomide drug. However, this figure, although shocking, in itself does not include their
parents and families or the many children who died shortly after birth. In Germany, for
example, where the drug was first marketed, thalidomide resulted in the births of 6000
severely malformed children. Only 2000 survived.5 The children who did survive suffer
from a variety of reduction deficiencies in the limbs, malformations of the eyes, ears,
deafness, defects of the heart and kidneys and malformations of the alimentary system.
However, despite the sever physical affects of the drug there were very few instances of
thalidomide children with learning disabilities.
Thalidomide was routinely prescribed to women in the first three months of pregnancy
primarily to help with morning sickness and sleeplessness. It was marketed as a completely
safe drug and indeed advertisements boasted that it was virtually impossible to take an
overdose. Following reports of an epidemic of births of malformed babies in Germany,
Chemie Grunenthal vociferously denied they could be related to Thalidomide and indeed
continued to do so for many years. However, the company eventually reluctantly withdrew
the drug in November 1961. Even then a government warning was not issued until the
following year and the drug continued to be sold in Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Italy and
Japan for several months.
In May 1968, a criminal lawsuit was initiated against seven individuals from Chemie
Grunenthal. The case was based on two charges. Firstly, the men were accused of marketing
a drug that caused an unacceptable degree of bodily harm without having tested it properly,
and secondly, they were accused of suppressing and failing to react on information regarding
side effects of the drug. However the company reached an out of court settlement two and
a half years after the case commenced. Chemie Grunenthal agreed to pay DM100 million
to the children with malformations that could be attributed to Thalidomide.
In the UK, the drug was sold under the brand name “Distaval” by Distillers (Biochemi-
cals)6 Ltd. between April 1958 and December 1961. In 1973, the Thalidomide Trust was
set up to administer compensation paid by Distillers to thalidomide children. The drug is
still produced and is currently being used in the treatment of AIDS.
The object of studying the thalidomide case was to challenge student’s emotional sensi-
tivities and encourage them to reflect on the feelings of the individuals involved in the case.
In order to facilitate these objectives Simone Baker from the UK Thalidomide Society was
invited to conduct the seminar. Simone is herself severely affected by Thalidomide. She is
married and a few years ago gave birth to a health baby girl. Simone presented the case
from her perspective as someone who was directly affected by the case. An extract from
her notes is re-produced in full here to give some idea of the way she presented the issue
and challenged the students.

5 Lack of limbs and therefore of skin area resulted in extreme sensitivity to high temperatures and some deaths.

Other deaths were due to severe internal injuries.

6 Distillers were taken over by Guinness PLC who in turn merged with Grand Metropolitan to become Diageo

PLC.
 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648 641

After two and a half years of tests, drugs, investigative operations and various exami-
nations, my ultimate desire—becoming a mother—was realised on November 5th 1996.
Bonding with my baby commenced from the moment I gazed at my first scan picture taken
eight weeks after conception. I knew that the birth of my baby would be very different to
my own arrival in September 1962. Thalidomide was in the headlines and many expectant
mothers were filled with dread. Despite my mother’s urgent pleas to see her newborn
baby, I was whisked away immediately whilst the doctors tried to decide how to break
the devastating news to her. Something was not quite right with the baby. Over 24 hours
later she finally had the opportunity to unwrap the blanket and study me. She touched
the tiny malformed arms, shortened to elbow length, the three fingers on flipper hands
and the legs shortened at the femur, and said a silent prayer. “Please God, if this child is
going to suffer any pain, then please take her now before I grow to love her any more”.

Thirty-four years later, I presented her with her first grandchild, Lois.

Of course, even those who knew me well enquired as to how I would manage. The
prospect was not at all daunting. I had coped with everything else life had put my way,
including finding employment, passing a driving test and living independently. As with
so many other areas of my life, I tried to plan ahead of the baby’s arrival for things I
believed I might have difficulty with. These included the design and construction of an
enormous bean bag cushion which I could place around my waist whilst seated on the
floor. This provided a safe and comfortable raised surface from which to feed the baby.
This cushion was well worth the valuable space it took up within the house, providing a
means of cuddling her to me, and a safe sleeping environment for her during naps.

I probably experienced fewer problems than many other able-bodied first time mothers.
People had enquired before Lois’ arrival what I wanted. My response would be “A good
baby who sleeps a lot”, and this wish appears to have been granted. I never cease to be
overwhelmed at how my child continues to adapt to me. At six months she would cling
to me like a limpet if I carried her. At twenty months, she could confidently climb up
and down the stairs. She climbs up and down from her highchair, straps herself into her
pushchair and she climbs into her car seat. She seems to have inherited my strong will
and independence.

Apart from family support, I receive no help with caring for my baby. Lois goes to a child
minder for one and a half days a week whilst I work. I pay privately for a home help to
assist me with the household chores, leaving me more time to enjoy my baby. The days
are harder and longer since Lois was born. I would not want them any other way. Feeling
her squeeze my shoulders when I first lift her out of her cot in the morning provides me
with all the energy I need to deal with the hard day ahead.

6. The maxwell pension fraud

The second attempt to engage student’s emotional capabilities relates to a case study of
the Maxwell pension fraud.
642 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648

The case was presented by Ivy Needham, a 77-year-old pensioner from Leeds who was
the leading campaigner for the Maxwell pensioners.
During the 1960s Robert Maxwell built up Pergamon Press into a major academic and
scientific publishing house. He was awarded the Queens Award for Industry for his achieve-
ments. However, following the failed acquisition of Pergamon by Steinberg’s Leasco, a DTI
investigation concluded:
We regret having to conclude that notwithstanding Mr Maxwell’s acknowledged abilities
and energy, he is not in our opinion a person who can be relied on to exercise proper
stewardship of a public quoted company.
Yet despite the DTI’s recommendation Maxwell regained control of Pergamon Press and
built an elaborate network of communications companies, including publicly listed com-
panies like Mirror Group Newspapers, which was used principally for creative accounting.
However, this network began to unravel as the economy declined. The creative accounting
system could not cope with increased interest rates and rising debt. The scam threatened
to be revealed when Maxwell failed to deliver security against a loan involving The Swiss
Bank Corporation, First Tokyo Bank, and Lehman Bros. Faced with the possibility of being
discovered he looted the MGN pension fund. He died in 1991 after apparently falling from
his luxury yacht and was given a quasi-state funeral. Shortly afterward, accountants reported
that £770 million was missing from his companies and that £430 million was missing from
the pension fund (Punch, 1996).
In an attempt to engage student’s emotional sensibilities and encourage them to reflect
on the feelings of the individuals involved in the case, Ivy Needham was invited to convene
the seminar on the Maxwell pension fraud. Ivy was canteen manageress of the Printing firm
Petty’s which was owned by MGN. She was recovering from a car accident which had left
her almost blind when she discovered that the Mirror Group would be unable to pay her
pension. She had lost her husband earlier that year. However a few days after receiving the
news Ivy began campaigning on behalf of the 32,000 pensioners nation wide who had lost
their pensions. During her campaigning she chained herself to railings outside the prime
ministers residence, stormed the Conservative party conference and attacked John Major,
the then prime minister with her white stick. She was invited to speak at Westminster and
flew to Brussels to speak to the European High Commission. As a result of her campaigning
she managed to secure a pension for all 32,000 pensioner and she was also able to convince
the EC to change the law in relation to pension fund management. She has since been made
a Member of the British Empire.

6.1. Bar-L

The final example relates to a visit to Barlinnie prison in Glasgow (McPhail, 2002).
Barlinnie is one of Scotland’s most notorious prisons. Recently, Christine Grahame MSP
slighted the prison saying that inmates were experiencing prisoner of war type conditions.
Barlinnie first became a ‘place of legal detention’ in 1882 and most of the halls have not
changed much since then. Every individual who has either been convicted and given a
custodial sentence or who is held on remand pending trial in the Glasgow area will spend
some time in Bar-L. Prisoners are generally held two to a cell, although this number does
 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648 643

fluctuate. At present the prison is designed to accommodate around 900 inmates although
it is consistently over crowded. Apart from the under-21 remand hall, there is no sanitation
in the cells and prisoners have to ‘slop out’ using a bucket.
Because of the risks involved the visit to Barlinnie was optional. However, only five
students chose not to attend. Group visits were restricted to 14 individuals so the students
were split into three groups and the visits took place on three consecutive days in week 7
of the 10-week course (this description is taken from McPhail, 2002).
The visit was arranged by Clive Bell, Health and Saftey co-ordinator at Barlinnie prison.
Clive, who is a veteran of 23 years prison service, was able to bring the visit to life. At
the beginning of each visit he introduced the students to the prison and went through some
preliminary safety procedures including for example what to do if someone shouts “LOCK
UP!” and what to do if anyone were to be taken hostage by a prisoner! Clive also explained
the legal processes and court system in Scotland.
The visit was primarily intended to simulate what would happen if one of the students
committed a business crime in Glasgow. Some students volunteered to role play convicted
criminals and the group was taken through what would happen to them from the moment
the prison van arrived at the prison gates.
Initially the students were taken to the admissions block. One of the wardens, dressed
in a white coat, explained the admissions process and a number of students were locked
in “dog boxes”: small 3 ft. square holding cells. There were some real inmates in other
dog boxes (one student latter commented that the sight of faces peering through the small
windows in the doors was both primitive and disturbing). Some students were also given
the psychological test that new arrivals receive in order to assess if they are suicidal. The
students were then taken to the strip and shower area. One student volunteered to stand in
the small cubicle with half swing doors while another warden stood on an elevated platform
beside the cubicle and explained that all personal belongings would be taken from the
prisoner, recorded and stored. The students were shown the boiler suits prisoners initially
wear and the colour coded prison uniforms. The students were then taken to another set of
dog boxes where the prisoners are held until they are escorted to the remand hall.
Before the students left the reception block Clive explained that well-behaved prisoners
are generally given jobs in order to get them out of their cells. Some of these pass men
help in the admissions unit and it transpired that one of them was an accountant doing 18
months for fraud. Unfortunately, he did not want to talk to the students. The students did
however speak freely with the prison wardens and the officers explained how they can spot
first timers straight away and also how they can tell the re-offenders from the men they will
not see again. The wardens suggested that the accountant would not be back.
From the admissions unit the students were taken to remand hall A. The students remained
quite close together as they walked half way along the ground floor of the huge Victorian
hall. Some of the prisoners called to the students but the atmosphere was not threatening.
The students were shown into one of the cells. The cell was approximately 6 ft × 10 ft.
There was one window high on the back wall, a bunk bed and narrow shelf. There was
pornography on the yellow walls and an unpleasant smell from the chamber pot in the
corner of the room. The students crowed in and were left alone with one of the men to ask
questions. Most were shocked that two men had to live in such a small area. The inmate
told the students the worst thing about life inside was having to squat at the chantry in front
644 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648

Fig. 3. .

of your cell mate. Some students noticed a picture of a young boy: the man’s son. After the
students had finished asking questions Clive locked two of the students in the cell, but only
for a few minutes.
On the way out of the remand hall the students were shown the suicide watch cells
(see Fig. 3). One miserable, skinny man had just been escorted from one of the cells and
Clive asked the warden if it would be OK to show us the cell. The man’s darkness was still
palpable in the cell. There was a foul smell and a mattress. That was all. Clive explained that
in the really bad cases the mattress is taken away because the men asphyxiate themselves
by tearing off strips of material and swallowing them.
As we were leaving some inmates whispered that we had only seen the nice cells. They
told us to ask to see a particular cell. It was in a part of the Hall where the beasts are kept.
The beasts are remand prisoners awaiting trial for sex offences. They are kept separate for
their own protection.
After A Hall the students were taken to Letham Hall: the sex offenders and high de-
pendency unit. As we arrived most of the inmates were being escorted off for their af-
ternoon activities and duties. The students did not get the opportunity to talk to prison-
ers but they did meet some of the officers who work in the sex offenders unit: two men
and a woman. As they discussed the nature of the crimes they have to deal with the stu-
dents were able to link sex offences to business ethics. One warden commented that the
problem with the men they have to work with is that most of them treat other individ-
uals as objects and cannot see that they have done anything wrong. The students were
told that role-play techniques are commonly used to try and redress this problem. One
inmate takes the role of the victim and the other plays the role of the perpetrator, then
they swap. We were able to relate this to the problem of objectification within accounting
and business and how treating individuals as objects and categories like wages and ex-
penses perhaps makes it easier for some individuals to treat other individuals in an unethical
manner.
In total, each group of students spent approximately 5 hours at Barlinnie and they gen-
erally left physically and emotionally exhausted.
 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648 645

7. Discussion

Students were encourage to reflect on and explore their emotional responses to each of the
three experiences in small tutorial groups and also during a weekend retreat at a University
field station in the Loch Lomond National Park.
It certainly seems that the events had an emotional impact on the students. Responding
to the prison visit one student said,
Fantastic, extremely interesting visit, learnt a lot about the justice system and the con-
sequences of acting unjustly. Severity of prison living circumstances should make you
think before you act but for some it has become a way of life. It made me realise that
prisoners are humans the same as you or I and thus have feelings and should not be treated
in a derogatory manner.
Another student commented,
Very powerful. Made me question a number of beliefs I held as well as the implications
of unethical actions. Kept thinking about it for days afterwards!
And one student said,
Increased awareness of both the possible consequences of decisions I may be asked to
make and also what would happen if I committed fraud. An experience that will always
stay with me.
Responding to Ivy’s seminar one student said,
it was great! Ivy is a real inspiration! It’s grand at last to get a course that is lively, and
allows us to develop ideas not memorise everyone else’s! A forum like this is no doubt
what a lot of potential accountants need!
Also, commenting on Simone’s seminar, one student said,
I didn’t realise the seriousness of the case until then.
Another student said,
I was surprised by her optimism and the fact that she wouldn’t have changed the life she
has. I was really impressed by her lack of bitterness.
And one student really caught the objective of the session when she said,
It’s one of these issues that you don’t really appreciate until you hear someone who has
experienced it themselves.
Another female student said,
I was very touched by her talk, I feel a closer proximity to the issue
Like the field of Social and Emotional Learning in general, the course represents at best
a tentative attempt to proceduralise ill-defined concepts with a view of helping students
progress towards some uncertain goal. However, the responses from the students do seem
to indicate that the experiences did engender a certain imaginative access into the feelings
646 K. McPhail / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 15 (2004) 629–648

and emotions of other individuals (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Earl, 1983, 1984; Hanoch, 2002a). It
is impossible to determine whether these events will have any impact on the student’s emo-
tional capacities, however, what does seem more certain is that while emotional intelligence
remains magrinalised within accounting education, their impact will probably be short lived.

8. Conclusion

This paper has critically analysed conventional conceptions of reason and emotion. By
doing so it has attempted to show that the prevailing view within accounting that emotion
is an inadequate and untrustworthy basis for making business decisions, may actually be
misplaced. Section one in particular suggested that the dichotomy between reason and
emotion is less than obvious. From a critical perspective, emotion can be seen as a key
facilitator in our decision making processes and from an even more radical perspective it is
possible to conceptualise reason as a particular kind of emotion. The implication to be taken
from this argument is that if emotion does play a significant role in social structures and if
it is an unavoidable part of decision making then surely it deserves more attention than it
has been given to date in the critical accounting education literature and practice. Section
two attempted to develop a legitimate case for emotional intelligence and outlined some
specific emotional competencies that this form of education might endeavour to develop. It
would also seem to follow logically that just as accounting decisions could be based on bad
or ill-developed reasoning, so decisions could be and are taken based on an ill-developed
emotional intelligence. Thus while the paper concludes by suggesting that accountants
should be encouraged to take decisions based on their feelings (because they inevitably do
anyway), it also argues that in order to do this critically, accountants need to have a more
developed level of emotional intelligence. The concluding section of the paper presented
three attempts to proceduralise social and emotional learning within accounting education.
However, there is a need for more research into the role of emotion within accounting and
particularly how accounting education could be used to increase students critical emotional
awareness.

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to the participants at the 2002 Critical Perspectives on Accounting con-
ference in New York and particularly to Jesse Dillard for his helpful review.

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